


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We
and the
World



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WE AND THE WORLD

a symposium on the changes in
the international situation
and how they affect us

symposium participants

THE PROBLEM

Posed by **Romesh Thapar**, Editor

REINVIGORATED NON-ALIGNMENT

Arthur Lall, former member of the
Indian Foreign Service, now Professor
of International Relations, Columbia
University, New York

TIME FOR REVIEW

Harish C. Kapur, teaches at the Graduate
Institute of International Studies in Geneva

A NEW STYLE

Vidya Prakash Dutt, Professor and Head of the
department of East Asia Studies at the
Indian School of International Studies

NATIONAL SECURITY

J. D. Sethi, Reader in Economics, University
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FINDING OUR FRIENDS

Girija K. Mookerjee, visiting professor in the
department of European studies at the Indian School
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BREAKING NEW GROUND

K. P. Karunakaran, commentator on foreign affairs,
now teaching at Rajasthan University

BOOKS

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A select and relevant bibliography
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COMMUNICATION

From **A. K. Ray**, Delhi

COVER

Designed by **T. A. Balakrishnan**

positions taken by Jawaharlal Nehru in the enunciation of India's foreign policy, for such positions could also have been 'instant' in their formulation. My contention is that right up to the rupture with China, India had a viable structure of foreign policy. Developments in China, however, put this structure under terrible strain. Today, no structure exists and nobody seems to be making the effort to forge it.

To blame Prime Minister Lal Bahadur for his limited knowledge of foreign affairs, and then to despair over the rather inconsequential handling of policy by his Foreign Minister, Swaran Singh, is to run away from the hard home-work which must be done before we can evolve a frame-work, or structure, within which our foreign policy can be spelt out in depth and in perspective. Jawaharlal Nehru did not evolve his attitudes to international developments through a series of 'hunches'. He applied his mind to the harsh realities of a cold war situation and thrashed out an approach which would serve the national interest of India. Let us recall this effort, briefly, for it holds many lessons for us today.

When India emerged as a free entity, what were the dominant characteristics of the international situation? A terrible war had ended. Another was threatened by the 'arrival' as it were, of the nuclear age. Two powers—the USA and the USSR—were in dangerous confrontation. The USA was the stronger. Untouched by the ravages of war, with an industry geared to armament production, it also possessed what appeared then to be the weapon to destroy all weapons. The atom bombs which shattered Hiroshima and Nagasaki marked the ascendancy of the USA even as India gathered her strength to face the problems of freedom.

India's nationalists, long nourished on the humanistic, liberal thought of the West and the egalitarian, anti-imperialist ideology of the socialist/communist movement, saw a world divided sharply into the two blocs. They were naturally reluctant to commit either way, for commitment would sharpen the existing polarisation, increase the chances of war and gravely damage the possibility of the developed world aiding the under-developed which constituted two-thirds of mankind. Neutralist postures were sought. These were later to be embodied in the philosophy of non-alignment.

In that embryonic phase, the political differences on neutral policy, between Jawaharlal Nehru and Vallabhbhai Patel, the fact that Patel did not want to do anything which would offend what he considered the all-powerful West, and the pressure of the business community which saw its own growth in an alliance with the West, did have the effect of making India's

The problem

WE have devised, it is said, an 'instant' foreign policy, like instant coffee or instant tea or instant milk. This may well be true of the goings-on in our Foreign Office since Pakistan's dream of defeating India was rudely disturbed, or what has been going on since the clash with China in 1962, but the description does not fit the state of affairs which prevailed during the first decade or so of freedom.

I say this not because so many of us were active in supporting the neutral or non-aligned

early foreign policy positions unprincipled and ambivalent. However, in the course of battling for a neutral position in international affairs, Nehru discovered, as it were, how such a position was in our national interest.

Starting with an assessment of the geographical position of India and its size, the fact that it could not be ignored for long by either of the power blocs, that we would have common frontiers with the communist world, that a democratic society would always have to embody the elements of a mixed economy—whether of private and public sector or of public sector and cooperative sector—rooted in a socialist base, that India's many communities and culture patterns, some advanced and some backward, would necessitate a system of balanced economic planning, Nehru could turn on his critics and ask them what policy other than a neutral or non-aligned one truly reflected the national interest. The internal compulsions dictated the external posture. The external posture assisted the transformation of internal realities in the direction of a planned polity which would seek a democratic, secular and egalitarian structure.

The structure of foreign policy evolved in such a manner as to permit India to present her democratic, secular front to the West and her socially-purposeful, egalitarian front to the communist world. This performance was dismissed by the active proponents of the cold war as thoroughly opportunist, designed to play off one bloc against the other in order to 'squeeze economic aid for development. To an extent, this was true—only, we of Asia and Africa who had been bled white to provide the surplus for the industrialisation of Europe saw it as the skilfully enforced payment of an old debt.

With the passing in 1951 of Patel, and the resulting flexibility which Nehru was able to exercise to implement his foreign policy, it gradually came to be accepted that he had forged an immensely powerful weapon for the emerging independent nations of Asia and Africa. Non-alignment came to be regarded as the yardstick of a new nation's independence in international affairs. This assessment of non-alignment took place soon after the Bandung Conference in 1955 and was powerfully expressed by the newly independent nations in their attempt to constitute a decisive Afro-Asian lobby in the United Nations. These were proud days for India. She was a powerful inspiration for the non-aligned. She had a carefully worked out structure of a foreign policy linked to national interest and was able coherently to work within it.

One of the strategic aims of the non-aligned nations was to arrange a *detente* between the

two hostile blocs. This could only be achieved through a *detente* between the bloc leaders—the USA and the USSR. What the non-aligned failed to grasp, however, was that within the blocs were powerful groups opposed to the *detente*. The debate which was joined within the communist world on the question of peaceful coexistence and whether wars were inevitable, a debate which was to bring the USSR and China into an ideological confrontation, had its almost exact parallel in the western bloc where brinkmanship had found powerful and entrenched supporters.

The grim logic of the nuclear age, and the wider recognition of the consequences of a nuclear clash, intensified the demand for a *detente* but, at the same time, excited the sectarians in both blocs to resist this trend for peace as a betrayal of principles. However, isolated groups swelled to movements to demand an end to the cold war, an end to brinkmanship. These movements found their demands voiced by the governments of supposedly committed nations. And so, too, with the sectarians in both the blocs. If France under de Gaulle called for a new path, there was Albania to denounce those who would respond to such overtures in the communist world. If Goldwater challenged the right of the USA to indulge in parleys with the communist world, there was Mao Tse-tung to denounce Khrushchov for his 'surrenderist' tactics *vis-a-vis* the USA.

These complex developments, sparked to some extent by an awareness of the implication of a nuclear collision and certainly encouraged by the clash of national interests within the fast disintegrating blocs, were only superficially understood by the policy-makers of the non-aligned world. The qualitative changes taking place under the impact of nuclear pressures and the desire to break the monopoly of power enjoyed by the two genuinely nuclear powers—the USA and the USSR—were not grasped. Even the study of these changes was neglected. Such studies would have helped to sharpen and deepen non-aligned attitudes to the sectarians in both the blocs who were attempting to prevent the *detente*. But this was not to be.

India, prominent in the leadership of the non-aligned and bordering a major sectarian challenge to the USSR, was to feel the ugly manifestation of these changes. I do not intend going over the familiar course of the India-China clash along the northern border, but it is significant that we continued to place confidence in the Soviet Union's capacity to discipline an adventurist China even after the Chinese army had infiltrated beyond Aksai Chin and even the Karakoram range. It is significant, too, that we refused to accept the possibility of a major armed clash between India and China. Only

the sectarians in the West, and within our country, who were already committed to a war against communism in general, called for mobilisation against the menace of China. Their argumentation had little effect because it was supported essentially by false facts. There was no such thing as a general communist menace. China was acting traditionally, as a nationalist power. This was lost upon everyone.

There was method in the madness of the Maoists. First, the Soviet Union was assailed for giving aid to wretched bourgeois governments. It was argued that this aid only cushioned the crisis of the so-called non-aligned, whereas it could make all the difference to China under dedicated socialist leadership. Forgotten was the desire of the Soviet leadership to mobilise the non-aligned in support of vital dialogues on the subject of the *detente*, for the non-aligned were considered faltering, nervous allies. Then came the territorial claims on neighbours. Shrill propaganda attacks were followed by settlements, some quite generous from Peking's narrow point of view.

But, there was a deliberate refusal to clear the way for a settlement with India. A planned refusal to 'expose' India's non-alignment, to force her into the arms of the West and to create consternation among the non-aligned. The gambit almost succeeded. Had Nehru's government fallen under the pressure of agitations in New Delhi, and had the military commitment been made to the West in the face of an expected invasion through NEFA, Mao Tse-tung would have claimed this as another victory of his 'all-conquering thought'.

Sanity prevailed. But ever since those fateful months in 1962, no one really applied his mind to the re forging of a new structure for India's foreign policy. The diplomatic repercussions resulting from the war with Pakistan have brought this fact into focus again. Many of the earlier postulates of our foreign policy remain valid. But those which have been negated make it necessary to review the past and the present, to probe the future afresh, and to evolve a plan of action which will serve our national interest in the complicated international situation which is now unfolding. The pressure to do this is bound to mount, what with Pakistan pledged to play ally to China within the sub-continent—a distressing development, but one which could have been forecast.

When we view the world today, what do we see? The great exponents of the *detente*—Nehru, Khrushchov and Kennedy—no longer hold the stage. In their place have emerged Johnson, a man with many delusions, the dull bureaucrat-administrators, Kósygin and Brezhnev, and the still cynically ambitious Mao Tse-tung. Nasser and Tito, worried by internal economic crises, are unable to sustain a powerful intervention.

A de Gaulle finds himself speaking the kind of sense which the non-aligned world should have long ago grasped, moulded and directed. In this dangerous vacuum, the US devotees of brinkmanship are again pushing for brutal, limited wars—as in Vietnam—in the hope that their computer calculations will prove correct and that there will be no uncontrollable escalation. The Soviet Union is awkwardly embarrassed by developments which seem to make a mockery of the plea for co-existence. Mao Tse-tung is pleased. The minor camp followers on either side are making joyful noises, for there are temporary political and economic advantages to be seized in a confused situation.

We have to forge a foreign policy structure against this background. To begin with we must decide what we consider to be the major and continuing threats to India's national interest and how these are to be met.

A. The militantly chauvinist leadership of China, projecting a foreign policy which is essentially traditional, and exploiting her new alliance with a Pakistan that is likely to remain for some time psychopathically hostile to India, is really not interested in territorial aggrandisement. It, in fact, aims through a series of carefully timed moves to splinter the unity of federal India. The atomisation of the cohesion of the sub-continent would leave China as the dominant power in Asia, able as a single-nation State to resist similar erosion. Then, the writ of Peking would not be challenged. The 1962 thrust in NEFA, it now transpires, had some such objective. New moves are likely, in alliance with Pakistan, to perpetuate the military confrontation along India's northern, western and eastern borders. The infiltration in Kashmir, and its aftermath, is only a phase. Indonesia may also be encouraged to attempt a challenge from the sea, particularly in the area of the Nicobars.

Such confrontations are expected to spark economic and political crises which will place a heavy strain on the foundations of a federal State which has of necessity to be democratic, particularly where so many communities, culture patterns and levels of development are involved. We must mobilise manpower and resources, and a self-sustaining character, to break the back of this conspiracy without killing our society in the process. A mammoth job.

B. South-East Asia's stability is also threatened by the assertive Chinese presence. The operation on this front is complex, the armed formations of the West are directly involved, including the nuclear power of the USA. The western intervention in this region offers Peking the opportunity to muffle the desire of what might be described as the Indo-Chinese people and the Malay people for bigger federal groupings, groupings which would be more viable

and able to resist pressures from interested big powers, particularly neighbours like China.

The western nations create the bogey of communist expansionism to justify their intervention, forgetting that this is in China's interest. Prolonged civil wars, involving the western nations on the side of the doomed anti-communists, as in the Vietnam or Malay regions create the conditions for keeping South-East Asia as a region of small States which can easily be subverted. The ghastly failure to recognise, as de Gaulle has done, that China can only be insulated by bigger neutral States—or even bigger independent communist States!—feeds China's traditional ambition to dominate the entire region of South-East Asia, for then resistance to her *diktat* in South Asia would be splintered. We cannot afford to watch and wait.

C. The western obsession with preserving a major base in South Asia presents another challenge to India's interest. Pakistan's position geo-politically in relation to India and Afghanistan, her involvement in the strategic region of Kashmir and her contiguity to Burma, are facts which have been seized upon by the USA to justify the massive military and economic support given to the regime which now rules from Rawalpindi. Bases, fully equipped with the latest electronic devices for espionage against communist territories, exist in Pakistan—as also far mounting air assaults. These bases will never be abandoned—at least, not until bases in space have taken over the functions. Naturally, for an uncommitted India to expect that in a tangle with Pakistan it will receive equal or unprejudiced treatment at the hands of the West is patently absurd. Pakistan is a trusted ally of the West, even though she may flirt with China or cock a snook at the USA. Our confrontation with Pakistan is in fact a confrontation with the West. We must see it as such—at least, until the situation in Pakistan undergoes major changes.

D. The non-aligned nations, who played so crucial a role in preventing the total polarisation of the world into warring camps, are now in a state of disarray because they are unable to formulate a role for themselves in the changed situation today when the desire for a *detente* is eroding the unity of the blocs and encouraging independent trends. The non-aligned are unable to locate the points at which to intervene, and confused transition is sought to be exploited by the sectarians of both the disintegrating camps to sow discord and to paralyse any future intervention by the non-aligned. The calls for broad gatherings of Asian and African nations, when the non-aligned themselves are confused, only make confusion worse confounded.

We are entering a phase when the non-aligned should be evolving collective sanctions against the sectarians in both the disintegrating blocs, for such sanctions would speed the *detente*, but

the fear of group action is deeply embedded and inhibits the formulation of the only role that can be relevant in today's conditions. To put it crudely, the non-aligned must club together, surrender some of their individualisms and idiosyncracies, to win a world where peace is secure and where the possibility of bringing the yawning gaps between the rich and poor nations is beyond debate. The leadership must be mobilised to crystallise this trend. And this is our job.

E. Even as national interests come into play within the disintegrating blocs and among the non-aligned, a sinister attempt is being made to attack the whole concept of collective action. The arguments used by the non-aligned against the concept of blocs are now dressed up to urge the non-aligned to break away from group action. The fact that they act for peace and for repairing the damaged communications between nations is conveniently forgotten. The extent to which this operation has succeeded can be seen in the failure of the non-aligned and the Afro-Asians to prevent the United Nations from being made impotent. The sectarians in both the blocs seek to paralyse and then dissolve the United Nations because they are fearful that the institution might become a powerful weapon in the hands of the non-aligned nations and the Afro-Asians. The crisis is better appreciated if it is realised that the United Nations itself at various sensitive points is in the hands of men who would wreck it. It is a salvage operation which demands clarity, boldness and courage.

F. The growing failure internationally at the political level is matched by the failure at the economic level. The gap between the rich and the poor nations is wider today than at the end of the anti-fascist war. The cost of manufactured articles from advanced countries outstrips the price being paid by these advanced countries for the raw materials and semi-finished goods from the less advanced two-thirds of the world. This development can prove explosive, unless the non-aligned lead Asia and Africa to curb this hidden exploitation. In this respect, the exploited have not even begun to set up an organisation for researching the facts of their present-day deprivation. So skilful is the operation that one underdeveloped nation is set against another to preserve the pattern of unequal trading. Indeed, even the much-publicised aid policies of individual advanced powers are now being viewed as a part of this pattern. If the old ideological polarisation is made to approximate to the polarisation of rich and poor nations—as the Maoists would wish—mankind would again enter the abyss of nuclear self-destruction. We must call a halt to this exploitation, economic and political.

G. The supporters of an independent nuclear capability, the seekers after big power status

and spheres of influence, those who imagine that only nuclear strength can ensure independent thought and action, are in fact unconsciously opening the way to new authoritarian and chauvinist trends. These trends alone can sanction a nuclear programme in an underdeveloped country. The fact remains that in the absence of guaranteed atom free zones, the nuclear bomb makers are growing in numbers like the weapons they seek to proliferate, and particularly in underdeveloped societies which can ill-afford these weapons of economic destruction and political brigandage.

The shame of it is that we have failed to silence by logical argument the ambitious atomic scientists and political freebooters in this country who seek to open the doors to this highly inflammable speculation. These elements have to be curbed, brought under the discipline of political supervision or else we may find ourselves betraying our national interest in international disarmament and economic development merely because some short-cut specialists imagine that the possession of a nuclear device will give us a foreign policy!

H. And there is, of course, the internal health of our nation which can never be treated as something apart from the formulation of a foreign policy—or even the designing of its structure. Only a people who tax their own energy and skill to the maximum can resist the pressures from abroad which seek to modify or subvert an independent foreign policy. Then, and only then, does foreign aid and foreign collaboration come on terms which are not damaging to national interests. This is a lesson with which we are familiar, but very often we are persuaded to ignore its meaning. We have to anchor ourselves firmly to moorings which cannot be disrupted by interested lobbies of unprincipled businessmen and politicians.

I have attempted a broad survey of the past and the present. The detailing of some of the major challenges is necessary because it is within the context of these challenges that we have to build our system of alliances and, thereby, strengthen our inspirational role among the non-aligned. As we apply the tests we will probably find that it is only in close collaboration with the Soviet Union that our major national interests are served. We have no conflicts between us, no outstanding problems to solve. Indeed, it is also fortuitous that the Soviet Union and Japan are beginning to see themselves as partners in the future.

The India-Soviet Union-Japan triangle could well provide the answer to many complex problems, both at home and abroad. *From this 'base' we could move more effectively to achieve the international objectives which I have enumerated earlier.* A whole new field of research

and study should be opened, even though there are few at the moment who perceive the possibilities of an understanding between India and the Soviet Union, and through the Soviet Union with Japan—understandings based upon mutual benefit and with profound implications for the world at large.

Take the facts as they are. The Soviet Union, anxious to free the newly-emerged nations of Asia and Africa from their dependence on the former colonial powers, and facing the additional challenge of a sectarian China which sees itself as the overlord in Asia, does not have the economic surplus to compete internationally. Japan, with her industries dependent on foreign raw materials purchased largely by earnings from exports to the European and American markets and worried that they might create barriers to her export trade, seeks more stable outlets. The Soviet Union, although industrially advanced, provides such an outlet for manufactured consumer goods. It can also offer raw materials in untapped Siberia. And there is the pronounced interest in capital goods, too, for in this way, using the potential of Japan through equal trade, the USSR can increase her own surplus for aiding the underdeveloped nations of Asia and Africa. Japan would rather depend on a stable market in the Soviet Union than on politically unreliable regions in Asia and Africa. She does not have the desire or the capacity to play the role which the Soviet Union must in order to survive, but she does wish to restore her Asian relevance, to end her dependence on the West.

China, within easy reach, does not offer the opportunities to Japan that the Soviet Union can, for her people will not be ready to absorb consumer goods for many decades. Consolidating her trading alliance with Japan, the USSR would set out further to strengthen her ties with those forces which cement the independence of Asia and Africa. India would be the first to benefit from these developments. Step by step, each of the challenges which face us would be met with greater confidence and wider support.

Clearly, the facts must be researched in all directions. This is not the purpose of the present article. Suffice it to say that despite the absence of a coherent foreign policy at the moment, we are, under the impact of events, adhering more or less to the broad principles of non-alignment laid down by Jawaharlal Nehru. This is fortunate. We will certainly move forward as the outlines of the new international situation emerge from the confusions of today, for a failure to do this would bring our independence into question and render us helpless in our struggle to break the bonds of poverty and suffering which stifle the creativity of our people.

ROMESH THAPAR

Re-invigorated non-alignment

ARTHUR LALL

INDIA bore the brunt of the early displeasure with what is now a major international posture—non-alignment. We survived international animadversion for three reasons. Firstly, we had the advantage of size and consequent

interest even for our detractors. Secondly, we emerged as of some significance in world affairs by virtue of the dogged application of the twin strategy of refusing to join in ideological stridency or the calls on either side of the cold war

for hard policies—which meant that at times one or other of the super powers appreciated our restraint; and at the same time we offered limited solutions or pointed the way to avenues of alleviation of worrying situations.

Thirdly, Nehruvian non-alignment became the starting point of an important world posture. By 1961 it was able to bring together 25 countries at the Belgrade Conference, and in 1964 at the Cairo Conference as many as 47 participating countries were present together with ten sympathetic observer States. Most of the re-emerging countries find non-alignment to be in their best interest, and the very extent and growing persuasiveness of this finding has virtually compelled the cold war leaders to treat with the 'third world' both politically and, what is of more practical importance, economically.

The Two Failures

But success can arrest analysis and development. In the case of the Nehruvian framework it had this effect in two vital respects. First, the essential elements for a viable system of national security were not assembled. The European neutrals base their posture on what is for their size formidable military preparedness, as in the cases of Sweden and Switzerland, or on international treaty guarantees as in the case in Austria. India fell between two stools: it neither built adequate military strength nor sought guarantees. The analysis, or rather the hope that non-alignment virtually insulated us from attack, proved to be faulty.

The second bemusement was an internal reflection of our 'successful' non-alignment. Our mixed economy has developed a bumper crop of bureaucratic tramelling weeds. Besides, our remedial measures have never been forthright against an array of anti-social activities, and we have not fully perceived the difference between the mere transplanting of certain industrial plants to India—and

this too with the most important components of the finished product not within the productive competence of those plants—on the one hand, and the genuine development of full scale indigenous industry on the other. It is inexcusable folly that after almost twenty years of regained independence we still do not manufacture all the components of an automotive industry—relevant to the building of tractors, earth moving equipment, tanks and automobiles. It is much more serious that this one illustration can be repeated almost endlessly, and that as a consequence we have not advanced technologically to the degree that should accompany the present range of products on which we display the legend, 'made in India.' Let us remember that the meek transplanting of industry was a stage which Japan virtually moved out of at about the turn of the century. For the most part our industrial plans are being implemented not by men who are industrially or socially welfare minded but by financiers who think in terms of quick profits, or by bureaucrats whose philosophy naturally tends to favour one minute step forward at a time.

The fact that our leaders have not been fully aware of the implications of either of these two handicaps which we have created for ourselves, has profoundly affected our foreign policy. If it had not been for military weakness—of which the government was basically unaware, amazing though this blindness was—our moves and statements in 1961 and 1962 would not have contributed so logically and inevitably to the Chinese military adventure of 1962. Equally, the economic muddle which we have generated at home has dire and continuing consequences in the field of foreign relations which are so obvious that exemplification is unnecessary.

Changed Situation

I do not think we can fairly blame the present government for the grave handicaps which weigh us down in the field of foreign affairs. For one thing the govern-

ment is adhering fairly closely to a policy of non-alignment. If in the implementation of this policy it lacks the vigour of the best days of Nehru this is largely because of the sharp diminution of our power and prestige consequent upon the unfavourable military events of 1962. Secondly, the development of polycentrism in both of the cold war camps has complicated the world to which non-alignment addresses itself.

This is specially so for India because a trusted and significant ally of one side, a country which happens at the same time to be our closest neighbour, has found that with the blurring of the lines of the cold war it is possible for it to become virtually an ally of two opposing world powers—indeed, of just those that are now increasingly poised for conflict. This posture of Pakistan's has, as well it might, seemed incredible to us. But we must accept the possibility of Pakistan becoming further entrenched in this posture. Indeed, if the relationship between China and the United States worsens, both of them will be all the more interested in the allegiance of our neighbour; and until we can improve our relations with Pakistan it will feel that it needs the succour of both these great powers with which it is currently involved; and for good measure it will also strive to improve its standing with the U.S.S.R.

Favourable Factors

I have delineated what is in many respects an unpromising context for the development of India's foreign policy. But there are also some favourable factors in the situation. First, under the stress of circumstance, we appear to have decided that our non-alignment should be backed by an adequate defence posture. It could be argued that India would have contributed more effectively to its own well being, as well as to the peace of the world, if it had at the appropriate time chosen quite another course: that of promoting an international treaty whereby the great powers and

other States would have guaranteed the territorial integrity and the independence of India.

We could have done this in the early 50s and at that time probably the only significant country to remain a non-signatory would have been Pakistan. Even if China had also refused, we would at any rate have had the adherence of the USA, the USSR, the UK, France and many other countries. In that context we could have embarked on a unique and valuable internal and international experiment. I mention this alternative to the one which we have presently decided on because, though it is not now feasible except in a considerably modified form, circumstances could again rise in which such a course would merit serious consideration.

However, for the present we have adopted the course of a strong defense posture. What is equally necessary is that we should now re-invigorate our foreign relations and practical attitudes toward other countries, and particularly our neighbours.

The Big Powers

Let us take first our relations with some of our large neighbours. Our relations with the USSR are good, those with China are bad. But do we realise that unless we follow a vigorous policy our relations with the USSR might not remain good? Do we realise that, as in human relations, there must be a constant nurturing of international relations? It is common knowledge that the Soviets do certain tangible things for us politically and economically. Do we do enough in return? Of course, our resources are much more limited than theirs. But I suggest that we must recover one of the important aspects of the Nehruvian mood in our relations with the great powers. Nehru frequently spoke of his desire to cooperate with them. Why should we not do so in a practical way, within our capacities? For example, if the USSR could make use of assured port facilities in the Indian ocean (of course, for peaceful purposes) why should we not

offer them such facilities at say Dwarka or at an East coast port?

The USA, though geographically not as close a neighbour as the USSR, is nevertheless a State in our vicinage today because the world has shrunk. The USA too has had a favourable tangible impact on our economic situation. We too must translate our relations with it into tangible terms. It probably does not need port facilities on our coasts, but if it does a parallel offer should be made by India. There are other peaceful ventures of mutual advantage which we could pursue with the US and the Soviet Union jointly or separately. We should make it a point to sound Washington and Moscow about such possibilities. India is a country which because of many reasons should bring a peaceful reciprocity into its relations with other States, particularly with the great powers.

Pakistan

Obviously our relations with our two remaining significant neighbours—China and Pakistan—present much more intractable problems. But in geopolitical terms it does not make good sense to live in enmity with most of our big neighbours. True, we have tried hard, almost to the point of exasperation. But particularly in regard to Pakistan another effort is called for because the destinies of that country and India are inevitably connected. Even if Pakistan refuses to do so, we for our part must show her and other countries that we realise that there must be a certain primacy in our relations with Pakistan.

In the cis-Karakoram and cis-Himalayan area, which is a fifth of the world, this is essential. If either Pakistan or India makes its primary relations with powers outside the area to the detriment of either country there is bound to be strife on the subcontinent. With hindsight we can say that Pakistan's policy of making her primary relations with the USA and then with China, and directing those relations into wide military channels, was bound to lead to war

with India. But it should now be clear to Pakistan that two can play this game and that if she insists on playing it in the long run she will suffer much more than will India.

Equally, this result which is not far to see should be discerned by other countries which wittingly or unwittingly come between the primacy of relations which must naturally exist between India and Pakistan. If the great powers desire peace on the subcontinent, then they must encourage India and Pakistan to come together on reasonable terms. It is clear that to strengthen the smaller of these States (Pakistan) for defence against communist aggression merely gives Pakistan arms with which she tries to settle scores with India. Therefore, except under arrangements which have been agreed with India the arming of Pakistan is not to be resorted to unless those who do so do not mind provoking war on the subcontinent.

But, per contra, we must be able and willing to see that a policy of arming India cannot but be considered in Pakistan as a threat to that country's security. It follows that India's armament too must be within agreed levels.

How are the various strands of a new relationship between India and Pakistan to be achieved? It is not a simple matter and to expect a simple reply is unrealistic. Nor can one say with any assurance that only one satisfactory answer can be given. But any satisfactory answer must re-establish cooperation on the subcontinent. I would suggest the following outlines of a possible new arrangement between India and Pakistan.

Our Initiative

India, the larger country, should take the initiative. She should propose to Pakistan that the two countries enter into a formal treaty, which would be registered with the United Nations as provided in Article 102 of the Charter, to establish the respect of either country for the independence of the other. The two countries should also bind themselves in the treaty

to enter into a relationship of co-operation to be spelled out in a separate agreement, and they should further bind themselves to restrict their armaments within agreed limits. Attached to the Indo-Pakistan treaty should be a protocol to which other States would adhere. Under the protocol, the signatory States would bind themselves to respect the terms of the Indo-Pakistan treaty, and to guarantee the independence and freedom from aggression of both from any source (including aggression by one partner to the treaty on the other partner).

An arrangement in these terms, both by the arms control agreement it envisages and the great power guarantee—which will in effect be part of the international treaty—will give both India and Pakistan, and notably the latter, a full guarantee against any aggression. It is assumed, and this is a reasonable assumption, that both the USA and the Soviet Union would be among the powers which would adhere to the protocol attached to the proposed treaty.

Mutual Cooperation

The suggested separate agreement regarding Indo-Pakistan co-operation should provide for the establishment of an inter-governmental consultative committee consisting of the relevant cabinet ministers of the two governments, including those of foreign affairs, commerce, defence, communications, atomic energy, and power and irrigation. Other ministers could be included as necessary. The inter-governmental committee should meet monthly, alternately at Rawalpindi and Delhi. The chairmanship of the committee should alternate between the Presidents of India and Pakistan, and for the first year the chairman should be President Ayub Khan.

The arms control agreement will naturally take into account India's greater size and population, but it will not stress needs of defense against outside attack because the independence and freedom from aggression of both India and Pak-

istan will have been guaranteed by the great powers, including the US and the Soviet Union. In short, neither India nor Pakistan will need a large army. The arms control agreement should contain provisions for mutual plus international inspection under the United Nations. This means that inspection of Pakistan will be by teams which will include Indian personnel and inspection of India will be by teams which will include Pakistanis.

Common Concern

In the context of these arrangements which will progress in the direction of common customs, a common market, consultations on defence, improved communications—of particular significance to Pakistan—the joint development of atomic energy for peaceful purposes and consultations on matters of foreign policy of common concern, the questions at issue between India and Pakistan will take on a new perspective, and solutions or mutual tolerances will be very much easier to find.

Space does not permit of a detailed treatment of India's relations with our smaller neighbours and with other countries. But the same approach of taking useful initiative should apply. Also, there must be no smell of a big power attitude on the part of India. Why, for example, to take a matter of detail, was the Indian representative not present the other day at the Kathmandu airport when the Foreign Minister of Nepal returned to the capital from the recent meetings at Algiers? The newspaper reports said that the others at the airport included the representative of Pakistan. If indeed India was not represented this absence was a blunder and it cannot be explained away in any satisfactory manner for the simple reason that the effect of absence cannot be undone. With the smaller countries, more than even with the greater powers, our approaches should search out those avenues which will promote co-operation. If we seek our own best interests, which assuredly we do, there can be no better way of going about achieving them.

Time for review

HARISH C. KAPUR

LIKE many big nations, who have undergone a long period of revolutionary experience, independent India joined the comity of nations with a firm determination to play an important role in international affairs. For an internationalist like Jawaharlal Nehru, it was inconceivable for a country such as ours to be preoccupied solely with internal problems—howsoever important they might be. In more ways than one the fate of India, in his view, was closely linked with the outside world—a world sharply divided into two rigid blocs irrationally leaping from one dangerous crisis to another.

So, with the vision of a teacher and the deep intuitive insight of a statesman, he thoughtfully spoke about the world, the difficulties it faced, and the problems it had. On

many occasions he stressed the useful role India could play 'in helping to avoid war',¹ underlined the 'special responsibility' that was cast on the nation,² and emphasized the importance of India on the Asian continent.

Undoubtedly, all this was very instructive; for it generated among the Indian intellectuals a great interest in world affairs, and aroused in the nation as a whole a vague consciousness of the existence of the world beyond the frontiers of India. But Nehru did not merely confine himself to the vital task of performing an educative function in foreign affairs. He did more. He launched the country into the mainstream of world poli-

1. Jawaharlal Nehru's Speeches, Vol. 1. P. 249.

2. Ibid, P. 256.

tics. Diplomatic relations were established with the independent countries of the world. Support was extended to those nations which were still struggling for their national independence. Great effort was expended on the important task of bringing peace to areas where explosive situations had led to actual conflicts. And, what is most significant, a concept of non-alignment was put forward which proved inter-continentially contagious, culminating in the creation of an effective non-aligned force in international affairs.

All this was very significant; for within a few years after independence, India gained considerable importance in the outside world, usefully performing revolutionary as well as peaceful functions in many areas. For the Indonesian nationalists struggling for their national independence, India mobilized world opinion against the Dutch colonialists. During the Korean war she acted as a mediator to bring the belligerent nations together. At the 1954 Geneva Conference on Vietnam, the Indian delegation used its good offices to create the proper atmosphere which finally led to the signing of an agreement on Vietnam. Many of us living outside of India felt a great sense of pride at the amazing manner in which the Nehru Government had created an impressive impact on the outside world.

No Practical Touch

But while the Indian decision makers were participating effectively in the resolution of many delicate problems of other countries, while they were inculcating an internationalist outlook in the nation, they were, strangely enough, showing a disquieting inability to solve or even face squarely some of their own foreign policy problems. Was it because a frame of mind had been developed which tended to respond favourably to the problems of others than their own? Was it because the problems of others appeared to be more explosive, more dangerous to world peace, than our own? Or was it that while developing a world out-

look, India failed to acquire the practical touch so necessary to face one's own problems? Whatever may have been the reasons, it was obvious for anyone to see that issues and problems were arising everywhere near India, and the Indian leadership showed a striking incapacity to solve or effectively face them.

Pakistan and China

With Pakistan our relations continued to worsen. Almost all the controversial issues remained unsolved. And within a few years after independence, we witnessed the sliding of our unfriendly neighbour into the western camp from where she obtained important sophisticated weapons that were eventually directed against us in September 1965. The Kashmir issue—principal bone of contention between us and Pakistan—has become so hopelessly internationalized that one really wonders whether we can successfully hold out from having political negotiations with Pakistan despite our continuous claim that Kashmir is an integral part of India.

Already in 1962, after the Sino-Indian conflict, we were, under U.S. pressure, forced to sit with Pakistan to discuss Kashmir. Will this not happen again—especially when one takes into account the inescapable fact that we are greatly and continuously dependent on Washington for some of the food that the nation consumes.

Communist China forcefully moved into Tibet, thereby destroying the buffer area that had for decades given us a certain sense of security against any danger from the North. Instead of analyzing soberly the dangerous consequences of such a development, we found ourselves publicly involved in one of the most useless discussions since independence—the difference between Chinese suzerainty and sovereignty over Tibet. Once Communist China had successfully established a grip over Tibet, the border dispute was inevitable. For it is a known fact that the Nationalist Government had not accepted the MacMahon line as the border between India and China, and there was no

reason whatsoever to believe that Communist China—even more nationalistic—would have done so. Therefore, we should have been on our guard and should have sought a formal guarantee from China in 1954 when we signed the agreement on Tibet. But we did not, the net result of which was that the border dispute became increasingly serious, culminating in a war in 1962 leading to our defeat.

But this was not a simple military defeat. It was a defeat of all our ideals, and a brutal exposure of our weaknesses and our inability to defend our interests and our security. For the first time it really dawned on us that, despite our moral stature, despite our great role in international affairs, we were unable to withstand an attack from the outside; and that we felt obliged to seek assistance from nations whom we did not consider as our friends. This was indeed a very serious crisis for us—a crisis which has undermined our policy of non-alignment.

Other Examples

This was not all. There were other examples of setbacks to India. Nepal, for example, on which India had exerted important cultural influence for centuries, and whom India had helped to attain her independence, can no longer be considered a close friend and ally. For, China has forced her to adopt a posture of complete neutrality so far as the Sino-Indian conflict is concerned—a posture we have preached to the outside world since our independence.

Indian influence over Bhutan and Sikkim has increasingly become hazardous. Both the countries have become victims of Chinese intrigues and in one of them there was even an effort to dethrone those elements known to be pro-Indian. For how long can these small and very exposed countries withstand pressure from the north? Would they not, in due course, adopt a posture of neutrality in order to maintain their position? At present we can perhaps say with great confidence that this will not happen. But can

we give such an affirmative answer for the future—especially when it is becoming clear that China has begun to show definite signs of stabilizing her position in Tibet?

Relations with Burma and Ceylon are also not cordial. The agreement concerning the Indian nationals in Ceylon which was signed with Colombo by the Shastri Government appears to have been placed in cold storage. And Burma who has always been suspicious of India has displayed no hesitation—with India watching helplessly—in confiscating the property of Indian nationals and forcing many of them to leave the country.

Weakness

With regard to the Afro-Asian world in general, our position is also no longer what it was, say, five years ago. Our moral stature in the world and our prestige as a non-aligned nation has considerably diminished. Although there are a number of factors which led India to this sorry state, the principal reason, of course, in the view of this writer, is the incredible weakness and tragic incapacity we have shown in handling some of our foreign policy problems. No nation can possibly expect the outside world to respect her, to look up to her, when she shows considerable weakness in the resolution of her problems.

The evidence of the diminution of Indian stature in the Afro-Asian world is abundant. Only a few of them can be cited in this short article. Much against our wishes, many Afro-Asian countries—under the pressure of Communist China—had agreed to the convening of a second Bandung conference. India had decided to go along with this decision. But when New Delhi intensified its diplomatic efforts to obtain the admission of Soviet Russia to the conference, it was once again postponed—much against the wishes of India and in accordance with the desires of the Chinese Communists. Why? Obviously because Peking had successfully persuaded a few Afro-Asian countries to agree to the postponement of such a con-

ference. If Peking can obtain such a postponement by threatening to boycott the second conference, can India obtain the same results if she decides to do the same when such a conference is actually convened? One wonders!

During the entire Indo-Pakistan conflict of September 1965, the Arab world, to whom we have given our total support against Israel, did not see it fit to condemn Pakistan as an aggressor. The Colombo 'powers' which met just after the Sino-Indian conflict, did not think it necessary to condemn China for her military aggression against India.

In short, India today has lost her international stature and has been deprived of the support of those developing countries whom she had always considered as friendly allies. A time has therefore come when we should review our foreign policy. Obviously, now seems the appropriate moment, since with the disappearance of Nehru from the political scene of India a new leadership has come at the helm of Indian affairs which—not possessing the broad sweep of history—may perhaps make a more realistic approach to foreign affairs. And this is what we need today. By stressing this factor, this writer does not in any way wish to denigrate the great contribution Nehru has made to Indian foreign policy. Far from it. Only, Nehru has played his role by giving a perspective to the nation which could now be used for the formulation of more realistic and more limited objectives.

Perspectives

We must, therefore, first of all set out in a very concrete fashion what our foreign policy objectives are and seek various ways and means of attaining them.

There is no doubt that we are today faced with a difficult situation. India is contiguous to, or rather surrounded by, two countries—Pakistan and China—who are determined to seize certain parts of our territory. The situation has worsened in view of the fact that Pakistan and China—

starting from two different points of the political spectrum—have joined hands with the obvious objective of creating greater difficulties for India. In the past, when nations have been faced with such a difficult situation, they have invariably tried to extricate themselves from such a situation by seeking some understanding with one of the two enemies. Naturally, such an initiative on the part of India would be good; but under the circumstances, for reasons that are too obvious, such a course seems impossible.

Faced with such a situation, we should naturally first of all seek out those countries who also have problems with our unfriendly neighbours. In the case of Pakistan, naturally Afghanistan is the first country that comes to mind. We should, in the first place, develop close relations with that country, and at the same time give material assistance to the Pakhtoon movement operating from Kabul. This is very important. For once this movement catches momentum—which it should—there is every reason to believe that pressure on Kashmir would be lessened from Pakistan.

The Major Powers

Secondly, we should also use everything that we have in our diplomatic armour to persuade the Soviet Union not to develop close relations with Pakistan. This should be possible, for in view of the serious deterioration of the Sino-Soviet relations, India is much more important for Moscow than Pakistan. Thirdly, the Sino-Pakistan relations should be played up in order to create some distance between Pakistan and the West, and thereby forestall any future possibility of massive military assistance from the United States. Therefore, our confrontation with Pakistan should not be considered 'a confrontation with the West' as has been suggested in the poser of this issue. The situation has indeed changed and we should take full advantage of it.

So far as China is concerned, every possible effort must be made

to contain the expansion of Chinese influence in South-east Asia. Obviously, this is in our interest. But it is quite clear that we, on our own, are unable to do this for we have neither the economic strength nor the military power. But in coordination with the United States and the Soviet Union this should be possible.

The United States along with her Asian allies, is deeply involved in the outer fringes of China to contain Chinese communism. Although we may not agree with many aspects of U.S. policy in the area, their objectives, let us admit, are the same as ours. And she has the economic power and military strength to attain this objective. Therefore, if we are unable openly to support Washington—for political reasons—we should in that case adopt a policy of total silence on U.S. policy in South-east Asia as long as there is no serious danger of world conflagration. If Communist China and North Vietnam have displayed no hesitation in taking advantage of Indian difficulties with Pakistan, why should we not do the same in South-east Asia?

However, the influence of the United States in the area should not be permitted to have an unlimited growth. Not because she is a 'capitalist' or an 'imperialist' nation, but because the unlimited growth of any power in the area would make it difficult for Indian diplomacy effectively to play an independent role. Obviously, the only country that can perform the role of a counter-balancer to American presence in the area is the Soviet Union; for she has the military and economic strength, almost equal to that of the United States. To obtain the creation of such a situation should therefore be one of the principal objectives of Indian diplomacy; for once both the major powers have effectively established their influence in Southeast Asia, it would be exceedingly difficult for Chinese communism to make any further headway on the continent of Asia.

A new style

VIDYA PRAKASH DUTT

INDIA'S foreign policy ceased to have a viable structure in recent years because the old structure had become hopelessly out of joint. We continued to talk in terms

which were relevant years ago but which had lost their meaning in the world of today. Times had changed, conditions had altered, far reaching developments had taken place. Yet, we went on as if the world of the sixties was the same as that of the fifties. In our thinking and approach we failed to stay tuned with a fast-changing world. This was the biggest malady affecting our foreign policy in the last five years or so.

The Guidelines

We had certain guidelines for conducting our foreign policy: non-alignment, peaceful co-existence, opposition to colonialism and racialism. These guidelines were essentially sound and, perhaps surprisingly, continue to remain valid even today. But our inability to grasp the fact that these guidelines were only principles and that they did not by themselves constitute a foreign policy was at the root of much of our trouble later on. The enunciation of some very good principles was not tantamount to the development of a vigorous, resilient foreign policy rooted essentially in healthy nationalism. Instead of using the guidelines for a purposeful direction of our foreign policy, we almost became prisoners of the guidelines and contented ourselves with repeating them to the chagrin of others and our own misfortune.

The result was that our foreign policy increasingly became unreal, unimaginative and unproductive. It failed to answer the challenge of the developing situation that demanded new thinking, a new approach and, above all, a new style of diplomacy. Despite the intellectual realization by Jawaharlal Nehru of the tremendous change that had come over the world, somehow there was a failure to evolve new responses.

What was the developing situation by the turn of the sixties? The two blocs which threatened to divide the whole world into opposing, belligerent, irreconcilable camps, were withering, being subverted from within, subject to

the creeping wear and tear of time and of inner-bloc contradictions. These blocs had come into existence with the emergence of two super powers, looking at each other fiercely and demanding loyalty from all else. The blocs began to fall apart, firstly because of internal tensions and secondly because of a realization by both the super powers of their common interest in preventing a war which would result in mutual destruction. On that issue the narrow individual interests of members of the bloc had to be subordinated and even ignored. This led to trouble within the bloc, one of the obvious causes of China's displeasure with the Soviet Union.

New powers arose within the blocs which resented domination by the Big Brother and which claimed an equal share in the process of decision-making within the bloc. General de Gaulle's defiance of the United States is essentially an attempt to challenge Washington's pre-eminent position within the Atlantic camp and to acquire a more powerful voice for Paris. In the other camp, China is engaged in a mighty struggle to assert its place as one of the great powers of the world.

Dissolution of Blocs

The virtual dissolution of the blocs was also accompanied by the establishment of direct channels of communication between the super powers. Washington and Moscow not only began to talk to each other directly but even established a 'hot line' so that no accidental war could take place. They no longer needed an honest broker, a role which non-alignment was eminently fit to play. On all vital issues affecting world peace and relations between the giants, they could now deal with each other directly. Non-alignment continued to be necessary for maintaining the balance of power but not for mediation and reconciliation.

Thus, ideology was melting, bloc unity evaporating and bloc hostility softening. New friendships were replacing old ones and new conflicts taking the place of previous disputes. In a sense, the

world was reverting to the classical period of old-fashioned, power-based diplomacy. Of course, history never repeats itself completely and many new ideas have come to hold the minds and hearts of the people. World opinion is also a new force to reckon with. The independence and dignity of nations, big or small, as of individuals, is being increasingly recognized. All the same, traditional diplomacy is asserting itself after a period of eclipse from about 1948 to the end of the fifties of this century.

Diplomatic Paralysis

We became vaguely conscious of these changes but failed to grasp their full implications and readjust our foreign policy accordingly. Then, again, by 1958 it was patently clear China had become a hostile neighbour. Our military unpreparedness has been the subject of innumerable comments and there is no need to belabour the point. What was even more important was our diplomatic immobilization. While Peking blithely changed its tune and became even more vigorous diplomatically, denouncing us everywhere, we seemed to have been so dazed, almost stupified, by the conflict that we gradually lost all initiative and fell into a state of diplomatic paralysis. If we disagreed with Peking on various issues, we hardly knew what to say; if by any chance our stand seemed to be identical with that of Peking on any world issue, we were even more at a loss to know what to do.

When Peking finally committed military aggression against us and we lost a few battles on Himalayan elevations of 16-17000 feet we did what no country normally does. We publicly began to beat our breasts and told the whole world that we were down and out and that we wanted them all to come and protect us. No country which does that can continue to command respect by the outside world. Our debacle was now complete and the world began to treat us with indifference, and even contempt. Weakness, vacillation and flabbiness are the last things that the international community

makes allowance for in any country.

Unrealistic

Our inability to look at reality in the eye, so to say, has been the chief cause of our trouble. Take, for instance, the Commonwealth issue. History has passed the British Commonwealth by; whatever value or utility it once possessed has gone. It is now a totally meaningless and empty structure. Its central power, Great Britain, is no longer great, no longer an independent centre of power, no longer capable of infusing new life and meaning into this association. In fact, when faced with the choice between Europe and the Commonwealth, Britain herself chose Europe and if she is still not a member of the European community, it is not for want of trying.

Yet, in our country so much sentimental nonsense is heard about the Commonwealth. Even people like Krishna Menon and Mrs Pandit are making a pathetic defence of the Commonwealth just because they cannot envisage a world without the Commonwealth. One senior Cabinet member of the government is on record at least twice to say that our Commonwealth link has stood in the way of the development of independent relations with the United States which has always sought to act in concert with Britain whenever issues concerning the Indo-Pak subcontinent have arisen, because India and Britain are both members of the Commonwealth. It needs little intelligence to know that France, which is now the dominant power in Western Europe, will not take us seriously so long as we stay in the Commonwealth.

Or, take a domestic issue which has a vital bearing on our foreign policy: the question of self-sufficiency on the food front. Every one recognizes now that without self-reliance in this vital field, all talk of standing up on our feet and resisting world pressures is meaningless. If others are in a position to starve you, they can also bend your will on various other things. Yet we shy away from the reality and are unable to take the mea-

sures that theoretically most people agree are essential to achieve the objective of self-reliance.

Subramaniam, who started out roaring like a lion, is now bleating like a lamb and the State Chief Ministers with all their pious pledges refuse to adopt policies which may involve some hardships initially. One cannot over-stress the tonic effect on our foreign policy and our standing in the world, the day we could thank the United States and other countries for all their past help in giving us foodgrains and tell them that in future we shall make do with what we produce within the country.

Or even take an issue like that of the manufacture of the atom bomb. There is a similar attempt to run away from reality because it might be unpleasant. Most people either perch themselves on a high moral pedestal or, like the poser does, first create an artificial frankenstein and then set about destroying it. The issue is important and ought to be considered in its totality, first of all taking the realities of the present world situation into consideration and then taking stock of the demands of our national interests.

Complex Responses

The structure of our foreign policy has to be recreated in the light of all these considerations. We have first to look at the world as it is. It is a depolarized world, where the old balance has given way to a new one, and where there is diversification of power and multiplication of interests. It is a complex world which requires complex and flexible responses. It needs a multi-pronged effort, a simultaneous approach at various levels. Above all, it requires a new style for our foreign policy. This style must combine determination with flexibility, resilience with vigour. Its primary function is to remove the impression that India was a flabby country and that it did not matter whether a friendly or hostile attitude was taken on issues which concern her vitally. This flabbiness must go; more than that, the impression of the flabbiness must be removed.

It must be made clear to friends and foes alike that we are not to be taken for granted.

We must stiffen up in our diplomatic stand. We must put our relations with other countries on a firmer basis of equality and mutual benefit. Our foreign policy must get rid of the legacy of 'all give and no take.' Other countries must be left in no doubt that they cannot expect to refuse support to us in our hour of need and yet get our support in their difficult times. They cannot go against us in matters affecting our independence, territorial integrity, State system and vital interests and yet hope to retain our friendship. Our relations with them need to be put on a reciprocal basis.

Backbone

Our diplomacy must acquire teeth and our stance some backbone. We should of course try to be friends with all countries but we must know who our friends are and with which countries it is in our national interests to develop closer relations, and we have to be appropriately friendly towards those who are friendly to us and appropriately stiff towards those who do not care about our friendship.

The structure of our foreign policy can only be built on the premise that we are a nation of nearly five hundred million people. Once we grasp that fact firmly we shall be able to cope with all our problems. We are not a country which can be sat upon, nor a country which can be tinkered with, nor even a country which can be ignored. Our size, population, geographical position all compel attention and if we show sufficient will and determination, few countries would choose deliberately to remain unfriendly to us. I am not writing all this to stir up any chauvinistic sentiments; I am also not suggesting that we should now start abusing other countries. All I am saying is that a certain quiet confidence in our strength and position in the world and a certain plain speaking would enable us to face all the problems boldly and pre-

vent any hostile winds from blowing against us.

The Big Powers

Secondly, we should continue the policy of friendship with both Washington and Moscow, but with a difference. This friendship should neither mean, as in the past, willingness to be pressurized into certain postures nor should it mean silence over issues on which disagreements exist. Both of them must be made to realize that, if necessary, we shall be ready to go it alone and dispense with outside aid. This is a point that is just beginning to be made and needs to be driven home.

There are many differences between the United States and India over important issues and it is as well to recognize them. The United States has so far been routing its policy towards this subcontinent through London and the U.S. policies towards Pakistan have been going directly against our interests. The U.S. also borrowed the idea from London of maintaining a so called balance of power between India and Pakistan. There are also differences between Washington and New Delhi over policy in South-east Asia. Yet, it is in India's national interests to maintain and strengthen her friendly ties with the United States, especially in view of the danger from across the Himalayas.

Moreover, the policy of reduction of tensions through simultaneous friendship with Moscow and Washington remains sound and sensible, serving our interests as well as those of world peace. But it should be made plain in Washington that we will not be pushed around and that we shall not be amenable to pressure on an issue that involves the territorial integrity of India.

With Moscow, we have fewer differences so far as foreign policy issues and the approach to our subcontinent is concerned. There are no national irritants and Indian and Soviet interests are complementary to a very large extent. Moscow has also rendered us valuable help on both our fronts—Pakistan and China—and at the United Nations too. It is,

therefore, in our interests to strengthen friendship and understanding with the Soviet Union. But Moscow too must be left in no doubt about the limits of action it might enjoy in its policy towards this subcontinent which, if crossed, would quite frankly invite Indian resentment.

We must also take due note of the sweeping changes in the world situation. In Western Europe, it is obvious that our primary concern should be to develop closer relations and understanding with France. The re-emergence of France as one of the great powers of Western Europe is a major event of this decade. France is ready to play an independent role both in Europe and Asia and it is to our mutual advantage that efforts should be made to make common cause with France.

Similarly in Eastern Europe, countries like Czechoslovakia, Poland, Yugoslavia and Rumania are beginning to play an independent role and cast their net far and wide. In size they may be small countries, but they are highly developed, technically competent countries, possessing various advanced skills. What is more, they have the friendliest feelings towards India. We should seize this opportunity to befriend and cultivate them. They are in a position to assist us not only in our economic construction but also in our defence preparedness. And there is no danger of their attempting to exercise political leverage on account of the aid given to us. It has been correctly pointed out in the press that Japan is another country with which we ought to strive for closer relations. This is as much in the interests of Japan as ours and she should be encouraged to play an independent role in Asia, unburdened by the weight of American policies (and blunders) in Asia.

South-east Asia

More than anything else, we must re-examine our policy and place in South-east Asia. This is an area of vital concern to us and we cannot afford to be passive spectators there. I recall that some time ago a question was

asked about Vietnam in Parliament and the Minister of External Affairs, Swaran Singh, gave the inexcusable (but perhaps typical!) reply that it was for the great powers to decide the issue. It is not only, if at all, the business of the great powers (China included!) to settle the fate of Vietnam. It is of course, first of all, the concern of the Vietnamese people themselves, but in so far as it is an international issue now, it is equally the concern of India to be associated with a Vietnamese settlement. We have as much at stake in these parts of the world as the United States, or the Soviet Union, or China or any other outside country.

The situation in South-east Asia is highly inflammable. There is one Asian power (China) riding the region like a colossus and trying to establish its paramountcy. There is a non-Asian power (the United States) trying to stem the tide and equally to preserve its own pre-eminence in the region. It is an unequal fight; the United States has no chance of winning. What is required is a new balance which can only be provided by some Asian countries like India and Japan. But this balance can be provided only if these countries do not depend on borrowed strength from Washington or London but formulate genuinely independent policies with a view primarily to serving the interests of South-east Asian countries.

Our Objective

Our objective ought to be the strengthening of the independence and integrity of these nations, the reduction of outside influence and the encouragement of mutual co-operation. It has been a signal failure of Indian policy to have looked on with folded hands while the South-east Asian countries were being pulled apart in different directions and to have made no attempt to reduce the tensions existing between them. The policy of support to Malaysia, and now to Singapore also, is quite correct, but perhaps the time has come for opening a dialogue with Indonesia and for making efforts to soften her hostility to Malaysia

and encourage the reconsideration of the original concept of a Greater Maphilindo, including Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines.

Then there is the vast, sprawling continent of Africa to which we have to give priority attention. It is now an acknowledged fact of international relations of this decade that the upheaval in Africa is the single biggest factor in disturbing the old balance in the world. We in India have also begun to recognize this change but our diplomacy has yet to show the vigour and initiative necessary for making a worthwhile impact. Here, again, while maintaining friendly relations with all African countries, we must strive for closer understanding with those countries of Africa with whom it is possible and in our interests to do so.

I suggest that our greatest opportunity lies in East and Central Africa. Most of the countries there entertain the friendliest sentiments for us and it should be our urgent concern to cement these relations with mutually advantageous economic ties as well. And on an issue like the struggle against the racist regime of Ian Smith in Southern Rhodesia, one cannot urge too strongly that we should display more initiative in the waging of this crucial battle, including the offer to send volunteers to fight side by side with the Africans, in our interests as well as in African interests.

To sum up, we should adopt an attitude of 'no nonsense' as far as the question of our territorial integrity and State system is concerned. For that we have to build up rapidly our internal strength and shed our reliance on others. Simultaneously we should go in for development of extensive relations with some of the new centres of power that have recently arisen as well as maintain friendly ties with the super powers. But we do not have to be mightily afraid of any one. We should strike a mean between chauvinism and meakness, between bravado and fear. We need the world, the world needs us.

National security

J. D. SETHI

THE more the things (appear to) change the more they (truly) remain the same. Despite loud, agonized and continuous demand in the public and paradoxically in the government, which is supposed to act and not protest, for the reappraising and reshaping of our foreign policy, old myths and postures, like sacred old gods, overshadow the profession and practices of political leaders. The small men on whom history has imposed, somewhat ironically, the great and difficult task of nation-building and national security of India remain blissfully immersed in 'the artificial world of their own creation' despite continuously explosive situations confronting the country from both within and without.

Yet, in the field of foreign policy, not a single new idea has emanated from the new government or her foreign minister ever since they took over. It is abundantly clear now that unless we change our foreign policy and its administration we are in danger, in the short run, of losing on the diplomatic field what has been achieved by the magnificent performance of the armed forces on the battle-field. In the long run, the very survival of the nation is threatened, partly by adhering to policies which perpetuate internal weakness, allure big and small hos-

tile powers to commit aggression against us and infuriate and alienate potential friends; and partly by relegating in action the national security problem to the second order of priorities.

Two Approaches

It is necessary first to understand the meaning, quality and dimensions of change required. There are two main approaches: (i) the policy or policies pursued over the last 18 years have failed to achieve the main objectives of the Indian State and hence the change required is in all its fundamentals; (ii) the country needs only an incremental change which both supports limitations on innovations and permits marginal deviations from past policies adding up to a grand total.

The latter approach obviously rests on stable conditions, aspirations and problems as well as on the absence of any major threat to the security of the country. Few nations fulfil that requirement and India certainly does not, with two aggressions already committed against her and by near total isolation imposed on her. Furthermore, as argued by Y. Droz, and so unmistakably exemplified by India, 'the incremental change model has a disfunctional effect on reality by providing a theoretical-ideological justification for an actual situation which in effect stems from inertia and a priori basis. An optimal model takes into account rational and extra rational components in big policy making under conditions of rapid change.'

It would be argued below that India needs the second approach because so far her strategy of disjointed incrementalism, and 'instant' marginalism has failed. On several issues of foreign policy, national security and the world power struggle, the Government of India repeatedly exhibited a deplorable lack of mind and nerve, fruitless and tortuous tight-rope postures, and sometimes even an absence of policy. The emerging pattern is that the government is often found caught unawares and it resorts to hurriedly improvised and unpremeditated measures

which are generally contradictory and seldom add up to a policy.

The 'instant foreign policy' is reflected in the fact that one is hard put to find any examples of India's foreign relations that one could confidently say are solidly based on the full knowledge of political and strategic implications or the full awareness of self-interest, are progressing in the desired direction and in definite pattern with the help of a forward-looking strategy, and finally are strong and flexible enough to meet current and potential challenges or create challenges where necessary. A challenge thrown for a potential response is as important as the response to a given challenge.

Partly, this hopeless situation was bequeathed by Jawaharlal Nehru, whose big and global ideas on foreign policy were not backed by the necessary courage and preparedness for lack of either the will or the capacity or both to use the basic means and methods of power diplomacy, material preparation for a military-industrial complex, strategic and non-strategic manoeuvrability etc. Nehru's foreign policy, like his home policy, was a strange mixture of fears, aspirations, values, complexes, etc.

In fact, the whole bag of tools known to power diplomacy and strategy, particularly that of making India through a definite time-shape the nucleus of a power system, was scorned for sanctimonious and illusory moral and pious reasons. One of the significant features of the conflict with Pakistan has been that the name of Nehru, the architect of India's foreign policy, was seldom mentioned despite the events being so near to his death. This attitude clearly reflected a general disapproval of that approach.

Basic Postulates

One need not begin with a prejudice against the Shastri government as a legacy of the past. But if this government insists on perpetuating this demonstrably fatuous legacy without even clarifying what is to be retained and what is to be discarded from the past in the light of new problems, the

charge against the new incumbents of creating more confusion and uncertainty and not heeding the warning of history and experience cannot be dismissed.

Unless some basic postulates of foreign policy are clearly understood and accepted as underlying assumptions of the foreign policies of all major powers of today, we shall be doing no better than muddling through.

First, in modern times foreign policy has become an extension of national security. The confusion in our foreign policy is largely symptomatic of the lack of deep understanding, direction and clarity of our national security problems. The state of our defence forces, military equipment, and the number and variety of strategies available to meet possible challenges, etc., are an unknown quantity, for we are so heavily dependent on others not only for equipment, which is unavoidable, but also for thinking and organization, which is totally unwarranted. The absence of proper and continuous relationship between foreign policy and national security is also revealed in the fact that in the absence of any immediate military crisis, there is little public interest and urgency in these crucial matters.

The Sequence

Therefore, the first important change needed is in the order or sequence in which we approach these issues. Whereas foreign policy has long been recognized as an instrument of national security in other countries, India has followed rather dogmatically the reverse of this: she has, without logic or advantage, allowed her security to remain contingent on her foreign policy, a large part of which was based on formal declarations of friendship, sentiments and global clichés. For example, the debate whether India should or should not manufacture nuclear weapons has been explicitly made to depend on sentiments, on global precepts and not on straight issues of national security.

A foreign policy must have goals, patterns, facets, tools etc.

But it must also be flexible enough to permit new adaptations when objectives appear contradictory. In short, a foreign policy must give us a freedom of choice. We must profess and even work for, if it does not strain our resources, world peace, and anti-colonialism, universal friendship, interdependence, world government, etc., but we must also realize clearly that at the present juncture most countries support these largely empty slogans while working truly and practically for their own security and national interests. It has not been uncommon in history that nations create a common enemy for nation-building. Peace sometimes may not be a right policy for a nation in respect of all other nations. Let us not feel virtuous or feel morally burdened in these matters. If we have to flout an international decision or authority when necessitated by our national interests, we must do so, of course not crudely, but firmly and skilfully.

Supreme Principle

This brings us to the second postulate, namely, that foreign policy is largely an instrument for safeguarding and expanding national interests. I have separated the postulate of national security from that of other national interests because the former must have the highest priority at all times and in all situations while the latter can have no fixed priorities for its components and can even be disputed. Important and big nations always pursue their national interests openly or secretly, crudely or skilfully, bilaterally or multi-laterally, peacefully or aggressively, successfully or unsuccessfully—in fact that the supreme principle of a nation's policy remains the achievement of her national interests.

A large part of history is nothing but the history of national conflicts. Of course, a national interest is also achieved by cooperation and not by conflict alone. In modern times conflict or cooperation between national interests has become very subtle under

the veneer of value-orientation, internationalism and humanitarianism. To protect its national security, a country today may even partly or temporarily surrender her independence as the countries of Western Europe did and no sooner the threat to their security disappeared, they exerted their independence and demanded more equal terms for interdependence. The erosion of the western and eastern blocs has been largely due to the super power being unable to reconcile their national interests with those of other members of their respective alliances.

The recent Baltimore speech of President Johnson should be read by every Indian. He bluntly and angrily admitted in that speech that what the US was doing in Vietnam or elsewhere was motivated entirely by her own national interests. It is not in Johnson alone. The same thread runs unbroken back through history to the architect of American foreign policy, George Washington, who said that in foreign policy 'consult only the substantial and permanent interest of our country ... it is a maxim found on the universal experience of mankind that no nation is to be trusted further than it is bound by its own interest, and no prudent statesman or politician will venture to depart from it.'

The Soviet Union telescoped the achievement of her national interests, like her economic development, in a shorter period and therefore tried to pursue her interests ruthlessly and at all costs. China has done one better than the Soviet Union and has proved to the world that communism or nationalism alone may have to be reckoned with but as a combined force, they become formidable. Since in the past we largely neglected our national interests or pursued them half-heartedly, we must clearly understand the importance of this postulate.

Finite Goals

Third, foreign policy is a matter not of abstract definition but of finite goals. Instead of concentrating on the aforementioned matters

and perfecting the tools, it is amazing to note that both the government and the opposition in India ceaselessly insist on defining foreign policy in abstract terms. Does there exist in abstract a definition of the foreign policy of any important country today?

Foreign policy cannot be grandiose, unitary or a comprehensive algebraic formula in this complex world. It is a matter of manifold dimensions and imponderables. Thus, if the supreme objective remains national interest, a strict definition of policy would only restrict freedom of action. The need is for a functioning historical understanding of our and others' objectives and adopting suitable means and tactics for which we have necessary pre-requisites. In parts the policy must remain a guessing game for some countries; sometimes our foreign policy posture may have to be intolerant, suspicious and arrogant for a particular type of enemy. Oriental diabolism of the Chinese cannot be answered by parroting suave, decent phrases but by a skilful *kutniti*. Must our diplomats keep defining our policy most of the time? Diplomacy is a subtle and precious combination between truth and its concealment.

Administration

A corollary of the second postulate is that a distinction must be drawn between a policy and its administration. Even the most mature and developed countries make mistakes in foreign policy but a skilful administration of those policies reduces their adverse effects. A right policy which is continuously wrongly administered becomes worse than useless. India has, unfortunately, suffered on both counts. Her foreign policy has been reduced to routinization and bureaucratization; it never became a matter of politics. For their operational effectiveness, the foreign office boys have to play politics and they should not therefore be politically neutralized as they are at present.

Fourthly, the configuration of the security problem of the

modern world of 125 nations rests on particular balances, including the balance of mutual deterrence between super powers, within a world power spectrum arrived at through the interaction of more or less homogeneous groups of nations. The essential principle underlying these relationships is one of interdependence between independent nations or of a big power-satellite dependence. India is obviously not cast for the latter role unless she is dismembered, nor can she afford to escape the obligations of the former role any longer. Except for some peripheral issues, all the major problems of security are those of collective security, despite the major shifts in the loci of power from two to four. There is no security outside the collective security.

Our Position

Frequent insults hurled at India from its tiny neighbours are a cruel and constant reminder of the gravitational pull of other power systems as well as of a power vacuum in this region. The world power-order abhors a vacuum. The game of power politics is a matter of low moral tones in inter-State relations, and yet the game is played. We cannot substitute it by high moral but empty postures and thus invite the ridicule of the entire world when attacked. Power determines policy just as policy determines approaches to power. Given the best and most peaceful intentions in the world, our national security interests, arising out of our survival as a big unified nation, impose on us the inescapable role of determining our firm and dynamic position in this world order. In this role we are some time or another bound to clash with this or that big power. There are no fixed enemies or permanent friends. And, certainly, any unilateral initiative in peace just as in war is hopeless and out of date.

Whatever else non-alignment means in other fields of foreign policy, it is not a policy at all for national security. Defence and national security are a matter of political choices for which non-alignment is a self-denying pre-

cept. At best, non-alignment is a matter of negative political response to a challenge; and there are innumerable challenges to which no decisive political response is enough and some combined military-political-diplomatic response, not only of a single nation but also of its friends, may be necessary.

Alliances

The great reluctance to joining military alliances arose from two arguments. The first came from the economists of the absolute developmentist school which held that military alliances would fritter away scarce resources so very badly needed for economic development. This approach is still very strongly entrenched. But a moment's reflection will show this argument is false and dangerous. The argument not only minimized the dangers to India's security despite two open aggressions on her but stands discredited by the fact that the burden of military expenditure entirely fell on India when she was attacked.

Above all, experience corroborates that 'decision to defer the burdens of defence establishment—often prompted by the desire to avoid strains and imbalances in the structure of the developing nations economy and political power—may actually retard both political and economic development' (George Leska). Pakistan's rate of economic growth has been higher than that of India in the period of her military alliance with the United States. Since this argument comes from the side of the Left in India it needs be asked: did not the Soviet Union sacrifice part of her economic development for military purposes?

The second argument against joining alliances naturally arises from the fear that India, being militarily a weak country, will be reduced to playing the role of a satellite. It would certainly be suicidal to join any alliance as a satellite or to play second fiddle. Therefore, a simple mechanical shift from the whimper of non-alignment to a loud cry of alignment is meaningless and amounts to replacing one false choice for

another. Whether to join any of the existing alliances or create new ones or even to consider the formation of a supra-national structure are questions which cannot be answered *a priori* and independent of the nature and the time scale of the national security problems of India and that part of the continent the security of which largely determines the security of India. And these are the problems we are generally unaware of and reluctant or unable to debate about.

This gap in our understanding was largely the product of a pseudo-faith in non-alignment. It is not even logical to adopt a policy of economic alignment and not military alignment when we know now that the former has increased our dependence on others, and we are faced with the worst colonialism of political and military pressures being brought on us through food imports. We don't need alliances as a matter of principle but as an objective necessity of living in a world of independent nations.

Self-reliance

It is amazing that the call for self-reliance, which was an explicit imperative of non-alignment, has come nearly two decades after the initiation of that policy. Another call of the same genre is for a *national food policy* after fifteen years of planning. Either we don't have faith in our policies or we don't understand them. Ironically, the louder we talk of self-reliance the greater becomes our dependence on others for our daily bread. If self-reliance is accepted on the score that no nation in history has become great without rising by its own bootstraps, it is a great psychological instrument. If, on the other hand, it creates a false faith in self-sufficiency, friendlessness and utopianism, we are in for a rude shock. Only a self-reliant nation, and not the one with a mendicant mentality, can understand the principle of interdependence and optimal relationships with others.

Fifthly, the relation between foreign policy and ideology is much

narrower than is often believed. It is dangerous to raise foreign policy to the level of a philosophy, particularly if that philosophy becomes inconsistent with national security. We must, therefore, reassess and restart the debate on foreign policy in relation to ideology primarily from the interest of security. Once we do so, the fear of ideological sacrifice and compromise will exist in known and workable proportions. It is nonsense to dismiss this problem of ideological compromise as non-existent or unimportant as many would like to do when faced with uncomfortable situations. Looked at in perspective it appears that every big and small country uses and practices ideology, which belongs to the second order of policies, as an instrument of its foreign policy. The sequence between ideology and foreign policy is reversible, but both must together serve national security.

Value-scales

Our having been caught in the great struggle of world ideologies and being unable to create any effective new ideology of our own over these years does not oblige us to project any particular ideology if we do not have one or cannot do so. This inability can however be used skilfully and advantageously by being more pragmatic and eclectic in our choices. This does not preclude us from measuring our internal performance by the most desirable and acceptable value-scales. However, all value-scales have a dimension of time; and since India has been reduced today to a position of being incapable of taking initiative in any major world problem, a great part of the ideological sting has been taken out of our desire for survival, only if we could realize this fact ourselves.

In the U.S., which swears by freedom, there have occurred substantial erosions of freedom in the conduct of her internal and external affairs for reasons of national security. In the Soviet Union the great dream of socialist affluence remained brazenly eliminated for so long, and individual

freedoms of Soviet citizens and world communist parties were unceremoniously sacrificed for the defence of the fatherland. It is noticeable that China, while making a big fuss over ideology in her relations with the Soviet Union, does not mention it when dealing with non-communist governments in the conduct of her foreign policy.

Place of Ideology

And, if free is to be what Americans say is free, if socialism is what the Chinese arrogate themselves to call it, an industrially and militarily weak India cannot project in the world the ideology of democratic socialism without inviting ridicule. It is a mistaken notion that a radical foreign policy implies an ideological policy. One can be radical without being an ideologue. The place and limits of ideology must be clearly understood and not evaded.

Space limitations preclude a detailed analysis of the policy of non-alignment, but it is necessary to test this policy in relation to the aforementioned postulates. In the early period of its formulation, i.e., during the years of a bipolar world, a cold war and near-war situation when the two rival blocs feared new countries either becoming communist or capitalist, non-alignment implied a declaration of non-involvement in war and the maintenance of independence. Although there were a host of other situations, apart from warring bipolarism which required a more subtle and flexible policy, in its broad approach non-alignment appeared to be a most sensible policy. However, there was little justification for its continuation by India when the cold war situation disappeared and the power blocs eroded from inside.

Over the last decade, relations between communist countries within their own bloc and capitalist countries within the Atlantic bloc have made them look more and more inwardly, and subtly or brazenly adjust to new situations according to their respective national interests. Old postures

between the Americans and the Russians are no longer ever subjects of serious discussion. Dulles and Stalin died a long time ago and with them died their mutually exclusive and destructive policies; yet India remained committed to the rigid definition of her policy in a radically changed situation.

The non-alignment policy became popular for two other reasons. First, it created an illusion of India's greatness despite her weakness because of too conspicuous and successful interventions in one or two great power conflicts and India's words being apparently listened to when it came to talking points. It appeared, and we came to believe in this false appearance, that India could bring about a *detente* between the great but hostile powers. However, once the thaw set in and the two super powers talked straight to each other, the game for India was up. Ever since then our policy has increasingly become a subject of ridicule, rebuff and embarrassment at the hand of every country with the exception of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia.

No Intellectual Basis

The architect of India's foreign policy was humiliated and certainly did not die a happy man. We quite madly even came to believe that India could change the course of history. In fact, there is not a single example of any country changing her foreign policy on any issue because of our persuasion or intervention. We intervened as a successful intermediary when the situation for a particular settlement was ripe. Unfortunately, we tried to read too much into it, for it gave us a position much beyond our strength, and developed a serious dichotomy between our security and our world view. We made the worst mistake of elevating a short-term policy into an ideology and philosophy and in sheer exhilaration totally ignored the defence and security problems of India. We never developed even a proper intellectual and theoretical basis of that policy.

For example, as a proposition it was meaningless to propose that

India or, for that matter, any country should be neutral between, say, A and B in all situations and at all times. Some time or the other the policies of A or B both were likely to clash with our national interests. It would be a meaningful proposition to state that India was non-aligned between A and B on issue C, i.e., India did not seek to effect the struggle in the case of C but might on a situation, D which affected India's or any of her friends' security directly or indirectly, in short-term or long-term. 'It is rational for a State to be neutral to a conflict of subliminal relevance and not to be neutral to a conflict of transliminal relevance.'

Domestic Problems

Secondly, as stated by Romesh Thapar, India's foreign policy was dictated by internal compulsions. But this relationship turned out to be extremely perverse. Non-alignment initially imported stability to India's policy by robbing the ideologically warring groups of the extreme Right and Left of the force which they drew from the internationally-oriented ideological conflict. Paradoxically, however, the policy which began as response to internal conditions ended up as a policy of total lack of response to solutions of domestic problems.

The government took the line of non-alignment or least resistance to the urgent demand for the solution of the age-old problems of Indian society. To borrow a phrase from Robert Good, it became easier for Nehru to demonstrate wisdom and political potency by resolving the problems of the world than by tackling the obdurate issues of home and defence policy. Non-alignment abroad became at home a functionless and non-solution policy for domestic problems, which have now reached pathological proportions, so much so that the danger to India's unity comes equally from both within and without.

A more glaring example of this perversity is that the more econo-

mic aid poured in from two big powers, the more we dragged our feet with regard to our own effort. The more complacent we became, the more loudly and hysterically we talked about non-alignment. It was not realized that social tension is the price a country has to pay for its political and economic progress, and more so if the society is largely backward and inequitable. The Chinese transformed their revolution into a national movement. As a different and competitive experiment, Indians were supposed to transform their national movement into a social revolution. In fact, non-alignment contributed to the death of our national movement and our revolution. In short, non-alignment has resulted in declaring a moratorium on internal political change.

Hopeless Policy

I cannot agree with Romesh Thapar when he contends that Nehru's foreign policy was very thoughtfully evolved and was correct until India was attacked by China. In fact, the very occurrence of the Chinese attack and our poor response to that exposed the shabby and hopeless character of that policy. Our pseudo-faith in non-alignment has disabled us so much that we cannot see how close or far is our policy from realities. We ignored such a simple fact that a country must either be very strong or physically distanced away from the area of conflict and be immune from foreign intervention before it decides to choose a policy of neutrality, indifference or non-alignment. But, for a country whose very existence is threatened, the acceptance of such a policy amounts to adopting the proverbial ostrich response and putting a premium on new and fresh aggressions against her.

Non-aligned India became over-committed to a phoney peace and denied to herself the elementary need of a modern viable State to investigate the war and military aims of other powers and their possible consequences on our security. In the end, no wonder, the greater became the danger and magnitude of military intervention against us, the narrower was our

response to innumerable other issues of foreign policy.

The biggest of all myths was that non-alignment would make India the 'area of agreement' between the super powers. The question we should have addressed to ourselves was agreement for what? For our preservation, strangulation or dismemberment! We ignored the question by ignoring the dimension of time in the foreign policies of the big powers. If we assume that every big power is working for her national interests, a situation could arise where India could also become expendable to the big powers, particularly if the U.S. and China enter a period of reconciliation, say, in a decade's time, and the U.S. may not hesitate to pay the price to China for reconciliation with her by accepting a dismembered India. It could equally be true of the Soviet Union's policy.

Besides, when the super powers are living in comparative peace, the concepts of 'zones of peace' or 'areas of agreement' are sheer anachronisms. Above all, there are no longer two but four centres of power today and one has to imagine very wildly to locate areas of peace or agreement between all centres. In fact, the setting in of a thaw between the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. has resulted in all neutrals no longer occupying a position beyond their strength or enjoying any special considerations for agreement.

The Third Bloc

Finally, non-alignment did not preclude the building of a third bloc of neutral nations and India, the largest of them, assuming the leadership and using that position for her own interest. Of course, the leadership of new nations implied a unique and exemplary performance at home along with a strong build-up for defence, and a skilful manipulation of our foreign relations. Both these requirements were ignored. Consequently, several neutral countries took the maximum advantage of our support and not one of them came to our defence in our hour of trial.

Today, the neutral group of nations has nothing more than con-

tempt for India. But that is not very important except probably to an ideological non-alignist. The group is thoroughly incoherent, riven with mutual hostilities and more vitally concerned with regional and local problems. (Here, too, it may be pointed out that India is again guilty of ignoring the problems of regional defence). India need not pander to the neutrals any more, not certainly to their national and racist policies which are ignited by the Chinese in the name of anti-colonialism. We must make true friends who will stand by us and by whom we shall stand. Platonism in foreign policy is a sin.

In short, India's foreign policy to date has failed to satisfy even a single postulate. It has not only ignored our defence problems but exposed us to foreign aggression; it has become a functionless policy and lacks political strategy; it is too broad and narrow at the same time; it is more of an ideology than a policy and is therefore politically and psychologically incompatible with a strategy of flexible response, and it has developed in us a begging-bowl mentality and destroyed self-reliance which it was meant to promote.

Creating the New

However, it is easier to demolish than to create; it is easier to attack an unsuccessful foreign policy than to replace it by another more successful one. But a totally nihilistic attitude would prove ultimately very frustrating and therefore must yield to serious attempts at a systematic formulation of our foreign policy and its administration. A new policy cannot be produced out of a hat. A simple cry for alignment is as much a product of fear as was non-alignment. Both have degenerated into ubiquitous rhetorics or abstractions. And one can't persuade an abstraction.

It is a reflection of the same large degree of abstraction that among the two most vocal and active groups in the field of foreign policy in India, one looks to the East, without even bothering about the problems of subversion and long-term confrontation

with China; and the other group of 'super-patriots' is too eager to hand over the security of India to the West irrespective of the knowledge (or lack of it) as to how far the West is prepared to entertain such obeisance. And which West? The Atlantic or the European? The two are increasingly generating foreign policies independently, of each other and looking differently, if not with a sense of conflict, at their respective security problems. And between these two extremes there are the protagonists of non-alignment, who are smug, lethargic, alternatively hopeful and cynical, intellectually eroded and even greater victims of abstract definitions than the first two groups. They chant non-alignment like a *mantra*.

Security Issues

Therefore, it is not difficult to see that the confusion is not merely confined to the government; it is rampant in the nation. We simply do not possess a historical and strategic perspective of our external security. We do not even exhibit an intellectual curiosity, for neither the universities in India undertake strategic studies nor do there exist such specialized institutes as are the common feature of the intellectual movements in the West. Even the newspapers do not have defence correspondents to educate the public or their co-workers. What is the value of a newspaper editorial or a feature on security matters? Probably a comfortable assurance from a dogmatic conviction.

This is a dismal picture despite the fact that over the last few years there has taken place a healthy shift from the idea that there are principles, to the idea that the nation has to be its own master and its own interest is its supreme principle. This shift, however, remains inarticulated and not fully recognized or understood in time and space scales of India's security and allied problems of foreign policy.

The developed world has been able to face complex intellectual and practical issues of the nuclear age by the growth of their strength and by making policy

more and more a product of rigorous and systematic analysis. The political significance of the growth of national security research is fully realized and exploited. The result is not only the narrowing down of operationally optimum strategies from a mixed bag of scores of feasible strategies but also the evolution of clear alternatives in the whole field of foreign policy. The research in pure strategy has yielded some workable rules of the game of limited war, principles of graduated escalation and calculated risks, and mutual deterrence, etc., which have come to be accepted by the contending powers as a compromise between security and total annihilation. This has been made possible because the classical military strategy has been rendered insufficient by new military technology and the concomitant risks involved in its use. For example, both sides know in advance, or one side lets it be known to the other, the important military developments to avoid the risk of war by accident.

When the Republicans came to power in the U.S., men like George Kennan, Paul Nitze, Louis Hall, etc., left the government but continued scholarly work on strategy and foreign policy without being the prisoners of authority, either individually or through great centres of research. President Kennedy appointed national security experts and thus provided the government with expert and objective-oriented intellectual resources, so much so that he did not put any military representative on the National Security Council. The image of American policy today is not the product of the minds of card-carrying Christians, like the late Dulles, but is the result of cool, calculating, hard headed realists like Bundy, McNamara and others. In Britain and Germany, several centres for strategic studies are working independently as well as in close co-operation with their respective governments.

Positive Projections

Even in the Soviet Union, a great debate has been opened in military and political journals on the choice between the use, ex-

pansion and reliance on conventional and nuclear weapons. The debate is addressed to China and the West as much as to intelligent Russians. India on the other hand has only to offer some abstract questions for neither the diversified capabilities and alternative strategies are worked out anywhere nor even the broad alternatives clarified through discussion, debate and research.

The real and difficult question is how a new policy is to be evolved and to which directions it is to be positively projected. It will take years before a complete model of the new policy emerges, for we cannot afford to terminate our foreign relationships abruptly and in a huff in our present difficulties. While developing new flexibility in the short term within the existing framework, we must start work on our long-term objectives. There is still time to face hard choices and real events and to be specific rather than abstract. World powers still seem interested in maintaining the status quo. It may not remain so ten years from now. There is now raging a great intellectual upsurge in the U.S. for reconciliation with China. If that reconciliation takes place India would become expendable to the Chinese aim of paramount influence in Asia. Therefore, we must resolutely either try to destroy that possibility by coming to some understanding with the U.S., or, if we cannot do that, we must look for a similar understanding with the Soviet Union.

Military Strength

So long as India is militarily weak, any withdrawal of the Soviet Union from Asia could spell disaster for us. Soviet involvement in Asia will act as a counterweight against both the U.S. and China taken together or separately. The supreme test of Indian diplomacy is to keep the U.S. and the U.S.S.R. involved in Asia until India can develop a military balance with China. That would also be the time for establishing a lasting friendship with China and not before. We do not have to join any alliances necessarily for these ends but we must

clearly understand the principle of *quid pro quo*. In the short run we must give top priority to getting colossal military aid from all sources so as to create a balance of military hardware with China. The manufacture of atomic bombs will be of crucial importance for deterrence, particularly if we can develop an edge over China in this field to compensate for other weaknesses.

Three Steps

We must also take three other steps without loss of time. (1) We must immediately open our dialogue with western Europe, particularly France and Germany for new economic, political and military cooperation. In this respect we may have to transfer our external assets from sterling to francs and marks. Britain must be recognized as both an unfriendly and a finished force. (2) We should work for some alliance with Australia and Japan for the defence of the eastern hemisphere. (3) We must pick up no more than a dozen neutrals who will stand by us and by whom we shall stand in all crucial matters and start a new informal bloc within the big amorphous Afro-Asian bloc. This is not the end of the new positive approaches in our foreign policy. Once we recognize the true objectives of the Indian State, a host of other new vistas will be opened before us.

In the final analysis, the success of our foreign policy will depend upon the leadership inside the country. Political weaklings that rule the country today do not have the perspective or imagination for projecting a dynamic foreign policy. History, however, sometimes makes small men face big issues and thus thrusts not greatness but heroism on them. The leadership, if it can do no better, must accept the establishment of a National Security Council as a single top-ranking body to formulate and correlate security and foreign policy. The Council should consist of political and military leaders along with pragmatic analysts and pure strategists. It must be the highest decision-making authority in matters of security and foreign policy.

Finding our friends

GIRIJA K. MOOKERJEE

UNLIKE marriage, which according to some, is made in heaven, the foreign policy of a country is made here on earth, on *terra firma*, and on *terra firma* only. It is necessary to rub this in, because we have already elevated astrology to a science, if not to a social

science, and while Bertrand de Jouvenel, following the excellent methods of Tocqueville, tries to anticipate future political events in his *Futuribles*, we take a shorter cut by consulting our formidable palmists and the sadhus with third eyes. Our foreign policy

makers also do not seem to be above consulting astrologers and rare would be the occasions when they would not have told us what the attitude of the Soviet Union would be on the cease fire or that of the U.S.A. on PL-480 as they do on ministerial changes in Delhi. Even if this be an exaggeration, undoubtedly many of us are still in the habit of thinking that certain things are destined to happen in a certain way whether we plan it or not to be otherwise, and that a vast number of other things remain just pre-determined.

It is no wonder that in this atmosphere of necromancy and magic, our political thinking, even amongst the Marxists, has not become yet quite literate. In addition to this, the Victorian political standards of the Establishment have made us constantly the objects of further sociological studies by the American universities and in foreign policy matters also we have gone on floating between highly sophisticated statements and totally inadequate implementation of any one of them. The result has been that very few countries took us seriously, because no one quite understood what our stands were on important international issues.

That is why, I think, it is not quite true to say that when India's relations were broken with China, India had already developed a viable foreign policy. This assumption arises from the fact that during the first decade of our independence, we were led to believe that by being present in every country, we were also developing relations with them or formulating a policy towards them.

No Policy

Here, it is worth while making a distinction between policy and relations. Let me explain it further. What happened when we became independent was that we were so thrilled by the fact that after so many centuries India attained independence, that we wanted to make this known to everyone in the world. In fact, Jawaharlal Nehru's various trips to foreign countries were meant

intrinsically to show the flag. He met many Heads of States and he was the subject of tremendous public admiration and no one in the world except perhaps Kennedy received so much public ovation wherever he went, whether it be Moscow or Washington, Peking or Bonn.

But Nehru never tried either to capitalise on this or enter into an agreement of a specific kind with any of the Heads of State he came to know, and with whom he held long conversations. The reason probably was that Nehru almost believed that making India's presence known was by itself a sort of laying down the foundation of a policy with the countries he visited. He spoke a great deal on these occasions, the central theme of which was the laudable idea of maintaining peace, with which nobody disagreed. He was, however, still full of youthful enthusiasm of the Congress militant who took pride in the fact that at last the Indian nationalists had succeeded in overthrowing the oldest empire in Asia.

Only Exhortations

Thus, we saw that although various types of declarations were made, exhorting peace and how to maintain it, yet Nehru never tried to give these exhortations a more concrete form in what we call, State Acts, that is to say, to embody them into State documents which alone bind nations to conduct their relations with one another in a specific manner. The result was that Nehru who believed in the value of contracts, as he himself said so, in carrying through many of the social legislations in our Parliament, including that of Registration of Marriage and Divorce, never thought, however, that what was valid in the relations of even a husband and a wife, need be valid in the case of two foreign nations. We know, for instance, from Nehru himself that even personal relationships are best safeguarded by contracts and engagements, because human nature being what it is, it is necessary that in order to avoid disappointments, human

relationships should be defined in clear and unequivocal terms.

If one does not carry this principle to the relationship of nations, the result is, as it was in our case, that although from 1947 to 1962 many nations of the world expressed their sympathy for us, yet, when it came to the question of helping us out from an unjust and cruel aggression, very few came forward to do anything about it, because no one felt bound by any contract to do so. Our statesmen had not even initiated any preliminary discussions with any other State for the eventuality of an aggression against India, so that in the case of such an eventuality, they could at least remind these countries that the subject had been mentioned.

Naive Belief

This was not merely a lapse but this was our way of doing things, for we really did not think anything serious was going to happen to India and we, therefore, saw no reason why we should anticipate such events and take steps against them until they actually appeared on the horizon. When, however, we compare the action of other States in similar circumstances, we see that no statesman pays a visit to another country without the desire to derive some profit from such contacts either in the field of commerce or in diplomatic relationships or in both. In our case, this was totally absent. Most of our national leaders really believed that such contacts were unnecessary, probably because they sincerely thought that if a country had a just cause, others would come to its rescue in times of danger or they simply believed that India was not in danger of invasion because India did not want to invade another country.

When we take this view into account, then whatever we may say of the Nehru period, one thing seems to be certain that it did not really lay down the basis of an Indian foreign policy. It laid down no doubt the framework of an Indian Foreign Service and we also took part in many international conferences, but during this period no firm policy of our

conduct with the rest of the world was formulated or agreed upon.

This was not due to the fact that our foreign policy aims were lacking. As Dr. Appadorai has shown admirably, these aims were 'enlarging the area of peace, not by forming a bloc but by bringing together like-minded nations in declaration supporting what is known as the Panch Sheel... Finally, there has been a clearer perception of the close connection between foreign policy and internal development, in particular of the need to evolve a proper economic policy'.¹ In other words, these were 'aims' and 'perceptions' but they were never made the basis of our foreign policy action. They were conceived but not implemented. It is also probable that they could not be implemented because though we shared these views, others did not; and hence as an instrument of foreign policy they could not be applied, not to speak of implementing them.

The Essence

The reasons of this failure were that the aims alone could not suffice and they were often contradictory. We know that the essence of a foreign policy is involvement and alignment and not non-involvement and non-alignment. After all, what does a country do when it initiates a policy in order to safeguard or strengthen its national interests? It involves itself in carrying out discussions and negotiations with another country in order to explore the possibility of finding a common ground which could unite them for mutual benefit.

This exploration which leads sometimes to the concretisation of some formula is generally believed to be the policy of one country towards the other. Unless a State agrees that it will take action, however, limited, in relation to another, its negotiations or discussions with another State becomes utterly meaningless, because, if a country decides to remain uninvolved in the affairs of the world, then why should it

try to have any contacts whatsoever with another? Contacts obviously mean involvement and, therefore, whatever we did during the first decade of our independence, we did erratically without really realising what we were doing, because while we said we wanted to be friends with everyone, we went on protesting that we did not want to be involved in friendship! How can one make friends unless one is prepared to give and take; or, in other words, unless one agrees to be involved?

Past Inhibitions

The reasons for these erratic actions are many, the first of which is that for several centuries we had nothing to do with the foreign policy of our rulers and, hence, of our country. For a very long time, we had also nothing to do with the administration of our country or its finances, its police system or the road system. Hence, when we started off with a big bang in order to search for a foreign policy, all these inhibitions which were acquired from our dependence on our foreign rulers for such a long time, stood in the way of clarifying our foreign policy ideas and implementing them.

It would be wrong to blame anybody for this failure and certainly not Jawaharlal Nehru. He was never very happy about such words as 'non-alignment' 'neutrality' or 'non-involvement'. In fact, no English word could adequately express what he had in mind. As Dr. Appadorai explains, Nehru really wanted a policy of self-respect, for 'self-respect demands according to Nehru that India should be free to express her opinion on the merits of each question'.² But, again, according to Nehru, India was not strong enough 'to act' freely on the merits of each question. Here arose the dilemma.

But the whole nation somehow or other will have to share this ineptitude of our policy because nobody can deny today that whatever Nehru did as Prime Minister had the approval of the nation. It is, therefore, true to

say that if there has been a failure, we are all responsible for this failure, because very seldom in the history of a nation had a national leader enjoyed so much popular support as Nehru did until he died in 1964. We shall have, therefore, to seek anew the basis of a new foreign policy which would really be the beginning of a practical and practicable policy of our relations with other countries. The search for such a foreign policy has become easier today. Since, after 17 years of experience in world affairs and after two wars on our soil, we must have learnt a great deal about the basis of relationships between countries.

We also know better now what are the forces which go to make friendship or enmity between nations and we are able, I hope, now, to recognise the source or the sources of power, where things are shaped either for good or evil for a nation. We have now learnt that by merely trying to be friendly with everybody, one ends up by having no friends at all. We have learnt also, for instance, that by trying to be conciliatory only one cannot avoid conflicts, as was the case with Pakistan. We never looked deep into the causes which separated India and Pakistan and whatever we did was merely a scratch on the surface of the abyss which divided India from Pakistan. We multiplied acts of friendliness and friendship towards Pakistan no doubt but without knowing her real intentions and the result was, as it was bound to be, that almost total alienation took place between the two countries. We have at least learnt the lesson that by mere repetition of outworn platitudes of undivided India we could not remove misunderstanding and far less could we solve it. And this lesson, I believe, will stand us in good stead and will guide us in laying down the foundation of a true Indian policy towards our neighbours.

Changed Situation

What should this policy be? Could it be again non-alignment which was more an attitude than a policy? As I have said before,

1. *Foreign Policies in a World of Change*, New York, 1963 p. 484.

2. *Ibid*, p. 485.

Nehru did not like the word because he found later that what the French described as '*tiers monde*' (near to Nehru's conception) tried also to align itself with similarly non-aligned countries. That is to say, if a country was really non-aligned, why should it then try to align itself with other non-aligned countries? At any rate, the '*tiers monde*' is no longer in good shape.

Nehru is gone and Tito is aging. Since the removal of Ben Bella from power, Nasser's position has suffered considerable eclipse in the Arab world. The failure of the Algiers Conference has brutally demonstrated the division amongst the Afro-Asian countries who were considered to be the most non-aligned countries of the world. On the other hand, closer contacts between the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. have taken away the sharp edges from the blocs and the Sino-Soviet schism and Sino-American confrontation in Vietnam, have added new dimensions to the global tension of the forties and fifties, for which the so-called policy of non-alignment was devised.

The Priorities

What are we to do in the altered conditions of the world and the deteriorating position of the non-aligned camp? How are we to adjust ourselves to the new grave situation which has developed since the Indo-Pakistani war? If until 1962, the main function in our foreign relations was to show the flag, could it remain so after 1965? Soon after the Chinese invasion, the re-appraisal which took place, led us to give priority to (1) safeguarding Indian territory by military means against aggression from China and Pakistan, and (2) to win friendship first of the South-east Asian countries and to enter into an understanding with them in order to checkmate Pakistani and Chinese designs.

Nehru and his advisers had admitted that the priorities in our foreign policy could have been only these two. But what did we do? No doubt, our military means

were augmented but instead of trying to carry on intensive diplomatic negotiations with the neighbouring countries of Asia, we went on doing more or less the same thing as before, namely, using our diplomatic services for carrying on the same routine functions. There was no serious attempt during this period to enter into any understanding, political, military or even cultural, with the countries of this region which might have eventually become our allies one day. The reason of course was that Nehru himself was not interested in any precise commitment and although it is difficult to say how he visualised the defence of India, yet it was obvious that he did not want to commit our country to any common policy with any other country either in Asia, Europe or America.

Seeking Allies

Herein lay, of course, Nehru's originality of thinking, for, in every country and in every century, whenever a State feels itself threatened by a superior power, its main object becomes to win allies for its defence and to create a common ideology against the probable enemy. This had been done during World War II. This was done again and again in the 19th century by various European States and this has also been used by the British themselves throughout the 19th century in our country in order to consolidate their position in India. The British who left behind considerable experience in matters of the defence of India, going back to nearly a century, must have been astonished to find Indian diplomacy so ineffective in the face of Chinese aggression and the Pakistani threat.

The classical method which every State follows in such a situation is to make allies in order to strengthen one's defence and to weaken the defence of the probable enemy. No one in our country thought in those terms, and not even Nehru. He had, however, realised that there was very little sympathy or understanding of India's difficulties in

any part of the world. Yet it is difficult to say from his own declarations whether our virtual isolation led him to think of military and political means of containing China and neutralising Pakistan. Probably he did not, because his disappointment was too great and he was no longer as buoyant and sturdy in body and mind as before.

Revise our Thinking

But, that is not to say that Nehru would not have changed. He had realised that with the Chinese invasion of India, the post-war era of comparative peace had come to an end. He was trying to give the new era a name, but, alas, he was not spared to do so. But we who will carry out the burden he has left, will have to spell out the function and nature of the new period of history we have entered. It is no longer the same and it can no longer be understood by the standards of the forties and the fifties. And as Romesh Thapar says in his poser, the Pakistani invasion of our territory, has brought us in confrontation with the West. And because we had never any commitments to the West (Pakistan had), the West did not feel obliged to be committed to us in spite of the fact that we imagined ourselves to be nearer the West than Pakistan because of our western attitude towards government, law and society. Should we not, therefore, try even at this late hour to revise some of our foreign policy thinking and put it more and more on a *quid pro quo* basis as it is done by every modern State and as it has also been done by every ancient State.

All students of politics know that without alliances, solemnly entered into, one cannot have allies. Mere verbal expressions of sympathy in the domain of diplomacy, have never been considered to be proper substitutes for a treaty, an agreement, or even the signing of a protocol. Why should we then follow a chimeric idea of pleasing everyone, which has caused this deadly isolation for us?

The whole world came to us when Gandhiji was alive and he

was the 'kindly light' which warmed the soul of everyone who visited our country. That country of ours has become today 'an area of darkness' not only in the diseased mind of a rootless expatriate, but in the convictions of many millions of people in the world. Why? Why is it that the prestige and goodwill we acquired in the world when we did not have a foreign office, a foreign service and foreign publicity have been lost to us? Is it not because we have failed to adopt a correct foreign policy? Or, is it because we have from the beginning followed in reality a policy of isolation although we gave it different names in different times?

Effective

At any rate, we know now, as we have seen in the course of the last few years that it is only a very great power, in fact, a super power, which can remain non-aligned in the sense that it can rely entirely on itself for its own protection. Instead of being a stickler for words, the policy which our country, therefore, should adopt in the light of new international alignments need not be divested of the spirit of 'self-respect' which Nehru gave to it so abundantly, but it should emerge at the same time, as an effective policy which would win us friends who would either be on our side or be neutral in the case of conflicts with China or Pakistan or both.

On the other hand, if our diplomacy is skilful enough to convince some of the neighbouring countries that by joining with India in a pact, they will be also securing their own future protection, then we should also enter into such alliances,—military or otherwise—with those countries which feel themselves threatened either by China or by Pakistan. As I have said in the beginning, pacts and alliances need not be considered to be unmentionable subjects, because the age-old convention amongst the States has always been to win allies in order to foil the design of the enemy.

Nehru sincerely believed and said so in his foreign policy decla-

rations that India had not inherited any enmity after independence. How one wished that this were true? The sad fact is that as soon as India became independent, she, like any other country when it attains independence became, like them, the object of envy of other countries. The coming into existence of a new State as important as India, was bound to be looked upon by some countries with suspicion and enmity. It is also in the nature of things. It is unfortunate that we went on believing all the time—in the adage of *Vasudhiva Kutumbakam*—an ideal which is to be aspired but not to be accepted as achieved, and is it really a discredit for a nation that it has an enemy or two? We also know that it is not possible either for an individual or for a nation with definite social aims to please everybody; only the indigent in thinking can believe that he pleases everyone.

Realistic Approach

Unfortunately, however, our official policy to please everybody has now succeeded in pleasing none, and the result is that we were friendless when we needed friends. What is the lesson we can then derive from the isolation and encirclement of our country realised by China and Pakistan? Does it not point to the fact that we shall have to revise our views on international relationship and also change our policy where needed, to suit the new conditions which have arisen in the world due to the Indo-Pakistani war, the war in Vietnam and the Sino-Soviet conflict?

Our national leaders, and also Lal Bahadur Shastri, I believe, have by the method of pragmatic approach to the problem, begun to realise that it was an illusion to think that India will have no enemy and that we can be in the good books of fascists, militarists and democrats at the same time. If we take this assessment into consideration, I am sure we will devise our foreign policy on a more realistic basis having in mind that in doing so we may have to offend some, because then alone might we be able to please those who would be our real friends.

Breaking new ground

K. P. KARUNAKARAN

VERY few will disagree with the view that some hard home-work must be done before we can evolve a foreign policy which will have a perspective. But it is doubtful that that homework can usefully begin with the recalling to our minds of what Jawaharlal Nehru did in an earlier period. Once Nehru was asked whether, at a moment of crisis, he would try to reflect how Gandhi would have reacted to it. His reply was in the negative. Nehru said that he would try to recapture Gandhi's balance of mind and composure and would come to his own conclusions. Those who are in authority now can try to capture Nehru's balance of mind to come to their own views on India's foreign policy.

Any attempt mechanically to apply the so called Nehru view on world affairs in the present day

will be nothing short of disastrous. Towards the end of his life, many events in various parts of the world—and particularly in Asia and Africa—were outstripping Nehru. He was incapable of keeping up with them. His international outlook was, naturally, gradually becoming out of date.

It was true that in the years immediately following 1947, India's refusal to join any bloc promoted her national interests. Equally important is the fact that developments in other parts of the world helped us to pursue a non-aligned policy with vigour and simultaneously get economic and, subsequently, military aid from the two big powers and their allies. The death of Stalin, followed by de-Stalinization in the Soviet Union, and the acceptance by the new Soviet leaders of the concept of peaceful transition

from capitalism to socialism and of the view that peaceful competition with capitalism could be undertaken with co-existence between the two systems, were factors which strengthened the non-aligned trends in the world. Although India was the first non-communist country to take advantage of the new situation in the Soviet Union, she was only its beneficiary and not in any sense its cause.

A few years later, the death of Dulles and the replacement of the Republican administration by Kennedy's Democratic administration in Washington also helped India. The nuclear parity reached by the two big powers and the technological revolution in warfare which made the American bases in Pakistan unimportant, was also another factor which tilted the balance against the aligned in South Asia. The emergence of many African and Asian nations as sovereign members of the international community and the decision of a large number of them to pursue a non-aligned policy vindicated and strengthened India's stand.

Moral Posture

Thus, the success of the non-aligned policy lay not in any inherent philosophical and intellectual superiority of its exponents to others but in the hard realities of the international situation which were moving in its favour. The words and phrases such as 'India was pursuing and promoting peace in a strife-ridden world', were mere sentiments and propaganda such as the claim of the United States that it stood for the 'Free World' and that of the U.S.S.R. that it was championing 'people's democracy and lasting peace'.

Ignoring this fact, many of India's spokesmen, including Nehru, assumed a moral posture. In the first non-aligned conference held at Belgrade, the Indian Prime Minister pleaded that priority must be given to space and not to anti-imperialism. He was not interested in giving representation to the Algerian Provisional Government at Belgrade, as the

Indian Government was not interested in giving recognition to it. More than once, on important matters, India was out-voted at Belgrade. Now, when Indians are told by the two super powers that peace must be given priority in relation to India-Pakistan disputes and that hysteria and preparations for war are unhealthy; we are annoyed without realising that we were annoying other nations in an earlier period.

Out of Step

The Belgrade Conference was not the only occasion which demonstrated that India was gradually becoming out of step with many countries of Asia and Africa. There was a fear in many of these nations and in a country like Cuba that India's championing of peaceful coexistence was a mask for her preference for the *status quo*. Nehru, in his later years, and those who assumed power after his death have done nothing to dispel this fear. The Indian foreign policy-makers seem to be unaware of the political mood of a militant and radical section of the underprivileged nations of the world.

The manner in which India's foreign service and our studies on international affairs are organised is not conducive to the throwing of any fresh light on these areas either by our diplomatic representatives or by our scholars. It is often reported that I.F.S. people do not, as a rule, like to go to Africa. They prefer Europe and America. In the academic institutions there are departments on the Commonwealth, the U.S. and recently attempts are made to organize studies on China. But even on Pakistan, Indian students have to depend upon American books. Africa is not considered as important as the Commonwealth and within the Commonwealth the preference is for the white members.

The Indian newspapers, as a rule, do not perform a better job. Quite a good number of them have representatives in London who report from there on Europe and Africa. Unfortunately, China

is being reported from Hong Kong and now our contacts with Pakistan are broken. We look at Indonesia through Singapore's glasses. Under the circumstances, foreign policy in relation to these areas is formulated and the discussion on it is taking place in blissful ignorance.

The portrayal of Ho Chi Minh by some of the demonstrators of Delhi as one of the villains in the group of Ayub and Mao may be an extreme case of this ignorance. There are varying other shades to it which are not less undesirable.

France's Contribution

Ignoring the significance of recent developments in Asia and Africa is not the only dismal feature. Nothing short of a revolution has taken place in European thinking on world affairs. Very few in India are aware of it and most people are prepared to look at Europe through London. The writer of the *poser* has drawn comparison between de Gaulle's France and the Albanian Government, because both had not shown any enthusiasm towards the *detente* between the two super powers. But their similarity ends there. The most important contribution of France, with or without de Gaulle, to international politics in recent years is what she did for the loosening of the Bloc system. Her rebellion against the U.S. was very healthy in many respects. It is freeing western Europe from U.S. domination. France's recognition of China is breaking the latter's isolation. De Gaulle's advocacy of a neutralized Indo-China has more far-reaching effects than his attempts to make France a nuclear power. The most important of all the developments in Europe is the new economic grouping in that continent which will enable western Europe to emerge as powerful as, if not more powerful than, the United States or the Soviet Union. There is no evidence to suggest that this development has made an impact on Indian foreign policy.

While discussing the matter whether India should remain in or quit the Commonwealth, very few

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have pointed out the significance of this emergence of the new centre of economic power. The discussion was around Britain's attitude towards India-Pakistan conflicts. In regard to Europe, as well as Africa, India must break completely new ground. There is nothing in Nehru's legacy which the present government can take up in these matters.

This is true of Eastern Europe also. The much-publicised Albanian rebellion against the Soviet Union may be a dramatic event, but not the most important one. India should develop completely independent contact with Rumania, Poland, East Germany and Czechoslovakia. Some steps are taken in this field; but they are not enough. Each one of these countries is an independent entity by itself. Cultivating very close relations with each one of them must be considered as important as our enthusiasm for Yugoslavia or our antagonism towards Albania.

Soviet Policy

As was noted earlier, India belonged to the first group of countries who comprehended the changes in Soviet foreign policy and the domestic politics of the post-Stalin era. But the people of India are the slowest to appreciate the recent changes in the post-Khrushchov era. Indira Gandhi, Aruna Asaf Ali, Ambassador Kaul and the 'right' communists have repeatedly assured us that the Soviet policy in relation to India-China conflicts and India-Pakistan conflicts has not changed. No Soviet spokesman has said it. On the other hand, the writings and speeches of Soviet commentators and diplomats clearly indicate that the Soviet Union is taking an increasingly neutral attitude towards India-Pakistan disputes.

The mediation in Tashkent under Premier Kosygin's auspices would not have been suggested by the Soviet Union or accepted by Pakistan if the former is unambiguously on India's side. The fact of the matter is that the Soviet Union wants to disentangle Pakistan from U.S. domination

and does not want that country to fall into China's lap. If Khrushchov was making a breakthrough in the non-communist world by cultivating good relations with the non-aligned nations, Kosygin's government wants to make a breakthrough in the camp of those who were aligned to the West. And Pakistan, whose alignment is very uneasy now, offers the best opportunity for the Soviet Union to test its new policy. In one sense, it is not a departure from Khrushchov, but only taking the new step from him. No doubt the Soviet writers will give a theoretical justification to this policy by characterising Pakistan as a progressive State, with some qualifications.

Even in regard to India-China disputes it will be unwise to take Soviet support to India for granted. If the Soviet-Chinese relations have not improved, it is not because the Soviet authorities have not tried to improve them, but because the Chinese have not responded to their gestures. The Chinese can still change their character, by changing their tune. One must be a very bold man to assert that the Chinese will not, even temporarily, lessen their verbal attacks on the Soviet Union and speak with sweet reasonableness if it is in their interests.

Pakistan and China

Under the circumstances, the only wise policy India can follow is on the assumption that the Soviet Union will not be our reliable ally against China and Pakistan. The view that China's present international outlook is based on the traditional aggressive nationalism of the Chinese people is wrong. In many respects, it resembles the international outlook of the Soviet Union in the early Stalinistic phase, which survived to some extent even in the post-war era. During those days it was not unusual for the Americans to say that Russia would remain as a permanent menace to freedom and world peace.

We are making the same mistake in relation to China now. But

neither the Soviet Union nor Japan is subscribing to the typical Indian view that Pakistan and China are permanent or long-term menaces to India's security or to world peace. Our attempt to seek the friendship of these countries on the basis of hostility towards the Peking-Rawalpindi friendship is a one way love-affair. None of these countries will respond to India. Japan is eager to cultivate cordial relations with China. By temporarily suspending some economic aid to India during the India-Pakistan war, Japan displayed her disapproval of the conduct of our relations with Pakistan. The Soviet Union would not have continued to negotiate economic aid to Pakistan if she was interested in forming an India-Soviet Union-Japan triangle.

No doubt India must maintain cordial relations with the Soviet Union and Japan. But they can be promoted only if we succeed in reducing our tensions with Pakistan and China. The discussions in relation to the convening of the Afro-Asian conference clearly proved the tremendous influence China exercises on many Asian and African countries. An Indian student, who had visited many African countries, reports from that continent that unless India-China relations are restored to a normal level, Africa's image of India will be clouded. We know how many countries have reacted against us in regard to India-Pakistan conflicts. To imagine that such countries as the Soviet Union or Japan will toe the Indian policy is too naive. If we want to maintain good relations with them and travel through the vistas opened up by many recent international developments, the first thing we have to do is to try our level best to improve our relations with Pakistan and China. If we do not do so, we not only will not succeed in forming any alliance—triangular or not, but we will be isolated in the international field.

Our Obsession

The suggestion in the poser that we should evolve a framework within which our foreign policy

can be spelt out is sound. But the detailed suggestions given in it leave out the most important developments in the international field. Our international orientation today is based on an obsession with China and Pakistan as in an earlier period Pakistan's whole international orientation was based on an obsession with India. In our obsession, we forget that the images of Pakistan and China, which the rest of the world has, are not the same as we have. To many countries in Africa and Asia, China is not just a traditionally aggressive nationalist power, but the only economically backward country which made rapid economic progress mainly by relying on her resources. They also know that to us in India 'self-reliance' has remained a slogan. Although China's propaganda in regard to her aid to under-developed countries is highly exaggerated, it is not altogether without significance. Even in India's immediate neighbours like Nepal, Burma and Ceylon, China has made successful diplomatic and economic thrusts. The same applies to many West-Asian and African countries. China's trade with the U.K., Canada and other western countries is not of insignificant proportions.

New Power Centre

China has become another centre of power in the world today—however weak it is when compared with the two big powers. Jawaharlal Nehru's diplomacy in relation to China succeeded when China was weak, diplomatically isolated and was in need of India's support to make an entry into the international arena. He could not adjust to the quick developments in China and the fact that she was no more in need of India's patronising support and that she was no more bound to the bandwagon of the Soviet Union. Many European, Asian, African and Latin American countries are aware of the significance of this emergence of the new centre of power in the Far East. Even in the U.S., there are powerful and influential groups which advocate the establishment of diplomatic and economic

relations with China. If China will keep within limits, even the Soviet Union will be prepared to recognize China's special interests in the region surrounding her. Now the question may arise: will China keep within limits?

Fluid Situation

No definite answer can be given to it at this stage. But if history is any pointer, we must not rule out such a possibility. We know from the experience of many revolutionary regimes, including that of the Soviet Union, that, after achieving a certain degree of political stability, economic progress and diplomatic recognition, they behave like a satisfied and even a conservative power. First we made the mistake of not counting upon the transition of China from the initial stage of the status of a weak country to a new centre of power. Now we are ruling out the possibility of China moving towards a third stage of a conservative and satisfied power which will be interested in preserving the *status quo* in the world. But we cannot ignore the fact that other powers are not ruling out this possibility. Japan, China's closest neighbour and once her bitterest enemy, is interested in cultivating close and cordial relations with her now.

Pakistan's international outlook is also not confined to hostility towards India. Whatever may be the motive behind that country's moving closer to China and the Soviet Union, the fact remains that its effect is to make Pakistan less aligned to the U.S. In India's own long term interest this is a healthy development. Many Asian and African countries have welcomed this development and Pakistan's position in the Afro-Asian world has also changed as a result of the new trends in her foreign policy. And this is not a temporary phenomenon because many other developments in the world favour Pakistan's new international posture. Even the U.S. is not anxious to get back Pakistan as an ally, with all its liabilities and no significant asset at present. The current trends in the Soviet and Chinese

foreign policies are also helpful to Pakistan. These factors in relation to Pakistan are not taken into account in the formulation and discussions on foreign policy in this country.

The Broad Picture

Broadly stated, the recent developments in the world scene are the following: 1) the loosening of the bloc systems—specifically, France and Pakistan have disrupted the NATO and SEATO alliances and China, Rumania, Albania the alliances in the communist world. The call of polycentricism in world communism was made, and with favourable response, by such communist parties as that of Italy also, which are opposed to China. On the main question of world peace and easing of tensions between the two powers this is a healthy trend. (2) One of the by-products of this development is the coming closer together of the two former aligned nations like China and Pakistan—one of which was aligned to the Soviet Union and the other to the U.S. (3) The concept of non-alignment developed on the basis that there are two crystallized power blocs has become out of date. There are so many new centres of power in the world which was once a bi-polar world. Indian foreign policy must recognize this fact and India must develop increasingly closer contacts with all these centres of power.

(4) The 'Peking-Pindi' coalition—if one can call it a coalition—and its combined enmity towards India is a passing phase. The continued hostility of any one of these powers, towards India must also not be taken for granted. As many other countries are not obsessed, as we are, with India-Pakistan and India-China conflicts, they have welcomed many other new trends in the foreign policies of the two countries. While developing a new international outlook and searching for allies and friends among other countries, we have to be conscious of the fact that the nature of our unhappy relations with these two countries will have unfortunate repercussions elsewhere.

Books

INDIA AND REGIONAL INTEGRATION IN ASIA

By Sisir Gupta. Bombay, 1964, pp. 155.

INDIA'S RELATIONS WITH PAKISTAN (1954-1957)

By Sisir Gupta. New Delhi, 1958. pp. 62.

As potentially the major powerful nation in South and South-east Asia, India's attitude toward regional integration is particularly important. In the background of the international situation where rigid bipolarity is steadily giving place to a meaningful nation-State system with a propensity to strive for regional alliances, scholarly studies on the subject

are valuable. These two studies by a well qualified author are, therefore, useful contributions to the knowledge on the subject.

The first book discusses India's over-all objectives and policies in foreign affairs, the role which India has played in different conferences of Asian States including her efforts toward regional integration, the attitudes of other Asian States and the trends in Asian and international affairs.

The relationship between India and Pakistan is of particular importance in any attempted 'process of

regional integration' in South and South-east Asia. This is what the author takes up in the second study and briefly surveys developments in Indo-Pakistan relations between 1954 and 1957. During this period, there was unprecedented public enthusiasm in both the countries for a negotiated settlement. It was followed by an equally unprecedented public demonstration of hatred of India in Pakistan. The author has analytically spotlighted the factors accounting for this 'love-hate' relationship. It was then that external pressures made the most out of the differences between the two countries. Through involvement in military pacts, Pakistan was weaned away to a course in external relations which proved to be diametrically opposed to the 'process of regional integration'.

The term 'regional integration' has been used in these studies in its wider connotation as 'an association of States based upon location in a given geographical area, for the safeguarding and the promotion of participants' (study at S. No. 1 p. 28). The nature of such an association has been taken as the product of a long gestation period of regional cooperation with a goal for promoting an ever increasing mutual relationship. Such a 'process of integration' had its deep rooted and wider prevalence in European countries only.

The same could hardly be said about Asian countries. In any envisaged area of cooperation and integration, the pre-requisites of the existence of a built-in capacity to prevail over the countering external pressures and a workable degree of self-sufficiency within such an area of cooperation, are conspicuously lacking in the Asian context. Here the outside powers have, in the present situation, a capacity to put up one or a group of nations as a 'balancer' against another State or group of States. Moreover, the issues dividing the Asian nations effectively counter such a process. Their differences can be exploited by outside powers to perpetuate the same and thereby arrest the progress in the 'process of integration'.

As a whole, the prevailing balance of forces in the international scene is such that a meaningful 'nation-State system' has come to stay. It is more congenial to the emergence of regional power-patterns than to that of regional integration.

The author has himself highlighted such difficulties in detail (ibid. pp. 101-2). But, he has still preferred to take the prospects of mutually collaborative activity as conducive to the process of integration which in its wider connotations, as earlier explained, has much relevance in the context of European countries only.

The author succeeds in resisting the temptation to remain stuck in the morass of sentiment and frustration and has rightly emphasised that the 'process of regional integration' will have much meaning only if mutually collaborative activity between India and Pakistan builds up a nucleus for

a wider regional integration. It is true that the envisaged 'regional integration,' to use the term of his choice, will not have much substance until India and Pakistan take up the role of prime-movers in that direction. It is, however, too much to come to a conclusion that 'India and Pakistan have between them the most fertile ground for the attempted regional integration in Asia.' It is like mixing up what could be the ideal with what is practicable in the present context and mistaking the latter for the former.

It is the unfortunate but stark reality that the relations between Pakistan and India could not be but a projection of the respective outlook and the approach of the leadership of the Muslim League and the Congress Party. Pakistan came into being and got the attributes of an independent and sovereign nation partly because the Congress Party which provided leadership to free India achieved it for the sub-continent and partly because the retiring rulers, the British, helped her to come into being and later continued to prop up her position.

No wide, pervasive social movement in Pakistan with a promise of far reaching changes has ever thrown up a leadership from among the people. No doubt, a leadership which could provide the lead to the people in Pakistan in external relations could not be on any basis other than that of hatred toward India. This has been the major reason for the unfortunate reality that, notwithstanding the fact that both countries have much in common as well as promising prospects in mutually collaborative activity, an ever continuing drift has continued to characterise the relationship between them.

The attitude of the leaders in Pakistan toward any realistic 'process of regional integration' was fore-shadowed by the attitude of the League leaders even before the two countries emerged as independent States. The author has himself highlighted this aspect though he has not given due recognition to it in arriving at his conclusions. The Muslim League dissociated itself from the Asian Relations Conference held in New Delhi in 1947, and called it a 'thinly disguised attempt on the part of Hindu Congress to boost itself politically as the prospective leader of the Asian people' (ibid p. 36). Similarly, a realistic observation that owing to the 'continued existence of antipathy to such a course in the political infra-structure of Pakistan' (ibid p. 113), the 'process of regional integration' is seriously impeded, has not found its due weight in the conclusions arrived at by him.

These elements in the League continued to thwart realistic attempts by the enlightened leadership of Ghulam Mohammad, the Governor General of Pakistan, even to arrive at a workable and mutually useful rapprochement between the two countries. Similar attempts by Mohd. Ali Bogra also met with failure. He had to turn *volte-face* even on his own earlier statements in order to rehabilitate his position in Pakistan. The crux of the problem was aptly pinpointed in an editorial comment in *The Hindu* in its issue of September 4, 1953, that the Prime Minister

of Pakistan 'does not yet feel strong enough to stand up to the clamant pressures of the extremist section even while trying to carry on the negotiations' (S. No. 2 p. 13).

The prevailing objective conditions conspicuously highlight the fact that for the present and pending the emergence of a new leadership in Pakistan out of a wide-spread and deep rooted social movement, it is not possible to bank upon Pakistan to join hands with India as a prime-mover for the envisaged 'process of regional integration'. This naturally poses the question: what are the alternative avenues to set the desired 'process' into motion? The author has not dealt with this aspect of the issue although he has discussed strivings by India to evolve an Asian policy.

The goal of 'regional integration' being wide off the mark for the present, the factors for and against a case for a 'regional power-pattern' could have been better taken up for an analytical study. Due importance has not been given to the fact that mutuality of stakes and common interests in a given situation are no less a factor as a unifying force. Such avenues can be explored simultaneously with the attempts for forming a nucleus for 'regional integration' in the Indian sub-continent. The latter may not necessarily precede the former, notwithstanding the fact that it will ultimately be the former which would eventually provide significant substance to the envisaged 'regional integration'.

On the whole, in these two scholarly studies the author has opened up a fruitful and important field for further investigations.

Purushottam Prabhakar

INDIA-CHINA-TIBET TRIANGLE By Ram Gopal.
Pustak Kendra, Lucknow, 1964.

INDIA, CHINA AND NORTHERN FRONTIERS By
Rammanohar Lohia.
Navahind Prakashan, Hyderabad, 1963.

Ram Gopal's book is of value not only because it gives a very competent summary of claims and counter claims, arguments and counter arguments, put forward by the two sides over a border dispute between the two biggest countries of Asia and the two most populous countries of the world. The real worth of the book lies in the fact that this is an objective study and the author has succeeded in taking a long range, historical view of the problem, and has not allowed his patriotic emotions to get the better of demands of academic probity. He has not just dismissed the case of the other country but has taken it into consideration unlike the eminent political leader, Rammanohar Lohia, in his study of the Himalayan States.

The purpose of the two books is different. Ram Gopal has gone to the root of the trouble, what mistakes were committed and what could possibly be the best solution for all concerned, whether one might agree with the solution or not. If in the final analysis he finds India's case very strong, he has not

done it by ignoring the arguments of the other side but after taking them into consideration. But Lohia's aim is that of a political partisan who wants primarily to discredit the ruling party and its leader. Lohia almost gives the impression that but for him the aggression on our borders would not have been brought to light. And Lohia knew from the very beginning what was in the Chinese mind. One wonders, though, whether Lohia's opposition to the government's Tibet and China policy was really due to his omniscience or to his general temper of almost total opposition to the government and its Prime Minister.

Moreover, Lohia's book deals less with foreign policy and more with India's external problems in Kashmir, NEFA and Nagaland. He has a number of useful and helpful suggestions which are not confined to the purview of policy but are recommendations for supervising and selecting benevolent civil servants and for administering these areas. One thing, however, which is transparent in the book is Lohia's patriotism and nationalism as well as his faith in democratic socialism.

Ram Gopal points out correctly, that subsequent events which culminated in the war in 1962 were a logical development of the decision taken by the Chinese communists to liberate Tibet from its own people—the Chinese presence in Tibet made the subsequent dispute almost inevitable and converted the Indo-Tibetan border into the India-China border. It has been suggested by many that the seeds of mischief were sown when India accepted Chinese suzerainty over Tibet. It is always easy to put the blame on the shoulders of one person rather than to analyse the situation as it existed 15 years ago. Ram Gopal is inclined to doubt whether things would have been very different if India had not accepted this principle of suzerainty. It is hardly likely that India's refusal would have deterred the Chinese from advancing into Tibet.

So far as the political status of Tibet is concerned, Ram Gopal has taken pains to go through the whole issue over the last three hundred years and is convinced that in order to keep Russia out and for the sake of convenience as they themselves did not want to move in, the British were paying lip service to the principle of Chinese suzerainty but in fact they had been treating Tibet as an independent country and sometimes both China and Tibet complained to the British against each other. Surely a country would not complain to a third party about a part of its own territory. However, scholars need to do more research regarding the status of Tibet and its relations with its neighbours and they need to make more extensive use of not only Tibetan and Chinese sources but also Mongolian, Nepalese, Bhutanese and Soviet Central Asian sources, besides Indian materials on the subject.

Ram Gopal has suggested two possible solutions to the border conflict between India and China. One is the old suggestion of Nehru to refer the issue to the International Court and he believes that India's case

is so strong that there is little chance of her losing it. Precisely for the same reason the Chinese are unwilling to accept it. His other suggestion is to oblige the Soviet Union to take a hand and secure a settlement. It is doubtful, however, if the Soviet Union has any leverage left with the Chinese communists and if Peking would accept Moscow as the arbiter.

Gargi Dutt

STRUGGLE FOR THE HIMALAYAS: A Study of Sino-Indian Relations By Shanti Prasad Varma.

University Publishers, Jullunder. 1965, pp. 342.

The Chinese invasion of India in 1962 created an awareness of the need for a reappraisal of Sino-Indian relations and the responsibility of making such a reappraisal fell on those engaged in teaching and research. The publication of *Struggle for the Himalayas* indicates the acceptance of this responsibility. Written by an experienced professor of political science, this is so far the only study of India-China relations brought out in book form by an Indian scholar after the Chinese aggression.

The book is divided into four sections each dealing with the historical background, the consequences of the aggression, the prelude to the aggression, and a reassessment of India's foreign policy. In the section on the background, Professor Varma discusses how Sino-Indian friendship grew and solidified through various stages and how shifts came in China's policy towards India in particular and towards other Asian countries in general. The second section deals with the prelude to the Chinese invasion of India in all its perspectives. Thus, an analysis of the claims and counter claims in the border question, an account of the revolt in Tibet, and a discussion of Chinese diplomacy—they all find place in the second section.

While the Chinese motives behind the aggression and its impact on India's domestic politics and defence form the subject-matter of the third section, an examination of India's foreign policy in the light of recent changes in her relations with neighbouring countries is reserved for the fourth section. This fourth (and the last) section covers a variety of topics: theory and practice of non-alignment, India's relation with Pakistan, Nepal, Burma, and Ceylon, the Kashmir issue, and South Asia as a region.

Obviously, then, the book covers a wide field but this wide coverage itself affects the quality of the book. One wonders why the inclusion of India's relations with so many countries and of the Kashmir question was found necessary in a book dealing with Sino-Indian relations. The labour wasted on these irrelevant topics would have been well spent on the other relevant aspects of Sino-Indian relations, in which case the general quality of the book could perhaps be improved and the author too could be saved from the criticism of having failed in an ambitious undertaking. Actually the book offers a case of defective organization. The title 'Struggle for the Himalayas' and the sub-title 'A Study in Sino-Indian Relations' assume that the relations

between India and China centre on the question as to whom the Himalayas belong to; and hence an impression is conveyed that Professor Varma identifies the Sino-Indian border question with the struggle for the mastery of the whole of the Himalayas. This implicit assumption is neither warranted by facts nor substantiated by the author's own treatment of the subject.

Beside the structural defects, the book is a monument of haste. It seems to have been hastily written, hastily printed, hastily proof-read, and even hastily bound (take, for example, the correction of a spelling mistake on the spine of the book and the appendage to the twentieth chapter of the footnotes which are meant for the nineteenth chapter). Ultimately, what suffers is the quality and the book reads like a first draft, despite the author's claim that the manuscript underwent several revisions. From the unusually long preface the author emerges as an important man but from the book only as an ordinary scholar. It is a case of a superfluous preface to a superficial book; and it still leaves scope for a better work on the subject.

However, it will be an injustice to Professor Varma not to point out a significant and praiseworthy aspect of the book. The last chapter of his book is devoted to 'South Asia as a Region: Problems and Prospects'. No Indian scholar, as far as known to this reviewer, has ever attempted a study of South Asia as a region. So much so that programmes of area studies flourish in quite a few institutions in this country without a clear idea as to what an area study means. From the point of view of India's defence, South Asia is an important region and Professor Varma has rightly hinted at the need for studying the common problems of South Asian countries. It is hoped that this part of Professor Varma's book will be taken by Indian scholars as a serious reminder of their responsibility to study South Asia as a region and as an international system both in the context of India's interest and international politics.

Reviewer

THE SINO-INDIAN DISPUTE. By N. J. Nanporia.
Times of India Publications, July 1963.

An anthology of N. J. Nanporia's provocative articles which appeared in *The Times of India*, in the form of a weekly commentary during the critical months between September 1962 and June 1963, has been published in book form.

There are in all thirty two articles in the book. Most of the articles have a direct or indirect bearing on the crucial phase of Sino-Indian relations, when New Delhi was confronted with Chinese massive military onslaught and deceptive political moves.

Some of the articles, especially of the earlier phase of the crisis months, can best be characterized as a probe and a plea. They are a probe in the sense of N.J.N.'s attempts to unravel the rationale of New Delhi's China policy or the woeful absence of it as he makes the readers believe. He assails New

Delhi's attempts as 'piecemeal', 'un-coordinated' and 'ad hoc' reactions to Chinese tactics. Such a policy according to him was a result of a 'lack of an over-all policy' towards China 'in reference to which immediate answers can be found from crisis to crisis instead of hopelessly 'drifting from crisis to crisis'.

In some other articles, one can clearly discern N.J.N.'s plea for a clear-cut policy which could counter Chinese political-cum-military machinations.

He very rightly pleads for a careful appreciation of China's aims and tactics without undue 'excitement', 'emotionalism', 'exaggerated expectations' and 'un-realistic estimate' of what she intends to do. His defence of non-alignment and his ability to forecast the possibilities of Chinese unilateral withdrawal are remarkable.

He demands that New Delhi should abandon some of the myths and false impressions which it had created while projecting the non-alignment policy in the past. In an article entitled 'Playing it Cool' written on December 24, 1962, he observes that 'Non-alignment was pictured in the past as an inability to decide, a reluctance to act, an evasion of responsibility and a rejection of force under any circumstances. Events have shown that it need not be anything of the kind and that, simply defined, non-alignment is a refusal to join military alliances and equally a refusal to assume that a conflict between the communist and non-communist worlds is inevitable. For the rest it is inconsistent neither with receiving military aid nor with exercising its right of self-defence.'

In another context in the same article, he writes 'Non-alignment as it really is must be resuscitated so as to enable New Delhi to have a coherent point of view and to demonstrate that if India has not surrendered to communist China it has certainly not in any sense "sold" itself to the West.'

Thus we see that his defence of non-alignment was both forceful and purposeful and that too at a time when an avalanche of criticism was blowing against it. The merit of his articles lies in the fact that his observations on Sino-Indian relations, India's non-alignment policy, India and foreign aid, and his plea to streamline the Ministry of External Affairs are as relevant today as they were three years ago.

If one were to look in the book for a well argued alternative to New Delhi's China policy, then one would be disappointed. Neither the nature of the book, which is a collection of old articles, nor the purpose of the author seems to be to provide a substitute for New Delhi's much-maligned China policy. The refreshing way in which N.J.N. looked at the drifting events of 1962 pointing out the vacillations of New Delhi's China policy, warning us against self-deceptions, and cautioning us against Sinophobia, is really noteworthy.

To sum up, while N.J.N. has given vague hints of the line of approach that could have been followed by India, he has not spelt out any concrete policy

towards China which India ought to have followed in the past or could with advantage follow in the future. Let us hope that he will bring out in regular book form the framework of such a policy with the pros and cons clearly analysed.

R. Ramakrishnan

INDIA AND SOUTH EAST ASIA 1947-1960. A Study of India's Policy Towards the South East Asian Countries in the Period 1947-1960 By Ton That Thien.

Librairie Droz, Geneva, 1963.

It was with a profound sense of shock that many observers in India suddenly realized in 1962 that our policies have not been properly understood in, of all places, the capitals of the South-east Asian countries. For years there was a general impression that with rich cultural contact in the past, with common experiences under colonial domination of one or the other European power and with identical interests in future, India and South-east Asian countries are close to each other and would come closer still in the future. It is with dismay that it is realised that they have drifted apart in the course of the last decade and the frantic efforts of the Ministry of External Affairs in the last two years have still to bear fruit. It is unfortunate that the study of our policy towards our closest neighbours is extremely limited even at the academic level until very recent times.

South-east Asia is a vital area. The smaller countries in the region have been under the shadows of the two major powers in the area, China and India, and in the past they had been subjected to invasions by both China and India. Thousands of years of contact with these two powers have left indelible impressions on the countries in the region. During the colonial era these contacts had been snapped and there was a tacit understanding that the powers would not disturb their possessions and for over three hundred years contact even among themselves was restricted.

The sudden collapse of the colonial powers following the Japanese attack and the emergence of independent countries in the post-war period changed the picture completely. The withdrawal of the colonial power caused a 'power vacuum' and almost immediately after the war the new independent countries of South-east Asia were drawn in one way or the other by the power blocs. The area soon became important from every angle. What happened in the area would inevitably affect India considerably.

India's position in the area is delicate and the adoption of a suitable policy had not been easy. Her size, political stability, economic development and other such factors had led many Indian leaders to urge Nehru in the early years after independence to assume leadership in Asia. Ton That Thien cites numerous spokesmen, including Vijayalakshmi Pandit, S. K. Patil, M. Gautam and several others, who urged the late Prime Minister to assume such a leadership. Nehru however firmly rejected

such suggestions while at the same time granted that 'a certain responsibility is cast upon India ... for taking the initiative sometimes and helping others to cooperate.'

Even this cautious approach had exposed the country to several criticisms from neighbouring countries. The mention of 'Greater India', 'Further India' and 'External India' all had been resented and Ton That Thien himself writes: 'When K. M. Panikkar wrote, as he did in *Asia and Western Dominance*, about India and the lesser countries of Asia he betrayed a certain chauvinism. When Mr. Nehru spoke dogmatically, as he did at Bandung, he also did the same, and other Asians as Carlos Romulo, were quick in pointing it out.' Herein lies the difficulty of evolving a suitable policy towards South-east Asia.

It is now well known that Nehru was not anxious to develop South-east Asia as a 'third bloc' and as Ton That Thien himself points out the 'idea of an Asian Federation or Union ceased to occupy a prominent place in the statements of the Indian statesman,' in the post-independence years. Nehru was anxious that South-east Asia should be an area of peace. The countries of South-east Asia should not be subjected to the stresses and strains of Cold War politics and Nehru was striving for this. The policy of non-alignment was pursued by Indonesia and Burma with great advantage and while Nehru was anxious to maintain close relations with these countries, he firmly rejected the idea of these countries forming a bloc. India's main aim has been 'to lessen fear, bring about a climate of peace and ensure collective peace through the practice and advocacy of Panch Sheel.' In striving for these, argues Ton That Thien, 'India furthered her national self-interests well,' and was not motivated by any moral considerations. Her policy, argues Ton That Thien, 'was nothing more and nothing less than a policy of balance of power.'

India's policy towards South-east Asia in the crucial period 1950-54 will always remain a matter of acute controversy. Did her policies indirectly favour the Chinese interests and was India oblivious to the dangers of China's expansionist policies in Asia? Ton That Thien analyses the interests of China in the area in lengthy chapters and argues that India 'was very useful to China.' India played a dominant role in 'demanding a determining voice for India and China in Asia and South-east Asia and in maintaining unity in Asia and Africa. India thereby prevented a shift of the balance of power in favour of the West.' India's policy in general has been to favour the adoption of non-alignment and Cambodia proclaimed her neutrality in 1954, largely as a result of the encouragement of Nehru, as Ton That Thien argues.

Analysing Cambodia's relations with India since the Bandung Conference, Ton That Thien states that by 1955 Cambodia was dissatisfied with India's role in the International Control Commission and India's support 'was limited and was obviously less

than' what Cambodia had expected from a sister.' Prince Norodom Sihanouk, who according to Ton That Thien was looking up to Nehru for support in his disputes with the neighbouring States, gradually drifted away from India and began 'to turn towards Communist China for support.' Perhaps there were similar shifts in the policies of other countries of South-east Asia in later years.


India's role in finding a solution for the conflict in Vietnam between the Vietnamese nationalists and the French had been criticised by observers in India and abroad. It has been argued that India was acutely aware of the dangers of the expansion of communism in the area and was aware that Ho Chi Minh was considerably influenced by Chinese communists. It is this awareness that led India to be hesitant in her support for the national movement and it was the awareness that unless a peaceful solution is sought the Chinese might gain that led India to play such an important role in the Geneva Conference. The outcome of the Geneva Conference pleased the government and the people.

Ton That Thien has studiously gathered evidence to demonstrate how India's position had shifted from a pro-North Vietnam stand to that of rather cool relations with them in later years. It will remain a moot question whether the 'stubborn refusal to yield to popular pressure in favour of Ho Chi Minh's government,' had prevented the spread of communism in the area. Writing in 1963, Ton That Thien states that 'in 1960 one thing was obvious. For the nationalists of Vietnam, starting as they did in 1945 with severe handicaps, and with little prospect of standing successfully against the communists, the deadlock was itself a great achievement. To this achievement, India had contributed a part which although not decisive, was important.' The problem of Vietnam had assumed new dimensions and one only wonders what Ton That Thien would have to say now.

Ton That Thien has devoted several chapters to trace India's relations with Burma, Indonesia, Cambodia, Laos, Malaya, Thailand and the Philippines. The Indian problems in Burma and Malaya are traced in detail and India's attitude towards them are analysed fully. Ton That Thien argues that in the case of Burma and Malaya 'the Indian policy... contributed to the defeat of a communist attempt to seize power by armed violence. The emergence of an independent and non-communist Malaya within the Commonwealth, anxious to maintain and develop friendly relations with India, has been a strategic economic and diplomatic gain to the latter.'

Ton That Thien's book is a well documented study of India's policy during a crucial period. But unfortunately since 1960 events in South-east Asia have moved so fast that some of the observations may not be as valid today as they were when the book was first published.

S. Krishnamurthy



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Communication

The foreign policy of a country is becoming an increasingly sophisticated art, and the emergence of the cadre of technocrats is an inevitable concomitant of this process. Fortunately, in India the left-over second rankers of the nationalist movement with their roots in the grass manage to remain in power, albeit precariously. Till political leadership remains in the hands of such a group with its sociological base in the peasant-oriented rural society, the slogan of new India will remain 'Jai Jawan—Jai Kisan—Jai Hind'.

But even in normal times the exacting demands of economic planning has put an undue premium upon trained civil servants and a consequent dependence upon them by our Vidyapith-brand leadership; and it may be a matter of fortuitous relief for us to find that the latter's purely moralistic fervour was still strong enough to outweigh the pressures of the technocrats in favour of a policy of the 'Bomb' and the so called 'defence-oriented planning.' For, otherwise, political authority in the country would have been run by a still more exclusively select elite and, in all probability, also run for them. This danger is still not obviated.

In extraordinary situations like what this country has just been through, another

source of danger to the political leadership is the higher echelons of the armed forces, and more so if, as in this country, the political leadership is still groping to catch the imagination of the mass. As a war is fought on the battlefield, the military leadership has to be given its due share of credit to keep the morale of the fighting forces high and so also the spirit of the people. But the more the political leadership tries to play up the armed forces as a vindication of its faith in them, the more its own need for popular support. This need necessitates that the press, radio and all other means of mass communication be attuned to the task of hammering into the public mind the fact that the country is being led properly, ably and on the right lines. An analysis of our recent crisis will amply demonstrate the usual pattern of this general rule.

Before actually analysing the role of intellectuals in the foreign policy-making of a country like India, where the gulf in the social milieu and political acumen between the intellectuals and the common man is so great (with notable exceptions on either side), it is worthwhile recapitulating the course of events which led to two neighbouring countries getting caught up in a descending spiral of worsening relationship, till President Ayub saw India

and Pakistan 'at war', fed, as it were by the press of a guided democracy and the 'free press' of the 'lamp of freedom in Asia'. In fact, so similar were the undertones and overtones of the newspapers of the two countries that, for quite some time before the open clash and ever since, the newspaper headlines as also part of the news coverage in either of the countries could be anticipated by simply interchanging the names of the two countries. It seems ironical that the press of two supposedly opposed forms of government had served an identical purpose for their respective countries.

Professional politicians greeted the news of our troops' crossing of the ceasefire line in Kashmir by a sense of jubilant relief (that results from giving vent to pent-up emotions), and by the time the Defence Minister announced in Parliament that the Indian army had crossed the international border (just the crossing of the border, no victory nor any successful exploit), the entire sting of the opposition's motion of no-confidence had been taken out and the whole 'Opposition' vied, member with member, to establish its patriotic bonafides by an unequivocal support of the government's action. Some offered to join the armed forces, while quite a few offered their services 'in any capacity' that the government thought fit. Opposition seemed suddenly out of fashion and dissent a virtual taboo.

The common man greeted the news of our troops' march towards Lahore with snake-dances in the shopping centre of the capital and for a few the nostalgic memories of the 'Anarkali Kulfi' kept their palates moist and spirits high. The 'free press' saw in it the high morale of the people and the leaders called it the 'grim determination' of the nation. In fact the news of the opening of every new front by our armed forces was greeted by an increasing crescendo of ovation from our leaders and there pervaded a sense of fulfillment all around. It was an interesting sight to see the leaders when the nation was 'at war'. It reminded one of Nero with his fiddle.

The situation obviously called for a voice of restraint, may be a voice of dissent, howsoever ineffective that might initially have been. The press, probably for reasons already analysed, did not, the common man could not and the politician dared not. Even in normal times—more so in an emotionally surcharged situation—the most well-meaning politician's need for popular support precludes all possibilities of going against popular opinions and is very often an inspiration for the expedient display of

popular emotions (this may, in a way, be welcome in our country where the opposition's sense of propriety so often needs being enforced by the Marshall's baton). The increasing impatience discernible in the public pronouncements of our erstwhile appeasing leaders is a pointer to the proposition.

The same is proved by the fact that even those of our public leaders whose patriotic bonafides are above board by a life-time of unselfish sacrifices and who are otherwise not averse to speaking out the most unpopular proposal at the most inconvenient moment, dared not voice a note of dissent. Or was it an indication of the absolute justness of our cause? Or perhaps everyone was just being 'clever' after the stifling experience of the post '62 witch-hunt. If such a situation leads to a form of mental militarisation in the nation and executive dictatorship in the country followed by a total bankruptcy of creative activity, it is the intellectuals of our country who must accept the blame for having helped in this process by their own default.

The above observations could be made about the general policies of the country, particularly during a crisis, but their greater relevance lies in the domain of foreign policy which is increasingly being recognised as a country's first line of defence; and till the urge for self-preservation of a nation—even at the cost of others, continues to play the role in national emotion as it does now, the greatest excesses could be committed and the gravest 'adventures' undertaken in the name of defending the territorial integrity of a country. This brings the realm of foreign policy necessarily under the vigilance of our intellectuals, with the common man so innocent of the intricacies of a policy which ostensibly is remote from his immediate concern. It is here that the task of the intellectuals is so very challenging, and it is precisely here that their failure appears so dismally patent.

Ever since the 'ethical' period of our foreign policy the role of the Indian intellectuals has been that of general conformism with the official policy, and in this the Indian intellectuals appear to be a shade 'better' than the 'gullible' American intellectuals who evoked so much critical comment from McGeorge Bundy. In the heydays of the glory of non-alignment, the moralistic overtones of an astute manoeuvre of *real politik* was underwritten by our intellectuals; and while some traced 'non-alignment' back to the days of the Buddha and Asoka, a few dubbed it as a continuation of the Gandhian 'philosophy of restraint'. Thus, when 'Goa'

became a military necessity both the 'Buddhists' and the Gandhians had to wear the sack cloth.

One is immediately reminded of the comment of an eminent western sinologist—by no means a sino-phil—of what he said while reviewing the special China issue of a scholarly journal—the mouthpiece of an autonomous research institution, brought out immediately following the Indo-Chinese border war. The reviewer pointed out that, of over thirty articles in the journal, not one had to say anything sympathetic about the Chinese, nor was even one critical of the policy of the government of India. This is not to suggest that one had to be critical of the Indian case so as to be objective. But it certainly could never be a case where the entire Chinese claim was one of a series of unjustifiable actions and the entire Indian point of view based on a series of equally justifiable ones.

Yet, it was precisely this which this group of eminent scholars tried to convey. But the most revealing part of the reviewer's comment was when he said that barely two years before, during the 'Bhai Bhai' days of our relationship he had found, while in this country, tremendous sympathetic response to China and the Chinese among Indian intellectuals. Even in the recent issue of a famous scholarly American journal, while reviewing the book of an eminent Indian scholar, the reviewer hints at the same aspect of Indian scholarship—the difficulties the Indian intellectuals are facing while writing about those whom the government is not friendly with. It may be a tremendous strain on our credulity to believe that these responses of our intellectuals are part of the process of democratic spontaneity.

It is equally difficult to explain all these away as the general western desire to run down India, the intellectuals notwithstanding. It is well worth remembering that in the USA, even in the worst days of McCarthyism, scholars like Owen Lattimore, Justice Douglas and Hans Morgenthau disagreed with the very basis of American foreign policy and served their countries in the way scholars were meant to serve. The U.S. Senate Committee's screening of Owen Lattimore and the latter's forthright answers are now a by-word in scholarly integrity. Even in recent times, standing on the base of a pathologically anti-communist society, the record of the American intellectuals has baffled the imagination of even the most diehard sceptic. The proverbial liberalism of British scholarship has also been a great foil against the bastion of social conservatism which permeates British political life and

right from Edmund Burke through Harold Laski and the fabian socialists up to the left-wing labour group we see 'His Majesty's opposition' in its role of political education backed up by a steady stream of fearless intellectuals.

Unfortunately in our country, when this vacuum, like in most other spheres of our requirements, is filled up by foreign aid of the variety of Selig Harrison, Carl Wiltfogal or Ronald Segal, the response it evokes from our intellectuals is one of self-righteous indignation. One wishes that the revolutionary doctrine which is sought to be created out of the homely virtue of 'self-reliance' includes as its primary pre-requisite, 'self-reliance' in the sphere of fearless intellectuals.

In analysing the causes of this 'bliss' of credulity on the part of our intellectuals, one is tempted to conclude that it is largely a self-imposed blessing, apart from the lure of some imaginary plums, a greed whetted by an occasional crumb falling into the open mouths of one of their fold. For some, of course, the stifling effects of the dreaded DIR cannot be ruled out, particularly after its all-comprehension sweep—from pornographers to political adversaries, and from pressmen to playwrights.

An analysis will reveal that the greatest single dampener to any honest intellectual pursuit—not to speak of creative non-conformism—in the country, particularly the capital, has been the 'Establishment'. For the articulate intellectuals of the capital (which, incidentally, drains off a substantial part of the country's total supply due as much to better emoluments as also due to its proximity to the Establishment) can broadly be divided into two categories: those who are already in the Establishment (mostly, 'ex-officio' intellectuals) for whom the area of disagreement varies inversely with the interest of the latter in them; and those who want to make a break-through into the Establishment, for whom the degree of dissent is an alibi to pressurise their own indispensability. A pointer to the latter group—by far the greater—is to be found in the competition among them to invite blissfully 'innocent' ministers to visit higher research institutions, as also the tell-tale spectacle of such ministers delivering convocation addresses.

One important psychological sustainer to this lure has been the indirect consequence of comparative material security. For the bulk of them, financially speaking 'it was never so good', with a reasonably good condition of service and substantial leisure.

With the result, as it so often happens with a materially contented professional class or intellectuals, the only articulate section among them is the one seeking alternative means of social recognition through political power.

In the provincial towns, it works the other way round—with a comparatively lower income level, the sheer necessity of supplementing the income and budget takes away much of their energy to leave them with little time or energy for creative intellectual pursuit. Nevertheless, it must be said to their credit that the seats of creative non-conformism, apart from some cynical 'Hindu' minds, have been outside the capital. Remoteness from the seat of authority has been a blessing in disguise, enabling the provincial intellectuals to be more dispassionate, with little to lose in the bargain.

It is this articulate section of the intellectuals whose bankruptcy becomes so apparent, being most vocal. Fortunately, if they do not raise hopes for us, they cannot cause any despair, for the simple reason that it is neither a unique phenomenon in this country nor could it ever be wiped out. Along with it would also remain a form of blind conformism and marginal dissent depending upon individual assessment of the line of least resistance towards political patronage. The tolerance of this section is the inevitable price that a democratic sense of humour calls upon us to pay. After all, democracy will always have its parasites as also its casualties.

The real hope lies in making the erstwhile inarticulate and uncommunicative section of our intellectuals more alive to their tasks, in educating the common man to understand national policies in their true perspective and to bring forth the importance of foreign policy in national affairs in spite of its remote impact on individuals' work-a-day life.

For the purpose of this analysis, in the latter group will belong those scholars who choose to contribute their thoughts to the most exclusive *avant garde* journals abroad and the few such types that exist in this country. No one questions the professional requirements of writing in such journals, neither does any one question the inherent right or honest intention to remain exclusive. But after all, the way to hell is also paved with good intentions.

Unfortunately, the exclusively limited character of their readership makes these honest and well-meaning intellectuals virtually

inarticulate. One does not also expect these eminent self-exiled intellectuals to associate with journals of any type ranging from the 'Yellow' to the 'Blue', but certainly there is no dearth in the country now of journals of respectable reputation and wide readership which could be utilized by our intellectuals to contribute their instructive judgment to the benefit of the country. It is this group only which can inculcate in the common man a sense of values—something more permanent than temporary and imaginary military gains; the futility, may be the vulgarity of a 'war of attrition'; the permanent characters of our neighbours in spite of, or irrespective of, our desires to the contrary; the hollowness of the proselytising mission of those inspired only to teach others a lesson; the damage to the mental make-up of the future generation in wars of doubtful gains and questionable intentions; and such other long-lasting values.

They can also instil the sadly lacking sense of perspective in the politicians, for whom it is 'today, for who knows to-morrow we may die'. In short, it is the honest intellectuals of the country who can be the bridge between the professional politician and the common man, by making national aims more intelligible and governmental policies more acceptable. In times of crisis it could be an effective substitute for the built-in checks against excesses of a government composed of fallible men which is provided by a democratic opposition in normal times.

Bearing in mind that ours is too small a country in a game of pure power-politics with the giant power blocs, and too big not to have a recognisable national ideal (as apart from mere national interest) of its own, it is the intellectuals who can help the judicious blending between noble idealism and crude power-politics in our foreign policy; of forestalling the ominous possibility of having military aims from merely military necessities; and to resuscitate the common man from his 'dumb ignorance' or 'blind inertia', so that each one can have more intelligible responses and give intelligent support to our foreign policy, in the formulation of which the intellectuals play their role, with all the advantages of being impervious to the need of political patronage and popular approbation.

The time has come for the intellectuals of country to make an honest self-introspective about their true role in a re-assessment of India's foreign policy.

ASWINI K

New Delhi.

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THE PLAN

a symposium on the implications
and prospects of the next

five years of economic growth

symposium participants

THE PROBLEM

Posed by **Mahendar V. Desai**, Advisor,
Plan Information Unit and publication
branch of the Planning Commission

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Gautam Mathur, Head of the
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Osmania University, Hyderabad

NEED FOR NEW DIMENSIONS

S. C. Gupta, Deputy Director,
Agricultural Economics Research Centre,
University of Delhi

A NOTE ON SELF RELIANCE

B. G. Verghese, assistant editor,
'The Times of India'

THE INSTITUTIONAL COMPLEX

Arun Bose, Head of the Department of
Economics, Kirori Mal College,
University of Delhi

THE ULTIMATE TEST

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RESOURCE MOBILIZATION

R. J. Chelliah, Head of the Department
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BOOKS

Reviewed by **Hartirath Singh**, **Anees Chishti**,
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and **Kusum Madgavkar**

FURTHER READING

A select and relevant bibliography
by **Dinesh**

COVER

Designed by **Chowdhury/Grewal**

The problem

THIS is the time when much ink and paper—not to mention nervous energy—are being used up on examining how to give defence orientation to the organisation of our economy. At this moment, it is good to remember that the basic strategy behind our planning and particularly behind the perspective of development for 1961-1985 has been that of a rapid advance towards self-reliance. What the campaign in Kashmir and Punjab has thrown into bolder relief is two things. While economic strength is the basis of defence capability, there are many accepted indicators of economic growth which are not relevant to defence. Nor do they invariably and concurrently make for defence preparedness. So, there emerges a new economic order of defence priorities, a new view on which are the first things in need of being placed first.

Secondly, there are areas of industrial, scientific and other enterprise where dependence on international aid and assistance can stultify defence measures and inhibit diplomatic moves. Such aid is in all events precarious, whether or not the aid-giving country wants to exert diplomatic pressure by threatening to withhold aid, by demanding a *quid pro quo*. This is the danger facing an India unable to pay its way internationally.

In war or peace, the basic elements which made up the strategy of the Fourth Plan will hold good. But even such well-defined economic strategy leaves much room for manoeuvre so far as the tactical moves towards agricultural development, industrial investment and orga-

nisation of scientific research go. Against the background of defence requirements, a fresh look will have to be taken on the programmes for each sector. Also, individual projects will have to be reallocated on occasionally different priority, which is theirs on account of the speed with which they help defence production. This determines their relevance to immediate and long-term defence and gives us their importance production-wise and capacity-wise. Defence orientation thus means the detailed matching of material and human requirements of a slightly new order of priorities.

In our earlier essays on planning and in the Fourth Plan, especially, emphasis has been laid on the following:

- (i) self-sufficiency with regard to food supply to be achieved within the Fourth Plan period;
- (ii) reduction in the dependence on imports for supplies of metals, machinery, fuel and basic raw materials;
- (iii) achievement of maximum increase in exports, so that more and more of our foreign exchange needs could be met from export earnings;
- (iv) acceleration of the programmes of technical training and research, so that we reduce our dependence on others for technical skills and know-how; and
- (v) maximum of internal resource mobilisation, so that all real supplies of productive factors available domestically are effectively utilised.

Defence will in future draw more heavily upon our resources in regard to transport equipment, fuel, steel and basic chemicals. The operational draft on other civilian supplies is almost negligible. It does not, in any case, lead to any economic dislocation except in small pockets, temporarily and usually on account of enemy bombing or the threat of it. Having allocated the highest priority to agriculture, the task therefore is to enlarge the industry-communications programmes. We must ensure that existing resources—in materials and skills—are used fully. For actual use and for putting up reserve capacity, we must examine the physical targets—and not so much the financial outlays—in these sectors.

More specifically, we must work out the details of how and with what speed we shall seek to attain self-reliance in:

- (i) steel and special steels;
- (ii) fertilizers and fertilizer machinery;
- (iii) steel-making machinery;
- (iv) petroleum, oil, lubricants and products;

- (v) earth-moving and construction equipment;
- (vi) electrical and transport equipment;
- (vii) chemical raw materials and machinery;
- (viii) communications and electronic equipment;
- (ix) metallurgical equipment; and
- (x) oil drilling and refinery equipment.

There is yet another bottleneck in the industrial field—lack of indigenous research, design and consultancy capabilities. These have not been built up with the resoluteness necessary and have enlarged our dependence on outside aid. If any significant measure of self-reliance is to be attained, these service organisations should be greatly enlarged and systematically brought into operational tasks.

According to information collected from various ministries, a sum of Rs. 13.29 crores has so far been paid by government during the current plan period to private firms for industrial consultancy and design services. Out of this, almost one half was paid by the Department of Iron and Steel for project reports, overhead designs, engineering services and construction work. A sum of Rs. 2.86 crores was paid by the Ministry of Petroleum and Chemicals and Rs. 1.71 crores by the Department of Mines and Metals. About a crore of rupees was paid by the Ministry of Transport for technical advice, surveys, preliminary designs and construction drawings for ship-yards and ports. About Rs. 50 lakhs were similarly spent by the Department of Communications and by the Ministry of Irrigation and Power each. To this must be added the amounts paid by the private sector. Inevitably, a good part of these fees for industrial consultancy and designs has to be paid in foreign currency.

In the immediate future, the task is one of identifying the precise requirements of defence and harnessing the existing production capacities to meet these needs. It is of little consequence whether these capacities are in the public or the private sector. This is a task for the operational agencies, such as the Union Ministries and the State governments. The function of the Fourth Plan and of the Planning Commission would remain that of concentrating on the capacities to be built up in the medium and long-term, so as to reduce the dependence on external aid for defence as well as civilian requirements. It is needless to add that the Fourth Plan, as now envisaged, is basically in tune with this function.

Whether as a result of a reassessment of our defence needs or of discovering our lags and lacks in wake of Pakistani aggression, pro-

grammes in these fields will have to be worked out in the greatest technical detail. This is a whole time job for experts. It cannot become another assignment for the busy members of any *ad hoc* committee. It is not economic constraints or considerations alone which will guide our pursuit of the objective in these varied fields of development. For, they belong to the realm of politico-military strategy. The task force will therefore have to impose its technical analysis on the common and sometimes conflicting elements derived from economic, political and military conditions. It will have to keep in mind the time periods for the completion of each project so that there is simultaneous progress in different directions and the interrelations of investment and growth-factor are continuously watched.

What is the general economic context in which such thoughts on defence orientation have to be worked out? What are our achievements of the past ten years which make the super-imposition of such a plan for preparedness and self-reliance a hope and a possibility rather than a mere wish? It is sobering to begin at the beginning and look at the characteristics of an under-developed economy with a traditional social structure.

One point of view in relation to India reads as follows:

'India has a low average income for its inhabitants; small access to mechanical energy; a subsistence sector mainly agricultural, which cannot generate a surplus for investment and so stagnates or deteriorates yet which constitutes the major portion of the economy; and an organized, mainly industrial sector, which can produce profits for investment but which constitutes a minor portion of the economy. Such a society is not only poor, it tends irretrievably to grow poorer. The techniques of modern medicine, the decline in internal disorder, the development of centralized authority, all encourage a population increase that is unmatched by an increase in economic resources. Agricultural yields are low and fall even farther as more and more people crowd their tiny ancestral plots; only large-scale mechanized farming, with the employment of fertilizers and pesticides, would increase yields significantly, but for this there is neither the land organisation nor the capital. The subsistence farmers are too poor to nourish themselves, let alone the soil which they work, too poor to replace exhausted equipment or buy new and more efficient implements, too poor to support beyond subsistence the village pedlars, artisans and shopkeepers. Producing and earning no more than can provide them with their essential food and clothing, they cannot save and spend and so promote a market for the consumer goods on which a dynamic industrial

sector might develop; such industry as exists does so despite rather than because of them.'*

How valid is the advice, 'Cut your developmental coat according to your resources cloth' for a country so placed? It would be an ideal state of affairs if India could pull itself up economically by its own bootstraps. It is a fact, however, that neither the existing knowledge and capacity nor our current earnings from exports are adequate to meet the demands of transforming and pushing the economy into a state of self-sustained growth. Foreign aid—know-how, special skills and techniques, and machinery and some raw materials—is essential now if only to plan to do without it at some stage. It is not a question of self-respect as one of historical accident.

When thinking of its balance of trade, India will soon have to decide upon what sacrifices it is prepared to make to promote exports. The Prime Minister has suggested that every unit, whether in the private or the public sector, should reserve part of its production for export. Not only farm and plantation produce but ships, railway wagons, machinery of all kinds, steel, diesel engines, electrical motors—such goods enjoy a wide market. With effort and self-denial, some of these could be diverted from home consumption to earning foreign exchange. For, the most crucial element in defence effort in the near future is the availability of free foreign exchange. With this we can get equipment, make stock piles of strategic goods and expand the basic production facilities. And gold is one source of free foreign exchange for government. As it is, we are more dependent on imports today than ten years ago. That is why the need to make it more difficult to import and to manufacture indigenous substitutes. Heavy import duties have their own place in the immediate future but they are merely the means to an end. The end is a viable economy sustained by the *swadeshi* spirit.

The question then is: how soon can India attain a state of self-sustained growth? Is it by seeking a balance of payments from year to year that one can hope to solve the problems of foreign aid and external ways-and-means resources? How do we build up long-term capabilities and change the structure of the economy in agriculture and industrial production so that we can do without foreign capital and equipment—except what is available from current earnings—in the 1970's? It is suggested that India has over-stretched itself, that it has invested too heavily in projects which take an unconscionably long time to yield results and that it will be a good idea either to lay them off for a while or to stagger their phasing and go slow on their completion. Such a decision

*Ronald Segal: *Crisis of India* (Penguin, 1965)

cannot in the near future create more goods and services of which there is shortage and which really is the root of this advice to go slow. Not merely that. For, the result of going slow will be to postpone the point of time when the end products of these investments will become available for purposes of further production or for consumption. The result could be to prolong the present difficulties.

In the meantime, the other things will not remain the same, population for instance. To cut down on investment which would carry us over the economic hump, therefore, is also to introduce some more uncertain factors into the making of our economic problems five or ten years hence. Provided there is proof to show that India is exerting itself to the best of its ability and diverting financial and real resources in channels dictated by an agreed order of national priorities, there is everything to be said for quickening the pace of development by using foreign aid—in some place for a strategic economic break-through, in another to gain tactical advantages and yet elsewhere as a catalytic agent. Once the goal of a self-generating economy has been fixed, the time taken in reaching there is a crucial factor. And even in the long term self-reliance does not mean economic isolation or autarchy.

Placed as it is, India has to go through the arduous processes of development for achieving the targets of the next five-year plan and the objectives of the larger perspective of development over 1961-1985. So the economic aims and intentions are not negotiable. The sights have been set to ensure that every Indian can live a life worth living. Today there is co-existence of penury and high living or conspicuous consumption, serious under-employment within hailing distance of shortage of labour, unrelieved illiteracy near great seats of learning. How long must the Two Nations co-exist before the afflicted get comfort and the comfortable a share of their afflictions?

What is open to debate is the means of achieving nationally accepted economic goals, keeping well within our framework of political democracy, representative government and a mixed economy. To the extent, however, that the end points have been fixed, they also impose some compulsions in respect of the movement towards them and also in respect of the direction and pace. This is not to say that, if in a particular year the harvest partly fails or if the export earnings fall, readjustments will not become necessary. Such readjustments, however, have got to take place within the framework dictated by the long-term goals. The most crying re-adjustments of today are those dictated by the needs of defence.

Any attempt to depict the Indian situation in factual terms is to enter into the deadeningly

familiar exercise of showing how poverty is writ large over our lives. For rural India, where four-fifths of our people live, the monthly *per capita* expenditure is less than Rs. 20 for 60 per cent of the people; for some it is still less—only Rs. 7.2 for the poorest 20 per cent. The figure goes up five times—and yet remains less than Rs. 38 a month—for the affluent 20 per cent. It is actually the richest five per cent at the top who have the tolerable *per capita* income of Rs. 61 a month. If we come to urban areas—where incomes as much as the costs of living are higher—the average moves up. But the picture still remains one of almost unrelieved poverty. Here the *per capita* figures are for monthly expenditure:

the poorest 60%	Rs. 26
the richest 5%	Rs. 99

It does not mean that there is no means of escape out of this vicious circle of impoverishment. If resources can be mobilised to create a surplus and this invested for creating further surpluses, the economy can be set on the road to planned development. India set its heart on this goal when a National Planning Committee was organised under the Chairmanship of Jawaharlal Nehru in 1937. Post-independence efforts towards planned progress are part of our lives.

The emphasis in the First Plan was on the rehabilitation of the economy from the short-term dislocations of the second world war and partition. More significant progress was made during the Second Plan in improving agriculture potential, developing basic industries and providing technical facilities. It is good to recall Jawaharlal Nehru's summing up of the initial steps when he addressed the National Development Council in September 1957:

'We had rather an easy time in the First Five-Year Plan, because really we had not stretched ourselves, we had not made any particular effort. We just took what was there and called it a plan.'

During the short period of the first two plans, substantial progress was recorded in diverse fields. National income over the decade 1951-61 increased by about 44 per cent (during the first three years of the Third Plan, it went up again by about 10 per cent). The *per capita* income increased from Rs. 247.5 to Rs. 300.4 in 1963-64. Agricultural production went up about 40 per cent in 1960-61. There was a steady increase in irrigation facilities and flood control, in the availability of chemical fertilisers, and in acreage under improved seeds, plant protection and soil conservation which go to build up the agricultural production potential. The net area irrigated increased from about 50 million

acres in 1950-51 to about 70 million acres in 1960-61. (It is expected to increase by another 20 million acres by the end of the Third Plan).

The progress in the industrial sector was more spectacular. Industrial production had almost doubled during the first decade of planning. What is noteworthy is not so much the increase in the quantum of production as the structural changes brought about by the development and expansion of basic industries like steel, heavy electricals, industrial chemicals, fuel and power and the establishment of machine building capacity. Requirements of further industrialisation can at this rate be met to an increasing extent from the country's resources within the next ten years or so. By the end of the Third Plan, production of steel ingots will have increased from a mere one million tonnes in 1950-51 to about 8 million tonnes, aluminium from 4,000 tonnes to 69,700 tonnes, coal from 32.8 million tonnes to nearly 76 million tonnes, cement from less than three million tonnes to about 12 million tonnes, nitrogenous and phosphatic fertilisers from a paltry 9,000 tonnes each to 425,000 and 200,000 tonnes respectively, machine tools from Rs. 3.0 million worth in 1950-51 to Rs. 250 million, power generating capacity from 2.3 million kW to about 11.7 kW.

Transport services have likewise expanded considerably and effort is being made to keep them ahead of requirements. Freight carried by the railways, which was less than 100 million tonnes in 1950-51, is expected to reach over 225 million tonnes by 1965-66; carrying capacity likely to be developed would be about 250 million tonnes. The mileage of surfaced roads will have almost doubled. By 1965-66, the number of commercial vehicles on the road will be about three times as many as in 1950-51. Shipping tonnage will have also increased about four times and handling capacity of major ports more than doubled by the end of the Third Plan.

In respect of social services, the most encouraging advance has been in the field of technical education. While the demand for trained personnel and expertise, particularly at the higher levels, has yet to be fully met, the out-turn of engineering graduates will have increased by more than five-fold by the end of the Third Plan and the targets exceeded. A major step towards a literate population is to make primary education free and compulsory. By the end of the Third Plan nearly 80 per cent of the children in the age group 6-11 will be attending school as against about 40 per cent in 1950-51.

Expansion of similar magnitudes is anticipated at other stages too. The expectation of life has increased from 32 years to nearly 50 years.

Incidence of communicable diseases has decreased. The number of hospitals and dispensaries and beds will have about doubled by 1965-66. The number of doctors, practising or in service, will have increased by more than 50 per cent and of nurses three-fold.

The most recurring question about the Fourth Plan was: should it be a big plan or a small plan? Should it be a Rs. 21,500-crore plan or a Rs. 22,600-crore plan? A smaller plan may be less painful, it may create fewer problems of resources mobilisation, organisation and management. Offering fewer challenges, it could also offer, for the immediate future, a little more comfort and ask for smaller sacrifices. But planning calls for a serious effort to realise our full economic potential in a determined and deliberate way.

A study prepared by the Perspective Planning Division shows why it is necessary to aim at a rate of growth of 7 per cent or more, and what it implies in terms of capital formation, education and training, foreign trade and aid, public finance, structure of agricultural and industrial production, etc. The more meaningful questions regarding the Fourth Plan pertain not so much to its bigness and smallness but whether it is unrelated to our needs and whether it imposes uncalculated risks on the economy's capacity to undertake the tasks. Torn out of its socio-economic context, it is impossible to say whether a plan is small or big. For, quite often it is thinking which makes it so.

The Perspective Planning Division, in its *Perspective of Development: 1961-1976*, assumes that the modest goal of Rs. 20 per capita income per month could be achieved by 1975. The amount would provide the minimum consumption needed for the cost of a modest diet, a reasonable standard of clothing and small provision for other items. The possibility of realising this objective within a relatively short period would depend very much on public awareness of the issues involved and a pervasive and genuine sense of identification with the interests of the poor, giving it a priority even at the cost of one's immediate gain.

In deciding on a minimum income objective of Rs. 20 per capita per month to be attained by 1975-76, a balance was struck between what may be considered tolerable as an objective and what is in fact feasible by way of resource mobilisation, rate of growth of output and of income redistribution to be realised within a given period of time. With a plan outlay of Rs. 21,500 crores, a total investment of about Rs. 19,000 crores has to be put through. The annual net investment will have to be stepped up from about Rs. 2,700 crores in 1965-66 to about Rs. 5,200 crores in 1970-71. The domestic

savings during the same period would require to be increased from about 11 per cent to 18 per cent of the national income.

This step up in domestic savings and investment is large. But neither the *per capita* investment in 1970-71 nor the rate of net investment would seem excessive against any international comparisons. In absolute terms India would be investing annually less than Rs. 100 *per capita* at the end of twenty years of planning. Investment in the Chinese People's Republic has been reported to be 26.7 yuan in 1959 (equal to Rs. 5300 crores or about the same as the investment planned for 1970-71 in India) with a much higher proportionate allocation for industry. (By 1970-71, China's would have further and greatly increased).

- The rate of investment provided for 1970-71 has been exceeded in many other countries. A study made by Kuznets shows that during the period 1951-57, gross capital formation as a proportion of the gross national product was as high as: 29.5 per cent in Japan, 25.6 per cent in Australia, and 25.2 per cent in Holland. The comparable figure for India will be less than 15 per cent in 1965-66 and about 20 per cent in 1970-71.

It is inevitable that most of the resources needed to finance the plan are found by our own exertions. Yet, the tax effort involved in realising the investment target in the Fourth Plan cannot be considered too high. Even after levying all the additional taxes required in the Fourth Plan, the total tax revenues as a proportion of the national income will be under 12 per cent in 1970-71. This proportion has been exceeded not only in many industrially advanced countries, but also in a number of under-developed countries. For instance, in 1962, taxation as a proportion of national income remained in: Brazil at 35.1 per cent; Israel at 25.4 per cent; Ceylon at 21.7 per cent; and Burma at 17.8 per cent.

Let us now have a look at the resources. With a public sector investment of some Rs. 12,000 crores, speedy and determined efforts will be needed to mobilise additional resources to the tune of Rs. 2,600 crores over the plan period. This cumulative total is impressive but not forbidding, if it is remembered that the additional tax yield for the Third Plan period is not likely to be less than Rs. 2700 crores. This means that between them, the Centre, the States, local self-governing institutions and public sector enterprises including the railways will have to collect about Rs. 225 crores each year additionally.

At the cautious estimate of a six per cent rise in the level of national income, it will be (at 1965-66 prices) about Rs. 21,000 crores this year and Rs. 28,000 crores in 1970-71. Of the

additional incomes thus generated, a diversion of some 30 per cent for investment, leaving 70 per cent for better consumption standards, should prove adequate in making the financing of the plan non-inflationary. As the growth rate rises and the economy becomes more diversified, new commodities will enter the market. Not all of them will be basic essentials, and some of these will provide greater scope for levying excise duties and sales tax.

While large doses of investment have been made and the highest priority accorded in the Fourth Plan to agriculture, taxation in this sector so far has been neither heavy nor markedly progressive. It should therefore be possible for those who benefit from higher agricultural outputs, price supports and more irrigation to pay more by way of land revenue, water rates and cesses. On investment in public sector undertakings and public utility concerns, it should become part of our national policy to raise the return on capital to some 12 per cent a year: greater efficiency and reduced costs, going hand in hand with proper pricing policies, should bring this return within reach. With the returns from personal income tax being no higher than five per cent of the national income and total tax receipts under 18 per cent—they were about 13 per cent in 1965—it should be possible to raise domestic savings from 10.5 per cent at present to 15 per cent in 1971 and to mobilise the necessary internal resources for the plan.

Another way of adding to our resources lies through higher export earnings. The target to be aimed at during the Fourth Plan period is Rs. 5,100 crores. If the physical targets in respect of industries with export potential are realised, this figure would be reached. If, on the other hand, the production targets for the Fourth Plan period are lowered or not achieved, the export target will become difficult to attain. This problem has some immediate relevance to the allocation of maintenance imports: these will by and large have to be siphoned into channels which make for better use of capacity in industries with a significant potential for replacing imports and for enlarging exportable supplies.

If the foreign exchange gap has to be bridged and an element of long-term viability introduced into our balance of payments, it may become part of economic wisdom even to let some installed capacity in industries catering for the home market to remain idle for lack of their maintenance imports. And to encourage substitution, imports may have to be made dearer through fiscal measures. Whether it is from current or additional production, export requirements will have to be given a prior claim over the demands of the domestic consumer. As a nation struggling to pay its way interna-

tionally, it is inevitable that for some time the domestic consumer of sugar, vegetable oils and fish should be made to do with the residual supplies. Simultaneously, our dependence on imports of food grains, fertilisers, metals, chemicals and petroleum products will have to be reduced by enlarging agricultural and industrial production.

Even as we talk in the more familiar terms of monetary outlay on the plan by mobilising domestic savings and resources, by higher exports earnings and with foreign aid, it is helpful to bear in mind that the problem of plan finance is essentially an essay in the allocation of real commodities and human skills in such a way as to enlarge and diversify net national production. The larger the national output, the greater the chance of using resources for further economic betterment. When thinking of plan outlays, it is therefore essential to look for the ways and means of realising our targets efficiently and speedily. Do our methods of organisation and economic management make for this? What are the procedures which hold up progress? Which are the institutions whose working runs counter to higher yields in agriculture, industry, etc? These problems of organisation and implementation cannot be wished away by a smaller plan outlay. Tenant-landlord relations, trade union practices, administrative procedures—all these will need to be scrutinised more closely in the days to come.

Speaking around the middle of July at the inaugural function of 'India Productivity Year-1966', the late Prime Minister Lal Bahadur Shastri voiced the feelings of his countrymen and of many friendly critics abroad when he said, 'We are far behind our objectives.' We have been generous with our plans and proposals, with schemes small and grandiose to spend so much money in anticipation of certain benefits. We have aroused great hopes, and started a revolution of rising expectations.

There is a public and political commitment to fulfilling the targets and overcoming the challenge of development. But how well are our organisation and management geared for implementation? Do we get the value of our efforts? Is there no scope for economy? Is the quality of production in keeping with the quality of inputs? Does the money spent yield the expected results? How can the country talk a little less of promises, proposals and budgets and pay more heed to locating delays or shortfalls in implementation, and the reasons therefore? Apart from a continual functional control of expenditure, there should be overall performance audit going hand in hand with cost audit. If performance lags behind, it is a matter for general concern. Suitable machinery will have to be

devised not only for scientific studies of techno-economic feasibilities but of performance—its timing and quality.

The end of the Third Plan provides a watershed. Experience with the three plans has made it possible to have a closer view of many economic problems and issues, and of their inter-relationships. More than that, intimations of economic growth have made it possible to decide on what strategy to adopt for rapid development. It is useful to remember that economic development is a function as much as of resources and organisation as of leadership and of a will to do things.

This is how W. Arthur Lewis puts it in his *The Theory of Economic Growth*:

'Growth is the result of human effort. Nature is not particularly kind to man; left to herself she will overwhelm with weeds, with floods, with epidemics and with other disasters which man wards off by taking thought and action. It is by accepting the varied challenges presented by his environment that man is able, in innumerable ways, to wrest from nature more product for less effort.

'To accept the challenge of nature is to be willing to experiment, to seek out opportunities, to respond to openings, and generally to manoeuvre. The greatest growth occurs in societies where men have no eye to the economic chance, and are willing to stir themselves to seize it.

'Now societies differ widely from each other in the extent to which their members seek out and exploit economic opportunities. There is a difference between countries, between groups in the same country (e.g. regional, religious or racial groups), and between patterns of behaviour in the same country at different stages of its history. These differences may be traced to three distinct causes, namely to differences in the valuation of material goods relatively to the effort required to get them, to differences in available opportunities and to differences in the extent to which institutions encourage effort, either by removing obstacles in its way or by ensuring to the individual the fruit of his effort. Many of the observed differences in effort are due to institutional defects, and social reformers who wish to promote economic growth are mainly concerned with seeking to bring about appropriate changes in institutions, whether by propaganda or by law. . . It is possible for a nation to take a new turn if it is fortunate enough to have the right leadership at the right time. In the last analysis history is only the record of how individuals respond to the challenge of their times. All nations have opportunities which they may grasp if only they can summon up the courage and the will.'

M. V. DESAI

Growth under parasitic conditions

GAUTAM MATHUR

IT is not the purpose of this essay to appraise the structure of the Fourth Plan but to search for the questions which should be asked by the growth theorists and to suggest the type of data which should be provided by applied economists in order to make a proper appraisal of the plan possible.

The Fourth Five-Year Plan aims merely at becoming a not unworthy fore-runner of the Fifth Plan. It is the latter which has the objective of the fulfilment of

self-sustained growth, full employment (presumably with use of traditional type of equipment), minimum standard of living to every family, and narrowing of socio-economic disparities. Even there, except the phrase full employment, all the other objectives of the Fifth Plan are open to subjective interpretation.

As regards the intermediate stage (i.e., the Fourth Plan) even the degree of employment to be achieved with the given type of

equipment, is a flexible variable. Little analytical purpose can be served by describing the objectives of a planning period as short as five or ten years in such imprecisely defined terms; and for that reason it is proposed, for the purpose of analysis in this essay, to ignore the description altogether.

Non-inflationary Growth

The framework of the Fourth Plan should be looked at from the point of view of its being the fourth instalment of a long-term strategy of non-inflationary growth. The objective of the long-term strategy is taken in this analysis, as elsewhere¹ by the present author, to be the achievement of golden-age growth, which is fairly well identifiable from engineering data, as a state of full employment in which the standard of living of the workers is the highest which modern technology allows and continuously increases with the growth of technical knowledge, given the long-run growth rate of population and the thriftiness of the entrepreneurs.

The objective is to be achieved in the minimum of time, subject to the constraint that growth should be non-inflationary (i.e., there should be no decline in the standard of living of the workers during the long journey on the path of development). In addition, the constraint is put on moral grounds, that while non-employment lasts there should be no increase in the standard of living of the workers already employed, the increase in national consumption being more equally distributed by its disbursement through greater employment. It follows from the above description that the standard of living which is the objective of the long-term strategy is to be taken to be of an order at least ten times higher than the subsistence level rather than merely its doubling in twenty-seven years. Consequently, the time-horizon of the path of deve-

lopment increases much beyond even two generations.

Priority

With the stated objective and constraints in mind, it is possible to trace a least-time path suitable for a country with a large volume of initial non-employment. The particular strategy which would be optimum under the circumstances indicates top priority for heavy investment in the first few phases of the long-term strategy.

The term 'priority to heavy investment' has been much used during the last ten years in India, especially in connection with the strategy of the twenty-five year plan based upon the Mahalanobis model and enunciated at the start of the Second Plan. However, in the context of the strategy in the present model, the criterion for priority to heavy investment is entirely different. It may be remembered that in the Mahalanobis model the priority is achieved by keeping the real wage from rising as fast as capital and allocating a high budgetary provision to the heavy-investment sector. In the least-time path relating to the present analysis, the priority to heavy investment is achieved by maximising the rate of ploughback of heavy investment capacity in its own further expansion. Any diversion of this capacity into making light machinery for the production of consumption goods would be a detraction from the principle of priority to heavy investment.

In this context one can inspect the strategy of Indian planning based upon the Mahalanobis model to see how far is priority to heavy investment achieved in terms of the criterion of the ploughback ratio. The Mahalanobis model requires that the ploughback rate should equal the marginal propensity to save, which in relation to a near-hundred per cent ploughback ratio is even theoretically a very low proportion.

In actual practice also it has, in India, come to be of the same order as the marginal propensity to save, as envisaged in the Mahalanobis model (Table I, from where the

ploughback ratio can be seen to be about 20 per cent in the interval 1953-60).

From this table it is clear that the rate of ploughback of heavy investment into itself has been extremely low in India where the slogan of priority to heavy investment has been trumpeted the loudest. Even in advanced countries where the exigencies of a strategy in favour of priority for heavy investment is not any longer a compelling motivation, the heavy-investment ploughback ratios for countries shown in the table are double that of India, and are in the region of 36-44 per cent whether for communist or for capitalist countries.

The ratio becomes even more significant if it is realised that the Soviet priority to heavy investment had necessarily to be restricted in that country by technical and demographic conditions, being one with a low man-land ratio and low degree of non-employment. In that case, the techniques in the consumption-goods sector had to be of a relatively mechanised variety. In India, where the degree of non-employment and the population pressure per acre of land is high, the availability of techniques at a low degree of mechanisation may make it possible for an exceedingly high rate of ploughback of heavy investment to be achieved, if it were so planned, on account of the well-founded presumption that less mechanised techniques do not require, to any significant extent, the products of the heavy-investment sector or equipment of high foreign-exchange content.

The Strategy

The strategy for priority to heavy investment (called the Heavy Strategy) then should have consequential effects of keeping the degree of mechanisation in the consumer-goods sector low, using both mechanised and non-mechanised² methods of production in the heavy-investment sector and increasing the ploughback ratio in the latter in order to make it a non-exporting, self-regenerating sector. Another

1. Proceedings of the Konstanz Conference of the International Economic Association (1960) on the *Economics of Take-off into Sustained Growth* (Macmillan, 1964), pp. 309-10; *Planning for Steady Growth*, (Blackwell, 1955) pp. xv; 191.

TABLE I

Comparative Rates of Ploughback of Basic Industries

% of output used	within the Basic Industries as current Inputs							
	U.S.A.	USSR *	ITALY	JAPAN	INDIA			USSR**
					53-54	55-56	60-61	
Machinery and Equipment ...	23.5	8.6	13.0	16.2	4.0	7.3	3.0	12.2
Iron and Steel ...	63.0	77.6	71.6	70.2	38.4	46.3	35.9	90.2
Non-ferrous metals ...	75.5	70.4	68.6	59.1	49.8	60.2	98.9	84.3
Chemicals ...	29.5	31.3	35.7	24.7	16.5	21.9	20.2	57.8
Electricity ...	32.4	49.3	28.1	29.4	14.2	10.2	24.1	59.6
Coal ...	24.2	46.8	21.6	33.6	29.4	22.6	32.0	51.6
ALL BASIC INDUSTRIES ...	36.8	43.4	36.2	44.1	18.4	22.2	18.6	39.4

* Excluding Defence Industries.

** Including Defence Industries.

Sources : H.B. Chenery and P.G. Clark : *Interindustry Economics*. Appendix to Chapter 8, Tables 8.10, 8.11 and 8.12 for Italy, U.S. and Japan.

N. Kaplan and others : A tentative Input-Output Table for the U.S.S.R., 1941 Plan, R.M. 924, (The Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, California) Table 1, for U.S.S.R.

Transaction Matrices for the Indian Union for 1953-54, 1954-55 and 1960-61 compiled by the Interindustry Unit of the Indian Statistical Institute, Calcutta, for India.

(Figures compiled by Mr. Yadava Reddy of the Osmania University, from relevant sources).

effect would be that opportunities of employment in the consumption-goods sector and the heavy-investment sector would be quite high; but this would be only an incidental side-effect and not the purpose of the strategy.

A policy merely of increasing employment for its own sake may result in the encouragement of inferior techniques which give a very low rate of surplus.³ In the heavy strategy the increase of rate of employment would come about by following a technique of low degree of mechanisation in

consumption-goods production for a purpose quite different from the creation of employment—because these techniques would not divert the output of the heavy-investment sector from its own further expansion. It is for this reason that the creation of a high degree of employment would not be, in the Heavy Strategy (unlike the Fourth Plan), an objective of the strategy but only its side-effect.

There is a further confusion about maximising the national output subject to given resources, which is sometimes mentioned as one of the objectives of the plan by linear programmers and by other economists wielding less deadly weapons. The fulfilment of this objective may result in the choice of a technique of such a low degree of mechanisation that the surplus per man and also the rate of growth become extremely low, as shown by Dr. Sen in relation to the Polak criterion. The process through which the objective of reaching the golden age would be achieved in the Heavy Strategy is the maximisation of the long-term growth rate of heavy investment, not the maxi-

misation of level of output as a whole in the Fourth Plan.

The result of the implementation of the Heavy Strategy, as explained in the present article, would be to put the economy into a phase of self-reliant, non-inflationary growth. It would be self-sufficient because the heavy-investment sector in the country itself would have enough capacity and diversity to make everything needed for its further expansion. It would be non-inflationary because the consumption demand created out of the incomes of the heavy-investment sector would be allowed to be spent on the essentials of consumption produced in the non-mechanised consumption-goods sector with supply exactly matching the demand. To achieve this state, the consumption-goods sector would have to produce more than enough for its own needs, and the State would have to devise machinery for procuring the surplus for the use of the heavy-investment sector to satisfy the demand of their workers for the necessary consumption goods.

As the heavy-investment sector would not be sending back any

2. e.g., in dams and road building, canal works, machine tools. As regards the last item, the productivity of a set of seven simple machine tools consisting of lathes, drilling machines, grinders and shapers have been recently studied by Mr. T.R. Chadda of the Osmania University. The data show that they are able to reproduce themselves, given steel from outside: and if they were organised for steady growth by giving appropriate process intensities to the seven processes the rate of growth for this set would turn out to be extremely high i.e. 2,227% per annum.

3. This was neatly demonstrated by Dr. Amartya Kumar Sen in his Stevenson-Prize Essay *Review of Economic Studies*, 1957). See also his book, *Choice of Techniques* (Blackwell, 1960), diagram 2a, p. 28

goods to the consumption-goods sector in return, the heavy-investment sector would have to be subsidised by the consumption sector during the main phase of the Heavy Strategy. In other words, the heavy-investment sector would be a dependent process tagged on to the self-sufficient sub-economy using non-mechanised techniques for production of consumption goods.

In this sense the consumption-goods sector would have to be heavily taxed so that it would grow under conditions in which it would have to feed the heavy-investment sector which would be rendering it no immediate gain in return. As this phase of the Heavy Strategy may take a very long time to complete (being dependent upon the initial non-employment and the rate of growth of population, both of which are large), the situation may be described as one of *growth with chronic parasitism*.

The term parasite sector in this context connotes a sector of production which takes its inputs from the rest of the economy but in return it does not render it corresponding benefit in terms of providing inputs for further production of civilian consumption goods. In the Sraffa system of input-output analysis it is referred to as a non-basic activity.⁴ In mathematical economics it is termed as a dependent process.⁵ To convey its effect upon the economy, however, it is useful to employ the term parasite sector, without any political or moral connotations.

The H-sector

Chronic parasitism is one which continues for a long spell of time, in contrast to a temporary deprivation of resources as in a short-lived war, a strike or a lock-out; or a holiday declared for celebrating some occasion. Hence,

the use of the term chronic parasitism is appropriate for the growth of the heavy-investment sector (the H-sector) during the long time-interval of the main phase of the Heavy Strategy:

However, in the Heavy Strategy, the H-sector acts like a parasite only during the main phase organised as described above. Ultimately, when the heavy-investment sector has expanded to a size sufficient for yielding consumption goods at a standard appropriate to full employment in the golden age, then further growth of the heavy-investment sector will be decelerated and an increasing proportion of its capacity will be diverted for the production of consumption goods by mechanised techniques. Thus, though the heavy-investment sector in our strategy behaves in the meantime like a parasite, it is a benign one, for the economy in the long-run does not expect to be harmed by it. On the contrary, it will ultimately benefit the economy a great deal by being the instrument of its entry into the golden age.

Malignant

There are other types of parasites which are malignant in nature, for they imbibe the produce of the economy and permanently feed upon it without rendering it corresponding benefit in the form of increasing the material wealth of the country now or in the future. Waste is one such activity, luxury consumption (whether by private individuals or by the State) is another. Unemployed population and unwanted children are another such category. Professional beggars, mendicants, robbers, corrupt and incompetent public officials or politicians are another set of malignant parasites for purposes of immediate gain in national income.

To the agricultural sector, the concept of growth with chronic malignant parasitism is not at all a new one, for farming under conditions of landlordism has always fallen under this category. Another example is that of the entrepreneurs who consume a

large proportion of their current income rather than reploughing it in expansion of productive investment activity, or who dis- hoard the accumulated cash hoards of previous periods for hoarding physical goods for speculative purposes. In addition, all the consumption of luxury goods (utilising scarce materials) by the upper-income group (the U-sector) in an underdeveloped economy falls under this category. Thus the U-sector as a whole is a malignant parasite. It is supplemented by the sector for the production of semi-luxuries which may be called the Semi-U-sector.

The D-sector

In some sense, the same epithet has to apply for analytical purposes to defence expenditure (the D-sector) so far as the growth of civilian consumption and welfare is concerned. The provisos in this case are weighty. Firstly, not only an intangible asset (the sense of security) is created by it in return, but in addition the nation actually derives the greatest of all benefits—its survival in times of war—from that sector.

Secondly, a lot of social overhead capital not likely to be formed under normal circumstances (like road building in hill tracts opening that terrain to industrial expansion) may get made under the name of defence in periods of military emergency. It may also encourage the rapid growth of some vital industries like the metal industry, or the machine tools and precision-instrument industries.

Notwithstanding these provisos, for economic analysis (especially regarding the creation of inflation) it is useful to consider the D-sector (along with the S-sector and the U-sector) as a dependent process. The H-sector is a long gestation investment which will *ultimately* give huge returns in terms of material goods, and the other two are a permanent drain upon the resources of the economy—the D-sector unavoidably so, but the U-sector being dispensable for the existence and health of the economy. To the extent that some

4. P. Sraffa, *Production of Commodities by means of Commodities*, Cambridge 1960.

5. Gautam Mathur, *Neumann Systems and Dependent Processes*. Proceedings of the Second India Econometric Conference, Bombay, 1963.

defence investment incidentally helps in the building up of social overheads and civilian industry, the D-sector as a parasite is less of the malignant and more of the benign variety.

The Size

What is the percentage of our total investment in the Fourth Plan which will go to the parasite sectors together which form the inflation-creating sector? How much will go to the avoidable category of the parasites and how much to the unavoidable variety? Is the investment in the inflation-dampening sector sufficient to expand the production of necessities of consumption for feeding the parasite sectors? On answers to these questions depends whether the Fourth Plan would be non-inflationary or not.

On account of the fact that the statistics collected by the applied economists give no indication of whether a big or a small plan of a given investment distribution could be physically feasible in the country, one feels a real difficulty in assessing the appropriate size of the plan. It is an evidence of the bankruptcy of neo-classical theory relied upon by most applied economists, that instead of searching for remedies for inflation through the proper allocation of investment to the inflation-creating and inflation-dampening sectors, a substantial portion of the mental effort of so many brilliant applied economists in the Planning Commission, in the Ministry of Finance, the Reserve Bank, and the Research Institutes in Economics and universities, is directed towards finding out about financial resources, about savings of the community, about State and central taxes and borrowings of government, about evasion of taxes, about the quantum of 'safe' deficit financing, and about the ratio of black to white money in circulation etc. Important as these latter questions undoubtedly are, yet they are not crucial ones for either the size of the plan or the determination of the degree of inflation.

The size of the plan is determined not by financial resources,

not merely by the availability of physical resources even, but by the pattern of their allocation in the form of investment. The degree of inflation does not depend so much upon the way financial resources are raised as upon the way they are spent. It depends upon the allocation between uses which increase supply of the necessities of consumption and those which create merely the demand for them. It is entirely unhelpful to think of a non-inflationary plan as one which depends upon internal financial resources of the country without deficit financing.

There is one ratio between inflation-dampening and inflation-creating investments which leads to non-inflationary growth. If this Balanced-Allocation Ratio is achieved the plan will be non-inflationary whatever its size and whatever the extent of deficit financing in securing its physical implementation. The Balanced-Allocation Ratio is apparently much higher than that indicated by what the actual pattern of investment in the Second and Third Plans has been.

In the Fourth Plan, has the proposed allocation ratio travelled towards the Balanced-Allocation Ratio, or is it going to deviate from it still further? Which part of the memorandum of the Fourth Plan gives this answer? What attempts are being made by applied economists to find the correct answer?

The Bottlenecks

The debate on the size of the plan in terms of the amount of money to be expended is entirely unreal. The size of a non-inflationary plan with investments according to the Balanced-Allocation Ratio is determined by the bottlenecks to physical production, not upon the targets written on paper following from an estimate of financial resources. If there are no physical bottlenecks to the production of food and simple clothing on the one hand and to heavy-investment goods on the other, then by a proper allocation of investments a plan of the size

of thirty thousand crores of rupees could easily be maintained.

If there are such bottlenecks, then we are not sure whether more than ten thousand crores of rupees could be digested by the economy fruitfully. The debate on a big or a small plan takes place between the narrow limits of five hundred crores this side or that of twenty two thousand crores. It does not take into account the physical and skilled manpower bottlenecks which, if they are not removed, could frustrate a plan of even half the size. It is as illusory, irrelevant, and futile, as would be a discussion among engineers deliberating upon whether the driver's seat should be half an inch higher or lower for a comfortable run of five hundred miles in a rickety old bus, not having checked whether the petrol available will suffice for even two hundred miles or whether the tyres will not collapse at the next bump.

Self-Generating Growth

The method of planning non-inflationary growth is to put various sub-economies of the economic system into self-generating growth. This is achieved by allocating investments among the processes of each sub-economy in such a way as to yield the same rate of growth for all goods. If this is done, then inflation can never arise in that system and, in addition, further growth is assured at a steady rate. To get the economy into this shape is the first task to be achieved in five-year plans during the earliest phase of development. To what extent is this deliberately planned to be achieved in the Fourth Plan?

This is a difficult question, for the answer does not depend so much upon the total capacity of an industry but upon its backward integration within the country. Thus it may be a wonderful thing that our capacity to produce steel has gone up by 350 per cent in the last ten years. But, from the point of view of a self-generating system, this might be illusory, for further growth would depend upon whether alloy steels and high-temperature containers have

grown through domestic production by the same rate or not. If all the different types of materials and equipment and also the machines to make these all along the line, are made to grow together, then even if the rate of growth is low (on account of low productivity) and the rupee cost is high, from the point of view of economic growth the economy will have taken-off and would have come out of the stage of pre-development.

If, on the other hand, the six million ton steel capacity is of a character by which a new steel mill cannot be reproduced through all the components being produced at some place or another within the country itself, then the self-generating property would be lacking and further growth is frustrated by lack of foreign exchange or inflow of foreign investment.

Composition of Imports

The importation of goods is not incompatible with a self-reliant economy. But the composition of the imports is all-important. Self-generation is an essential aspect of self-reliance, but can be coupled with foreign trade if the imports are of a balanced character, i.e., all goods are to be represented in the imports in the same ratio as they are required in the self-expanding sub-economy which they are going to supplement. As a result, the composition of the basket of the sub-economy remains the same, but the basket grows both by self-expansion and by imports. In spite of this economy being open to foreign trade it will be self-reliant because the nucleus is self-expanding and the imports are supplementary, not complementary to internal production.

In a situation where, due to the phase of development being only an initial one, a state of self-generation has not been reached, the imports will have to be complementary to production inside the country. In this case the imports should not be of a balanced composition representing all goods, but should be heavily

weighted towards those materials which serve as bottlenecks and which would put the economy into a state of self-generating growth.

Proper Balance

However, even here it is important that among these bottleneck materials and equipment there should be a balance between various complementary goods. Thus, for making an underdeveloped economy self-generating it may be important to import a huge amount of electrolytic copper and insulating paper for power cables. But it does not make the economy self-reliant if imports are confined to these. The balanced composition among bottleneck materials would require corresponding weightage to the import of machinery and other ancillary inputs for making these materials. Has the import composition in the Fourth Plan been looked at from this point of view to determine how far is the actual import composition deviating from that required in this strategy?

It is generally agreed among serious Indian economists that as regards self-reliance and foreign aid one has to be very cautious in accepting the proposition that India has reached the level of skills and manufacture of equipment by which self-generation can be easily achieved. While fully endorsing this warning, one may, however, bring the attention of the public to a factor to the contrary. During the last fifteen years of planning, although much has been achieved by foreign aid, yet a serious problem has been overlooked. The correct degree of mechanisation to be adopted depends upon the strategy of long-term growth. The selection of the optimum strategy depends upon the technical conditions as well as the initial factor-endowments. When foreign aid comes, it is in some cases tied up with equipment and skills which do not always conform to the requirements of the strategy which is optimum for the country.

Thus, although the optimum strategy requires agricultural

methods which apart from being highly productive should be of a low degree of mechanisation, yet some of the technical personnel connected with the aid missions are effective mostly in advising about methods which they have experience of in their own countries (where a much higher degree of mechanisation is appropriate on account of the higher wage and lesser non-employment).

Appropriateness

The acceptance of foreign aid as regards equipment and technical skills has been done in the past, in general, without too close a study of the appropriateness of the technique with regard to the optimum strategy. Any diminution of aid in such projects would not entirely be without ultimate benefit for the economy. It would discourage our engineers from certifying as top-priority essential expenditures, schemes in which the import content is unconscionably high, in the belief that foreign collaboration and availability of exchange at zero cost should make an examination of the suitability of technique and capital intensity on economic criteria unnecessary.

Let us take the case of the Indian railways. The problem there is to increase the traffic flow per mile track. This can be done either by laying an extra track, with corresponding bridges and embankments. This is an extremely expensive method in terms of rupees as well as foreign exchange cost. The alternative is the adoption of administrative regulations and minor changes in equipment which would make the degree of utilisation of the same tracks about double that as at present. Yet, I believe, the former alternative is the general policy of the railways. If new tracks are to be laid, it would be more worthwhile to do so in the hinterland of industrial and commercial centres rather than adding a track to the existing lines.

In addition to influencing the degree of mechanisation in the

country towards a higher level than is desirable, some of the foreign-aid projects are connected with the production of goods which are non-essential. Thus, foreign exchange may get used both by the public and the private sector for the manufacture of goods which would be classed under luxury consumption, e.g., nylon shirts and refrigerators for the high-income domestic market, or the small car for the lower rungs of the upper middle class. The precious foreign exchange in these cases is used for feeding the demand of chronic malignant parasitism. The process is further encouraged by the slogan of import-substitution which sanctifies the production within the country of any imported commodity, irrespective of an examination of the desirability of producing it at all. The production of import-substitutes in the case of luxury items often requires huge capital investment which is more easily available if some foreign collaboration is in prospect. A decrease of that part of foreign inflow of capital or skills which is used for feeding chronic malignant parasitism will be all to the good of the country, and that at least should not deter us from moving towards a self-reliant economy.

Foreign collaboration, foreign aid, the degree of mechanisation, concentration of economic power and other forms of economic disparities are interlinked with one another and the purpose of the next three sections is to show some possible causal influences and to trace their effect upon the rate of growth.

Economic Disparities

Economic disparities have two independent aspects which are sometimes confused with each other. One criterion deals with the distribution of income between entrepreneurs and wage earners and may be referred to as the inter-class distribution. The other criterion refers to the income *within* each economic class being dispersed slowly. This may be called intra-class

distribution. The inter-class and intra-class dispersal of economic gains need not follow the same direction, for the former, among other factors, depends upon the degree of mechanisation and the latter upon the appropriate scale of operation.

In the technological situation obtaining in India, a high degree of mechanisation is associated with a large scale of production for economic and technical efficiency, with more durable forms of physical equipment, and with imported machinery. In addition, there is a lack of widespread media for mobilising small savings. This makes self-financed investment of firms important. A large-sized firm is the only one which can raise internal capital in the required measure for large-scale production. Moreover, imported capital goods and foreign collaboration is obtained more easily by the large-sized firm. In such a situation the high share of entrepreneurs in income following from a high degree of mechanisation go side by side with concentration of economic power among a few large business houses.

Misleading Argument

It is maintained by economists that some increase of the disparities in income taking place may be favourable for economic growth. For instance, the distribution of income moving in favour of higher income entrepreneurs as opposed to the group composed of workers and the lower income section of the self-employed population, may lower the aggregate propensity to consume and raise the ratio of investment to income, because the former group has a higher propensity to invest out of income than the latter group. In this sense, it is claimed by the proponents of concentration of economic power that it may, instead of reducing output as the static economic theory supposed, actually increase the rate of growth.

This argument is, however, subject to a fallacy that the higher the ratio of investment to income the higher is the rate of growth. This proposition follows from the

common confusion between two senses of the term rate of profit, viz, rate of profit on the turnover and the rate of profit on capital. The relationship between the marginal ratio of investment to income and the rate of growth as well as between the ratio of profits to income (i.e., the rate of profit on turnover) and the rate of profit on capital depends upon the degree of mechanisation of the new investment.

The trader's view of the rate of profit is the rate of profit on the turnover. In the pure trading situation owing to the absence of fixed capital, the working capital and the total capital are the same. So, the rate of profit on turnover and the rate of profit on capital (including working and fixed capital) come out to be the same. However, in industrial production the rate of profit on capital depends to a very large extent on fixed capital and the concept of rate of profit on capital differs very much from the rate of profit on the turnover.

Indian traders entering into the new line of industrial production have carried over with them to industry the remnants of modes of thinking of traders and, though to the shareholder they have to show a maximum rate of profit on capital (the dividend), the organisation of production takes place with the attitude of minimising prime costs per unit of output, or of maximising the rate of profit on turnover. Thus, the selection of technique of production tends to favour the highly mechanised techniques for a given wage rate. As a result, on the one hand the share of profits in income tends to be high which creates inter-class disparity, and on the other hand the rate of profit on capital and the consequent rate of growth come out to be lower than the optimum.

Strategy of Growth

This is so because the optimum degree of mechanisation itself depends upon the strategy of growth. In the strategy where priority to heavy investment is being given, we have seen that for the consumer-goods sector the techniques

should be confined to those which have a negligible proportion of inputs from the heavy-investment sector. In this restricted production function the optimum technique is that which maximises the rate of growth at the prevalent general initial wage. A higher degree of mechanisation than the optimum, though it may show a higher ratio of profit and of investment to output, has a much lower output per unit of investment, so that profits and invested surplus per unit of capital are lower than optimum. Thus, the rates of profit and of growth are lower and economic disparity higher than optimum when the degree of mechanisation is higher than optimum. In this situation, a high level of economic disparities becomes coexistent with a low rate of growth, unlike what the supporters of the concentration of economic power suggest.

A Fallacy

There are also some other aspects of disparities which retard the rate of growth. Although the propensity to consume of the high-income entrepreneur is lower than that of the wage-earner, the goods required by the former are of a luxury type requiring for their production extremely scarce resources like foreign exchange, or the output of the heavy-investment sector. The effect upon the economy through a lower rate of growth and the deviation from the strategy with heavy investment as priority is very large in this case.

It is a fallacy to suppose that the consumption of luxury goods by the rich does not raise prices of necessities as it does not directly exert the pressure of demand on them. It does exert an indirect pressure on necessities by increasing the employment of workers in the sector catering for malignant parasitism, apart from directly competing away scarce resources which in other uses would have resulted in the furtherance of economic growth in the Heavy Strategy.

The effect of demand for luxury goods by the rich entrepreneur,

the privy-purse holders and those highly-paid foreign consultants who are paid in rupees, is not confined to the direct effects observed above. It also produces a demonstration effect, and the desire for the possession of such goods permeates down the income line. Through the intermediate income-group comprising the middle-income businessman, the higher civil servant, the management executive and the landlord, it reaches the higher levels of the organised worker. It is at this stage that we find that the demonstration effect produces a much more deleterious effect upon the rate of growth, because of the numbers involved in the demand for semi-luxuries by the more well-to-do workers. The Semi-U-sector becomes a large appendage to the U-sector.

This aspect of the question is linked up with the application of socialist theory, derived from and specific for economically advanced countries, to the conditions existing in an underdeveloped country. The objective of socialism is to attain for all workers the high and growing standard of living on golden-age growth in the shortest time, and to eliminate the inequality of consumption.

Advanced Economies

In the advanced countries with near full employment, the trade union movement no doubt helps to achieve this by aiming at the reduction of the share of entrepreneurs in income and actually securing the prevention of an increase in it. But because of universal trade-unionism and full employment, the internal disparities among different classes of workers does not seriously increase. In addition, the raising of the money wage raises the demand for a higher standard of living and this particularly increases the minimum conventional standard of living which the workers will accept. It thus increases the 'inflation-barrier wage'⁶ where a wage-price spiral of inflation would arise through money-wage

demands if the real wage of the worker were to rise less fast than productivity.

In an economy where capital is not scarce and labour is not plentiful, this increase of the inflation-barrier wage is all to the good, as it forces the entrepreneur to put into use the known but unutilised technical inventions which form an advance in technical knowledge and if they were not adopted at the higher wage the rate of profit would decline. Thus, the trade union organisation in an advanced country helps to increase the rate of growth of capital and productivity, and consequently helps to build the base for further increases in the standard of living of the worker. It thus serves the ends of socialism.

Under-developed Conditions

The situation is radically different in a country with scarcity of capital and huge non-employment. The techniques which would be adopted at a higher wage would be of a greater order of mechanisation and would bring down the rate of growth. They would also be, in practice, the techniques which require as input the products of the heavy-investment sector and would make the strategy deviate from one in which heavy investment has priority.

Now, it has been noticed during the last twenty years in India that wherever organisation of labour is effective, it leads to a considerable rise in the real wage of the organised worker in relation to the unemployed worker. Thus, a rate of growth of real wages higher than that of the national income can be witnessed in a number of organised industries.⁷ This must be construed as malignant parasitism in terms of our analysis, and to that extent it is an element in the trade union movement which detracts from the early achievement of socialism. The increase of per capita consumption of workers instead of

6. See Joan Robinson, *The Accumulation of Capital*, Herconillan, 1956.

7. *Wages in Certain Industries in India* by A. Nagaraj of the Department of Economics, Osmania University, published in the *Asian Economic Review* (1965), pp. 404-17.

being channelled through a greater rate of growth of employment to a wider population and to the poorest section of it (i.e., the 20 per cent who draw less than four annas a day) it gets concentrated in the hands of a relatively smaller number of organised labourers.

Government Action

The strengthening of trade unionism for the purpose of attaining wage increases in an underdeveloped country, it is true, tends to reduce economic disparity between the organised worker and the entrepreneur; but at the same time it aggravates it among the workers themselves, and delays the time when true socialism would be achieved with a higher standard of living for all workers at full employment. This is a moral conflict facing a socialist economist in an underdeveloped economy, and its resolution would require greater direct use of government action rather than dependence on trade unionism for curbing disparities. Thus, steep rates of expenditure taxes and a severe restraint on allocation of resources for luxury-consumption manufactures would be recommended as more appropriate instruments for the reduction of disparities rather than reliance chiefly upon trade union activity.

The need for government action in the form of restraint in the allocation of resources to luxury production becomes more apparent if it is realised that it is the feeding of chronic malignant parasitism through which the economic disparities produce the distortion of consumption and investment in the economy. Had it not been for this type of consumption, the mere existence of inequality of wealth would have gone unnoticed by social observers and would not have had such a detrimental effect upon the economy.

It is because resources are actually commanded by the unequal purchasing power in the form of luxury goods that the rate of growth of the economy gets affected. It is for this economic reason, apart from the purely moral one regarding attachment to egali-

tarianism, that economic disparities should be reduced. And, further, because it has to be reduced not only between the entrepreneurs and workers, but also between the organised workers and the unemployed (or subsistence-level employed workers), State action in allocation of resources must be relied upon in preference to trade unionism.

We have seen that a high degree of mechanisation happens to be technologically associated with a large scale per unit. The large scale of the unit of production has incidentally provided one of the facilities which have reinforced the movement for the organisation of labour. The result of the success of trade union activity, as we have seen, has been a rise of the real wage. This not only provides an *ex post* justification of the higher degree of mechanisation on the maximisation of the dividend and the rate-of-profit-on-capital criterion, but also creates an expectation of still further wage rises.

Now, we have also noticed that there is high durability of equipment for some techniques at a higher degree of mechanisation (with high import and heavy-industry content) in relation to indigenous techniques at a lower degree of mechanisation. In a situation of a rising real wage, the longer the life of the machine, the higher is the average expected wage rate over its life. As a result, the techniques, which at a higher average wage yield a rate of profit on turnover at the same level as those with a lower wage, would have to be even more mechanised.

Spiral of Choice

This sets up a spiral of choice of successively higher degrees of mechanisation, successive lowering of the rate of growth at a constant inter-class disparity for each level of the growing real wage. On account of the higher degree of success for its activities, the trade union organisation is strengthened and leads consequently to still higher wages for organised workers. This increases still further the intra-class disparities among

workers. The volume of chronic malignant parasitism of the U and Semi-U sectors grows by this feed back all the time.

The causal connections need still to be worked out more clearly both in theory and by statistical tests. But among this jumble of correlations it is clear that the strategy which we are following is becoming increasingly removed from the one of priority to heavy investment and more akin to the one in which consumption goods of mechanised production figure prominently and in which the rate of growth is consequently lower.

Self-reliant Economy

Moreover, this state of affairs is intimately linked with foreign collaboration and foreign assistance to the light-machinery sector. A more self-reliant economy would not necessarily be worse off from the point of view of capital accumulation and welfare, in as far as it would lack elements of artificial encouragement to the chronic malignant parasitism of the U and Semi-U-sectors.

The last three plans have aggravated concentration of economic power in the hands of a few entrepreneurs, and increased disparities between organised workers and other workers. They have consequently resulted in an increase of luxury consumption considerably. How far does the Fourth Plan envisage government action in the allocation of resources for the prevention of encouragement to avoidable chronic malignant parasitism, emanating either from disparities of income or from an inappropriate degree of mechanisation or from foreign aid for the manufacture of semi-luxuries and luxuries? Unless something drastic is done in the Fourth Plan, it would become impossible for us to have a self-reliant economy with enough surplus for feeding the unavoidable chronic parasitism of the Defence sector. But if the U-sector is sacrificed along with that part of foreign aid which sustains it, then there is great hope that the H-sector and the D-sector will both survive and flourish in a self-regenerating economy.

Need for new dimensions

S. C. GUPTA

DURING the period of the Third Five Year Plan, 1961-62 to 1965-66, economic planning in India has been subject to severe strain. Twice during this period, the country was attacked on her borders by China in October 1962, and by Pakistan in September 1965. During these brief but crucial moments of crisis, the nation was obliged to cast searching glances on her plans of economic and social development in order to locate weaknesses, if any, and make necessary readjustments dictated by immediate requirements. Then, in the political and economic spheres, a number of developments have taken place which have focussed attention on certain basic aspects of our developmental planning. On the one hand, the attitudes of aid-giving countries, specially the U.S.A., the U.K. and the World Bank, have been changing with changes in international political weather. Recently, they have shown increasing anxiety to scrutinise our plans of economic

development to determine whether they should continue to give us aid.

Internally, an acute awareness of the growth of monopolies and concentration of economic power and widening disparities of income and wealth amongst different strata of society has led to a questioning of the basic premises, strategy, methods and techniques of economic planning in India. Growing imbalances in the various sectors of the national economy during the Third Plan, especially between industrial and agricultural sectors, growing shortages of foreign exchange resources, and increasing difficulties of obtaining aid from foreign countries in a growingly hostile international environment have also forced the country to reconsider our basic assumptions relating to the availability of foreign aid and foreign exchange.

Exposed to these new dangers and with heavy shortfalls in ful-

fulfilment of planned targets, our methods and techniques of planning, and instruments of policy formulation and implementation have revealed serious weaknesses. To counter the new hazards, it had become necessary to add new objectives into our plans. For instance, after the Chinese attack in 1962, defence became an essential objective of economic development, and attainment of defence and development simultaneously became the main objective of our plans. More recently, during the Indo-Pak war, the need for self-reliance and self-sufficiency in arms and food was acutely felt in the wake of the Anglo-American embargo on the flow of military, economic and food supplies to India during the period of the war and afterwards.

But, soon after, it also became evident that India's plans of economic development have not yet succeeded in taking the country anywhere near the goals of self-reliance or self-sufficiency in food and arms. Nor has it been possible for India to undertake the tasks of defence and development together. And for these reasons, the government had to beat a disgraceful retreat from its earlier postures of self-reliance and confidence and decide to take massive imports of U.S. food and consider the proposals of the World Bank for various changes in our planning strategy including the devaluation of the rupee.

Facing Reality

In face of these grim and harsh realities of our current economic and political situation, and in the light of failures in the achievement of agricultural and industrial targets of the Third Plan, it is only natural that the 'Memorandum on the Fourth Five Year Plan', issued by the Planning Commission in October, 1964, should evoke an attitude of serious caution, and even considerable scepticism. The 'Memorandum' has projected a 7 per cent annual rate of growth of national income during the Fourth Plan period when the achievement

during the Third Plan period has not been even 3.5 per cent per annum.

For agricultural output, the Memorandum envisages a rate of growth of 5.0 per cent, while the performance in the Third Plan has been less than even 2.5 per cent. Since October 1964, when the Memorandum was first published, the proposed targets of industrial and agricultural output as well as the rates of saving and investment in the economy have been further revised. Varying estimates of foreign aid availability and foreign exchange requirements have been circulating with no degree of finality about any one of them. The dark shadows of Indo-Pak and Indo-Chinese relations have substantially influenced these estimates.

And, prevailing uncertainties all round prevent any firm commitments regarding either the size or the shape of the Fourth Five Year Plan. Only the plan expenditure for the year 1966-67 has been decided upon at Rs. 2080 crores, which too is much less than would be spent in the last year of the Third Plan. Even for this level of expenditure to be incurred, it is still necessary to find resources to the tune of Rs. 200 crores.

The Test

To ponder over the size, shape, and content of the Fourth Plan in such uncertain conditions might appear to be ridiculous. But it is precisely in such moments that our ingenuity in economic planning, our capacity to have an honest assessment of our own resources and our national will and determination to overcome our economic backwardness are put to real test. If we can steer ourselves through these moments of crisis, and devise for ourselves a plan of economic development which will make our economic independence a solid reality, and self-reliance a realisable objective, we would have met the serious challenge we are presently confronted with.

But, for that purpose, it will be necessary to think in terms of

new dimensions. Our plan would then have to be not a mere catalogue of aspirations and targets, full of pious phrases and projections, unrelated to any definite instruments of policy to ensure their fulfilment. Nor would its formulation have to depend on the advice and instructions of the U.S.A. or the World Bank. On the contrary, the new plan would have to contain clear perspectives not only on the targets and immediate goals of the Fourth Plan, but also on the means and methods, instruments and measures of policy through which the given goals would be achieved.

While laying down the various instruments of policy, the specific roles to be played by different sections of society in the achievement of national goals will have to be clearly laid down. Whatever changes in the mutual socio-economic relationships of our people or in the structural organisation of our polity and economy are necessary to enable different strata of people to play their respective roles in the national endeavour will have to be fully spelt out. Vague and ambiguous phrases, generalised exhortations for people's participation without any concrete programmes of action will have no place in such a plan. And abject dependence on foreign countries, western or socialist, or on the World Bank, for foreign aid and foreign exchange, will not be its essential ingredient. Only then will a plan be able to carry meaning, purpose and conviction to the people of India.¹

Recalling the Past

At this stage, it might be instructive to reiterate the approach towards national economic planning which was evolved during the days of the national freedom movement. For instance, the National Planning Committee of the Indian National Congress, appointed in 1937 with Jawaharlal Nehru as Chairman, had defined

1. See my article 'Plan with Precision' in *Competition Review*, April, 1965, pp. 23-27.

the objectives of national planning as follows:

'The principal objective of planning the national economy should be to attain, as far as possible, national self-sufficiency, and not primarily for purposes of foreign markets. This does not exclude international trade, which should be encouraged but with a view to avoid economic imperialism. The first charge on the country's produce, agricultural and industrial, should be to meet the domestic needs of food supply, raw materials and manufactured goods. But outlets for surplus goods may be explored to meet the requirements of India's international indebtedness.'²

National Interest

It would be evident from the above extract that during the days of the freedom movement, national interest was uppermost in all our thoughts and sentiments. The Gandhian spirit of *swadeshi* had penetrated deep into our national consciousness, and we had proclaimed national self-sufficiency as the primary goal of our planning.

The intensity of our nationalism in economic matters in those days is also evident from our approach and attitude towards 'foreign capital and management'. For instance, the Advisory Planning Board of the Government of India, appointed in October, 1946, with K. C. Neogy as Chairman, had recommended as follows on the question of foreign capital and management:

'...we are of the opinion that the intrusion of foreign firms in the field of Indian industry should not be allowed. The reasons for keeping the basic industries of the country free from foreign control and entirely in hands of the nationals of the country are obvious. But even in the case of other industries, e.g., consumer goods industries, we think there are good reasons for a

similar restriction. If foreign companies with their vast resources, technical and financial, are allowed to establish themselves in industry in the fields at present not covered by Indian enterprise, there is little chance, in our opinion, of that enterprise being brought into existence at a future date. Even if an attempt is made, it would have to contend against formidable difficulties. It seems to us preferable that the goods which the country cannot produce at present but would be in a position to produce later on, should continue to be imported from other countries rather than that their local manufacture should be started or expanded by foreign firms. In the course of time, it will be possible to restrict or discontinue foreign imports, but foreign vested interests once created would be difficult to dislodge.'³

Prophetic Wisdom

The prophetic wisdom of these words would be obvious to those who have been witness to the changes in the attitudes of western countries towards India in the wake of our hostilities with Pakistan. These countries not only stopped the flow of their military and economic supplies to India, immediately with the outbreak of hostilities, but have also utilised our difficulties for wresting numerous concessions in respect of liberalisation of licensing and control procedures, entry and participation of foreign capital into various industries, right of control and management, and freedom of pricing and distribution of products in several industries.

This has been so because, contrary to our national legacy, we have left our doors wide open for foreign capital and management ever since the beginning of our economic planning. How has this change in our outlook come about? It would require some explanation. But at this stage, it is sufficient to point out that until not very long ago, we were so acutely conscious of the dangers of economic im-

perialism and its penetration in our country, that we did not want foreign capital or management even to descend on our soil, let alone our wooing it and inviting it to our shores.

Specific Goals

Apart from national self-sufficiency, another fundamental aim of economic planning in the days of the freedom movement was defined to be 'to ensure an adequate standard of living for the masses. . . (which) implies a certain irreducible minimum plus a progressive scale of comforts and amenities.' For this purpose, it was suggested that improvement of nutrition to a calorific value of 2,400 to 2,800 units per adult worker, of clothing from 15 yards to 30 yards per capita per annum, and of housing at least 100 sq. feet per capita should be planned to be attained within a specified period of, say, 10 years.

It will be seen that national self-sufficiency and an irreducible minimum standard of living for the masses were two very specific and concrete goals of national planning in India. These two goals were perfectly intelligible to every citizen of India, and sufficiently inspiring for everyone to work for them. However, in the years after Independence, these concrete and specific objectives of national planning were almost completely obliterated. Instead, certain broad and generalised goals and objectives were substituted.

As early as in 1947, the Advisory Planning Board had amended the objective of national self-sufficiency as follows:

'It has been suggested that national self-sufficiency should be regarded as the objective of planning. It should certainly be aimed at in certain spheres, e.g., in the production of essential foods, but we find some difficulty in accepting it unreservedly as the objective of planning, as no country can be absolutely self-sufficient.'⁴

And regarding the objective of raising the minimum standard of

2. A Note on the work of the National Planning Committee, by Prof. K. T. Shah, in *Reports of the Advisory Planning Board, Government of India, 1947*, p. 144.

3. *Report of the Advisory Planning Board, Government of India, 1947*, p. 17.

4. *Report, op. cit.*, p. 4

living per capita by a pre-determined amount, the Planning Board made the following observation:

'The National Planning Committee suggested certain norms, to which various ingredients making up the standard of living should be raised, so that the cumulative effect would be to raise the standard to three times its present level. . . It must be frankly recognised that we do not at present possess in India either sufficient knowledge or statistical information or sufficiently extensive control over economic activity to be able either to frame or to execute plans whose combined and cumulative effect will be to increase *per capita* income by a pre-determined amount. Nevertheless, broad objectives stated in quantitative terms, as by the National Planning Committee and in the Bombay Plan, have a definite value whose direct practical significance will increase as knowledge and statistics improve.'

Vague Perspectives

It will be seen that the two objectives of economic planning which had been formulated by the National Planning Committee of the Indian National Congress had been thus declared as impracticable and, therefore, irrelevant. Instead, the objectives of economic planning were generally defined to be, broadly speaking, 'to raise the general standard of living of the people as a whole and to ensure useful employment for all.' The attainment of these objectives required that the 'resources of the country should be developed to the maximum extent possible and that the wealth produced should be distributed in an equitable manner.' It also required a certain degree of 'regionalisation,' i.e., a dispersal of industrial and other economic activity, so that, so far as physical conditions permit, each distinct region of the country may develop a balanced economy.

Thus, the objectives of economic planning in independent India came to be detached from the

mores and ethos of the national freedom movement almost immediately after independence had been achieved. And these were defined *de novo* in a blissfully vague and generalised phraseology.

With the establishment of the Planning Commission in March 1950, the perspectives of economic planning in India became even wider and broader. The Commission was entrusted with the tasks of making an assessment of the material, capital and human resources of the country including technical personnel, and formulating plans for the most effective and balanced utilisation of the country's resources. The central objective of planning, according to the Commission, was 'to initiate a process of development which will raise living standards and open out to the people new opportunities for a richer and more varied life.' And the scope of planning was 'not merely...the development of resources in a narrow technical sense, but the development of human faculties and the building up of an institutional framework adequate to the needs and aspirations of the people.'⁵

No Operational Value

Within such a broad framework, it was but natural that the Commission came to possess wide latitudes in interpreting the processes of development in the economy, and formulating policies for directing them into desired channels. But in its composition the Commission consisted of various political and regional interests. Moreover, every five year plan served as a blue print for national development to be placed before the electorate on the eve of every quinquennial election. Therefore, the Commission had also to reckon with the political and social objectives as formulated and laid down for the country by the ruling political party.

However, since these aspects of national life were determined by forces altogether beyond the con-

trol of the Planning Commission, and for purposes not directly relevant for the Commission's work, it became unavoidable that the Commission had to take recourse to making a plethora of vague and general statements of platitudes which had neither any operational nor practical significance. The Commission borrowed its stock phraseology regarding these vague platitudes from the resolutions of the ruling party without any independent mind of its own. It incorporated these broad, platitudinous statements about general objectives and goals of planning in India as preambles to its five year plans which had no relevance whatsoever to its programmes of development or to the operational instruments of policy suggested in the plans. The result was that every five year plan contained a mass of verbiage which had no operational value. It only served the ideological purpose of embellishing whatever was proposed to be done as part of the plans during every five year period.

Limited Statistics

Thus, while the social and political objectives of the plans were derived from sources exogenous to their operational framework over the years, the Commission developed certain routine methods and techniques of formulating and preparing five year plans, on the basis of limited statistical data available for 'the country as a whole. Since the plans are prepared first at the national level, then disaggregated at various State levels, and never broken into smaller regional units, it is only natural that only such statistical data which may be useful for preparing all-India estimates would appear to have any meaning for the purposes of the Commission. All other data for smaller regional units may be useful for any other purpose except for national planning. Consequently, it has been a perennial complaint of the Commission that adequate statistical data have not been available for the preparation of five year plans.

Over these past 15 years, continuous efforts have been made to collect new information and im-

5. *First Five Year Plan, Government of India*, p. 7.

prove the methods of collection of statistics. A vast paraphernalia of trained economists and statisticians has been gradually drawn into the preparation of five year plans. An impressive Panel of Economists has also been constituted to advise the Planning Commission on various problems of planning which has recently changed into a National Development Council. And this structure of planning machinery has continued over the three plans with only minor variations of detail from time to time.

The volume of planning work in the Commission as well as in the Central and State departments has also continued to expand. The core of this work has consisted of preparation of the plans of financial expenditure on various projects of industrial and agricultural development together with fixation of targets of physical output for some items, and average annual rates of growth of national income, domestic savings, and investment for different plan periods. An important part of this work has also been the preparation of a financial resources budget both for the Central and State governments as well as estimates of the extent of foreign aid and foreign exchange required for certain projected levels of economic growth. And, over the years, a certain degree of efficiency has been acquired by the Commission in the preparation of the various projections, estimates, budgets, and the so-called plans.

Widening Gap

But, curiously enough, as the routine efficiency of the Planning Commission in making these plans has improved, the ineffectiveness and the unrealism of the five year plans has tended to increase. The gap between the projections and targets of the Planning Commission; and actual achievements of the economy has begun to widen. Deviations from the course of planned development have become far more frequent; the clamour of the States for sharing in the spoils distributed by the Commission has become louder over the years. And political pressures on the Commission

for distributing its favours amongst States and regions have intensified. Under these pressures, allocation of resources in the plans are made on the basis of horse-trading and hard bargaining between the Commission and the Chief Ministers of various States, rather than on economic criteria.

The processes of planning and decision-making in the Commission have thus tended to become detached from economic rationale. Economic exercises and models have begun to have less and less relevance for purposes of planning decisions. All this has happened because the Planning Commission has not been paying any attention to the concrete and specific changes in the structural and institutional framework of the economy which have been assuming urgency with the completion of every five year plan.

Salvaging the Plan

In such a structural milieu of economic planning in India, to pontificate on the size, shape and content of the Fourth Five Year Plan would appear to be an exercise in futility. Yet, it is necessary to say that although during the Third Five Year Plan, economic planning in India has failed, leading to a sense of frustration and disbelief in the efficacy of planning amongst some sections of our people, yet in the Fourth Five Year Plan period, planning must be made to succeed because that is the only method of economic salvation for India. The question therefore is: how can planning be made to succeed in India?

To seek an answer to this question, one has first to seek answers to some of those fundamental questions which had been raised in the very first meeting of the Panel of Economists which was held in January, 1955, to consider the proposals for the formulation of the Second Five Year Plan but which have never been adequately answered.⁶

Some of these questions were

formulated as follows:—

1. How much interference would the government like to resort to in the national economy for planning purposes? This question is vital because the need for government interference in the economy has been increasing in recent years, while its desire to exercise such control has been slackening.

2. Would the private sector be subordinate to the public sector or would it be parallel to it?

3. What is the precise meaning and content of the expression 'Socialistic Pattern of Society' and what is its operational significance for planning purposes?

4. Would the plans be merely an exercise in phasing of financial expenditures on certain given programmes of development, or would they be based on a realistic assessment of physical resources, and on concrete plans for their effective utilisation for national purposes?

5. Would the plans be only series of aspirations, or sober documents which will set out concrete, easily identifiable and intelligible tasks to be accomplished by every strata of society? Would the plans enjoy the sanctity of being an expression of the national will through a constant process of participation of the people in the formulation of plans?

6. What will be the concrete framework of government policies, and the type of institutional changes the government would be prepared to undertake during a plan period?

7. What will be the relationship between the goals of planning and the instruments of policy through which the goals are to be achieved?

8. Is private banking and credit structure compatible with the requirements of a planned economy?

More Questions

These few questions raised at the very inception of planning in

6. See Record of the First Meeting of the Panel of economists held on 27th and 28th of January, 1955. (Mimeographed), Confidential.

India but which have never been squarely faced and adequately answered contain some of the basic reasons for the failure of planning in India today. During the last decade, many more questions have been raised but not answered. For instance:

1. Can mere production of more consumption and investment goods by itself be sufficient 'to ensure a minimum level of living to every family in the country' as laid down in the Memorandum on the Fourth Five Year Plan?

2. Can redistribution of income and wealth be achieved without any conscious and active policy for this purpose?

3. Does not all new wealth produced simultaneously dissolve itself into distributive shares of income of different classes in society? If, yes, how can policies of merely promoting production solve the problems of distribution in socialist directions?

4. How can the growth of monopolies be a danger and yet beneficial for the economic interests of the country?

5. How is private control of foreign trade and foreign exchange banking compatible with the planned regulation and utilisation of scarce foreign exchange resources?

6. How is dependence on U.S. food imports, and maintenance of a free market in foodgrains in the hands of private trade compatible with the needs of a planned economy with persistent secular upward pressure on food prices?

7. How does the gap between legislation and implementation relating to land reforms explain the failure in the agricultural sector? How can it be eliminated, if at all?

8. How can the fulfilment of the targets allocated to the private sector in the industrial field be ensured? Through what effective instruments of policy?

What are the lessons for the future from the failures of the private sector in the Third Plan?

9. What is the sanctity of a big or a small plan in financial terms when the physical targets are liable to change with changes in the price level?

10. Can unemployment and underemployment be removed sooner and better, and surplus labour utilised for productive purposes, through a programme of land redistribution or by promotion of joint-stock capitalist farms in agriculture?

11. Can dependence on the U.S.A. for food imports be ended sooner by the maximum possible use of local manurial resources and efficient utilisation of domestic fertiliser output for food-grains production or by complete switch over on a mass scale to fertilisers which have also to be imported from the U.S.A. for a long time to come?

12. Will the cooperative movement work for the establishment of a socialist economy or will it be developed on lines so as to adjust within the existing framework of a capitalist economy?

13. Can mere allocation of relatively greater financial expenditure on public sector projects ensure a commanding role for the State in the economy? Would the parallel development of the private sector on monopolistic lines not threaten the very existence and further development of this sector?

14. Can the fulfilment of specific targets of output be ensured without providing for built-in methods of checking whether specific programmes of development have actually led to planned increases in output? How is it that Rs. 733 crores of additional investment in agriculture has not resulted in any additional output during the Third Plan?

Specific Goals

These are only a few questions to which the Commission must provide an answer while formulating the Fourth Five Year Plan.

And, in their answers, they must lay down concrete and specific goals to be achieved, modest though they may be, which may be easily intelligible to every strata of the Indian people, and for which they may work with a sense of dedication. They must also concretely explain to an average citizen of India as to what would be his gain from the fruits of planning, and what would be his tasks for the five years to come. They must lay down in concrete and specific terms through what methods and instruments of policy, do they propose to build a democratic socialist society and how soon? What will be the precise composition and economic structure of such a society, and in what respects will it be different from the present society? What will be the respective roles of different classes, workers, peasants, capitalists, middle class people, intelligentsia, bureaucracy, etc., in such a society? Who will produce for whose profit? Who will have the freedom to exploit the labour of whom? Who will be allowed to fatten on whose difficulties? And who will bear the incidence of such exploitation.

Social and Collective

If the Commission seeks answers to these questions in right earnest, it will soon discover that planning of the national economy has to be as much a social and collective process as it is technical and economic. Answers to most of these questions will not be available until these are provided for by an organised will of the people who are to translate those answers into reality and who are to ensure the fulfilment of plan objectives and targets. And the need to associate representative institutions of the people from the smallest unit upwards with the formulation of our five-year plans will only become self-evident to our planners.

Unless thought is devoted to these questions, and clear, unambiguous answers are found, our five-year plans will remain as full of romanticism, unrealism, vague aspirations, and pious projections, as they have been hitherto. And they will remain as distant from reality and prospects of fulfilment as the Third Plan has been.

A note on self reliance

B. G. VERGHESE

THREE hundred years ago and for centuries before that India was counted among the more advanced countries of the world while some of the advanced industrial nations of today were 'backward' or 'developing'. The Iron Pillar, now in Delhi, ancient irrigation works such as the Grand Anicut built across the Cauvery, the fine muslins and calicoes, and the exquisite proportions of the Taj Mahal testified to the skill and technological excellence of Indian craftsmanship. Even until more recent times, the west coast was famous for shipbuilding and

the master-builders of Surat and Bombay built some of the finest men-of-war with which Britannia ruled the waves while the Ganga was a great highway of commerce with a multitude of ships plying up and down its broad expanse over hundreds of miles. Made in India was a certificate of excellence.

Then something happened. India fell a prey to western imperialism as a by-product of the industrial revolution. Ultimately, it was a victory of superior technology.

Today, self-reliance as a motto of development in India implies

technological change. In the literal meaning of the term, it also implies national self-help rather than avoidable dependence on others. But, in whatever sense it is used, self-reliance must always mean a continuing process, a means, and not a static objective to be attained at the end of a given programme of development or a finite period of time.

The First Lesson

Consider a baby learning to walk. It experiments: falls, sits up, crawls, stands, moves by holding on to things, steps out, falls, tries again, falls again—and at last walks, wobbling and unsteady, but all on its own. This is man's first exercise in self-reliance. Aid is not spurned. It is accepted. But only as an aid, not as a permanent crutch. The child falls and knows that it will fall again but it doesn't occur to it to give up; nor do its parents expect it to learn to walk without falling and making 'mistakes'. This too is an important lesson that nations must learn as they set out along the path of development. Self-reliance often entails making mistakes. But progress comes from learning from those mistakes. A needless fear of making mistakes has led India to make many mistakes.

India is a young nation in the modern sense of the term. It is also an ancient land with a rich tradition to help it along. The country has adopted planning and completed three five-year plans. Much has been accomplished. But much has gone wrong and there have been many disappointments. Suddenly there is all around incessant talk of self-reliance. What does this mean? It does not mean self-sufficiency. For in the world of today, life is becoming increasingly inter-dependent. No man can satisfy his own wants. He earns a living and buys what he needs. So too with nations. Few countries are so well endowed and so placed that they can be utterly 'independent'.

Self-reliance means doing with what one has, to reach out to wider horizons. Well, what does India have? It has manpower, a vast expanse of territory, a variety of

natural resources; water, forest, animal and mineral wealth. These must obviously be exploited. Take minerals. Extensive reserves of some minerals have been located. Deposits of other minerals have yet to be discovered or proved in any abundance. Coal would be an example of the first, oil of the second. Well, India has discovered some new oilfields in Gujarat and Assam and further exploratory work holds out the promise of deposits elsewhere—in Rajasthan, West Bengal, the Gangetic plain, South India and both on land and off-shore and under the sea.

Again, India is extremely short of non-ferrous metals like copper, zinc, lead, tin, nickel, etc., which constitute critical industrial raw materials. Perhaps new deposits of these minerals might yet be found. But till then India must make do by using substitute materials like aluminium, which it is fortunately well placed to produce from its large bauxite deposits, and by making alloys that contain little or no 'rare' metals such as nickel free and copper free alloys for coins.

Unproductive Use

But sometimes we also seem to suffer from a peculiar embarrassment of riches. Coal was one time in short supply for industry, for the railways, for thermal power stations, for brick-burning. Now, all of a sudden, there is a glut. There is a crisis of a 'surplus' of coal. This is absurd, for coal is part of India's wealth and a poor country cannot have a surplus of wealth. Something must be wrong. Coal is 'surplus' only because it is being used for traditional purposes—to burn as a fuel. But coal can be used in other ways: as a fuel gas and as a chemical. Indian agriculture is so poor, among other reasons, because so much good topsoil is lost to erosion while a valuable manure like cowdung is burnt as fuel. The reason is that although timber is recklessly felled for use as firewood or charcoal, thus exposing the naked soil to wind and rain, there is not enough timber to meet ordinary fuel needs.

Now, coal can be used as a substitute fuel not only directly but,

more conveniently, by conversion into soft coke or gas which could replace scarce kerosene. Modern methods of low and high temperature carbonisation of coal offer a key to widening the use of coal as a fuel, chemical and fertiliser. Work on this is being done at the Central Fuel Research Institute at Jealgora near Jharia in Bihar and at the Regional Research Institute, Hyderabad. Carbonisation plants have in fact been set up at Durgapur and Neyveli.

Again, not all coal can be used for making iron and steel. But inferior coals can be used by 'washing' and blending with superior metallurgical grades while new processes of smelting in low-shaft furnaces now make it possible to produce iron with inferior coals. The National Metallurgical Laboratory in Jamshedpur has set up a low shaft furnace and is conducting a number of experiments that might soon widen the technological base of the Indian steel industry. This would be important not only because India is short of metallurgical coal but also because most of this coal is concentrated in the Bihar-Bengal area whereas the country's low-grade coal and iron ore reserves are much more widely dispersed.

Self-reliance entails the use of available resources. Take another example. Amul is today literally a household word. This co-operative dairy produces butter, milk powder, baby food, cheese and a good deal else at Anand in Gujarat. Now all of the milk processed at Anand is buffalo milk and no one had ever made powdered milk from buffaloes milk. Obviously not, because there are no buffaloes in Europe, America, Australia or New Zealand. So powdered milk was only made of cow's milk—until Amul came along.

Waste Products

Most industries have a waste product or a by-product which is either thrown away or put to very inefficient use. Very often these wastes are valuable raw materials for important industries. All the blast furnace muck called slag

which previously used to be thrown away at some cost of haulage and dumping space can now be used for making slag cement. Likewise, fly-ash or the fine ash left behind in thermal station boilers can be used in making light-weight building materials, while railway locomotive cinder has actually been used in the construction of Bombay's eastern expressway over a tidal marsh where a light-weight material was especially suitable in view of the weak subsoil.

Similarly, the sugar industry burns bagasse or the residual cane left over after the juice is extracted by crushing. Bagasse is not a very efficient fuel, especially in the kinds of boilers used in much of the sugar industry in the older sugar-producing States of Bihar and U.P. It is, however, a raw material for manufacturing paper and newsprint and if used for this purpose would not only give a much higher return to the sugar industry but provide a cheap and plentiful base for a whole new industry. If, however, sugar factories are not to burn bagasse they must have an alternative supply of fuel. The north Bihar and eastern U.P. sugar factories are fortunately located in reasonably close proximity to the coal fields. Here is another answer to the coal 'surplus'.

Residual Sea Water

Another exciting example of 'waste' material is the bittern or residual sea water thrown away after making salt in innumerable salt pans along the country's long coastline or on the shores of the Sambhar salt lake in Rajasthan. This bittern is more valuable than the common salt—or sodium chloride—which forms only part of the 3.5 per cent salt content of sea water. The 'waste' that is thrown away contains a number of valuable chemicals which are used by a very wide range of industries including some that the country imports from abroad. Of these, potassium chloride is an important fertiliser and India's only source of potassium salts which go into a number of industries including the manufac-

ture of explosives. Bitterns also contain a large family of magnesium and calcium salts, bromine and certain rare chemicals.

There is a good deal of talk of 'defence orientation' in planning these days. Well, the utilisation of bitterns is relevant to this objective. In the field of defence alone, bitterns can provide base chemicals that go into the manufacture of explosives; aircraft (magnesium), plaster of Paris from marine gypsum for medical use, rubidium for non-propulsion engines for space missiles, and cesium which is employed in infra-red detection devices. The Central Salt and Marine Chemicals Research Institute at Bhavnagar has developed certain processes for commercial extraction of chemicals from bitterns and trial production of potassium chloride has already commenced. Considering that the country produces over four million tons of common salt from the sea and plans to augment this output to about six million tons by 1971, there is a large and growing potentiality in marine chemicals. Seaweeds or algae can also yield chemicals and protein-rich food.

The sea can also yield an enormous harvest of fish apart from a harvest of chemicals. The possibilities of deep sea fishing are now only beginning to be tapped. The food, processing industry, employment and export earning potential of this source awaits large-scale exploitation.

Substitutes

Now even if the country makes a lot more steel and cement than it did ten years ago, it still does not make enough in relation to its rapidly growing requirements. One way of saving on cement or steel would be to use substitutes. Another way would be to develop designs and specifications that use less of these materials. Surkhi, that is burnt clay with puzzolanic or binding properties can replace cement to the extent of 20 to 25 per cent in cement-surkhi mixtures for dams, roads, building and other construction. Likewise, over half a million tons of fly-ash waste at present available from the coun-

try's thermal power plants can replace cement up to 20 per cent in the production of ready mixed concrete. Fly-ash has been used in the Rihand dam, a major project, while the Madras State Electricity Board has replaced cement by fly-ash to the extent of 30 per cent in the construction of RCC transmission poles for rural electrification, the cost of which has been reduced in consequence.

This is the kind of economy which has enabled Madras to electrify practically all its 18,000 villages. The impact of this on the use of irrigation pumps and the dispersal of small industry throughout the State has been striking. Alternations in building designs and specifications in conformity with modern practice and the use of new and lighter materials also permits very substantial savings in steel which can then be released for other purposes. Construction is such a large item in development—it accounts for almost half the outlay on the Plan, that any savings in cost and materials here has the most vital bearing on self-reliance.

Idle Capacity

If self-reliance means using natural resources to the best advantage, it also implies making the fullest use of existing installed capacity. There has been a good deal of idle capacity in Indian industry over the past several years—about 40 per cent in certain sectors of the engineering industry and rising up to 60 per cent at present on account of acute raw material and other shortages. This implies a considerable waste of resources and capital locked up in unutilised capacity, the overheads of which fall on the smaller volume of output actually produced. This can be overcome by relating further licensing to current production, current capacity, future needs and a more careful assessment of maintenance requirements. The fault sometimes lies in setting up initial capacity in excess of the manpower, managerial, technical and design skills needed to operate it at full capacity.

There is also often a tendency to label certain plants and assume

that they are mono-purpose plants concerned only with the label they wear. For instance, the coal mining machinery plant at Durgapur is a large engineering plant that can be put to a great many uses other than producing strictly coal-mining equipment. Therefore, when the country needs new heavy engineering capacity in any line it must first make sure that this does not already exist in the form of idle capacity at Durgapur and elsewhere. In other words, having set down a certain capacity in say an engineering shop, the country must plan to utilise it fully before avoidably duplicating it elsewhere. This is not done. Unless the CMMP at Durgapur is fully loaded and soon, a lot of valuable capacity is going to remain idle for years while the country imports items which could be fabricated here.

Many small and medium workshops are idle for want of orders or materials while many other industries are idle or slowing down since they cannot get foreign exchange to import plant and equipment including spares and components which could very probably be manufactured by one or other or a group of engineering plants with idle capacity. It would be cheaper to import the raw materials needed to fabricate equipment in India than to try and import the complete plant or component from abroad. It would appear that a good deal of imported equipment and components could be fabricated indigenously either by individual plants or by groups of them formed into consortia. In some cases some balancing plant may be required; in others technical assistance including drawings and designs. This is really a very large and vital area which calls for detailed study and there is no reason why a lot more import substitution cannot be achieved within its framework.

Indiscriminate Collaboration

Because of import requirements and the uncertainties of getting import licences as and when required, many firms, both in the

public and private sectors have tended to over-import and stockpile anywhere from six to eighteen months' requirements in inventories. Here is another example of idle capacity and an unproductive locking up of capital and foreign exchange. Inventories would fall sharply if spares and components were freely available from indigenous sources. This would be possible if the kind of exercise in import substitution discussed were methodically undertaken. But this objective is defeated by another factor: indiscriminate foreign collaboration.

India's great advantage is a large continental-sized market that can support economic manufacture of a wide variety of quite sophisticated items, despite the relatively under-developed state of the country. But this market has tended to be fragmented and balkanised by collaboration within the same field with several foreign countries each of which employs processes, designs and equipment with different specifications and maintenance needs. The result is that ancillary manufacture is no longer economic because large bulk orders are not available and it is often not worth while for any firm to instal plant and equipment and train skills to produce two of one thing and three pieces of another. This problem must be overcome by a more discriminate pattern of foreign collaboration and by encouraging standardisation. The impetus this would give to industry and the economies it would yield could be startling.

Design Skills

Indian standards and Indian designs will naturally be geared to India's particular needs, circumstances and resource background thus making for greater self-reliance at yet another point. But this again will, apart from the drawing up and enforcement of standards, require the development of a large corpus of design skills. Consider the sequence. A country might first import a certain item. It might then set up a plant to manufacture that item and import the plant. It may first only as-

semble the product and later make the whole item. It should in due course adopt or adapt its own designs to meet its own requirements. Finally, it will try and evolve its own processes and equipment and develop its own technology.

The Successes

India is at present moving from the stage of manufacture to machine building and from fabrication on the basis of imported plant and designs to indigenous designing. The Gnat fighter for example is built to a British design. But the design has undergone certain modification and improvement at Hindustan Aeronautics Ltd, Bangalore. It is as a result of these modifications that the Gnat out-classed the Sabre in the conflict with Pakistan. Now Hal has designed a new high-performance fighter, the HF-24, and a jet trainer, the Kiran, on its own. These aircraft are still being developed.

Hindustan Machine Tools was initially set up in Bangalore in collaboration with a Swiss firm. Since 1956, however, HMT has been on its own and has done remarkably well. It has peaked its production, designed and built new machine tool plants and is now designing a number of new machine tools. It has established an ancillary industrial estate where some of its former employees and other entrepreneurs have set up small feeder production lines. Some items of equipment that HMT had to try and make itself or get from outside or import will now be bought out from one or other of these ancillary units.

Part of the detailed drawings for the first million ton stage of the Koylai refinery has been done indigenously by an Indian design team. More basic design work will be done indigenously for the second stage and yet more again during the third million ton stage. Fertiliser and Chemicals Travancore Ltd., FACT, has designed and executed its own expansion and has now prepared a detailed project report for a proposed new fertiliser plant at Cochin. It has developed certain new processes

and now plans to set up a unit to fabricate fertiliser and chemical equipment. New design capacity has also been built up in the steel and power fields, to mention only two of the important sectors of industry. These talents must be used.

The country's research laboratories constitute the most important item in the armoury of self-reliance. It is here that a new and growing Indian technology is being born. Hindustan Antibiotics has discovered a new drug, Hymaycin; the Central Electronics Research Institute has designed a cheap television receiver; the Tata Institute of Fundamental Research has designed and built a digital computer and is now designing and erecting a large radio-telescope five times the size of Jodrell Bank in the U.K. This will be near Ooty. The Central Mechanical Engineering Research Institute at Durgapur has designed a scooter and a tractor. The list could be multiplied.

Atomic Energy

A noteworthy example of self-reliance is to be found in the work of the Atomic Energy Establishment at Trombay. Atomic energy, because of its military applications, represents a field of technology in which foreign collaboration is not easily available except in the more elementary phases. The AEE has therefore had to 'go it alone' and has eminently succeeded in developing India's nuclear technology to a point where it ranks among the most advanced in the world. A fuel element plant and the more recently built plutonium separation plant have been completely designed and fabricated at Trombay. The electronics division of AEE has also designed, developed and productionised a fair range of highly sophisticated nuclear electronic equipment. The fact that Indian scientists and engineers have been able to achieve such significant results in one of the newest and most highly classified branches of technology shows that India possesses the requisite intellectual skills to forge ahead.

Self-reliance, however, does not lie merely in large scale industry

or in the most highly sophisticated fields. It is an omnipresent challenge. The manner in which hundreds of small, sometimes illiterate entrepreneurs and refugees in Punjab and western U.P. have developed a variety of small industries manufacturing machine tools, cycles, sewing machines, hosiery goods, sports goods and other products is a splendid example of self-reliance. There is nothing grandiose about these little garage sized workshops. But their total impact is impressive. Likewise, the tremendous fillip given to agro-industry and the utilisation of agricultural by-products by the co-operative sugar factories in Maharashtra is of great significance. This is promoting self-reliance at the grass-roots.

A Discipline

Self-reliance is an all pervasive attitude and a discipline. It is not something that mysteriously comes from above. It exists at all levels and the worker, the manager, the scientist, the engineer and the consumer have all to play their part in promoting it. Its main ingredients are a willingness to adapt, improvise, struggle and make mistakes without necessarily waiting for external stimulus and assistance. Self-reliance consists in creating opportunities and seizing these opportunities as they arise. These opportunities exist in abundance in India today and there are many more opportunities waiting to be created and exploited. The current shortages of raw materials, foreign exchange, skills and equipment are therefore not to be regarded as so many impediments but as so many challenges which can be overcome with ingenuity and perseverance.

Ten or 12 years ago India did not make transistors, telephones, aircraft, heavy electrical equipment or radar equipment. It does today. In a few years it will make steel plants, fertiliser plants, tanks and frigates, have a large petrochemical industry, its own rockets and propellants etc. All these will bear the brand name 'Made In India', once more an internationally accepted certificate of excellence.

The institutional complex

ARUN BOSE

DESPITE frequent laments about failures of implementation or about deep, inert sociological obstacles, serious thought on Indian planning in the past decade has been essentially preoccupied with quantitative solutions. If the growth-rate was disappointing, raising the savings-income ratio by a precise per cent, and/or re-ordering the quantitative patterns of investment in some precise manner were the proposed remedies. If the dimensions of the unemployment problem looked too large on paper, precise investigations were suggested to estimate the employment effects of using techniques of varying degrees of capital intensity in different indus-

tries. If the food problem's many ramifications were upsetting too many other magnitudes involved in the planners' exercises, the stress was switched on to long-term PL-480 commitments by the USA, and/or to changed outlay patterns — on fertiliser imports rather than on major irrigation schemes, or on building up a domestic fertiliser industry in preference to both.

Of course, many of these quantitative exercises had definite, often contradictory, implications for the 'institutional complex', i.e., the whole complex of institutions and institutional practices through which the plans were to be put

through. But the institutional changes arising out of these exercises were marginal. Often the proposals themselves were marginal, e.g., government agencies enter petroleum distribution or take over steel-plant designing, while chemical fertiliser production is opened up to private enterprise.

Alternatively, after shake-down to the level of implementation, the originally large-sized changes proposed turned out to be very marginal indeed (e.g., the change-over to co-operative production, marketing and distribution in agriculture). In fact, it was assumed, consciously or unconsciously, by most people with a serious interest in planning that the institutional frame-work which sedimented in India around the middle fifties was politically stable, and left sufficient scope for solving most of her problems by quantitative manipulations within its limits.

Reasons for Change

However, things have begun to change recently, supplying the author with an excuse for writing this article. And for this change, there are several reasons

After all, we have had a decade of serious planning behind us—a decade in which other developing countries have also been experimenting with 'mixed economies' (e.g., Indonesia), or have made swift change-overs to public ownership-based economies (e.g. China, UAR, Burma), trying out novel institutional forms. Our current plan-making is also getting more and more involved with long-term projections stretching to 1975 or 1976. Should we stick to an institutional *status quo* for a full-twenty-year term without making quite sure?

Then, again, our brand of mixed economy with central planning assigned a very definite and growing role to public sector enterprise. Though cruder and more suspect than most statistics, among the few statistical pointers regarding this role are those to show that the share of government companies (excluding Government Departmental undertakings) in total net

capital formation rose from 4.1 per cent in 1950-1953 to 21.6 per cent in 1957-60. Its magnitude rose from 6.4 per cent of net capital formation in the private sector in the first period to 47.8 per cent in the second. Are we sure the institutional practices evolved since 1955 for working these enterprises do not have to be re-examined with their rapid expansion?

Serious Questions

In fact, quantitative projections are themselves throwing up rather more serious institutional questions than at any time in the past decade. It has been argued in a recent publication that even with the most favourable set of conjoint assumptions we cannot attain the perspective planners' 6.6 per cent average growth-rate between 1961 and 1976, simply because we cannot hope to raise the average rate of saving from around 9-10 per cent in 1961-62 to the projected 18 per cent in 1970-76 without major institutional changes. Attention has also been drawn to the perspective planners' unexplained assumptions concerning the oscillations in the incremental capital: output ratio; downward from 3.7 to 2.3 during the Third Plan, rising to 3.1 (Fourth Plan) and 3.2 (Fifth Plan).

Such oscillations are hard to justify purely in terms of changing investment patterns (or changing import-substitution or maintenance import possibilities). But they might make sense if changes in the institutional set-up are also, postulated, designed to bring down the high excess capacity ratios (often put rather crudely at 40 per cent over-all). Another set of figures have been published demonstrating that we can hope to attain a 6.6 per cent long-term growth rate, and become self-supporting as regards capital accumulation, only if we can assume a capital:output ratio of 2.5, a marginal rate of saving of 25 per cent, much improved earnings over the next 10 or 12 years, and disregard all return flows arising out of foreign capital inflows.

Until very recently, essentially Procrustean conclusions were be-

ing drawn from the kind of numerical exercises noted above: since major institutional changes are unlikely, we have to get reconciled to a more realistic 5 per cent growth-rate, and rule out self-reliance in capital accumulation for decades to come. These Procrustean quantitative conclusions were melancholy, but bearable.

But the recent break-up in the *status quo* in our external (political, military and economic) relations with the outside world make quantitative exercises linked to an institutional *status quo* untenable. The defence effort as such probably calls for no more than manageable quantitative adjustments (e.g. an extra Rs 350 crore expenditure per year; its steel intake is said to be no more than 4.5 per cent of current supplies.) and small institutional adjustments like a slight slackening of public sector monopoly in major lines of defence production. But, alternative projections now undertaken must digest most unexpected quantitative assumptions: drastic cut in fresh foreign capital inflows, defaults in our foreign payments, up to 20-25 per cent cut in our marketed food-grains supplies due to import cuts; over-all effects of a serious blockade on all foreign dealings etc.

Unavoidable Break-up

Whether these new projections show that we have to face absurdly low growth-rates in the immediate future, may be followed by a sharp step-up later, or whether we ultimately escape being 'forced' into premature 'self-reliance' precisely by being ready for it—a break-up in the institutional *status quo* seems unavoidable.

Our brand of a planned mixed economy specially provides for a sector of public enterprise growing rapidly in size and weight. As we have seen in the previous section, it has been growing, maybe spectacularly, on its own steam, so to speak, i.e., by re-investing its own earnings (though subsidies out of government's general reve-

nue have almost certainly played a role which is hard to quantify). If the institutional *status quo* is to be dramatically ended we could throw overboard our mixed economy and artificially accelerate the process of public sector growth to predominance. This could take three forms of 'nationalisation' decrees: (a) large-scale take-over of all or most private concerns in old-established industries and sectors like large-scale banking; (b) a ban on new private undertakings in many more industries than at present, (c) a ban on extension of plants or extended operations by existing private enterprises.

- Such moves could be justified easily if it were clear in very general terms that effective economic planning is impossible without having immediately a much more powerful lever of control than taxes (often evaded), disputed subsidies and ineffective control,—in the shape of an all powerful public sector. Now it is true that in the third plan period Indian planning has been very shaky. Unfortunately, no comprehensive assessment has been made of the comparative contribution of public and private sector units and agencies to plan-making and plan-fulfilment.

Performance

Even in particular industries where these questions have been brought up and debated for some time, no serious study has been made and the partial pointers are inconclusive. Aluminium production has clearly lagged seriously, but would public enterprise have obviously done better? The coal industry was the most important case of an industry where all extensions were reserved for new State collieries; old private collieries were permitted to extend their operations only after the step-up in State collieries' production was found to be slow. But the latest position seems to be that the Planning Commission is under fire for exaggerating expected demand for coal, while it has itself permitted a rapid dieselisation programme in the railways to deflate future demand for coal. These questions clearly can and should

be thrashed out and lead to very definite conclusions for or against a general take-over of private collieries or aluminium production units.

Considering the importance attached to raising the saving-rates, a *prima facie* case could also be made out for nationalisation measures of types (a) and (b) as levers for achieving this objective. In fact, the idea keeps cropping up in serious economic writings (e.g. by Nurkse and Tsuru) that nationalised public sectors in developing economies play a key role by jerking up the saving-rate during the initial stages of the development process until the hump is crossed and productivity increases make it easier to maintain high savings-rates. In practice, it is always difficult to test these hypotheses.

Detailed Comparison

Even if we could calculate and compare the saving-income ratio for all public sector and the private corporate sector enterprises, and found sufficient divergence to warrant a conclusion one way or the other, we could not ignore the fact that the composition of aggregate investment in the two sectors is at present not at all similar. Before we could conclude that extended nationalisation would strikingly raise the overall saving-income ratio in the economy, we would have to make supplementary checks by comparing the performance of public and private concerns in the same type of activity. This may not be easy until the public sector is deliberately extended into many more consumer goods and service industries than at present proposed even in the drafts of the Fourth Plan; and is extended into the citadels of corporate private enterprise in India, like large scale cotton and jute textiles, the tea plantations and cement production.

It is curious that the saving-income ratios which are most easily available in India are useless for throwing even a blurred light on this question. We see that the saving-income ratio in the so-called 'government sector' oscillated between 14 per cent and 10 per cent

if we put together several two-yearly and three-yearly averages between 1950 and 1962; the corresponding ratios for the 'domestic corporate sector' oscillated between 44 per cent and 40 per cent. But the first set of figures is vitiated by the lumping together of government revenues and disbursements with public enterprise savings and incomes; the second series refers to retained earnings of companies only, the ratio of savings out of dividend-income is submerged in the over-all ratio for the 'urban household sector'.

It is quite likely that re-processing of already available statistical raw material and fresh investigations will suggest definite nationalisation measures of the first two types listed above. However, there can be no economic justification for nationalisation measures of type (c), i.e., imposition of a ban on extension of existing private concerns which are permitted to function. It is fairly clear from western European experience, that within wide limits output increases via extension of existing plants are cheaper and quicker compared to output increases promoted through establishment of new plants. In fact, this idea has been sufficiently strongly endorsed in the Soviet Union in recent years to account for some of the important Soviet reforms concerning rights of plant managements to make investments out of plant earnings. In any case, there can be no flat policy for or against plant-extensions, whether in the private or the public sector. The issue should be decided in each case mainly on efficiency considerations.

We can be a lot more definite with our conclusions when we pass in this and the next section to (a) mutual inter-relations between public and private productive units, and (b) the relations of both to government departments and agencies which are the 'apex' bodies, so to speak, at the top of the planning-control pyramid.

Fundamental Inequality

In considering the first group of questions, one must start out by stressing that in the Indian plan-

ned mixed economy, there is a fundamental inequality between public and private productive units which should on no account be changed to parity. As noted at the beginning of section II, it is a major plank of our institutional pattern that all new enterprises in a specified list of sectors are required to be public enterprises. This means that all or most of the actual or potential supplies of vital inputs for the rest of the economy are to be controlled by 'commanding' units in the public sector because (a) the private sector cannot be trusted to assume the responsibility of producing and delivering these vital supplies in such a way as to promote rapid development of the whole economy, (b) without this control planning becomes largely a passive 'voluntaristic' under-writing of what will happen in any case, and (c) without it, correct plan targets centrally set can be more easily evaded because 'public accountability' by private enterprises will be hampered by the principle of commercial secrecy.

Of course, there is no harm in making periodical changes in the list provided the public sector commanders remain in charge, if private projects are more advantageous and are selected on the basis of competition by all willing public and private agencies. Indeed, this may even be desirable up to a point precisely to keep public enterprise management on its toes.

Commander Units

Once this is understood, however, the functioning of the commander units must be judged solely on the basis of their efficiency in serving both public and private sector users of the inputs supplied by them *on the same terms*. They should not be allowed to misuse their commanding power to discriminate deliberately against private concerns in order to 'squeeze' them out, or to cover up their own inefficiencies with the claim that they were helping to extend the public sector.

However, there is one special function of these commander units which would distinguish

them from all other public productive units. They have to use their special position to penetrate the bafflewall of commercial secrecy in the private concerns to ensure plan fulfilment and efficiency in the private user enterprises. The commanders will also have to use their powers with other public sector units in much the same way. But public accountability and efficiency auditing of private concerns will remain a dream unless the commanders act in this way and co-ordinate their investigations and controlling operations along with the government and semi-government, loan-giving agencies and the (usually ineffective) financial controllers from government revenue and excise departments.

Efficiency Competition

In the case of the general run of public and private units enmeshed in a horizontal, or vertical or mixed type of inter-relations, the rule should be strict efficiency competition, instead of (a) collusion between all of them or groups of them (whether aligned on public vs. private sector lines, or cutting across such lines of demarcation) or (b) the purely power-seeking type of competition to 'do each other out' by any means. (The degree of integration of horizontally or vertically interconnected processes desirable on pure efficiency grounds will, of course, have to guide the apex bodies in their decisions to found new economic units, and promote their amalgamation or liquidation with redistribution and re-employment of resources when necessary).

At present there are powerful barriers to the spontaneous development of the kind of inter-relations so far discussed in this section. (1) The various arms of the public sector do not, are not, supposed to co-ordinate their activities, except perhaps at the highest level, and/or for archival record-keeping in preference to live information, and last of all for action. (2) Where there is co-ordination between them, it more often than not leads to over-all misuse of public sector resources (e.g., free or nearly free supply of

factory sites, transport facilities, etc., which are wastefully used), or to undue procedural delays in processing public sector requisitions for the sake of co-ordination between multiple agencies. (3) Private concerns usually act in mutual collusion, or in mutual competition, 'use' or 'do out' public concerns frankly to register pure gain in terms of power. (4) Plan-fulfilment and efficiency objectives are often adopted by private concerns, and often achieved more successfully than by public enterprises, but they are never allowed to interfere with the maintenance of commercial secrecy.

Thus, if a regime of efficiency auditing by public agencies, live-wired by the commander units, is to be introduced, the first step is to enforce precise rules for both public sector and private sector books being opened for inspection by commander units (without, of course, asking for open books, i.e., open to all, or abolition of all secrecy, which is utterly incompatible with efficient management).

It follows from the argument of the previous section that so far as possible controlling bodies in our planned economy should exercise control by efficient supply of vital goods and services (i.e., they should mainly be the commanders), rather than by power to obstruct without any *quid pro quo*. This means that the country should move away from the purely licensing and tax-subsidy type of control towards an inducement type of control. Of course, the tax-subsidy type of control can perhaps never be abolished completely, nor can the change-over be an overnight one. It has to be gradual, phased with the development of efficient activity by the commanders.

Specific Reforms

Meanwhile, the 'control by obstruction' agencies which remain have to be converted into efficiency breeders by a set of very specific reforms: (1) they must shorten time-lags in processing requisitions by introducing multiple (and flexible) price systems for

their services, e.g., by a development of the 'late-fee' type of system of charges by the post offices plus a system of refunds if lateness is not avoided; (2) this must be reinforced by a system of transfer of surpluses earned by quick service to workers and employees as bonus earnings (partly on an individual, partly on a collective basis). In many cases, where there are stable rates of bribes in existence as effective efficiency prices there is no harm done if they are adopted as the initial set of incentive prices and earnings, subject to variation with changing performance and pressures of demand; (3) they must modify drastically the system of checks on the exchange of information with each other and with the commanding units in order to facilitate co-ordinated efficiency controls of the type mentioned earlier.

Apex Bodies' Role

These licensing apex bodies should be forbidden to do any 'protective sheltering' of other public units in their charge simply because (a) new public units should be so designed as to take a firm stand on their efficiency from the start, (b) if they cannot survive efficiency competition, they should be reorganised in order to make them more efficient, or (c) they should be liquidated. The doctrine that a public concern cannot be allowed to die is obviously economic nonsense, just as speedy redistribution of resources and re-employment of labour of the closed enterprises makes very good economic and political sense, though there is as yet no government machinery for doing this.

However, these apex bodies should permit below-par private concerns to function provided (a) their production is needed because it can't be substituted, and (b) their private owners are willing to subsidise their inefficient working. This policy is justifiable on the same fundamental ground on which a mixed planned economy is justified: as long as there are people who want to engage in private enterprise, have the resources to do so, are willing to work

within the plan, they are welcome. If they want to subsidise their own losses rather than give up, they may be allowed to go on; however, they must on no account get government subsidies to compensate for their losses (as the private steel firms have been demanding). (If public concerns have been receiving such subsidies, it is a mistake to be rectified).

One of the most difficult tasks which the appropriate apex bodies ought to undertake to do is to check malpractices connected with power-motivated competition, e.g., private concerns 'stealing' expertise and scarce skilled labour from dull-witted and red-tape bound public concerns. The matter is complicated by the scope for vertical mobility with essential insecurity in private concerns versus security with stratification in public units. However, if apex bodies with inspection rights are able to operate (and co-ordinate), sterile stealing with no net productivity effects can be checked by requiring the 'thieves' and the 'losers' to establish their cases in terms of productivity, and by introducing reforms in public enterprise employment and promotion policies in the light of these findings.

Mutual Relations

At various points in the previous sections the purely internal problems of public sector enterprises have been discussed, e.g., the relations between the apex licensing or commander units and the general run of public units, the questions of public accountability, the relations between the latter category and private concerns etc. But two questions remain: how should the ordinary public units regulate their mutual relations and what rules should guide the management of these enterprises at the unit level?

Should direct contact between public unit managers be encouraged or not? Unlike the Soviet Union where until recently such contact has been strongly discouraged (except for purely information purposes), direct contact and bilateral decision-making has not been ruled out in India. However, the

pattern is not uniform. Hold-up at the head office level of sprawling horizontally integrated organisations, the requirement to go through an official labyrinth or a government procurement or supply organisation leading to wrong decisions—are not uncommon. Clearly, both direct contacts and decision-making as well as decisions routed through centralised agencies ought to be valid, leaving a wide option to enterprise managers to employ the most efficient channel.

Should public units (e.g. steel plants) producing the same products compete with one another? An affirmative reply has been given above. But should their mutual competition or mutual bargaining (especially when the relations are vertical) be based on open diplomacy with nothing hidden and confidential? In practice an element of bluff and false play will be unavoidable, if only because there will be so much of it involved in dealings with private concerns in any case. But ordinarily there should be a greater degree of 'openness' than in their dealings with private concerns, not pressed to the point where everybody interferes with everything, so that nothing gets decided.

As regards the rules to guide the management of public concerns at the unit level, there are signs that the Planning Commission realises that a turning-point has been reached.

The Oldest Rule

The oldest rule in operation in India in department undertakings has been: maximise expenditure by first over-stating needs and then justifying them by overspending. Another rule in use has been to operate productive units as channels for the provision of products or services at concessional rates subsidised out of the public exchequer. A third rule has been to learn on the job and draw loans which are later converted into grants, or to secure outright grants to tide over the teething period. A fourth rule has been to rely on security of employment in government service, a time-rate system of reward, at best

supplemented by a system of individual prizes, as the incentive system in public concerns.

In recent documents, the Planning Commission seems to be wanting to tighten up management at the unit level by stressing three things. (1) Discontinue the practice of subsidies, waiver of interest (or repayment) of loans to tide over long gestation lags. There is serious concern at the spill-over of projects from the Third to the Fourth Plan. (2) Public concerns should pay interests at the going market-rate. This is probably partly a supplement to other measures to shorten gestation lags, partly a general drive to ensure better utilisation of working capital. (3) An 11-12 per cent rate of return on capital should be secured both by reducing costs and raising product prices and service charges—apparently because this is a way of raising resources from the public on the basis of a *quid pro quo*.

Pressures and Inducements

There is no doubt that these proposals represent a serious attempt to establish a system of pressures and inducements to increase efficiency at the enterprise level, though the inducements are mainly to the public and not to operators of these enterprises. It is a pity, however, that the need to judge performance by the index of sales rather than of production or expenditure has not been made the starting point of this drive.

The first of these proposals is generally unexceptionable: the going market rate of interest is probably the most convenient way of enforcing in practice the system of paying for capital-use. There is some danger, however, that the recommendation will be sought to be applied too mechanically at first, and then dropped as impracticable. When there is a fairly sudden large scale extension of public enterprise in a new (and non-standardised) field, it is hard to insist on maximum efficiency in resource-use right from the start.

For example, there is a proposal to set up consumer co-operatives to take over 20 per cent of the vol-

ume of retail trade in the urban areas, with a government offer to subsidise up to 2 per cent the interest the co-operatives would pay for deposits collected from the public. The logic is that the amount of subsidy is expected by the Finance Ministry to be covered by its savings in dearness allowance to government employees. Clearly, the proposals ought to be modified to limit the subsidy to a certain period and to provide for removal (when necessary) of subsidy-maximising managers to ensure adequate progress towards efficiency standards.

Profitability

The third proposal—for a 11-12 per cent rate of return—should also be seriously concretised if it is to establish firmly the profitability principle. Without a directive to assign targets for sales as well as output, the rate of return directive can be misleading. Assuming that the rate is considered to be some sort of a long-term average rate actually prevailing in the Indian economy, there should be an attempt to establish its plausibility, to lay down in the case of the important branches of the economy the different periods over which the long-run average rate should be earned, and what the level should be in each branch.

It should also be made clear that the profitability criterion should be interpreted not only as a device to step-up public sector savings (as is being stressed) but also as a pressure to promote efficient use of resources. For this latter purpose, a supplementary criterion of maximisation of the return on fixed capital or the output:fixed capital ratio could be usefully introduced, to help deal with the excess capacity problem. However, if there are strong indications that raw material shortages are the chief cause of excess capacity, rewards for maximising the return per unit of working capital or per unit expenditure on raw material (in foreign and/or home currency) may be employed instead.

There seems to be no easy escape from such multiple criteria if there is to be effective planning.

The ultimate test

A.D. MODDIE

SOMEONE shrewdly said that the old British I.C.S. was an excellent machine, polished and efficient-looking; only it had no transmission. Indian planning so far has had perspective if not polish, it has had sophisticated economic processes but slow, archaic admin-

istrative ones, and it too stands in danger of lacking 'transmission'—only at a much higher cost, political and economic. The time for economic analysis is over; that has been adequately done in the basic approach to agriculture, industry, exports and the infra-structure.

The time for effective implementation is long overdue.

Delay and Drift

With each passing month and year of delay and drift we compound our problems and prolong the poverty and hardships of our people. We put off hard decisions, especially those at the top. The goals then become ever-receding, despite mounting sacrifices by the people, and the mounting papers of the planners. There has been too much doctrinaire dogmatism, incapable of implementing its own dogmas; only leading to a higher and higher waste of resources. The Indian people have been burdened with too many men and institutions, which seem to be an end in themselves. The rot cannot go further; there is still a nation of tremendous future potential to be saved. The stakes are immeasurably high. The job can yet be done, but it will require ten thousand big men in the right place. Big jobs, like big empires and little men go ill together.

The problem of implementation is no more than the efficient management of the Indian economy from the Prime Minister and the Managing Director down to the B.D.O., the supervisor and the foreman. Too long has it been assumed that the only function of leadership in a pluralistic society like ours with many intermediate power groups between the elite and the masses, is to compromise, to put off, and to let events take us. That it must do sometimes. This may happen especially in some policy decisions for political or pragmatic reasons on, say, linguistic States, or the role of private enterprise, or the scope of the S.T.C., but once these are decided, and objectives and targets are set, it is of the very essence of leadership that decisions are made clearly and results pursued with determination and accountability.

So often political leaders leave the impression that it is enough for them to coin slogans; enough to point to vague socialist goals (in Jaipur even that flopped); enough to imagine that specious sign-posts like 'Destination Man' or 'Co-ope-

rative Commonwealth' constitute policy and direction, experimentation and execution being left to take care of themselves; enough to believe that 'Grow More Food', 'Vanamahotsav' and 'Farms Support Arms' will actually produce more food, trees and resources. After fifteen years of this the nation has come to believe that all this does not ring true, and the man in the street or at the 'chaupal' thinks this is all *bakvas* (empty talk), and *befazul* (useless) at that. The people's eyes and ears seek only two things: real immediate results, not paper ones, from decisive leaders, and a true account of progress or failure. It is a nation generous enough to excuse even major failures when they are clearly admitted if it knows that there is a genuine sense of purpose and an honest hand at the helm in each ministry, department, district, and corporation.¹

Honest Assessment

Perhaps the last analysis required now is an analysis of the fundamental reasons for so many of our failures to implement; not less, to learn from an analysis of some success too, for success there has also been. This is, therefore, an attempt to diagnose and learn; facile or insincere criticism cannot come to anyone who appreciates that the task of the government and people of India is perhaps the most difficult of any nation in the contemporary world, not excluding China. Its scale boggles: its complexity is the acutest challenge any democracy could have. But if we have set ourselves great tasks we cannot afford to be too kind to ourselves. That we

may leave to the charity of spectators. We have to be hard with ourselves if we are to pull ourselves out of poverty by our boot-straps.

Any serious analysis of a major Indian problem appalls by its very scale. It is easier to examine a project here or an administrative problem there. The specific is usually better. But an introduction to so vast and complex a canvas as 'implementation' leads to the necessary evil of a certain degree of generalisation. We will, therefore, try to choose only the significant. We will attempt to illustrate with the specific.

Cliche and Reality

Until October 1962, it was a cliché to put down Indian failures to the lack of experience for a hundred years or more under British rule. After that date, the cliché became reality. It became apparent that for four generations at least, between the Sikh war and Se La, there was not only inexperience of the higher command in war and peace but the absence of powerful stimuli for national survival. Whether we like it or not, war and the security of a nation are the final crucible of leadership. It determines survival or defeat, life or death. Whilst the elite of other nations in the West, in China, and in Japan went through this century of war, of modernisation, of the struggle for survival, a part of the Indian elite was eating its heart out for freedom, another part was content with a subordinate share of British rule; both parts finding satisfactions for the national ego in a historic and glorious, but dead past; not less in the recent mahatmaic era of moral leadership.

In the seventeen years of Nehru's leadership between the famous tryst with destiny that exciting August night in 1947, and that other grim October night of his broadcast to the nation after the fall of Bomdi La in 1962, when Nehru confessed we had lived 'in a world of illusion of our own making', Indian leadership had barely begun to emerge from the cosy cocoon of the previous century. Se La and the Third Plan

1. Ashoka Mehta at a press conference at Bombay on November 28, 1963, as reported in *The Statesman* of November 29th; 'On planning, he was told: "You Indians are wonderful at analysis but your performances do not match your planning." Mr. Mehta added: "I have yet to meet a banker or a businessman who did not make this complaint..." A British collaborating firm lost interest in a project after it had taken 3½ years to be approved by the Government of India. The spokesman emphasised, "tell us your policy and your conditions but don't keep things hanging. We must know quickly whether you want us or not."

say good-bye to all that. So this may be the first and historical reason for our inexperience; the long absence of stimuli for national survival. We have only to ask ourselves if the nation and its leaders have really learnt the lessons of NEFA, the Pakistan war and the Third Plan; or are we relapsing into old ways?

Accountability

The second major reason for failures in implementation is the absence of accountability for results over large fields of economic activity. Here the blame lies squarely at the door of the political executive. No one has yet turned the old imperialist charge of *divide et impera* to the very politicians who made that charge in days gone by. Yet, after independence they have practised this to extremes of chaos in dividing political parties into factions and groups, exploiting to the fullest the inherent divisions in Indian society from the village up.²

To the extent they assume that power rests on dividing potential opponents even within one's own party, to that extent,

(a) the political executive is much more engrossed in the problem of survival, rather than fulfilling urgent administrative programmes;

(b) the 'organisational wing' of the party in power is constantly fighting faction wars instead of doing its real job of getting the people's co-operation in implementing plan programmes between elections, and in making the 'governmental wing' accountable for results³ and

(c) political factions along caste or regional lines determine the choice, promotions, transfers and prospects of officials, and they then become as involved in

the faction game, to the detriment of honest, objective advice and accountability for implementation.

And all this can be done with our great Hindu genius for subtle adaptation, observing the outward ritual of constitutional practice. For example, a State may be split into spheres of influence between the ministers. If the Transport Minister has a transport decision to take in the region of the Agriculture Minister's sphere of influence, the file will be sent to the Minister for Agriculture for comment. He will, quite reproachlessly, suggest that the comments of the local district officer be invited; having previously seen to it that the local officer is his appointee, or protégé, and will be subject to his advice. The district officer will report back; the appropriate minister will take a government decision in his own sphere, i.e., transport, but it will look after the Agriculture Minister's local interest. And so the round goes in case after case, with scheming, delay and sectional interests.

In Village Fields

India's planned economy will succeed or fail in the village fields, yet in one of the largest States in India there have been three ministers in charge of agriculture within a month. Each of them had presumed to tell his officials in the introductory meetings that he knew exactly what was to be done in agriculture: yet during the short tenure of their office, each of them was only interested in the files relating to petty revenue and animal husbandry officials. It was more important for them to reinstate a patwari or an animal husbandry compounder than to take big measures on policy and growth. Political instability even within the faction-ridden ruling party created three agriculture ministers in one month, but more than political instability has led to the deplorable misuse of power in their petty actions afterwards.

The one authority not dependent on factions, namely the Prime Minister, has never run his cabinet on the basis of account-

ability for results. There has hardly been a collective responsibility either. Under that broad and safe umbrella the ineffective and the innocuous have lived long in office. The Indian cabinet has been one of diminishing competence since 1947. Even the A.I.C.C. and P.C.Cs. do not make their cabinets regularly accountable for over-all performance. And there are always compensations for the failing politician from the vast reservoir of patronage, governorships, ambassadorships, a high committee or board, an 'honorary' advisorship with a free house and ample T.A. or a delegation abroad.

Dividing Responsibility

The bureaucrats have also followed a principle of *divide et impera*, but their forte is to divide responsibility rather than power. The fine art of so dividing responsibility among officers and departments so that it is impossible to fix it on any one is now so well practised that it has become an instinctive reflex. The instruments for this are the file and the committee; the sanction, 'Victorian administrative procedures; the urge, power without real responsibility. Decisions can only emerge when all the cushions against risk and responsibility are built up. The end results can be safely left to the Public Accounts Committee and oblivion.

So, when government controls everything from planning steel-works to sport, everyone is in the national game of what the man in the street lightly calls 'playing politics'. If we are honest enough we will recognise the weight of Letwins' charge in *Fortune* that so much of our planning and administration is 'shaped by political value judgments from beginning to end', and the absence of proper scientific or economic criteria. The formation of panchayats and co-operatives, the choice of minor irrigation works, the development of ports, the location of steel works or oil refineries, over or under licensing of certain industries—these are a few of a wide range of major investment decisions where

2. F.G. Bailey: *Politics and Social Change* Orissa in 1959, Oxford University Press.

3. The first clear public statement by a prominent public man on this subject was as late as 4.12.63, when Hanumanthaiya, ex-Chief Minister, Mysore, told the Congress Parliamentary Party members that the Prime Minister and his cabinet should be made accountable for results. This was only when the 3rd Plan was in jeopardy.

politics rather than economic efficiency is the determining factor from the village to New Delhi.

Past Practice

Apart from the *divide et impera* of politician and bureaucrat, accountability is absent because of the break-down or disappearance of three earlier administrative systems, common to all good organisation, past and present, whether it involves the tax-payers' money or the shareholders' money.

The first of these is the break-down of the pre-'47 system of inspection and follow-up in the Indian administration. We have clearly jettisoned the earlier system of higher level inspections which we inherited from the British. In those days, Commissioners personally inspected Collectors' offices once a year; Collectors, in turn, inspected Sub-Divisional offices. This was the training given to all officers who subsequently went into other fields of higher and more specialised administrative responsibility. Since 1947, inspections have been performed by office superintendents and head-clerks, and their officers have been content only to sign such reports. Some form of inspection is a pre-requisite of accountability in large organisations.

We have made a caricature of early inspection systems in our administration and there is need to restore the original vigorous inspection by higher level minds. The same point may be made about annual reports and promotion or increment recommendations. How many such reports are honest, objective appraisals of men and their performances? How many indulge in vague assessments with non-committal remarks? How many fail to reward the deserving and let the non-deserving either gain or get away with inefficiency or failure?

Occasionally, especially at the Planning Commission level, we have followed fashionable Ford Foundation 'evaluations', but real accountability at all levels of

planning seems to have been absent. The FICCI seminar on the public and private sectors in 1963 placed emphasis on the training and development of managers, but what is the meaning and content of training and development if there is so little accountability and real responsibility for results? Real responsibility is the bridge between powers given and accountability made.

Then, the absence of follow-up systems built into organisations and procedures, particularly in government and the public sector, where the usual follow-up by external bodies like Audit, the Estimates and the Public Accounts Committees are too late and too protracted to be effective. What is needed is an effective follow-up system within the unit executive itself at short intervals of time, monthly, quarterly, or half-yearly. The built-in systems are far more effective and timely than the extraneous ones of stricter parliamentary control, which cannot physically tackle the mounting load of public projects and public administration. In the absence of such follow-up systems, the best of governmental or large organisation policies and instructions may sometimes get buried in masses of paper beyond recall and without accountability.

The Holy Cows

The second reason for the break-down of earlier systems of accountability is the absence of a clear recognition of the need for rewards and punishments, the primary motivators of large numbers of people; and a too unrealistic reliance on vague altruistic motives and welfare considerations. At the recent seminar on the problem of the two sectors a responsible person from private enterprise said that in the public sector and government, 'Nobody has a shirt to lose'. There was also much point in the impassioned plea of a senior manager of the public sector when he urged: 'Put the managers out of want'. In the whole field of public enterprise we provide undue security for the mediocre and the

incompetent; and we fail to provide enough incentive for enterprise, risk-taking, and results at higher levels of responsibility. We parade a social justice which, in practice, means sacking nobody, neither minister, official, manager, clerk nor worker. All, and in growing numbers, must feed upon scarce resources like holy cows. This must be the most congenial of Parkinsonian worlds.

Motivations

Oddly enough, there is little or no emphasis placed upon the importance of human motivations by our students of economic activity, yet such a range of practical people all over the world, not least Russian planners themselves, see clearly that there is need for the recognition of material rewards and punishments. Can we really have Nehru's brave new world of material progress in hard competitive international markets with the vague emotional hang-over of the ethical and moral assumptions of Gandhian ashrams? Can we really double exports as the Fourth Plan aspires to do with rising raw material prices and little political support for higher productivity; with no real encouragement for marketing and advertising skills in the internal market; with taxation penalising capital growth and competitiveness; can we expect 'to grow our lilies in salt water'? If we want economic growth, we must clearly recognise the economic man; we must seek out and reward the real 'multipliers' of wealth among the best entrepreneurs, managers, scientists, technicians, workers and farmers in our economy. The few who can pluck success from the thorny nettle have to be treasured as national assets beyond value; they must at least have a fair field and a long enough run; they must be protected from the petty animosities of lesser men who cannot deliver the goods.

The third continuing lack in the administration since 1947 is that of the training of young officers. Time was when a young civil servant was trained to succeed his

seniors in skills as well as in tradition. Except for a brief formal training at a school immediately after selection there is hardly any training worth the name given to young all-India service officers by their seniors on the job. They are left to fend for themselves, to learn by experience, and so often this is a disillusioning process because of the unfortunate examples set by their seniors. No good organisation can do without training and development on the job, whatever periodic coursing there might be. The Indian army has recently demonstrated the value of training between 1962 and 1965 on the Panjab battle fields.

Senior Levels

At very senior levels, civil servants engage in important economic activity, for which officers brought up on revenue systems and criminal law totally lack modern management training with all its skills and intellectual disciplines. The result is that civil servants sometimes tend to take broad or political decisions first, and then get technicians to carry them out, instead of getting proper technical examination of projects before high level decisions are taken. In many cases, the Planning Commission projects have had to project studies made years after the plans are made. This is inconceivable in the industrial world.

Encouraging attempts are being made at the Administrative Staff College, Hyderabad, and the Institutes of Management at Calcutta, and Ahmedabad to make good this lack, but it is largely at middle and junior levels. An equally vital need is for short-term courses in modern management skills for Secretaries, Joint Secretaries, and Directors of all economic ministries and departments, for it is they who have the main executive responsibility for the implementation of plans. Their learning in the less hierarchical and more demanding world of industry has yet to begin. They would do well to expose themselves to what may be called a modern industrial cul-

ture, and move away from the traditional, administrative one.

The fourth reason for the lack of accountability is the absence of known and realistic yardsticks. The normal yardstick in our administration is the age-old governmental concept of expenditure; but expenditure is only a means to an end; the ends are usually production, productivity, and returns on expenditure. One finds this in a host of government and co-operatives' reports. One public sector Managing Director has said, 'I am the victim of compulsory expenditures'. In one State a Revenue Minister informed his Collectors that it was not their business to go into the suitability of minor irrigation schemes: it was their business to spend the entire appropriation under this head, just as they draw their salaries fully! The economists have taught planners and administrators to be outlay not output conscious. Even the U.S.S.R. has now recognised the importance of measuring results by the returns on investment, which it calls 'management by the rouble'. We, in India, might adopt 'management by the rupee'. Until we do so we will not learn to utilise resources efficiently.

Cost and Efficiency

We have devised no system of comparative cost and result efficiencies, either amongst comparable public sector projects or between comparable private and public sector enterprises. A lot could be done even within certain economic utilities, like the railways, posts and telegraphs, ordnance, and electricity boards per se. Dr. V. K. R. V. Rao once stressed the need to devise such systems of comparative cost and performance efficiencies in the same seminar referred to in this note. Comparative exercises could be done within and among units in the fertiliser industry, the steel industry, the machine tool industry, the chemicals industry, and the paper industry, to give a few examples.

Whilst our plans have targets of expenditure and production, there

are no objectives and schedules of performances laid down at all levels of projects. Hardly any project which is scheduled to be commissioned by a certain date has done so, and this is largely because no such system has been laid down at all levels with periodic accountability for failures and delays, and with adequate recognition for success and good work at all levels.

Paper Facade

The net result of a lack of real accountability over vast areas of planning, and the complicated administrative procedures for the fragmentation and disappearance of responsibility, has led to the creation of enormous paper facades, from the V.L.Ws. in the village to the scientists and civil servants at the highest levels. The main aim of too many V.L.Ws. is to submit satisfactory reports and not necessarily to get results; the main aim of too many scientists is to publish learned papers and gain administrative power rather than true scientific recognition; the main aim of too many civil servants is to climb up the civil list over mountains of paper. There are, of course, many honourable exceptions, and they stand out in marked contrast. They are a standing proof of the thesis that it is not systems alone which get results but men, and some evidence of this may be seen when we come to an analysis of a few of our successes.

How one would like to have left this out, but corruption is central to efficiency. Where there is no accountability for results; where there is no objective appraisal of performance by realistic yardsticks; no rewards for good, honest work; no punishments for gross failures; corruption alone feeds on every opportunity for growth—the building of a road or an irrigation work, the granting of an import or industrial licence, employment on a new project, and so on. Corruption creeps in at each stage of official processing to demand a price; or else delay, impediments and possibly failure. To avoid

these, at the start offers may be made; once made, they have to be sustained. Thus the Augean chain is forged.

A Process

All this is only a description of a process: to what extent it exists calls for the most objective public opinion surveys, which, of course, no one will do. So each one's view is formed by his own direct or indirect experience. There are, however, certain observable phenomena about corruption.

(1) Only good heads of organisation groups, not vigilance bodies or watch dog committees can effectively check corruption or create clean conditions continuously. No village receiver of black-marketed seed, no harassed tax assessee, no tenderer stung for a bribe can be expected to face future harassment or victimisation at the hands of an all-powerful bureaucracy, unless he is assured protection by that bureaucracy and not by a distant, unknown watch-dog committee.

(2) Corruption usually feeds those political masters with political ends, and not those with performance ends.

(3) Corruption, like manners, begins with the family not with public bodies. Therefore, parents have a greater responsibility for it than heads in government.

(4) Education by itself does not lessens corruption. Independent public opinion supported by a free and brave press does; particularly as the sense in which corruption is used here includes some major anti-social ways such as tax evasion, profiteering and hoarding, on which scores the larger part of private enterprise has yet to gain greater public confidence.

In a society traditionally given to caste and hierarchy, our officers and managers are prone to rely too much on authority and power, and too little on the right motivations of people. A General Manager of

Rourkela has rightly pointed out that in our labour relations the problem was primarily one of implementation rather than legislation. He rightly emphasised that it was far more important to have good relations with the workmen than to make good laws. Even good laws cannot remedy bad relationships.

Greatest Failure

Perhaps, the major single failure has been in getting planning translated into increased agricultural production for food and industrial raw materials. Not usually given to talk of planning failures, the Prime Minister gravely announced to the National Development Council (November, 1963) that if we failed here we would fail totally. This seems to have come home to us as late as 1965. Agriculture is our hardest and most complex problem, but here let us touch on only one crucial aspect of failure in implementation. Westernised planners of purely physical resources have put hundreds of crores into the two principal panaceas for rural India, community projects and panchayati raj. They presuppose the disappearance of caste, the spontaneous community co-operation cutting across castes, a moron farmer waiting to lap up the varied fund of knowledge the VLW and BDO have to offer on everything under the sun, from fertilisers to sanitation.

These are the attitudes of facile planners refusing to face facts; the fact that caste is there and not to be banished by paper plans; the fact that an effective tradition of community co-operation cutting across caste lines is absent; the fact that a good extension service has yet to meet the timely requirements of the farmer in seed, water, and fertiliser, in the village itself; the fact that there are deep-rooted psychological and social barriers in the village inhibiting the desire for higher productivity and higher living standards above those traditionally ordained among both the higher and lower orders; but

most pathetically of all, the fact that this new breed of reforming administrators and community developers are as incomprehensible as Martians, and that India's westernised political and administrative leaders make no effort to understand this in their passion for secular official programmes—on paper! It would not matter in the long run if the immediate results were not too flattering but what reduces hope for the future is that the administration is so insensitive to the true instincts of its own rural society, so lacking in objective analysis and pragmatism in its doctrinaire pursuits of colossal tasks on a scale beyond its capacity and the understanding of its people.⁴

Even the rigid Chinese have been pragmatic enough to modify their earlier approach to communes within two years, but in our democratic system we have failed materially to modify the approach to community projects after a decade, when it has long since spent itself as a useful force at the village level.

Present Attitude

By now a schizophrenic attitude to economic development has been fairly well established in nearly all under-developed countries, and we are a conspicuous example. On the one hand, we wish to have the prestige and emotional satisfaction of big plants and big plans, and, on the other, we are reluctant to place a premium on enterprise and efficiency, growth and bigness.⁵ At the two-sector seminar in Delhi, Professor Mason hinted at this marked difference between the climate in the U.S. and India when he said that in his country

4. See Berreman's *Hindus of the Himalaya*, Oxford University Press.

5. Of the hundred largest companies in the world outside the USA, Japan has no less than ten, and it has shown the way to encourage industrial growth in all types of undertakings—large, medium, and small—fully appreciating that the secret to higher exports is the efficiency of its internal production: hence its progress in the export field is unmatched anywhere in the world since World War II.

great prestige is attached to successful managers in industry and business, and that society was prepared to reward them. In India, these producers of the goods are still second-class citizens, still 'vaish' as compared with the 'brahmans' among the political and administrative leaders.

Equity and Productivity

In India, we passionately desire economic growth, almost as an abstract concept of national per capita incomes, as a statistical result, and not as a desire to welcome more prosperous living among real people, among our very neighbours. Subjectively, we regard affluence as a bad thing. Success too is suspect. The nouveau riches are not liked by the fixed income professional class, yet how can a newly developing country help but have people who have lately acquired more means, especially if the earlier propertied classes are dispossessed. The more such people, the better. Newly developing nations should produce the nouveau riches in large numbers, if they are the multipliers of wealth; subject, of course, to reasonable and practical limits of wealth disparities.⁶ Aristotle once said 'Envy is the basis of democracy'. It certainly seems a powerful factor in economic development in a democracy, and here Professor Millikan's contribution at the seminar seems to have been completely lost by the press. He said that in a choice between equity and productivity we should always choose productivity, as equity can only follow after productivity grows in a staggeringly poor economy like our's. The cake must be made much larger before we seek to carve it up into 400 million pieces.

For the greater part of these fifteen years our public authorities

have regarded profit as a dirty word. Only lately has Parliament and government awakened to the economic need for corporate profits and taken premature credit for Rs. 300 crores from the public sector in the Third Plan, even though a surplus of only Rs. 70 crores has so far accrued in the three years of the Plan. Attitudes to corporate profits still linger from the earlier attitudes to personal profits.

Perhaps the root of religion lies in finding a saviour, or a messiah; and a people given to much religion in the past still seem prone to look for saviours externally. So often in small and large matters we tend to look outside ourselves to the company, to the department, to government, or even to that amorphous abstraction, the educational system, for the remedy of our ills. This is made worse by those in responsibility, managers and officers themselves betraying the same tendency and not realising that in so many matters the beginnings of action could lie with them, if they would only take it; not realising too that they themselves are government or the company of the department, as the case may be. There could be a significant managerial revolution if only this was consciously accepted by a few thousand leaders in government and industry, that the beginnings of action lie with them and not elsewhere.

In all these ways, earlier attitudes to people and hierarchy, to work, wealth and profits, underlie many of the reasons for our inability to work productively and get better results.

Successes

Yet, success we have had; Indian planning is no write-off. In the first two plans industrial production was doubled; the foundations laid for a complex of new basic industries; agricultural production increased 50 per cent; electricity generated was nearly trebled; national income went up by about 45 per cent and per capita income by nearly 20 per cent; and all this

with adult suffrage and parliamentary government. Yet, these are general results. Let us take a small sample of success to get an insight into what really makes for success in a few specific cases. If the lessons of these could be multiplied on a larger scale, we would not fall so far behind our targeted needs as we appear to be doing.

Perhaps, the first in our small sample bag might be Air India International, of which we can be justly proud in a very competitive international field. And perhaps the first reason for the success is that government put it into the hands of the best possible chairman from the start, and then gave him 'complete freedom of action and decision'. J.R.D. Tata recently acknowledged that 'Air India provided the best example of the correct relationship between a public sector enterprise and government'. As a result, in ten years its revenues have grown from Rs. 3.5 crores to Rs. 24.5 crores. Having had a run of profits, it is now paying government a dividend. Here is an example of good, imaginative and profitable management, with continuity of top management and the right relations with government.

Other Cases

To take another case of conspicuous success, and that in a totally new field, Hindustan Machine Tools. Success here too began with the right man at the top, after years of a stumbling start. Its attitude to work and results are modernised. It believes in profits and ploughback and growth, and for a change, this fecund country is spawning a new machine tool factory every two years.

Then there is the pride of the Punjab, the Bhakra Dam. Once again, it is a story of determined, skilled, strong leadership with clear objectives, brooking no nonsense and delay.

The stupendous challenge of agriculture has been partly met by

6. Some recognition of this is found in C. Subramaniam's address at the meeting of the Associated Chambers of Commerce, Calcutta (7 Dec. '63) when he acknowledged that ways would have to be mobilised for industrial development to be undertaken by the growing class of new entrepreneurs in the country'.

the hard, enterprising farmers of the Punjab, Gujarat and Tamilnad. How could they achieve what most other Indian farmers have failed to do? Whatever the other reasons, two quite certainly distinguish them from the rest, an attitude of productive investment in the land, and an eye for the market. They were not merely producing for consumption. In ten years the Punjab was transformed from a deficit to a surplus State.

Exports; another tough task. For years we talked about exports and they remained static. Then a new minister and his ministry brought drive, purpose, incentives and the fever of expansion. At last the cart was moved out of a decade's rut around Rs. 600 crores and the first significant increase made to about Rs. 800 crores.

When the Chinese Emergency came we found ourselves partly paralysed with transport, coal and power bottle-necks. A practical, purposeful minister with imagination and drive collected a chosen team of a few officers unburdened by an army of clerks and cleared the bottlenecks in a few months.

The Lessons

One could go on repeating such examples, but the lessons would be the same. These are the lessons.

a) First and foremost, good leaders, by choice or accident, in each case. They are the most vital national assets, the magic wands of the chief planners, without whom no rabbits will be produced even from a million political caps.

b) Next, clear tangible objectives which each unit could comprehend — turnover, profits, ploughback and growth. At the unit level or in export markets there is little room for 'isms'. Productivity and competitiveness are the keys to success.

c) Third, the absence of undue politics and faction. They are

the worms in the apple of our desires.

d) Fourth, the relative absence of corruption. Wherever it starts, top or bottom, the responsibility is at the top.

e) Fifth and in the last analysis, the human element, whether it is the individual leader or the group. It is this element with the right attitudes which brings planning to life from dead papers, the attitude of productive investment, of risk, of profit and result-seeking, of challenge, change and a purposeful response.

The Take-off

Is all this too much to ask, a tall order? Of whom does the country ask this? A surprising few. Perhaps a few dozen political leaders in the Centre and the States, perhaps a thousand top managers in industry and business, a few hundred local politicians in the A.I.C.C., the P.C.Cs. and the leaders of the opposition parties. In all, less than ten thousand men for a nation of four hundred and fifty millions.

Will they give it? Can they give it now in the next five or ten decisive years for the world's largest experiment in democratic, planned economic growth? About half this number died or were lost in NEFA and Ladakh in one month because a weak nation tempted a strong aggressor. Forty thousand times this number still patiently wait for more tangible, seeable results of good management and fruitful planning, as they wait each year for good rains and fruitful fields. But will these few, these ten thousand or less 'suit the deed to the word'? The age of Nehru may yet be saved if we emerged from the cocoon of political illusion and administrative complacency to a real world of accountability and result-mindedness. These are the two managerial wings of 'take-off', whatever the visions of perspective planners.

Mobilization

R. J. CHELLIAH

SUDDEN crises and catastrophes often force us to undertake a review of national policies and re-examine the premises on which these policies are based. They also call for short-term solutions and extraordinary measures to tide over the crises and to re-establish a new state of normalcy. The impact of the present emergency—the conflict with Pakistan and its consequences—has been felt in almost every field, but in no other field perhaps more severely than in the field of finance.

The sudden rise in the demand for resources for development and defence has coincided with the shrinkage of the sources of internal and external finance. As a cumulative result of the virtual suspension of large-scale foreign aid, import cuts, power cuts and fall in agricultural production, the economy has been thrown out of gear and there is apprehension even about our ability to maintain normal increases in revenues. While it is true that ultimately it is the shortage of real resources that matters, the levers of finance are of immense importance in a mixed economy and have to be controlled and manipulated to fulfil our objectives in terms of the allocation of real resources. The present crisis on the financial front, while demanding an immediate short-term solution, presents us with a need and opportunity to re-examine our basic approach to fiscal policy.

The structure of Indian public finance today is vastly different from what it was at the beginning of our efforts at planned development. Many measures have been introduced over the years which have brought about significant quantitative and qualitative changes in the public finance of the country. The ratio of taxation

to national income which was less than 7 per cent in the early fifties has been raised to nearly 13 per cent over a period of 15 years, while the share of government expenditure in net national expenditure at market prices has been raised from 10 per cent to 20 per cent during the same period.

Over the primitive base of direct taxation which existed at the time when the Taxation Enquiry Commission (1953-54) reported, an attempt has been made to build up a modern and progressive system of direct taxation designed to divert increasing resources for development and simultaneously to take us nearer the goal of economic equality. Vast sums of money raised through taxation and loans have been utilised to promote the growth of the public sector. There has been a fairly rapid growth of public sector industries but what is more striking is the tremendous increase in government expenditure which is supposed to represent collective consumption and investment on public account. The scope of public expenditure has also been considerably widened. As a result of these developments, a vast and complex structure of taxation and public expenditure has come into existence, the analysis and study of which has become a matter of prime importance.

Our basic approach to fiscal policy was developed on the premises that (a) the most urgent task was to bring about as high an increase as possible in the volume of resources diverted to the government and that (b) the rapid growth of the public sector was one of the important means by which we could try to achieve our economic and social goals. When the ratio of taxation to national income was as low as 6 per cent, it was only natural and

proper to lay all the emphasis on the volume of resources diverted to government. Similarly, in an underdeveloped economy in which there was very little of government expenditure for the promotion of economic development and social welfare, it was again proper to argue that considerable benefits would flow from a rapid growth in public expenditure.

The Many Faces

In this context, only secondary importance was given to the relative effects of the various ways in which resources were being raised and spent. The structure of public finance has become quite complicated and is now giving rise to many new problems relating to administration as well as the most economical use of scarce resources. The public sector has grown rapidly. This may in general be welcomed.

However, the public sector has many faces and not all of them are quite pleasant. Statistical data relating to the many-sided growth of the public sector do not always measure real gains to the economy. Impressive rates of growth of plan expenditure and preoccupation with the over-all size of the plans have distracted attention from considerations of economy, efficiency and real benefits. It will be generally admitted that the growth and allocation of public funds have been significantly influenced in recent years by political factors. Of course, plan decisions are in the ultimate analysis political decisions, but political factors could so vitiate economic decisions that the end-results could be disastrous for efficiency and justice.

The manner in which plan assistance is being granted to the State governments illustrates quite clearly the undesirable consequences that could be expected to flow from the interplay of political factors and insufficiently worked-out schemes of financial planning. It is by now quite clear that the whole scheme of financing of State plans is such as to lead to fiscal irresponsibility and indiscipline on the part of many of the State governments.

With committed expenditure as well as other non-plan expenditure being under-written by the Finance Commission and with the virtual certainty of resources being made available by the Planning Commission for any current plan on a larger scale than for the previous plan, the States have lost sight of priorities and have come to adopt the attitude that their own efforts should be the last resort when all sources of help have been exhausted. Even the schemes of assistance attached to the different projects sponsored by one central ministry or another are such that most States find it impossible not to take up even those projects whose benefits are dubious and whose priorities are considered fairly low by the State officials.

Curb on Expenditure

Meanwhile, neither at the Centre nor at the State level has adequate attention been paid for evolving criteria of efficiency in public expenditure, or for developing methods by which the benefits flowing from different kinds of public expenditure could be evaluated. Since a good deal of government expenditure represents the offering of goods and services to the public free of costs, the evaluation of the benefits of such expenditure on the basis of consumer demand is not possible. Hence, it becomes all the more important for the government to substitute its own criteria of benefit for consumer preferences.

In its forecasts of the growth of public expenditure, the Planning Commission usually allows for a 5 per cent rate of growth of administrative expenditure. In fact, the rate of growth of administrative expenditure in the last few years has been much higher, though even a 5 per cent rate of growth in administrative or current expenditure must be considered too high because the average annual rate of growth of national income has not yet reached the figure of 5 per cent. If the rate of saving in an economy is to be raised it is of course obvious that the rate of growth of consumption should lag behind the rate of growth of income. In a situation where the

proportion of income taken in taxation is rising, one could easily imagine what would be the consequence for the rate of savings if the rate of growth of governmental consumption exceeds the rate of growth of national income.

While theoretically it has been pleaded that one of the important functions of taxation in an underdeveloped country like India is to ensure collective savings, in practice it has not been possible to bring about a rise in government saving commensurate with the rise in government income. A more than negligible part of the increase in government expenditure both on plan and non-plan accounts seems avoidable and would perhaps have been avoided if there had been a closer correlation between the raising and spending of resources and if certain criteria for measuring efficiency and benefits of public expenditure had been evolved.

Both from the short and long-term points of view, the most important step that has to be taken in the field of financial planning in India today is to devise means by which we can prevent the expansion of public expenditure for the sake of more expansion, as well as to discover means by which those who have the opportunity to spend resources would also be entrusted with the responsibility of raising a substantial part of them.

Correct Allocations

The finance ministers have, by and large, looked upon their job as one which is mostly concerned with the problem of raising ever-increasing resources. Actually, however, in a developing economy like ours a more important task of the Finance Minister is to ensure the allocation of resources according to national priorities, as against the tendency of most of the government departments to increase their budgets year by year.

This latter job automatically involves placing curbs on the expansion of many departments. Thus, the job of the Finance Minister is as much to prevent

undue expansion in government expenditure in many fields as to bring about increase in revenues. Too late in the day perhaps T. T. Krishnamachari, the Ex-Finance Minister, realised the importance of this aspect of his job. If what he has said is true, many State government and Central Government departments are in no mood to prune their expenditure plans and observe financial discipline.

Long-term Policy

As a matter of long-term policy, the Planning Commission should evolve suitable methods of ensuring efficiency in public expenditure and should also develop criteria for evaluating the benefits of services not sold in the market but given free to the public. Efficiency in government through systems analysis is a new field of research and study which is being developed in the United States of America. Research in this field is needed in much greater measure in a country like India which is wedded to the rapid growth of the public sector.

No substantial changes in the financial behaviour of the States can be expected unless certain basic changes in the scheme of devolution of resources from the Centre to the State as well as in the process of planning at the State level are introduced. While grants on even a cent per cent basis may be made available to the States in regard to schemes of national importance which could be put together into an integrated national-sector plan, for schemes which are of importance mainly to the States concerned, finance in large part must be found by the States themselves. These schemes would form the plan for the States sector and it would be far better to give assistance for this part of the plan in the form of lump-sum grants which are partly based on proved efficiency and achieved results.

All in all, in the structure and pattern of public expenditure which obtains at present, there is much slack to be taken in. Careful examination of the budgets of the various departments can lead to diversion of men and resources now being used in completely or

relatively unproductive directions to productive sectors, which are in great need of resources. In the present grave emergency facing the nation, it should be the aim of every government to bring about at least a 15 per cent cut in non-plan expenditure.

Non-plan expenditure, it may be pointed out, includes also developmental expenditures which are the result of previous plans. There is a wide-spread feeling that many schemes which are continued from earlier plans have not yielded the expected benefits. The Community Development movement is a good instance. There are many who believe that a sizeable slash of expenditure on the Community Development movement can take place with much benefit and no loss. This proposition can be tested by introducing cuts in the Community Development movement on an experimental basis. In fact, the experimental method ought to be adopted on a wide scale as a method of judging the presumed benefits of various types of public expenditure.

Scope for Economy

We have laid great stress on the necessity to introduce reforms in the system of public expenditure towards economy and efficiency, and on the possibility of releasing resources from relatively unproductive schemes and wasteful or ornamental establishments to vital schemes and projects to be included in the next plan. This emphasis is, we believe, warranted by the real scope for economy and diversion which exists today and also by the fact that the willingness to bear additional burdens on the part of the general populace will depend to a large extent on a demonstration that the utmost possible efforts are being made to eliminate all waste and avoidable increase in public expenditure.

However, it has to be conceded that the resources needed for the plan in the coming years will necessitate considerable increases in revenues, because whatever the scale on which economy measures are introduced, the total of public expenditure will have to be increased by a sizeable percentage

during the next plan. Hence, measures to increase public revenues have also to be considered carefully.

Increases in Revenue

Broadly speaking, increases in revenue are brought about in two ways: (a) by automatic increases in revenue and (b) by measures of additional taxation. From the long-term point of view, the former ought to be relied upon more and more to bring into the public exchequer an increasing quantity of funds with the growth in national income. The short-term measures of additional taxation and of tax reform ought to be attuned to this long-term objective.

Many of the measures of taxation introduced during the last fifteen years can indeed be shown to have contributed towards making our tax structure income-elastic. But in introducing measures of taxation, neither the long-term objectives nor this particular attribute of the tax measure seems to have been kept clearly in view. Additional resources are largely thought of as having to come from *additional measures* of taxation rather than as a result of the interaction of an income-elastic tax structure with the growth in income.

In the schemes of financing worked out by the Planning Commission, automatic increases in revenue are always relegated to a secondary position. Indeed, even a rough idea of the magnitude of automatic increases in revenue is not vouchsafed to the public; the item in the scheme of financing entitled 'Balance from current revenues at existing rates of taxation' shows only what is left (+ or -) after projected non-plan expenditure figures are set off against the expected revenues for the plan period. The manner in which 'automatic increases in revenue' are disposed of indicates the background of a policy which intends to rely mainly on revenue from additional taxation and loans for plan financing.

Now, it should be fairly clear that there are limits to measures

of additional taxation both in terms of the kinds of measures that could be devised and in terms of administrative efficiency. The number and kinds of imposts cannot be indefinitely increased in one plan period after another. There are also definite limits to the increases in the rates of important direct taxes.

Moreover, if the intention is to divert to the government a portion of the growth in incomes during a given plan period, new imposts and increases in rates would be justifiable only in so far as they would fall largely on those whose incomes have risen but whose tax continuing studies have to be conducted to identify groups and sections of the population whose incomes have risen but whose tax contributions have not increased even proportionately. Additional tax measures would be called for in order to deal with such cases.

Agricultural Sector

The agricultural sector in India is a case in point. We shall deal with the problem of agricultural taxation in a little while. What we would like to emphasize here is that additional tax measures should be reserved for (a) bringing about changes in the tax structure from the long-term point of view to make it highly income-elastic, (b) for making adjustments to improve the equity and administrative efficiency of the system, (c) for imposing additional burdens on those sections whose tax contributions are not automatically increasing with increases in their incomes and (d) for meeting residual requirements.

This would be a valid principle for normal times. In times of emergency, additional taxation would obviously be necessary to meet the sudden increase in the demand for resources. Such an abnormal use of 'additional taxation' should not lead us to forget the crucial role of automatic increases in revenue in normal times.

The greater the increase in revenue which a State government or the Central Government is able to bring about without resorting to additional tax measures, the greater should be considered

its success in raising resources. At any rate, it is the total surplus made available for plan outlay rather than the revenue from additional tax measures which should be taken as the test of good performance by a government in the field of plan financing. It would be an incentive for economy in non-plan expenditure, better administration of taxes and tax reforms on the part of the States, if assistance from the Centre were made to depend partly upon performance by the different States as judged by the above-mentioned test.

It is not contended that additional tax measures have no longer any important role to play in plan financing. What is emphasized is that much greater reliance than hitherto must be placed on automatic increases in revenue both by better administration of existing taxes and by checking the growth of non-developmental expenditure unrelated to defence requirements. It is not being realized sufficiently how much more of extra revenue can be raised by better administration of the personal income and the sales taxes—to mention only two of the most important taxes.

Income Tax

In the case of the income tax, efforts only recently initiated to track down earners not filing returns have resulted in almost doubling the number of assesseees. What little study of sales taxation that has so far been undertaken reveals the use of rough and primitive methods of administration with a number of State governments not having even estimates of total turnover in respect of broad groups of commodities assessed to tax. A rough, and probably not very wrong, guess is that as much of sales tax is evaded as is collected. Obviously, one of the most important steps to be taken by the State governments is to plug the loopholes and to take joint and coordinated action to increase revenues by cutting down evasion.

The consequences of proposed additional tax measures from the point of view of equity, allocation

of resources and prices of exports must also be carefully considered. Since there are definite limits to increases in the rates of direct taxes, additional tax measures have largely taken the form of indirect taxes. Therefore, the preponderant reliance on additional taxation for financing current expenditure on the plans has resulted in an increase in the proportion of indirect taxes to total tax revenue, whereas in the interest of equity one would have expected a gradual shift towards direct taxes. Actually, the proportion of indirect taxes has increased from 62.5 per cent in 1955-56 to 69.9 per cent in 1965-66. In the years to come, the relative importance of direct taxes should be increased by much better administration of the existing direct taxes and by raising the burden of direct taxes on the agricultural sector.

Decline

The agricultural sector is one important example of a case in which the existing tax structure does not automatically impose additional burdens commensurate with the growth of incomes in that sector. As several studies have shown, the relative burden of land revenue has declined with the growth in agricultural output and the rise in prices. While indirect taxes are beginning to reach various sections of the rural population, the better-off agriculturists are certainly not bearing their due share of direct taxation.

A progressive developmental surcharge on land revenue to be utilised primarily by the local government units (Panchayati Raj bodies) may be recommended. The entire proceeds of this surcharge should be ear-marked for plan expenditure in the areas concerned during the Fourth Plan period. This step would cut down the quantum of assistance to be handed out by the State governments and at the same time soften the resistance to additional taxation by tying together benefits and burdens.

This device of a developmental surcharge or impost to be ear-marked for plan purposes can in-

deed be used on a much wider scale. The complaint, imagined or real, of the general taxpayer has been that a considerable part of the increase in revenues has been used up for unproductive purposes and for running a costly administrative machine. Additional tax measures during the Fourth Plan period should be clearly set aside for plan financing. A developmental surcharge may be imposed on the three basic taxes: excise, income tax and sales tax. The proceeds of the surcharge should be earmarked for financing schemes of the greatest priority which would yield tangible results.

Urban Sector

In the urban sector there seems to be considerable scope for the exploitation of the property tax. Not all municipalities and town panchayats in the country are levying this tax. Even where the tax is levied, with some exceptions, the valuation of property, the rates of levy and the collection of the proceeds leave much to be desired. In view of the extremely unsatisfactory state of affairs in the field of urban property taxation, there is case for the creation of a State Valuation Authority in each State. All assessment of property for taxation must be carried out by this organisation throughout a State, while the tax itself may be levied and collected by the municipal authorities.

A minimum rate of tax must be made compulsory for the local authorities, or should be imposed by the State Government itself. The quantum of general-purpose grants given to the local governments by the State governments should be made to depend partly upon percentage increases in the revenue from the urban property tax, as a measure of incentive for higher rates and better collection. The entire amount of urban property tax paid should be deductible from Central Wealth Tax liability. This would serve the ends of equity, while making it easier for the State governments to impose additional burdens.

As already pointed out, other additional tax measures should be primarily designed to bring into

the tax net rising incomes which are not being adequately reached by the existing tax structure. Studies on the generation and distribution of additional incomes as well as on the impact of the tax structure on 'new' incomes would indicate the manner in which additional taxation should be imposed. Pending such investigations, the developmental surcharges and other fiscal measures we have outlined above including changes in the expenditure pattern should yield enough resources for the first two years of the plan.

The direct tax structure already contains several incentive provisions designed to promote private savings. With a fairly stable price level, one can safely predict a continuous increase in the rate of private savings, a part of which could be drawn upon as before for public investment. However, private savings need to be supplemented by public savings.

Signal Failure

It is one of the signal failures of fiscal policy in India that budgetary savings have not been made to increase over the three plan periods. After fluctuating between Rs. 100 crores and Rs. 200 crores for about 10 years, public savings have started increasing only since 1960-61. Even this recent rising trend has to be largely attributed to the savings by public sector undertakings. Budgetary savings are only marginally significant.

It should be a fundamental tenet of fiscal policy to budget for a certain percentage of surplus on current account. As Musgrave has recently shown, it is much easier to increase the volume of national savings through surplus budgeting than through tax incentives to promote private savings. With a total revenue of Rs. 3,600 crores, a 10 per cent surplus on current account would yield an amount of savings roughly thrice the current figure of domestic corporate savings. This principle combined with the device of ear-marked developmental surcharge would ensure that at least a fairly substantial minimum percentage of

current revenues is utilised for tangible plan projects.

These measures should be acceptable to the financial planners at least for the duration of the emergency, when several unorthodox methods have to be employed. Indeed, paradoxically enough, in influencing governmental as well as private behaviour, temporary measures and injunctions limited to a definite period of time are, sometimes, more effective than permanent measures and appeals to change one's pattern of life for all time to come. Thus, it has now been shown that a temporary expenditure tax will be an excellent device for curbing consumption during a war or an emergency, whereas a permanent expenditure tax is not so likely to promote savings.

Example

The expenditure tax in India can be made more effective by recasting it as a temporary measure for 5 or 7 years with a lower exemption level. Appeals to cut down extravagant expenditure, to be austere, etc., should also be always related to a specific period of time. Moreover, appeals in terms of specific items of expenditure are likely to produce more effect than general advocacy of total abstinence. The government should also set a visible example by cutting down the consumption of electricity, stationery, etc., by postponing the construction of office buildings and by saving on transport, to mention only a few examples.

Armed with such example, it would be possible to carry on effective propaganda aimed at curtailing specific forms of private consumption for a specified period of time. But the example must come from the top. Would the ministers and the governors and the top civil servants set the snow ball rolling? Would their private and public behaviour in relation to the use of resources and the expenditure pattern begin to reflect a realization that we are indeed passing through a grave emergency calling forth a determined, dedicated and exemplary leadership? On this, alas, a mere economist cannot say much.

Books

INDIA WE WANT By Surendra J. Patel.
Cyclostyled.

The post-war period has witnessed a phenomenal expansion of literature on development economics. Economists all the world over have been feverishly engaged in answering the questions of newly emerging nations: can we get out of the morass of poverty? Can we catch up with the developed countries? Can we build up a new world on the dust and dirt of the present one? Will our hunger and poverty give way to prosperity and plenty? What, if any, are the short-cuts of affluence? Can we traverse the path of growth in the life-time of a generation?

India We Want by Surendra J. Patel is the latest and the most recent addition to the sahara of literature on the subject. While the author had the benefit of the previous works of his forerunners and contemporaries, he refuses to tread their path or follow in their footsteps. He explodes in no uncertain terms the theories of those who are appalled by population explosions, vicious circles of poverty, bottlenecks of finance and skills, and the crises of food and foreign exchange. The performance of developing countries in the 'fifties was far better than the most sanguine hopes of those who thought development to be frightfully costly. 'Any construction firm which quotes outrageously high prices for the tenders,' Patel rightly says, 'would have soon been out of the business, but the rate of survival in our profession is apparently very high.'

The author enumerates 10 lessons of economic growth, which form the pillars of the edifice of India he has envisioned for us and our children. He finds sustained growth a very recent phenomenon in human history, for a century ago the economic distance among the nations was very small. The late starters in the field of industrialisation drew on the experience of the early starters and had a faster rate of growth than the latter, narrowing in the process international economic inequalities. Industrialisation, particularly the growth of heavy industry, has been the hall-mark of development in all countries—large or small, socialist or capitalist.

The use of incremental capital output ratio for calculating the amount of capital needed to bring about a given level of development has serious limitations and so has the classical theory of international trade based on comparative costs. The educational distance between the developing and the developed countries is less than the economic distance between them. All this makes the author emphasise that what the developed countries have achieved during the last 100 years by an annual growth rate of 1.8 per cent *per capita* can be achieved by the developing countries in half the time by doubling this rate. In the 'fifties, three-fifths of the developing countries did, in fact, expand their output at twice the

historical speed of industrial countries and the rest are poised for such an attempt.

The author then enumerates the achievements of India's five-year plans. Our *per capita* income has risen at a little under 2 per cent per annum—higher than the historical growth rate of developed countries. Summing up the achievements of planning in India, the author says: 'The last fifteen years do represent the first measurable break-through in the long-term stagnation of the country. They are a watershed in our economic history. Its economic "explosion" was indeed more profound than the much talked about population "explosion", though it has yet to find as powerful advocates as the demographers.' The reviewer is here pleased to mention that he for one has found the first-ever powerful advocate of economic 'explosion' in our country.

What then is the author's vision of India? For the first time, we have amongst us an economist who gives a clarion call to the nation to have before it the affluence of America, tempered with the justice and equity of a socialist society, as the vision that is achievable in the life-span of a generation. This, according to him, India can do if she has an annual growth rate of 7 per cent. Many other countries have achieved this rate of growth. The logic of our experience and perspective planning suggests its feasibility here too. The most heartening aspect of this vision is that most of us—may be in our advanced years—will be a witness to its realisation.

The proposed transition from Indian standards to American ones entails a five-fold expansion of total agricultural output, which sounds rather ambitious. But the author is quick to point out that this merely involves raising the annual growth rate from the present one of 3.5 per cent to 4.5 per cent for eight five-year plans. The magnitude of investment called for this is gigantic indeed, but then the author does not accept investment as a 'cost' or as a 'benefit foregone.' He instead regards investment as a generator of income, which implies that not investing would be growth foregone—a real national loss over a period of time.

In the industrial field, output has to be raised about 40 times above the 1960 level. Our *per capita* industrial output by the end of the century would then be comparable with that in the USA. Lest this target should be treated as a day-dream, the author points out that its realisation calls for an annual growth rate of 10 per cent, which is lower than what was envisaged, though not achieved, for the Third Plan.

India We Want is a delightful book on a vision of India half a century hence. It is not the product of the fertile imagination of a poet but the vision of a far-sighted, practical-minded earthy economist. The econometricians, perspective planners and

mathematical model-builders would, however, be disappointed if they look in it for a formidable array of neat looking elasticities, shadow-prices, resource-based projections and all that. Patel has barely drawn the contours of a development plan the final picture of which would emerge only at the hands of a group of technical men competent to do the job and the party in power.

In the cynical mood of national pessimism over the performance of planning in India, a book like *India We Want* is like a whiff of breeze in a stifling atmosphere. It should be a useful compendium for growth economists, planners and policy-makers not only in India but in all the developing countries.

The author unreservedly deserves three cheers for his originality, intelligence, competence, diligence and, above all, vision, all of which are so manifest in *India We Want*.

Hartirath Singh

ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT By John Kenneth Galbraith.

Harvard University Press, 1964.

ESSAYS IN ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT By V.K.R.V. Rao.

Asia Publishing House, 1964.

ECONOMICS OF GROWTH By J. K. Mehta.

Asia Publishing House, 1964.

ASIAN STUDIES IN INCOME AND WEALTH. Papers presented at the first Asian conference on income and wealth.

Asia Publishing House, 1965.

Books on economic growth and development have overflowed in the recent past. Until about two decades ago, the economics of growth, except in a limited historical context, did not attract much thinking. Understandably so, for then the aspirations of countries freed from colonial rule to plan deliberately for growth simply did not exist. Nor had the extraordinary success in planning for economic development in the Soviet Union yet become apparent. The absolute belief in the efficacy of the invisible hands of supply and demand was held supreme in the minds of the people. Liberation from colonialistic regimes and the subsequent realization of their need to develop economically brought about a revolutionary change not only in policy orientation but in the entire economic thinking.

The four books under review devote themselves to the fundamental theme of economic development. All of them, with the exception of the one by J. K. Mehta, are collections of papers written under the framework of growth and, therefore, do not develop any specific theme common to all the volumes.

Galbraith has in his mind the average lay newspaper readers as his audience and gives a popular presentation of the major problems in development economics. His latent advice to the vestals of the free market, who have been carried away more by

the myth of the invisible hand than by the hard realities of economic life, to look into the intricacies of several other factors, is timely not only in his own country but gives a danger signal to the free enterprisers of India as well.

One disputes certain basic assumptions which have often led to only marginal changes in a society where structural changes should take place. For example, given the income distribution, the only need is to make production as efficient as possible and ensure that markets so function as to reflect faithfully the desires of consumers. The inability to change this distribution of income would definitely lead to a different type of growth from what is desirable for a developing country.

The essays on 'Purpose of Economic Development' and 'The Causes of Poverty' have been lucidly written. Of special interest should be his references to the undue reliance on foreign aid and technology for economic development, particularly his advice to borrowing technology where adaptation is necessary to suit the varying conditions of the countries.

Rao has tried to examine modern economics as it is applicable to the problems of underdeveloped economies. Almost all students of economics are familiar with the papers included in the volume and already published in a number of important periodicals. He has raised certain intelligent queries regarding the assumptions of economic science. 'The Nature and Purpose of Economic Activity' bears the stamp of Indian philosophy and ethical system. His celebrated article 'Investment, Income and the Multiplier' examines the validity of Keynesian concepts in the context of underdeveloped countries. He unfolds the various relationships of the subsistence economy making the forces envisaged by Keynes in the case of advanced countries less effective and significant. This came at an opportune time when the Indian economists were bent on applying, with or without much reason, the Keynesian system to our economy.

Rao's thesis on comparability of real national incomes of industrialised and underdeveloped countries has been recognised all over the world as a significant contribution to the national income studies. His important paper is among the most valued ones included in the present volume.

The compendium also has some of his less bright contributions. 'International Aid for Economic Development' and 'Price Policy and Economic Development', for instance. One had expected that the economic giant would be able to systematize theoretically the role of the price mechanism in the development process so needed in view of the utter confusion that prevails in the country. He, however, chose to remain satisfied with the commonplace account of the usual price mechanism.

Often, Indian books on economics suffer from the lack of a proper scientific approach to distinguish economics from philosophy. Worse examples are to combine modern developments of economics as a field of enquiry based on certain postulates with

confused philosophical traditions. The economic science, as borrowed from the West, is based on certain assumptions. Wants are unlimited whereas the means are scarce, is among the fundamental ones. The scarce needs need to be utilised to satisfy these wants.

Mehta refutes both these premises and tries to substitute the assumption that these wants are created by the aggrandizement of man. His objective is to reduce the wants which would give peace to human beings (*italics mine*). One would not have had any complaints against Mehta if he had developed an independent economic system based on his thesis. But he makes use of such concepts and models of modern economics as the capital-output ratio, multiplier, accelerator and Harrod-Domar models to arrive at such meaningless conclusions as that Keynes' investment multiplier is the same as the capital-output ratio.

Towards the end of the book he says his objective is to study normative economics and not positive economics. In positive economics he tries to study the relationship between two things as we seek them and not as they exist. Confusion is detectable throughout his exposition of such concepts as stable growing economics and the like.

Mehta does not approve very much of the competition between man and his inferior animals. He is not exactly successful in adopting the modern econometric models to his advantage. His model of multiplier and accelerator, for instance, does not bear much relevance to his conclusion: the grabbing instinct gone, producers' attitude would also show a change.

National income studies are mainly a post-war phenomenon. It is well recognised in the countries of the world that any proper understanding and planning of economic growth is possible only when there is a complete picture of commodity flows between various sectors and the contribution of these sectors to the national income. The developed countries are in a relatively better position with regard to data and consequently stand a better chance of fair inferences. The developing countries, however, suffer from the inadequacy of all data.

To fill this gap, the studies presented in the Asian conference of national income and wealth are of significance. The volume contains twelve papers which can be classified into three broad categories: (i) long-term growth, (ii) capital formation and (iii) national income estimation.

In Harry Oshima's paper one finds a modified system of national accounts for the analysis of economic growth and policy in under-developed countries. Since national account systems are devised to meet the needs of advanced countries, Oshima tries to examine critically the system accepted by the United Nations in an Asian context. National accounting varies from country to country depending upon the level of development. In Oshima's system the important feature is the introduction of the household sector, its production and consumption. Since the

Asian economies are still mainly agricultural the important aspect of the household business sector is studied in greater detail for the trend in this sector influences the entire tenor of the development process.

An important Indian contribution is the one on capital formation and the estimates by S. G. Tiwari and H. Mazumdar, both statisticians. Both work with different objectives. Mazumdar likes to estimate capital formation only in the monetized sector; Tiwari concentrates on the non-monetized sector. The need, however, is to examine these estimates very carefully and arrive at figures which have a more satisfactory basis before these data can be used for practical analytical studies.

The studies include a country-wise estimation of national income. In the various Asian countries, it is necessary to get at least the first approximation of national income accounting. The volume containing these contributions is a useful addition to the literature on the subject and presents, for the first time, a broad indication of the contemporary status of national income work in this area.

Anees Chishti

ECONOMIC STRATEGY AND THE THIRD PLAN (Indian Statistical Series No. 21).

Asia Publishing House, 1964.

PLANNING AND THE PEOPLE (A Study of Public Participation in Planning in Uttar Pradesh). By P. N. Masaldan.

Asia Publishing House, 1964.

We are almost at the end of the Third Five-Year Plan. When it began in 1960-61, there was no military conflict with China and no military conflict with Pakistan. The battle between building for defence and building for development was joined later. The first is treated as an emergency, but the second is not. The first emergency cannot cover up the second one for long. The two have to be integrated because they are inter-dependent. The war is against two kinds of insecurity, and here comes the importance of the economic strategy of planning and its political base, which depends on effective public participation in planning. Towering above both, there must be clarity of thinking and clarity of policy. Do we have it?

The best essay in *Economic Strategy and the Third Plan* is also the longest one. It is by Thomas Balogh of the University of Oxford, who prepared his notes on Indian economic strategy during his visit to the Indian Statistical Institute in the winter months of 1960-61, the first year of the Third Five-Year Plan. 'Planning and the People' is the result of a Research Project sponsored by the Research Programmes Committee of the Planning Commission itself, and was executed under the direction of a Professor of Political Science, Lucknow University.

How did Balogh see the meaning of the Third Plan? This is what he has to say on this point: 'The Third Plan has an exceptional importance of its own. Its success or failure will in fact decide whether the

establishment of a socially balanced and increasingly prosperous and integrated community is feasible without compulsion, by non-violent revolution. 'It will decide whether India is able to lay the foundations for an eventually self-sustaining growth.' Can we say now, five years later, what this decision is, or likely to be?

Here is another impertinent observation, which it is most pertinent to grasp in this present situation when so many copy book remedies are being advocated by powerful advocates: 'The control of productive activity through licensing should closely conform to the desire to create a balanced socialistic society if that is really the declared political desire of the country. The creation of new wants is directly hostile to saving and accumulation and thus impairs the growth of the economy. It must be kept under strict control. In particular, care should be taken not to introduce into Indian society the social escalation of material desires which has led to such frustration in the highly developed industrial countries of the West. A better balance between work, leisure, material income and satisfaction, and between private and collective consumption, might be striven for. This will not merely make India a better balanced society than now exists in the West, but will hasten the day (because of a concentration of effort and the avoidance of conspicuous consumption) when a satisfactory minimum standard of life for the great multitude of the Indian people can be achieved.'

On the basis of this, Balogh concludes that the proposed establishment of a so-called 'people's car' factory shows the extent of the failure to realise this simple truth. So much on Indian economic strategy, on which there is much more, but we must come to the common area of the joint review, which concerns the role of the people for making any planning strategy a success.

On this too Balogh has something significant to say. He feels that it is possible to launch a scheme based on voluntary participation if the participants are fanatically convinced of the metaphysical importance of their sacrifice (e.g. the Israeli Kibbutzim). He goes on to say that it is also possible to launch a scheme on the basis of total indoctrination buttressed by police (or only social) compulsion (China). It is much less easy, but still possible, to cajole participation by appeals to self interest, if some measure of penalty (social or taxation) is kept in the background. But in a village riven by differences of status and interest, it is difficult to envisage success based on exhortation.

What are the findings of Masaldan? Despite its shortcomings, the institution of village panchayats is gaining ground and popularity. This is encouraging. The people are appreciating its activities and services. During the entire survey, hardly any respondent, even if dissatisfied with its working, suggested that the village panchayat be discontinued.

What about the urban area? Attention was drawn repeatedly to the slow pace of development and the absence of adequate programmes to meet the needs

of the people. Active participation by the people, specially in the cities, in the formulation and implementation of plans, is still quite remote. Public representatives associated with various bodies lack a proper sense of responsibility and appreciation of their role as members of such bodies.

This study is concerned with the survey of attitudes towards planning in one rural and one urban area, of organisation for securing public participation, and of material and methods employed in plan publicity for securing public interest and participation in planning. While the conception of the plan may be admirable, there is little awareness of the need to consider economic planning in its social and political setting and framework. While the change in the philosophy of community development schemes from welfare measures to the organisation of production, is regarded as a great step forward in the fight against poverty, there is still justification for stronger public initiative in this matter.

The achievements may be big but still are small in comparison with the magnitude of the problem and its needs. The emergency provides a good climate for real emergency measures on both fronts, including food and industry, and for developing self-aid with the help of the kind of aid that encourages it, not tries to thwart it.

A. K. Banerjee

FIFTEEN YEARS OF DEMOCRATIC PLANNING,
Vols. I & II. By S. Kesava Iyengar.

Asia Publishing House, Bombay, 1963 and 1965.

Fifteen Years of Democratic Planning is a compilation of information on almost all aspects of economic history, planning and development. The study is not confined to India alone. Russia, U.S.A., U.K., China and several other countries figure prominently; so does U.N.O., F.A.O., W.H.O. and other international or world bodies.

We are told of what the Charter of the U.N.O. is, how its constituent bodies function, how the craze for gold started and what its implications are. We are also briefed about the progress and results of alternative models of planning: the communist and the democratic. Included in the first are: 'planning in the U.S.S.R.', 'plan progress in China' and 'Czechoslovakian plans'. The democratic model is more extensive and is, therefore, given a larger coverage. It includes the western democracies, U.S.A. and U.K. in particular, and the countries in the East having more or less similar political and economic backgrounds like Japan.

India, being in the middle of the two, figures in both types. But the discussion is too lengthy and unsystematic to sustain even casual interest. From a marathon and most materialistic account of the 'three plan frames', the discussion rises to almost mystic heights—'beyond economic emancipation'. The result is two volumes of printed matter containing 16 chapters or sections, 72 sub-sections, 366 tables, 11 appendices, and one thousand, one hundred and twenty eight pages. This is no doubt a remarkable

feat, but a little too much for appreciating the 'essentials' and 'results' of *democratic planning*.

A book of this type is not much different from a yearbook or a *Who's Who*. The only difference between the two is that the former is aimed to serve the need of a less varied readership than the latter. The contents of the book are, no doubt, more selective and exhaustive, but that hardly makes any material difference. The book will, therefore, be of interest and use to only those who are looking forward to a statistical handbook on economic developments in India and elsewhere during the past fifteen years or so.

It contains detailed and well tabulated 'facts and figures' relating to the following aspects of planning and economic growth: international economic situation, including the financial position of the United Nations' economic organisations; gold and dollar reserves of a few leading countries, their national incomes and rates of growth, sectoral output and production per head; results and progress of planning in some of the leading communist countries; planning and progress in India in different fields—agriculture and community development, P.L. 480 and U.S. expertise, cooperatives and agrarian reforms; industrial growth and output; balance of trade, foreign aid and exchange crisis; public finance, inflation and price structure; domestic trade, commerce and marketing; social security and social welfare.

An attempt of this order cannot but be very tiresome and unwieldy. The author can, therefore, be hardly blamed for keeping himself confined to the surface; leaving the deeper and systematic probing to those who are less ambitious but more precise and effective. Excepting 'facts and figures', the readers would therefore do well if they consult books of the latter type for assessing the progress and performance of planning in India.

Ranjit Gupta

THE TAXATION OF CORPORATE INCOME IN INDIA

By S. Ambirajan.

Asia Publishing House, Bombay, 1964.

FOREIGN ENTERPRISE IN INDIA: Law and Policies

By Mathew J. Kust.

Oxford University Press, Bombay, 1964.

In a mixed economy like ours where the public sector and the corporate sector, comprising the public and the private companies, co-exist and influence each others activity, a knowledge of the one is essential for a correct appraisal of the role and prospects of the other. Functionally, the two sectors share several characteristics in common. Both operate under similar laws and principles of economics and create goods and services in a like manner.

The corporate sector being older in the run and, in a way, the motive force behind the growth and shaping of the public sector, merits special consideration. A study of its structure, progress, performance and problems provide the material for assessing the

scope and relevance of the public sector including how best it could be attuned to serve its functions effectively.

The studies under review provide this knowledge, though not as comprehensively or even as systematically as is required to comprehend the subject matter of this seminar. The scope of these enquiries is limited to a study of certain characteristics which provide a fairly broad account of the role, complexities, structure, performance and future of the corporate sector, but not of the public sector. All this material can however be systematized and used for the purpose of making comparable studies on similar aspects of the public sector.

The area covered by the two authors being different, both the enquiries are equally useful. Ambirajan's study is an enquiry into the structure of the corporate sector and corporate taxation in India including their inter-relationship. Kust, on the other hand, is concerned with the flow of foreign capital in India and the institutions on which rests the social, political and economic life in this country. The study is not only varied in its theme but also informative and valuable from the investor's point of view.

It, however, suffers from one major drawback. The author is so engrossed in describing the details which run through the Indian set-up—administrative, political, social and economic—that he almost loses sight of the primary object of his enquiry. In a book of about 500 pages, the discussion on foreign enterprise in India is thus summed up in less than 15 pages. Another 250 pages are devoted to a factual account of the official regulations relating to licensing of industry, use of foreign exchange, control of capital issues, taxation, industrial property rights and the like. The rest is filled with facts and events—such as, the cast structure in business, the Hindu Marriage Act, the impact of English language on Bengalis and Madrasis, the land revenue system, population growth and food shortage, etc—which have very little relevance for a study of *Foreign Enterprise in India*.

Compared to Kust, Ambirajan is much more steadfast in his enquiry. At times, he too yields to the temptation of looking beyond his field of study. Generally, however, he keeps himself confined to his subject of enquiry which includes a review and analysis of the economics of corporate taxation, the growth of the corporate sector in India and its structure, the evolution and structure of corporate taxation, its effects on the corporate sector and its role in planning for economic development.

The first chapter of the book contains a review of the theories which have been advanced, from time to time, in support of corporate taxation. The review is rather sketchy and somewhat schoolboyish in its presentation. There are too many quotations and too little explanation, just as one finds in the note books of students appearing for their final examination. This may be due to the fact that the book itself is a revised edition of what Ambirajan once wrote for his doctoral thesis. However, if not in his own words, in the words of




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
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


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
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others, he succeeds in developing his contention that 'the main, if not sole, objective of corporate taxation is financial, and not social or administrative or ethical.'

The next two chapters deal with the history of corporate activity in India, and the volume and variety of Indian legislation on corporate taxation. The last three chapters are devoted to an examination of the structure and complexities of corporate taxation in India, its effects on corporate savings and investment and its place in planning for economic progress.

Some of the important conclusions which emerge out of this study may be summed up.

1. The growth of the corporate sector in India since the close of the Second World War has been phenomenal. Between 1945 and 1961 the number of joint stock companies has risen from about 14,900 to 26,100, and their paid up capital from Rs. 389 crores to Rs. 1725 crores. This growth has been achieved despite the partition of the country, the Korean War and other disturbing effects including corporate taxation itself.

2. The government policy of licensing to prevent overcrowding has tended to give almost monopoly power to many industries in the corporate sector.

3. The profits of the corporate sector within a span of twenty years have risen by nearly eight times or from Rs. 27.72 crores in 1937-38 to Rs. 212.97 crores in 1959-60.

4. The retained profits, as distinguished from disposable profits, constitute the most important source of feeding the growth of the corporate sector and hence the need for a taxation policy which encourages the retention of corporate profits.

5. The total tax paid by the corporate sector to the national exchequer has increased from Rs. 8.44 crores in 1939-40 to Rs. 122.34 crores in 1958-59 or by as much as fourteen times in less than twenty years.

6. The tax structure in India has been so frequently changed that it has become much too complex and retrogressive in its incidence. Unless this is corrected, neither the corporate sector nor the general economy would grow at a rate commensurable with the requirements of the country.

The tone of the other study is, however, more optimistic. It depicts India as a promising field for foreign investors and, what is more, envisages rich dividends on their investments. The reasons for this note of optimism are many; most important among which are: the political stability of this country; instability elsewhere, particularly in economically less developed regions, such as Latin America and South-east Asia, where much of British and American capital is invested; the lack of a highly developed technological base in India and her increasing desire to create such a base through foreign aid and collaboration: the foreign exchange crisis and the rising demand for foreign goods in India; the avowed policy of the Indian Government to woo and attract foreign

capital and the high probability of its continuation in the future.

The flow of foreign capital or the growth of foreign enterprise in India, as a matter of fact, has not been shy. Since independence the outstanding amounts of foreign capital in the private sector (Rs. 255.8 crores in 1948 and Rs. 760.5 crores in 1961) have more than doubled. Most of this capital (nearly 65 per cent) came from the United Kingdom. 'The U.S. was next with Rs. 113 crores or 16 per cent'. It was followed by Germany, Japan, Switzerland and Russia.

So far as foreign collaboration is concerned, there has again been a sharp rise in the number of enterprises set up. At the start of the Second Plan, there were only 17 enterprises. By 1961 there were as many as 403 enterprises. 'Between 1956-59 about 150 new British companies came to India to collaborate on heavy engineering, chemicals, cables, textiles, machinery, and specialised consumer goods... American collaboration is next in importance. Nearly 200 Indo-American collaborations were approved during the period 1956-61.'

These figures do not include government to government collaboration, nor do they include collaboration of private foreign capital in public sector undertakings. The study excludes collaboration of such capital. But even in this field, as we all know, foreign capital is increasingly flowing in. The capital market is therefore not as oppressive as Ambirajan seems to think.

Not that the taxation policy is free from defects or not in need of simplification and improvement. But this is an easy task compared to the improvements required elsewhere. They pertain to broader policies and programmes for the development of the two sectors, the corporate and the public, and therefore call for a careful examination of the wider issues, such as the political and economic implications of the flow of foreign capital in either of the sectors or in both; the mechanism by which the two sectors operate, and their efficiency; their mutual relations and scope of expansion; and the like. Neither of the authors have made any attempt to study these issues. Their field of enquiry being different, they could not have possibly done so. But some such study is essential for a correct understanding of the role and prospects of the two sectors, including how and to what extent they should be taxed or allowed to attract foreign capital.

R. G.

THE DIPLOMACY OF ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT

By Eugene R. Black.

Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Massachusetts.

The world is a better place with Eugene Black. He is one of the great practical bridge-builders between the poor and the rich nations, a leading engineer, working indefatigably on one of the world's major structural defects. So when his Clayton lectures on 'The Diplomacy of Economic Development' appear in print they command the attention of all those who would seek to know something of this new

concept from such an unrivalled authority. His world-wide experience is unique; he shares a sense of mission with others in the West like Barbara Ward; and, like her, he writes well too.

Eugene Black conceives of the diplomat of economic development as a person somewhere between the diplomat and the businessman; a new international figure unknown before World War II; a product of the new role of the West and the new nations of the post-colonial era in the revolution of rising expectations (or, more significantly, for Black 'the loss of traditional expectations'). Whatever the developing nation's leaders may think of the World Bank, no one will quarrel with its erstwhile chief's main thesis, that it is the function of the development diplomat 'to illuminate choices', choices between political pressures, prestige investments, and economic needs; choices between difficult kinds of economic needs. But can creditors be content only to 'illuminate'? Black has not answered that one. Nor, for that matter, has Escott Reid in his more recent, *The Future of the World Bank* although he has said much the same, that 'the Bank diplomat will remember that he is not laying down the law to a poor country'; that the role of the Bank is 'to be informed, to encourage, to warn, but not to dictate'. Many men who man the governments of under-developed societies may feel that so fine an ideal enunciated by two distinguished servants of the Bank leaves something more to be explained from the experience of recent years.

And this takes us to his second thesis that development diplomacy needs to have a separate and distinct status of its own. Given the need for that status, perhaps the weakest link in his argument is the constructive link between development and conventional diplomacy. It is not enough for him merely to say, 'that development diplomacy should not ignore the problems of conventional diplomacy.' To the extent it did, it would be totally unrealistic. India at least has never known a time when the two seem to be so inextricably mixed as in 1965. How can power conflicts and economic aid mix in an imperfect world?*

When he discusses economic aid as 'a tactical weapon in the Cold War', the reader shares his confusion when he says, 'I often wonder just where economic aid fits into the strategy'. Surely that fitting-in has been all too apparent in SEATO, in CENTO, in Ghana (when President Johnson suspended aid after a speech of Nkrumah's alleging neo-colonialist intentions of the U.S. Government); and, more recently, around the Indo-Pakistan conflict. When Black accepts the tactics of aid in the overall

*Until IDA was founded, the Bank did not have to beg for money from governments the way most international institutions have to. It had been endowed by governments and was consequently independent of them. This is the great advantage of endowments: they promote autonomy and independence. But when IDA was founded, the Bank had to join the long queue of agencies and institutions which ask national governments for grants. This has made the Bank dependent, as it had not been before, on the good will of the governments, which are the major contributors to IDA. 'The Future of the World Bank' by Escott Reid.

'strategy' against the communist world, when he suggests it should be 'the principal means by which the West maintains its political and economic dynamic in the under-developed world', he is not only indulging in out-dated Dullesian over-simplification; he is totally ignoring the fact that the world will not be neatly divided into pro and anti-communist countries in which aid can be treated as a political weapon against the communists, but a totally non-political, no-strings instrument of economic good intentions among the rest. This is a fiction of the American imagination which ignores the realities of the Afro-Asian world. The new nationalisms of this world with varying shades of Left and Right leanings have already shown how hard it is for development diplomats to wear two hats at the same time, the good Quaker's for the free world's image, and the conventional diplomat's when strings may be useful. The dichotomy is at the heart of Eugene Black's unanswered problem.

The leaders of the developing nations might find two valuable lessons from these Clayton Lectures. The first is when Black warns against 'under-emphasising exports' and placing too great a weight on autarchy in the desire for more rapid growth. No advice could be more apposite for India in its new-found passion for economic self-reliance after the September conflict. Black rightly warns all of us that too great an imbalance towards autarchy and away from export promotion would only 'prolong the poverty' of the poor nations. He is dead right: the balance must be weighted in favour of higher export earnings for growth, rather than in cutting the import bill, for, in both the short and the long run, export promotion can only succeed with import promotion too. Trade, unlike aid, can only be a two-way business.

The other is when he asks the simple question of where entrepreneurs come from, and replies that we do not really know. From Japan through India to the West, they have sprung from different classes in very different situations. 'All we know for certain is that once people become conscious of the possibility of economic development in their society, entrepreneurs start appearing.' He might well have added that they are the foundation seed from which a more productive crop can grow, and governments should take care to multiply them and not strangle them, for they, not State plans and investments, are the prime catalysts of growth. Entrepreneurs can be in both private and public sectors, the men who risk, innovate and make the profits/surpluses for more growth.

Perhaps the most valuable nugget in this brief book is in the three questions Black poses as 'the searching test' for all aid programmes.

First, are these illuminating the choices in development without the pretence that economic standards of value are somehow morally superior to other standards of value?

Second, are they making and maintaining constructive contracts, working partnerships that promise to

remain working even in the face of the controversies which bedevil conventional diplomacy today?

Third, can these point to 'visible results in terms of engineering a series of escapes from poverty'?

Happy is the development diplomat, and rare the government, which can answer these questions with a confident 'yes'. Till then, which hat, when?

A. D. Moddie

LEADING ISSUES IN DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS:

Selected materials and commentary By Gerald M. Meier.

Oxford University Press. 1964.

The newly-independent countries in order to get rid of their economic backwardness, have set some socio-economic goals for themselves and have had recourse to some kind or other of planning to achieve the goals. This planning for development has attracted the attention of western economists and the result is the creation of what is called development economics, dealing exclusively with the problems of economic growth in the under-developed countries.

Development economics studies issues of a developing country's economics in isolation and to the exclusion of its historical and socio-political conditions. This method of study, if one wishes to be kind, is learnedly abstract but actually myopic and unrealistic. Besides, practical problems which a people face are regarded as controlled laboratory experiments. Like the Newtonian model of the universe, development economics toy with models and through these models may solve a fringe problem here and there. But there they stop like the Newtonian law.

Of course, development economics with its models, 'production functions', 'coefficients', ratios, sounds extremely scientific. Like science, development economics too is highly 'mathematicised' and neat formulas are produced, seemingly achieving what in mathematics and science is called aesthetic simplicity. But there is one difference between science and development economics. Science uses mathematics to measure various magnitudes to understand and control forms of energy and matter, while development economics begins with magnitudes and arrives at magnitudes.

For example, 'Given estimates of the current rate of savings and the capital-output ratio, the rate of economic growth, in terms of national output is 1000 and the saving ratio is 0.06, domestic savings would be 60, which may be invested to generate the increased national output. With a capital-output ratio of 4, this amount of savings and investment could generate an increase in national output of 15, ...'

So, here we are in a unilinear circle of successive increasing national outputs with constant rates of growth, constant variables and variable constants and what not. But what happens to the output, who benefits from the rate of growth, and what precisely are national output and savings are questions outside

development economics, for development economics will deal with development economics only, and nothing else.

Development is possible by investment and investment is possible when there is investible capital. This capital may be raised from various sources. The easiest source is savings. If savings are voluntary, there is no problem. If there aren't any voluntary savings, they should be induced by fiscal measures like inflation so that savings are available for investment. This part of the theory is completely contradicted by Indonesia where there is terrific inflation but not much savings and investment. Taxation can provide investible capital. But whom to tax and to what extent depends on the nature of the social system and of the government in a given country, which are outside the scope of development economics.

Exports, especially of raw materials and some agricultural products may earn foreign exchange so necessary for investment. Unfortunately, this device will only perpetuate the backward colonial economy of a country because the 'free' West (where foreign exchange is necessary) can refuse to sell the machinery that the developing country wants to buy or, alternatively, dictate what it should buy. Very frequently outmoded machinery is willingly offered on the pretext that the developing country does not have the personnel to operate modern and up-to-date machinery.

Yet another source of investment is foreign aid. Of course, for the purposes of this book, foreign aid must be understood as aid from the 'free' West only. This aid can be loans to the government of the backward country or capital collaboration with indigenous entrepreneurs, alias private enterprise. Out of these two forms, the first may entail political strings or high rates of interest which the developing country will have to pay through the nose. The second form of foreign aid comes forth only when there are firm guarantees of profit and/or when the helping country is conceded managerial control in addition to a government guarantee for security against mischievous policies like nationalisation!

Assuming that all these sources for investment are available by a miracle, will they bring about growth and development in the backward economy. The development economists say NO and with that they give up their parochialisms and go outside the rigid limits of their discipline. They say that the implementation of the plan and the achievement of growth need a strong government as a prerequisite. Of course, a strong government is a strong government, it does not need definition. It is understood that it must not be a communist or a socialist government. If that is so, the next type of strong government could be an individual dictatorship. If this is repulsive to the backward country, development had better be left in the hands of private enterprise which has a long tradition of growth!

K. M.

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
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COVER

Designed by **T. A. Balakrishnan**

The problem

THE prevalent political mood in the country today is one of bewildering gloom and despair. An attitude of impatient helplessness has seized even those who still carry on the political dialogue. A little more than a shadow remains of all the cherished goals which were set before the nation nearly two decades ago. Although the country is still one, its existence as a unified nation is seriously threatened, not the least by a big shift of political power from the Centre to the States and the growing tensions between the two. India is setting a poor example for history as being the only country in whose case serious and prolonged external threats have not imparted an enduring sense of unity and strength in the nation.

Although the formal democratic, political structure is intact, a growing disgust is spreading with the way in which democratic institutions work, so much so that one often hears an angry demand for the 'democrats' to lay off the backs of the people. One cannot imagine a more frustrating spectacle of hysterical and irresponsible legislatures. Planning and anarchy have become indistinguishable; for there are no norms of efficiency and honesty which have not been seriously breached by corruption, graft and the lack of effective decision-making, while intermittent, short-term crises cause tremendous hardships to millions. No wonder some groups are desperately and even hopefully looking for

authoritarian political alternatives, and others, while realizing that an authoritarian alternative is neither an imperative necessity nor a desirable vehicle of political change, nevertheless, imagine that such a foul atmosphere cannot be cleared without a storm.

However, there does not exist, and is unlikely to emerge in the near future, any nation-wide strong and disciplined force which could install an authoritarian regime. It may appear to be a simple and cruel irony that while no force is strong enough to topple the democratic structure, democracy itself is decomposing and rotting. Unless this drift is checked, the danger of the Balkanization of the country cannot be minimized. Therefore, between the necessity of a major surgical operation and the impossibility of having one in the near future, there must be found some viable and new set of policies which can stop the rot and create essential conditions for a fundamental political change.

Indian polity suffers from many ills. It is not possible nor even necessary to delve into all of them. Serious attention should be paid to the most urgent, crucial and fundamental problems of organic character dealing with the process of political change. Political change is defined as the acquisition by a political system of new capabilities to meet old and new challenges. In a democracy, the acquisition of these capabilities is inextricably tied up with the active instruments of the change, namely, the political parties: there must be a smooth transfer through a popular vote of the government from one party to another whenever so necessitated for a fundamental political change.

The purpose of this paper is (1) to show why, in face of a demonstrably urgent and crying need for change, there is a complete absence of a democratic alternative to a party in power, which has not only for so long retained power on a minority vote but has also become incapable of meeting serious internal and external challenges to the society; (2) to analyse known factors and instruments of political change and their effectiveness or lack of it in the contemporary situation of India; and (3) to suggest that changes in the electoral law can initiate new political forces and processes in the society.

The process of political change is a function of several factors. The important ones are: ideological struggle, character and functioning of political institutions and parties, practices and modes of operation of parties and other movements, distribution of political power, economic relations, calibre, quality and influence of leadership, etc. In a dynamically stable society, these factors converge in a particular balance between political parties which in number may be effectively only two as in the U.K., the U.S.A. and West Germany or more than two as in

many European countries. This balance (or balances) must provide, in a democracy, the corrective to democracy's own excesses, generate forces and reaction against supine *status quo*, and harness national and group energies and avoid large scale political frustration.

Among the factors mentioned in the preceding para, some are unlikely to undergo any radical change in any important dimension in the near future so as to make political change imperative. For example, there is no major change conceivable in the institutional structure of Indian democracy; almost all the necessary institutions exist and are functioning, although with diminishing returns. It is unlikely to expect any big shift in economic relations determined by the largely accepted but vague concepts of mixed economy, socialist pattern or State capitalism, and the extremely complex and cumbersome structure of economy which has resulted from the application or misapplication of these concepts. It is also fruitless to imagine a sudden emergence of new, dynamic, alternative, national leadership at various levels in the absence of a new political movement on a nation-wide scale. Therefore, the emergence of a democratic alternative should be estimated through the practical possibilities of the situation and not in abstractions.

Nevertheless, the problem of most urgent political change, namely, that of providing a democratic alternative to the Congress can be narrowed down to the analysis of one or more of the following four factors: (a) changes in the electoral law, (b) conflict of ideas, (c) party political organization, (d) political practice. The Congress Party in its present mood may not like to consider the need for an alternative government and relinquish power but, in the long run, in the absence of a serious challenge to it, this party, as it is at present constituted and functions, will decay with the decay of the society or would be wiped out bringing in its wake anarchy or dismemberment of the country. The more sober and less ambitious elements in the Congress are seriously concerned with this problem.

The electoral system determines to a very large extent the character and strength of political parties. Only those features of the system will be referred to here as are relevant. Indian experience might go down in history as unique in the sense of her electoral system defeating its own objective. It is common experience in many countries that elections by simple majority through single ballot and those by proportional representation (PR) yield drastically different strengths of the contesting parties. Even different forms of the PR system seriously affect party positions as is evidenced by the results of the recent changes in the

French electoral law under de Gaulle. It was always claimed and corroborated by European experience that election by simple majority in single-member constituencies would eliminate smaller parties and ultimately result in a two-party system.

This claim has seen its total refutation in India. A simple majority rule has, on the one hand, yielded a party situation which in numbers more than approximates to what would have resulted from PR and, on the other and in effect, has established a one-party government. This is the most significant feature of the fragmentation of Indian politics. Apart from the fact that the election commissioner recognises as many as about twenty-one parties at national or State level, the number of parties actually participating in elections is about three times the officially recognized number. And then there are factions within parties, each faction being as good as a separate party. And, of course, there are factions within a faction!

Although the party in power has generally held about three-fourths of the seats in the Parliament and two-thirds of the seats in the State legislatures, it has always been elected on a minority vote with the additional feature that the gulf between the percentage seats held by it and the percentage votes polled for it goes up to about thirty per cent. It is seldom mentioned that about half the voters in India do not vote; and if the Congress gets elected with a little less than half the votes actually polled, the basis of its legitimacy to power should be in serious doubt. Above everything else, the party position and competition is seriously threatened by the most anarchic intervention of independent candidates which alone number about three times the total seats in contest. Two-fifths of the independent candidates forfeit their deposits.

It is a great irony that thousands of candidates, independent or otherwise, stand for election with the clear knowledge and intention of losing; and this fact causes not only the fragmentation of party politics but also brings out the marginality and superficiality of the opposition by reducing its base in the legislature. For comparison, it must be mentioned that to avoid this type of bizarre situation, several European countries restrict the election to only party candidates. It is not difficult to see that the present Indian electoral system, despite its great democratic content, is utterly unsuitable for creating a democratic alternative through a balanced party system; in fact, the electoral system has added new problems of its own to an otherwise difficult and complex situation.

The system certainly does not encourage the voters to vote where their votes count. It is both absurd and amazing that citizens should vote for a party they dislike and hate most of

the time. The present system, thus, has not only outlived its utility but is also a positive and major hindrance to political progress. The suggested reforms will appear in the last section of this paper. Let us look at some of the other factors for the possibility of their being used as an instrument for political change.

The lack of political balance between political parties in India is often attributed to the absence of polarization of parties on ideological grounds. It becomes a matter of great despair for intellectuals who, in search for simple solutions, do not find political parties as primarily doctrinal bodies polarized between the classical Right and Left or some new version of that division. It is true, though, that western political institutions were the result of a long history of struggle of polarized opposition, often irreconcilable between social groups and classes; but we in India today are no longer working with the institutions of the 18th and 19th century and in fact we have telescoped in time all the major western constitutional developments of centuries and set up at once all the contemporary institutions as found in the developed world.

However, ideology has its role and this cannot be dismissed by wishing for an ideology-free two-party system. Democracy assumes the existence in the community of substantial difference of political opinions. The clarity of fundamental ideas is essential in imparting clarity to party programmes as well as providing a certain continuity in practice to party leadership. A consistent, and clear programme in full view of the declared objectives is most likely to create confidence between the politically established top and the politically active bottom in the party, for it is not possible for the rank and file to translate by itself the great issues of ideology into practical issues. Politics is healthier when it is policy-oriented than when it becomes a matter of expediency. Ideological struggle, if not mutually destructive, also attracts many dormant and sceptic elements of the society, particularly the intellectuals.

Nevertheless, a classical approach to ideological conflict not only represents a gross oversimplification of a complex phenomenon, but it is also erroneous in ignoring the experience of the last hundred years in the West that the classical Right and Left of extremes cannot coexist today, for they would not, one or both, accept the rules of the game of parliamentary democracy and be generally unwilling to compromise. The greatest danger of politics riven by paranoiac ideologies of the extreme Right and extreme Left would be the rise of authoritarianism. Therefore, for a modern democracy to survive, it is essential that the battle of ideas must emanate from a broad consensus on certain

fundamentals. In fact, the advantages of political polarization can be had only within the limits of this consensus; political cleavages and political convergence must remain in dynamic equilibrium in a progressive society.

Independent India at its very inception was caught between conflicting world ideologies, which then appeared to be locked in a deathly struggle. The danger of Indian politics also getting sharply divided on the same line was very real. It was, therefore, quite right for the Indian leaders to perceive this danger as well as the broad irrelevance of the ideological conflict for the major problems of the reconstruction of Indian polity and economy. Non-alignment was initially a declaration of non-participation in that war and conflict and an assertion of unity, independence and Indian nationalism. Its later degeneration into a simple cliché and impotence against aggression is a different matter.

The great prestige, tradition and strength of the national leaders and the Congress Party, which had always remained ideologically centrist ever since Gandhiji took over the reins, further reduced the possibility of any big ideological cleavage, despite the breakaway from the Congress of the parties of the Left. The natural or forced disappearance of some of the stalwarts of the Right in the Congress also helped in keeping the balance. However, the Congress in the years of its rule of compromise, accommodation, gloss and patronage, as well as absorption of various protest movements has been reduced to a cumbersome amalgam of almost all conceivable conflicting interests and ideologies without any genuine convergence on fundamental policies.

It is debatable whether in the event of such a convergence, the trend would have been towards the establishment of a one-party State or the growth of a democratic alternative to Congress. But the net situation obtained today is one of shocking absurdity and futility. There are today nearly as many political parties in the opposition as there are factions inside the Congress; nearly each faction pairs with an opposition party for supporting or not supporting a particular ideology or policy or programme. The opposition parties do not oppose or support the Congress as a whole but its different factions. Although there exists a party spectrum which conforms to both the classical and the modern distribution of parties, this particular juxtaposition of the factions in the Congress and the parties in opposition has not only added an element of unreality to Indian politics, but has caused the fragmentation of politics.

Paradoxically enough, whereas on the one hand ideology has been reduced to a second or

third order of motivation in politics, on the other hand the growing weakness and frustration of political parties can superficially ignite ideological conflict and create venom and distrust to fantastic limits. For example, the election manifestoes of a dozen parties are indistinguishable one from the other and yet these very parties would bitterly and violently oppose one another with ideological sticks. The parties treat each other as blackly black and whitely white. The theoretical politics of the last two decades converged on the broad acceptance of such objectives as socialism, democracy, planning and modernization. Yet, the ruling party which symbolized all these objectives represents today not their highest but their lowest common denominator.

Formally, there are rampant in India all sorts of ideologies and ideological groups and parties—in fact several parties ostensibly sharing the same ideology—as well as the broad confluence or convergence of fundamentals, and yet there is in sight neither a democratic alternative to the Congress nor any other method for bringing about desirable political change. However, there is bound to be great pressure on opposition parties of nearly the same political persuasion to come together if only the electoral law was such that it did not encourage party political fragmentation. The same pressure would also make the Congress more cohesive.

It may be considered that if the Congress develops cohesiveness under the pressure of bitter internal strains and tensions, it is likely to set up for all practical purposes a one-party State, particularly under the present electoral law. If this cohesiveness comes under the pressure of a more sensible party position in the opposition brought about by a new electoral law, India may be on the road to a stable democracy with modern ideologies playing their useful role. If neither of these situations emerges, the Congress and the country may together disintegrate in each other's lap.

In several western democratic countries, although ideologies remain at low key, political change and democratic alternatives are provided and assured by the growth of strong and popular parties with powerful organizational set-ups and well-knit units at various levels. The U.S. is the classical example. Parties build up their own hierarchies, leadership, organizational patterns, party-machine cadre, research units, individual and mass membership, etc. Germany, which had been riven by ideologies for decades, has in the post-war years, developed an efficient party system with ideologies drastically trimmed to sustain their democratic structure. In India, eighteen years of hectic political activity in the most open system, with an elaborate institutional structure and with scores of parties in the field, has not brought about an organiza-

tional take-off. Political parties appear loose-knit, sick or juvenile and their balance sheet in terms of their programmes, discipline, cohesiveness, stability and overall performance is not creditable.

Pluralism is the essence of democracy, but to avoid its being unwieldy and fragmentary, it is generally accepted that a few political parties should between them represent the vast multiplicity of conflicting interests, groups, classes, etc., though not as passive reflectors but as active organs for the meeting, compromising and resolving of these interests. In short, parties must function as instruments of political change through the resolution of conflicting interests. Indian political parties do perform this function but in a very perverse and self-defeating manner.

For example, it is their common feature that one interest is represented through factions in several political parties. There is no opposition from these interests to factions and their leaders changing political parties overnight and sometimes even returning to the original fold without any embarrassment. Many parties have a floating leadership. Although organized parties are not allowed within a given party, factions within a party function like organized and mutually hostile parties. The traditional interests like those of the trade unions, peasant organizations, cooperatives, intellectuals, which are well known parts of the democratic parties in the West, have, it is odd to observe, very little say in party policies and organizations in India.

Partly, this unhealthy and perverse situation was the product of the establishment, in one stroke rather than in stages, of all the conceivable democratic institutions and their super-structures, and their imposition on a situation in which a debris of centuries had accumulated and needed to be cleared in one great sweep. It was not realized that some social and economic reforms were the absolute minimum pre-conditions and not mere accompaniments of the efficient democratic super-structure. Such a cumbersome institutional system, if expected to work smoothly, required a large, complex, efficient and shock-absorbing infra-structure. And this was an immense and a tough job which could be done quickly either by an authoritarian or a charismatic leadership.

India had the 'benefit' of the second category, but the job was badly done through patching, grafting, clipping and papering every crucial problem. The political structure became more and more diffused and less and less functional in the sense that its most active political manipulation yielded very poor results. Largely, the situation, as portrayed earlier, was the result of the fragmentation of Indian politics and a

great jungle of political parties and factions the latter substituting for the infra-structure.

Consequently, not only had parties come to be burdened with floating leadership, fratricidal factions and lack of policies, but they also lacked effective organization and stability needed for their growth. Scores of small, unstable political parties have spread all over the States in India and do not have the education, experience, knowledge and resources to cope with the complex and technical State problems. At the lower level, political activity is almost totally factional. In almost every party there has developed at the top a wilful control of the caucus which is authoritarian and itself factional and thus a source of encouraging indiscipline and defiance.

The arbitrary way in which the Congress bosses dispose of and quite unsuccessfully, factional disputes shows both the strength of the caucus and its fundamental weakness. The top Congress bears in its impotence the unmistakable impress of the warring factions which constitute it. In the West, in the early years of mass democracy, it was the resistance to caucus control which ended with parties becoming the chief representatives of politics.

Resistance to caucus has not been very effective in Indian parties. And the way out evolved of this difficulty has produced even more damaging effects. Too many parties and too many factions and the gift of producing another tiny party as if out of a hat, when someone's leadership is threatened, have stood in the way of stable and well knit party organizations in India. The sociologists keep repeating to us the success story of group behaviour, organization and membership participation, etc. And here in India we have witnessed the biggest failure story and yet no sociologist seems to be losing his sleep over it.

There is some sense in recognising the danger of making a fetish of the interest group theory as the focal point of political organization. In the West this group politics has been raised to the level of a scientific, political theory and perhaps there is some justification for that. But in India, the parochialism of group politics, its clash with national interests, and the way it has impaired and undermined the personal and tactical continuity of party leadership and the political authority of the party organization point towards the dangers of this theory. Failure to distinguish between pressure group politics and political fragmentation can lead to absurd conclusions.

For example, to say, as many sociologists do, that recent politicization of castes in India is

no more than the emergence of pressure groups at the lower levels is to distort the reality and to fall victim to 'scientific' euphoria. The real question to be answered is whether with the introduction of democratic decentralization and the rise of politically-oriented castes, social tensions are resolved, economic exploitation is reduced, and better trends are established towards the growth of a more integrated society, larger democratic political participation and welfare distribution and the involvement of competent and well-informed leadership which can inspire confidence? The answer is not in the affirmative so far as the evidence goes.

The most serious danger arises from the fact that if groups and interests, as distinguished from factions, cannot be absorbed in a proper balance within a party, they exert undue and corrupting pressure on the governmental administration and bureaucracy to get their demand satisfied. Galloping corruption in the administration through pressures from innumerable political factions has not only resulted in the loss of confidence in the administration but has also seriously undermined its operational efficiency. Failure of group politics has also brought back with vengeance a pseudo-ideological conflict between parties and factions, and among top echelons, as a result of the interaction of the high level of political consciousness and the low level of organization. Group politics can serve a useful political purpose only if the number of parties, having a non-coincidence of the main cleavages of opinions, is small and also if there is such a balance between parties as to yield a democratic alternative for a desired political change.

Unfortunately, there is no motivation or force at present in India which could exert its influence towards interplay or intra-party integration. A faction or party, however small and ineffective, is the only instrument left for retaining one's political personality. There does not seem, therefore, any great possibility of a democratic alternative emerging out of any big effort to improve party organization in face of the growing fragmentation of politics, although the need for attention in this direction cannot be minimised. If parties tighten their discipline, set up units throughout the country and work through them, have research staff and trusted political cadre and improve the functioning of the party machine, something substantial would have been achieved.

The character and functioning of the political system of any modern State are substantially dictated by political practices and modes of operation of political movements. In the first

instance, every democracy in the world faces the perpetual dilemma of allowing or disallowing the existence of those parties or groups which neither believe in democracy nor conform to democratic political practice; in fact they work for its overthrow. This dilemma sometimes makes democracy, particularly if it is weak, in its struggle with authoritarianism, adopt the methods of the latter. A strong democracy on the other hand keeps anti-democratic forces in check by its own dynamics and without the use of illegitimate methods. Though we do not have any large scale threat from authoritarianism yet, a sick democracy could invite it on herself through violent political practices. The nature of mass political activity outside the institutional system is such that it always runs into violent anti-democratic streams, if institutions do not work efficiently or are not held in respect.

The failure of the democratic institutions and the weakness of democracy can largely be attributed to their failure to provide a smooth and peaceful change of government when the change is urgently required. The way parliamentary institutions function broadly reflects the conduct of politics, and both together depend upon the parties having the prospects of being voted into power alternately. Those political parties which do not see any chance of replacing a government successively elected with a minority vote do not feel obliged to give regard to the rules of the game and, in turn, the party in power increasingly functions without a proper sense of responsibility and caution. Political practice consequently becomes a war between frustration and irresponsibility; the objective of winning political power becomes of secondary importance and parliamentary political practice ends up in perpetual pandemonium, walkouts and abuse of parliamentary privileges.

To the common man, parliamentary institutions appear as a fraud or a failure and, to those who demand either a one-party State or party-less democracy, a ghastly mistake. When the division of politics is carried to the point of general disgust and institutions are held in contempt, masses of voters are also treated by politicians as a necessary evil to be pandered to once in five years and ignored otherwise. The function of government is to govern and that of the opposition to oppose, but if the government misuses its power and the opposition is perpetually frustrated and believes in total opposition, political practice is debased and corrupted to limits where institutions become non-functional.

Political practice and conduct are also determined by the position, behaviour, authority and

security of leadership. Floating and insecure leadership, being at the mercy of factions whose attitude is unpredictable, cannot be expected to observe the rules of the game. In a socially backward milieu there is absence of any stable, close relationship between modernist leadership at the top and traditionalist elite at the lower levels. Feelings of caste, communal group and factions do not produce homogenous leadership within a party. Therefore, a great gulf grows between the practices of the leaders and their supporters; e.g., whereas the top leadership may like to organize popular political support for great issues of national and State importance, the followers may consider it a waste of time and energy. Lack of integrity and dishonest political practices have made politicians so disreputable in the eyes of the public that while recognizing that the game of politics is about power, the leadership openly denies having any such intentions.

It is the political parties which first break laws, rules and procedures and adopt corrupt practices and then the rest of the community follows. It is not enough to have institutions and law-making bodies unless they are respected through a strict code of conduct and openly recognisable practices. In Europe, corruption laws were tightened before the introduction of adult suffrage and mass parties. No such attempt was made in India and the supreme emphasis Gandhiji put on a proper code of conduct was the one true message from him which Congressmen have abysmally ignored. There is a lot that can be done to improving the machinery of the law, setting up of conventions and norms and their stabilization, tightening party discipline, but so long as political fragmentation with innumerable but ineffective parties remains the most dominant feature of Indian democracy, only a small improvement can be expected.

If the Indian people are given a chance once again to prepare and set up an institutional system which suits their genius, one can be sure that the job would be done much better. But this chance is not even a theoretical possibility and hence great and high-sounding manifestoes on partyless democracy or basic democracy or another form of institutional set-up radically different from the present one are all irrelevant. India has formally established almost every conceivable democratic institution found elsewhere in the world, and though marginal trimmings can be done here and there, the setting up of any big new institution is hardly on the agenda. There is, therefore, no point in wasting one's energies in looking for utopias. Consequently, desired political change can be conceived only

within the existing system and with other methods.

The analysis of the issues given in the preceding pages could certainly have been more exhaustive and better evidenced, but a detailed study would need volumes. The general picture of the political situation today and the functioning of the instruments of political change broadly suggest that the possibility of a democratic alternative emerging in the near future from independent improvements in ideological, institutional and organizational aspects of politics is extremely small and the trend is towards further fragmentation, uncertainty and lack of decision and confidence. Therefore, if anarchy or violent upheavals are to be avoided some minimum changes in the electoral law, on which there are unlikely to arise any big irreconcilable differences, must be introduced, at best to stop further fragmentation of politics if not to achieve its integration.

There are three important functions of an efficient, democratic electoral system. The first and its primary function is to create truly representative bodies which are either constitutionally provided or established by custom. The second function is to provide a representative government whose job is not only to represent but to govern and govern effectively and responsibly. Third, with the growth of mass democracy and a multiplicity of interests and groups, the electoral system must be so devised as to give the ordinary voter clear-cut and fair choices to let him make a sensible decision. The lower the level of education and political consciousness among voters, the more simplified should be the choices and the procedures.

The way an electoral system performs these functions largely determines whether one representative government can be replaced by another within the same law, and whether the government's strength essentially lies in mass democratic support. It is argued here that the present electoral law in India is unsuitable to achieve any of these objectives and, in fact, is undermining the whole process of building a stable democracy.

Certain important developments which have taken place over years in mature democracies of the West in making the electoral law a serviceable tool for a democratic system must be understood both in their form and spirit to see the defects, if any, in our electoral system, only because we are working and experimenting with western institutions. (1) In the West there is a clear and perceptible drift from parliament to the governing-party bodies which organize the electorate politically.

(2) Nominations of the candidates is by and large and in some cases entirely through the

parties only. The role of the independents is almost completely eliminated. This has been achieved either by specific provisions in the electoral laws as in some West European and Scandinavian countries, or by practice and custom and party ascendancy as in the U.K. Individual candidates and their qualifications were important factors in the days of restricted franchise. With universal suffrage, the independent candidate has become redundant. Political interests are represented no longer individually but through groups and parties.

(3) Voters are also becoming both by pressure and volition a part of a political group and not independent entities; a distinct proportion of voters feel heavily committed politically to parties.

(4) Trend towards the growth of bigger and bigger parties and reduction in the number of smaller parties. In fact, the trend of power concentration became so strong that, in some smaller European countries, it was felt that two big parties would neglect several smaller interests or would lead to one-party rule and, therefore, these countries deliberately created smaller parties through proportional representation.

The idea behind proportional representation was to present in the highest possible degree the strength of a few parties as against both total polarization and futile intervention by the large number of independents and splinter groups and to balance the government and the opposition through coalitions on either side of the parliament. However, the trend towards greater interest participation in political life in these countries came after a prolonged dose of political stability and the establishment of a process of smooth political change.

(5) Very small deviation exists between the political divisions of the electorate and the composition of their respective seats in the parliament. (6) Electoral process, procedures and practices are divorced from any type of government patronage or fear. (7) A very high percentage of voters participate in elections. (8) Tightening of electoral laws against corruption from all sources.

India has acquired and capsuled the western democratic institutions but has paid little attention to the afore-mentioned developments which have gradually strengthened democracy. The framers of the Indian Constitution in fear of being accused of paying insufficient attention to institutions needed for a new democracy almost looked too exclusively and excessively to the formal structure. They did not pay enough attention to the realities and the nature of political practices and methods which were to emerge from traditionalism, social and economic backwardness and exploitation which

were built into the system. The electoral law was correspondingly framed to suit the formal political structure rather than to these realities of the situation and the possible psychological reactions and habits of the voters.

In the West, special stress is constantly laid and corresponding measures taken for making the electoral systems, through suitable changes, suit the particular social structure and habits of each society, make the composition of the parliament and party political position conform to the division of the public opinion, guide the electorate to make intelligent decisions, simplify or complicate the election procedures as dictated by the educational and political standards of the voters, accentuate the power and prestige of parties against individuals and any tendency in the government to steamroller through brute majorities, and finally work towards 'excellence in the substantial activity of the electorate as a creative organ intended for the production of an effective parliament, and indirectly of an effective cabinet.'

In India, on the other hand, there had been almost the complete absence of any debate on the merits and demerits of the existing system, the lessons of electoral experience since independence and the need for reform in the electoral system. It may be mentioned here that even the framers of the Indian Constitution did not show any profound interest and spent a relatively small time in dilating upon the suitability of the proposed electoral system except for providing a number of don'ts for both the elected and the electorate in anticipation of the dangers of political corruption. However, whereas corruption has seeped into almost every aspect of Indian society, it can be said with some justification that we have witnessed over the last three elections, negligible corrupt practices in the electoral process itself.

It would be of little use to discuss the merits of any particular western electoral system, methods or principles in abstract or out of the context of the needs of Indian democracy. No electoral system by itself can create a political heaven. There are three important considerations which must dictate the reforms in the present electoral system. (1) The system must be able to rationalize in a reasonable time the present irrational and anarchic party situation and to reduce the number of parties to a level which guarantees a proper balance between them as well as assures a smooth change of government when needed. (2) The system must remain very simple for ordinary and uneducated voters to comprehend its meaning and make their choice without difficulty. The present system of voting as such is quite simple, though the voter is often confused with the multiplicity of parties and candidates and their respective policies.

(3) Simplicity need be accompanied by effectiveness. The system should guide the electorate in making an intelligent exercise of his or her voting right. Millions voting indifferently or cynically do not speak very well of the system.

The experience of three open and largely fair elections through a single ballot has not produced either a two-party system or a system with more than two parties but properly balanced. The charge against the single ballot system, that it fosters inequalities of individual voters and seats, has been established. The existence of some double-member constituencies has not introduced any serious modification of, or complication in, the system because the number of voters per constituency runs into several hundred thousands.

The opposition parties which are nationally recognized suffer the most from the single ballot system and naturally demand proportional representation (PR). It is possible that PR may produce better results for these parties, although it is not very certain because other smaller parties may make a dent on their votes. But the most serious objection to PR being introduced now is that it will freeze and sustain the existing irrationally large number of parties and that there would be no chance of integrating the politics or the parties and hence there would be no urge and motivation towards stability.

One cannot foretell what may happen to the Congress under PR, but even if it is ousted, the coalition replacing it will be no better as it will also be like the Congress made up of several parties and factions between which there would be little else common except the desire to cling to power—the smaller a party the nearer it is to a faction in its character and functioning. PR and multi-seat constituencies will complicate the system and, in the midst of great ignorance, illiteracy and the low level of political consciousness of the vast mass of the voters, will confuse instead of enlighten the voters.

It is often suggested that India should adopt the most popular European electoral system which is known as d'Hondt rule or quota system. By this system, the total polled votes for each party in each constituency are respectively divided in turn by some pre-fixed divisors. Of course, there is a difference between voting procedures and counting procedures and the d'Hondt system is more concerned with the latter. But the system is too complicated even for counting purposes and most unlikely to be accepted and will certainly not remove the threat of independent candidates and too many parties.

It is also suggested that a candidate for seats must first get the signatures of a few hundred

voters before he or she can be declared a candidate. This suggestion may reduce the number of independents if the number of signatures required is large, but not so very drastically and will certainly not change the present party position. Moreover, this will encourage large scale corruption and vote-selling. Besides, this suggestion is practicable or useful only in a constituency with a few thousand electors but not in the one with several hundred thousand electors.

Another step suggested is to ban the change-over of an elected candidate from one party to another. Obviously, this step, if taken, will help but only marginally and with great strain on the elected members' conscience and sense of responsibility. There is also a general support to the idea that more strict laws should be introduced for checking election expenditures and contribution of vested interests to parties. This step should be taken in any case whatever the electoral system. In fact, this and several other suggestions could be adopted to improve the present or any alternative electoral system. Even then, with all these suggestions implemented, the most important problem of fragmentation of politics will solidly remain through the existence of innumerable parties and independents in the political field.

The afore-mentioned suggestions emanate from contemporary European practices in one country or another. The general trend in Europe is to complicate the system because the simple two-party or PR system cannot reflect or translate the ethos of a highly educated and politically enlightened community, total climate of opinion, specialized interests and different sets of values. The adoption of a complex system does not worry the ordinary voter because he is educated and politically conscious enough to make an intelligent and a discriminating choice.

The introduction of preferential voting or alternative voting, the development of a list system and an elaborate ballot paper which provides useful and necessary information on candidates and parties, and gives voters the right to strike off or add the names they like, the separation of voting from counting and distribution of seats by complicated formulae, etc., reflects the desire to improve the quality of the candidates, to stimulate the interest of the voters and to democratize further the parliamentary institutions. These policies do not result in political fragmentation because (1) they come only as marginal modifications to a system which had remained stable and democratic for a long time; (2) western societies have homogenous political,

cultural and economic structures; and (3) the overall system remains highly streamlined and simplified so far as party balance is concerned. These new features of the European system, if introduced in India, will not improve the situation. Some of the features will unnecessarily create complications and confusion. We must look for something simpler but which also produces the desired results in the shortest possible time and without political breast-beating.

Examples can be multiplied, but we shall concentrate on the experience of West Germany during the pre-war and post-war decades. In the pre-war decades, the alternation between political fragmentation brought about by several mutually hostile parties, and the rise of authoritarianism as a consequence of that fragmentation, were the dominant features of the German polity. Instability led to dictatorship and the latter led to war; the ugly history of the two world wars does not need any restatement. However, after the coming into existence of West Germany as a *de facto* independent State, an era of remarkable political stability and strength as well as of balanced party position began and continues despite the extremely difficult situation created by the partition of the country, the pressure of chauvinistic and revanchist groups and above all the threat from the East.

One of the most important factors contributing towards stability and the balanced party position is the Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany of 1949. Unlike other countries in Europe, the German law allows political parties, by the authority of the constitution in clear recognition that the parties participate in the forming of the political will of the people, but with the express condition that their respective internal organizations must conform to a democratic process. This feature is not of a mere formal nature: it has the intent and content of giving prestige to recognized parties. Candidates are nominated by the parties 'who are thus the creators and upholders of the political will of the people.' (The pre-war attitudes of parties has undergone a fundamental change).

The voters no longer look upon the government as something impersonal and parties as something separate and a nuisance rather than as a necessity. The traditional mistrust of politics which undermines democracy has disappeared. A still more important feature is the imposition of two types of restrictions: (1) restrictions on parties which do not continuously have at least five members in the Federal or Land Parliament and (2) restriction on the secondary distribution of seats through an alternative vote to only those parties which have obtained at least five per cent of all the valid votes polled. The results have been

startlingly beneficial for a country which did not experience stability and democracy together for a long time. Parliamentary life became considerably simple and extremely effective in eradicating the entire basis of political fragmentation.

The voters offered their support mainly to three parties, the Christian Democrats (CDU/CSU), the Social Democrats (SPD) and the Free Democrats (FDP). In the four legislative elections of 1949, 1953, 1957 and 1961, the three parties gained 72.1 per cent, 83.5 per cent, 89.7 and 94.1 per cent of the total vote. It must also be mentioned that between 1946 and 1956, as many as 74 parties or electoral communities put up candidates at the Federal and State levels, but as a result of the electoral law all but 5 were eliminated in the course of time.

The German electoral law provides for proportional, personalized representation and is quite complicated in voting and distribution of seats in the parliament. But, as stated earlier, the trend towards proportional representation and deliberate introduction of complications in western Europe has been the result of a desire to make numerous small interests get some form of political representation. Yet, this trend has been permitted, and very gradually, only within the limits of such an overall, highly simplified electoral process as do not permit the proliferation of political parties or the atomization of political communities. It will be of little use for India to adopt proportional representation, particularly when the actual results of an opposite system have produced the worst features of the proportional system. There is an unmistakable and urgent need for the introduction of an overall simplification of the electoral system to reduce the number of parties.

It is not possible to recapture here in a few paragraphs the dynamics of the stable and successful German democratic system, which has also become an economic giant, in relation to the new electoral system. But, by way of contrast with the pre-war German situation, the most salient features of post-war Germany can be traced.

As stated earlier, German politics and parliament have come to be dominated by two political parties despite proportional representation. The electoral law has made it impossible for the parties of the extreme Right and extreme Left, which had vitiated the politics of the country ever since the first world war, to make any serious headway. It is true that some parties of the extreme like the communists and neo-nazis have been legally banned, but even before the ban was imposed their respective political strength was insignificant. Besides, the banned parties, as was expected, have reappeared under different names, though their strength

has not improved. The communists are functioning within the German Peace Party, and this party was able to secure only 1.9 per cent of the vote in the 1961 elections. The right-wing extreme parties like the German Party and the All-German Block were equally successful in influencing the voters.

As a consequence of both these points, the role of ideology, which was paramount in the days of the Weimer Republic and divided the nation against itself, has been reduced to only legitimate proportions. The growing affluence of the people has further strengthened resistance against violent and paranoiac ideologies.

The main contending parties and the mass of their supporters, conscious of the ugly past and their newly won freedom and economic prosperity, feel a tremendous stake in political stability and moderation. Voting has become a conscious act of political faith and a matter of active participation in the resurgence of new Germany.

The elimination of smaller parties and independent candidates, which presumably represented small interests, has brought the two main parties in direct contact and close link with various group, class and small community interests. This levelling tendency has forced both the CDU and SPD to project to the public not a sectarian but a national and social image by political absorption of these interests. Consequently, the old rigid alignments have disappeared. For example, whereas 76 per cent of the Catholic votes were polled for CDU in 1953, it dropped to 61 per cent in 1961. On the other hand, the working class vote for the SPD has declined from 75 per cent to 65 per cent during the same period.

A vast and efficient party machine has emerged for each party and it is in this fact that the organizational and institutional strength of German democracy lies. Germany is not a unitary but a federal State and its units have vast powers. Yet, the balance of power has not been upset and the federal structure not weakened due to the growing strength and power of the main parties. By contrast, the Indian Union has vast powers and yet this Union has been gradually weakened for lack of party balance.

In India, we need similar reforms to rationalize and streamline the party system. The Election Commissioner recognizes parties at the national and State levels if they get a certain number of votes, but this recognition is neither constitutional nor effective, for there is no restriction on unrecognized parties; the number of parties is in fact increasing with every new election. It is a meaningless extra-constitutional authority enjoyed by the Election Commissioned. For example, recognizing two splinter

communist parties, as recently done, does not help anybody, least of all the communists.

The reforms needed in India will have to go a little further than those in Germany, Austria, etc. In the first instance, the electoral law should provide straightaway that every candidate must be a party candidate and the party must be registered at least one year before the elections. There should be no such entity as the Independent Candidates officially recognized or otherwise. Secondly, if the party does not get a certain minimum percentage of votes polled—say 3 per cent in Parliament and 5 per cent in the State legislatures, it would lose the right of being represented at all.

These two provisions would materially stimulate smaller parties to merge with bigger parties of similar or nearly similar political opinions, and further proliferation of the parties will be stopped. Parties will compete with each other on more distinct programmes and policies. Parties will have to build their machines, cadre and organization etc., to remain as a live political force. Above all, with this elimination of small parties, a more healthy party balance is likely to emerge with a good chance of providing a democratic alternative to the party in power. Political parties will not be regarded as a nuisance and source of political corruption. The essentiality of political parties will be recognized and understood after a period of transition.

Once a balanced party position is crystalized, a platform would be created for the youth and the intellectuals—who are nowhere near politics today—to participate. The party in power will also be forced to have clearer policies, a greater sense of responsibility and a stimulus for greater efficiency. The Congress may remain in power if it becomes a more coherent and acceptable party and may also be able to deliver the goods. Or it may be replaced if it does not satisfy these conditions and the democratic process of alternative governments may be ushered in. There is a small but illusory loss of freedom to independent candidates and small parties. They can always remain, and more usefully, as constituents of a party if they so desire.

In the final analysis, no change in the electoral system alone can bring about a political millennium. It is a matter of how far the spirit of democracy has gone deep into the minds of the people. Voting is a mental and not merely a physical act. But a proper and suitable electoral system is of supreme importance so long as democratic institutions function and their prestige and respect needs to be maintained. It requires the full attention of the parties and all other interested persons and institutions in India.

J. D. SETHI

A democratic alternative

DEENDAYAL UPADHYAYA

INDIA is the biggest democracy in the world. The total number of voters in the Third General Elections was 216 million more than the population of the United States of America and one and a half times the total population of South America. The peaceful way in which the last three elections have been held testifies to the basic democratic aptitude of the people. The manner in which the succession issue in the ruling Congress Party has been solved twice in the course of the last two years has added to our credentials as a demo-

cratic nation. And the behaviour of the people and the political parties during the period of the Indo-Pak conflict has demonstrated the strength of our democratic structure.

While these positive achievements sustain our faith in democracy, we cannot lightly dismiss the sceptics who have been impatiently feeling the inadequacy and incapacity of the institutional framework for a democratic society. Right from the Parliament down to the village panchayats, we have

established elected institutions and the people do enjoy the right of vote to all of them. But the machinery which runs these institutions is still not there. The political parties, with no exception, are not equipped organisationally, ideologically and even psychologically to discharge this democratic responsibility.

The Congress Party has been running the government since independence, yet it still continues to behave as if it were a movement and not a party. The people, too, do not still understand and appreciate the need and legitimacy of political parties which are looked upon with suspicion and a politician, striving for political power is invariably considered a selfish man. The voter does not consider it his duty to vote. It is an act of favour with which he can oblige a particular candidate or party and in return expects considerations of various kinds. His expectations are so varied and vast and the failure of the ruling party so great that many of the voters are becoming cynics.

Desire for Change

It is most surprising that the more educated and the better placed people are even more disinterested. They discuss politics but will not take the trouble of influencing politics. The Congress Party, being in power, is criticised the most and therefore some infer that it is disliked the most. This might be fallacious and a case of oversimplification. But there is no doubt that people want a change. Even those who support the Congress would like a change if it can come about without their effort or without harming their interests. Not conviction but compulsion binds them to the Congress.

There is a growing helplessness. An alternative to the Congress is the need of the hour and a yearning of the people. How to bring it about is the question before the practical politician. It is to be solved in a democratic and peaceful way. Authoritarian alternatives are neither desirable nor feasible. They will do more harm

than good and might even disintegrate the country.

Past Analysis

If we analyse the results of the last three elections, the picture is not as gloomy as it apparently looks. Although the Congress has been returned to power successively with an overwhelming majority at the Centre and in most of the States, yet there are instances where it was displaced or came in with a very narrow margin. Even in the first general elections it could not form a ministry in the then PEPSU State. In Kerala it is reduced to a minority.

In the first elections, it got only 67 out of 140 seats in Orissa, 82 out of 160 seats in Rajasthan, and 44 out of 108 seats in Travancore-Cochin. In the 1962 elections, too, it secured only 144 seats out of 288 in Madhya Pradesh. In Goa we have a non-Congress ministry. These facts may not satisfy the impatient but are surely encouraging to the enterprising. One should not however forget that, except in Kerala, the gains of the opposition could not be maintained. Why?

Politics in India has developed in the people a negative attitude. All opposition parties and candidates try to exploit the people's anti-Congress feelings and many of them get elected. They include ex-Congressmen who leave the parent organisation just before the elections. Most of them have returned to the Congress, betraying their electorate. Even those who left the Congress as early as 1948 on ideological grounds and with the laudable objective of building an alternative party, have recently decided to rejoin the Congress. This has shaken the people's faith in the opposition.

Yet another factor which has adversely affected the growth of an alternative is the constant regrouping and division of parties. The S. P. and the K.M.P.P. merged together after the first general elections which weakened both. The two together did not fare better in the 1957 elections. Their

subsequent disintegration, reunion and regrouping has only introduced an air of uncertainty about their future. The Krishikar Lok Party, the Tamilnad Toilers' Party, the Janta Party, the Jharkhand Party, the Akali Party and other such parties have behaved so waywardly that people with a democratic conscience feel disappointed.

Straight Contests

The strategy of united fronts has also worked against the development of an alternative party. It creates confusion on the policy level, and gives a fresh lease of life to minor political parties. It is true that Congress has been securing about 75 per cent of the seats with only 45 per cent of the votes. But it would be wrong to infer that in straight contests, 55 per cent of the non-Congress votes would have been cast for the opposition candidate. All candidates divide not only the opposition votes but also the Congress votes.

An analysis of the election results shows that it is only in areas where a particular party is sufficiently strong that its candidate gets an edge over the Congress in a straight contest. Otherwise, the Congress candidate invariably improves his chances if there is a direct fight. In the 1962 Lok Sabha elections there were 17 straight contests between the Congress and the Communists. Of these, twelve were in West Bengal and Kerala. Of these 12, the Communists won 8 seats. In other States, they had to yield seats to the Congress.

The Swatantra Party had a direct contest with the Congress in as many as twenty constituencies. It could win only in six areas where its candidates were powerful personalities. In such cases, even a multi-cornered contest does not improve the chances of the Congress. The Jaipur constituency of the Lok Sabha had the highest number of candidates, i.e., eleven. Yet Maharani Gayatri Devi won with an overwhelming majority. Out of the sixty seven Lok Sabha

constituencies where Congress faced a direct contest, it could win as many as 42. If Kerala and West Bengal are excluded, it won 38 out of 50 such contests.

Yet another difficulty in the way of the growth of an alternative party is the existence of regional and sectional parties. Such parties exploit local feelings and temporary issues. The D.M.K., Maharashtra Ekikarana Samiti, Nag Vidarbha Andolana Samiti, the Nutan Maha Gujarat Janata Parishad, the Hariyana Lok Samiti, the All Party Hill Leaders Conference, the Jharkhand Party, the Lok Sevak Sangh, the Akali Dal, are regional parties concerned only with particular issues. These parties are not likely to take a comprehensive view of politics.

Independents also pose a great problem. Many of them are apostates. They not only confuse the issues but are a source of corruption as well. It is not unusual for shrewd politicians to set up Independents only to divide the votes of the opponent. There are some who do not want to reveal their party affiliation at the time of the elections, but later join the party. Most of them belong to the Communist Party of India. Although the number of Independents elected is not large, yet the number of contestants is considerable. Few exceptions apart, there is hardly any justification for allowing independent candidates to disturb the organised group behaviour of the voters and politicians.

Omnibus Character

'A political party' according to Edmund Burke, 'is a body of men united for promoting national interests on some principle on which they are agreed.' There are few parties in India and fewer candidates that come up to this definition. So far as the Congress is concerned it is hardly agreed on any principle except to keep power. Jawaharlal Nehru tried to invest the Congress with some ideology. But he failed. This omnibus character of the Congress coupled with a sense of impatience, helplessness and diffidence in the opposition parties has prevented the

polarisation of forces and the growth of an alternative. Most of the parties in opposition only intend to work as the lobby of particular interests and are not much concerned with capturing power. They would be satisfied if their counterparts within the Congress gain ascendancy.

It is too much to expect ideological cohesion or homogeneity to develop within the Congress. Its break-up is necessary for that purpose. Of course, over the last fifteen years the Congress has been gradually disintegrating, but there has been no dissent on an ideological basis. That will be possible only when the Congress is further weakened and it is challenged by a party strong enough to replace it. This will bring an end to the Congress and fresh parties will emerge. The Jana Sangh and the Communist parties will provide the nucleus. If, however, the Communists are debarred from misusing democracy for totalitarian objectives, the Socialist party will provide the nucleus.

Ideology

Ideology-based parties and policy-oriented politics are desirable, for they alone can sublimate politics and distinguish it from the game of self-aggrandizing power-hunting. So far as the present elections are concerned, it hardly matters. The voters are less swayed by ideological considerations. But an education of the people on an ideological and programmatic basis is necessary so that they are freed of casteism, communalism and regionalism.

It must also be realised that in a democracy there is no scope for ideological fanaticism. Too much stress on ideology will breed intolerance and may lead to authoritarianism. Moreover, a party which is in power or wants to be in power and intends to carry a majority of the people with it through their free will cannot afford to be extremist. Pragmatism dictates a centrist policy. Polarisation on a doctrinaire basis is therefore neither possible nor desirable.

The strengthening of party organisations is a must if demo-

cracy is to succeed. Almost all the parties are ruled by a caucus called the High Command in Indian parlance. Parties have branches, but they hardly function in an effective way. So far as the elections are concerned, they are managed and manipulated by village caucuses which belong to no party. The success of the Congress to a large extent is due to the fact that these caucuses in most cases find it to their advantage to support the ruling party. Political parties, if they want to be effective, will have to replace these caucuses by their own branches. Too much preoccupation with too many elections leaves little time and energy to organise the party, with the result that most of the parties are becoming mere tools in the hands of local leadership and the hierarchy of the various castes.

Regulate Functioning

If democracy is to be preserved, there is need to regulate the functioning of the political parties which are the working instruments of a democratic system. In the first place, parties which have no faith in democracy and exploit it only to subvert it should be banned. Hitler and Mussolini both liquidated democracy through democratic processes. Communists have everywhere utilised opportunities offered by democracy only to impose a totalitarian regime.

Parties which have extra-territorial loyalty should also be banned. Democracy must subserve nationalism. West Germany has banned totalitarian parties, yet nobody will deny that it is functioning democratically.

In the most politically conscious State of India, the existence of such forces has created a situation where democracy has ceased to function. If the communist challenge had not been there, the people would have evolved, in a normal way, a national democratic alternative to the Congress. The history of Kerala should not be allowed to be repeated in any other State.

In a democratic set-up there must be some arrangement for

communication between the people and the government. While the ruling party looks at things from the view point of the administrator, the parties in the opposition mainly reflect the people's reactions. It has therefore been said that in a democracy it is the minority which rules; the majority simply executes. This is possible only when the majority is responsive. If the ruling party is responsive, the opposition will become responsible.

The Legislatures

In India, the legislatures have not yet become the forum of fruitful discussion and consent. Government policies are influenced not by what is said inside the legislatures, but by what is done outside. Direct actions and mass movements hold the field. '*Ghera Dalo*' and '*Bharat Band*' have become the order of the day. The conduct of the opposition parties in the legislatures is determined by the needs of the movements outside. While mass movements cannot be ruled out, they should be conceived more as a means of ascertaining public opinion rather than as weapons of coercion. Since the non-cooperation movement, constitutionalism has never been our forte. The liberals were decried and pushed out of politics. Unless conscious efforts are made and the political parties decide upon and strictly adhere to do's and don'ts, parliamentary democracy will not succeed.

We have adopted the British parliamentary system which has been functioning on a two-party basis. In India, too, the emergence of a two-party system is eagerly awaited. But, in the near future, there is no such possibility. Steps should, however, be taken to reduce the number of parties on the one hand and, on the other, to adjust the governance of the country to the emerging party system. It might need changes in our Constitution and the adoption of conventions different from the British.

Suggestions have been made that we must adopt a committee form of government on the American pattern. A period of fifteen or

twenty years is not long enough to demonstrate the unsuitability of the existing system. Let us not amend in haste. But there is a point in reviving the Standing Committees; consultative committees attached to different ministries serve no purpose.

It can be visualised that no single party may get a majority to form the government. Instead of insisting on coalitions, the government must be entrusted to the largest group. A vote against any proposal of the government should not be considered as a vote against the government. Thus, the Parliament should rule and decide and the government execute. A specific vote of no-confidence should alone oust the government.

In order to provide due representation to various interests and to reorientate the castes there should be functional representation in the upper house. It should cease to represent the States.

Elections to the State legislatures and the Parliament should not be held simultaneously. At present, in the elections, local and State issues so much dominate the scene that national issues are hardly agitated for. If the personality of the Parliament is to be preserved and developed, its elections should be freed from the debasing influence of provincial policies.

National Parties

We have adopted the simple majority, single ballot system. It tends towards the two-party system inside the individual constituencies, but the parties opposed may be different in different constituencies. If therefore makes possible the creation of local parties or the retreat of national parties to local positions. It is, therefore, necessary that the parties must have a powerful organisation at the national level. The law must assist this process. The first Election Commission rightly recognised the parties as national and regional.

Since the last general elections, the Election Commission does not recognize any all-India party. Recognition is accorded on a State

basis. As such, there is no party which is recognized in all the States. The Indian National Congress is not a recognized party in Goa. This procedure instead of upgrading the parties has degraded them to State level. It has halted the process of the merger of regional parties into national parties. It has also created difficulties in the way of any extension of the national parties to new areas. This basis must be changed. Only national parties should be recognized.

A legal status afforded to these parties will go a long way in the polarisation of forces.

Improvements

The German system can be adopted in India. There is no harm if the Independents are precluded from the contests. A vote for the party, besides for the candidate, will reflect public opinion more precisely. It will also compel the parties to pay greater attention to their policies and manifestoes. It will help in strengthening the party machinery.

Changing from one party to another after the election should not be banned legally. But the political parties must adopt the healthy convention that in such cases they must face a re-election.

It is said that the function of the opposition is to oppose, to propose and to depose. If the political parties keep in view all the three objectives and maintain a pragmatic balance, a democratic alternative to the Congress will emerge in due course. It cannot be ordered from above; it must grow from below. It is not possible to unite the leaders; it is easier to consolidate the masses. The old leadership, having failed in the Congress, cannot succeed outside the Congress. If we can free ourselves of the temptation of a short-cut under the guidance of known names and, instead, devote our time and energy to the organisation of the masses, it shall be possible ere long to evolve a democratic alternative which will not only replace the present set-up but will be able to deliver the goods.

Amend existing law

ASHOK MITRA

LEVITY in political speculation is normally frowned upon; there is nonetheless a certain quality of soundness in the assessment that India is fast going 'down the Mexico way'. The external resemblances are indeed striking. It is now more than fifty years since the original Mexican revolution, but the political party which ushered in the revolution has refused to wither away and has continued to wield power. Outwardly, Mexico has a democratic structure. This has not however helped any of the opposition parties to make a serious bid for power. Groups have split away from the ruling party times without number; very soon, they have gone the way of all flesh. The charisma associated with the name of the party furthering the Revolution has been exploited with great success by the leaders of the caucus controlling it.

Whenever the sentiments of the electorate have swung to the Left,

the party too shifted its stance a little towards the same direction. When raising anti-Yanqui slogans were the necessity of the day, the party compliantly filled the bill. In the process, ideologies have been reduced to shibboleth. Even today, every now and then, the leaders of the party breathe fire and talk in terms of revolution, social justice and all that. Nonetheless, in practice the party is very respectable, very bourgeois, and, let me add, exceedingly pro-American. It has demonstrated rather convincingly that political platforms are an empirical irrelevance; whatever the formal 'ideological' position, actual political and administrative practice can be altogether at variance.

Despite the gushing eloquence of revolution and social justice, income distribution in Mexico is skewed to a degree which is really staggering, and this skewness has

in fact escalated in the post-Revolution period. The paraphernalia of the State has been utilised to provide, at subsidised rates, power and water and fertilizer to the affluent landowners, who have also been allowed to consolidate the holdings after the ejection of the *ejidos*. There has been a tremendous boom in private agriculture especially in the production of tobacco and sugarcane and grains, the benefits of which have gone almost entirely to the new generation of the landed gentry. In industry, some of the crucial sectors, such as petroleum and steel fabrication, are publicly owned. This hardly causes the industrialists much worry, their influence on the government is very strong, and, after all, why should one fret if the State wants to oblige by assuring the provision of economic overheads at cheap rates? For all essential purposes, the Mexican regime is one which believes in fostering and encouraging capitalism at home. In international relations, the Mexican politicians have to be a little more wary, and have to assert their separate existence vis-a-vis the US administration. But hard words spoken at international forums break no bones.

Important Difference

The emerging symptoms indicate that Indian developments are going to conform closely to the Mexican pattern, although in one important respect our crisis is qualitatively different. Despite the perversity of income distribution, the Mexican Government and the private capitalists have together been at least able to maintain, over the last twenty years, an average annual rate of economic growth equivalent to 6 to 7 per cent of national income. Even allowing for the fact that the rate of population growth exceeds 3 per cent, this order of growth allows the regime some scope for assuaging, even if marginally, the discontent induced by the prevalence of one-party quasi-authoritarianism.

In our country, on the other hand, economic progress has been

particularly disappointing. While till 1960-61 an overall rate of growth amounting to 3.5 per cent per annum could be maintained, the average growth during the last five years will not add up to beyond 3 per cent per annum; population must have increased by almost 2.5 per cent over the same period. This failure on the economic front makes the political problem very much more acute.

Nature of Crisis

The nature of the political crisis can be stated in fairly simple terms. The Congress has been in power since independence and its leadership has got used to the idea of holding power. There is a strong element of auto-regression involved in the process, and the factor of being in office has bestowed on the Congress certain advantages which make it extremely difficult for the other political parties to dislodge it through free elections. As with the Mexican party, the Congress has exploited to the full the advantages of being the party which led the struggle for freedom.

Given the added lustre of Nehru's leadership, the Congress could propound to the electorate at large that the movement represented a continuum, that 1947 did not represent any watershed in history, that the party which fought for freedom was also the party which was now endeavouring to bring about socialism and economic progress. Very thoughtfully, the party decided to insert in the Constitution the provision for adult franchise. The leadership was shrewd enough to gauge that the charisma of being the party of Gandhi and Patel and Nehru would have a greater marginal impact amongst the illiterate, unorganised mass, constituting the majority of the voters, than amongst the relatively more sophisticated.

The ruling party started out with yet another specific advantage. Till 1947, the Congress was a party without power, and the ecstasy of irresponsibility induced it to give vent to a jumble of idealistic outbursts; sometimes they were conflicting with each other; very often

major elements within the leadership did not believe in them. Thus the Indian people were already accustomed to being treated to declarations of policy statements and resolutions which did not have any empirical significance.

The trend has continued. When the ruling party today adopts a political platform or passes a resolution favouring socialism or the rapid expansion of the public sector or the cooperativisation of agriculture, the electorate in its sub-conscious knows that these declarations are not to be taken seriously. When the party fails to translate its commitments into action, there is no sense of outrage on the part of the people: they have been conditioned to condone almost any act of misbehaviour so long as the culprit is the party with the charisma.

Financial Superiority

In the circumstances, and till so long as effective political organisation does not spread among the working class, including the peasantry, the system of adult franchise will always favour the ruling party. The core of the Congress strength is in the countryside, where the boss-type affluent farmers are able to influence the voting behaviour of the landless labourers and the small peasants. The permissive clause in the Companies Act, allowing companies to contribute to political funds, has further tilted the balance. The bulk of the money which businessmen and industrialists have turned over for political campaigns have accrued to the Congress.

In recent years, the Swatantra Party has been claiming a share of the spoils, but its intake is still of a modest proportion. Since a majority of the electorate are either politically naive or otherwise susceptible to economic pressure, it is a simple task for the Congress to purchase the votes outright or, in the alternative, to influence the mass of the voters through catchy public relations' stunts which can be put up with money. If the parties in the opposition could be similarly supplied with funds by trade unions

and peasant organisations, the advantage enjoyed by the Congress in this matter would have been somewhat neutralised. But this is yet to come; the financial capability of the trade unions is at present severely limited, and effective peasant bodies are non-existent.

• Uneven Battle

It is therefore an uneven battle between the ruling party and the opposition, the Congress being in a position to use the resources provided by businessmen and rich landlords to subvert major segments of the electorate. And it can even subvert the administration. Where the democratic conventions are not adequately spelled out and the civil servants know that the ruling political party is unlikely to be dislodged from power at an early date, administration can get easily demoralised. In consequence, even the machinery for holding elections can be utilised to favour the party in power.

The latter, in its anxiety to maintain its position, might go to the length of using the very process of democracy itself to undermine the democratic structure. In case a majority in its favour exists in the legislatures, it is possible for the party in power to pass legislation suspending the provisions of the Constitution, and to pretend every now and then that the circumstances justify the continuance of this suspension. After all, Hitler's depredations in Germany got started with the suspension of the constitution of the Weimar Republic.

Our difficulties are aggravated by the adoption of the simple majority system for electing representatives to the Lok Sabha and the State Assemblies. In a simple majority system, the results of the elections will generally favour a party with relatively greater resources and this pattern has emerged clearly in our country. In each of the general elections, the ruling party has obtained only about 45 per cent of the total votes cast, but has secured representation in the Lok Sabha to the extent

of 70 per cent of the seats. The story has been repeated in the State legislatures. Already the opposition parties are in a disaffected frame of mind on account of the heavy built-in bias of the political structure favouring the Congress. If, in addition, representation in the parliamentary bodies fails to reflect the preferences and predilections of the electorate, the disenchantment can grow much worse. Up to a point, the ruling party can even gerrymander the constituencies to ensure that the advantage continues to lie with it.

Feeling of Hopelessness

A simple-majority system works best where two parties exist which are more or less equal in strength and influence. It cannot work in a milieu consisting of one big, domineering giant and several lilliputs. The type of developments taking place in both Parliament and the State legislatures would indicate that several elements in the opposition are reaching the end of their tether. They are being left permanently out in the cold, and therefore have no compunction in indulging in the deliberate breach of parliamentary conventions.

A very bad example was of course also set when the Communist Government in Kerala was removed from power in 1959. It is still an open question whether the stability and progress of the country would have been grievously affected if Namboodiripad was allowed to continue to function as Chief Minister. The Communist administration in Kerala marked an innovation in our federal structure, namely, rule by an opposition party in one of the constituent States. The Congress could easily have gone along with the experiment, and the extra-constitutional movement launched in Kerala for bringing down the State government could have been called off under the direction of the Centre. But, obviously, other considerations, including perhaps those of class interests, prevailed.

Today most of the opposition parties are convinced that there is

little possibility of effecting a change in government through periodic elections. The manner in which the declaration of the Emergency has been used to further the interests of the Congress has reinforced this skepticism.

Attempts have been made to put the blame for the existing state of confusion on the opposition parties themselves. For example, attention is sometimes drawn to the fact that not only is the opposition in the country weak, but that it is divided into so many little factions. This however proves little. The proliferation of parties in the opposition is not on account of any particular perversity of character of the opposition groups, but simply because the long spell which the Congress has been enjoying in our polity has acted as a great demoraliser.

Parties split up like amoeba, for the opposition elements know that the cause of the ideology—whatever it is—will not be affected by such splits. One has to submerge one's individual ego if one is to belong to a political party. Where there is a possibility that it might come to power in the near future, even those with a strong ego would submit to the discipline of the party. If, on the other hand, it is felt that no substantial difference will be made to the state of the polity or the devolution of power in the country if one disrupts the unity of the party, the temptation to assert one's ego is likely to win out.

Two Conditions

In my view, two conditions have to be fulfilled if parliamentary democracy is to be saved in the country and if particular elements in the opposition are to be restrained from taking recourse to ultimate means, such as anarchism, to satisfy their desire for responsibility and power. In the first place, there ought to be an unequivocal declaration on the part of the Congress that it would not use the appurtenances of power to shift the balance of power itself permanently in its favour, such as through

gerrymandering of constituencies and not allowing the opposition parties to form governments even where they capture a majority of the elective seats in the State legislatures.

Of course, a declaration of this nature by itself will not mean much if the temptations of class interests overwhelm the caucus leaders. But one can only offer suggestions; whether the suggestions will be acted upon will depend on the quality of the leadership of the ruling party.

Reform

The second major task is a reform of the electoral laws which could reduce to some extent the built-in advantages which the Congress is at present enjoying. My own preference is for a system of proportional representation so that the Lok Sabha and the State legislatures would immediately reflect the true state of influence of the respective parties among the electorate. According to one theory, such a system would accelerate the trend towards multiplicity of parties, thereby further adding to political confusion. But, even under a system of proportional representation, it is possible to introduce some checks and restraints to guard against frivolous political groupings.

I would suggest that, both at the States and the Union levels, 50 per cent of the elective seats should be distributed on the basis of votes obtained by the recognised political parties. A minimum proportion of votes cast will have to be obtained by a party before it is recognised for this purpose. The 'party' quota of seats will be distributed among the recognised political parties according to the proportions in which the electorate has voted for them; votes polled by independent candidates and non-recognised political parties will be ignored.

For example, if 5 per cent of the total votes has been cast for the latter categories, the apportionment of the 50 per cent of the seats among the parties will be on the basis of the proportionate dis-

tribution of the other 95 per cent of the votes cast. Such a procedure will discourage indiscriminate formation of parties and groups. After the votes have been counted and the seats apportioned, the names of the elected candidates will be chosen from authorised party lists submitted to the election authority. If a particular member decides to quit his party, his seat will automatically fall vacant, and the political party concerned will be asked to name another individual in his place.

The other 50 per cent of the seats should be apportioned on the basis of results of voting in individual constituencies. But even in this case the simple majority system should be amended in favour of a two-stage election consisting of a preliminary and a final round. If, in the preliminary round, there are more than two candidates, only the two candidates securing the highest number of votes will qualify for the contest in the final round. Whoever among the two obtains more votes in this round will be declared elected. While this part of the elections will not exclude candidates of non-recognised parties and independent candidates, given the fact that in the final round there will be confrontation between only the two major candidates, the supercilious elements are likely to stay out of the fray. On the other hand, if, despite these rigorous provisions, an independent candidate performs well in the elections, that would testify to his popularity in the constituency.

Necessary Recognition

Undoubtedly, many alternative proposals, resembling or differing from the system suggested above, can be presented for consideration, and it will be foolish to assert that any particular variant of the proportional system will be superior under all circumstances to the other ones. But what is *a priori* necessary is the recognition that the existing electoral laws need drastic amendment. Once this realisation comes, the rest will follow. The future of the parliamentary process in India hinges a great deal upon this recognition.

Is gradualism inevitable?

RUDOLF GYAN D'MELLO

THE multi-directional quest for solutions to our national problems is inevitable because of their seeming intractability. That one of these directions should lead to effecting changes in the existing electoral system is understandable. Did not France do precisely this—or more—with the establishment of the Fifth Republic despite the long democratic tradition? Has not the German Federal Republic shown astonishing results? Was not one of the British party conventions cited at the time of the election of the new party leader, ignoring that Britain does not have a federal structure. This tendency to compare with western nations appears natural because our present democratic structure is mainly of western import and our education leads us to think in terms of western categories. (Edward Shil's 'Tutelary democracy', 'guided democracy?' etc).

But, surely, this is a misleading approach simply because the essential problems, national conditions, temperaments, political attitudes, levels of education, the will to work, social values, are so very different. What is special about the new democracies is that they, being free from the legacy of accumulated conventions, can show surprising flexibility and capacity for innovations within the existing frameworks. The recent election of the new Prime Minister represents a major breakthrough in conventions, quite unthinkable at this juncture in Britain, France, Germany, the U.S.A., Australia or Canada.

The question which arises is how far is an electoral system the cause of a political situation and how far its effect? If over-simplification is

not resorted to, it would appear that cause and effect are inextricably interwoven, exasperating though such an answer may seem to be. Therefore, one must be on guard not to view problems purely from the heights of Utopian ivory towers. For, theoretical desirables have to be tempered by practical exigencies. 'Compromise' may be a perjorative term to the purist and he may substitute it by 'accommodate'. But some sort of adjustment process is inevitable in any kind of democratic functioning. But if the urgency and the acuteness of our problems force the rejection of parliamentary democracy, that is an entirely different kind of proposition, outside the range of the present essay.

Moreover, it is not as if our system is incapable of solving our problems or that we are wanting in right intentions or sensible policies. Our Constitution, for instance, possibly the longest ever written, drawing on the experience of several others, even incorporates a novel feature: 'Directive Principles of State Policy.' How much has it helped, so far? The intentions and objectives of our five-year plans are unexceptionable. But how much have they achieved judged by standards of per capita economic betterment?

Maybe we are searching in the wrong directions. The clue to our solution may not be in better intentions, institutionalised, but *efficient execution*. Why do we persist in ignoring what persistently calls for attention, namely, our lack of what might be called the implementational skills; the ability to do a job-assessment and to formulate the most practical solution needed.

Is this another legacy of the British i.e., 'of bungling through' or is it a part of our cultural ethos? Possibly both. What our cheerful bunglers overlook is that the British astutely covered up their underlayer of efficiency with the myth of an innocuous phrase. Our administrators seem to have got stuck with the phrase, and little else.

Concept of Efficiency

More than food grains, we must import and make our own the concept of efficiency. By efficiency I mean the capacity to do a given piece of work in the minimum of time spending the minimum of energy, or as the *Concise Oxford Dictionary* puts it 'the ratio of useful work performed to the total energy expended.' Apply this efficiency yardstick to any of our problems like social inequalities, food, education, family planning, and the answer is obvious. What our policy-makers and planners seem to ignore, with some notable exceptions, is this missing link in their reckoning. Maybe because they themselves are part of a culture which does not prize it and, therefore, cannot realize its absence in themselves.

Gearing to efficiency on a national scale is not going to be easy, because it means a radical transformation in our psychological make-up—coming to terms with time, space and matter and not keep regarding them as so many manifestations of *maya*, as our philosophic system enjoins us to. Maybe it is because of *maya* that some of those who occupy high places, ostensibly to serve the people, cannot see that more than half our total population is condemned to exist at subhuman level. They cannot realise that any system which degrades fellow beings to a degree at which the normal human personality disintegrates is positively evil, by any social code, and will not be tolerated for long, despite the powerful hold of the concept of *Karma* which rationalizes acceptance of any situation, however impossible.

It is not surprising that the poser article should begin by em-

phasizing the atmosphere of 'bewildering gloom and despair' and 'growing disgust with the way the democratic institutions work because a little more than a shadow remains of all the cherished goals which were set before the nation nearly two decades ago.' The need for a major surgical operation has been balanced by the impossibility of having one. However, the author seems to over-emphasize reform in the electoral system as a solution to our problems.

Restructuring Society

At the outset, it is necessary to examine what we are about; most of our problems can be subsumed into one, and depicted in its barest terms it is this: after two decades of independence we have not succeeded in restructuring society on the basis of social and economic justice. Or at the minimum, we have failed to provide human living standards to the majority of our people, e.g., according to the Economic Survey, 1964-65, the per capita food grains available today are less than in 1935-1948 or even in 1955-58. Over 250 million people are either undernourished or suffering from chronic malnutrition. Even compared to the other poor countries, the total food available for a person in India is only 3/4ths, and less than a third compared to the richer countries. It is the same story in housing, clothing, health etc.

Then, who benefits materially from the exercise of power which belongs to the people and in whose interests is it being exercised? If the present trend is not reversed and the minimum human needs are not met within the framework of our system, there is every likelihood that there will be a major explosion—an explosion possibly sparked off by the mass production of unemployed graduates. Kerala projected on a national plane. There may be those who wish to adopt the ostrich posture of the French Court before the Revolution. (Actually Marie Antoinette did not say 'If you have no bread, why dont you eat cakes?'—and what one often hears now is

worse!—but it is good apocryphal story that transfixes the reality of that situation.)

Alternatives

Changes then are inevitable, but can the existing political structure absorb them or will they smash the framework? Theoretically speaking, there are four alternatives;

1. reform through the present form of parliamentary democracy,
2. an autocratic or totalitarian regime of the communist type or a military dictatorship,
3. a communalistic, obscurantist, theocratic State as advocated by the Jana Sangh. (Back to the Dark Ages.),
4. antistatism based on total decentralisation as advocated by Jayaprakash Narayan or sundry anarchists.

The last two are not real alternatives at all because they are the kind that will lead to national disintegration and therefore fall well beyond the scope of this analysis. The real alternative then is the second, despite the several factors militating against an autocratic structure, such as the ingrained liberalism of our traditional culture; the impact of western liberal thought; the difficulty of imposing military rule on a country of this size and so on: but the pressure of economic conditions after a time may gather enough momentum to bring out the autocratic tendencies, which also exist in our society, thus creating a favourable climate for the rise of a totalitarian alternative, possibly after a violent upheaval. This may be the eventual fate if the necessary social changes are short-sightedly resisted by those who would now lose partially by them.

But the political history of Great Britain in the course of the last hundred and fifty years, to the extent that it is analogous, indicates the path of gradualism. It shows how the strong instinct for survival in vested interests led them to accept social changes when the conditions were ripe. Beginning with the Reform Acts of 1832-

1948, through the extension of franchise and other progressive measures, the 'Nightwatchman' State of the 19th century became the Welfare State of the 20th, with one of the best State Health services in the world.

The Congress Party

Our post-independence period has been far too brief and the problems far too vast for the impact of social changes to be felt horizontally, as yet. But, an objective observer cannot help noticing the tremendous spurt of construction undertaken immediately after independence to establish a base for the industrial take-off. However, critics and disillusioned idealists—and they may not be one and the same—both from the Right and the Left tend to blame the Congress Party for not showing better returns. In fact, indulging in facile blame of the Congress Party seems to have become a habit of mind as an escape from social guilt.

These obsessional anti-Congressites deliberately ignore the limitations of the party because of its peculiar genesis. They insist on comparing it to the contemporary western parties when in fact its origin is uniquely different. And just as men carry the mark of their childhood all their lives, so also parties are influenced by their origins. Moreover, the different political roles it has had to play has also had a determining effect on its character: (a) the winning of freedom; (b) the forging and maintenance of national unity; (c) national reconstruction (This it could undertake only after independence, a period of only eighteen years which is but a short span in its existence).

Moreover, in its third role it started encountering resistance within its own structure. This is understandable since in its fight against colonial rule it had developed into a national movement accommodating every possible section and interest in its fold. If the heterogeneous composition led to ideological weakness it facilitated the growth of a national sense. This national feeling arose initially in the small, westernised, mid-

dle class which emerged from the university education introduced by the British in 1856. The new intelligentsia began communicating its interests and ideals through the common English language and the growing English press, demanding certain privileges from the alien rulers. Gradually the party's objectives became more ambitious and, eventually, with the advent of Mahatma Gandhi, it developed into a mass movement.

It is to the credit of the post-independence leader, Jawaharlal Nehru, that he, like Buddha not only transcended his own social background but made the party transcend its own origin, at Avadi. And, finally, since the party managed to carry out a major political revolution through non-violent and constitutional means, is it surprising that it should seek to carry out the social revolution through the same means?

Political Reality

After considering this historic backdrop, certain political propositions need to be re-stated.

(1) Since the unity of India continues to be fragile (we are still not out of 'the dangerous decades'), it needs to be buttressed by a national party organization. As yet no other alternate party has developed this kind of organisational structure. That imposes on the Congress a role quite unlike its western counterparts.

(2) The reason why there is not a viable alternate party is because in a developing economy the logic of social conditions demands only one kind of solution. Since Congress has adopted this, no other party can provide a better alternative. Therefore, in the existing circumstances, the supremacy of Congress is inevitable in the foreseeable future. The other existing parties are fully aware of this situation as shown by their obsessional preoccupation with the affairs of the Congress. The PSP at its annual get-together gives top priority to Congress matters, in marked contrast to the sublime indifference of the Congress to other parties at its sessions. That is because these other parties are

really not much more than pressure groups with some of their colleagues within the ranks of the Congress.

(3) In a democracy, the ultimate power lies with the people which is exercised at the time of elections, and to the extent that they support the Congress, is a clear indication that the party policies have popular endorsement. Of course, there is a lag between intention and implementation. But by its very nature the verdict of any election is bound to be limited to very broad and general issues. Nevertheless, the voters, however unsophisticated they may be, are given a clear choice and they exercise their judgement. And in a fallible world they have quite a good record of making as wise a decision as the elites who rule them. After all there are no absolutes in this world at all—there may be in the next!—and any electoral system is but a 'qualified imperfection'. And the percentage of voters who actively participate in the electoral process is not much different from that of some western countries, despite the greater physical hardships involved, like lack of transport facilities.

(4) No government or party can ensure proper democratic functioning through programmes or legislation. That is up to the society at large. All that the government can do is to introduce standard democratic institutions like adult franchise, secret ballot, periodic elections, freedom of expression and organization, separation of powers and so on. Legislation cannot introduce other democratic prerequisites such as (a) sophisticated discussion of issues; (b) a net-work of interest group organizations and, above all, (c) virtue and knowledge. All these are aspects of the one and the same thing, i.e., the polity.

Conclusions

(5) The conclusion then is inevitable that, to improve our political functioning in terms of our social objectives, what is required is a multidirectional search for solutions. And even if a major change is not possible, certain mea-

asures are imperative if an eventual blow up is to be avoided.

The kind of measures which have to be adopted are varied and due to the usual limitations only the guide lines can be chalked out.

Representative governments to function well must attract the best talents to the highest legislative bodies. In order to attract these talents not only incentives are needed but a more suitable political climate has to be created. So long as the puritan ethic is demanded of our public figures, the political world will continue to be an alien and twilight world of shadowy images to the uninitiated. It is time we faced the fact that the sanyasi ethic is well beyond the normal human being and therefore leads to hypocrisy or alienates those who have developed a humanist conscience. And probably it is among the latter that the best material is available. Therefore the puritan code of life must be replaced by a humanistic one. After all, there is the basis of the noblest humanism in most religions and certainly in the best of Hinduism.

Specifics

Two specific suggestions well worth consideration are:

- (a) *choice of candidates.* Seats to the legislative houses must not be regarded as rewards for social service unless an individual has the other qualities necessary for a parliamentarian, such as high degree of articulation, general knowledge and aptitude for parliamentary work. The criterion by which the candidates are chosen must be made public;
- (b) a base of apprentice parliamentarians could be created by attaching desirable kind of young persons to ministers and other important political leaders. This base is necessary because at the moment talented young people have few if any step-ladders to power.

The increasing ruralization of Parliament and the consequent de-

crease in professionals as shown in the changing compositions of the last three Lok Sabhas does not augur well for higher standards of debating and parliamentary life in the future. Indiscipline inside the Houses must be firmly stamped out by the imposition of stringent penalties.

Educational Reform

Educational reform is a basic problem germane to the entire spectrum of our political life. After liberation, just as there was a radical reorganisation of the princely States, there should have been a major operation on the educational system (on administrative as well). The present educational system leads to the weakening of initiative, lack of self-reliance and a refusal to take risks. Job getting becomes the prime end. Until this is changed we shall not throw up enough entrepreneurs which are essential for a developing economy. Our society too puts a premium on security. (The marriage column advertisements of dailies are full of young women wanting husbands either in government services, the army or in well established firms.) As V. K. R. V. Rao points out, the present system must be re-oriented to establish better relationship between higher education and manpower requirements. For purposes of adult education, mass media like radio and television must be fully utilized.

Since a high-powered committee is considering the problem of administrative reform, I will limit myself to recommending a drastic overhauling of the administrative services to gear them to the implementation of welfare programmes. There is need also for decentralising the decision-making apparatus.

If ideological cohesiveness is not possible because of the accommodation of different colours, the organization must be streamlined by tightening up the nuts and the bolts and discarding the obsolescent. If ideological discipline is not feasible at this stage, organizational discipline must be imposed, specially on the higher echelons. Leading figures should not be exempt from such discipline

when they indulge in deviations from defined policies. Examples are numerous of even Cabinet Ministers making statements which are at variance with the stated government policy on Kashmir, Goa, etc.

At a minimum, new cadres of party workers must be trained to act as the hard core of the organization. In this connection, the most heartening feature has been the decision of the President, K. Kamaraj, in consultation with Shrimati Indira Gandhi, the Chairman of the Central Youth Advisory Committee, to re-organize the Youth Congress, to make it into a genuine youth movement by entrusting it to the younger people and by conferring on them greater responsibilities.

Power Centres

The shift in power from the Centre to the States, at several points horizontally distributed, plus the differential response to national problems like food and the rise of inter-State disputes, makes it necessary for a review of the present State administrative boundaries. The divisive forces which are operating in our country have not subsided. Below the surface, States and regions are still jostling with each other for national supremacy. A redrawing of the boundary lines would bring about a new equation not only among States but in power relationships between the Prime Minister and the Chief Ministers on the one hand, and between the Chief Ministers and the Pradesh Chiefs on the other.

The need for a national language is incontrovertible. Hindi continues to be resisted partly because it handicaps those whose mother tongue it is not, and they are the majority by a long shot. Perhaps a new language similar to Hindi based on Sanskrit will have to be developed. On this issue, Bhakt Darshan, the Union Deputy Minister of Education, recently made the suggestion for a new type of Hindi which would include useful and essential words from all the regional languages of India. This kind of Indian esperanto created by a

committee of experts in the State languages, would have the advantage, like English, of placing every one on par. Admittedly this will be a long-term measure with an unrealistic flavour, but what then is the alternative? English as the parallel link language?

The problems of population growth and food and other resources are inter-related. The former is more insidious and of greater long-term import. It must be tackled on a top priority basis. Otherwise the population growth will outrun the increases in national income no matter what improvements are made in the exploitation of national resources. A multipoint programme for this purpose is required which will include financial incentives and disincentives, old age social security measures to discourage the outlook of children being regarded as a form of insurance, social pressures, more tactful provision of medical facilities—and, of course, eventually, the overall raising of living standards.

Food production also requires a package deal and not just fertilisers, but land-reforms, better irrigation and quality of seeds, economic incentives through price and marketing mechanisms, credit and know-how facilities. A new national food policy is imperative offering, among other things, economic incentives to the farmers. In the long-run there will have to be an occupational shift from agriculture to industry in a larger section of the population, if there is to be greater capital formation, because the returns on land for given inputs can never be of the same magnitude as in industry.

Human Standards

A minimum income and a *human* standard of living for everyone must be clearly stated in the new manifestoes. No doubt new techniques and innovations will have to be realized. For instance, in housing we must mass-produce pre-fabs and geodysic domes. Without new techniques these problems will continue to appear intractable.

Our social values have to be restructured for the realization of

national objectives. This calls for special efforts by the intelligentsia both within and outside the immediate field of politics. Enlightened public opinion must sympathetically encourage what is desirable and discourage that which is not in the present system of values. These guide-lines are necessarily cursory and by no means exhaustive.

Summing Up

Summing up then, the parliamentary democratic system can be made to yield better results in terms of national objectives of all-round economic betterment, if greater awareness and response is shown to the needs of the neglected ones. During the social transformation period, the Congress Party will continue to dominate the scene provided resistance to change does not gather strength within its fold. Therefore, reform will have to come from within

Changes are occurring all the time, with a dialogue going on between the traditional culture and the contemporary one. Eventually, a new social equilibrium will be reached harmonizing the values of the two. (e.g., nepotism is a form of corruption to the moderns, but virtue to the traditionals.) Until then, the cultural conflict must not be viewed as a long drawn-out match of targs vs wogs—as some are facetiously inclined to do. For, this kind of attitude does not assist the process of harmonization. Even the Centre-State conflicts over language, revenue, food, are triggered off by the differential response of the regional cultures to modernization.

If, in the eighteenth century, India was equal and possibly ahead of western countries, today the sad fact is that we, as a nation, are way behind most parts of the world. The old images of snakes and elephants, maharajas and fakirs may have been replaced by socialism and non-violence, planning and non-alignment, but poverty and underdevelopment continue to be the dominant images. It is true that our best compare with the best in any part

of the world and in some respects are even superior. But this is an infinitesimal proportion compared to our vast reservoir of potential.

Two Nations

We are, in fact, Two Nations, a small section at the top living in the contemporary pattern and the vast majority underneath having only a glimpse of what life can be, but too demoralized still to try to realize it for itself. Therefore, the responsibilities on those who have the best is all the greater. And since adult franchise has not yet generated enough political articulation in the have-not section, the educated, the competent, the technocrats and the idealists will have to assert themselves in the power structure lest by default it is monopolised by the semi-literates, the incompetents, the opportunists, and the delinquents. A higher degree of political articulation should be demanded of our public figures. At the moment some of those who are not stuck on the platitudinous plateau jump from one cliché to another with the agility of a mountain goat leaping from crag to crag.

However, a new, post-independence generation will soon come of age and assert itself in the national life. Even, today, the demographic composition of our society has changed in the favour of the young. And to the extent that the new generation is aware of, and responds to, the needs and challenges of our society, will depend the answer to the question whether gradualism is inevitable or not because this question is still loaded with too many imponderables for a definite answer. Certainly, the election of a young Prime Minister represents the resurgence of a new dynamism, raising anew the expectations of the young—and of the older ones too—and rekindles their aspirations. Her exhortation to the young at her first press conference after being elected to the leadership, deserves more attention than it has received; work hard, be fearless, be adventurous. That should be the principal theme in the exercise of power for the purposes of national reconstruction.

The brokerage system

JITENDRA SINGH

THE Indian political process still remains to be described and explained in an adequate manner. The elite groups know a fair amount about the legal framework of our political system, about the vague ideology of social welfare which we have verbally accepted, about the diffused and contradictory goals which we seem to pursue in the name of 'a socialist pattern of society' (few talk of it much now), about rules of behaviour within legislatures and something about the Union State relations (how centralized is our system? and so on).

But, the game of Indian politics is being played differently from the manner the articulate Indian intelligentsia understands it. No one has as yet described the play of the game and the way it is moulding our political attitudes

and the character of our political system. We often find the curious situation where the intellectuals discourse on Indian politics at a diffused ideological level which seems so unreal to the practising politicians, while the politician's understanding of Indian politics is circumscribed by a lack of vision, indifference to symbolization or even to myth making. Practical politics is shorn of purposeful direction and the politics of the intellectual has no impact on practice. The chord of communication between the intellectual and the practising politician is broken and they are drifting apart and there is a lack of intermediaries who could weld them together in a meaningful way.

The usual reaction to this situation is two-fold. The first view

holds that it is good that these two elite groups are falling apart, for it is really a sign of the maturity of Indian politics. In other words, the politician knows best how to play the game and the intellectual should not interfere with him. The second view on the other hand holds that without the help of the intellectual the politician would only drift into purposeless, self-seeking activities, and that to play the game simply to win or retain personal power is not the substance of politics.

When we move from the elite groups—intellectuals and practising politicians—to the communication between the masses and the elites the situation is even worse. The politicians—for the sake of sheer survival—have maintained some links with their constituencies, although inadequate, while the intellectuals have not formed a professionalized audience to hear their view points (some of them are vainly canvassing politicians for support). The major strength of the politicians is that they have not become complete aliens to the people they represent (the desire to be a charismatic leader of the masses, fortunately, is no longer there), while the weakness of the intellectuals is that they represent no one.

Cruel Dilemmas

This has created cruel dilemmas for the latter and has led to a feeling of uprootedness and frustration among them. It is for them to realize that their audience is not the whole nation (for that would only add further to their frustration) but a small group of professional students of politics who would read them, appreciate or criticize them, and who may through indirect influence practical politics. When this realization comes, the intellectuals would stop searching for their identity among the masses. If they possess a yearning to join a political party—to the extent that they are effective and earnest, they would have become practising politicians.

The political problems which really confront us and which would

need painstaking research and study can be listed under three heads.

(i) The study of Indian elites, i.e., what kind of interaction there is between the Indian elite groups (specially in the field of politics)? Is this interaction leading to some kind of fusion or does the possibility of fusion remain latent and untapped, and what is the scope and rate of mobility between different elite groups and within the same elite group (i.e., both horizontal and vertical mobility)?

Ideology

(ii) Ideology for a developing country, i.e., how do we determine the question whether there should or should not be an ideology for a developing country? And what should it be? Are the compulsions of development so great that there has to be a consensus among the competing Indian elite groups about the kind of polity and development we need, or should the consensus be only about the form (the rules of the political game) and not about its content?

The real problem here is: how can we reconcile the contradictory tendency which on the one hand advocates ideological precision (in a climate of ideological vagueness) and at the same time remains numb and apathetic towards substantive programme accomplishments. This leads to a wide gulf between expectations and actual commitments to action. Ideology, in India, has often been used as a means of slogan mongering and for destructive purposes. The question is: can we use it for nation-building purposes?

Political and intellectual elites have not given thought to these problems. The former because they think that a heterogeneous party does not need a precise ideology, with the obvious general implication that ideology to be politically effective must be as ambiguous as possible; the latter because they think that ideology should play only a legitimatizing role in politics or simply create an intellectual euphoria that satisfies

but numbs both thinking and doing. We have not given attention to the question as to how ideology in a developing country can be a means of spelling out precisely the common tasks of development (i.e., what are the political and social implications, let us say, of a per cent or 7 per cent, or 10 per cent rates of growth?).

(iii) Organization for development and structure of public services, i.e., what kind of structure is best suited to achieving the set development goals at different levels of government? It would include topics like: the Union-State relations; (it is said that the centre is all staff and no line and is ineffective, while others maintain that it is too effective) the relations between the State and Panchayat Raj institutions (is there really an inbuilt conflict between them?, i.e., the more you increase the powers of the Panchayat Raj institutions the more you take away powers from the State); the relationships between Panchayat Raj institutions and the administrative hierarchy (is it the best arrangement for buck-passing?); the structure of public services at all levels (should the elite structure of public services and the preponderance of the generalists continue?); the autonomy and management of public enterprises; the relationship between politicians and bureaucrats, between bureaucrats and planners, between both of them and the intellectuals; and finally the emerging relationship between these professionalized elite groups and the masses (the latter would have to be thought of in terms of articulate interest groups whether they be caste, linguistic or professional groups.)

Borrowed Intelligence

Without adequate information on these topics—with little attempt even to identify problems—we seem to be acting and taking decisions in ignorance or throwing political suggestions on the basis of mere impressions, based on

limited experience or on 'borrowed intelligence'. 'Borrowed intelligence' deserves special mention here. We find some of the Indian political scientists imitating their foreign counterparts without fully assimilating the contributions of the latter or without understanding the relevance of their contributions to our situation.

They talk of 'socialization', 'differentiation', 'aggregation of interests', 'political and sub-political cultures', and then add a few details about India, and call this hash a profound attempt at political analysis. It is so easy to learn a vocabulary. We should instead use political, sociological or psychological concepts by seeing relevant interconnections between them, and through deductions arrive at bold hypotheses which are then constantly tested by rigorous empirical data, or from which we may extract guide lines for further empirical research. Then only would 'borrowed intelligence' become meaningful intelligence.

Explanations

For a scholar there is no escape from attempts at explanation and our political situation is crying out for explanations (not attitude surveys or prescriptions). If we do not know why a certain thing happened in a certain way how can we then remedy it. On the other hand, we will have to be ruthless towards sloppy, imprecise and diffused thinking from wherever it comes, but specially when it comes from policy-makers or political scientists. There is no way out to professionalization in the field of politics, and creating an audience that would appreciate professional contributions. It is this audience which would play an important role in moulding the future politics of this country.

In this article, then, I am going to discuss an aspect of the problem of Indian elites, i.e., the characteristics and role of political brokers¹ and the need to have

more of them in present day India. I start with the assumption that the political development of a transitional polity—like that of India—would have to evolve out of 'a fusion process'² rather than the 'process of elimination', and that this fusion would be brought about by these brokers.

Creating Intermediaries

The purpose of colonial rule in India was to provide stability and maintain the status quo in favour of the ruling power. The whole structure of governance was geared to that purpose. One of these fields was the conscious attempt to create a group of intermediaries who would function as brokers, communicators, controllers between the colonial rulers and the masses of the Indian people. Their problem was: how to create intermediaries in a traditional society which already had its traditional elites?

The theoretical solution was easy: uproot the traditional elites from their old settings, habits and commitments and mobilize these persons into new patterns of loyalty and obedience to the Imperial power. The very manner in which the problem was posed eliminated the alternative of creating a new and parallel elite group to that of the traditional elites (for this would have meant cutting the former off from the traditional society which they were supposed to control). The intermediaries were really to act as communicators between two culturally heterogeneous groups (the colonial rulers and the Indian masses). This meant that they were to be well versed in these two diverse cultures.

There was of course the dilemma that if the traditional elites were westernised they may lose contact (and therefore control) of their traditional groups, but if they were not fully westernised they could not act as effective commu-

nicators—and thus lose the whole purpose behind conversion. British colonial rule really asked for the impossible and by shrewd adaptation very nearly achieved it. They escaped this dilemma by creating not one mediating elite group but a number of mediating elite groups. It no doubt raised future problems of relationship between these different mediating elite groups, but until colonial rule lasted the problem was very nearly solved. It is in this sense we could say that the newly established brokers served the purposes for which they were created.

This process of creating new brokers may now be described. There was first the elite group formed out of foreign colonial personnel. The two important characteristics of this foreign elite group were, first, that it had total control and power over the territory it ruled and was accountable to its own men in India (the top hierarchy was completely British) and to White Hall and later to the British Parliament; second, it kept itself aloof from the masses it governed. This for three reasons: (i) by this means it was able to establish a sense of awe among the masses; (ii) aloofness was also necessitated by the fact that in the early stages of colonial rule there was little communication between the rulers and the ruled because of their heterogeneous linguistic and cultural backgrounds; and (iii) over this was superimposed (later) the idea of the superior race which further justified and perpetuated aloofness between these two races.

Subordinate Groups

To facilitate the task of governance, the foreign colonial rulers gradually established, through indoctrination or other material and status incentives, a number of subordinate groups who functioned as mediators (communicators and controllers) between the foreign ruling elite and the masses. Three such identifiable subordinate groups were created.

First, the traditional rulers and chieftains of India who in lieu of their acceptance of the 'para-

1. I use 'brokers', 'intermediaries' 'communicators', 'mediators' as interchangeable terms for the purposes of this article.

2. 'By a fusion process' I mean the coming together of different elite groups on the basis of tolerance and common understanding and the establishment of an identity between them and the varied specialized interest groups in society.

mountain' of the British power were allowed to retain the authority to administer their territories, and were also given certain status privileges (your highnesses, 21 gun salute). They were for instance indoctrinated into British manners through five Chief's colleges in India and in their later years through close contacts with British residents and other personnel who frequented their regular shooting parties (someday someone will have to play Proust to describe these shooting extravaganzas). The confirming of honours and property privileges immuned many of them from any tendency to revolt against the colonial power. If a ruler showed the slightest amount of disloyalty or a tendency to independence, he was quietly but effectively put in his place.

Distinguishing Characteristics

The three distinguishing characteristics of these mediators were: (i) that they retained a considerable stronghold amongst the traditional groups in the areas where they ruled (they knew the language of these groups, they were held in esteem—sometimes in reverence—by the latter, and they were far more affluent than the rest of the traditional groups they represented; (ii) they also imbibed the language, habits, manners and modes of behaviour of the foreign colonial rulers (through sheer imitation); and (iii) they were left comparatively free to deal with their subjects, so long as the law and order situation did not get out of hand. This gave them a sense of power and with it a loyal commitment to preserve the foreign colonial rule.

Here then was developed a relationship of a brokerage where a privileged land-owning class, which in lieu of protection given to it by the foreign colonial rulers, developed a binding, self-protective attachment towards the latter. The Indian princes helped the foreign colonial power to keep peace in their areas, and the latter encouraged them in this pursuit by maintaining the status quo in their favour. These brokers were then allowed to retain their traditional hold over the masses (often quite ruthlessly) while at the same time,

through indoctrination, they adopted the superficial manners of a Britisher without imbibing his culture or other intellectual refinements. Some of them remained true to their traditional culture, kept aloof from colonial rulers and developed a haughtiness which was self-preserving (e.g., the ruler of Dewas as described by Forster in his *Hill of Devi*).

Professional Administrators

The second kind of mediators were the professional administrators and the defence personnel which the Britishers created simply for manning the government (civil and defence) at lower levels. Education was to be geared for the purpose of creating this kind of personnel. Macaulay hoped that a western type educational system would help to develop a class of men who would be brown in colour but British in taste, manners and intellectual sophistication. He visualised that when that stage was reached Indians would become, for all practical purposes, like Englishmen and then the whole need for colonial rule would disappear (he had the missionary zeal of the utilitarians to reform the natives by changing their attitudes, habits, customs and manners).

For this purpose, Macaulay advocated that English should become the lingua franca of India, but the educational system actually created a horde of 'babus', well versed in the English language, willing to occupy subordinate positions with some authority and discretion to impress the masses and with a comparatively lucrative income to maintain themselves in some comfort. They were to bask in the reflected glory of the British Raj and some of the awe which people felt for government was to be shared by them, for they were the government at the point of contact with the masses. By their loyalty to the colonial power, they could rise higher and enjoy other privileges.

A few Indians were allowed from 1865 onwards to compete for the I.C.S., but it was not until 1923 that a major policy decision was taken to recruit enough

Indians into the I.C.S. so that by 1939 the I.C.S. cadre may have at least 50 per cent Indians. A hierarchy of administrative services was created (they had different names at different times; covenanted—uncovenanted; superior—subordinate; imperial—provincial, etc., and now simply All India, Central and State services) to allow scope for every category of Indian to enter government service and develop a vested interest in the continuance of colonial rule.

Government service eventually came to have a very high status in the mind of an Indian. The service provided security, prestige and power—the same ingredients which the Indian princes—in a different context—enjoyed more fully. The defence structure, with minor modifications, was the same. Here was another conscious attempt at building two professional elite groups (the civil service and the defence forces) which were to serve as professional brokers to the British government.

The Third Category

The third kind of brokers (but who did not function as brokers of colonial rule) emerged in a different way than what Macaulay had visualised. One of the unintended consequences of Macaulay's educational policy was the creation of other professional groups which later acted to erode British rule. Three of them need to be mentioned here: the lawyers, the doctors and the teachers. From these three professions a large number went into independent legal and/or medical practices or for teaching jobs (schools and colleges were not wholly government owned). Their income did not depend on government patronage, and it was not necessary for them to express their loyalty to the colonial government for the sake of maintaining a livelihood. This factor of 'independence' was a major consideration in turning some of them nationalist.

It is important to note that their education was not in any way different to that of the other professionals (civil servants and defence personnel) but their inde-

pendence' helped them to imbibe western values and rebellious ideas (for instance 'liberty', 'equality'), and the logic of these ideas made them bold enough to express them in the open. This was real westernization. The cadre of nationalist leaders was formed from this group. It could easily be seen that from the colonial point of view the nationalists had no functional role to play, but the need for professionals led to this other unintended consequence. The intention of the British was to create a professional middle class which would come to think that its best interests would be served by being loyal to the colonial power.

Some from among these lawyers—although retaining independence of judgment—remained loyal to the British government and hoped that one day India would achieve dominion status, closely tied to the British Crown in feeling, and sentiment. They were what came to be known as 'liberals'. The Indian National Congress was founded by a Scotsman with the support of these liberals—and its demand in the early years was simply to Indianize the I.C.S. (a professional's demand). But Macaulay had also considered that these 'brown gentlemen' would be the spearhead of western culture, thought and practices in India.

Westernization

Such men were not easy to create. Westernization (like Sanskritization) is a concept indicating assimilation or identification with a culture and values which are alien to one's own. It involves a set of common expectations and nearly similar responses to external events. These expectations get habituated and out of them acceptable rituals emerge. It would be wrong to cite the Indian princes as an example of westernization. Westernization ought not to be thought of in terms of accepting the viewpoint of foreign rulers, playing stooge to them or the process of mere physical imitation of the behaviour of foreigners.

The most outstanding example of westernization was that of Ram Mohan Roy or, later, of Jawaharlal

Nehru. They belonged to the traditional elite groups, were deeply nationalist and yet their conversion was complete. But this kind of mediator was not easy to produce—specially in large numbers—and therefore it merely remained a possibility, although both Ram Mohan Roy and Nehru did much to westernize India. The orthodox traditional elements have not forgiven them for this attempt.

The Tasks

Whereas the task of the first category of brokers was to maintain stability within their areas, the task of the second category of brokers (administrators and defence personnel) was to impose and execute the policies of the foreign colonial rulers. In India, the administrators also played the role, in a limited way, of agents of change in a traditional society. They were very often the only contact point between the agrarian masses and modernization.

These two categories of brokers, then, constituted two different hierarchies governing India through an indirect and direct rule respectively. Sometimes they did and at other times they did not work closely with each other. But both these categories of brokers during the British rule converged at the top. Their common source of command and control resided in the foreign colonial rulers. The masses were manipulated by both these categories to achieve the purposes set by the ruling elite. It is really the third category of brokers (the professionals, the liberals, and the westernizers) with differing intensity who acted as deviant, non-conformist groups and broke the hegemony of the three other elite groups, i.e., the foreign colonial rulers, the landed aristocracy and the functionaries of colonial power. The third category, then, functioned as new agents of change and in due course formed the new ruling elite group. It has been said that the British ruled India through Indians and were ousted by Indians and this is true.

The important thing in the study of brokers is the kind of support imperial power builds for itself

among the natives of a different culture, climate and history. The question is: what kind of brokers are needed in an independent and vastly heterogeneous country like India? In a situation of charismatic leadership, having direct access to and the support of the masses, there is no need for brokers. But, where the gulf between the ruling elite and the masses is great, the brokers come to play an important role both in the nation-building process and in the development process.

Communicators

This role in a modern, developed State is usually carried out by the cadre of different political parties. Elections on the basis of universal adult franchise, and between competing political groups, creates a need for political brokers to win elections. These brokers have developed fast in India. But this by itself is not enough. The problem is to create communicators between different elite groups and between them and the articulate interest groups which exist in our society. Communication helps increased mobility.

Post-independence India threw up a new ruling elite mostly coming from the third category of brokers mentioned above. The Congress Party contained within it a heterogeneous group of persons, some westernized, some semi-westernized (having different kinds of ideological commitments) and a large bulk representing different shades of traditional outlook. It was the unique contribution of Gandhiji that he fused all these diverse elements into the national movement having a common aim which overwhelmed all other differences. The manner in which he fused them for a common purpose is a story which needs to be retold by someone.

But, soon after independence, this heterogeneous ruling elite took over the reins of government and was posed with two important problems: (i) what kind of a political system should India have?; and (ii) how is power to be legitimized? Systematic ideology as such played a very subservient role, although westernized values were

incorporated in the Constitution. It is amazing that during the framing of the Constitution, there were no major differences (one could say there was unique unanimity) among the leaders of the Congress Party.

Much of the Indian Constitution is borrowed from the India Act of 1935 and to this were added some welfare clauses. It has been interpreted as liberal, socialist and even conservative (if we remove the Directive Principle part of it, which is in any case not justiciable). The real innovation was in the fact that universal adult franchise was introduced in a society where the majority of the people had never before voted their rulers to power. It made the people of India sovereign, i.e., the source of legitimacy. This created a new relationship of competition between different political elite groups, and was bound to end the unity achieved during the nationalist movement.

The situation—in a simplified form—was like this: the ruling elite represented the nationalist movement, which had the following of a large section of the Indian masses. This very nationalist movement developed a few charismatic leaders having direct contact with the masses. The charismatic relationship is always personal and eschews the need for any kind of brokers. The contact between the leaders and the masses is direct, immediate and spontaneous. These charismatic leaders were of great help during election time to the Congress Party. Nehru literally carried the Congress Party on his shoulders to victory.

Romantic Notions

The close relationship between charismatic leaders and the undifferentiated masses created two romantic notions amongst the leaders: (i) the belief that the only kind of contact which the leaders should have with the masses ought to be direct, i.e., personal; and (ii) the sight of millions of ordinary men voluntarily submitting to the power and influence of the charismatic leader created a certain euphoria in the latter which

led to the belief that the masses knew what was in their best interest, and that if they were allowed direct participation in their own affairs they would do the job better than any amount of competent functionaries (this was the basic assumption behind the whole process of decentralization).

These beliefs and assumptions of a charismatic leadership true to one situation still continue to be applicable to quite another situation. It is in the context of a new situation (i.e., where there is no charismatic relationship and no justification for the maintenance of the attitudes imbibed during the nationalist movement) that the role of brokers becomes important.

With the disappearance of the charismatic leadership, a new situation was created. The 'movement' had to be turned into an arena of competitive politics. The Congress Party is faced with the problem of maintaining its heterogeneity, the need to establish direct contact with the masses and develop the attitude that it no longer represents the whole nation which it did when it was the spear-head of the nationalist movement.

The Growing Rift

For our purpose, the real problem is the growing rift between the ruling elite and the electoral masses. The whole nation can no longer be mobilized by one or a few leaders. The party organization has already come to play an important role, and more so the decentralized institutions newly created at the district and below district levels. This for obvious reasons: the party cadre at different levels could only pressurize its top hierarchy to distribute patronage to get votes, but the members of the Panchayat Raj institutions, being both political and administrative bodies have the power to distribute patronage on their own. The State is nothing but a conglomeration of Zila parishads and/or blocs. And if the latter are given greater resources for development, they then also have the power to distribute patronage, and whoever is able to do that (in this changed situation) remains the political master. This is the main

justification of Panchayati Raj institutions, for in carrying out development tasks and in mobilizing the masses they have not done so well (on the basis of information which is available). It is this phenomenon that has made M.L.A.'s (and sometimes even ministers) in some States envy the powers of patronage of the members of these decentralized institutions, as well as seek the latter's active support to get elected. These institutions then are playing a brokerage role in the political development of the country.

Different Power Levels

With the disappearance of the charismatic leader(s) the political elite has also got diffused. The centre of political power has shifted to district levels. If we were to identify the political elite within the Congress Party we would have to consider four elements contending for power and influence within it. The first level is that of the Union and State ministers; (by themselves they are rootless); the second level that of members of the Union and State legislatures (they have to depend for support on lower organs); the third level is that of members of Panchayat Raj institutions (the potential power holders); and finally the members of the organization of the Congress Party at different levels (who seem to activate only at the time of elections).

Diverse kinds of elites are emerging at all these four levels. Their loyalties and attachments intercross each level. The situation is highly complex. There is a sharp conflict, for instance, between the governmental wing and the organizational wing of the Congress Party. Conflict is inbuilt in the structure and runs right down to the district level. But it is also an essential part of competitive politics. The one way to resolve the disintegrating effects of this conflict is to allow for greater vertical and horizontal mobility of personnel from the district level to the Union level (including interchangeability of persons from the governmental to the organizational wings and vice-versa). Unless this is done, the conflict will deepen the

rift within the Congress Party and also help to establish competing centres of power within the same party.

Fusion Process

Moreover, greater mobility between personnel at these different levels would be an important element in accelerating the 'fusion process,' i.e., allow the possibility for the westernized and traditional values to get intermixed and out of this fusion would emerge both national identity as well as modern values which are more important for nation-building and development.

The gulf between the westernized and traditional elites will have to be narrowed down and an attempt made to create different kinds of modernizing political elites. The new elite groups would have to be both Indian in background (i.e., emotionally tied and committed to India) but modernized in their values. Brokers well versed in both westernized and traditional values could bring these two elite groups together.

In a traditional society, education and contacts with foreign cultures are the two obvious ways through which the process of acculturation takes place. Attachment to one's traditions involves no acculturation. Westernization, therefore, is a much more dynamic concept—involving a certain significant break from the past. It is opposed to maintaining the status quo. Some people have called this process one of modernization, but westernization is much more concrete and factually correct. Traditional values on the other hand can help us to discover our past and give us a sense of identity and belongingness to our country.

This fusion has to occur in any person who wants to have an effective political career in India. We need such brokers. But this does not exclude the possibility of alienated westernizers, but their role now cannot be in politics. Westernization can be of many types: the experience of a particular kind of colonial rule, or the acceptance of an alien ideology, or the educational system modelled on

a foreign experience, determines the pattern of westernization.

There is no denying that in India the British cultural impact had the most powerful and lasting effect. It—to some extent—still persists in the leadership of practically all the political parties. The only two westernized ideologies which have had some influence in India are that of Marxism-communism and that of liberalism. But, many Indian communists feel more at ease discussing aspects of British culture or their experiences in Britain (with the proper accent) than about Marxism or the way communism developed in Russia.

This is not accidental. 250 years of British rule thrust certain attitudes and expectations upon us which in spite of political differences unites educated Indians as nothing else does. And yet education covered a tiny mass of the Indian people. The vast majority remained tied to ancient traditions, and the gulf was only partially bridged by the nationalist movement. When independence came, the value-gulf between the new ruling elite and the masses was wide and was only bridged (temporarily) by a few charismatic leaders. On this was superimposed a western democratic political structure, alien to the people, but which has reacted in such a way that it is helping to change the political attitudes of the non-westernized elite groups (specially at district, regional and State levels) and making them learn the new rules of the political game. They are gradually developing a vested interest in preserving that system.

New Orientation

How revolutionary is the doctrine of equality and how very alien it is to a status bound, traditional society? Or that of merit as against favouritism? Or that of interest groups as against kinship groups? Or the concept of the 'individual' and his freedoms in a society which only cared for kinship groups and community rights. The new westernized orientation can boldly be described as scientific, rational, functional, open minded, tolerant, adaptive, self con-

scious and self critical, mobile risk-taking with the possibility of visualizing a large number of alternative choices for this basic orientation may be linked to a liberal or social democracy or to a totalitarian system. People who are in a transitional stage (i.e., between westernization and complete submission to orthodox traditionalism) in the formation of new values are in the best position to play the role of brokers. Those who are completely westernized or traditionalist can never effectively play that role. In my view, then, westernizers are the path-breakers, innovators, trouble-shooters, alien in their own society (without which they cannot be effective) having either a direct charismatic relationship with the masses (as Nehru had) or having professional intermediaries with whom they could communicate their ideas to the masses (as in the case of Ram Mohan Roy) or the same communication may be achieved through the cadre of a political party.

The Essential Task

These westernizing elements work as the traditionalists, but the latter also have an influence on the former. The only valuable role of the traditionalists in their contact with the westernizers is to help to create a feeling of identity for one's own country among the latter. But if the westernizers—in this process—lose their other modernizing values they have nothing but this vacuous identity to inherit, which eventually means that they would come to imbibe traditionalist values. In that case they can no longer function as innovators and would only help to perpetuate the traditional order.

The creation of a westernizing elite is, therefore, an essential task for a developing country which is tradition bound but which also wants to modernize itself rapidly. The political parties as well as our educational system ought to give more thought to the creation of brokers, for at this stage of our development their mediating role is most crucial. In creating these brokers we would also be helping to professionalize our society, and make it more competent.

A pattern of dominance

RAJNI KOTHARI

EVERY society, in all ages, has had its inevitable prophets of 'gloom and despair'. In modern times, the practitioner of this craft has been called upon to answer to two tests: explain why things are as bad as he states, and provide a way out. In some societies these tests have resulted in a mature press and a scientific body of analysis, thus turning the articulate exuberance of the discontented into more constructive channels. In societies with less developed traditions of social criticism, however, the same pressures are met in a manner typical of the ideologue's approach to complex phenomena, such as by reference to a scapegoat.

For a long time this was Jawaharlal Nehru or the Congress; now

the tendency is to find fault with 'politics' and 'politicians' as such. As for the need to show a way out and an alternative to the present system, we are asked to behold the nice things done in some other country, and it is recommended that we adopt the same. The poser to this issue is a good example of such a line. Discovering gloom and despair everywhere, we are led, after a diffuse discussion of all the ills which the country suffers from, to a neat and simple anti-climax: the suggestion that things will start improving if only we changed our electoral law.

Political change, however, is not a product of simple reform in procedures. Indeed, the necessary condition of orderly political change

(as distinguished from simple disturbance in the *status quo*) is institutional stability; and the opposite is also true. And widespread acceptance and legitimacy of the system is a condition of both stability and change. What is important to note in India is that once the systemic outlines of the new political order spread out—socially as much as territorially—social change became more a function of political power and continuity in office than of intellectual agitation and 'blueprints'.

There emerged throughout the country a pattern of dominance and tension management that has steered through in spite of wide variations in capabilities and much social and economic transformation. Such an 'aggregating' of patterns of variance in political culture through the institutional device of dominance (in the caste system in society, in the party system in politics) led to a modification of ideological positions and issue-areas and gave rise to an essentially middle-of-the-road polity.

It is this gaining of edge of the *manipulative* component of politics over its *ideological* component which accounts for the political viability of our eclectic and plural polity—even when the tasks assigned to it are specific and pressing. Even the strategic and normative under-currents of political behaviour are under profound change and perhaps a new awareness of the essentials of an open polity is replacing the simplified expectations of a decade ago.

Emerging Trends

Under such conditions 'fundamental' critiques of the very feasibility of the system while interesting in themselves are nonetheless of little analytic consequence. The need, instead, is to direct attention to emerging trends within this system—which is yet in the process of articulation—and the critical problem areas of growth and functionality which prevent the system either from maximising its benefits or from drawing into itself new capabilities

from other maturing sub-systems of society.

A political system which has survived the strains of wars and successions, largescale internal political reorganization and massive transformation of economic and social structures, provides some measure of the consensus on institutional and ideological fundamentals on which the polity is being built and structured. Still in the process of extending its nascent infra-structure to include hitherto disenfranchised communities and tribes, and mobilising a time-honoured social system into the new framework of political integration, industrial growth and national power, it is not surprising that it faces a number of unresolved problems from the past, and that to these are now being added the pains of our development towards independent nationhood.

Psychosis

To turn our awareness of these problems, however, into a psychosis of impending disaster and then to ask for a panacea by importing yet another mechanism is to miss the perspective altogether. It is an approach which, while it fits in well with our natural tendency to intellectualise about politics along a means-ends dimension and in full accordance with a familiar abstraction based on a textbook model, it displays insensitivity to the much different historical context in which we are placed. Out of such rigid adherence to classical doctrines, we are likely to encourage doctrinaire leanings in our emerging political culture.

While the poser has an interesting listing of our problems as a nation, its effort to trace them all to the political process displays lack of empirical discrimination, while the corrective strategy that it proposes—electoral reform that would weed out minor parties and independents—is both too narrow to have a significant impact on the nation, and misguided in so far as it might have an impact.

On the other hand, the general discussion presented in the poser well reflects the prevailing peda-

gogy of democracy in this country and in the West: formalistic, linear and teleological in its grounding, pedantic and dichotomous in its presentation. Useful as a debating repartee, it is no aid in constructive social criticism.

The Questions

Two sets of questions are involved in this symposium. One of these relates to the contextual dimension of nation-building and political integration: how critical in this context are the classical assumptions of party representativeness and party alternation as essential components of democracy? The other set of questions relates to the operational viability of the present model of electoral and party systems as opposed by the proposed model of compulsory party nominations and a restrictive entry of political parties into the electoral system based on percentage performance.

The ostensible rationale for such an alternative model is that the greater the dispersal of the vote, the less the chances of an alternating party system to emerge. The assumption behind such a rationale is that such an alternation between discreet parties representing distinctive programmes and policies is a desirable state of affairs at the present stage of our development and that, on the other hand, small, localised and individual contests should be disallowed and forced to merge into 'qualified' parties. Only so shall we become a 'true' democracy and only so shall we also solve our several problems as a polity. Let us examine these contentions.

My position on these questions can be stated very briefly. Problems of politics are not grasped by reference to definitions of concepts and ideal types. Political phenomena take place in historical settings and call for empirically relevant categories of explanation as well as evaluation.

In discussing our performance as a democratic nation, we need to be sensitive to the peculiar national setting in which we are placed, our attempt to construct an efficient political community out of a diffuse and fragmented social struc-

ture, and consequently our paramount need for a framework of dominance at all levels of citizen involvement; while at the same time encouraging a plural structure of pressure, involvement and 'corrective' feedback so that the pattern of dominance does not degenerate into stagnation even while the general thrust is one of consensus, integration and political legitimacy.

Democracy

It is against such a statement of perspectives that our evaluation of the character of our State as a 'democracy' would follow, and our assessment of the electoral and party systems will be based.

The term 'democracy' refers on the one hand to a conceptual scheme of reference, an ideal type, and on the other to a scheme of classification according to which it constitutes a class of political societies which can be distinguished from, say, despotism and oligarchy. The class of actual political societies which is characterised as democratic, however, would not be structurally uniform, at the same level of institutional stability, and confronting the same set of problems. There is no single pattern of democratic societies, variations number of variations in the class of democratic societies, variations, ranging all the way from formal institutional structures to levels of socio-economic development.

Much of the confusion in social criticism on democracy is a result of applying the institutional criteria of one democracy (such as Great Britain) to other democracies; and, secondly, a result of confounding norms of 'democracy' with criteria of 'development'. Whereas we share some of our problems—such as adequately responding to various 'interests' in the decision-making process—with multi-party parliamentary political systems, we share our other problems, such as efficient implementation of economic goals or the consolidation of national unity, with the other new nations of the world. The distinction is certainly not neat, for one of the criteria of evaluating a 'democratic' political system is its functional efficacy in performing the tasks of 'develop-

ment' and an important measure of 'development' is the distribution of welfare and power in society.

However, there is little doubt that the political systems of different democracies differ markedly and that this is especially so as between the European and American systems and those found in countries like India. All of this should be no more than obvious; any political system after all can be but a result of the nation's cultural heritage, recent history, social and political institutions, and leadership during crucial periods of development and strain. And yet we so often and so consistently seem to neglect the obvious in our tendency to abstract away from empirical reality into standards of judgment derived from idealised versions of some 'model' society after which we would like to fashion ourselves.

In reality, however, each society constructs its own patterning of whatever class of political system it has adopted, and while it no doubt shares some of its ideological preoccupations with others in the same class, it nonetheless moves along on its own, responds to its own particular problems, and develops its own authentic structure and idiom of institutional behaviour.

Political Maturity

It is the first axiom of political maturity that we get less and less anxious about the operative system itself and devote ourselves to maximise its potential in providing us with a framework of confidence and efficacy in attending to our immediate problems and to give sustained thought to our long-range interests as a nation. Scholarship as well as statesmanship, then, ceases to be a function of new platforms and resolutions, educates the politically uninformed publics and elite groups into providing a perspective on the system, and directs both constructive and critical capabilities in correcting inadequacies of the present and preparing the society against future strains, all the time basing judgment and dialogue on a proper understanding of the psychological and strategic implications of the operative institutional system

through which all this is to be achieved.

We could deal at length with the 'inadequacies' and 'strains' of development referred to above. However, it is obviously not possible to do so in an article of this nature. I shall briefly touch upon them as part of my argument against tracing the origin of all our problems to politics and finding the remedy to them in what is a very small sub-system of the political system, namely, the electoral law. Before we do so, however, it is necessary to point out how thin is the factual evidence upon which the argument for the rise of an alternative to the Congress is based (knowing fully well that the poser itself provides little by way of precise data).

The Facts

There are three facts to be examined in this context: one that the Congress is not really popular among the people and in fact manages to continue in power on a minority of votes; second, that division among so many parties and the existence of a large number of independents are the root causes of the weakness of the opposition; and third, that if these causes were removed by enactment of a different system of representation in place of the present one, there will in all likelihood emerge an alternative political party with an alternative programme and leadership.

Presumably, such a change in electoral law will also bring about greater ideological homogeneity and cohesion within the Congress which is itself acutely divided into a large number of camps, almost corresponding to the plethora of parties outside. It will also remove the 'anomaly' of a ruling party based on a minority vote.

It seems to me that the anomaly mentioned above is partly a result of gross aggregates which only conceal the real measure of the dominance of the Congress which lies in the distribution of electoral support and organizational strength in the country, and partly due to a misleading *mystique* of the majoritarian principle. Bernard Shaw is reputed to have said once that democracy is a system of

curious arithmetic where 51 meant 100 and 49 meant zero.

Performance in Elections

In reality, a ruling single party that manages to secure a consistent support of around forty-five per cent of the electorate is a remarkable record under any system. It is only when we look closely at the evidence that we find that while the Congress support is distributed over the whole country, almost all opposition parties are in effect localised parties with pockets of support in some States, and even within States in a few districts. Thus, in 1962 only the C.P.I. and the Swatantra managed to get more than twenty per cent votes in any State (and D.M.K. in Madras) and even then in only two States each. Plotting the data on the basis of districts, and starting from the fact that the 'cut-off point' for success in an Indian election is around 35 per cent of votes, it was found that the Congress held fort in 255 out of 300 districts¹ in 1957, the figure falling to 243 in 1962.

Again, out of the total votes polled by elected members of Parliament and State Assemblies, the Congress secured, in 1962, 72.5 per cent and 62 per cent respectively of the total votes polled by all elected members. If we introduce another sophistication in our analysis and consider the *retaining capacity* of a party from one election to another in respect of the same seats, the Congress retained 287 out of the 371 Lok Sabha seats it held in 1957 (retention percentage 77.36) and out of the 2009 MLA seats held by it in 1957 it retained more than 60 per cent in 1962. The undivided C.P.I. scores the next in its retaining capacity which is around 40 per cent, with the socialist parties (together) trailing behind with about half of that capacity, while the Jana Sangh shows a high retention capacity in legislative constituencies but fails

to retain any parliamentary constituencies.

Again, contrary to the general impression, the Congress Party's performance in urban constituencies is about the same as in the country as a whole (72 per cent in the Lok Sabha and 63 per cent in State Assemblies in 1962) and the same is the case in constituencies with high literacy rates (Congress 75 per cent, 1962, Lok Sabha).

Similarly, plotting votes polled and seats won by levels of development following the classification of the Census Office, it is found that the Congress is better entrenched in relatively more developed parts of the country, and further that in more advanced districts the Congress position has been stabilised or improved from one election to another, a majority of its gains having been at the expense of the C.P.I. (70), the Socialist Parties (71), and most of all the Independents (143). The Congress losses have been in the relatively less developed areas and these have mainly gone to the Jana Sangh and the Swatantra Party.

There is one more illusion which I should like to dispel and that is that the Congress strength is largely based upon a divided opposition. A study of the straight contests between the Congress and a 'united opposition' in 1962 shows that the Congress retained between 50 and 60 per cent of these contests (233 out of 422 straight contests in State Assemblies and 43 out of 67 in the Lok Sabha).

Congress Strength

The upshot of all this is that a very large segment of the popular vote is in fact secured by the Congress, that a good proportion of this vote is effective in as much as it has gone to support the winning candidates, that even in better developed and more literate and urban areas the Congress retains its dominant position, and that even in straight contests the opposition is found to lose more than win.

All of this is not to establish the dominance of the Congress which is already well known but rather to

underscore the fact that its electoral base is both sufficiently wide and a result of a large number of variables that cannot be easily controlled. The conclusion is clear: it is only by erosion into the Congress vote itself, and that too on State-wide and national scales, that an opposition party or a party coalition can hope to change the present state of affairs; not by any manipulation of the electoral law.

As regards the independents and the minor parties, the problem is rather different. Until a drastic change in the distribution of electoral strength among parties takes place, thus affecting the very nature of the present system of one-party dominance, to think of the role and function of opposition in 'western' terms is an evident exercise in frustration. The fact of the matter is, that given the context of a developing polity, the need for considerable stability and continuity in political authority and in policies, and given the nature of the present party system which itself is a consequence of historical circumstances more than of electoral law, it is all the more necessary that our concern for the safeguarding and strengthening of opposition parties should take a form different from the usual notions of alternation in office and a choice between discreet programmes and ideologies.

The Real Problem

Indeed, the problem of contemporary India is not the dislocation of governments from power and quick alternations in policy but, rather, an opening out of the political system to include new social and economic differentiations, and a continuous management of the tensions generated by such an accommodation of new interests and capacities within the dominant framework of the polity.

This is at present done by the Congress alone and it is both unnecessary and probably dangerous to tamper with such a patterning of dominance, for the alternative is either a prolonged period of uneasy coalitions or the rise of a more authoritarian system of dominance. The former will place undue strain on the political sys-

1. The statistics provided in this article are based on investigation carried out for the electoral data unit of the District Data Inventory based at the Centre for the Study of Developing Societies, New Delhi. The 300 districts included here do not include Union Territories, NEFA and Jammu & Kashmir. I am grateful to Dr. Gopal Krishna for the material made available by him.

tem and the latter will prove dysfunctional for the growth of integrative commitments and balanced development.

Indeed, what we have to safeguard is the opposition's rights of free criticism, policy initiatives through the Parliament, and political pressures on the factional structure within the Congress so that the latter does not stray too far away from the balance of effective public opinion. In so far as it does stray away, it does so only under penalty of removal from office or 'direct action'.

Ventilation

If this is accepted, it will also be seen that the problems on which the ruling party is likely to be insensitive (as distinct from inefficient) are more local, individualised and group-oriented than ideological, national and policy-oriented. Hence the importance of the opposition parties, even of local parties opposing the Congress, of the politicized caste groups, of intermittent contests by groups with inadequate resources, and even of individual protests. The phenomena of a large body of independent candidates and of highly successful local parties and groups are precisely the features of a developing polity organizing and building itself within the framework of a dominant political party but at the same time keeping open various centres of protest and ventilation and various opportunities for criticism and debate.

In this respect, the 'independents' perform a useful function of sending up resourceful and often qualified and professional people who are not otherwise prepared to be labelled. In fact, an important political resource supplied by even national opposition parties is to throw up outstanding men who then become the watchdogs of politics. Seen in this light, the 'independents' too have a role to perform.

Aside from the national Parliament, it is only the Congress Party which provides a nation-wide organisational network and performs the essential functions of interest aggregation, integration between

levels, political socialization and mobilization, and the overall utilization of politics as an agent of social change. These functions cannot be effectively performed except through live channels of communications and participation and criticism of policies and personnel.

It is in this context that the right of forming political associations as well as the system of adult franchise, exercised at a number of levels and through a growing infra-structure of local institutions and autonomous centres of power and influence, become relevant. The details are different, but this too is a system with in-built avenues for political mobility, considerable leadership changes, a keen competition for power, and even 'alternating teams' of leaders, though here the latter are within the framework of Congress dominance rather than between different parties.

It is also important to note that the opposition to the Congress leadership is not as insignificant as it appears at first sight. We are too much dominated by the classical notion of an opposition party. This prevents us from seeing the strongholds created by opposition parties and dissident groups and sometimes even by independents in many places, the increased strength of individual opposition parties at the State level, the remarkable role they perform on the floors of the Lok Sabha and the Assemblies and in the committees, and, above all, their continuous interaction with factions within the Congress and with local interests and elites whose grievances and claims are often neglected by the Congress.

Developed Apparatus

All in all, then, we have already a fairly developed though not yet fully crystallised apparatus of power. This has developed a distinctive pattern and identity which deserves attention and study on the basis of the *criteria relevant to its own working* rather than some abstract ideas on the 'essentials' of democracy as such. That such a system has the possibility of fur-

ther fragmentation and possible instability cannot, of course, be denied. Indeed, if the Congress system in India is not further consolidated, this may in all probability happen before long even without electoral reform designed at weakening the dominance of the ruling party. If this does happen—perhaps largely because of a loosening in the leadership situation and the rather quick decline in charisma—we will drift into a long transition to another party system.

Two Basic Aspects

It will be seen from my description of the rationale of the existing political system in India, the electoral data presented above, and the reasons for my rejection of any proposal that tempers with existing arrangements for political competition, that there are two basic aspects to my approach. One is to argue the need for *patterns of stability and dominance* in a developing polity which has yet to fulfil its primary commitments to national integration and the mobilisation of vast and disparate regions, a varied economic organisation, and a highly complicated ethnic and social structure into the particular pattern of dominance that is found to emerge.

In India this is developed through a scheme of organisation in which the Congress at various levels plays a pivotal role. The 'system' is by no means stabilised, much less institutionalised in any comprehensive manner and is in fact sadly neglected in the training of cadres and their maximum utilisation in the communication channels and the extended organisational nexus created by a growing differentiation within the economy, the governmental bureaucracy and the traditional and modern segments of society. All the same, the Congress provides, through its organisational and parliamentary wings, the only available authoritative structure in this country.

My second point is that such a structuring of dominance patterns (through the Congress, the Parliament and elections, and the machinery of planning and government) must be tempered by a

wide diffusion of centres of autonomy, pressure and free criticism, if we were to fulfil the functions of social mobilisations, political participation and communication of needs, problems, aspirations and frustrations upward through processes of institutional feedback, leadership shifts and electoral manoeuvre.

Bases of Protest

The point is that these centres of local initiative must be very widespread, at least so long as another truly national party or coalition of parties emerges. Hence the importance of a multi-partied opposition, different parties concentrating their organisational efforts and resources in different areas; hence the importance of 'pockets' of oppositional influence and power, and also the role of individualised or group-based opposition as found in the existence of Independents, local political groups, 'negotiators' and 'link-men,' and minor parties.

In reality, the popularity of Independents is declining (the Assembly vote fell from 16.2 to 11.1 per cent between 1957 and 1962 while the candidates remained about the same, thus registering a marked decline in their electoral appeal; for the Lok Sabha the vote declined from 7.7 to 4.0 per cent respectively) and the appeal of minor and regional parties has also declined, and in many cases forces them to join a 'national' opposition party.

All the same, both factors are still important in the emerging pattern of opposition from outside the Congress and, as shown above, they also serve a useful function as bases of protest and pressure. The main point is that our approach to 'opposition' as a factor in government has to be revised and made appropriate to the systematic needs of our developing polity.

The various developments in the growth of the system of one party dominance discussed here and elsewhere (see 'The Congress System in India', *Asian Survey*, December 1964, for a description and appraisal of this system) and, of course, many other develop-

ments in the economy and the social structure of the country, have given rise to a great variety of problems and tensions, both transient and long-term. While the political system has achieved some consolidation and gone through rather testing times in the recent past, new differentiations in the economy and in community structures and new aspiration levels are also found to be struggling to bend the system further.

Often, however, this results in tensions which are irrelevant to the electoral system. There are also emerging wider issues in the ordering of elite relations between levels and in the handling of explosive public pressures. The first onslaught of a generational change in political leadership gives rise, in all politics, to a period of uncertainty and the time is inevitably exploited by perverse elements in party and society. If there is strength in the political-institutional system, this will perhaps come to pass.

Social Engineering

There are, however, more long-term issues and tensions which impinge upon basic capabilities of the system. A great many of these tensions are a result of a considerable lag in public administration and in economic planning and decision-making. They reflect the inevitable strains of trying to achieve a close 'fit' between processes of acculturation started off by urbanization, industrialization and education, and a limping and aging machinery of government which cannot cope with the problems of planned change and democratic politics.

It is these hard problems of social engineering for sustaining our organisational vitality as a nation that deserve close attention and study. They do not immediately bear on the issue of the symposium but are nonetheless relevant, for if unresolved for long, they could damage our political system beyond repair. The coming general elections may well show the extent to which the critical problems of our polity turn into unspelt 'issues' agitating the citizens of India.

Books

CONSTITUTIONALISM IN ASIA Edited By R. N. Spann.

Asia Publishing House, 1963, Pp. XII + 250.

Political situations have been so subjected to the arbitrary whims of individual personalities in the present moment of the contemporary era that the systems of administration in the newly independent countries in all their entirety are recording change like the uncertain currents of the weather. To talk

of any aspect of government management of the formerly colonial countries of Asia in the context of the conditions obtaining six years ago is a luxury heavily loaded with the possibility of losing much of the relevant meaning. The book under review suffers from some such inadequacy even though the text is of immense interest, academically speaking.

The papers read at a seminar on 'Constitutionalism in Asia' at Canberra's Australian National University,

concentrating mainly on the countries of Burma, India, Indonesia and Pakistan six years ago, are bound to be subject to the onslaughts of political events in this not-too-insensitive region on the globe. Regarding the situation in Burma, the seminar deals more or less with the polity around U Nu and his time, discussing in detail the Ne Win interlude. The Chairman of the Burmese Revolutionary Council has reappeared on the scene with his own concept of local socialism thereby changing the whole landscape of political administration.

The somersaults President Soekarno and his associates have taken since then have made chaos the only organised, easily discernible, constitutional trend in Indonesia. India, too, after the Chinese invasion and the conflict with Pakistan seems to be groaning under the forceps of the Defence of India Rules (at the time of writing). The situation in Pakistan is no better even though the 'post-revolution' administration has continuously given an apparent posture of consistency.

What exactly is the test of 'constitutionalism' prevailing in a certain system of government? The answers to this fundamental question are bound to be somewhat vague and even abstract. 'Can you meaningfully ask a lawyer what the constitution is?' someone said should be the appropriate test of 'constitutionalism' in a governed system. This seems to be a workable hypothesis. And in this light the systems practised in the countries like India, Ceylon and Burma are purely 'constitutional'.

In the initial stages, the liberated countries, specially those formerly under the hegemony of the British, adopted parliamentary democracy. So, at least, was done by India, Burma, Ceylon and Pakistan. They drafted constitutions, accepted party systems and went in for free elections. After a few years, many of them due to their typical political exigencies, had to switch over to other forms of government. Today, the phenomenon of the one-party system, and consequently even a dictatorship or army rule, is in frequent occurrence.

Due to the upsets of the parliamentary democracies, there was some academic rethinking regarding the success of such modes of administration in the countries still committed to it and the possibility of the return to the democratic camp of the governments thrown out by the winds of absolute power. An earlier symposium to discuss the issue was held as early as in 1959 in New Delhi.

In the present study, the papers made a deeper probe into the intricacies of constitutional situations in Asia. The discussion ranged from the role of the lawyers and courts and human rights to the interaction of the political viewpoints, modern as well as traditional, containing in its repertoire the role played by religion in the organisation of the States.

India and Indonesia have been given the major share of the heady wine that flowed in Canberra in 1960, probably because of their population and size.

Moreover, the amount of literature on the progress of constitutionalism in these countries should have necessitated this preference.

Editor R. N. Spann's paper, 'Notes on Some Asian Constitutions', is a generalised summary of the constitutional governments in the countries of the continent. A mere survey of some well known trends in Asia has been made; the examination of religion in the State's affairs is more inadequate than any other thing. The correlation is, perhaps, more deep rooted than it has been made to appear.

Indian problems of constitutional democracy have been discussed in quite some detail by V. K. T. Chari in 'The Courts and the Constitution in India'. It is a clear exposition of the development of laws, touching the various aspects of India's political, economic and social life. What, concretely, has been the role of the courts in protecting the citizens of the country under these laws? How far have their judgments facilitated the actual implementation of these laws? These questions were as vital then as they are now and should have been better answered.

The problem of communal minorities in the drafting of the Indian Constitution has been described well in its historical background, by Ralph H. Retzlaff. The conclusions suffer from some impatient jumps. In fact a scientific assessment of administering a multi-religious and multi-lingual Indian complex under certain constitutional stipulations is conspicuously absent.

Javid Iqbal of Pakistan seems to be one of the young spokesmen of the country in the intellectual world who substitute plain speaking for *Bhuttoism*, cutting more ice with some learned misinterpretations. He quotes extensively from poet Iqbal in an international gathering to assert that Islam has the germs of growth to suit any society and would be swearing by *Allah* that he was happier under the present regime than he would have been in any other system governing Pakistan. His attacks on some of the fanatical assumptions by his country's constitution are logical and carry enough weight. That Islam grants supreme power in the hands of the head of the State can hardly be a justifiable yardstick for the absolutism of President Ayub Khan in the modern world.

Morris-Jones, author of *Parliament in India* and a professor of political theory and institutions, has acquired some name for his critical approach to anything contradicting his own viewpoints. In his 'Behaviour and Ideas', he attempts to discern ideas which are essentially of western origin. Their importance in the political system of a country like India can never be over-emphasised.

The entire approach to 'constitutionalism' in Asia very often stems from the belief that in the West it is firmly established. But it does not take into account the fact that quite often constitutions have been abrogated in that part of the world. Dictator-

Communication

THE most amusing thing that we did upon becoming politically independent of foreign domination was to have given ourselves an expensive democratic set-up. We have all the paraphernalia of democracy—elections every five years, legislatures for the States, parliament for the Union and so on. But what is the reality behind all this sham facade? Finding that in the middle of the twentieth century it is not possible to have a monarchy for a country of this size and diversity, we have settled for one party dictatorship.

Traditionally, we are accustomed to authority and have lost our powers, if at all we possessed them for brief moments in history, of standing up against any kind of tyranny. Democracy is a totally alien concept to all of us. It is funny to speak of fighting for any principle or ideal because our lives are devoid of them. The affairs of this (geographically) great country are run exactly like those of the ancient Hindu joint family with all its inequalities, authority, deep, futile, stupid conservatism. If in the joint family we do not dare to disoblige the elders, in the affairs of the country we dare not disoblige either the politically powerful or the economically affluent.

Respect for power and wealth is a typically Indian characteristic. All that we care for is a kind of squalid, dull atmosphere in which to make our money and eke out a pittance of livelihood. We are security conscious to an abnormal degree. Freedom carries with it a certain risk of insecurity. Not all the constitutional guarantees in the world can make us free, for we really are terribly afraid of freedom. We just do not want it. If you cannot have any opposition inside of a joint family, what is the sense in having one for the country?

Individuals comprise a family, families comprise a nation. What is good for the family is ipso facto good for the nation. That is the logic and on the surface the individual is ignored, he does not count, his existence is not recognised. In fact, however, the individual does not cease to exist. He is very much there, unhappy, disgusted and simmering with impotent anger and hatred, making it totally unreal to speak of society and community in the Indian context. In a sense, the Indian society is not plural; it

consists of about 450 million individuals pulling each other's leg all the time.

In such a context as I have outlined above, elections can never be fair and free. The atmosphere in India is ideal for the politically powerful and the unscrupulous rich to join hands for feathering their own nests. Indeed, that is what has been happening all these years. The only redeeming feature about the Indian elections is that they have been held regularly since 1952. The elections cannot be fair and free because (a) they are so expensive that an honest middle class citizen cannot hope to contest them; (b) the Indian society is still so class and caste ridden that merit, integrity and the record of service of any candidate are hardly ever the criteria and (c) the people as a whole, fully educated, semi-educated and educated not at all, are just not interested in freedom or democracy.

People who have been accustomed to talking about 'India's glorious past, unhampered by fact or commonsense' (Dr. D. D. Kosambi) or those whose life's mission it has been to prove to themselves and to the world that Indian culture was and continues to be superior to every other culture in the world may hotly challenge all the statements I have made. But that doesn't take anyone very far.

The whole of Asia with the exception of India, Ceylon, Japan and Malaysia is under formal dictatorship of one kind or another. Even Ceylon has had an unsuccessful coup. So called democracy to dictatorship via different shades of 'guided' affairs seems to be a fairly well trodden Afro-Asian road. Political ills are as contagious as are some diseases of the body. What is now the fact of life in the greater part of Asia may become equally so in India tomorrow. The most baffling phenomenon in the Indian political scene is that few of us seem to realise the danger. Unless we ensure free and fair elections we cannot sustain a real democracy. It is true that individuals and parties fight elections to win. If 'winning' the elections becomes an obsession, then, one step more, and the conclusion is easily arrived at that to achieve the desired result any means, fair or foul, is good. And, after all is this not true of our elections?

It is sad but true that the press has failed to discharge its responsibilities all these 18 years of independence. The press is scared

or authority and the party in power like everyone of us. It has done very little to publicize, let alone condemn, even known facts of corrupt and unfair election practices. Ram Ratan Gupta, the Kanpur industrialist belonging to the Congress Party, was 'representing' the constituency of Gonda for God knows how long without any right whatever to do so. The less said about why and how he 'won' the election the better.

The methods employed by the Congress Party to defeat C. N. Annadurai in the Kancheepuram constituency in the last general elections are fairly widely known by now in the South. Very considerable money was spent in 1962, one is told, to ensure the *unopposed* return of a Congressman from a southern constituency who afterwards became a senior cabinet minister. It is anybody's guess as to how many Ram Ratan Guptas might have been and are in our legislatures and successive parliaments.

Once bitten twice shy. It is not always possible for the defeated candidates to have the patience, pertinacity, energy and funds of a Dandekar to establish facts before appropriate tribunals and ensure that justice is done. Even then, by the time the battle is successfully concluded half the life of the legislature may be over. And, again, is there any guarantee in Indian politics that candidates properly and deservedly put to shame like Ram Ratan Gupta will not re-enter the arena and, what is worse, 'win' successive elections? And a people who tolerate men like Ram Ratan Gupta, Patnaik and Biren Mitra, do they deserve any democracy?

An enormous amount of money has to be spent to fight the elections. The worst fraud is conducted in the submission of manipulated election accounts. Is it easy to assume in the Indian conditions, given the Indian character, that those who spend lakhs of rupees will not corrupt the electorate and may not expect to 'make up' for the money spent after 'winning' the elections? Solemn vows are known to have been obtained from the voters on the strength of cash and pictures of holy deities to vote for a particular party or candidate. Poor, illiterate voters are superstitious. Having vowed, with God as witness, they keep their promises. And, of course, the candidate wins. But then where is the free and fair election?

There is also the corrupt use of official position by the ruling party. Is there any distinction in India today between the ruling party and government? District Collectors go to receive the Congress President. Ministers so arrange their tours conducted at the expense of the tax payer to suit the party purposes. Government jeeps serve

well the interests of the Congress Party. But for the way (it is the talk of the town) the secrecy of the votes of the men of the police force of a State was violated, the State would not have its present Chief Minister. And yet they are Gandhi's children!

Even the staid and pro-government newspaper, *The Hindu*, reported as follows about a bye-election held in Dharmapuri in Salem District in South India:

'The Congress party men in their election propaganda told the electorate that Dharmapuri would be selected as the headquarters of Salem North District on bifurcation only if they chose the Congress candidate. They also said that a government college would be started at Dharmapuri by the next academic year' (*The Hindu* dated 13-4-1965).

The paper's caption of this news report from its Salem correspondent said that the Congress victory was a surprise to parties. And yet *The Hindu*, which advertises itself as India's national newspaper, did not make any editorial comment about this election and the way the Congress won it; which of course is not very surprising for we know by now what to expect of our newspapers.

Is it, therefore, any surprise that the Congress manages to 'win' elections? Apart from the power of money and the backing of big business which the party possesses, the magic names of Gandhi and Nehru are fully pressed into service. In the present context, no other party can afford the huge amount of money that elections involve, none else can make such corrupt use of government services, none else can improve constituencies before bye-elections, none else can guarantee permits, quotas and licences.

The real surprise is that in an atmosphere of such corruption a few opposition candidates also manage to win. It is to their credit that not even one of them has so far been disgraced like Ram Ratan Gupta. All this is reflected in the parliament. Take away Kamath, Dwivedi, S. M. Bannerjee, Ranga, Masani, Hiren Mookherjee, Prakash Vir Shastri, and what is left of parliament? The newspapers may find scarce newsprint to carry Congress speeches, but they cannot find readers for these speeches.

The tragedy in India today is the unholy alliance between the Congress and big business. The press has been merely an onlooker doing nothing about it all. And, as far as one can see, whether democracy can be a success in India is still an academic question. He is indeed a bold prophet who prophesies the success of democracy in India.

K. S. RAMAMURTHY

Madras.

ship, fascism, and one-man rule have appeared in Europe too. Except the countries like the United Kingdom and the United States of America where the administration has adhered to 'constitutionalism', the phenomenon has collapsed elsewhere, at times. Some consolation is there for the Asian countries whose hunt for a stable government is of fairly recent origin.

Anees Chishti

SOCIAL REVOLUTION IN A KERALA VILLAGE: A Study in Culture Change By A. Aiyappan.
Asia Publishing House, 1965.

Kerala is a land of atypical institutions. It is the first State in India which returned communists to power through the ballot box. It is here that the so called low-castes among the Hindus made the first bid for a modicum of human dignity denied to them for ages. It is the only region in India where the Brahmins legally mate with Sudra women. A land of classical matriliney and of adelphic and non-adelphic polyandry, Kerala has been a paradise for anthropologists. A research study on social revolution in the microcosm of a Kerala village was, therefore, likely to be a rewarding venture. Dr. A. Aiyappan, author of *Social Revolution in a Kerala Village*, has proved this by his authoritative and yet breath-taking account of Mayur—a pseudonym for a Kerala village—in a small volume of 183 pages.

The changes in Mayur are of such a fundamental nature that they have been rightly described by the author as 'revolutionary'. The wants of the man-in-the-street have multiplied fast. Whereas a decade or two earlier his consumption expenditure focussed on one major item, i.e., food, at present he hungers for a variety of commodities, say, for instance, toilet goods, tea, costly clothes, books, newspapers, radio and all the modern amenities.

The proliferation of wants does not necessarily mean a higher standard of living. With 1917 as the base, the wage rise till today has been of the order of 270 per cent to 500 per cent which has been more than counterbalanced by a rise in prices. The village-folk rarely take milk, for all the milk produced in the village is consumed in the tea-shops. Eggs, meat and nutritive food such as these, are taken only under medical advice. Such is the pressure of population on the slender resources of the village that one-fourth of the male adults had had to migrate to Ceylon or nearby towns. Many of the emigres settled down outside Mayur, with the result of a brain drain and loss of economic feed-back to the village, though it meant some sort of a *lebensraum* for the rest of the villagers in the physical sense. Those of them who returned to Mayur treasure their memories of the dazzlingly rich urbanism of Colombo or other principal cities visited by them and strongly crave for a variegated, fulsome life seen by them outside.

Formerly, the village lanes presented a spectacle of running brooks during the rainy season when the poor folk had to tuck up their clothes and wade

through the water, and the rich ones were escorted in hammocks. There is now a *pucca* road connecting the village to the nearby town. The road has wrought a revolution in the spatial mobility of the villagers as also in the nature and the number of their means of conveyance.

It is in the sphere of inter-personal relationships that Mayur has undergone a mass revolution. Time was when the landed aristocracy of Brahmins looked down upon the Nayers as polluting vermins who in turn looked down upon the Iravas as degraded beings. The Iravas, though themselves oppressed and suppressed by the so-called upper echelons of society, kept the serfs and Harijans (Vettuvass) under their iron thumb. Each one of these clusters of castes regarded itself to be inherently superior to those hierarchically inferior in status and, so, did not permit them the liberty of touch or propinquity for fear of pollution.

This status configuration, crystallised over centuries, was regarded by all—the perpetuators and the victims of social *apartheid*—as an ordainment of God. The superior weight of Muslim power under Tippu Sultan gave a jolt to this supposedly divine-ordained scale of ordination. Tippu Sultan humiliated the Brahmins publicly, awakening the people of the region to the rude reality that basically there was no difference between a Brahmin and a low-caste.

Naryana Guru—the charismatic leader of the Iravas—built separate temples for them, playing also the esoteric role of consecrating them. This gave the down-trodden Iravas a new lease of life and a fresh wave of confidence. In 1936, the Maharaja of Travancore State outlawed untouchability but it was not until 1947 that the temple entry for the untouchables had the full support and sanction of the State behind it. The passage of the Act banning untouchability in Hindu temples in 1947 did not mean a *fait accompli* for the Vettuvass, who for a decade afterwards played for safety by not exercising the right conferred on them by law.

Untouchability in Mayur, or for that matter in Kerala, now finds its hard core in the realm of rites and caste endogamy. There is otherwise a discernible move towards egalitarianism and equity in social stratification. While the Iravas of the North did not mix up with those of the South, there is now a feeling of solidarity and oneness among the two. Thanks to the British law and modern institutions, like the railways, schools, cinema halls, etc., where all are treated as equal, the bitter struggle for equality by the Iravas themselves and economic emancipation born of tenurial reforms in land, the members of various castes now intermingle freely.

Recounting this revolution in attitudes, the author says: 'Let me reconstruct the scene of Gopal's grandfather (an Irava), standing at a respectful distance of 100 feet, with folded hands, and tearfully pleading for mercy, and then threatening to kill himself when pleading failed, and let us contrast that scene with

that of the grandson. Gopal, sipping his coffee in the same verandah where the tyrannical landlord stood and glared at the poor tenant' (Gopal's grandfather).

In a nutshell, there is now little social distance—psychic or physical, vertical or horizontal—among the caste-men of Mayur. This stupendous change is epitomised in an Irava becoming the Chief Minister of Kerala and two Iravas, the Chief Justices of the High Court.

The political parties have made steady but successful inroads into the body-politic of Mayur. The Communist Party, the Muslim League and the RSS—all have their respective adherents who are ever on the look-out for converting others to their respective view-points. They, have cut across the barriers of caste and the 'we' feeling characteristic of a caste group. The old *gemeinschaft* relationships have given place to new *gesellschaft* relationships. The old norms of socio-economic conduct, dictated by hoary tradition, have given way to market values and democratic concepts of life.

Some anthropologists are of the view that the villages constitute a geographical fiction which is kept going by the myth-making nostalgic propensities of romantics and that they are neither the nuclei of power nor the foci of self-sufficient freedom. The book under review goes to prove that village Mayur is a structural reality. The village temple is a rallying point for all the village people and there is a trend towards increasing cooperativisation for projects of common good. The erstwhile constellation of feudal order which seemed self-perpetuating and ethically normal has yielded ground to a new system with equality as its spear-head.

Dr. Ariyappan is one of our most celebrated anthropologists. His micro-sociological study of a Lilliputian entity in the background of Kerala is a fruition of his earlier research studies, particularly the one on the Iravas twenty-two years ago. His account is gripping, for he has the felicity of expression of a fortune-teller. What he has written is a straw that indicates which way the winds blow in the social laboratory of our countryside. While there are many plus features to be duly proud of, there are minus ones too to feel sorry for. It is for the planners, psychologists, and social reformers to make practical use of what the author has so painstakingly brought out. The reviewer has hardly any comment other than a tribute to the author for his scholarship, objectivity and readability.

Hartirath Singh

GAON: Conflict and cohesion in an Indian village

By Henry Orenstein.

Princeton University Press, 1965, 68s.

EMERGING PATTERNS OF RURAL LEADERSHIP IN SOUTHERN ASIA.

National Institute of Community Development, Hyderabad.

The picture of the Indian village, passively acquiescing in its long-suffering existence, indifferent to happenings in the world outside, has changed. Of late, the Indian village has been receiving a great

deal of attention, whether from indigenous Development and Community Project officials, or specialists from outside. The former tell the people how to plant their crops and plan their families; the latter ask personal, inquisitive-sounding questions about themselves, their families and their neighbours. The villager generally gives the kind of reply he thinks the interrogator wants to hear, and reserves his genuine comments for those in whom he has confidence. Under these handicaps, most village studies, at best, are superficial, and *Gaon* is no exception.

Gaon means village, and Professor Orenstein has chosen this unnamed village not far from Poona for his studies in village conflict and cohesion. Orenstein has painstakingly tabulated detailed information about kinship, family structure, endogamous and exogamous groups, religious practices, caste relations and changing patterns of life in the village. Orenstein has not utilised this data to draw inferences about the origins or earlier forms of caste and kinship in the region. He seems to think he has done his duty and fulfilled his mission when he draws up an index of relationships within the kinship group.

As in many Maharashtrian villages, the caste structure of the people in *Gaon* is effected in the caste hierarchy of its village deities. The more recent deities, those of the ruling classes, have Brahmin priests and are housed in regular temples, generally in the Brahmin localities, while '...a celibate priest called *Gosavi* (who) served in the Data temple on the farms of *Gaon*.' The older deities like *Mariai*, the small-pox goddess, had their temples in the Harijan section. *Maruti*, a very popular god in Maharashtra, had a temple to himself, in his own right, and not as a servant of Rama. Similar points would arouse the curiosity of any interested observer, but the professional anthropologist studying the village does not think these avenues worth exploring. He is indifferent even to the primitive shrines within his demarcated field of study. 'Scattered throughout the area of the main settlement were many shrines and small "temples"—some consisting of stones daubed with red colouring, one being a circle of white painted stones around a larger, carved one, and others, statuettes of gods in tiny "houses" of their own.' The matter is then dropped and Orenstein starts counting the number of schools in *Gaon*.

Like many other Indian villages, *Gaon* too holds a village goddess festival every year. They honour *Mariai*, the goddess of small-pox, something they all fear. The festival is called the *Ambil Ghughriya* ceremony, and one of its unusual features it noted by Orenstein. '...a man who was regularly "possessed" by a goddess, always trampled the sacred fire (hom) in the *Devi* temple.' Orenstein echoes the narrow-minded views of a village leader and dubs this as an 'objectionable performance.' One would think that to an anthropologist, stamping out a sacred fire would be a vestige of some older ritual from the forgotten past, a clue well worth following up.

Orenstein seems to have got on well with the village leaders. He had a *Satyanarayan puja* in his house—a 'good luck' ceremony he calls it—yet, un-

professionally he evinces no interest in the origin or earlier forms or reasons for holding the ceremony. He seems to have wanted to test the village leaders' progressive attitude in accepting sweets from a scavenger.

Village leadership is another question Orenstein studies in this book. He divides his village leaders into two categories, one 'active', the other 'passive,' giving the qualifications needed for both. He realises that caste plays an important role in building up leadership by providing the potential village leader with a loyal following. Though the caste basis holds true in most cases, Orenstein admits that Congress Party workers broke through caste taboos in 1942 during the Quit India movement.

Orenstein has underplayed many important influences in his study of Gaon. The role of industries in drawing away landless labour is slurred over. While talking of the break-up of large families, he mentions 'economic conditions' as one cause among others, giving no further details. Any unimaginative official could tabulate information—it is for the anthropologist to try to get to the root of social practices. The book is full of anecdotes, some of which are amusing. It also contains photographs, most of which miss the point. In this book, answers fit the neat, pigeon-hole questions. Only, tidy solutions lead one nowhere. An anthropology study asks more questions than it answers, and that is where this fails.

The other book is on patterns of village leadership in underdeveloped Asian countries which seem to have aroused the interest of the United Nations. So, Unesco research teams were deputed to study rural leadership in South Asian countries, and India, Pakistan, Indonesia and the Philippines were chosen for the experiment. Whether to ensure the kind of results they wanted, or for some other reason, Unesco also gave these research teams tips on how to 'manufacture leadership.'

But what would happen if Unesco research produced one kind of leadership and events another? History has churned up a number of unknown leaders in time of need, and sloughed off the old leadership when found to be superfluous. The waves did not obey King Canute, nor are events likely to obey leaders—even those with the Unesco stamp on them.

One puts down this book with a feeling of disappointment. If only this world organisation were to take as much interest in constructive planning programmes for underdeveloped countries as it does in such futile studies, it would be a concrete step to improve the economic, social and cultural life of the people—and that, after all, is its *raison d'être*.

Kusum Madgavkar

REORIENTATIONS: Studies on Asia in Transition

By Hugh Tinker.

Oxford University Press, Bombay, 1965.

Reorientations is one of those books which authors having 'arrived' find it most convenient to

publish by a random selection of their earlier works. There is no harm in adding 'one more' to the list of one's publications, even if it be, what Tinker calls, 'putting together some occasional pieces and calling the compilation a book.' But when on the basis of such a 'compilation' the author begins to imagine himself a 'pioneer' in the field of 'Asian studies', one cannot but feel concerned for the harm his 'ego' is doing to his intellectual potentialities.

His 'think-pieces', as he calls them are the fleeting reflections of a sight-seer who has to see every object of curiosity, form his impressions in haste and talk about them with the authority of an expert. They are neither deep nor original. A prelude is, therefore, essential to explain their importance and place 'in the development of a literature of Asian studies' and why he considers it essential to reiterate them.

'The present volume arises', he writes, because of his belief that, 'he has occupied a peculiarly fortunate position on the side-lines, during a period when the transformation of Asia, and the techniques for measuring and recording this transformation, have been going through a phase of exceptional significance.' The emphasis is not on the events as such but on his having a position on the 'side-lines' and watching the events from there. To be able to secure a place on the 'side-lines' may be a fortunate thing, but it does not follow that by sitting there one necessarily gains a better perspective of the political events than by watching them from the centre or from any other point. A place on the 'side-lines' has its own hazards. The onlooker may well be lured away by the side-attractions as, for instance, in the case of Tinker, by the idea that 'the British rule in India was always more Indian than British.'

The example which he gives to substantiate this view is 'an account of an interview with the chief secretary of Punjab, Mr. Akhtar Hussain, who still keeps upon his walls the fading photographs of his British mid-Victorian predecessors'. A splendid example, no doubt, but rather far-fetched to support his notions about the British rule in India. If conclusions could be reached that easily, the history of all foreign dominations would have to be re-written from the point of view of its being more nationalistic than impersonalistic. A 'fading photograph' of the ex-rulers is not a rare object, not a piece of antiquity to be found only in the museum of a liberated nation.

Tinker is, however, not concerned with the history of foreign dominations in Asia or elsewhere. His 'think-pieces' are primarily intended to portray the many faces of the emerging Asia; its personalities and politics, cities and communities, races and racial expressions. In his essay, *India Today: A Nation in Making or Breaking*, he reviews a large number of studies on Indian politics, mainly those written by western scholars—Morris-Jones, R. L. Park, I Tinker, Seling S. Harrison, Overstreet and Windmiller, Rostow, Barbara Ward, etc.

The faces portrayed here are those which show how India as a nation is breaking down. The prob-

lems are numerous which 'no external influence can resolve'. The forces of 'caste and faction are nowhere declining'. Rather, 'men are becoming more conscious of their caste-ties'. There is 'an obvious lacuna in leadership and political institutions'. The growth of 'an all-India consciousness is restricted to the Anglicised upper middle class'. 'India is also miserably poor'. Added to this, there is the 'uneasy relationship with Pakistan' and the 'enigma of China's intentions along her southern border'.

Briefly, this is the shape of *India Today* as he sees it from his seat 'on the side-lines'. Some of the problems noted by the author are, no doubt, valid and difficult to resolve. But the picture drawn by him is neither complete nor as gloomy as he seems to think. His assessment of the 'infra-structure of Indian politics' is also not correct. The 'forces of caste and faction' do exist in Indian society, but not the way he sees them. The caste system as it exists now is not the same as it existed earlier. Yet, whenever a western scholar talks of Indian society or its politics, he immediately begins to see a caste-ridden society, an old leviathan stretching its paws in all directions. Unfortunately, their counterparts in India, the social scientists, commit the same mistake and help popularising a view which is neither objective nor scholarly.

Under the increasing pressure of various kinds of social and political influences—social reform movements, welfare measures, economic growth, intensive political struggle for independence followed by the adoption of a parliamentary system of democracy, the constitution of panchayat institutions, the compulsions of power politics and the politics of elections, etc.—the caste system in India has considerably changed. It now exists not so much as a social institution of the old type but as a modified and politically convenient institution for the pursuit of political gains and alignment of factions in the democratic sense of the term. At the social plane it exists primarily as an institution for the observance of the codes of Hindu marriage. Even here the hold of the institution is progressively declining.

In short, it is the infra-structure of Indian politics which is affecting and corroding the caste system and not the other way round. This is a great change—a change which is least appreciated by the students of Indian politics and sociology. As an example, the place of the Brahmin and the successful politician in social gatherings may be considered. Earlier, in such a gathering the Brahmin or a person belonging to a higher caste had an important place. He was the guest of honour, a man whose very presence elated the pride and the status of the host. The Brahmin has now been replaced by the successful politician—a minister, a member of the parliament or of the legislative assembly, a local politician, any one wielding some political power.

So long as the politician is in power, he need not be 'conscious' of his caste. At the time of elections, if his 'caste-ties' assume importance, it is not because

of his being a high or a low caste person but because of the fact that he has to poll the majority votes by winning over the support of those who constitute the majority. The 'caste-ties' perpetuated by marriage and family relations provide him the opportunity to secure this end. The caste whose support has to be won need not be the high-caste Brahmin. It may be high or low, an alignment between high and low castes—Brahmins and scheduled castes, Aggarwals and Misras, Srivastavas and Namboodirpads—or even an alignment of Hindus and Muslims—Mukhopadhyayas and Ansaris, Srinivas' and Shafis. This is altogether a different pattern from what is usually imagined and portrayed by the scholars and howlers of the caste system in India.

Not all the studies are, however, of the same standard as *India Today: A Nation In Making Or Breaking*. There is a long essay on *Magnificent Failure: The Gandhian Ideal In India*. It is a tribute to the contributions of Gandhiji to the development of a political thinking based on an organic concept of society, and a scathing attack against those on whose shoulders his mantle fell.

There is another long essay, *Community Development: A New Philosopher's Stone?* The countries surveyed are the Philippines, Thailand and Malaya. Both the theme and its treatment are dull. The essay is more descriptive than analytical. The remaining seven essays are shorter in size and varied in theme. Of these the *Name and Nature of Foreign Aid* is quite interesting. The essay on *East and West* which comes at the close of the book is an attempt to 'define the role of Asia—mainly of India—in helping to provide' the author 'with a coherent political philosophy'. The essay itself, is, however, not quite coherent. All that one gathers from it is that the author is greatly annoyed with the party system of democracy, as it prevails in Britain, and highly impressed by the writings of M. N. Roy. He starts as a rebel but ends up by accepting the role of a liberal.

Ranjit Gupta

POLITICS IN A PERIURBAN COMMUNITY IN INDIA.

Edited by A. H. Somjee.

Asia Publishing House, Bombay, 1964.

In recent years, sociologists and social anthropologists have shown an increasing interest in the study of political processes in India. Political scientists, in their turn, have found it more and more necessary to take into account the social framework which provides the background to the interplay of political forces. Thus, there is a certain degree of overlap today between the studies made by sociologists and social anthropologists on the one hand, and those made by political scientists on the other.

There are, of course, certain broad differences. For one thing, while the political scientists tend generally to concentrate upon the formal distribution of power, the sociologists feel more attracted to the study of the informal structures. Secondly, while

political scientists deal almost exclusively with political phenomenon, sociologists view political phenomenon as one among several aspects of the total social system.

The book under review which brings together the approaches of sociology and political science to the study of politics in a periurban community is the outcome of an experiment conducted by the Department of Political Science, M. S. University of Baroda, in sending post-graduate students to villages and making them write dissertations on the basis of the information collected during field-work. It contains a series of studies of six villages with a general introduction by the editor.

Each study describes a particular political situation while the general introduction enumerates the general characteristics of the villages and presents some theoretical observations regarding the nature of politics in a periurban community. Although the studies are not without their own limitations (in fact, the lack of experience and training, newness of the subject and the absence of sound theoretical orientation, etc., have exercised a limiting influence), each one of them tells us something about the peculiar problem of the village which remains at the centre of its politics.

The villages discussed in the book lie within the nine-mile radius of Baroda. All of them are well connected to the city either by bus routes or railways and they are continually threatened by the expansion of the city municipal limits within their territory. Some of them have already lost portions of their territory to the expanding industrial estates on the periphery of Baroda and have come under its urbanizing influence. Although closely similar in their social structure, economic organization, political institutions and levels of literacy and education, they present peculiar problems which dominate the politics of the village.

It is not possible to discuss each of the studies presented in any detail but the general theoretical conclusions which emerge can be briefly mentioned. In the first place, the picture of periurban politics as it emerges from the material presented does not speak of a community vigorously pursuing its politics. Generally speaking, interest in politics is largely confined to the two agricultural castes, namely the Patidars and the Barias, one of whom traditionally enjoyed political power and the other has become a contending group only recently. The villagers belonging to the lower castes have remained indifferent to the political activities of their village and have not undergone the same degree of politicisation as the upper and middle castes. Even the factory workers who live in these villages and possess a high degree of politicisation as a result of their participation in trade-union activities, are indifferent to what goes on in the village.

The second significant theoretical conclusion which emerges is that the nearness of the town provides a diversion to the villagers and seriously interferes

with their civic interests and responsibilities. Each day more and more villagers become town-minded and feel less and less concerned with what goes on in their village. The issues in the politics of the village bear little relation to the issues and problems of the wider political arenas, and political parties have also not so far explored the possibility of participating in the day to day politics of the village. In consequence, upto now village politics is very much guided by purely local issues.

The role of caste in political life is also discussed. Caste has been pushed into the background in the Constitution of India. With the exception of certain special provisions made for the Scheduled Castes, it has no place in the formal composition of either political or administrative bodies. Yet, in the villages discussed here the principal groups active in politics are organized along the idiom of caste.

The Patidars, an intermediate caste of rich peasants, enjoyed political superiority and wielded preponderant economic influence in the area. For a long time they exercised a monopoly in all political matters. The introduction of the electoral machinery has, however, provided the Barias, another peasant caste, with a means of effectively challenging the Patidar dominance. As a result of their economic emancipation from Patidar control, economic development and educational progress and the introduction of egalitarian administrative policies, the Barias have become the main contending group in the village. Instead of weakening under the impact of industrialization and urban growth, caste has been able to strengthen its grip to a large extent.

But, while the particularistic loyalty of caste has strengthened its grip, the fundamental principle on which these groups were organized in the traditional society has tended to break down. For instance, the traditional social system was based on the solid foundation of acceptance of inequality. In the traditional system social inequalities were, to a great extent, frozen. The upper castes, who were in a position of advantage, enjoyed a sense of permanence with regard to their status and privilege and the lower castes accepted their inferior position uncritically.

Today, however, the social system no longer rests on the old principle of acceptance. The villagers are conscious that the spirit of the time, government policies and educational and economic progress are nullifying the very basis on which the traditional social system was founded and they are making increasing demands for a share of the privilege and positions traditionally enjoyed by the upper castes. It is a debatable question whether, in the absence of its fundamental principle, namely acceptance of inequality, the caste groups active in the political arena are comparable to the traditional castes. Although this volume makes no attempt to deal with it, this is a question to which theorists of caste should turn.

Imtiaz Ahmad

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FARMS AND FOOD

a symposium on our
land relations and agricultural growth

symposium participants

THE PROBLEM

Posed by **P. C. Joshi**, Reader in Sociology
at the Institute of Economic Growth, Delhi

GROWTH VERSUS WELFARE

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Planning, University of Bombay

INDIAN 'CAPITALISM'

Boudhayan Chatterji, Lecturer in
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LAND REFORM LEGISLATION

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TENANCY AND RESOURCE ALLOCATION

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University and **T. C. Varghese**, Research
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BOOKS

Reviewed by **Ranjit Gupta**, **B. D. Dhawan**,
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FURTHER READING

A select and relevant bibliography
by **Sharat Arora**

COVER

Designed by **Chowdhury/Grewal**

The problem

IN the recent period, the attention of both the government and the public has been focussed once again on the food shortages and the need for increasing domestic production of food and other agricultural items. The immediate problem is to evolve effective short-term measures for self-reliance—for the mobilisation of internal surpluses and their distribution. But equally urgent is the need for rethinking on some of the basic issues of overcoming the agricultural lag and of bringing about greater dynamism and efficiency in the agricultural economy. It is in transforming traditional agriculture that we confront (and indeed all developing societies have confronted) the formidable issues of transforming a traditional society.

The experience of developing societies suggests that the traditional social structure presents more serious problems in the renovation of agriculture than in the creation of an industrial structure. The intrusion of non-economic institutions, values, norms, etc., in the economic sphere is much deeper in the case of agriculture than in that of industry.

The traditional, underdeveloped societies are generally characterised by the concentration of land in the hands of a class which values land as landed property and as a source of status and power; this class is divorced from any productive or entrepreneurial role in the exploitation of land as a factor of production. The surplus extracted by the landed class from the dependent peasants under its power in the form of rent is dissipated away in conspicuous consumption, that is, in maintaining itself as a 'leisured class'; in other cases, the more rationally motivated sections of the landed class are prone to invest the surplus accruing from mere landownership in such profitable spheres as further acquisition of landed property, trade and money-lending. The abstention of the landed class from entrepreneurial functions and the unproductive utilisation of the surplus

has the sanction of the traditional status system. Nevertheless, its economic consequences are unfavourable for growth; it results in backward methods of exploiting human and material resources and, consequently, in low levels of productivity of land and labour.

In the history of most of the developing societies, the break-through from agricultural stagnation has been associated with the reorganisation of the traditional land system and with the dissociation of land and labour from the non-economic constraints of the traditional society. Thus, agricultural renovation has generally been preceded by the replacement of the traditional landed gentry by a new class which is actively engaged in profit maximisation by productive investment in land, i.e., by revolutionising the agricultural production system. This new class is distinguished by its dynamic role from both the prodigal landed gentry and the indolent peasants of the traditional system.

Theoretically speaking, conditions for the formation of such a new class can be created in two alternative ways. The first course is to separate land completely from the traditional landed class and make it freely accessible to the peasant producers who are actively engaged in the process of production, i.e., the use of land for productive purposes. The dependent peasants are thus freed from the obligation of paying their entire surplus product over and above their subsistence to the landed class and have the opportunity now to plough back this surplus into productive investment.

The other course is to create conditions for the growth of a new class from the traditional landed gentry itself. The character of the traditional landed class is sought to be changed by inducing it, and also by making it profitable for it, to abandon the non-entrepreneurial mode of life, to exploit opportunities of gain by

ploughing back the surpluses, earlier dissipated in consumption, in farming and its improvement. The traditional landed class in this way resumes land from its tenants, converts them into hired labourers and reorganises agriculture on new lines. In this process, it gradually transforms its own character from an unproductive into an entrepreneurial class.

These two possible courses of transforming traditional agriculture should, however, be viewed as ideal types. In actual life, diverse combinations of this or that type of evolution may be possible, based on the inter-mixture and the overlap of different features of both the types.

- Historical experience of other countries generally suggests that a policy of total dismantling of the traditional landed class provides much more favourable conditions for the growth of entrepreneurship than the policy of promoting entrepreneurship within the framework of traditional landed property. The dismantling of the traditional landed property shatters not only the class structure of the stagnating, traditional society; more importantly, it undermines the foundations of the traditional status, power and value structures which were closely intertwined with and depended on the class structure. This overhauling of the old social structure results in creating 'a psychological, ideological, social and political situation propitious to economic development.' (Gunnar Myrdal).

It has been aptly stated that every period and society has some social class in which the characteristic qualities of its genius seem to be fixed and embodied. From this point of view, the 'characteristic qualities' of the traditional society were embodied in the landed gentry. The undermining of this class at its very roots accelerates the rise and consolidation of a new class as the carrier of basically different values and concepts of status and power. The dissemination of new values of productive labour, thrift, austerity, productive investment and enterprise are immensely facilitated as the traditional landed class lacking these values is manifestly divested of status and power and as the new social elements, the vehicles of new values, are pushed into prominence and helped to forge themselves into an ascendant social class. If the prospects of economic growth are explored, not by dismantling the traditional class structure, but by gradually transforming it into a new class structure, the debilitating features of the traditional status, power and value systems continue to obtrude into the economic system and to obstruct the full growth of productive forces for a long period of time.

This latter course perpetuates the association of status with the ownership and inheritance

of land and lack of enterprise, the main causes of stagnation in the traditional society. It stands in the way of a new association being rapidly established between status on the one hand and rational exploitation of land through productive investment on the other. Indeed, historical experience very definitely suggests that the break-through from stagnation to growth is invariably linked with the substitution of the landed aristocracy which derives its status from mere landownership and inheritance of land by a new class which derives status from productive investment in land and from revolutionising the productive system in agriculture.

In developing societies which have a high man-land ratio, the first course has additional reasons to recommend itself for adoption. Some of these societies do not face the problem of creating a landless class for industrial employment in the present phase of their development—a problem which was solved in many countries in the past by adopting the second course, i.e., by expropriating the small peasant producers from the land. The problem before these countries in the initial phase is to maximise returns per unit of land and not per unit of labour, keeping in view the scarcity of land in relation to manpower and the existence of unutilised resources of surplus labour. Agricultural growth has thus to be accelerated by maximising per acre rather than per man productivity. In view of the low yields in agriculture, considerable scope exists for increasing productivity per acre, not so much by introducing labour-saving machinery but, more so, by intensification of land-saving (and non-labour displacing) techniques (i.e., extension of irrigation improvement of quality of inputs and adoption of better methods of cultivation) in conjunction with the more intensive use of labour. Thus, so long as there are unutilised reserves of labour, small and medium peasant farming by cultivators who are also the owners of their lands can serve as an effective medium of increasing per acre yields and the total volume of agricultural output.

Large-scale farming by the traditional landed class on the other hand would perpetuate the divorce between unutilised labour reserves at one end and land concentration at another end. The large-scale farmers would be forced increasingly to adopt labour-saving and capital intensive techniques of farming—a course which may generate serious tensions and problems in a labour-surplus economy. Even if they don't resort to capital-intensive methods, labour intensity would be lower than in family labour-based farming. In brief, the concept of 'social mobilisation' and the role of the human factor in the development process finds only a restricted scope if the second course is adopted

as the medium of promoting agricultural entrepreneurship.

It should at the same time be kept in view that the dismantling of the traditional landed property and the diffusion of landownership among the direct producers releases only the potentialities of development. The translation of these potentialities into a reality pre-supposes a high-level of social, administrative and political organisation to create development and investment oriented attitudes among vast numbers of peasant producers. If the process of liquidation of landlordism is not followed up by developmental effort, the removal of the landed gentry which was associated with the performance of at least certain functions in the rural structure by the force of custom and law may create a vacuum and may temporarily result in conditions unfavourable to growth.

A study of the Indian agrarian history since independence suggests that as between the above two courses, the Indian nation-State did not adopt a firm course in either direction. It chose a middle course, the underlying idea of which was to promote an entrepreneurial class neither exclusively from the traditional landed class, nor from the peasant producers, but from both.

The land legislations did not aim at dismantling traditional landed property altogether and redistributing it among actual producers; they had a limited aim of separating part of the land from the traditional landed class to the State and of providing for its transfer (i.e., of ownership rights), subsequently, to a new class of proprietors or semi-proprietors.

In the second place, they aimed at providing as much freedom to the direct producers from their subject and dependent status as would ensue from the curtailment (and not total abolition) of traditional landed property.

The idea underlying these measures was to initiate the process of dissociation of land as a source of production from its non-economic uses. This change was to be effected to the extent possible within the limits set by a policy of restricting and not abolishing traditional landed property. In other words, these measures, aimed at modifying the virtual land monopoly of the landed class, were meant to induce changes in its traditional status as an unproductive, 'leisured class'. In view of the steep decline in its status and income derived from mere landownership, it was expected to begin exploiting land as an economic resource by introducing scientific methods and to maximise economic gains by reorganising the production system.

It was also anticipated that various sections of peasant producers would utilise their freedom, achieved in varying degrees from the

control of the landed class, for exercising greater initiative and enterprise in improving their methods of cultivation. A gradual change in the status of these peasants from dependent and indolent producers into active, gain-oriented farmers was conceived as the outcome of agrarian reforms.

The dynamism in the non-agricultural sector of the economy was also expected to have a beneficial impact on agriculture. By making new demands on agriculture, by providing inputs and by pushing up the rate of returns from farming, the process of industrialisation was expected to provide new incentives and opportunities for the agricultural entrepreneurial class.

Against the above background, let us briefly appraise the changes brought about in the agricultural set-up in recent years. The pertinent questions are:

(a) To what extent has the divorce between landownership and self-management been curbed or eliminated by land reforms in recent years?

(b) To what extent is land-ownership now associated with entrepreneurial functions by landowners?

(a) The divorce between landownership and self-management.

In the pre-land reforms period, the influence of the traditional landed class extended over the major part of the total land area. Land reforms enacted since independence appear to have significantly altered this situation. As a consequence of the 'abolition of intermediaries' and 'tenancy reforms', a substantial part of the total land surface is now under the control of owners or semi-owners who are engaged in 'self-management' and 'self-supervision' of the land under their ownership. This is the most significant development in the rural economy following the introduction of land reforms. According to the recent data provided by the 1961 Census on the percentage distribution of cultivating households and cultivated area by interest groups in land, 77 per cent of the total number of cultivating households were located in ownership holdings, about 8 per cent in pure tenancy and 15 per cent in mixed tenancy. Correspondingly, 78 per cent of the total cultivated area was under ownership holdings; about 4 per cent was under pure tenancy and 18 per cent under mixed tenancy.¹

It is evident that the area under tenancy, considering both pure and mixed tenancy, does

1. In the case of pure tenancy holdings, the cultivated area is held from private persons or institutions, whereas in the case of mixed tenancy holdings, it is partly owned or held from government and partly from private persons or institutions.

not exceed 22 per cent of the total cultivated area. This is not to deny that in this respect there might be great variations from State to State and from region to region within the same State. The implications of the still persisting tenancy arrangements for growth deserve attention. In view of the legal restrictions on leasing of land to tenants, landowners have been increasingly resorting to share-cropping tenancy under various disguises. The share-cropping tenancy has, however, a mixed character from the standpoint of growth; it is at once a vestige of the old as well as an index of the new.

It is a vestige of the old system in as much as it is a growth-retarding constraint on the share-cropper; the obligation to pay a share of the produce to the landowner (in most cases half of the share) adversely affects his incentive or resources for investment in agricultural improvement. 'For a given improvement to be worthwhile at the margin to the farmer it must yield twice as much if the rent is one half as it would have to yield if the rent were a fixed amount. This pre-supposes that the farmer bears all the cost of the improvements.'² The practice of sharing costs of improvements by the landowners with the tenants is not prevalent in all regions where share-cropping is practised. The system of share-cropping, therefore, acts as a constraint on the farmers' ability to adopt improvements.

The present tenancy, however, is different from the old one obtaining before the abolition of intermediaries. Under the old system tenancy was a method of surplus extraction by the *all-powerful* landlord from the tenants through extra-economic pressure. After the curtailment of the extra-economic and economic power of the landlord, the influence of extra-economic forces in dictating the level of rent has been progressively on the wane; it is determined increasingly by the market forces. The scarcity of land in relation to the high demand for it pushes up rent, i.e., the price for the use of land.

There are two ways in which the growth-retarding effect of tenancy can be neutralised in favour of development. One way is to eliminate the landlord-tenant nexus altogether so that the actual cultivator, freed from the obligation to part with a substantial proportion of the produce as rent, is able to save more and invest in agricultural improvements. Alternatively, the landlord may be induced or compelled to refrain from rack-renting and to share the costs of land improvements with the tenants. This implies the promotion of an economic arrangement profitable both to the tenant

and the landowner and at the same time in the interests of development. It is further noteworthy that the landlord-tenant nexus is much more amenable to legal control or even legal expropriation if it is associated with landownership by a tiny class of big landlords. Where this nexus is associated with small and middle landownership by a numerically large class of owners, any expropriatory measure would provoke tremendous unrest and opposition (as it did in Kerala).

Whichever of the two courses is actually adopted would depend on the relative bargaining power and pressure exercised by the landlords and the tenants on the governmental structure at different levels. The actual enforcement of these partnerships would require legislative enactments combined with the sanctions of non-official associations representing the interests both of the landowners and the tenants.

It must be stressed that the present policy of promulgating formal laws to ban or restrict leases runs counter to the working of economic forces and is, therefore, self-defeating; under conditions of high man-land ratio and acute competition for land unrelieved by commensurate opportunities in the non-agricultural sector, tenancy cannot be controlled or eliminated by legal measures alone. The more realistic course is to neutralise the growth-retarding effects of tenancy through legal measures backed by sanctions from below.

The major part of the cultivated area now being free from the traditional divorce between landownership and self-management, the next important field of enquiry concerns the effects of this 'self-management' on agricultural enterprise. It is noteworthy that the self-managed area is not under a single pattern of 'management'; it represents diverse patterns. The self-managing farmers can be broadly classified into three groups: (a) farmers engaged in cultivation mainly through hired labour; (b) farmers engaged in farming mainly on the basis of family labour, (c) dwarf holding cultivators who are principally suppliers of labour and only marginally engaged in cultivation.

The farmers (i.e. category (a)) can further be sub-divided into two groups.

(i) The first group consists of those who have their roots in the traditional landed class. By converting their former tenants into agricultural labourers and by beginning to perform managerial and supervisory functions either themselves or through paid agents, members of this group are changing over from mere appropriators of rental income into a class of farmers. They belong mostly to the higher or dominant castes and generally refrain from personal,

2. W.A. Lewis, *Theory of Growth*, p. 123.

physical participation in agricultural operations; they perform only managerial and supervisory functions. It is, therefore, best to call them managerial farmers.

(ii) The second group comprises those who have their roots in the peasant way of life and have recently acquired the privileges of peasant proprietors. Family labour being insufficient for their farm requirements, they engage labour also from outside to supplement family labour. The interpenetration of managerial and supervisory functions with productive labour is thus the principal characteristic of these peasant proprietors.

This important sociological distinction between the two types of employers of hired labour which is not available from purely statistical surveys has important implications for agricultural development.

The managerial farmers and rich peasants occupy a strategic position in the emerging class structure as they control the bulk of land resources and other sources of economic, social and political power. A recent study by the Reserve Bank of India giving the distribution of total assets held by cultivating households shows that 17.1 per cent of the cultivating households having assets worth Rs. 10,000 and above held 57.3 per cent of the total assets. Further, only 6.4 per cent of the cultivating households having assets of Rs. 20,000 and above held 38.1 per cent of the total assets.³ One can legitimately infer that these big assets' groups broadly correspond to the class of managerial farmers and rich peasants.

This class being in possession of relatively large land holdings and other resources is in an advantageous position to contribute to capital accumulation and improvement in agricultural technology. It represents the nucleus of an emerging capitalist sector in the agricultural economy. This sector, however, is still weighed down by traditional vestiges; in the present phase, the juxtaposition of retrogressive and progressive elements constitutes an important characteristic of this rising capitalist sector.

The class of managerial farmers is distinguished from the traditional landed class in that it is getting interested in land as a means of production and in agriculture as a means of rational profit maximisation. The *Programme Evaluation Reports* indicate that members of this class are the principal beneficiaries of the material inputs, credit and other services provided by developmental agencies. The report on the Gram Sahayak Programme reveals that the cultivators recruited for training in adoption of improved methods and practices were

predominantly from the upper strata cultivators.⁴ The *Rural Credit Survey Follow-up Reports*⁵ and the *Reserve Bank of India Debt and Investment Survey* have indicated that in the total capital expenditure as well as capital formation in agriculture, the contribution of upper strata cultivators and the higher asset groups was the largest.

This class is also responsible for the initiation of agro-industrial enterprising in some areas (e.g., the brick kiln industry, sugar factories, etc.). Further, members of this class are also emerging as the new elite group and the vehicles of some elements of modernisation in village society. An appropriate approach towards this class is, therefore, of crucial importance in any strategy of rural development.

These positive growth-promoting features of this class are still intertwined with other negative characteristics inherited on account of its genesis from the traditional landed aristocracy. These traditional vestiges vitiate its role as a class of vigorous agricultural entrepreneurs. This class is not yet fully devoted to farming and continues to derive substantial incomes by investing in profitable spheres such as money-lending, trade, urban housing and also often by leasing out part of the land to tenants and share-croppers. That the agriculturist money-lender is still the principal source of credit in the rural areas and that investment in housing by big cultivators is very high has been indicated by the *Rural Credit Survey* and the *Reserve Bank of India Reports*.

It is also evident that, leaving some regions like Punjab, the technological level of large farms in other regions is still low, land and livestock still accounting for the major part of the capital assets.⁶ Further, the *Rural Credit Survey Follow-up Report* shows that in the nine selected districts the share of big cultivators in capital expenditure in agriculture was the highest; at the same time, in most cases more than 50 per cent of this expenditure was on acquiring more land and livestock. What is perhaps most pertinent is that capital expenditure in agriculture other than the purchase of land and livestock per acre of cultivated holding by big cultivators was not very much higher than that by medium and small cultivators; in some cases it was even lower.⁷ The Farm Management Surveys have also reported that the investment in inputs per acre, specially on labour input per acre, by large farms was relatively lower as compared to small farms. It is no wonder that per acre

3. All India Debt and Investment Survey, *Reserve Bank of India Bulletin*, June 1965, p. 808.

4. *Evaluation of the Gram Sahayak Programme*, Programme Organisation, Planning Commission, 1961.

5. *Rural Credit Survey Follow-up*, 1959-60, Chapter VI.

6. R. Firth and Yamey, *Capital, Saving and Credit in Peasant Societies*, p. 363.

7. *Op. cit.*, p. 81-83.

productivity of the big holdings was inferior to that of the medium and small holdings.

Finally, this class is still not fully dissociated from non-productive conspicuous consumption so very characteristic of the traditional landed aristocracy; more, it is actively engaged in emulating the style of life of a modern, affluent status group. The pre-disposition for seeking status and power in unproductive ways is exhibited in lavish expenditure in building modern luxury houses in villages and towns, in providing public school and foreign education to children, in extravagant expenditure for acquiring power through elections to Village Panchayats, Block Samitis, State Legislatures and Parliament. The propensity to intensify investment in agriculture by cutting down expenditure in conspicuous consumption and by subjecting its mode of life to economic rationalisms in a manner expected from a class of agricultural entrepreneurs is still not the dominant characteristic of this class. Another factor which introduces instability in the entrepreneurial role of this class in agriculture is its strong fascination for urban life and for urban professions unrelated to agriculture (like jobs in the bureaucracy, the army, the private sector etc.).

It may be suggested that the rich peasants having their roots in the peasant way of life are relatively closer to the model of progressive farmers than the managerial farmers who have their roots in the traditional landed aristocracy or the urban professional classes. In U.P., for instance, the Jat peasants of the western districts present a sharp contrast to the managerial farmers of the eastern districts which have their roots in the upper castes and the traditional landed aristocracy. Apart from other factors, these sociological differences have a vital bearing on the differential patterns of agricultural growth in these two regions.

It is difficult to speculate how soon and, if at all, these retrogressive features of the above classes dissolve away to facilitate development; a crucial factor in this process is the widening and deepening of economic opportunities providing linkages between the agricultural and the non-agricultural, industrial sector as in many areas of Punjab. Alternatively, the persistence of these features may strengthen the case in the coming years for the transfer of land from these semi-capitalist elements to the peasant producers in the interests of development.

In the present phase, it is possible as well as desirable for the State itself to intervene more effectively to ensure more rational exploitation of land and greater capital investment in agriculture. Investment of resources in money-lending and trade may be discouraged by widening the net-work of cooperative credit on

a more effective and flexible basis and by extending cooperative marketing and State trading so that these new institutions increasingly reduce the rate of returns from the traditional channels of investment. Further, it may be possible to deter expenditure in conspicuous consumption and in luxury housing by stringent taxation measures discriminating against unproductive forms of investment and in favour of productive forms. Again, the widening of opportunities for small and medium agro-industrial enterprises like dairy farming may promote channelisation of resources and entrepreneurial talent in new productive activities.

In brief, the dislodging of this class from trade, moneylending, etc., is a necessary prerequisite to promote capital investment in agriculture. Keeping in view the factor endowments in the economy as a whole, it appears necessary to promote the intensification of labour-intensive and land-saving technology in areas where surplus labour exists either in open or disguised forms and to promote labour-saving technology in areas where conditions of labour scarcity have already emerged. The establishment of agricultural labour pools or cooperatives which ensure a minimum wage and better conditions of work on the one hand and economic utilisation of labour reserves on the other assumes importance in this context.

Still another crucial requirement is the regulation of the unrestricted purchase and sale of land which may be used by this class to enlarge further its land-holdings for mere status and power reasons. If the utilisation of labour is generally to be the principal means of maximising productivity per unit of land, the landholdings of this class are already too large for these purposes. Further accentuation of large landownership unassociated with agricultural enterprise should, therefore, be strictly curbed through the execution of land laws already enacted or through the promulgation of fresh laws.

The emerging 'capitalist sector' even at its best, however, by itself cannot deliver the goods in agriculture. It is note-worthy that of about 65 million cultivators in India as many as 60 per cent operate only less than 5 acres. Without the mobilisation of the vast numbers of these peasants, the process of development is bound to remain only partial in its scope. It is in inducing a process of growth in this vast non-capitalist sector that State policies have so far not met with much success. The emerging, relatively dynamic farmers constitute only an enclave surrounded by a numerically vast section of backward peasants who are becoming growth-minded at an extremely slow pace. Indeed, if a more effective strategy is not evolved to stir up this

stagnant zone, it would act as a drag even on the dynamic sector. In view of the opportunities of status, wealth and power through exploitation of the stagnant sector, even the upper classes would keep away from exploring new opportunities and avenues or explore them only partially.

The small and middle peasants are subject to a double disadvantage. Being small landowners and tenants (in many cases still without security of tenure), they continue to be traditional cultivators without enough resources and incentives to invest in agriculture. They are also handicapped by their social position as they belong mostly to the lower and scheduled castes; their bargaining power vis-a-vis the privileged classes as well as the State in getting land laws implemented, in procuring inputs and credit from official and non-official agencies and in getting favourable terms from the traditional creditors and the trading middlemen is extremely weak. The *Programme Evaluation Reports* have repeatedly stressed that official aid and subsidies have preponderantly gone to the upper strata cultivators and not to the lower strata cultivators.

In brief, if these vast sections have to be stimulated to pursue agriculture as 'gainful' activity and show greater initiative and enterprise, the State has to play a strategic role in helping them to overcome their handicaps as well as their traditional mentality. The re-enforcement of their economic backwardness by social (caste) disabilities further inhibits their participation in development.

The emerging capitalist class is mostly congruent with the dominant castes of the traditional society 'who are also the moneylenders and traders, and also the educated elite and also the officials in Panchayats and Block Samitis and all these in close association with the outside urban world of finance and power.' This congruence of status, class and power has so far kept the process of development confined to a narrow stratum in the rural areas. Indeed, developmental impulses have so far scarcely 'trickled down' from the top oligarchy to the rest of the village society. The continuance of a dual society—of deep economic and social chasms—have so far posed a great barrier for broad-based social and economic development.

In the context, it appears necessary to combine economic encouragement to enterprising landowners with safeguards against their social and political domination over the rural institutions. Without effective curbs on the social and political power of the 'rural oligarchy', there would be no check on their monopolising socio-economic facilities and incentives provided to the rural sector. There is considerable evidence to show that this is what has been happening in the rural areas.

Thus, without the positive support of administrative and political and social organisations coupled with their own organised pressure, under-privileged classes cannot get tenancy reforms (rent regulation, security of tenure measures etc.) implemented in their favour nor can they secure credit from cooperatives and thus get freedom from dependence on the moneylending and trading classes; nor is it possible for them to secure material inputs, technical services and irrigation facilities from official agencies.

Equally important in this context is to promote cooperation among these peasants for development purposes. Some forms of voluntary peasant cooperation—sharing of bullocks, pooling of labour for irrigation and other schemes of mutual benefit etc.—already exist in many areas. There may still exist unexplored areas in which mutual aid and pooling of resources may ensure considerable mutual benefit to small peasants; apart from serving as a means of minimising their dependence on the upper strata or on the State, cooperation even without cooperative farming, may help as a means of resources generation and resource mobilisation.

To sum up, during the past decade or so, primarily as a result of State policies, some of the impediments to agricultural growth have been neutralised; nevertheless, there still remain strategic points unresponsive to development. One of the principal determinants of agricultural revolution in western countries was the rise of an entrepreneurial social class committed to change and development. In contrast to these countries, the chief weakness of Indian agriculture has consisted in the inadequate commitment of the landowning classes to development and their insufficient dissociation from the traditional mores and the traditional concepts of status and power. The dominant impulse for Indian development has been provided by the nation-State by removing, though partially, the growth-retarding constraints of the traditional class structure on the one hand and by building up an infra-structure on the other.

A more strategic role has to be played by the State in the coming years by strengthening as well as supplying the factors of organisation and entrepreneurship. It has also to provide the ideological impulse for development. In the past, the pressure of traditional landed interests and that of traditional ideology has led to a great deal of hesitancy and ambivalence in the development policies of the State specially in respect of implementation. The concerted pressure of all social forces committed to development alone can provide the big push so as to re-affirm and strengthen the growth-promoting role of the State itself.

P. C. JOSHI

Growth versus welfare

ASHOK RUDRA

GROWTH and welfare need not necessarily be contradictory objectives, for economic growth would not be an objective unless it led to increased welfare. There might, however, be a contradiction when a fixed time horizon is given: steps that might lead to the maximum rate of growth during the time horizon might not maximise welfare during the same period. In economic theory there are propositions regarding static welfare maximisation which are irrelevant from the growth point of view and there are propositions regarding growth maximisation which completely ignore the welfare aspect of the problem. Confusion in discussions on Indian agricultural questions arises to a great extent from a failure to appreciate that the two objectives of growth and welfare are not necessarily consistent in all time dimensions: but this failure is much more than can be explained by the absence of any synthesis of theories of growth and welfare in theoretical economics.

Agriculture is so important in an economy like India both from the growth and welfare points of view that discussions have always tended to be passionate rather than objective: the vast masses of the country are directly dependent for their survival on agriculture and at the same time the growth rate of agriculture enjoys overriding weight in the growth rate of the economy as a whole. Most Indian farmers are holders and cultivators of tiny patches of land and their economic well being is regarded as of supreme importance from the welfare point of view.

Hence, it has become axiomatic among a very large section of

Indian economists, who consider themselves democrats and socialists, that the growth of agriculture must take place on the basis of a peasant economy with a size distribution dominated by extremely small farms. It is implicitly assumed that this extremely small farm basis would indeed permit of growth at a rate which could be considered satisfactory. This axiom was not always there. In earlier literature one finds the other axiom, namely, that agricultural growth calls for a minimum farm size far above the average operational unit as at present. The latter was regarded as too uneconomic for any investments and any improvements in practices.

This conflict between welfare and growth was frankly recognised but there was a ready solution: co-operativisation. Welfare was to be achieved by radical land reforms: expropriation of landlords, money lenders and all kinds of intermediaries, and the vesting of ownership rights in the actual tillers. Growth was to be achieved by the subsequent creation of co-operatives which would permit of the economies of large scale farming. Those who were Marxists, or rather, more correctly, Marxist-Leninist-Stalinists, were prepared to go further and say that not only the distribution of land to the tiller but also the formation of co-operatives were meant only as first steps towards further socialisation, namely, the formation of collectives. The change-over from one axiom to the other was not dictated by any empirical findings.

As a matter of fact, the presumption that the small farms,

forming the basis of Indian agriculture, are not only not economically inefficient but as a matter of fact could possibly be more suitable vehicles of economic progress than large farms, has made its appearance in the writings of economists ever since the middle of the fifties when it came to be accepted that the Indian peasants were not very responsive to the idea of co-operativisation, nor had the Government of India any serious intention of engineering any such movement in the country side. In the absence of co-operatives, large farms could come about only if capitalist farming were to be allowed and as this would endanger the welfare of the peasant masses, the axiom gradually crept in that small farms are as a matter of fact no less efficient than large farms.

Unreliable Data

While this change-over was not dictated by any empirical findings, an attempt has naturally been made to build a case for the small farm. This line of discussion has suffered a great deal from the fact that the basic data made use of are of very poor quality and they have been interpreted in a very careless fashion. It is not surprising that in such a situation one could be left with exactly the same sort of preconceived opinions as one started with.

The lack of reliable data—about which everybody complains—and the drawing of invalid inferences are phenomena typical of a state of affairs in the world of economic statistics in India which it might not be irrelevant to comment upon. The collection of statistics in India is officially entrusted to people who, whether statisticians by training or simply administrators, have neither any understanding of, nor any interest in, the economic problems which their statistics are supposed to bear upon. This mechanical and unimaginative character of the data collection process could have been corrected if economists who make use of the data would have shown greater interest in the methodolo-

gical problems of economic statistics.

Failure of Economists

However, economists have either been content idly to criticise the unreliability of data and leave it at that; or have betrayed a matching degree of unimaginativeness in uncritically picking up tools and techniques from the literature of mathematical studies and operational research and applying them to the crude and unreliable economic data with supreme unconcern for the validity of such applications. The raging fashion of econometrics has invaded the field of agricultural economics and young India research workers are producing papers making prodigious use of t-tests and F-tests, analysis of variance and analysis of co-variance, activity analysis and linear programming, quadratic programming and theory of games. Neither welfare nor growth is, of course, promoted by such puerile exercises.

In order to substantiate our criticism of both the quality of data and the interpretation of data pertaining to Indian agriculture, let us refer to the statistical tables published in the *Farm Management Study Reports*, which are widely made use of as the only comprehensive data on the economics of Indian agriculture. The reports present in each table two sets of figures, based upon two samples (e.g., the survey sample and the cost accounting sample), each representing a different mode of collection. A critical look at these pairs of sets reveals that in many cases the two sets are glaringly contradictory so as to cast doubt on either set of figures. The reports however have not paid any attention to this internal evidence of unreliability and have gone ahead with taking averages of the two sets and it is these averages that are used uncritically both by economists as well as the formidable econometricians to draw their inferences from and build their fancy models upon.

As to the conclusions drawn, we can cite the following as examples:

'From these data, and from the variations in the nature and

quality of capital employed on different sizes of farms, it follows that techniques of farming on small farms are labour intensive and tend to become relatively capital intensive as the size of farm increases.'

'The only advantage of small farms appears to be their ability to extract more output per unit of land, though not per unit of labour.'¹

These conclusions are stated in such a way as to mean monotonic dependence of certain economic characteristics on farm size treated as the independent variable—the larger the family size, the higher the capital intensity; the lower the per acre yield. Yet, such inference of monotonic dependence is strictly invalid and even more so when the same relationship is assumed to hold when comparing large farms run capitalistically with small farms run traditionally.

That is because the data fails to represent adequately the very large farms and even more so those among them which are run capitalistically. Firstly, these farms would necessarily be under-represented in any sample that is drawn randomly from the population of farms because of the highly skew nature of the size distribution: random sampling from such a distribution would always tend to under-represent the longer tail area. Capitalistically run farms, being a small proportion of the large farms, would be even more so.

Secondly, because of the grouping of data, a spurious monotonicity might well emerge, camouflaging the real nature of dependence: if the observed monotonicity really holds one up to a certain point in the size range defining the last group but not beyond that, the grouped data might never reveal that.

Irrelevant Criteria

Apart from all this, the other most serious objection, that has to be raised to the use to which the data are put, relates to the irrelevant criteria chosen for purposes of comparison of small farms with

large farms: yield per acre, capital per farm, etc. From the growth point of view, the only appropriate criterion is of course the proportion of increased yield to investment.

In view of all this, generalised conclusions about small farms and large farms are to be treated with skepticism, and to capitalistically run farms ought not to be ascribed the alleged economies and diseconomies of largescale farming as deduced from the *Farm Management Study Reports*. As formation of co-operatives has been ruled out and the capitalist farms represent the only vehicle of introducing economies of scale in agriculture, it is necessary that the various economic and social aspects of capitalist farming are examined dispassionately.

The Poser

Dr. P. C. Joshi fails to do so in his opening article. He first of all draws a distinction between what he calls managerial farmers and rich peasants. The former are 'those who have their roots in the traditional landed class. By converting the former tenants into agricultural labourers and by beginning to perform managerial and supervisory functions either themselves or through paid agents, members of this group are changing over from mere appropriators of rental income into a class of farmers. They belong mostly to higher or dominant castes and generally refrain from personal physical participation in agricultural operation.' The latter are those 'who have their roots in the peasant way of life and have recently acquired the privilege of peasant proprietors.'

Then he writes, presumably about the managerial farmers: 'It represents the nucleus of an emerging capitalist sector in the agricultural economy' and goes on to add, 'members of this class are the principal beneficiaries of the material inputs, credit and other services provided by developmental agencies.'

Speaking of the 'negative characteristics inherited on account of its genesis from traditional landed

aristocracy,' he reveals his class preference as follows: 'It may be suggested that the rich peasants having their roots in the peasant way of life are relatively closer to the model of progressive farmers than the managerial farmers who have their roots in the traditional landed aristocracy or the urban professional classes'. '...the persistence of these features may strengthen the case in the coming years for transfer of land from these semi-capitalist elements to the peasant producers in the interest of development.' 'The emerging "Capitalist sector", even at its best, however by itself cannot deliver the goods in agriculture.'

Dr. Joshi thus treats the emerging capitalist farmers as belonging to the erstwhile class of the landed aristocracy and his prejudice against them is based on his belief that, 'Historical experiences of other countries generally suggest that a policy of total dismantling of the traditional landed class provides much more favourable conditions for the growth of entrepreneurship than the policy of promoting entrepreneurship within the framework of traditional landed property'. He further believes that 'as between the above two courses, the Indian nation-State did not adopt a firm course in either direction'.

Different Opinions

Dr. Joshi has not provided facts and figures to support his beliefs, so that there is considerable scope for holding different opinions, both in the matter of facts and in their interpretation.

On the level of facts, the emerging capitalist sector need not be identified with the ex-landlords. There is a certain body of urban capital and urban entrepreneurship that has been wanting to go into agriculture and that has been prevented from doing so by the State power. It is not true that State power has been directed to help the erstwhile landed aristocracy into capitalist farmers. State power has been used to give the most favourable conditions of development to the top strata of owners and cultivators as brought about by the land re-

forms—this is the only behaviouristic conclusion that can be drawn from the reports of the Programme Evaluation Committee, Reserve Bank, etc. Nothing whatsoever can be concluded about discrimination being practised within this top strata, as between the ex-landlords and the rich peasants.

On the level of interpretations, for political economic purposes, a 'class' ought to be defined strictly in terms of its production relations. Class ancestry of persons may be interesting information if one were undertaking a study of their psychology or sociology, but is irrelevant when considering political economic issues.

Without Prejudice

It is not our intention to advocate the cause of capitalist farmers but to emphasise that correct policies can be adopted only if issues are discussed and analysed dispassionately and without prejudice. One need not have it as a premise that capitalist farming is bad for the country, especially at a time when socialists and democrats are happily participating with the establishment and consolidation of State capitalism in the industrial sector. Once having given up the programme of socialist transformation in agriculture, the case for capitalist transformation deserves serious attention. But the prevalent mood among economists is to expect that somehow or other there could be a mobilisation of the vast peasant masses, somehow or other small and medium farms could be made to become 'an effective medium of increasing per acre yield and the total volume of agricultural output.' Dr. Joshi himself writes that 'The emerging relatively dynamic farmers constitute only an enclave surrounded by a numerically vast section of backward peasants' and that 'development impulses have so far scarcely "trickled down" from the top oligarchy to the rest of the village society.' Does he expect dynamism to be generated among these backward masses without any structural reorganisation of the property relations, by way of magic?

Indian 'capitalism'

BOUDHAYAN CHATTERJI

IT will be my purpose here to indicate tentatively the premises of the political economy of Indian 'capitalism'. Inter alia, I hope to be able to demonstrate that the mechanics of the agrarian sector hold the key to such a system of premises. The outstanding features of the Indian agrarian structure, as revealed in a number of reports and studies appearing over the decade, are enumerated first as the scaffolding for the main analytical structure.

(i) There has been no change in the concentration of land-ownership in rural India between 1953-54 and 1960-61¹; i.e., the period during which the spate of land legislation was under way in the various States; the top 5 per cent of rural households own more than what the bottom 80 per cent own.

(ii) Area under revealed tenancy has also remained unaltered between the 8th Round N.S.S. (1954) and the 1961 Census:— near about a fourth of the total land is under various forms of inferior revealed tenancy. From all available evidence it appears that hidden tenancy in various forms is quite widespread². My personal prediction is to put the area under inferior tenancy, hidden and revealed, at not less than 35-40 per cent of the total land area.

(iii) There has been no change in the proportion of agricultural labour in the rural population between the first agricultural labour enquiry, 1951 and the 1961 Census. And, my own calculations based on the 9th Round N.S.S., 1955-56, show that the percentage of land area worked by enterprises mainly using hired labour is not

more than a sixth of the total land area. This can be squared with the fact that agricultural labourers constitute more than a fourth of the rural population, if one remembers the high percentage of 'cultivator' households reporting wages both paid and received in the *Rural Credit Survey*, 1951.

(iv) Hence, even if one defined the employment of hired labour as the sole criterion of agrarian capitalism, the 'capitalist' sector is of lesser weightage in Indian agriculture than the sector under inferior forms of tenancy. Moreover, this so-called 'capitalist' sector has remained largely stagnant over the decade, restricted to certain pockets. Those who would like to imagine that there is an appreciable sector of 'capitalist' tenancy in the total acreage under inferior tenancy, owe it to themselves to prove it, and not use the hypothesis as a matter of taste rather than of opinion.

(v) The weakness of the hypothesis regarding the so-called 'capitalist' sector is further brought out by the fact that concentration of land holdings is not associated with any economies of scale, higher productivity per acre or degree of capitalisation. There is no significant positive correlation between holding size and productivity, between asset-ownership size and rates of capital formation. In fact, there is a negative association between holding-size and intensity of cropping as shown by the *Rural Credit Survey* data. N.S.S. 16th Round data (1960-61), based on operational holdings classification, show that size groups above 20 acres exhibit a lower percentage of holdings and acreage under irrigation and chemical fertilisers than the size groups in the 5 acres to 20 acres range.

Even for holdings below 5 acres, for those who report acreage

1. Vide tables 3.23 and 3.24, page 82, Report of the Mahalanobis Committee, part I.

2. Vide the Ladefjinsky Report, in particular.

under irrigation and chemical fertilisers, the proportion of average holding-area under such facilities is higher than that for the group above 20 acres. And this, notwithstanding the fact that upper holding size-groups appropriate the lion's share of public expenditure directed to agriculture, as shown by the C.D.P. Evaluation Reports. On the other hand, a recent study³ shows significant positive association between percentage of area under tenancy and per acre productivity.

Inferior Tenancy

(vi) Historical data on the first half of this century show that commercialisation and urbanisation in India have been associated with the growth of inferior tenancy. In view of the overwhelming supporting evidence in favour of the validity of a *ceteris paribus* assumption regarding the Indian agrarian structure over the decade, it is only likely that this built-in historical tendency has been further accelerated by the rapid pace of commercialisation and urbanisation in the recent years. In fact, the rapid expansion of the existing education system in rural areas in recent years can only strengthen the tendency towards parasitism and leasing out land under inferior tenancy.

The up-and-coming sons of the upper land holding strata are imbibing the bandwagon effects of the system of values inculcated by the education - structure. They naturally turn their back on manual labour, cultivation and rural life and seek greener pastures elsewhere; thereby, of course, they only try to behave as we, the urban intelligentsia, do. This is bound to strengthen the parasitic use-pattern of assets and bolster up the preferences for riskless unearned income in the rural scene. Witness the growth of a veritable army of touts in the

rural scene thriving on the channels of public expenditure, credit and commerce, linked with the upper landholding strata on the one hand, and the vehicles of political power on the other.

(vii) The Indian agrarian structure is, thus, a Wellsian monster with a formidable concentration of land and ancillary resources⁴ in the hands of a 5 per cent minority at the top and a vast proliferating small peasant economy at the base, with a large fringe of a destitute labour force,—beset with caste disabilities and debt-bondage,—called agricultural wage labour in India, allegedly the hallmark of agrarian 'capitalism' for certain Indian Marxists, official and non-official.

The Second Way

The relevance of the Marx-Lenin concept of the second way of capitalist development to the Indian context has, of late, gained currency among left-wing research workers in the field. That should have been altogether a matter of gratification to the present writer. But, one does not quite feel requited in view of the fact that the concept is being used more as a descriptive cliché than an analytical tool. And, no effort has been forthcoming,—since this concept was first mooted in this country a few years back,—to explore its properties. People have felt content merely by noting that the second way of capitalist development consists in the gradual transformation of large precapitalist landed property into modern large-scale capitalist farming of the German Junker type.

Not that symptoms of such a course of development are altogether absent in India. Witness particularly the recent move of the FICCI in favour of joint stock farming. But, I assert, that is not the real danger within the realm of practical possibility. Powerful economic forces are at work to perpetuate the vicious circle of the existing pattern of enterprise and social existence—form-of-labour power in Indian agriculture.

Whatever may be the legal arrangement,—joint-stock or land-

lords' co-operative,—realities of the mode of exploitation, based on objective conditions of production, will cut across all legal appearances. The rapid development of Junker type large-scale farming in India, which can only take place on the basis of extinction of small peasant economy, is pure fiction. The FICCI are indulging in this essay in fantasy, not because tycoons are given to day-dreaming, but because they are out for a public political burial of the cause of the working peasant, the archetype and identity of our nation and freedom movement.

Indian Marxism, along with much of Indian intellection in general, has traditionally been the victim of the propensity to substitute for specific characteristics of the Indian situation, universalities modelled mainly on European precedence. Similar proceedings are naturally plaguing this concept of the second way too. The second way of capitalist development is not a catch-all category. There are variants. There is the Japanese second way, for example, altogether different from the German or the Russian (Stolypin type).

Defining the Concept

Let me, therefore, define the concept first. The second way of capitalist development consists in a certain combination of three different modes of exploitation, namely, the precapitalist mode of extraction of absolute rent, the mercantile-financial modes of exploitation through profit-on-alienation, and the capitalist mode of exploitation through profit-on-production of surplus value. Different mixes of these three modes are possible according to the rate and level of development of productive forces and the intensity of the class struggle. It is not possible to spell out this definition within the space permitted here. I shall try to make it clear, to the extent I can, by applying the definition to the Indian context and bringing out the essence of the specific mix taking place in India.

Small peasant economy and petty production in general con-

3. Vide P.B. Sharma's Paper : Impact of labour and land on per acre productivity, Indian Agricultural Economic Conference, 1965.

4. My guesstimate is that as much as 75% of total marketed surplus is concentrated in the hands of this same 5% minority and about sixty per cent of credit.

stitute the base for the first two modes, viz, that of extraction of absolute rent and of profit-on-alienation. Both these modes are similar in that the pattern of asset-utilisation in either case does not involve incurring the risks and costs of production and productive investment. The upper landholding groups in the rural scene subsist on a mix of these two modes mainly, sometimes mixing the capitalist mode, too, marginally.

The Base

The sector of inferior tenancy and bonded agricultural labour constitute the base from which absolute rent is pumped out by forcing labour power to sell below its value. Rural labour power in India is forced to sell below its value because of the condition of unlimited supply of rural labour and the absence of any, organisational bargaining power. And, so long as the relative demand and supply conditions of labour power remain as they are,—even worsen with a chronically deteriorating man-land ratio,—so long as rural labour lacks any organisational bargaining power, it is always possible for the upper landholding strata to reap higher returns by worsening the terms of employment of labour power than by undertaking productive capital formation. This explains the paradox of a high degree of concentration of land and low capitalisation and productive efficiency going together in the large landholding strata.

The concentration of the ancillary resources, such as credit and marketing, too, in the hands of this large land-holding stratum and its cognate groups in the rural scene, enables it to wield the other mode of mercantile-financial profit-on-alienation over the entire range of small peasant economy and petty-production in the rural scene. This caucus, with its strong links in the administration and the upper reaches of big urban finance in the speculative commodity market, is able to corner the overwhelming bulk of the marketed surplus, brings tremendous

pressure to bear upon the State governments, and ploughs under all official controls, procurement and distribution policies. Currently it is engaged in setting up its own mass political party—the Jana Sangh—in the Hindi speaking States where the Left is too weak to give expression to popular discontent. It constitutes the main prop, as yet, of the Indian National Congress, too, in the countryside.

Split Personality

This caucus is able to carry on with impunity its anti-national activities by virtue of its strong links with the urban Indian bourgeoisie. The objective basis of such links is the split personality of the Indian urban bourgeoisie itself—big and small. This is not only because the genesis of the Indian business community is basically mercantile; the highest form of integration of capital achieved by the Indian bourgeoisie, i.e., the managing agency system (with its various alter-egos in the post-Company Law Amendment period), is itself a projection of a dual mode of exploitation.

Through the managing agency system and its various camouflaged varieties, Indian big business wields the double-edged sword of primary accumulation through profit-on-alienation and industrial capital formation through profit-on-production of surplus value, over the whole economy. It is this stake of the Indian urban bourgeoisie in primary accumulation through the mercantile-financial modes of profit-on-alienation that serves as the objective basis of the rise of the Swatantra Party, and of its alliance with the rural caucus through the Swatantra-Jana Sangh get together—the emerging menace of a grand Rightist alliance.

The Indian urban bourgeoisie is a split personality, not because there is overmuch conflict between the 'monopoly' and 'non-monopoly' sections, but because while on the one hand it must seek its sources of primary accumulation through the *modus operandi* of profit-on-alienation—secular inflation being the time honoured

device of such primary accumulation—it has serious industrial stakes also. Marx never tired of pointing out the essential dichotomy between the antediluvian forms of mercantile and financial accumulation through profit-on-alienation and the requirements of industrial capital formation through direct production of surplus value.⁵ Caught up in this yawning self-contradiction of the Indian bourgeoisie, Indian planning stands paralysed.

The stage of primary accumulation through early colonial plunder and the series of price revolutions, was separated in time from the stage of the industrial revolution in the case of western Europe. That choice is not open before Indian capitalism. Indian capitalism, therefore, seeks to achieve both at the same time. If it cannot have the colonies abroad, it tries at least for the price revolution at home. The sector of small peasant economy and petty production along with unorganised consumers serves as a kind of internal colony. But, it cannot have both. While inflation certainly waters the roots of primary accumulation, it saps the bases of industry. For, characteristically, within the existing framework of distribution of property and income, the 'market problem' shows its head simultaneously with scarcity. You have the strange spectacle of deflationary piling up of unsold stocks in one sector (witness the crisis in textiles) and almost runaway inflation in another.

Western Experience

Moreover, the price revolutions even in the case of western Europe did not invariably accelerate the onset of the industrial revolution. On the contrary, Spain got permanently maimed, the *Resorgimento* failed in Italy and a dual economy persisted in southern Italy right up to the post-world-war II period; Holland became a laggard as London replaced Amsterdam and industrial

5. Vide, Marx's *Capital*, Vol. III and *Historical Writings*, particularly those on 19th Century France and Germany.

progress was markedly slowed down in France in the first half of the 19th Century. Only England broke through. Reasons for these wide divergences have to be sought in the deleterious effects of a persistent load of precapitalist hangovers in Spain and Italy, in the respective agrarian sectors, and of the mercantile-financial incubus over whole economies—which defied a Saint Simon in France. Spain has since been paying through her nose for centuries for the original sin.

Uneconomic Strategy

Is Subramaniam prepared for the re-enactment of the story of Spain in this luckless land of ours? But, perhaps he does not know his history properly. For, otherwise he could not possibly pin his faith on the pathetic 'strategy' he has been trying to sell. Concentration of inputs, particularly fertilisers, in 35 million acres will do the trick? How does he know? Who has established for him the objective function and done the necessary programming exercise to warrant such a drastic reallocation of resources?

If the experience of 'package programmes and the Evaluation Reports on the C.D.P. are any guide, the 'strategy' is destined to be at least thoroughly uneconomic, will only bid up the costs without any commensurate compensation in output. More. The fact that only about 40 to 45 districts account for the bulk of the increases in agricultural production and a considerable part of the marketable surplus, is one of the weakest points of Indian agriculture. The unevenness of agricultural development is one of the most fundamental reasons of the basic instability of agricultural production in India. Subramaniam's 'strategy' will only further accentuate this unevenness and instability.

And, then, what has warranted the current reversal of priorities in favour of chemical fertilisers? Have we created the essential prerequisites for a transition to intensive farming based on large doses of chemical fertilisers? Experience shows that without ela-

borate soil-testing experiments and assured irrigation capable of flushing the top-soil regularly, the use of chemical fertilisers may be just disastrous. Have we finished creating the requisite irrigation potential? If multiple regression analysis yields highly significant positive co-efficients of association between productivity per acre and proportion of irrigated area to sown area over the districts of India, even in high rainfall areas, what is the obvious conclusion?

I do not have the necessary data to figure out a study in comparative costs for a given increase in output. It seems obvious, however, that ensuring irrigation facilities for simply extending the double-cropped area should be the cheapest way of having a given increase in output, particularly in view of the much lower import-content of irrigation works compared to chemical fertilisers. The Planning Commission is in possession of the necessary data. Why does it not come out with such a comparative study, if only to justify Subramaniam's strategy?

Left and Right

The real purpose of Subramaniam's strategy is, however, to take the wind out of the sails of the Nagpur and the Bhubaneswar Resolutions, to play the game of the Indian Rights indirectly,—namely a public burial to the cause of the working peasant. And this, when all available evidence (some have been enumerated above) shows that strengthening the position of the working peasant and smashing up the grip of the large landholders are necessary not merely on egalitarian counts, but on grounds of sheer productive efficiency.

So long as the centrist element in Indian politics goes on playing in this way the game of the Indian Right indirectly, prospects of re-enacting the story of Spain remain bright indeed! But we have not yet come to an end of our woeful tale.

The Indian Left, too, refuses to acknowledge in practice that:

(a) countrywide total rationing in essential commodities with a

system of levies on large holdings has to be a feasible immediate measure,—and the Left must feel as much responsible for the success of this measure as the government;

(b) immediate demonetisation of currency is the only way to mop up the black money;

(c) unleashing popular initiative from below to create economic institutions of the working people—working peasants' consumers' co-ops and agricultural labour co-ops in particular—is the only way to create the necessary configurations of popular unification below which can tilt the balance of class forces in the countryside, and unify the toiling majority of the village.

National Self-criticism

The Indian Left remains steeped in an oppositional psychosis and hopes to build the castles of National or People's Democracy out of a certain magical split between the 'monopoly' and the 'non-monopoly' bourgeoisie—a ramshackle Stalinist dogma blessed by M. N. Roy. In the meantime, urban big business is forging a firm alliance with the rural caucus, is trying to galvanise the bulk of the working peasantry too under its wings, and execute a spectacular break-through in the coming general elections. Perhaps, only a rude shock can rouse the Indian polity from the stupor of pseudo-identity into which it was plunged by the traumatic murder of Gandhi.

A phase of all-out national self-criticism in terms of a social and political praxis geared to the immediate, concrete requirements of the working peasant, will have to be gone through to restore the nation to its sense of identity. But in order that this may start, some at least among us, the urban intelligentsia, will have to decide to jump off the bandwagon. The educator needs badly to be educated,—and not in the medium of English, the vehicle of this article and journal.

Land reform legislation

V. S. VYAS

ONE of the casualties of the so-called 'scientific' approach to agricultural development is the institutional reforms in the country-side. It is maintained in some quarters that the provision of modern inputs in adequate quantity, at right prices and at opportune time can inject a new dynamism in an otherwise stagnant agriculture. A justification (or an apology) is provided for all socially inequitable arrangements in terms of economic rationality. Or else it is presumed that archaic

relationships in land are symptoms of economic backwardness and will be swept aside in the process of economic growth. Both historical developments and *a priori* reasoning go against these views.

There are several economically inefficient and socially unjust tenurial arrangements which can be traced to certain social, political and other extra economic developments. Their perpetuation over a period of time has made the whole mass of tenantry weak and

inert. These people can be stirred out of their inertia only by the introduction of some external stimuli. Land reforms when properly conceived and implemented can act as a powerful stimulating agent. In fact, the rationale of any reform in land tenure should lie in its capacity to spark off the will to develop among the beneficiaries and release the energy needed to make it effective.

However, it will not be right to say that the defects in the agrarian structure of a country are automatically corrected with the country's economic development. There are evidences to show that defective tenurial systems have frustrated several efforts for economic development in the countryside. In our own country, a programme like the Intensive Agricultural District Programme (Package Plan), under which all the modern inputs were to be provided in suitable doses right at the farm level, could not show encouraging results in areas where rack-renting or insecurity of tenure prevailed.

This is not to deny that there can be a conflict, at least at the margin, between the goals of economic efficiency and social equity. But I maintain that areas of such conflicts are very narrow and also that by taking suitable ancillary measures they can be resolved in a way that the net social benefits enhance. A review of India's land reform programme provides several objective lessons in this direction.

The Past

There is a history of land reform legislation in India dating back to the seventies and eighties of the last century. However, a deliberate effort to change the relationships in land was made only after the popular ministries were installed in various provinces in the late thirties. These efforts proved more or less abortive. The land reform programme with very definite objectives was initiated just after independence. In its scope and content this programme has few parallels in world history. This fact should be recognised even by those who are not satis-

fied with its final outcome. A backward and exploitative land system was sought to be transformed to one which would be responsive to the requirements of social and economic change.

In our country, under the umbrella of the two principal tenure systems, *ryotwari* (peasant proprietorship) and intermediary tenures, a plethora of tenurial arrangements had emerged with a varying bundle of rights between State, land-holder and tiller. Over a period of time, these systems gave rise to defects which are by now well known.

Main Features

The existence of functionless intermediaries, a large class of tenants operating under distinctly oppressive conditions with regard to the payment of rent and the duration of tenure, and the uneven distribution of land leading to a concentration of land with a small number of people on the one hand and the palpably small size of the majority of holdings on the other, were the main features of the tenurial systems which we had inherited at the time of independence. Such a system was not likely to create conditions favourable to economic or social progress. Rack-renting reduced saving potential, insecurity of tenure led to 'capital-rationing' and, palpably small farms impeded the adoption of some of the commonly known improvements in agriculture.

The incidence of these defects as well as their implications on agricultural production differed from one area to another. There were certain areas, probably accounting for one-third of the cultivated surface, where genuine peasant proprietorship prevailed. Over some other parts of the area the landlords belonged to the category of small land-holders who would lease out the land and go to some urban area to eke out a living. The landlord-tenant relationships in these areas gave very little scope for exploitation of the tenantry.

Also, on small areas of land, where cultivators mutually agreed

to till each others holdings due to, say, locational convenience, the landlord-tenant relationships were on an entirely different footing. Such exceptions apart, a large part of the country has an agrarian system, the features of which I have described earlier.

Correction

The land reform legislation sought to correct these defects by taking the following steps: (1) abolition of intermediary tenures; (2) tenancy reforms which comprised of, (a) according security of tenure to the tiller of the soil, (b) scaling down rents to 1/4th or 1/6th of the produce and (c) enabling tenants to acquire ownership of holding on payment of ownership price; (3) ceiling on land holdings. There was a near unanimity in the country on the need to abolish function-less intermediaries and to provide security of tenure to the tenants. On other provisions of land reforms there was a voice of dissent from certain sections of the people from the very beginning, which with the passage of time has become more insistent.

The abolition of intermediary tenures generally involved three steps, namely, vesting of intermediary rights in the State after paying suitable compensation, allowing occupancy rights to the intermediaries in their home-farms, and conferring occupancy rights on the tenants of the rest of the estate. There is a general impression in the country that compensation to intermediaries, especially to the big landlords, was over-generous.

It is also recognised that landlords had ejected, on a large scale, tenants from their holdings and incorporated these holdings in their home-farms, as the abolition of intermediaries became imminent. Most of the States allowed the intermediaries to keep these lands intact in their home-farms. The tenants on the remaining parts of the estates did benefit as the rents were brought down, illegal exactions were removed,

security of tenure was assured and provisions for assuming full fledged occupancy rights, after making necessary payments, were made.

In most of the States the intermediary abolition was carried out thoroughly, at least in the letter of the law, if not in the spirit of the law. This was due to the unpopularity of the intermediaries as a class, the more or less equal social status of the bulk of the tenants-in-chief in many States (e.g. in Rajasthan, Rajputs were landlords while the Jats were tenants, in Saurashtra most of the intermediaries were Rajputs while the bulk of the tenants were Kanbis) and a whole hearted support by the political and administrative machine to implement the provisions of the law.

The Reality,

On the other hand, tenancy reforms have remained dead letters in most parts of the country. The basic objective of the tenancy reforms in the first phase of this programme, more or less coinciding with the First Five Year Plan period, was to discourage the spread of tenancy, to protect the rights of tenants where tenancy existed and to provide for them more favourable terms. In practice, none of these benefits really materialised.

The largest number of ejections of tenants in recent history took place between 1951 and 1956. By way of 'personal cultivation', voluntary surrenders and out-right evictions, a large part of the land came back to the landlords. Only the tenants of medium class absentee landlords could take advantage of the legal provisions in their favour. The tenants of big landlords who themselves resided in the village, or had intimate connections with the village, did not benefit at all. Provisions regarding the regulation of rents were honoured more in the breach than in the observance. Nor was there any sizable purchase of land by the tenants.

At the time of the formulation of the Second Five Year Plan it

was obvious to all concerned that the tenancy legislation had not succeeded in achieving its objectives. The principle reasons for this failure was that the majority of tenants in the *ryotwari* areas were small and poor cultivators and belonged to the lower rungs of the social ladder. Their capacity to assert their rights was nominal.

It was made much more difficult because of the pro-landlord bias of the revenue administration. This was fully reflected in the constitution of land tribunals and the procedures adopted in deciding the cases. In such circumstances, landlords could take full advantages of certain major loopholes in the legislation, e.g., vague definition of personal cultivation which enabled large scale resumption of land from the tenants.

The tenancy legislation of the later years started with the objective of abolishing the landlord-tenant relationship by providing occupancy rights to the tiller. But a new agrarian structure had already come into being as a result of the earlier defective legislation and, more still, its faulty implementation. Bigger landlords had firmly entrenched themselves at the expense of the weaker sections of cultivators although the absentee landlordism of the type which prevailed earlier had been completely eradicated, as the landlords had to take residence in the village and closely supervise operations on their holdings.

Ceilings

The legislation regarding ceilings on holdings was effective in curbing future acquisition beyond a certain limit. Apart from that it was ineffective as no State with the exception of Jammu and Kashmir and possibly West-Bengal, has acquired any sizable area of surplus land by the imposition of the ceiling. Nor is there any possibility that they will be able to do so now. With so much talk of ceilings for the last so many years, the bigger landlords have

already divided, at least notionally, their holdings among all the legitimate beneficiaries, present as well as prospective. The other two programmes which could have directly affected the size of holdings, cooperative farming and *Bhoodan*, were limited to such a small area that they could not make any impression on the country as a whole.

Relationships in land are highly complex embracing as they do social as well as personal factors. To gauge the impact of legislation even on a small region requires the intimate knowledge of local conditions. The task of evaluation when attempted for the country as a whole becomes still more difficult because the legislation for land reforms is under the States' competence. In its objectives, formulation, enactment and implementation, the legislation differs from State to State. Even otherwise, as together with the land reforms several other developmental programmes were also initiated in the country-side, it becomes difficult to isolate the effects of land reforms *per se* at any point of time.

Uniform Code

Within these limitations one can only hazard certain conclusions. It is, however, a fact that the land systems all over the country are now fairly simplified and are converging at a uniform code of relationship in land, approximating to the earlier *ryotwari* system. Over a large part of the country, the categories of tenants are reduced to two or three principal types.

This has facilitated the identification of rights and liabilities of cultivators. The keeping of proper revenue records, one of the major handicaps in the implementation of land-reforms, becomes easier and scope for discrimination by the revenue authorities is reduced. The functionless intermediaries are practically wiped out. There is a greater coincidence of ownership and management of land. The extent of tenancy has also been reduced considerably, although

tenancy is by no way extinct. Concealed tenancy, which in certain ways is more injurious to agricultural development, has taken the place of open, legal tenancy.

If our earlier assumption of large scale resumption of land by the former landlords for self-cultivation is correct, the average size of operational holdings should have increased. However, the figures revealed by the National Sample Survey for 1953-54 and 1960-61 suggest a diminution in the average size of an operational holding from 7.53 acres to 6.56 acres. This can be explained only in terms of population pressure on land which grew unabated during the last decade.

Further Polarisation

Its other, and more disturbing, implication would be a further polarisation in the size of holdings between a small number of big landholders and a multitude of small cultivators, the medium size holders accounting for a very small percentage of cultivated land. However, this conclusion cannot be verified in the absence of a proper census of land holdings.

The land market in the country has been further circumscribed. Both the sale and purchase of land, and the leasing-in and leasing-out of land has been put under severe restrictions, especially the leasing-out of land. This has proved to be a mixed blessing. While unproductive investment in land, merely with the hope of realising unearned incomes in the form of rent, is discouraged it has taken away, or at least restricted, the scope for going up on the agricultural ladder from landless labourer to tenant cultivator, from tenant cultivator to owner-cum-tenant and, from owner-cum-tenant to a viable farmer. This possibility, it must be recognised, was even in the best of the circumstances, little more than a theoretical possibility.

The land reform legislation can affect agricultural production by changing the size of holdings as

well as by changing the tenurial conditions. The size of operational holdings is relevant not only because of the economies of scale in agricultural production, on which there is no clear-cut evidence one way or the other, but because in our country the credit, subsidies and general patronage by the State officials is dispersed directly in relation to the size of holdings.

The Two Extremes

The land reforms have touched the structure of agricultural holdings at two extremes. On the one hand, a small number of large holdings have come into being as the absentee landlords resumed their land and started self-cultivation. From all available accounts, on these holdings agriculture is highly commercialised and is carried out in a scientific manner, with the use of all State-given or State-subsidised inputs and facilities.

At the other extreme are the former share-croppers or landless tenants, again few in number, who acquired small bits of land either from their landlords under tenancy reform, or from the State under some scheme of land redistribution. (In many parts of the country government, while resuming the estates of ex-intermediaries, also came in possession of waste land in sizeable blocks. In some States these lands have been distributed among landless labourers). The cultivation on these farms has not shown any improvement. This is partly because these farmers lacked the wherewithals for improved cultivation but mainly because there was no will to progress in evidence. The only change in attitude one could observe was their misplaced pride in ownership of land and wasteful social expenditure in order to 'behave' as land-holders.

The tenancy reforms have substantially benefitted the middle peasantry most of whom were, even earlier, owner-cum-tenants. The small peasantry, who were mostly landless tenants, were the worst sufferers, as they were the major prey to evictions by the

landlords. After the wave of eviction is over and things are settling down, these are the people who are again emerging as the landless tenants cultivating land under concealed tenancy. Under the changed circumstances they are worse off as the incidence of insecurity has further increased while there is no prospect of any reduction in the rent. As should be expected, the cultivation on these plots is largely subsistence oriented and is done at a low level of productivity.

The Beneficiaries

In the ultimate analysis, the beneficiaries of the land reform legislation are the big landlords who have now changed their role and have become substantial farmers availing of all the facilities given by the State to the agricultural sector, and the medium class owner-cum-tenants who have been able to enlarge their ownership holdings by taking advantage of the tenancy legislation. The victims are the small owners-cum-tenants or landless tenants who have borne the major brunt of evictions and are now mostly tenants-at-will. Even those among the small farmers who got the occupancy of land have not shown any signs of waking up to the new opportunities, how-so-ever limited they are. The cultivators who owned small, uneconomic holdings before the land reform programme are largely by-passed by it, as by other programmes of rural development. Their conditions remain what they were before.

Let me end this review of land legislation with a poser: will it not be advisable to strengthen the peasant proprietorship sector comprising the big and medium peasants on the one hand and to have a massive programme of co-operative farming for the small cultivators on the other? Is there any other alternative to this two-sector approach to Indian agriculture if we wish to raise the substantial mass of Indian peasantry from the pool of stagnation?

Tenancy and resource allocation

A. K. SEN AND T. C. VARGHESE

IT is generally conceded that the tenurial conditions of Indian agriculture continue to be disquieting despite attempted and partially successful land reforms. The *inequity* of the system has been widely noted. At the same time it has become increasingly common to argue that the *inefficiency* of this institutional feature is not so clear. This is the subject matter of this paper. We begin by studying the extent of the prevalence in India of tenancy in general and of share-cropping in particular (Part I), and then we examine the efficiency implications of the tenurial conditions in the light of some recent contributions (Part II).

In the next section we discuss the reasons for expecting misallocation of resources under tenant farming. The relevance of such consideration depends on the extent of the prevalence of tenant farming in Indian agriculture. As a prelude to the efficiency discussion, therefore, we examine the available data on this empirical question. Reliable data on tenancy are relatively rare. We have used two sources, viz, *Census of India 1961* [1], and the *National Sample Survey* [5]. The former gives an exhaustive collection of data, but unfortunately stops with classifying area into three broad categories, viz, 'owned' holdings (including leases from the State),

'purely tenanted' holdings, and 'mixed' holdings. On the other hand, while the NSS (8th round) gives a much finer classification, its coverage is more limited, and it relates to an early date, viz, 1953-54. We have used here both the sources.

From the 1961 Census we find that of the total area, the aggregate proportion of purely tenanted holdings and mixed holdings, which together we call here 'tenancy infested holdings', is 23.2 per cent for the rural area and 21.8 per cent for the urban area.¹ Our first question is whether this gives us a good notion of the order of magnitude of the prevalence of tenancy. The difficulty is that not all land is equally important from the point of view of productivity or potential increases in productivity. In particular, we would expect that the land which has irrigation, or assured rainfall, would be more important than relatively drier land. The loss from tenant cultivation in such wet areas will tend to be greater than that from tenancy in the more dry regions.

We have estimated the proportion of 'tenancy infested' area in

* Presented at the Seminar on 'Indian Agriculture: Problems and Promises' arranged by the Agricultural Economic Research Centre of the University of Delhi on April 1-2, 1966.

1. Sharma (7)

TABLE I

Percentage Distribution of Cultivated Area in Districts with Extensive Irrigation (A) and Assured Rainfall (B) according to the Tenurial Interest of Households

Category	Tenurial Interest of Households	S T A T E S															
		A.P.	Assam	Bihar	Gujarat	J. & K.	Kerala	M.P.	Madras	Mysore	Orissa	Punjab	Rajasthan	Maharashtra	U.P.	West Bengal	Total
A	Owned	71.9	77.4	74.6	*	55.5	15.6	*	52.3	*	**	46.0	88.5	*	96.8	76.4	64.7
	Tenancy																
	Infested:																
	Total	28.1	22.6	25.4		44.5	84.4		47.7			54.0	11.5		3.2	23.6	35.3
	Pure	6.5	6.1	2.6		1.8	50.1		21.1			7.5	1.9		0.6	6.5	6.8
	Mixed	21.6	16.5	22.8		42.7	34.3		26.6			46.5	9.6		2.6	17.1	28.5
B.	Owned	**	62.8	69.2	80.1	55.3	45.1	81.3	77.5	49.7	78.0	66.1	**	74.5	94.3	64.2	72.4
	Tenancy																
	Infested:																
	Total		37.2	30.8	19.9	44.7	54.9	18.7	22.5	50.3	22.0	33.9		25.5	5.7	35.8	27.6
	Pure		8.3	3.6	4.7	17.1	34.1	3.2	5.0	22.3	2.8	12.5		5.8	0.7	10.5	5.9
	Mixed		28.9	27.2	15.2	27.6	20.8	15.5	17.5	28.0	19.2	21.4		19.7	5.0	25.3	21.7

* No district of this State has 'extensive irrigation'.

** No district of this State has 'assured rainfall'.

the regions of 'assured rainfall' (with rainfall equal to or more than 1,150 mm. a year) and in regions with 'extensive irrigation' (with 50 per cent or more of gross sown area under irrigation). The results of the calculation are given State-wise in Table I.

It is to be noted that the prevalence of tenancy is significantly higher in the wet areas (including irrigated land) than in the dry areas. For the areas with assured rainfall, the area covered by 'tenancy infested' holdings totals 27.6 per cent, and for areas with extensive irrigation it amounts to 35.3 per cent. This contrasts with 23.2 per cent of 'tenancy infested' land for rural India as a whole. This indicates that the importance of the tenancy question is greater than the arithmetic of the all-India figures suggests.

Within tenant farms, the share-cropped ones raise some special problems, which are discussed in the next section. No information on this is available from the Census publications. We have to use the NSS data of the 8th round [5]. It is worth noting, on the general problem of consistency of the two sources of data, that the proportion of 'leased in' land for all India is about 20 per cent according to the NSS survey,² which is slightly lower than the proportion of the 'tenancy infested' land in the Census data. The 'tenancy infested' land, however, includes the mixed holdings and, furthermore, the 1961 Census relates to a period about seven years later than the NSS survey. So there is no noticeable inconsistency in the two sets of information, although the data are not in comparable categories to allow us to make any statements about the trend of change over these years.

Table II gives the breakdown of the tenancy land into different modes of owner-cultivator rela-

tionship. We have found it more meaningful to aggregate the categories in a somewhat different way from that used in the NSS presentation. We have four categories of rent: (a) formally fixed rent, (b) fixed rent where the contract is 'informal', (c) rent formally or informally fixed as a proportion of output, and (d) other types and unspecified. Of this only (c) is share-cropping rigidly defined. But, as has been noted by Thorner [8], Ladejinsky [3], and others, the line is difficult to draw between share-croppers and tenants with oral leases. With informal leases, the landlord may be able to charge a higher rent when the yield goes up, thereby making it rather similar to share-cropping from an economic point of view. Thus, for our purpose a better idea of the extent of *de facto* share-cropping can be obtained by aggregating (b) and (c). It is very likely that quite a bit of category (d) also falls within the general coverage of share-cropping, but in the absence of more definite information, we leave it out from our calculation.

It is seen that for India as a whole, the percentage of share-

cropping (rigidly defined) in tenancy areas is 36.6, and the *de facto* share-cropping area comes to 56.5 per cent. Furthermore, 22.7 per cent of the tenancy area comes under the last unspecified group. In fact, only 20.8 per cent of total tenancy area is under formal contracts with fixed rent, and beyond this figure we cannot be sure of the rest being free from share-cropping.

To conclude, roughly half the tenancy land seems to be under *de facto* share-cropping, and only a fifth definitely free from it. We have not got the data to carry the calculation through to the division between dry areas and wet areas, as we did with the prevalence of tenancy as such. It is clear, however, that on any basis share-cropping must be regarded to be quite widespread in the tenant holdings, and if there is any efficiency implication of this mode of tenancy, this is likely to be important for India.

The classic arguments against tenant cultivation as opposed to owner cultivation are the following:

- (1) The tenant has relatively little interest in undertaking

TABLE II
Breakdown of Tenancy By Types

Population Zones	Formally Fixed Rent	Informally Fixed Rent	Rent fixed as proportion of output	Other Types and unspecified
	(a)	(b)	(c)	(d)
North India	27.90 (3.18)	13.13 (1.49)	27.65 (3.15)	31.32 (3.56)
East India	24.64 (4.96)	13.08 (2.63)	49.58 (9.97)	12.70 (2.55)
South India	29.06 (6.36)	20.00 (4.38)	26.03 (5.70)	24.91 (5.45)
West India	23.95 (5.36)	18.35 (4.10)	32.70 (7.32)	25.00 (5.60)
Central India	18.42 (3.44)	22.72 (4.24)	37.73 (7.04)	20.51 (3.83)
North-West India	11.18 (2.96)	25.02 (6.62)	37.97 (10.05)	25.83 (6.83)
All India	20.79 (4.23)	19.95 (4.06)	36.56 (7.44)	22.70 (4.62)

Source: N.S.S. (5)

Notes: 1. The figures represent percentage of tenancy areas under different modes, and the figures within brackets give the corresponding percentages of the total cooperated area.

2. The percentage figures for central India do not add up to 100 as given in the N.S.S. (5), Table 3.19, p. 20. The reason for this is not known to us.

2. The proportion of 'leased out' land is lower, but that is what we would expect, in view of the fact that (i) absentee, landlords are not fully covered in the leased-out figures, and (ii) there may be conscious under-statements by the owners fearing legal problems in non-cultivating ownership.

long run improvements in the land he cultivates, for he does not own the land and may not be able to enjoy the fruits of his efforts and investment. This applies to all types of tenant farming except those with security of tenure (*de facto*, and

cultivator (or a tenant with fixed rent) and for a tenant receiving 40 per cent share of the crop. Two alternative 'response rates' are assumed to the package of improved practices, and the price of paddy is taken here to be Rs. 17 per bag. The results are quoted below in Table III.

TABLE III

Rate of Return on Investment in the Package Practices

Type of Tenure	Response Rate	Rate of Return (%) to		
		First $\frac{1}{2}$ of Pk.	Second $\frac{1}{2}$ of Pk.	3rd $\frac{1}{2}$ of Pk.
1. Owner cultivator	'High'	186	186	91
2. Fixed Rent Tenant	'Moderate'	91	72	15
3. 40% share cropper	'High'	72	72	11
	'Moderate'	15	3	—

(Source: [2], Table II.)

not merely *de jure*) at fixed rents.

- (2) In the case of share-cropping, even the application of current inputs is unduly restricted. If the share-cropper receives, say, 50 per cent of the gross produce, then the use of a current input, e.g., fertilizer costing Rs. 10, is worthwhile for the tenant only if the marginal increase in output as a result is at least Rs. 20. In fact, with interest cost, the value of output increase has to exceed Rs. 20 by an amount depending on the level of the interest rate.

Both the points are simple enough and have been discussed sufficiently in the past to require no elaboration here. An illustration of the second from an empirical calculation may, however, be interesting from the point of view of the orders of magnitude. We take it from a study of the Intensive Agricultural District Programme at Thanjavur District [2]. The rates of return to the package of improved practices are calculated for an owner-

If this catches the magnitudes correctly, then with 'moderate' responses, the share-cropper may have little incentive to apply the second one-third of the package, and none at all to apply the last third. The owner-cultivator, or the fixed rent tenant, is in quite a different position. With exercises of this kind, it is shown why the share-cropper may be very reluctant to adopt new practices, or (more generally) to make investments.

One limitation of the particular illustration quoted here is the lumping of the improved practices in the package. This makes it difficult to comment on the acceptability of some specific input, e.g., fertilizers. In so far as the I.A.D.P. practice includes using such 'packages', this is a relevant calculation, even though these figures are difficult to compare with the figures of return to specific inputs in different tenurial conditions, which are being discussed extensively these days (e.g., those of Minhas and Srinivasan [4]). However, the illustration does bring out the point about a significantly

lower rate of return to investment in share-cropped farms.

Recently, however, all this has been thought to be too simple, without denying its correctness in theory. Reasonably sophisticated arguments have been used to show why tenancy may not have that much effect on the efficiency of resource allocation given certain other facts. Of these counter-arguments, the following two appear to us to be most important:

- (I) It can be shown that if the input costs are shared in the same proportion as the return, then the marginal rate of return will be the same for the share-cropper as for the owner-cultivator. Why, it is asked, can we not introduce the cost-sharing convention without resorting to ambitious (and perhaps politically unrealistic) programmes of abolishing share-cropping?

- (II) While the rate of return is scaled down by crop-sharing tenancy, the return to modern inputs is often so high, that even after the scaling down, the net return is sufficiently lucrative to permit as wide a use of these inputs as the supply conditions permit. Perhaps the most satisfactory presentation of this argument in the context of fertilizers is to be found in Minhas and Srinivasan [4], whose data on the rate of return to fertilizers are reproduced later.

Minhas and Srinivasan conclude that 'share-cropping should not become a hinderance to the use of current inputs like fertilizers.'

5. (4). p. 24. This is explained to be a statement about the short-run and it is accepted by the authors that in the long run share-cropping can obstruct the process of intensification of current input use far short of levels which would be desirable from the point of view of extracting maximum output from the limited amount of available land (4 p. 24). It is also accepted that tenancy is not at all conducive to long run investment in land (p. 24).

TABLE IV
The Minhas-Srinivasan Estimate of Return to Fertilizers

Group	Cultivators share	Optimal dosage of nitrogen (kgs./ha) given that variable cost is		Net Revenue/ha given that variable cost is		Net returns as % of fertilisers' cost given that variable cost is	
		10%	20%	10%	20%	10%	20%
New Variety of Wheat	100%	88.4	84.9	256.5	210.4	159	136
	50%	60.5	53.6	60.3	42.0	107	89
	40%	46.6	37.9	28.6	16.9	34	24
Existing Variety of Wheat Irrigated	100%	47.0	45.6	207.9	149.7	242	180
	50%	35.7	32.9	65.2	60.1	79	65
	40%	30.1	26.5	29.3	20.3	53	42
Existing Variety of Wheat Unirrigated	100%	30.4	28.0	49.6	37.7	98	74
	50%	10.9	6.0	19.9	11.0	20	21
	40%	1.2	—	—	0.1	5	—
Rice	100%	43.2	41.8	167.9	139.3	213	183
	50%	33.1	30.3	49.2	36.9	81	67
	40%	28.0	24.6	28.2	19.3	55	43

(Source: Minhas and Srinivasan [4], Table 4, p. 23)

We discuss the two counter-arguments in turn. Regarding the first, the following counter-arguments are worth presenting.

Cost-sharing, while prevalent in some areas, is by and large not the rule in India. The difficulty in its wider use arises partly from the fact that under certain market conditions, it is not in the interest of the owner of the land to share the costs. The owner is not interested in maximizing either the yield or the return to the share-cultivators; he is interested in maximizing his own return. It may be possible for him to get a larger return to himself even with a lower total output. An illustration brings out the point. Suppose with a crop-sharing arrangement without cost-sharing, a 50 per cent share cultivator applies Rs 100 worth of inputs. The next chunk that he can apply is, say, Rs. 10 yielding Rs. 18 in return altogether. The cultivator's share being Rs. 9 out of this, he is unwilling to put this in. The landlord will, of course, now be willing to pay a little over Re. 1 of the cost, so that the cultivator will have to pay a little under Rs. 9. The return to the cultivator being Rs. 9, he will now stand to benefit from this sharing arrangement. The landlord of course benefits much more, viz, a little under

Rs. 8, through this marginal operation.

But the picture is quite different if the total costs (and not only the marginal bit) have to be shared. Even if the landlord has to pay out of the total costs no more than the proportion of the marginal cost that we assumed him to be paying, viz., just over 10 per cent, his share of the original cost of Rs. 100 will come to a little over Rs. 10. So that by sharing all costs, the landlord is a net loser, even though the total output is larger. Situations of this kind cannot arise under all market conditions, or under all bargaining situations, but they can arise often enough to make this a real limitation to the proposed substitute of tenancy reform.

The assumption of 'perfect foresight', implicitly used in some models, is misleading. If there is uncertainty, and the owner's views about, say, input response or about future prices, differ from those of the cultivator, cost-sharing poses some problems. Each party has to agree that his part of the traditional return will exceed his part of the cost (with appropriate weighting of alternative possibilities, including perhaps a risk-margin), and if one of them does not, the inputs cannot be

applied with mutual consent. If there is distrust of the other's ability to foresee, this cost-sharing scheme may be a very difficult one to run in practice.

Some costs cannot really be shared, in particular the labour of the cultivator. Of course we can consider a model where the owner compensates the cultivator for half of the money-value of his disutility from each additional hour of work, but the difficulties of such 'cost sharing' are obvious enough.⁶ It should be added that if the share-cropped farm has lower labour-intensity than a similar owner-cultivated farm, the non-labour factors (e.g., fertilizers) may also be applied more in the former than in the latter, because of complementarity between labour and other factors (e.g. greater use of labour causing a rise in the marginal productivity of fertilizers). Thus, the fact that the fertilizer cost may be shared in the same proportion as the output, does not make the intensity of fertilizer use the same in the share-cropped farm as in a similar owner-cultivated farm.

It is seen that cost-sharing is not as much of a substitute to land reform as it might appear. Cost-sharing should, of course, be encouraged as far as possible in the share-cropped farms, but this does not serve the purpose for which land reform is usually advocated. We turn now to the second counter-argument, and the following reservations seem to be worth mentioning.

Given the extent of uncertainty and what the generally poor cultivator has to face in case of crop failure, a high mathematical expectation of returns is not a guarantee of attractiveness. The Minhas-Srinivasan estimates of re-

6. Also the market value of the labour may exceed the real labour cost defined as the marginal rate of indifferent substitution between product and work, raising a further allocational problem thereby. Incidentally, it should be noted that even if the existence of surplus labour is assumed, this does not imply that marginal disutility of effort is nil, or that the equilibrium marginal product of labour must be zero. See Sen [6]

turn are high, but they are based on the assumption of perfect foresight. It is true, as they show, that 'even under the adverse (40:60) crop-sharing arrangement and when the tenant pays the entire fertilizer cost, he can expect a return better than 40 per cent per crop season on every rupee spent on fertilizers' ([4], p. 24). But a 40 per cent average return may or may not be high enough depending on the uncertainty. With people close to the limit of subsistence any substantial expenditure like that on fertilizers is hazardous if there is any chance of crop-failure. It does not seem to be very easy to conclude from figures of *average* return that the 'tenancy should not become a hurdle in the way of fertilizer use' ([4], p. 24). This is not to dismiss the illuminating analysis of Minhas and Srinivasan, but to argue that some supplementary sums are needed to be done before we can be sure.

The problem of credit has been touched on by Minhas and Srinivasan, and we agree entirely with them on the necessity of 'some arrangements for provision of credit which bypass the problem of collaterals' ([4], p. 24). But so long as such arrangements are not found, the share-cropper will continue to be in a very weak position to borrow, and may have to pay exorbitant interest, so that even a high rate of return (even if certain) may not be quite high enough to induce him to invest. The difficulty in overcoming this credit barrier for cultivators without owning land can be fully appreciated if it is borne in mind that even the cooperative societies are reluctant to lend to share-croppers, as noted (among others) in the Ladejinsky Report ([3], para 10).

Our main reservation on the conclusion of Minhas and Srinivasan lies in the nature of the problem they pose. They are interested in finding out whether the *total* amount of fertilizers that can be absorbed in Indian agriculture in spite of share-cropping is more than the available supply. But there is a further problem of

the *allocation* of that total between different farms. Even if there is no problem with the total absorption of the fertilizers and it tends to outstrip the supply, there is no guarantee that they will be distributed *between* the farms in an efficient manner. On the contrary, given the present prevalence of share-cropping, there is every reason to expect that the allocation will be economically inefficient. The division of the available fertilizers would be such that the marginal yield from a unit of fertilizers in an owned holding will equal a fraction of the marginal yield in a comparable share-cropped farm, so that maximum output will not be achieved from the given volume of fertilizers. The argument is a little technical, but it is a simple case of marginal inefficiency.

In the context of the use of fertilizers in the short run, we are concerned not only with the total absorption but in its *allocation*, and in the absence of tenurial changes the allocation will certainly be inefficient. There will be too much fertilizers on some land, viz., those that are owner-cultivated, and too little on other land, viz., the share-cropped areas.

This problem arises from tenurial non-uniformity. In principle, if all land was share-cropped with the same proportional shares, this difficulty would not arise. However, as we have seen owner-cultivation has other advantages (e.g., regarding long run improvements on land, the use of total amount of fertilizers, income distribution) and if uniformity is desired on grounds of allocation of a given amount of fertilizers, that really amounts to an argument against share-cropping.⁷

The importance of land reform seems to be serious *both* in the context of long run improvements of land as well as in that of the use of current inputs like fertilizers. This is not an argument for

postponing the expansion of fertilizers until land reforms are carried out, but it certainly outlines the urgency of a widespread land reform programme. The supposed alternatives to land reform do not seem to take us very far, and in view of the wide prevalence of the pernicious forms of tenancy, discussed in the last section, the need for immediate land reform is quite crucial. Some sophisticated arguments on allocational efficiency, which have been discussed a certain amount recently are seen to contain no implications on the lack of urgency of land reform, though they are sometimes interpreted as such

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7. Also the proportion of owner-cultivated land is considerably higher than tenancy land in India at the moment, so that uniformity in that direction is easier.

Books

GROWTH RATES IN AGRICULTURE.

Economic and Statistical Adviser, Ministry of Food and Agriculture, Government of India, New Delhi, 1964.

AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT: Problems and Perspectives.

Department of Agriculture, Ministry of Food and Agriculture, Government of India, New Delhi, 1965.

Agricultural statistics in India are rarely reliable. More often than not, they are also badly cooked. There are gaps all along the line—right from the stage of collection of primary or field data to their processing, compilation, analysis and reporting. The base year is quite frequently changed and a new series of indices computed. The result is that the efforts of the previous years suddenly become redundant. Any comparison between the old and the new sets of indices is now almost impossible.

Even the definitions, concepts, methods of study and the tools of analysis are often radically altered. This is usually done on the grounds of introducing improvements in the existing practices. In reality, however, the attempt is primarily intended to paint a rosy picture or else to conceal some ugly facts through a clever combination of the art and the science of statistics. Certain gross approximations are first arrived at—more on guess work than based on field research. These are then refined and reshaped through a laborious but complicated process of

abstraction which, for all practical purposes, makes knowledge unknowable.

Growth Rates in Agriculture is one such attempt. It gives the linear and compound growth rates of 'agricultural productivity', 'agricultural production' and 'area under crops' for all crops, for foodgrains and non-foodgrains, for each major crop separately, for all the States put together and for each individual State. The period of study is 1949-62. The base years are 1949-52=100 and 1952-55=100. In all there are eight chapters and 111 appendices giving the all-India and State-wise index numbers and growth rates of agricultural production, productivity and area under crops.

The linear and compound growth rates show the trends in production, productivity and area under crops 'during specific periods of time for purposes of inter-State and inter-crop comparisons'. The linear trends are those which show 'a constant amount of increase/decrease per unit of time'; the amount of increase or decrease being expressed as 'a percentage of the level in the base period'. The compound or 'geometric' rates of growth, on the other hand, are those which show 'a constant rate of increase per unit of time'.

The linear growth rates are computed on the basis of 'three yearly moving averages of the index numbers' which are 'adjusted by taking the average of the indices for the first triennium, i.e., 1949-50 to

1951-52, as 100. With time as the 'independent variable' and the adjusted moving averages of the index numbers as the 'dependent variable', a linear equation ($y=a+bx$) was then fitted, 'with origin at the average of triennium, 1954-55 to 1956-57'.

The compound growth rates, on the other hand, are computed by 'least-squares fitting' of the exponential function ($Y=AB^x$) to the adjusted three yearly moving averages of the index numbers'.

The growth rates thus computed reveal a few interesting facts, as may be seen from the following reproduction of the rates of growth pertaining to all crops for the whole of India.

Growth rates in agriculture:		
	1949-62	
	(1949-52=100) (1952-55=100)	
<i>Agricultural Production</i>		
Linear growth rate	4.07%	3.23%
Compound growth rate	3.49%	2.94%
<i>Agricultural Productivity</i>		
Linear growth rate	1.75%	1.76%
Compound growth rate	1.64%	1.67%
<i>Area Under Crops</i>		
Linear growth rate	1.99%	1.31%
Compound growth rate	1.83%	1.25%

How accurate these estimates are cannot be verified. But they show the curious fact of constantly rising production of foodgrains and non-foodgrains in the country (the rate of increase all through being more than the annual rate of increase in population) amidst, what we all know, increasing shortages of food and rising imports under P.L. 480. And this rise in domestic production is not only due to increase in 'gross area sown' but also due to constantly rising rates of agricultural productivity. The picture is not changed even if the rates of growth for foodgrains and non-foodgrains, at the all-India level and for most States of India, are considered separately.

The estimates also show that a change in the base year (from 1949-52=100 to 1952-55=100) gives still better results so far as the rates of agricultural productivity are concerned. This will, no doubt, provide an opportunity to the authorities to claim greater credit for their planned efforts than that hitherto given to them.

The second publication, *Agricultural Development: Problems and Perspective*, is indeed full of such claims. 'The long-term trend in agricultural production in India', claims the report, 'has been upward. Taking the average agricultural production for the triennium 1949-50 to 1951-52 as base, over the period 1949-50 to 1961-62, agricultural production marked an average linear growth rate of 4 per cent per annum, the contribution of growth in area and productivity to the growth of production being almost equal.'

And soon thereafter:

Even for the period 1952-53 to 1961-62 the rate

of growth of agriculture is slightly ahead of the rate of increase in population. However, this rate is not adequate to meet the additional demands... The income elasticity of demand for foodgrains is high and will continue to be so, till the standards of living are greatly improved... It is in this context that a rate of growth of 5.6 per cent (simple) per annum for agricultural production is considered inescapable for the Fourth Plan period.

From linear and compound growth rates, the shift is backward—5.6 (simple) per cent per annum. Even if this is achieved, at the end of the Fourth Plan the linear rate will be less than 5.6 per cent and the compound rate even less.

There are many more gaps. The reporting year is frequently changed. The years for which production of different crops are reported or highlighted in *Agricultural Development*, for instance, are those which were the best years for the crops under report—36.5 million tonnes of rice 'in 1963-64' and 12.0 million tonnes of wheat 'in 1961-62'; 6.4 million bales of jute 'in 1961-62' and 5.4 million bales of cotton 'in 1963-64'.

There are then the impossible estimates which only the Ministry knows how to calculate. Estimates of rat-holes or the quantity of local manures used are really beyond human ingenuity. Yet the Ministry knows all about them. One of its calculations, for instance, shows that 'in 1963-64 about 93 million tonnes of rural compost and 3.1 million tonnes of urban compost' were utilised. A highly laudable attempt, no doubt. But is it really necessary to jump the fence when the fence is not there?

Compared to the report on *Agricultural Development*, the brochure on *Growth Rates in Agriculture* is a far better study. Students of agricultural economics and planning will find it a useful reference book. Those interested in having a descriptive account of the progress and performance of the programmes of agriculture will also find the report on *Agricultural Development* informative, but far too dull to sustain their curiosity.

Ranjit Gupta

AGRICULTURAL PRODUCTION FUNCTIONS, COSTS AND RETURNS IN INDIA By C. H. Hanumantha Rao.

Asia Publishing House, 1965;

CAPITAL FORMATION IN INDIAN AGRICULTURE

By Tara Shukla.

Vora & Co., 1965.

The first book contains three papers. The objective of the first paper is to assess the factor productivities in Indian agriculture with the help of a sample from the Jagir villages of the former Hyderabad State. To begin with, input-output relationships are studied by the simple ratio technique. This is fol-

lowed by a precise evaluation of output elasticities and marginal productivities of factors of production. An important conclusion emerging from this paper is that the marginal product of labour is not only positive, but also significant. The explanation given by the author for this high elasticity for labour input, despite its abundant supply, is quite convincing. This finding should put a stop to some of the facile and facetious thinking about zero marginal productivity of labour in an under-developed agriculture like ours.

The second paper is concerned mainly with the analysis of efficiency according to farm size. The author questions the commonly accepted notion that the basic problem in Indian agriculture, from the standpoint of efficiency, is the uneconomic size of the farms. He argues for overcoming the managerial bottlenecks of the larger farms through the introduction of mechanised processes for bringing about a more effective utilisation of the large chunk of land resources concentrated among the large farms, if for some reasons the State is not in a position to alter the existing structure of land ownership. This precise role visualised for mechanised techniques should allay all apprehensions with regard to the use of labour-saving techniques in an underdeveloped economy suffering from chronic under-employment of its manpower.

In the third paper the author examines the efficiency of land allocation between different crops by comparing the relative net returns from individual crops and the area sown under them. The author considers the concepts of net-profit and net-value added irrelevant for this purpose. He argues that net farm income, defined as the surplus of gross output over costs excluding the imputed value of family labour, is a more suitable measure for assessing the optimality of farmers' decisions concerning land allocation among different competing crops. The main finding of this paper is that, subject to the physical and technical factors which are beyond the control of the farmers, there is remarkable correspondence between the net income per acre from different crops and the acreage allocated to them. This vindicates the stand of those who have time and again argued that the Indian farmer is basically rational in his allocative decisions.

The second book, which is based on a Ph.D. dissertation of the Bombay University, deals with the question of capital formation in Indian agriculture during the forty year period 1920-60. The questions examined in this enquiry are: what was the magnitude of the resources in the form of durable physical assets, how fast did they grow, how did their composition change, and did the experience of the different regions of the country differ?

The main findings of the study are three. One, the stock of capital has tended to grow during the period 1920-60, but the rate of accumulation being low, it has barely kept pace with the increasing labour supply on account of rise in population. Two, the changes in capital/labour and capital/output

ratios in Indian agriculture during the above period are minor. Three, the traditional forms of capital dominate the capital-mix because of the absence of any major technological change. Irrigation, which is a major land substitute, has helped in relieving the pressure of labour on land, which had not much scope for expansion. The new forms of capital assets have tended to increase at a rather rapid rate only during the plan decade 1950-60.

Research workers, both in India and abroad, who are engaged in studying Indian agriculture and its varied problems will find this study, according to Prof. Schultz who has written a brief foreword to the book, a 'most valuable source of heretofore unavailable estimates of stocks of major classes of physical capital. This study should dispel once and for all the naive view so widely held by economists that agriculture in India is a simple land-labour activity, a pre-capitalist sector with little or no formation of reproducible tangible capital during the long history of India.'

B. D. Dhawan

TRANSFORMING TRADITIONAL AGRICULTURE By Theodore W. Schultz.

Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 1964.

Professor Schultz is a well known and reputed economist, particularly for his contributions to agricultural economics. What he has to say on transforming traditional agriculture therefore carries the weight of authority and naturally deserves serious consideration. In this work he offers an explanatory theory of traditional agriculture and details out its policy implications for growth. Before doing so he contests all those current theories which either use non-economic explanatory variables such as cultural traits regarding thrift and work or are based on the assumption of allocative inefficiency or existence of surplus labour in traditional agriculture. He believes that there is no need to go to such far off fields as culture and ethics for explaining the niggardliness of traditional agriculture because meaningful economic concepts are available which can do the job more efficiently. On the other hand, he not only denies the existence of surplus labour but also that there is any 'allocative inefficiency' in traditional agriculture.

The main burden of the proof of his own theory, which we shall discuss a moment later, and also these denials, rest on two empirical economic studies—a study of a village in North Central India known as Senapur, another of a Guatemalan Indian community of 800 people called Panajachel and finally the author's own discovery of a fact that following the 1918-19 influenza epidemic, the heavy loss of rural manpower (20 million people died, about 6 per cent of the 1918 population) resulted in a fall of agricultural output in India and a reduction in the total acreage sown. After having convinced himself that he has disproved the existence of allocative inefficiency and surplus labour, Professor Schultz propounds his own theory—the theory of the price of

income (permanent) streams'—and examines its implications for traditional agriculture's growth.

This theory is nothing but a transplantation of Milton Friedman's now old theory of permanent and transient incomes and consumption which he developed in opposition to Keynes' theory for explaining the behaviour of developed economies. Well, there is no harm then in accepting it if it works in the economic situation of traditional agriculture. In brief, the theory runs as follows: economic growth denotes increase in income. To obtain an increase in income implies acquisition of the source upon which it depends. This source can be acquired at a price. An increase in income therefore can be obtained at a price. The central problem thus reduces to the determination of the price of an income stream. Here we suppose the existence of a competitive market where there are suppliers and demanders of the sources of the income stream whose bidding, under a constant set of preferences and motives, settles the price of the income stream. The human and non-human capital are the sources of the income stream.

In traditional agriculture, so says this theory, the prices of the sources of income streams has reached a high stationary level where no motives, under the state of arts and preferences, are left among the demanders and suppliers to do any more business. What is the way out of this? The answer is to move to a new state of art which means the adoption of new techniques. The initiative for this move lies with the suppliers (the State and any other private agencies) of the sources of income streams. They must produce these sources at a cheaper price so that the long run equilibrium of high price is broken and transactions reopen. This will lead to an increase in income and therefore growth. The change in the state of arts means taking to new forms of human and non-human capital, such as training and education of farmers, machinery, fertilizers, new seed variety and so on.

This summary I believe brings into sharp focus what Schultz has to say in this book. There is no room for doubting the logical structure of this theory in the same way as in the case of price determination in a perfectly competitive market. Nevertheless, the criticisms which apply in general to the latter apply to Schultz's theory too. Perhaps they apply more sharply because the idea of a competitive market for the produced means of production is far remote to subsistence agriculture. In it as yet there is no division of the community into suppliers and demanders.

To come to Schultz's denial of allocative inefficiency and surplus labour in traditional agriculture, perhaps more is needed to get convinced. Speaking from Indian experience, there are empirical works which show the existence of allocative inefficiency in Indian agriculture, notably that of M. B. Desai's study of Maharashtra farmers, where he shows that farmers could increase their income simply by moving to an optimal allocation. Next, there is no denying the fact that in 1919-20 there was no surplus

labour in Indian agriculture. This does not prove that in 1950-51 or 1960-61 the same situation was holding. As a matter of fact, it was only after 1921 that India's population began to rise and in 1941 it was about 27 per cent more and in 1951 about 44 per cent more. Correspondingly, the net area sown increased at a nominal rate of 0.1 to 0.2 per cent in the 1920s and 1930s.

Naturally, the pressure of population on land was gradually building up and that it may have given rise to the phenomenon of surplus labour in the 1940s and 1950s indeed sounds reasonable. This is further born out by the fact that while the total population was increasing, the proportion of workers in it was falling during 1921-1951 (from 47 per cent to 39 per cent). More and more people were being thrown at the margin to share work in bits and pieces with their more fortunate fellowmen that they were not counted as workers in the censuses.

Schultz's own theory as developed in this work is based upon very slender empirical grounds. How can a village in India and a tribal economy of 800 persons in Guatemala become the basis of a general theory of traditional agriculture? In this respect Schultz's criticism of earlier writers boomerangs. In the general context of the growth of underdeveloped economies, the implication of this theory is different from those based upon the concept of surplus labour. It places emphasis on agriculture as the growth promoting sector whereas in the earlier theories industry was the prime mover. This will take us far outside the present field otherwise there is much that can be said on the implications of this shift in emphasis.

S. N. Mishra

LAND AND LABOUR IN INDIA By Daniel and Alice Thorner.

Asia Publishing House, Bombay.

The food situation in the country irrefutably exposes the hollow claims made on behalf of our so-called agricultural progress. The full extent of the problem is unknown, but what one sees points only to one solution—the need for real, as opposed to paper, land reform. Surveys cannot help to ascertain the difficulties faced by the peasant, who, with his proverbial meekness, will draw the curtain over his real difficulties. The peasant knows what he would be up against if he sought to divulge information that might embarrass the landlord and moneylender. The surveyor is here to-day and gone tomorrow, while the landlord and moneylender seem to go on for ever.

Agriculture in India presents a bleak picture to the Thorneres, who have studied many land reform bills and seen how they work in practice. They have discussed forms of labour employment, the history of overcrowding of land by the deliberate de-industrialization policy of the British, and the output of the land.

There has been no dearth of land reforms since 1947, and there have been five year plans too. But

in practice, nothing has changed, except that perhaps here and there things are just a little bit better or worse. But as a whole the land reforms passed so far seem only to prove that the poor will always be with us. They have only increased the number of tenants and share-croppers, both of whom are at the mercy of the landlord, who is generally the money-lender and, sometimes, the provisions supplier too. Here is change, for the old type of landlord gives place to the land-owner, and the Thorners do not seem to appreciate the meaning and implications of this change. That is because they study not the general socio-economic systems but some details of the superficial existing order.

Reasons for the failure of land reform could be many. Here are just a few. 'The UP Zamindari Abolition Act of 1950 does not require the cultivator to till...He does not have to go to the fields and work... he is not even required to be in the village at all.' With all their awareness, somehow, the Thorners miss the very obvious reason, that vested interests cannot favour land reform. One popular method in the UP was to turn leased land into land under personal cultivation, literally overnight. It wasn't magic, it was just 'a few strokes of the pen in the village records,' by village officials. Their behaviour could easily be explained. 'The record keepers were small people, many of whom owed their appointments to the larger holders.'

The general conclusion after a study of various land reforms is, therefore, 'To date, India has not yet had the kind of land reforms that could conceivably pave the way for a period of rapid agricultural development.' Of course the mightiest of landlords, if not laid low, at any rate have had some of their mightiness chipped off. Those owning 100 villages or so, perhaps own about a thousand acres now. The more enterprising among the dispossessed landlords bought tractors and went in for intensive cultivation.

Employer labourer relations vary from one part of the country to another, but there are common features. They work their fields with traditional near-slave labour. The Thorners also warn the unwary not to be taken in by appearances, which in this particular case, means a contract drawn up between employer and labourer. The Thorners have reproduced copies of such contracts. The details vary, some include two meals a day for the labourer or a share of the produce. Some labourers are engaged on an annual basis, some on a daily one, like they seem to in the Mayurbhanj district of Orissa—the most backward district of a backward State.

Most labourers have one thing in common—perpetual debt. That often keeps the labourer tied to one employer... 'all his working life between ten and seventy...' Aboriginal tribesmen have also been incorporated into civilized society by being recruited as agricultural labour. The Thorners quote as an instance the Halis in some parts of Gujarat, where the Hali system enabled the employer to have in

reserve a dependable source of labour—one moreover which could be paid off-season wages during the height of the seasonal demand. The final summing up of the labour situation is '...various types of servitude, and many degrees of bondage.'

Through the 1951 census, posterity will know that 70 per cent of the Indian people depended on agriculture for their livelihood, and of these, non-cultivating owners and rent receivers made up only 1.5 per cent of the general population. The only thing they could wonder at in the midst of these census-attested statistics is the strength and persistence of the demand in all parts of the country for land reforms

Kusum Madgavkar

PLANNING AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT.

Agriculture, Land Reform and Economic Development, Edited by Ignacy Sachs, Polish Scientific Publishers (PWN), Warsaw, 1964.

These volumes are the first two of a series which the PWN intends to bring out under the general name of 'Studies on Developing Countries'. Both are collections of essays by scholars of repute from Asia, Africa, Latin America and also Europe. These essays were contributed to a 'Symposium by Correspondence' organised by the editorial board of these studies for the purpose of appraising the experiences in planning and development of under-developed economies. Both collections have the rare opportunity of carrying a preface by Professor Oskar Lange whom the world, alas, lost only a shortwhile ago. Quite a few of the essays are in French, in fact most of the those of the second volume. The editors, however, have provided an English summary at the end of each such essay. Apart from some printing errors both books are elegantly produced. They make available at one place varied economic experiences of far separated countries which are, nonetheless, found more or less at the same stage of social growth, facing more or less the same general problem of economic break-through. Their titles well indicate the broad range of subject discussed, from past history to future image.

In the first book, India finds a place of prominence, perhaps because she represents the most important planning experiment in an avowedly mixed economic system. Professors A. K. Dasgupta, Asok Rudra and Shigeto Tsuru all are concerned with planning in India, its problems and achievement and also its future prospects. The only other name chosen from the list of mixed economies is that of Indonesia on which Mohammad Sadli writes in much detail. There are two papers on Ethiopia, one by R. Pankhurst which is a beautiful short piece on the economic history of that country and the other by T. Gulilat on the approach to planning. A rather technical paper by Celso Furtado explores, in all its intricacies, Brazilian economic development of the past half century. P. G. Casanova examines with precision and insight the arrest and the probable release of the Mexican revolution. Finally follows C. Ayari's analysis of Nurkse's celebrated theory of surplus

labour as potential saving in the general context of the employment problem of under-developed countries.

What strikes this reviewer most in the book is the discussion of planning in a mixed economy as experienced in India and Indonesia, Furtado's almost unitary causal determination of Brazilian growth and Casanova's analysis of the Mexican revolution as a mixed linear-cyclical movement. No two of the contributors on mixed economy speak in a common tone. Dasgupta finds that the direction of the economy (Indian) is towards socialism, Rudra feels that 'despite all the declarations of the ruling power...limit in this particular direction has already been reached'. Tsuru says that it 'may be transitional to socialism and again may not be so.' Sadli chooses to remain silent on this issue although from the point of view of rapid growth, he emphatically maintains that a mixed economy bring out the worst of the bourgeois and socialist systems.

Nothing conclusively emerges about the system's efficiency as a mode of production and distribution. Its acceptance by underdeveloped countries is seen by some as a matter of historical necessity, by others as the most feasible least-cost mechanism of the time for the economic growth of those countries and by still others as the unique mode which permits a balanced social welfare function, balanced between economic necessity and political freedom. Since the system results from a compromise it ensures less than maximal efficiency. Planning in such a context is faced with maximum possible constraints. Rudra and Sadli deal extensively with these constraints. On the problem of economic equality, the net effect of the system, pretensions apart, is similar to that of a capitalist economy. Both Indian and Indonesian experiences justify this observation.

Brazil is the case of a capitalist economy which has developed through export diversification and import substitution. In the absence of any planning there, growth occurred through a succession of unbalances expressed in the form of inflationary processes. Can the experience of Brazil be generalised in order to justify inflationary pressures elsewhere? Perhaps not. Only an economy like Brazil with extensive virgin lands to till can afford to have protracted inflationary pressure and yet provide to its poorer stratum conditions of living above starvation.

Casanova's analysis of the Mexican revolution is extremely relevant for the forces of the Left which are committed to socialism in the underdeveloped countries. She thinks that the Mexican revolution, so far away from its point of origin, is a composite of a linear tendency which is cumulative and a persistent revolutionary - counter revolutionary cycle. With this phenomenon the Left has been doing a see-saw between opportunism and sectarianism in Mexico. 'Many Marxists of yesterday are big businessmen of to-day.' If in England protestantism was the ethic of capitalism, in Mexico Marxism fulfilled the same role. 'There was a Marxism of

the bourgeois and for the bourgeois. The young bourgeois is a Marxist, the old an entrepreneur.' In the underdeveloped countries of to-day the Mexican situation may well repeat. This is because a revolutionary process in a mixed economy has the great probability of acquiring a mixed mode of the Mexican type.

The second volume in hand enables us to get an idea of agrarian structures and their problems of reform in such different contexts as India, Brazil, Bolivia and the countries of North Africa. Dr. D. G. Karve provides a general framework for an appraisal of the role of agriculture in economic development against which the relevance of agrarian reforms may be judged. While each essay in this collection has an individuality of its own, certain observations common to them all may be summarised as follows. Most agrarian structures dealt with are dualistic in nature, products as they are of long colonial exploitation of the native economies.

Freedom from colonial rule has not led to the introduction of any radical reform measures. This is partly because parties in power were not prepared to shake-up the traditional structure as in Morocco and pre-1952 Bolivia. Partly also because the existing administrative machinery in league with vested interests defeated the purpose of the reforms by permitting elaborate circumvention of the measures. Other factors that are noted as impediments to reform are: the tradition-bound nature of agriculture, lack of reform consciousness, customary legal codes on property rights, half-hearted nature of the measures, uncooperative bureaucracy etc. Confining most contributions to these general remarks we choose to pick up V. B. Singh's essay for some comment.

Not for one but for many reason is Dr. Singh's appraisal of agrarian relations in India questionable. We shall, however, confine our comment to what is upper-most in his mind namely 'whether or not capitalism has become the dominant mode of production in Indian agriculture', and prior to that what distinguishes capitalism as a mode of production. Since Indian agriculture is in a state of transition, he holds that it is partly semi-feudal and partly capitalist. Then, what answers the question of the 'dominant mode'? A transitional state need not necessarily be an equilibrium state, whatever the nature of the categories under consideration. If one identifies the two, as Dr. Singh does, one commits a methodological error.

This apart, the author does try to disprove the dominance of capitalism in Indian agriculture but fails to convince us. As regards the distinguishing features of capitalism he sets up three criteria: private-ownership, wage labour and production for market. In the course of the analysis he gives up the first criterion and comes to accept an income-criterion in its place, without realising that this latter criterion transfers the relation of labour and means of production to a secondary position in the tool-box of analysis. It is

this departure from the basic criterion which leads the author to conclude that capitalism is not the dominant mode in Indian agriculture, although he very much alludes to the statistical picture of land-ownership.

In India one quarter of peasant households own between them 85 per cent of the land area under cultivation, the remaining 15 per cent of land is torn between 75 per cent of the households. In the absence of any 'extra-economic' coercion of labour—the hall-mark of feudalism—what does this ownership picture prove except the dominance of capitalism? In this brief review we can't go into these questions in any detail. One final remark remains, however. The author seems to suggest that preponderance of large sized 'operational' holdings is a necessary condition for the dominance of capitalism in agriculture. The scale of farming in fact depends on technical conditions of production which enjoy a measure of independence in their development. Capitalism in the beginning no doubt helps this development as it is doing in India by gradually mechanising agriculture even in the presence of plentiful surplus labour. It did in Italy in almost similar situation.

Notwithstanding our critical remarks, the volumes under review are a valuable addition to the list of works on underdeveloped countries. More because they open the possibility of comparative study.

S. N. M.

AGRARIAN REFORMS IN INDIA By Grigory Kotovsky.

People's Publishing House, New Delhi.

Dr. Grigory Kotovsky, the author of *Agrarian Reforms in India*, is one of the few Soviet indologists to whom the study of land reforms in India is a passion of life and an all-absorbing interest. Starting his career with a dissertation for Ph.D. on *Agrarian Relations in Tamilnad and Kerala, 1917-47*, he has written ten additional books on various aspects of agrarian relations in India. *Agrarian Reforms in India* is the latest product of his painstaking studies covering more than a decade, his on-the-spot investigations in India and his discussions with some of the eminent economists in India.

The first part of the book gives a graphic account of the Indian countryside on the eve of agrarian reforms. The feudal nature of ownership rights in land, the complexities of land tenure in Indian States and the exploitation of the tiller—the man behind the plough—in a host of dubious ways, constitute a suitable back-drop to the author's views adumbrated in subsequent chapters. About four pages devoted to India's peasant movement in the post-war period, particularly during the period, 1948-51, however, see too much in the class struggle. The author's complimentary references to the violent movement of Telangana peasants to wrest land forcibly and his overstatement of the role of

the All India Kisan Sabha to hustle the government into action for land reforms betray his preoccupation with class struggle and an inadequate appreciation of India's democratic constitutionalism.

The next two chapters which deal with the reforms of the systems of land holding and land cultivation and the final one, which sums up the author's views, together constitute a terrible indictment of agrarian reforms in India. The author uses a big brush to paint everything dark. He is impatient of 'a formally legal approach' to land reforms, for 'they are aimed not to eliminate the landlord class, but, on the contrary, to preserve it.' (p. 47).

He is also impatient of land revenue, betterment levy and agricultural taxation in whatever form. 'The preservation today of the old system of land revenue set up by the British in the 19th century indicates that land revenue remains essentially a land rent collected from the peasants. The mounting direct taxes in recent years and the redistribution of incomes from the land revenue exploitation of the peasantry between the landlords and the bourgeoisie in favour of the latter show that this form of exploitation of the peasants by the national bourgeoisie is growing all the time.' (pp. 61-62).

Examining the zamindari abolition legislation and land ceilings acts, the author concludes that 'the real purpose of the agrarian policy pursued in India' is 'gradually to convert the landlords and rich peasants into middle and small land-owning farmers of the capitalist type' and 'to draw away the mass of the peasantry from revolutionary struggle for land.' (p. 119). He characterises 'the results of nearly 15 years of implementation of tenancy legislation in independent India' as 'deplorable.' (pp. 144-45).


His verdict on the consolidation of holdings makes it look like a disaster. 'The legislative measures for consolidation of holdings, on the one hand, promote the expansion of the farms of rich peasants and ryot landlords, and, on the other, accelerate the process of ruination and proletarianisation of the bulk of the peasantry, thereby furthering the development of agricultural capitalism in India.' (p. 151).

The book dolefully concludes: 'Capitalism in India is thus developing in the shape of expansion of landlord and rich peasant farms, and as a result there are complicated relations between the upper stratum of the peasantry and the landlords, on the one hand, and the bulk of the peasantry, on the other.' (p. 167)

The only bright spots seen by the author in the landscape of Indian agrarian reforms are a curb on the economic power of zamindar-type landlords and conferment of security of tenure upon the chief tenants.

The book reads like a prosecution case and not an objective study. That the author, Grigory Kotovsky, is an agrarian expert devoted to research is the most surprising part of it. Kotovsky starts his study with an unshakable belief in the Leninist

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


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solution of the agrarian question in a revolutionary 'peasant-proletarian' way and thus sees everything through coloured glasses. Little does he realise that such a solution, apart from being accompanied by violence and bloodshed, has not yet contributed to sufficiency of food even in the USSR, to say nothing of the People's Republic of China, whose so-called anti-feudal agrarian reforms have been hailed by him as 'a prelude to the socialist reorganisation of agriculture.' (p. x).

Extensive documentation from official publications like the series of Five Year Plans and Congress publications like the *AICC Economic Review* and *Congress Bulletin* gives one the impression of objectivity, but the poor Russian reader (the book having been published originally in Russian) has not been told that only the references favourable to the author's viewpoint have been selected and those otherwise scrupulously avoided.

The use of matter from non-research journals like *New Age*, *Socialist Congressman*, *Janata*, *Link* and such other publications as a basis for a research work is also highly questionable. The author has obviously not been judicious in the selection of works for background matter.

In the interest of objectivity, the author should have devoted a brief introductory chapter to the political system in India which permits an unfettered comment on national and international problems and encourages cross-fertilisation of views through debate, discussion and mutual criticism. A voice of dissent from what the author regards as a progressive policy would not then have given his readers the impression of a voice of bourgeois reaction.

Our comments on the lack of objectivity in the book notwithstanding, we commend its study to all serious-minded scholars on the subject, for it lays bare some of the most serious lacunae in India's agrarian reforms. Those of the developing countries which have yet to usher in agrarian reforms may, by its study, learn from some of the mistakes we have made and avoid repeating them. Kotovsky brings to bear on the subject of agrarian reforms a highly unusual, controversial, and yet academic, approach. His work will provide food for thought to all interested in agrarian reforms, its special appeal to the leftists notwithstanding.

H.S.

A STUDY ON TENURIAL CONDITIONS IN PACKAGE DISTRICTS By Wolf Ladejinsky, Consultant to The Ford Foundation.

Issued by the Planning Commission, Government of India.

Wolf Ladejinsky—a well-known American expert on agrarian reforms and a close observer of land reforms in India since independence—was invited by the Planning Commission, Government of India, to report on tenurial conditions in five of the intensive Agricultural Programme Districts. He is outspoken and brutally frank. What, however, impres-

ses one most is not his ability to pick or point holes in agrarian policy but his anxiety to patch them up.

Availability of proper and up-to-date records is a *sine qua non* of a rational policy on tenurial reforms. Ladejinsky is appalled to find that most of the tenancies in Tanjore, West Godavari and Shahabad are oral, with the result that tenants cannot establish their title to the cultivation of a piece of land they are cultivating or have been cultivating for years on end. In Shahabad, even after a decade of land reforms, 'no reliable data are available about how much land is cultivated by *bataidars* and by how many.' Ladejinsky takes strong exception to the accuracy of up-dated records of Shahabad. 'The up-dated records,' he says, 'are totally misleading as far as the tenants are concerned; their rights to tenancy hardly appear in the record.'

Ladejinsky is distressed at the inadequacy of tenancy legislation. In Tanjore, it is of a temporary, stop-gap nature. In West Godavari, there was no tenancy legislation till 1956 and comprehensive legislation is yet awaited. While the law prescribes the maximum limit of rent, it does not provide for any penalty in case of its violation. The provisions in the Andhra Pradesh Tenancy Bill 'give the impression that they are aimed at the protection of landlords rather than tenants.' In Shahabad, 'the law is on their (landlords') side.' In Ludhiana, it 'seeks the improvement of tenancy conditions by aiming to evict about 500,000 tenants and settling them on new holdings.'

Superimposed on the faulty legislation is the wholesale violation of laws. In Tanjore, the share of the landlord amounts to 60-65 per cent of the crop as against 40 per cent prescribed by law. In Shahabad, there is not a single case where the rental provision of the Act is applied. The same is the case of Ludhiana. 'Failing to legislate and enforce in the face of existing non-operative Acts,' to quote Ladejinsky, 'is little short of the State's abdication of its sovereign rights to interfere in the economic and social process when it is found lacking.'

The Ladejinsky Report conclusively proves mass ejections, insecurity of tenure and growing burden of land rents, leading to a shortfall in agricultural investment. If these festering sores are not cured once and for all, the Package Programme, it fears, would suffer stagnation. It, therefore, spells out constructive suggestions for the consideration of the State governments concerned.

The comments of the State governments which form a part of the book under review are interesting to analyse. The government of Andhra Pradesh did not take the trouble to offer any comments—a clear proof of its complacency on the issue. The governments of Punjab and Madras, particularly the former, have come out with a stout defence of their respective systems which, however, does not carry much conviction. The government of Bihar gave it careful consideration and promised constructive follow-up action. The government of UP interpreted it as complimentary to the situation in Aligarh and considered its recommendations in a sober perspec-

tive. All in all, the reader is left with a contrasting picture of Ladejinsky being objective, outspoken and constructively critical and the State governments largely sitting on the fence or taking a defensive posture.

The study under review is an invaluable document which the economists, agronomists and planners in India can ill-afford to miss. It is based on first-hand observations and detailed discussions with the villagers concerned and the officials whom the author has taken to task in unmistakable terms for their apathy, lack of action and complicity with the landlord interests.

It is not clear why it took the Planning Commission more than two years to publish the report which was received in May, 1963. The comments of the State governments—if the latter are responsive—could be secured in a couple of months and the report in its present form could have been published in August or September, 1963, i.e., about two years earlier. The delay in the publication of the report is symbolic of the delay in the evolution, particularly the implementation, of tenurial reforms that could sweep away the roadblocks that hinder agricultural production in India. The recommendations of the Ladejinsky Report are in conformity with the policies adumbrated in our five year plans. Their acceptance, particularly enforcement, should not be difficult for the State governments responsible for agriculture.

Seminarist

LAND REFORMS IN WEST BENGAL By S. K. Basu and S. K. Bhattacharya.
Oxford Book Company, Calcutta, 1963.

A STUDY OF LAND REFORMS IN UTTAR PRADESH
By Baljit Singh and Shridhar Mishra.
East-West Centre Press, Honolulu, 1964.

Both these studies were sponsored by the Research Programmes Committee of the Planning Commission for the purpose of evaluating the extent of implementation of land reform laws in the States to which these studies relate. The work which is incorporated in these volumes was organised by the Department of Economics of Calcutta and Lucknow Universities respectively. The findings in general are based on information collected through a sample survey of agricultural households in the case of U.P. and of plots or fields in the case of Bengal.

The scope of the U.P. study is much wider than that of Bengal. Apart from direct aspects of land reform like the reform cost, land redistribution, security of tenure etc., it covers cropping pattern, land-use pattern, hired and family labour, revenue administration and so on. The Bengal study concentrates on an appraisal of change in the Bargadar system (share-cropping) and the extent of unauthorised land transfers and evictions in the State.

Methodologically, the Bengal study is perhaps more sound than the U.P. one because in the latter

case a household was required to give information on many subjects not only relating to the point of time immediately before the question was asked (1959-60) but also relating to a point in the past separated from the present by as many as 8 years (1951-52). Any comparative inference drawn from the data collected in this way is bound to involve errors of misused memory. Nevertheless, the usefulness of both these studies cannot be over-emphasised.

Whether land reforms in India achieved anything worthwhile except the abolition of intermediaries is a question bothering many heads even today. Because it has not been as yet answered satisfactorily, these studies provide a step towards tackling this question. Broadly, they confirm the general fear that land reform measures in our country have not shown any significant results.

After 10 years of operation in Bengal, the law has been ineffective in changing the Bargadari system either in matters of sharing produce or costs, a system which covers 25 to 30 per cent of land under cultivation. In regard to the ceiling programme, the Bengal study says, the *mala fide* transfers which can more or less be identified with transfers by ways other than inheritance varied between districts from 10 to 25 per cent of the total transferred area and quite a number of these transfers were made in anticipation of the law.

The U.P. study is equally revealing on the failure of land reforms. Even the cost of Zamindari abolition has been so high 'that financially the State Government has not gained anything as a result of Zamindari abolition' (p. 118). The per acre abolition cost worked out at about Rs. 34.50 of which Rs. 32.3 went to the intermediaries. Extreme inequality in land-ownership is still a marked feature of the State, with 33 per cent households at the bottom holding 7 per cent of area while 2 per cent at the top hold 14 per cent of the area. Share-cropping amounted to 9.01 per cent of the total area before Zamindari abolition, while today this figure is 8.67 per cent. If one were to take into account the increase in the cultivated area in the State during this period, this system perhaps has maintained itself or may even have expanded in absolute terms.

More studies of this kind are needed so that a clearer picture of the country as a whole may appear. The failure of India's agriculture is an old story now and the amount of investment which has gone into it is not insignificant. But no corresponding returns have appeared. Inputists argue for more material inputs. But they do not explain that whatever inputs have been used have not yielded results. Institutional arrangements cannot be ignored as explanatory factors. And progress requires a change in them too. Land reform studies of this type may provide the basis for refuting the contention that institutional factors like tenancy are immaterial or irrelevant to growth in agricultural output.

Critic

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Further Reading

A select and relevant bibliography
prepared by D.C. Sharma

COVER

Designed by Dilip Chowdhury

The problem

Many years have gone by since we gave ourselves a constitution. Then we were young as a nation, still flushed with the newness of independence, confident of our oneness and unity despite the tragic warning of partition. There was an eagerness to safeguard and protect the individuality of our different units and peoples, a spirit embodied into our constitutional framework. Today we have the experience of governing behind us and we know now that every serious debate gets bogged down in the complexities of Centre-State relations, confusing the implementation of whatever policy there is. Frustration breeds impatience and, very often, demoralization and psychological exhaustion. The public apathy we speak of, the political drift which we criticize, the gap between precept and practice which we now regard as part of our national ethos, all are rooted in our apparent incapacity to think things out, to bring logic to bear on the problems which surround us.

‘We must be self-reliant’ is the slogan of the day common to both the government and the opposition. And, yet, when food is vitally needed in Bihar, the surplus provinces hedge and delay, the opposition organizes against procurement, and the Centre looks on helplessly, unable to force the issue, thereby eroding its capacity to govern. Political parties without exception, look greedily at every bit of territory outside their own provincial confines, coveting it. They are prepared

to barter away the spirit of national unity for a few extra crumbs of territory. Vast sums are spent on an Education Commission Report when there is no earthly means by which the Centre can even introduce a superior text book in State schools, leave alone implement the Commission's recommendations. So stoutly do the States resent interference in these matters that one can be sure of the copious quantities of parochialism with which our younger generation is being fed. Economic rationality and feasibility is swept aside as a whole province stages a dramatic performance for a steel plant which if agreed upon would mean a tremendous national loss.

The Right tends to base its demand for a strong Centre on revivalist, anti-scientific slogans of banning cow slaughter and imposing the language of a particular region over the entire country. The Left talks about greater provincial autonomy forgetting its scientific moorings, forgetting its role in the partition of India. In a sprawling sub-continent like ours, a polity, federal or otherwise, cannot retain its dynamics without rigorous institutional support which cuts across divisive interests. At the very core of this institutional support is the constitution which we framed for ourselves. It is time we gave it a second look, because to change when change is needed is the imperative in the quest for a total, integrated approach which alone can get this community of 500 million moving to secure its future.

Is the sun setting?

M. N. SRINIVAS

A MORE unpropitious time for writing about the state of the Indian polity is hard to imagine. Not a week passes without the eruption of a fresh crisis which sends shivers down the spines of citizens. And while ordinary folk are worried about our constant companions, crises, and drought and famine, Congress politicians seem to have no time for anything except fighting each other and for election tickets. And they do not seem to consider their conduct anything out of the ordinary. Moral judgments only emanate freely from candidates who have been denied party tickets: they condemn their erstwhile party for corruption, nepotism and what not, and try to form parties which will presumably be pure as driven snow.

What has come over the country? Among the causes usually listed are the harsh economic conditions, especially in the context of devaluation and the unprecedented drought, pre-election instability, regionalism (including linguistic chauvinism), casteism, communalism and corruption, nepotism and factionalism in the ruling party, poor leadership following the death of Nehru and

Shastri, past mistakes of our leadership catching up on us and doctrinaire planning by ideologues in power. I shall consider here only a few of these causes, briefly and, I am afraid, dogmatically.

Before I discuss the causes, I should like to make the point that the causes listed usually vary according to the social background and upbringing of the observers. The westernized intelligentsia, which is very articulate, is, by and large, cut off ideologically from its social base, and even where it is deliberately politically reactionary, its values, attitudes and outlook are radically different from those of the masses. It has a deep conviction that the masses are ignorant, superstitious and narrow, and its plans and programmes for the development of the country totally ignore their sentiments and feelings. The masses have to be told what is good for them though they are not intelligent enough to listen to those who know better. In their private, and sometimes not so private, moments they joke at the stupidity and prejudices of the people, and their elected representatives.

The intelligentsia would probably rebut any suggestion that

they might share secretly, and perhaps unknown to them, some of the values and attitudes of the masses. Thus, they might not themselves fast for the erection of a steel mill or a fertiliser factory in their home region, but they would be happy if one was secured as a result of the fast of someone else. I.A.S. lists would be scanned to find out how many candidates from their own region had got in. Politicians hailing from their own State or region would normally be regarded with greater friendliness than outsiders. A few members of this group would probably reserve their harshest criticisms for politicians from their own region, but that might only mean that the critics are keen to show off their freedom from regionalism. In other words, the intelligentsia is neither as intelligent as it claims to be, nor as honest.

The Mystique

What about those members of the intelligentsia who have a professional, i.e., political, identification with the masses? Here self-interest combines with an elaborate party mystique about the ryot and industrial worker to blur and confuse perceptions. Gandhi and Marx have both contributed to the mystique. Infallibility has passed from kings and popes to the 'people' from which anyone who is educated or not in dire want is excluded. The 'people' want this or they demand that. And whatever the people want, or demand is, of course, just. The government has to concede it. This type of propaganda has gone so deep that both communist and Gandhian intellectuals constantly feel the need to apotheosise workers and peasants though in their 'off' moments they might have some doubts. To Nehru, 'mass contact' had mysterious curative properties much as pious Hindus or Catholics would claim for their favourite deity or saint.

Western, and especially British, observers of the Indian scene have

consistently compared India to Europe in its size, and with reference to linguistic, cultural and social diversity. How can India be a nation? E. M. Forster called it an 'apotheosis'. This angers all patriotic Indians but that ought not to come in the way of appreciating the modicum of truth in it. India is not only vast, and culturally and religiously diverse, but its population is also sharply stratified, socially as well as economically. A crucial consequence of the divisions which characterize Indian society everywhere is the widespread 'minority consciousness'.

Minority Consciousness

The term 'minority' commonly refers to religious or ethnic groups which are numerically small *vis-a-vis* other similar groups, and it is implied that 'minority consciousness' is usually confined to a section and not widespread. But what is striking about India is that minority consciousness is pretty nearly universal. There are not only Muslims, Christians, Parsis, Sikhs and Jains, but also Anglo-Indians, tribals, speakers of non-Hindi languages, Arya Samajists, Sanatanists, Brahmins, Harijans, Vishwakarmas and so on. And even Brahmins and Harijans are synthetic categories—at the local level they are fragmented into tiny, endogamous and named groups.

Since minority consciousness always manifests itself in a negative context, innumerable groups all over the country have a feeling that they have not had a fair deal. Such feelings, paradoxically enough, find their sharpest articulation in the context of development. In the rural areas it is generally the leaders of the dominant peasant castes who have benefitted politically and economically from the new opportunities which have come since Independence. This has produced a widespread sense of grievance among the others.

It is here relevant to mention that, since the closing years of the

nineteenth century, caste groups have shown increased self-consciousness. This naturally began with the higher castes and over the decades it spread to the others. In the case of the latter, increased self-consciousness expressed itself in efforts being made to improve the standing of the caste concerned in the eyes of its neighbours by shedding some customs and ritual, and acquiring more prestigious ones. New group-identities were sought, and to this end myths of origin were either created or elaborated, and names were changed.

Increased Opportunities

A feature of the self-consciousness that gradually assumed increasing importance was a movement to take advantage of the educational and employment opportunities available under the new dispensation. Group self-consciousness became sharper with increased opportunities and, in a democratic system based on adult franchise, dominant peasant castes were the most important beneficiaries. In the process of exploiting the opportunities, the internal divisions within castes began to be ignored, and castes became political pressure groups especially at the State and lower levels. The political, economic and social 'arrival' of the dominant peasant castes has roused the envy of all others who are in a numerical minority *vis-a-vis* the former. And it is pertinent to remark here that in rural areas landowners from the dominant peasant castes have been the traditional oppressors of the landless labourers, largely coming from the Harijan castes, and to a less extent, of the artisan and servicing castes. The oppressed naturally do not welcome the addition of power to the elbows of their oppressors. The high castes which have been displaced by the dominant peasant castes are also understandably bitter.

At the national level, there are religious and ethnic minorities, while at the State and lower levels all castes except the dominant peasant castes have the sense

of being minorities who are at a disadvantage thanks to universal franchise. might have been more generous to minorities.

Secularism

The division of the political society into a number of groups, and the consequent widespread minority consciousness, are antagonistic to stability in a democratic system in which strength rests with numbers. In the game as it is played, a majority of one vote can decide an issue of fundamental importance one way or the other: the casting-vote of the Hindi-speaking Chairman of the Constituent Assembly decided that Hindi should be the official language of the country.

Justice and Generosity

It is no wonder that in the non-Hindi areas there is a widespread feeling that they are second class citizens just as Hindi-speakers feel angry that the Constitution is being flouted in Hindi's not becoming the sole official language of the country. What has never been sufficiently emphasised by our political leaders, many of whom were trained as lawyers, is that the rules of the democratic game need to be underwritten by the rule of justice, if not generosity, to minorities. Attempts to hector, threaten and bully minorities will leave festering sores which work against national integration.

It is indeed unfortunate that the Hindi-speaking area which from the national point of view is the majority area, is also the area of social and economic backwardness: three-fifths of the children in the age-group 6-11 who are not attending schools are in a solid block which includes the Hindi-speaking area, and Jammu, and Orissa. It is also the area where Hindu sentiments are strong as expressed in the anti-cow slaughter agitation. This area also includes some of the poorest regions in the country—eastern U.P. and western Bihar, the deserts of Rajasthan, and the tribal belt running through Rajasthan, Madhya Pradesh and Bihar. The point which I am making is that if this area had been economically more prosperous and socially more forward-looking, it

It is precisely in this context that India's decision to be a secular State is so crucial—the authors of our Constitution deserve praise for this decision, and further, for trying to give effect to this decision by affording constitutional protection to religious, cultural and linguistic minorities. They must also be congratulated for their clear realization that the American concept of secularism was only of limited applicability to India. (See in this connection the excellent essay of Marc Galanter 'East and West—A Review of Donald Eugene Smith, *India as a Secular State*', Princeton, 1963, *Studies in Society and History*, Vol. VII, No. 3, 1965, pp. 133-159). They did not allow their adherence to secularism to come in the way of outlawing untouchability. (Similarly, while equality of all citizens before the law is a central principle of the Constitution, seats in legislatures and posts in the government at all levels have been reserved for Harijans and tribals, and the State has been authorised to take special measures for protection of the weaker sections of the society). Secularism can only be meaningful when untouchability is really outlawed, and equality when the socially backward and economically exploited sections have been enabled through the provision of special privileges to develop themselves.

This is not to say, however, that secularism in India is assured of smooth sailing. The present crisis over the banning of cow slaughter ought to make it clear that the threat to secularism is present, and will probably even increase in the future. I shall not consider here the argument that cow slaughter is already banned according to the Directive Principles of the Constitution, but merely rest content with pointing out that compromising over fundamental issues in the interests of expediency does not pay in the long run.

That particular Directive Principle (The State shall endeavour

to organize agriculture and animal husbandry on modern and scientific lines and shall, in particular, take steps for preserving and improving the breeds, and prohibiting the slaughter of cows and calves and other milch and draught cattle': Article 48) housed a contradiction in as much as scientific animal husbandry requires the slaughter of useless cattle. But the authors of the Constitution did make a concession to the feelings of orthodox Hindus, and this particular chick now, like several other chicks of Gandhi and Nehru, has come home to roost.

Setback to Modernization

Politicisation through adult franchise is not always a force for modernization: given an electorate which is largely illiterate and backward, the 'backlash' from it can destroy the slender plant of modernization which a small, westernized elite had nourished for over a century. In fact, politicisation combined with modern means of communication can provide just that overall structure which Hinduism has historically lacked, and which might mean a permanent setback to the modernization of the country.

There are other matters such as some programmes on the All India Radio, and some lessons in school text-books published under government aegis, and the existence of government departments to regulate the activities of Hindu Religious Endowment Boards, which raise the question whether these do not imply the extension of government patronage to Hinduism. If in answer it is maintained, and with a good deal of justification, that a considerable part of Indian thought and art is inextricably mixed up with Hinduism, then the further question has to be asked whether government should support such a culture; I do not have a definite answer but this question should indeed be discussed.

Several political leaders and journalists have expressed—and continue to express—the view

that the creation of States, the units of the Indian Union, on the principle of linguistic homogeneity was a retrograde step which undid the effects of over eighty years of nationalist struggle opening the door to the eventual 'balkanisation' of India. Given the need to divide a large country such as India into smaller units for purposes of administrative convenience, was it wise to create unilingual units? Again, if linguistic homogeneity were the sole principle, Bihar, U.P., Haryana, Madhya Pradesh and Rajasthan ought to have been a single State. If administrative convenience were an important consideration, Haryana would perhaps be too small and Madhya Pradesh and U.P. too large?

Single Entity

In any case there is no doubt that the principle of linguistic States has brought into existence extremely solidary units consequent upon the coincidence of political and cultural boundaries. Strong units mean a weak centre. Loyalty to the linguistic State might become more important than loyalty to India. It may be observed in this connection that India was first made a single political entity by the British who brought with them modern technology, knowledge and administrative skills.

The westernized leaders of the Indian nationalist movement also thought of India as a single political entity. But Tilak, and to a greater extent Gandhi, in the course of mobilising the masses for the freedom struggle not only gave a great stimulus to the development of Indian languages including Hindi, but also sowed the seeds of linguistic States. A concomitant of the nationalist movement was hatred for the foreign language, English, which, to be fair, brought together elites from different parts of the country in much the same manner as Sanskrit and Persian. English also brought modern knowledge and nationalism and modern political ideas to Indians.

Given an electorate of which nearly 70 per cent are illiterate,

and 70 per cent live in villages, loyalty to the linguistic State might very well come in the way of loyalty to a remote entity such as India. However, it may be pointed out here that great as is the solidarity of the linguistic State, it is not conflict-free. For instance, the Vidarbha region still seems not yet totally reconciled to being a part of Maharashtra, and Old Mysore of the enlarged Mysore State.

Small Regions

Within each linguistic State, there are smaller regions which are more homogeneous, and have cherished a sense of self-identity. Rivalry between small, intra-State regions is as much a fact of modern Indian political life as is rivalry between different States. Chief ministers are under pressure to confer one or other benefit on a region which feels that it is neglected. One reason why universities are springing up all over India is in order to satisfy regional aspirations. Education is a State subject and starting a university unlike a factory, does not involve the spending of foreign exchange for which the permission of the Government of India would be necessary.

There are also natural regions, mountain ranges and river valleys, which straddle several States, and which are best treated as single entities for purposes of development. Each such region should have its own development council consisting of experts and M.L.A.s drawn from the concerned States. (The Zonal Councils, it is relevant to point here, are not based on the idea of the development of natural regions.)

The important point is that leadership at the national level must not only accept as inevitable but welcome as desirable the fact that people have a loyalty to their region and are vitally concerned in its development. Such loyalty is a valuable national asset, and it is wrong to expect people to be without it. The concept of regional

development must be accepted *in toto*, as also the derivative concept of special attention to backward regions. But regional development should be with reference to attaining a common level throughout the country and the level of development which all regions ought to attain in a period of, say, ten years should be arrived at through discussions in the National Development Council. In the matter of location of major industrial projects, however, certain rational norms should be insisted upon, and machinery should be devised for arbitration in case of disputes between two or more States.

The encouragement of the development of small regions within a State as well as of trans-State regions might contribute to the lessening of the solidarity of the linguistic State. In some parts of the country, there are sub-linguistic movements, and these are based on 'dialectical' and cultural-historical differences. At the present moment these movements are not only not powerful, but the entrenched interests are against them. They are there, however, and given suitable conditions they might develop into a powerful movement. If that happens the present linguistic States will be divided into smaller units and this would be a good thing from the point of view of the Centre. But such a movement will produce widespread instability for several years to come.

Fast Disappearing

The thoughtful citizen cannot help concluding that the two basic assumptions underlying a democratic country are fast disappearing in India today. The first assumption is that India is a single country and that all Indians owe a primary allegiance to it, and loyalty to any part of it being only secondary. The second assumption is that all disputes, whether between different States or other organizations, and over all issues, will be settled by debate, discussion, negotiation, arbitration or adjudication. When *bundhs*, fasts unto death, threats of self-immolation and resort to violence be-

come the normal means of ventilating grievances, however well-founded, then what is being threatened is not only the government of the day, but the very structure of the State itself. Whether the disputants are aware of it or not, they are working for chaos.

Democracy

The attack on the Indian Union comes from both categories of people, the non-westernized masses and the small, westernized elite. The former have been mobilised politically by means of adult franchise and it would not be untrue to say that their loyalties are in the first place to their immediate region, caste and State, and only subsequently to India. The immediate leaders of these masses are the chief articulators of loyalty to the linguistic State in the promotion of the interests of which they seem to destroy the Indian Union. And Gandhi has contributed powerful weapons to their armoury, viz., civil disobedience, *bundhs* and fasts, and the Buddhist priests of Vietnam another and even more powerful, viz., self-immolation. Gandhi's insistence on non-violence in deed and thought, has been jettisoned because it is inconvenient.

Political parties such as the Communist and the S.S.P. whose top leadership can be regarded as westernized, seem to be convinced that the present government is so corrupt, inefficient and reactionary that it should be overthrown by all the means at their command—*bundhs* and marches outside parliament, and scenes, walk-outs, and defiance of speaker's authority inside parliament. The dignity of parliament has indeed suffered, and this is certainly not calculated to strengthen the democratic process in the country.

It is not fair, however, to blame only the opposition parties. The party in power which has ruled the country for nearly twenty years without a break, should be held mainly responsible for the present state of disarray everywhere. Its policies have been wrong in some important respects—agriculture,

population control and defence have been neglected, the colonial bureaucracy which it took over from the British has not been transformed to suit the needs of a developing democracy while at the same time the State has been greatly increasing the range of bureaucratic control by taking on a variety of new functions, and corruption and nepotism have become, by all accounts, rampant both in the party and government.

The ruling party's monopoly of power and the prospect of its continuance have worked against the long-term interests of democracy in India. With no prospect of power coming to them, the opposition parties have no temptation to behave in a responsible manner. But it is not always certain that power brings with it responsibility—witness, for instance, the cavalier manner in which the Congress Party has been advocating the abolition of land tax to win votes. The Congress did not also show respect for parliamentary democracy when it secured the dismissal of the Communist Government of Kerala and the imposition of President's rule on that State.

Chicks of the Past

The student of the Indian political scene cannot help coming to the melancholy conclusion that the two chief architects of independent India, Gandhi and Nehru, have also let loose forces which threaten to pull down the Indian State. Gandhi was not only the author of civil disobedience, but the concept of linguistic States, hostility to English, and establishment of Hindi as the official language of India, are all ultimately traceable to him. Language and religion are both powerful genii which once let loose are well-nigh impossible to control. Gandhi also mobilised the students for the freedom struggle, and student unrest has become a major problem today.

Nehru found foreign policy, planning and socialist ideology to his taste but could not bring himself to take an interest in that essential implement or impediment

to policy, viz., the bureaucracy. Nehru's emphasis on heavy industries and gigantic projects to the neglect of agriculture have resulted in our present pathetic dependence on the U.S.A. and other countries for our daily food. Under the advice of his 'progressive' friends he did not pay enough heed to the demographic menace, and an otherwise worthy lady who was opposed to 'artificial' birth control was put in charge of family planning.

The Possible Tragedy

Nehru had a deep interest in science but here too his preference was for building huge national laboratories (the temples and pilgrim-centres of new India) outside the universities. The failure of his policy towards China did damage not only to India's position in the comity of nations, a position to which he himself had largely contributed, but also inflicted severe damage on the Indian economy. Finally, he does not seem to have given serious thought to creating a cadre of younger leaders who could be trusted to guide the country after him. Gandhi gave India a Nehru and a Patel, but whom has Nehru given?

In a word, Gandhi's and Nehru's chicks have come home to roost in Indira Gandhi's India. The result is a widespread situation of anomie or total lack of moral norms in the political and other fields. Each group tries to secure what it wants adopting whatever means it finds effective. The only consensus seems to be that the orderly representation of grievances does not pay but only agitation does. It is only too obvious that such a psychology on the part of the people makes for anarchy. Here and there one finds people saying that what the country needs is a 'strong man' who will stand firm and govern the country and not yield to threats. If the present unrest continues, even avowed democrats might start feeling any kind of order was preferable to chaos. The sun may conceivably set on Indian democracy, and this will be not only a tragedy for India and for Asia, but for the entire world.

A question of relationship

M. Y. GHORPADE

LORD Bryce described the American federal system as 'a great factory wherein two sets of machinery are at work, their revolving wheels apparently intermixed, their bands crossing one another, yet each set doing its own work without touching or hampering the other.' This harmony of shared functions is, no doubt, the result of continuous experience. But it is also, largely, due to the compulsions of advanced techno-

logy which automatically results in various forms of discipline and uniformity; the cultural homogeneity and unity of purpose and modern means of communication which facilitates quick exchange of experience and reduces time and distance.

In an underdeveloped country, these conditions do not obtain in sufficient measure. On the other hand, there is social stratification.

underdeveloped national consciousness and gnawing disparities. At the same time, there is greater need to make the best use of scarce resources which presupposes central planning and appreciation of national priorities at the implementation levels. It is necessary to ensure balanced development and avoid the stresses and strains of lopsided growth; and to take into account the great variations in local conditions and develop local initiative and responsibility—especially in a dynamic democracy—without losing a sense of direction or central purpose.

There is also the problem of power in progress. Progress in underdeveloped countries inherently involves the dethroning of reactionary forces, and obstacles. But, in a democracy one cannot force the pace too much and, yet, one cannot go too slow, to survive.

Division of Functions

The basic characteristic of the federal structure is the division of legislative powers and functions between the Centre and the federal units. In a complicated, developing situation, a sharp division of legislative functions is not always feasible or desirable. This is precisely the purpose of the concurrent list of subjects where both the Centre and the State can legislate and co-operate without running into constitutional difficulties and bottlenecks. Obviously, the concurrent list should be as large as possible in a developing country. It enables co-operation without necessarily creating conflict. It may result in a certain healthy blurring of legislative functions, but need not smudge. There may be certain aspects of agriculture, education, health and industry, (which are all in the State list, in our Constitution) on which the States themselves may want the Centre to legislate; just as, on certain matters such as prohibition and the banning of cow slaughter (which are a part of the directive principles of our Constitution) the Centre may find it convenient to leave it to the States to legislate.

The federal units are not only law making bodies, but also ex-

ecutive and administrative units. There are obvious, practical limits to what the Centre can directly do, without loss of efficiency and effective administrative control. The same thing applies to the relationship between a State and its local bodies. At the same time, the various social, commercial and political complexities make it difficult to divide sharply the numerous, complicated and interdependent administrative functions. In short, the area of co-operation will have to grow, largely, by convention and common objective, and not always by legal or administrative compulsion. This is, initially, a difficult process in an underdeveloped country, with its cross currents and regional differences and disparities.

A parliamentary democracy also assumes an independent judiciary which interprets laws made by the Centre and the States. Interpretation of fundamental rights is also, ultimately, a question of correctly interpreting the social philosophy and will of the people, as reflected in Parliament, as the latter can change the Constitution itself, if it likes. Certain difficulties can arise if there are sharp differences in the fundamental social and political philosophy of the different federal units, and if the majority strength of the political party in power at the Centre is derived from only a few States. But under such conditions, difficulties will arise whether the structure is federal or not. On the other hand, a federal structure gives maximum flexibility and scope for regional differences in attitude, without allowing the Centre to crack. Imposition of undue uniformity on a situation which is inherently un-uniform will surely result in a breach.

Unity in Diversity

In this sense, a federal structure, especially in an underdeveloped country, is based on the concept of maintaining unity in diversity. The problem is, how to preserve unity by recognising diversity; and the manner and extent to which diversity can be allowed to express itself without affecting stability.

The principle is to allow and encourage the federal units to do what they are capable of doing without harming the interests of other States or units.

This is also the principle of Panchayati Raj, according to which the units at a particular administrative level should do what is most appropriately done at that level. It is the principle of dynamic decentralisation. But, what is best done at a particular administrative or legislative level is not a static concept, but a changing two-way movement, conditioned and determined by the process of growth. The increasing administrative competence, strength and maturity of the federal units, and the local bodies within these units, points towards greater decentralisation.

Movement of Power

At the same time, development in the means of modern communication, technical development, and economies of scale, may necessitate the movement of certain responsibilities and functions from the States to the Centre. For instance, after a certain degree of regional development of hydro-electric power has taken place, it becomes logical, and almost inevitable, to have a regional or country-wide grid, so that maximum economies could be secured in the light of regional requirements and potentialities. Co-operation between regional research institutes, on a country-wide basis, is another example of the growth of fresh, central functions, in the best interest of the constituent units. Complexity requires co-ordination, and development means increasing complexity and cooperation.

It is essential to ensure that the to and fro movement of powers and responsibilities is functional, and not status or prestige ridden. In an underdeveloped country, where power flows from top to bottom, there is likely to be a curious psychological mix up. For instance, in India, a State minister who becomes a minister at the Centre, perhaps, considers it a promotion, and not just an opportunity to function at a different

level. With the States becoming more and more powerful, this is changing, and a chief ministership of a State is now more coveted than a ministership in the central cabinet.

The officers of the all-India services, should also move to and fro between the Centre, the State and the districts, in the interest of national integration and valuable exchange of experience. It is in the States and the districts that we want some of our most experienced persons to work and not gravitate permanently to the Centre. The districts are the places of the most significant, practical achievement and experimentation, because, in an underdeveloped country which suffers from a paucity of competent personnel, implementation is the weakest link.

Financial Dependence

Let us look at the Indian situation more closely in the context of our federal structure. After Independence, the partition of the country, the integration of the Indian States, and the existence of a strong national party like the Congress headed by the great Jawaharlal Nehru, were factors which made for a strong Centre. In recent years, the linguistic States are becoming more conscious of their homogeneity, power and prestige; the National Development Council, consisting of the State Chief Ministers, is playing a more influential role. At the same time, the increasing financial dependence of the States on the Centre is causing considerable frustration. While the States are becoming politically more independent, economically they are becoming more dependent on the Centre. This conflict will have to be resolved. Healthy financial relations between the Centre and the States depend on the financial security of the States. Too much financial dependence makes for bad co-operation.

A constant, constructive, reappraisal of Centre-State relations is inevitable in a developing economy, particularly in the field of finance. The major elastic taxes

such as, customs, income and excise, are all central taxes. On the other hand, State taxes are inelastic and limited in scope, while the burden of developmental expenditure and social services on the States goes on increasing by leaps and bounds. Education, health, industry, agriculture, irrigation and power are all State subjects, but much of the resources for these have to come from the Centre by special arrangements with the Planning Commission.

The Planning Commission was established in the year 1950 to assess the country's resources and formulate plans for their effective utilisation. In practice, the Planning Commission got more and more involved in day to day decisions and the States, now, look upon it as the shrine they have to visit for money once in five years for the five-year plan, and once a year for the annual plan. The financial position of the States has become desperate. Quite a few of them have a negative cash balance with the Reserve Bank and are finding it difficult even to meet their debt service charges and the normal maintenance of tanks, buildings, roads etc.

The bulk of the transfers from the Centre to the States are in the form of loans and discretionary assistance. The loan from the Centre to the States was less than 100 crores in 1951, as compared to the outstanding loan due from the States to the Centre, of the order of more than 1000 crores in 1956, and more than 2000 crores in 1961. The dependence on the Centre for financing State plans has gone up from about 25 per cent to more than 50 per cent in the last 10 to 15 years.

State Expenditure

The expenditure of the State Government is classified under three categories:

- (i) Plan expenditure, i.e., expenditure, both capital and revenue, pertaining to the current five-year plan.
- (ii) Committed expenditure, i.e., the recurring expenditure such as salaries, etc.,

pertaining to the personnel appointed during the previous five-year plans. For example, the salary of school teachers appointed during the first three five-year plan periods is described as committed expenditure in the current fourth plan period, while the salaries of teachers appointed during the current plan is called plan expenditure.

- (iii) Non-plan expenditure includes committed expenditure and other expenditure such as on general administration, law and order and debt services.

Distortion

These broad categories of expenditure are mentioned above in the order in which they are favoured by the planners and central financiers, although the distinction is artificial, as all the categories are inter-related and, therefore, equally important or indispensable. This artificial division or illogical weightage results in distortion and ultimately in dissatisfaction. The State governments, in order to get as much central financial assistance as possible, try to inflate the size of their plan and the local resources they expect to raise. The Finance Commission tries to take into account the committed expenditure, and recommend devolution of central funds to the State on a more or less ad-hoc basis, in order to cover the so called 'gap' in resources.

The States, naturally, exert to show as big a gap as possible while representing to the Finance Commission, which is appointed once in five years as per the Constitution. Once the Finance Commission has finished the job of distributing funds to the States, no further thought is given to the problem of Centre-State financial relations. Moreover, only a small portion of the total central financial assistance to the States comes under the scope and purview of the Finance Commission, which is mainly concerned with the shared taxes and not with the loans and

discretionary assistance towards plan expenditure.

The distinction between different types of financial assistance from the Centre is artificial, as no intelligent attempt is made to relate the type of assistance to the purpose for which it is used. For example, the loans taken by the State governments are not necessarily used for projects which will give an adequate financial return to repay the loan. Expenditure on social services may be an essential, long term investment in man, but it does not give an immediate financial return; which means that the State will get into financial difficulty, sooner or later, if these are financed with loans.

This has already happened in some States. The Centre will, therefore, virtually have to write off much of the loan, or give more loans to enable the States to repay previous loans. What is the logic of closing our eyes to the heavy debt burden as non-plan expenditure, without ensuring that such loans generate the necessary income for repayment. This has a very demoralising effect on the State governments and encourages financial irresponsibility.

Ensuring Cooperation

In this context, one is reminded of the project and non-project assistance of the World Bank to the Central Government. If the Centre gives a project loan to a State Government, say for a big irrigation or power project, it should be on the basis of a detailed project report which is worked out to the last detail, and indicates clearly how exactly the extra income needed for repaying the loan will be generated. The procedure should, more or less, be the same as when a central financing institution like the Industrial Development Bank of India, the Industrial Finance Corporation, or the Industrial Credit and Investment Corporation of India, sanctions a loan for an industrial project undertaken by a public limited company.

To enable and ensure effective Centre-State co-operation in this

regard, such matters should be in the concurrent list so that the Centre can also legislate, and suitable high powered machinery in which both the Centre and the States are represented, is made responsible for this. The States may even find this politically convenient when it comes to a question of levying adequate water and power rates from the beneficiaries as committed to at the time of initially planning the project.

Taxes

It sometimes helps when the taxing authority is not too close to the tax payer. The Panchayats, for instance, would prefer the State Government to legislate, making it obligatory to levy a minimum house tax, rather than be left free to tax or not to tax. Apart from the outright grants (whether it be in the form of a share in a particular tax or a per capita grant to ensure minimum establishment and amenities) the Panchayati Raj bodies should be encouraged to tax at more than the minimum obligatory rates by giving them an incentive matching grant which varies in inverse proportion to their taxable capacity. The concept of taxable capacity implies that the same per capita tax revenue in different units may not mean an equal tax effort on the part of these units, because the inherent taxable capacity may be different, enabling one unit to achieve the same per capita revenue by levying a lower rate of tax than the other unit.

So, also, with a similar tax rate and an equally efficient tax administration, the yield from a particular tax in one State may be smaller than in another State due to differences in the concentration of wealth or taxable capacity. Population is a good rough measure of the social services and amenities needed by the area, although some areas may have their special problems. Such scientific principles should govern the devolution of all types of funds from the Centre to the States. The financial preponderance of the Centre should not result in grea-

ter arbitrariness. Indian democracy has become sufficiently sophisticated for people to question the logic and the rationale of central assistance to the States. It must not appear as political patronage.

Central assistance to different States has varied from 40 per cent to 80 per cent of the plan outlay. It is necessary to evolve norms to test the justification for such variations in central assistance with reference to factors such as comparable tax effort, the need to maintain a certain minimum level of social services and amenities, and to correct regional imbalances and glaring disparities. Then the States will know where they stand and make a more reasoned and purposeful tax effort.

A State Government will naturally be reluctant to face the odium of raising taxes if vague, ill conceived financial gaps swallow up the proceeds from fresh taxes, without resulting in a corresponding, visible development and progress which satisfies the people. A systematic effort should also be made to evolve scientific norms of normal, administrative expenditure in relation to work load. Salaries and dearness allowances of personnel at the Centre and in all the States should be determined in an integrated manner. We have already seen the confusion which results from separate, unilateral decisions, without inter-State consultation and central co-ordination in this regard.

Scrutinizing Body

There is a tendency to limit the scope of the Finance Commission because it infringes on the power of the central executive which is responsible for raising the funds which the Finance Commission distributes. But, the bulk of the central assistance to the States, which is now outside the scope of the Finance Commission, will have to come under the scrutiny of some high powered body or permanent commission (working, perhaps, in close collaboration with the Planning Commission) assisted by a permanent secretariat, in which

both the central and the State experts are adequately represented. This will also make the working of the National Development Council and other inter-State conferences more meaningful; and also serve as a clearing house for inter-State data and experience.

It is vital to ensure that the stresses and strains of rapid development are not allowed to damage the structure of federal finance and relationships. Similarly, at the State level, there should be a State Finance and Planning Commission, constantly reviewing the financial relations between the State and local bodies and corporations, on the one hand, (including the whole gambit of State loans, shared taxes and grants to these bodies) and between the State and the Centre on the other. The emphasis should be not merely on plan outlays, but on physical targets and qualitative performance, with sufficient scope for regional or local initiative and experimentation to suit local needs and conditions, within the broad framework of national priorities.

Political Aspect

It is obvious that adequate institutional arrangements should be made to settle inter-State problems such as boundary disputes, sharing of river waters, and the location of major national projects like the steel plants. But, it is well to remember that even after taking into account all the technical and legal considerations, the Centre will have to be strong enough to take a political decision and see it through. Technical factors may indicate that a steel plant could be located in several places in the country with equal economic advantage. After that, it inevitably becomes a political decision. Similarly, the future of Chandigarh may be referred to a judicial commission any number of times to distil impartiality. But, ultimately, it will have to be a political decision. What is so legal or technical about it?

On a riparian issue, a decision may be got under the Inter-State River Disputes Act, but the right

kind of political will is needed if the upper riparian State is not to use more water than what is its rightful share. In our present condition, no State can take up a major irrigation project without massive central financial assistance. This is a more potent, practical consideration than legal rights.

Process of Growth

Then again, the Food Corporation of India is an attempt to achieve co-ordination and provide a central machinery for inter-State co-operation in working a national food budget. But, the Food Corporation will inevitably have to depend heavily on the institutions and personnel of State governments in its work of distributing fertilisers to, or purchasing grain from, the farmer. To succeed, we have to assume that the States with a relative food surplus have the will and the political capacity to part with the agreed surplus, so that people in other States may survive without depending on precarious, demoralising food imports.

All this only means that political consciousness must keep pace with the increasing complexities of growth and the logic of co-operation. This is the challenge of our democracy. In the ultimate analysis, the quality of leadership should match the increasing sophistication of a growing democracy. Politics should become increasingly specialised without, of course, losing touch with the masses.

The Centre, in a federal structure, is comparable to the head of a joint family who inspires sufficient confidence and respect to prevent its members from going astray, and is sufficiently enlightened to give full scope to the growing children to imbibe new ideas and values and fulfil their natural destinies, without having to break away from the mainstream of the family. It is essentially a problem and a process of growth, of encouraging self-reliance with firmness, tact and love, and a constant readjustment of a deep and abiding relationship.

Strengthening the centre

SISIR GUPTA

NORMALLY, in a federal union it is the autonomy of the constituent units which needs to be meticulously safeguarded against the inevitable threats of erosion posed by the process of centralisation inherent in any modern society. Even in societies where there is no centralised State planning, a certain amount of centralisation takes place out of economic development; the growth of communications of various kinds also undermines the distinctive characteristics of States. In such situations, the task of protecting State rights is of the judiciary. The Indian Constitution, like other federal constitutions, provides for the same role for the Supreme Court of India. Some of the centralising tendencies are at work in India and it is possible that at some future date, the Supreme Court of India will have to protect the spirit of the Indian Constitution which, without being strictly federal, does envisage a great deal of autonomous rights for the States.

The immediate and formidable political task in India, however, is to promote and strengthen central authority rather than protect and safeguard the States' rights. There are a few extremely disturbing trends in today's India which can not only overwhelm the trend towards centralisation but also undermine the very basis of the progress of the country by weakening the central authority. It is to be realized that in the absence of a strong central authority, inter-State disputes and rivalries could begin to dominate the Indian

political scene; such issues might be relegated to the background the other and more meaningful issues in public life.

Also, the very problem of managing a loose union could tax the energies and resources of national leadership, making it impossible for them to concentrate on the solution of other issues. It is also important to note that for the modernisation of an emerging nation, both economic and political, the very first condition is the cultivation of a sense of national identity. This implies in the Indian context the existence of a strong central authority.

In fact, it is precisely because India is in many ways a multi-national State that it must opt for a political system in which a strong central authority is not only ensured by the constitution of the country but promoted deliberately and methodically until such time as the ordinary Indian develops a different structure of loyalties. At the moment, many of us owe our loyalty either to the narrowest community to which we belong, or to the human family and the world community; we are either Mathurs or citizens of the world.

A relatively higher sense of loyalty is exhibited by those who are provincialists rather than casteists, but even that is a sub-national loyalty. In fact, the ease and frequency with which an Indian proclaims his loyalty to the human family, to world brotherhood and the like is a measure of the fact that his real sense of be-

longing is at a sub-national level. When national loyalty and an all-India sense of belonging is cultivated and taken for granted, the problem of promoting central authority will cease to be acute.

The real answer, therefore, lies in persistent and serious efforts to promote national integration in India and inculcate a sense of Indian nationalism as a high priority of national policies. It is a pity that after the Chinese invasion, a hasty conclusion was made that all problems of national integration had been resolved. In a country like ours, for several decades, a major political task for the national leadership should be to promote such integration. It is true that faced with external aggressions, Indians responded remarkably well and many of the pessimistic forebodings of foreign analysts were proved to be wrong. But it is undeniable that there is a great need in India to integrate the Indian political community and to prevent the institutionalisation of sub-nationalism before nationalism has taken strong roots.

The redistribution of States on linguistic lines, the emphasis on regional languages while retaining a foreign language as the link language, the rise of boundary disputes between States, the growth of State parties in some areas—these are some of the factors which have created a problem. It may be worthwhile for the government to think of a separate organization like the Planning Commission constituted on a statutory basis to work constantly for national integration and recommend and implement measures calculated to create and cultivate the necessary loyalty to India.

Border Areas

This, however, is a long-range task; the problems to be immediately tackled are different. In the first place, there is the problem of India's border peoples. The real threat to India's integrity does not come from the conflicts between the various linguistic and cultural groups which inhabit the heartlands of India. These conflicts harm India's progress and weaken

central authority, as stated earlier, but do not really pose the threat of disintegration.

The problem is in its acutest form and indeed qualitatively different when one thinks of maintaining central authority in India's rimland regions. The situation is qualitatively different because, in these cases, the problem of the relationship between the Centre and the concerned groups tends to become an international problem. The case of Kashmir is an obvious example. India's enemies can operate through the separatist elements in these areas. Even in the case of the Nagas and Mizos, foreign arms supplies are known to have been made available to the rebels.

Unity Above All

The problem can be tackled in one of the following two ways: one, a determined assertion of central authority in these areas and, two, conceding the maximum possible autonomy to them and retaining the loosest possible links between the Indian Union and these groups. The problem in pursuing the second course is that the demand for fullest possible autonomy may become infectious and as the marginal areas of today are treated that way, other areas will become marginal tomorrow and demand the same treatment.

No large State of the world is free from these problems and India is to learn a few lessons from the manner in which others have tackled them. There is no immaculate federation anywhere. The Tibetan people owed little loyalty to the Chinese State and China had to assert the central authority in that region. It is possible that at some future date, the Tibetans may also develop some kind of loyalty to the Chinese State. There is of course a major problem of values inherent here, but there is a supreme value which India must cherish, as much as China does, of maintaining the unity and integrity of the State at all cost.

Any equivocation on this may end in grave problems of disintegration and secession of groups from the Indian Union. What we in

India need to realize is that these problems are not peculiar to us; nor is India a uniquely vulnerable Union. There is no new nation which can survive as a nation State and tackle its domestic problems effectively if it weakens in its resolve to maintain the nation's integrity.

Diffusion of Power

For the rest of India, the problems are different. It is clear that in the last few years, the power within the Congress Party has become diffused to an extent which has affected the strength of central authority. Even in the last days of Jawaharlal Nehru, the trend could be noted; but after him it has become a pronounced feature of our national life that the State chief ministers and the political bosses in the States have become enormously powerful. The set of all-India leaders that Gandhi built up in the days of the national movement are virtually all dead and gone. There is a new set of all-India leaders who do not owe any particular loyalty to any State but their weight and authority within the Congress Party is not so overwhelming as it was in the case of the earlier leaders.

The seven hundred and odd parliamentarians of India are expected to be the real *national* politicians. While in the case of the all-India opposition parties, the leaders continue to perform this role in varying degrees, in the case of the Congress Party the parliamentarians are virtually representatives of States rather than all-India politicians. The solidification of votes in the Congress Party in Parliament on State lines before leadership contests is an ominous development.

A major task in the coming years would be to convert the member of Parliament into an active national functionary rather than a mere representative of a State. Consistent with this role as the representative of a territorial constituency, the member of Parliament must begin to treat the whole of India as his constituency. It may be worthwhile to give some thought in India to a reform of

the electoral system and have two different elections—one for the States, on a territorial basis, and one for the Indian Parliament, on a proportional basis.

National Outlook

Meanwhile, the problem is one of utilizing the services of the member of Parliament in various types of national efforts or endeavours unrelated to local or regional problems. It could be ensured through a more vigorous functioning of the committee system so that each and every member of the Parliament is associated with one or the other committee dealing with a major national problem. It is also necessary to treat the Congress Parliamentary Party as a body of great significance and impart a distinct identity to this group.

Within the Congress Party and organization, a premium must be given to those politicians whose State loyalties are not so great as to impede a proper national outlook. For long, the much maligned factionalism in the State Congresses ensured the authority and strength of central leadership over State affairs. It has been one of the consequences of the increasing concentration of power in the hands of the chief ministers that factional politics in the States no longer provide as great an opportunity to the Centre as before to assert itself. The situation has become particularly acute because as the State Congresses have tended to unite under a single leader or a single faction (those who could not unite or adjust are being forced out), factionalism is growing at the Centre. Instead of a united central leadership arbitrating between State factions, united State leaderships have begun to make the maximum possible use of factionalism at the Centre.

There is no easy way out of the situation and much depends on the way in which the President of the Congress, whose power and authority under the Congress Constitution is almost unlimited, begins to tackle these problems in the post-election years. If the problem is perceived, one can hope that the

solution will be found. Although many of the present leaders of the Congress have become all-India leaders because of their success in consolidating their position in the States, it is not impossible that as they begin to function at the all-India level, they would develop a different kind of perception of their own roles in Indian politics and adopt different techniques of managing the All-India Congress political machine.

In the ultimate analysis, the development of this kind of a national attitude is a function of the attitude to politics in general. If one is all the while thinking of who should be where and why, and not what should be done and how, it is difficult to function as the all-India leader who can ignore some of the State pressures, which may appear insurmountable on the face of it but which may be very insignificant in reality. The tragedy with the Congress so far has been that while it has demonstrated a remarkable degree of ability in managing the set of problems pertaining to the question of who should be where and why, it has not shown an equal degree of ability in tackling problems pertaining to the other set of questions of what should be done and how. The importance of the two sets of questions varies inversely; many of the present problems are due to the fact that there has been little importance lent to the second set of questions, with the result that the first set of questions has begun to dominate the political scene. Increasingly the problem may assume unmanageable proportions and affect the unity of the party unless one poses before the Congress the other set of problems vigorously and challengingly.

New Model

The model of a zonal federation, as worked out in the case of Assam, is an obvious way of strengthening central authority while according due recognition to the very genuine regionalism within the existing States. It is not as if the Centre can go about encouraging such regionalism; but should such regionalism exist, a federal arrangement within the existing State

could well be thought of. Not only for administrative convenience but also for other reasons, such a model is attractive.

In a State like U.P., for example, there are clearly distinguishable regions within the State with their distinctive problems. Western and eastern U.P. have very different problems. The hills of U.P. are again a separate category and, finally, in the southern districts there are different problems.

In Bihar, likewise, there is a clear division between south and north Bihar, not merely in terms of their population but also in terms of the problems they face. North Bengal within Bengal; Telengana within Andhra Pradesh; Malabar within Kerala, the former British areas within Mysore, Vidarbha within Maharashtra, Saurashtra within Gujarat, the tribal belt within Orissa, Madhya Bharat and Chhatisgarh within Madhya Pradesh, these are regions which deserve recognition as entities of some kind.

Risks and Advantages

Such recognition would incidentally strengthen central authority simply by preventing the emergence of a strong united authority in the States. In case the divisions within the States are institutionalized on a territorial basis, this by itself will serve the purpose that factionalism in the Congress Party used to serve at one time.

There is an obvious problem, however, in this kind of a scheme. We still do not know how and what kinds of pressures would be generated on the Indian federal structure if opposition parties were to come to power in some States. In case such sub-divisions take place, it is almost certain that quite a few of the units will be under opposition parties and, in considering such a scheme, the risks of weakening the party structure must be taken note of. This may turn out to be a self-defeating exercise; for, one of the important unifying elements in this country is the strength of the all-India parties. At any rate, such a scheme deserves careful consideration.

Economic challenges

P. N. DHAR

THE Indian experiment of attempting an economic breakthrough within the federal democratic structure today presents a picture which has made many observers pessimistic about the outcome of the experiment. It is feared that the Indian economy is gradually reverting to its old and familiar stagnancy and that the very unity of the country is in danger. This is in sharp contrast to the admiration that Indian efforts had evoked earlier. Perhaps this admiration was part of a euphoria which (under the impact of the cold war) was generated by the 'partisans' of democracy in one camp and those of 'socialism' in the other. The recent pessimism seems to be the result of the difficulties into which the third plan has run.

It is easy to see that both these reactions to the Indian experiment

have been highly exaggerated. There were, of course, observers who had attributed the earlier successes of India to an accident of history—the personality and power of Jawaharlal Nehru. A meticulous student of the Indian scene prognosticated that the post-Nehru era would be 'a shambles of feuding regional ministries held loosely together by a Government in New Delhi whose writ in economic development clearly does not extend to much of the country'. Envisaging the break-down of the present regime, he predicted the establishment of a 'new authoritarian or quasi-authoritarian order'.

It is not the purpose of this article to support or reject such 'predictions'. Nor is it the purpose to dilate upon the special difficulties that brought down the rate of growth in India in recent years.

The attempt is rather to highlight some of the issues which arise in trying to achieve an economic break-through alongside a viable and functioning democracy and to explore the possibilities of reducing the area of conflict between the two. The areas of conflict between democratic methods and an economic break-through could be identified as follows.

(1) The conflicts between the requirements of capital formation and the need to raise consumption levels.

(2) Conflicts arising out of the existence of a federal constitution in which the powers and functions of the federal and State governments are constitutionally defined. In such a structure, the Centre assumes a large role in the formulation of policy and overall plans while the States take on steadily expanding administrative and development functions.

(3) Problems arising out of the existence of a mixed economy where the public sector and the private sector conflict at certain points and have to be made complementary to each other by policy measures.

Capital Accumulation

The basic feature of all economies which have effected a successful break-through is that their most crucial period has been a period of high investment. Economists have simplified this proposition by saying that if a backward economy becomes, say, a 15 per cent saver instead of the more usual 5 per cent in its state of underdevelopment, it has broken the barriers to growth and prosperity. To bring about this change in the percentages of income saved for investment implies a high marginal rate of savings, that is to say, a very rapid increase in the ploughback of the additional income into investment or, in other words, a sharp restraint on consumption.

Thus, the pattern of investment, income and consumption actually chosen over time for or by the people is reflected in the choice of the marginal rate of savings

and this is what determines the acceptable or imposed degree of austerity. Most developed countries passed through this basic period of high investment under conditions of low mass consumption. One does not have to recall all the horrors that accompanied the industrial revolution in Britain in the eighteenth century or the exploitation of the Japanese peasantry through severe taxation after the Meiji restoration to trace the sources of 'primitive accumulation' of capital in these societies. Even 'Socialism had to become an engine of this primitive accumulation in Russia where abortive capitalism had left the job unfinished. Be that as it may, the absence of political democracy undoubtedly helped in the process of capital accumulation.

Democracy and Austerity

India on the other hand has initiated this process through the democratic method. But democracy is a soft regime and austerity is not its normal characteristic. In a democracy, competing political parties make the common man articulate about his demands and expectations; and the exercise of universal adult franchise gives these demands and expectations a cutting edge. The compulsions to increase consumption can be seen in terms of the slow increase in savings. At the end of the first two plans, the rate of savings did not increase as much and as fast as the planners had expected. It went up to 8 per cent or 9 per cent, whereas it was expected to go up to 11 per cent. Part of the reason was, of course, the greater increase in population, but the more substantial reason was the inadequacy of the measures taken to mobilize domestic resources.

During the third plan period, the government made energetic attempts to raise resources through taxation, especially after the Chinese invasion. Even so, the rate of savings has not kept pace with the targets. Agriculturists, especially the richer groups amongst them, get off lightly; so do the middle-range income earners who belong to the income-tax paying category. The government's

hesitation in reaching out its tax-gathering arm to these groups can be attributed to the fact that its other arm seeks their votes. Even the leftists in India supported the peasants in resisting the government's effort to take a share from the income arising out of the States' expenditure on their development. Indian leftists in need of votes found themselves supporting the 'Kulaks.'

Perhaps the lines of conflict between investment and consumption as indicated above are getting somewhat overdrawn. Fortunately, however, there are components of expenditure which promote economic growth directly or indirectly, especially in a backward society. Expenditure on health and education belong to this category. In fact, it is investment in the human factor which can yield substantial economic returns. Mass literacy is a necessary pre-requisite for effective farm extension services, family planning programmes, national cohesion and, of course, for the understanding and debating of basic issues that form the very substance of a participating democracy.

Saving Possibilities

Even increased food consumption can be investment in as much as it leads to extra effort and productivity on the part of the under-nourished. And where savings have to be raised from even the poor, as must happen in a poor country if it wants to develop, it is conceivable to devise ways and means of doing so. The wage increases of the working class may, for example, be difficult to resist but they need not take the form of increases in daily or monthly wages. The Japanese increased personal savings sharply by channelling wage increases through bonus payments. Similarly, it was not inevitable that the ban on the import of non-essential consumer goods should have resulted in the diversion of resources to the production of their domestic substitutes. Anticipatory excise duties could have been used to make their production unprofitable.

Again, in a country with widespread unemployment, or

under-employment, conflicts arise between maximizing output and maximizing employment. If more employment is sought to be 'created' in the short-run at the cost of capital accumulation, it will merely postpone the date of full employment for all. This implies a conflict between the present generation and the generations to follow. Compulsions of democracy emphasize the present at the cost of the future. Even in the present generation there are conflicts of interest between different groups, such as those between the employed and the unemployed; between the bulk of the agricultural and the industrial population, not to speak of the poor mass and the tiny minority of the very rich which attracts the greatest attention.

In purely statistical terms, it is easy to demonstrate that the industrial working class in India is a much pampered class compared to the landless labour in the countryside or to show that the income of the agitating government employees is a multiple of the average per capita income of an Indian. But statistical comparisons do not necessarily generate a sense of well-being.

Failure in Leadership

It would, however, be wrong to imagine that the conflict between output maximization and employment maximization is absolute. It is possible, for instance, to provide considerable employment by deploying labour in agricultural capital formation through a bold rural public works programme, secondary road-building and by the use of labour-intensive techniques in construction. If this has not happened in India so far, the reason is not paucity of capital or foreign exchange but failure on the part of the administration and the party cadres to provide appropriate organization and leadership at local levels.

It is true that the civil service could not provide such leadership. Its traditions had rendered it too sterile for that. But the Congress Party had, been well-equipped to

play that role in development programmes, thanks to the long spell of Gandhian leadership. Instead, the party became merely an election-fighting machine. The argument that rural works contribute to agricultural capital formation without at first producing more agricultural products is granted but the cushion for the intervening period could have been provided by P.L.-480 supplies. Similarly, the removal of inhibiting influences on the expansion of the cement industry could have had a multiplier effect on employment via construction if more thought had been given to the problem.

A significant and steady increase in national income can, of course, help in accommodating conflicting group demands. But, paradoxically enough, economic development itself stimulates these pressures and demands. As a close observer of the Indian scene observes, 'the argument that economic growth provides the government with revenue, thus enabling it to satisfy more of the demands made on it, assumes a constancy of demand for which there is neither historical precedent nor theoretical justification.'

This phenomenon of rising expectations can only be contained if the elite groups in India can evolve an effective ethic of austerity such as was evolved by their prototypes in other countries in crucial periods of economic development. Gandhism has not played the role that Calvinism did in England in restraining consumption. Perhaps Gandhi could still be recalled in the service of Indian economic development.

Problems of Federalism

Let us now turn to the second area of conflicts arising out of the federal structure of the Indian Union. Whereas the size and diversity of India make a federal constitution obligatory, they make the tasks of economic planning more difficult. Problems arise on account of the uneven distribution of resources and differential levels and rates of development in different parts of the country. Fur-

thermore, the natural economic or geographical units that could be carved out for developmental purposes are not coterminous with the boundaries of linguistic States which together constitute the Union of India. These factors inevitably result in conflicts between national and regional economic goals which are expressed in differences regarding (a) geographical distribution of investment, especially in locating new industry, (b) Centre-State financial relations, and (c) mobilization of domestic resources.

Geographical Distribution

(a) Economic growth often proceeds unevenly not only in time but in space as well. Natural resources abound in some areas and are lacking in others. The exploitation of certain resources has greater urgency than that of others in phasing development. Investment in basic industries, transport and other social overheads is often lumpy and has to be carried out in large chunks at a few selected points. The existence of external economies often results in large agglomerations of industrial investments. Then again the uneven size of the markets requires uneven development in transportation and market-oriented activities. In view of the small size of the market in a poor country, an industry may not consist of more than one or a few units. To increase their number in the interest of wider dispersal in order to serve the ends of equity means the sacrifice of economies of scale.

These are powerful economic arguments. Considerations of economic efficiency warrant their acceptance. But it is also arguable that the acceptance of this logic will widen the pre-existing gap between the comparatively advanced and the comparatively backward areas. In the long-run, the gap will be filled as a result of the spread effects and the use of surplus resources generated in advanced areas by way of investment in backward areas. But, to persuade the backward areas that faster growth elsewhere is in their own long-term interest is a difficult job.

Politicians are even more interested in the short-run than other human beings. Perhaps even the long-run may not hold comfort for the backward areas. The 'backwash effects' which Gunnar Myrdal has shown operating in the world economy might operate just as well in a national economy so that the poorer regions never catch up and the gap becomes ever wider.

Considering this, it is not easy to find the 'right' point of balance between the concentration and dispersal of investment. In some cases, of course, the choice of the planners is more or less predetermined, as in the case of the location of a steel plant or an irrigation-cum-hydro-electric project. But there are many other fields of investment where this is not the case. The economic argument is naturally in favour of maximization of economic returns, but if this results in political tensions which threaten the very unity of the country, then the pursuit of growth becomes self-defeating.

Comprehensive Plan

It may be held that the State governments will realize that a nationally integrated economy does not warrant regional self-sufficiency in major industrial activities and that they will become aware of the advantages of a common national market. But the State governments cannot be persuaded unless a comprehensive, long-run plan is drawn up which lays down clearly the phasing of development over time and geographical areas so that each State knows exactly where it stands. Failing this, the State governments will find it difficult to ask their own people to wait for eventual benefits. This process of waiting is, of course, eased a little by devoting some resources for special programmes for the development of backward areas. But such programmes are in the nature of transfer payments from more developed areas to less developed areas and should be treated as part of the price to be paid for the smooth working of a federal structure.

One of the reasons for the scramble for large industrial pro-

jects is the absence of competent planning units in the States. Too much faith has been pinned on the growth-promoting possibilities of individual industrial projects. Even if a few factories were set up in a State, they would hardly make a dent on unemployment or contribute significantly to the growth of income. Bihar has had more heavy industries than many other States, but is still not the fastest developing State in India. Industrial projects have been so emphatically regarded as growth promoters that enough care is not bestowed on the possibility of raising agricultural productivity.

The U.P. Government which has been agitating to acquire large industrial projects is not much bothered about the fact that yields per acre in almost all important crops in that State are clearly well below the all-India averages. The causes for its relatively poor performance in promoting economic growth lie in this field rather than in the absence of heavy industry. It appears that in a large State like the U.P., the brunt of raising incomes will have to be borne by the agricultural sector for some time to come. This is necessary to step up the rate of industrialization itself. The increase in rural incomes and consequent accelerated demand for industrial consumer and capital goods are themselves powerful inducements for industrialization. It must be realized that factories can flourish in a rural environment only if farm investment, production and income are rising. But all this needs careful State planning which cannot be done unless the States are equipped with adequately staffed and competent planning units.

Financial Relations

(b) The powers and functions of the Federal and State governments are defined by the Constitution. Economic and social planning is in the concurrent list, but vital areas of development, such as public health, education, land, agriculture, irrigation, electricity, local governments and a wide range of activities under industries and transport fall in the

State list. Since economic and social planning is a concurrent subject, as it should be, there has to be some intrusion from the Centre into affairs otherwise earmarked for the States. How far such intrusion should go is not a point which can be settled on constitutional considerations alone. The question is essentially one of what would be the best way of formulating and executing State plans.

Centre's Control

So far, the State plans are formulated and executed within a set of financial disciplines. The States are made to conform to the ceilings of State and central resources settled in consultation with the Centre. Secondly, the targets, priorities, types of schemes, etc., are required to fit in with the overall national objectives. The implementation is left entirely in the hands of the States but here too there has been some attempt at central control. The Centre's approval is required for large schemes, reappropriation is permitted only with the Centre's sanction, central grants are tied to individual schemes and the overall central assistance is sought to be linked to plan performance.

There has been some relaxation of the Centre's control in recent years and the patterns of assistance have been simplified and restrictions on reappropriation somewhat reduced. The States have also evolved ways and means of evading controls which results in deviations from agreed priorities. The reduced political strength of the Centre has accelerated this trend lately. Thus the relationship between the Centre and the States is one of financial control which, however, does not maximize efficiency.

The central control through financial tools operates mainly on account of the growing financial dependence of the States on the Centre. In the third plan period, the Centre directly financed nearly 62 per cent of the State plans and indirectly the rest, through grants recommended by the Finance Commission and the shared taxes. The indebtedness of the States to

the Centre has been growing at an alarming rate; from about Rs. 238 crores in 1951-52, it jumped to about Rs. 1,095 crores in 1956-57 and had reached the figure of Rs. 3,156 crores in 1963-64.

The increasing dependence on the Centre has made the States less and less enthusiastic about increasing their own contributions. Their contribution to mobilized resources has been reduced further by the rapid rise in 'non-developmental' expenditure. There has also been a tendency on the part of the States to promise or 'estimate' larger contributions than they can make in order to get matching grants from the Centre. This creates a situation in which the Centre is constantly confronted with the awkward choice of either stopping or slowing down the project concerned or coming across with additional assistance to cover the breach.

No Adequate Mechanism

It will thus be seen that the existing Centre-State relations are not governed by a smoothly operating and discipline-enforcing mechanism. Nor have the recommendations of the successive Finance Commissions with their quasi-judicial approach helped in the matter. It is true that the working of a federal constitution is bound to reflect the changes and shifts in the political power structure as between the States and the Centre and between the States themselves; but if these shifts prove to be detrimental to national planning and development, a readjustment in the Constitution itself is indicated.

Admittedly, political factors make it difficult to adhere strictly to the logic of economic development, but a constant endeavour to approximate to it is necessary nonetheless. In order to reduce the distorting political pressures on the Planning Commission and the central ministries, the choice of projects and their location could be left to the discretion of some type of banking institution specifically created for this purpose. The bank could examine rival projects as clients for its resources

and evaluate them on a strict cost-benefit basis. Since the bank is expected to be a non-political body, its decisions are less likely to be suspect. To enable the bank to examine the projects expertly, the composition of its Board of Directors would need to be heavily weighted in favour of persons of known integrity and high professional expertise.

Activating the States

(c) Even if the Centre-State relations improve, the problem of activating the States into raising additional revenue will remain. It is not wholly correct to suggest that the problem arises solely because the States are left with comparatively 'inelastic' sources of revenue. The land tax and the excise provide autonomous tax-bases that are potentially strong but neither has been exploited. Actually the burden of land tax has come down from about 4 per cent of gross value of agricultural output in 1938-39 to about 1.3 per cent in 1960-61. Raising of revenue from an agricultural income tax has not been considered seriously.

Admittedly, democratic governments shy away from measures that might mean loss of political support; but the State governments also make things difficult for each other by not approaching the problem in a concerted manner and by creating awkward precedents for one another. The latest in this sphere is the announcement of the Congress Party that Madras State will abolish land revenue after the elections. This is bound to lead to a chain reaction in other States. Similarly, several State governments in the past have been competing with one another in offering concessions on power rates, etc., to attract industrialists to their respective States.

There are crucial problems where opposing pulls between States constitute a hurdle in adopting a truly national policy as, for instance, in the case of food. Here the tussle between the surplus and deficit States is a chronic one and despite the emphasis which the Venkatappiah Committee has placed upon it we are no nearer

an effective implementation of a national food budget.*

India is not only a political federal democracy, it also has a mixed economy. In a mixed economy, the public sector and the private sector share economic activity as partners. The manner and the proportions in which a particular mixed economy combines the two sectors depends partly on ideology but, to a much greater extent, on the social and economic circumstances of the country concerned.

Public Sector

One does not have to be a doctrinaire socialist to realize the importance of the public sector as an accelerator of economic growth in backward countries. A country needs basic industries, a transport system and other social overheads before secondary manufacturing industries can get started. Quite often such industries and services have to be set up in anticipation of their demand. Since investment in them involves a longer time perspective, the State has to come in, otherwise investment in such industries is not likely to take place. The Indian strategy which emphasises heavy industry in its investment programme calls for the services of public enterprise. Heavy industry implies setting up of technically complicated factories requiring large capital investments which are beyond the means of the private sector. Since such enterprises often do not pay in the initial stages, the need for public enterprise is obvious in these circumstances.

Equally important is the role of the public sector as a counter-weight to private monopoly and concentration of economic power. Perhaps the most fundamental requirement of economic development in a democratic society such as we have in India is to mobilize popular support for our economic plans.

* In fact one wonders why the food surplus States should be interested in preventing their surplus to move freely across their borders and fetch a higher price for the produce of their cultivating community constituting so overwhelming a proportion of their electorate. One should have thought that this was an instance where democratic politics and sound economics could converge.

Hence the need to plan for an economy in which there is no justification for 'large inequalities of income'. And this can be achieved only if the public sector takes over 'progressively the promotional and managerial functions necessary for development'. The enlargement of the public sector is therefore partly a pragmatic necessity to promote economic growth and partly a means of providing an ideological stimulus to enthuse people for a better and more just social order.

The two sectors of the economy, public and private, do not and cannot function in separate watertight compartments. They impinge on each other at numerous points. Without heavy investment in basic industries and other social overheads in public enterprises, industrial production in the private sector could not have been stimulated. The government has helped the private industrial sector substantially in securing finance through various financial institutions set up for the purpose. Large public funds have been used for a comprehensive programme of assistance for private small enterprises resulting in the growth of a new class of small-scale manufacturers. This is direct public support to private enterprises. The political advantage of this is that the new class will be part of a countervailing power to private monopoly.

Rival Claimants

So far so good. But, the two sectors are rival claimants for scarce resources such as domestic savings, foreign exchange, goods and commodities in short supply. The government's price and taxation policies affect the resources available to the private sector. These policies may raise government revenues, but may not necessarily enlarge the national pool of savings. When the price retention policy of the government reduced the internal resources of the private steel manufacturers in India, the government had to provide loans and guarantees for loans to enable them to expand to the targeted capacity. This emphasises the need to have policies which will enlarge the total pool of

savings rather than merely the public savings.

In a completely market-oriented economy, all firms whether in the public or in the private sector compete for scarce goods in the open market. He who can pay gets what he wants. But what happens in a planned economy where the public sector is investing in high priority fields? Should the public sector have a pre-emptory claim on scarce resources? It could be said that in a well formulated plan, inputs and outputs are balanced and since private sector needs have been taken care of in the plan, there is no scope for conflict nor does any problem of choice arise. Such conflicts and problems are, by definition, settled in the very process of formulation of a plan.

Enforcing Preferences

In practice, however, uncertainties and inefficiencies create bottlenecks and imbalances. These bottlenecks and imbalances may get aggravated and new ones may arise when the government is not able to enforce the preferences it has decided upon in respect of investment in the private sector. In such circumstances, when a pre-emption of resources becomes obligatory, the priority projects in the private sector need to be treated on par with those in the public sector. They should be provided the resources, especially those in short supply, to carry out their production programmes; the only safeguard required to prevent resale is to tie the supply of these resources to the realization of their production targets.

The private sector also complains that it is shackled by too many, often unnecessary, controls. A certain amount of regulation and control over the private sector is no doubt necessary, but the jungle of controls that has grown over the years needs to be cut down to the minimum necessary to keep to the main objectives of economic policy. Many of the controls have given rise to vested interests, increased bureaucratic power and political corruption. A ruthless review of these controls is necessary both for the health of the economy as well as that of the political system.

No half measures

SHAMLAL

JUDGING by the morale of the public, the state of the Union today seems to be pretty bad. It is not for the first time that the country is desperately short of food or that the government has been unable to prevent a big spurt in prices. But never before has the general distress led to such loss of self-confidence. It is not unusual for a poor country to take a dim view of the present; what is most disturbing about the Indian scene today is the way in which so many seem to have all of a sudden lost all faith in the future.

It is no use decrying the prevailing mood. Nor does it serve any purpose to point to what has been accomplished. There has been a big increase in the output of steel, cement and power. A host of engineering industries have come into being. There has been

a steady increase in the number of schools and colleges and clinics and hospitals. Even in agriculture where the rate of growth has been far too slow, the long stagnation of the past is over. Even last year when the country lost 17 million tons of foodgrains on account of drought, its output was 16 million tons more than in 1950-51. But then freedom came at the time of a population explosion. The country today has 160 million more mouths to feed than at the time of Independence. If the development of the last 18 years has made little impact on the general standard of living, it is because the increase in population has left only a very small surplus for any rise in per capita income.

A number of factors have gone into producing the present mood of despair which is at the root of

the almost daily outbreak of violence in one part of the country or another.

Lack of Purposefulness

1. The first factor is the lack of purposefulness in the government. The people can be disciplined to face new hardships if they have a clear idea of the goals before them and if they know that the government is straining every nerve to achieve them. Instead of having any evidence of such determination, all that the people see is a policy of drift and *ad hoc* decisions, each devised to deal with an explosive situation.

There can be no more damning comment on this policy of drift than the failure to follow up the devaluation decision with stern measures to check prices, enforce higher norms of work and introduce new austerity standards. How can anyone take seriously the government's claim that it wants to reorganise economic life on a war footing when it can think nothing of having as many as eight public holidays in a month. In January this year alone, apart from the four Sundays, no official work could be transacted on four days because of public holidays. All this is to mock the state of emergency.

Another evidence of this easy-going attitude is the leisurely haggling over distribution of Congress tickets in Bihar and U.P. which went on for weeks in the Capital, requiring repeated visits of ministers from these two States to Delhi while large areas under their charge were living under the shadow of a near famine. How can a party which cannot even close its own ranks in the midst of so great a catastrophe hope to prepare the people to cope with it?

A third instance of the same lackadaisical attitude is the failure to evolve a national food policy. Even after the almost total failure of crops in a score of districts the government has been unable to enforce equality of rations. How can the people be made to feel that they are citizens of the same country when in certain areas they get 50 or 100 per

cent more of wheat or rice by way of daily ration than in other areas?

2. The second factor which has led to the present mood is the way in which the government seems to have done everything to foster a psychology of dependence. The circumstances in which the devaluation decision was announced created the impression that it was taken under duress. Very few have been convinced by the official claim that the decision was entirely the government's own.

Government spokesmen never tire of emphasising the need for self-reliance but do everything to prove how completely dependent the country is on foreign assistance. There can be no more convincing proof of this double-think than the delay in finalising the fourth plan on the excuse that the foreign aid picture is not yet clear. If the government prizes self-reliance as much as it claims, the proper thing for it to do in the face of this uncertainty is to draw up a plan solely on the basis of indigenous resources and such aid commitments as have already been made and to keep in readiness certain projects which can be implemented if and when more aid is available.

But the government continues to hold fast to the view that the shape and size of the plan depends entirely on the quantum of aid that is likely to accrue. This is not surprising because as things are the country's own export earnings do not suffice even for maintenance imports. Surely all this is not calculated to develop the people's faith in their own strength. What is true of foreign assistance for economic development is also true of food aid. Appeals are made every day to foreign nations to come to India's help but nothing is done meanwhile to perfect the procurement and distribution systems at home. This again undermines the nation's will to be self-reliant.

Divisive Tendencies

3. The third source of the present despair lies in the new divisive tendencies at the Centre. This does not mean that the central government worked until last year

as a homogeneous team. Even in the first three years of freedom it did not. The whole country knew that Nehru and Sardar Patel did not see eye to eye with each other on many an urgent issue of policy. But whatever their differences, they did manage to work out a proper division of responsibility and did not allow differences of temperament to clog or disrupt the processes of decision-making.

This is no longer the case. The kind of factionalism which has been the bane of the ruling party in several States for a decade and more is beginning to raise its head at the Centre. Luckily, the rot has not gone far but if it is not checked here and now it can undermine the authority of the government and further detract from the efficiency of the administration.

Moral Authority

4. The fourth reason for the present mood is the corrosion of the moral authority of the Congress. For every scandal involving a Congress politician that comes to light, the public has come to believe that there are a dozen which are hushed up. The party over the years has ceased to take an active interest in the day to day life of the people and has by now degenerated into an election machine. It has yet to realise that life in a country of half a million villages cannot be revolutionised through the bureaucratic machine. A petty official looking after ten villages and having to do a lot of paper work can never develop intimate contact with the people or win their trust. Local leaders, fully conscious of what needs to be done, can alone mobilise the village people. The Congress has done nothing all these years to train local cadres who can help in making a success of the community projects. Can there be a severer indictment of the party that after 16 years of development millions of people in the countryside should not have even a faint idea of what the plans are about? Again, can there be a greater stricture on its record than that a decade after the passage of the land reform laws, powerful landed interests should continue to defy

these with impunity in almost every State?

The party's failure to provide the villages with leadership is matched by its inability to draw educated young men to its ranks. The result has been that over the years it has lost whatever *elan* it had at one time. It has been talking for years of the need to infuse new blood into its ranks but has done everything to alienate the very people who could have brought it new strength.

Opposition's Demoralization

5. The decline in the moral authority of the Congress is matched by the complete demoralisation of the opposition. Only those who feel utterly frustrated because they know that they can never hope to come into power could have behaved so irresponsibly as to organise the recent series of bandhs, strikes and 'ghera dalo' movements. In a democratic society, opposition groups have no doubt the right to have recourse to extra-parliamentary methods to bring home its failure to the party in power. But they ought to be able to see that a poor country adding 12 to 15 million to its population every year cannot achieve a miracle of development overnight. A higher rate of development calls for a higher rate of capital accumulation which means far greater sacrifices on the part of the people, the vast majority of whom live on the margin of subsistence. No party has yet come out with concrete proposals to show how it hopes to achieve a faster rate of growth.

The present outlook in the country would not have been so dark if the people knew that there was an alternative. Today they know that even if the Congress is defeated in a State, the opposition parties will not be able to form a government on the basis of a coherent, viable programme.

6. The task of planners in a poor country like ours is not only to fix the priorities of development and ensure a minimum rate of growth. However well designed, such plans are likely to go awry if the people persist in their old attitudes and cannot look beyond the interests of

their family or their caste group. They have to be made to develop a new sense of obligation to their neighbours and to the community as a whole. Unfortunately, the community development plans have wholly failed in this task. On the showing of various evaluation reports, instead of unifying the village community and imbuing it with a new sense of purpose, they have created new sources of tension. The larger part of the benefits from the community plans has gone to the more well-to-do, thus sharpening the contrast between the poor and the rich in many areas.

What is worse, the plans have failed to involve the majority of people in the new tasks. Many new industrial towns have come up. Power has come to thousands of villages. New areas have been brought under irrigation. But there are millions of people whose life has not been touched in the least by the plans. They constitute, so to speak, a new class of *pariahs*. There is no reason why the plans should not be framed in a way which assigns specific tasks to these people and helps them in building up new assets for the community and, in the process, raising their own standard of living. But this can be done if the plan is conceived in terms of not only financial allocations but of fuller utilisation of manpower resources. Organised industry can at best absorb only a very small part of the yearly increase in the country's population. A new ray of hope can be brought into the life of the idle millions if work is found for them and a manpower budget is drawn up for every village and *taluka*.

Poverty of Thought

7. Nothing in the national scene is more dispiriting than the prevailing poverty of thought. This does not mean that the national leaders in 1947 were all bursting with new ideas. The very Constitution they adopted in 1950 is a witness to their pathetic inability to think boldly. They assumed, all too glibly, that institutions which grew over centuries in entirely different conditions, could be transplanted in an alien soil with-

out suffering any damage or distortion. Experience has belied that assumption. The reality of political life with its spoils system and widespread abuse of power and patronage mocks the spirit of the Constitution.

The country is supposed to follow largely the British system of jurisprudence. But what safeguard has a poor villager today against a petty official who is bent on abusing his power? Very often he does not have the means of seeking redress and even where he has, the process is ruinous to him. Will it not be much better for him if there is only a rough and ready system of justice in the countryside. This may result in grave injustice in some cases, but it will at least be quick and cheap. Can anyone honestly claim that the present system achieves complete justice in every case?

Federal Structure

The same lack of originality marks our federal system. Luckily there has been no major constitutional breakdown so far because most of the time the same party has been in power at the Centre and in the constituent units of the Union. But can anyone say that there will be no breakdown if and when different parties come into power in three or four States? Even under the present dispensation the federal system has not worked happily. In land reforms and in education many States have been unwilling to fall in line with the Centre and the Congress has failed to use its party machine to bring about the unity which cannot be enforced at the constitutional level.

There could be some excuse for Madras and Bengal and Maharashtra trying to pursue different educational policies if different parties were in power in these States. But can the same party claim the right to pursue one policy in one State and another in a different State. If Congress regimes in the States have been reluctant in the past to abide by directives issued by a Congress Government at the Centre, how can the latter expect to enforce its will in matters of national urgency when the directives have

to be carried out by parties which do not see eye to eye with it?

The prevailing poverty of thought is nowhere better illustrated than in the desperate conclusion which some are drawing from the experience of the last 18 years. Many think that the country would be much better off with a presidential system based on the U.S. pattern. But this is a gross fallacy. In countries where most of the issues in dispute are at best marginal, the presidential system can work even in the face of a prolonged conflict between the executive and the legislature. Under the conditions which prevail in India where every issue tends to become explosive, even a president elected by popular acclaim is liable to forfeit much of his authority if he faces a hostile legislature and what is even worse, hostile crowds outside the legislature. It is true that he will be in a better position to form a cabinet of talents but he can hardly retain his hold on public opinion if he ignores the claims of any one region or community. So, like the Prime Minister today, he, too, will have to make continuous adjustments between various claims.

The other desperate conclusion that the country would be much better off with a milder version of the system prevailing in China is even more wrong-headed. It is only because under the present system the discontented have been able to work off their sense of frustration in demonstrations that the country has been able to avoid a convulsion. In the absence of such a safety valve it would not have enjoyed so long a spell of political stability. The harrowing experience of Indonesia last autumn and the current upheaval in China are a warning against any recourse to terror and totalitarian methods. Whatever the reforms in the system, they must conform to the demands of a multi-party democratic system.

Danger of Delay

8. That every reform must conform to the logic of a democratic system does not mean that the process can be delayed. The longer the delay, the greater will be the

danger of violent upheaval. The situation has already reached the point where it can easily get out of hand. Whether it is the development of large pockets of famine or runaway inflation it ought to be clear, after the series of violent disturbances in one State after another, that the people will no longer put up with further hardship unless they are convinced that the government is determined to master the present crisis. This calls for a series of stern measures.

(a) A renovation of political life in which the Congress should set the example. It should recruit and train new cadres throughout the country, encourage more vigorous debates on policy issues, encourage people with new ideas, secure better coordination of policies and do everything to inculcate a new spirit of idealism among its members. No worthwhile gain can be made without such renovation.

(b) The government must fix new norms of work in every walk of life. Everything must be done to develop the habit of hard work. This will involve longer hours in factory and office and fewer holidays. This alone can bring home to everyone the gravity of the crisis through which the country is passing.

(c) The government must sponsor a new programme of rural works to provide gainful employment to the idle millions in the countryside. This programme should be based so far as possible on better utilisation of local resources and should involve no expenditure of foreign exchange.

Decision Making

(d) The processes of decision-making must be speeded up. There is no reason why chief ministers should meet again and again in Delhi and yet fail to evolve an agreed policy on such matters as procurement and distribution of food and control of prices. The practice for such high-powered meetings should be not to adjourn until firm decisions have been taken in regard to every detail.

(e) The ministers themselves should give the lead in clearing up

arrears of work. A limit should be fixed on the time they can be away from Delhi. They should cut down the hours reserved for interviews and devote more time to files. To dispose of matters which call for coordination between two or more departments, the ministers and secretaries concerned should meet more regularly.

(f) There should be a set procedure of inquiry which should come into operation whenever serious charges are levelled against a minister or senior official. This alone will reassure the public that the government does not want to hush up cases in which its own senior party men are involved. It will also save the Prime Minister the embarrassment of taking a decision in each case on an *ad hoc* basis.

Priorities

(g) Steps should be taken to draw more qualified men to the teaching profession. It is a sad comment on our sense of priorities that a young man on leaving the university can expect a higher salary on joining a big firm as an executive than he can hope to secure at the end of a teaching career. All such disparities must be removed if the careerist outlook is to be discouraged and young men are to be made to think more of what they can contribute to society than the claims they can make upon it.

(h) Planning itself must be made more self-reliant and must not always look to foreign assistance. This can be done if better use is made of the country's own export earnings, and a higher priority is given to industries with a marked export potential.

In any case the time is past when the country can do with half-measures. Whatever the Congress may have failed to do in the past, it cannot hope to govern unless it musters the will to take a number of stern decisions. These may be unpleasant to begin with but in the long run they alone can give the country the confidence to cope with the challenges that face it.

Back to nationalism

J. D. SETHI

FROM disenchantment to weariness, and from indignation to helplessness is the current national mood. There is a nasty stench in the air and everyone, except those who sit on the rot, knows where it comes from. The nation is decomposing at its vitals. With two decades of bigotry, arrogance and corruption of political monopoly behind it and in its moments of utter degeneration and possible suicide, the ruling party is pushing India towards some dark, unknown abyss.

Over the last twenty years we tried almost everything conceivable, at least, in theory. We experimented with a variety of institutions, with the subtlest of ideologies, with the theory of the economic big push, with democracy carried to the lowliest man, with socialism crying itself hoarse from multi-storeyed house tops, with new methods and procedures about methods and procedures, etc. And, yet, despite all solutions, all our problems survive and with the utmost vengeance and ferocity. We are apparently stuck with the age-old solution to all problems: 'solving problems by failure'. How to reverse this course of national suicide?

One essential step to reverse this is to throw overboard the dead-weight of, what Kenyes called, the older parrots. There are too many blows given to the nation in the name of Nehruism and I do not know how many times Nehru will have to die before his ghost is finally laid to rest and the nation allowed to find a new faith in her destiny.

Nehruism slowly emerged as a national consensus about a decade ago; but today it is a chilling strategy of weakness abroad and short-

term, cheap tricks at home to bypass the crucial national issues. Its sphinx-like demise marks the tragedy of a great nation and the historical opportunity that came to its leaders after almost a thousand years to grasp the nation's destiny and clear the garb-age and shame of history. Nehru cannot be judged as an ordinary ruler of a big country; his balance sheet would always demand his juxtaposition to this historical moment and the *carte blanche* the nation gave him.

What was the Nehruism consensus? Whatever else it was, however abstract, it was certainly not an ideology nor could it be subjected to 'system analysis' as commonly understood in political science theory. And yet it was unmistakably some sort of national consensus.

As a positive-cum-normative statement of it the Nehruism consensus meant four things. (1) Non-alignment which, implicitly though not explicitly, called for non-interference of the great powers in India. There is no systematic explanatory statement of it on record, as is sometimes asserted, to imply an independent nationalist foreign policy making friends and foes on that basis. (2) A federal democratic constitution entirely western in form and content. The Constitution completely bypassed the enormous complex social structure and its behaviour patterns in the hope that this political modernization imposed from above would short-circuit the process of social change via political participation, economic progress and welfarism. (3) Planned economic growth through a set of policies and objectives which themselves were to emerge either from compulsions of growth

of some undefined consensus of sub-nationalisms, ideological convergence and a host of other conflicting forces. (4) Secularism, democracy, social stratification, democratic decentralization, educational expansion, etc., would take care of other social and political tensions in the community.

'The Break-down

That consensus has now completely broken down. Never before has India's dependence on foreign powers been so abject and total as it is today. Never before have the questions of India's security and war and peace been so completely out of India's reach as they are today. A formal democratic superstructure is intact but it has become utterly non-functional and is treated with total contempt. Not only has economic growth ground to a halt but at no other time and under no other system could big business enrich itself as it has done under the banner of Nehru socialism. The nation's integrity is threatened by such divisive forces as linguism, communalism, regionalism, casteism and what not. Above all, instead of a confidence of national resurgence there is a climate of unpunished and unchecked intellectual treason. This climate is comparable to the Britain of the thirties when the intellectuals were divided in their loyalties between Hitler and Stalin and thereby brought ruin on the nation.

There must be a hundred and one causes, general and specific, that failed the Nehruvian consensus. Unfortunately, they cannot be allowed to crowd into this paper. Nevertheless, the assumption, processes and approaches which went into the formation of that consensus deeply disturb and concern us.

A consensus has to be national *per se*. In a nation which has emerged from a long period of subjugation and which also contained within its bounds a multiplicity of new and old conflicting forces, an overpowering and crusading sense of unification and oneness must accompany any workable consensus. Because, in such a society, the weakness or

strength of a consensus directly emanates from its basic foundation, i.e., rational or collective conscience.

In recent years there has occurred a profound decline in the collective conscience in India, partly because the Nehruvian consensus was never nationalistic enough in tone and emphasis. Nehru's attitudes towards nationalism in the post-independent era remained ambivalent. In 1950 he said at Lucknow that nationalism as a war cry warms the heart of every Indian and that 'any other force, any other activity that may seek to function, must define itself in terms of nationalism.' Not much later he also said that 'nationalism is essentially an anti-feeling and it feeds and fattens on hatred and anger against other nations.'

The Background

This ambivalence needs a little excursion into history. To Oxbridge and other British historians, for whom 'the world' began with industrialization in the West, Indian nationalism was the product of British Imperialism and its history, culture, tradition religion, etc., had no or little part in it. To them India was only a geographical expression, not a nation, just as to many pseudo-leftists and westernizing 'modernists,' it is not a nation even today.

Whereas the first crusaders of Indian nationalism in the 19th century looked upon political progress or freedom coming via reforms in Indian society which were to bring out the superiority or at least non-inferiority of the Indian civilization, the later brand of nationalists, though rightly insisting on freedom first, were so deeply convinced of the superiority of the British institutions and culture that they came to rely heavily on supra-national principles in their struggle for freedom. Whereas the former imbibed and spread the spirit of the Renaissance the latter developed and spread Faustian contradictions.

The colonial rulers came to use not more but less and less force

because they had many other cultural and political weapons and immense technical superiority, a much more convincing and effective set of tools. Gandhi tried to combine the passion for freedom with a sense of Indianness, but since he essentially did not want to disturb the status quo of the Hindu society, the combination wore very thin. Had our national movement been revolutionary in the true sense which it was not, this combination would have been inevitably more profound and lasting. It would have proved a dynamic force of gigantic magnitude in radicalizing the freedom movement as well as cleansing and preserving what later Ramsay Macdonald came to accept as the 'beautiful soul' of India as expressed in her nationalism.

The founding fathers of the Constitution and the intellectuals behind the Nehruvian consensus were even more impressed by the superiority of the British political institutions and culture or their variants elsewhere. Indian tradition was described as the enemy of 'modernization', Indian social values as inimical to individual freedom and progress, the social system or structure as incompatible with democracy, etc. The Nehru era was a period of the grand exercise in national intellectual masochism. Of course, the Indian society, probably more than any other society, needed a big clean-up and ruthless extermination of accumulated inequities, rigidities and the fossils of centuries. But what the new consensus did was simply to throw away the baby with the bath water. Ironically, all the social dirt and the garbage has come to stay with a vengeance through the same very western system which replaced Indian nationalism.

In brief, not being nationalist enough or having the right spirit of national renaissance, the Nehru consensus was largely a decorated superstructure without solid foundations. It could not but collapse.

National Consensus

A national consensus is vaguely about the sort of society we want

to live in and therefore must equally emphasize rights as well as the duties of citizens. The constitution and the political system of the Nehru consensus was a romantic and distorted projection of western liberalism which evolved over years in Europe a set of fundamental rights and stressed the spirit of individualism. The Indian Constitution and laws put an exaggerated emphasis on rights but ignored totally the duties of citizens and revealed the intellectual adolescence of their authors.

The liberal spirit of the West stimulated a great deal the movement for self-determination in the colonial era. But what was lacking in the post-Independence consensus in India was operational policies to keep check on hot-house ideas and theories imported from the West. Besides, on a false and irrelevant premise that the old Hindu society stressed more the obligations than the rights, the most ruthless individualism and groupism were released without realizing that the old attitude was a remnant of an era of religious and political persecution and did not belong to any permanent social tradition of India. The casualty was both a sense of obligation and the traditional principle of brotherhood and national unity.

Distributive Ideology

Today we have been left with the loud and shrill cries of rights including the right of blackmail, treason, corruption, breach of law as well the right to get away with it. No consensus can have any meaning in this situation, particularly if law and order has broken down. Almost all the contemporary ideologies, pressures and institutions constituting the Nehruvian consensus add up to a structure of distributive pressures on the economic system. The federal political structure, democratic decentralisation, welfare State, socialism, land distribution, theory of balance among group interests, educational expansion, etc., are all distributive ideologies without necessarily requiring any emphasis on productivity and efficiency. Only when the national

cake, i.e., national income, came to grow slowly was their squeeze felt terribly on the economy.

Nevertheless, thanks to that consensus, there is yet no realization about the fatal pressure of distributive ideologies. Nehru had a great sense of history but no sense of time. For example, socialism is an historical inevitability but how can one forget that it took the greatest socialist country forty years of productive effort before anything worthwhile could be distributed to the Soviet citizens. The Nehru socialism on the other hand began with distribution.

The Two Essentials

An important characteristic of a workable consensus is that its general pattern should be able to determine the relative role and function and degree of competitiveness of its component parts as well as hold them together in a consistent fashion. In other words, social progress cannot be had only at either of the two extremes of the scales, namely functionalism and dialectics; the two must exist and reinforce each other in right proportion.

The Nehru consensus was essentially functional in approach and completely discarded the dialectical part, with the result that it ceased to be functional in the end. It never tackled the basic problem of arriving at a theory of society that could achieve an adequate balance between stability and change, between equilibrium and disequilibrium and even between consensus and conflict. If it ever was one, Nehruism as a political system, following David Apter's three fold classification, was reconciling and not, or at least not enough, mobilizing and modernizing. The former has the characteristics of pyramidal authority, multiple loyalties, built-in-compromise, pluralism and ideological diffusion. The last two have tactical and strategic flexibility, unitarism, exclusivism, ideological specialization, neo-traditionalism, i.e., modernizing nationalism.

But the worse part of Nehruism was that while it accepted one

system, it tried to behave differently. In this contradiction lies the emerging frigidity of the Indian system about which Professor A. H. Hanson has remarked that 'many of the difficulties which Indian planners have encountered spring from the fact that they are constantly attempting to transcend the limitations of the reconciliation system within which they have to operate and the tendency to assume the existence of attitudes and the viabilities of techniques which are meaningful only within the framework of a mobilizing system.'

The Means

What were the means, techniques and choices open to the Nehru consensus or used by it? It is not possible to enumerate all of them or analyse fully the most important ones. Nevertheless, something must be said about their failure story. (i) A democratic consensus is bound to fail without a dominant two-party system. For twenty years, instead of a two-party system, we had more or less an effective one-party rule through a curious mixture of scores of fragmented parties.

(ii) A consensus must be arrived at through some recognizable process. It may appear strange but it remains a fact that the Nehru consensus was never subjected to a full scale national debate. It was never even questioned until the Swatantra Party came into existence. Lack of debate was more pronounced in issues of foreign policy.

(iii) A consensus is either participant or non-participant. All sorts of institutions were set up for peoples' and elite's participation and they did participate, but unfortunately the character and functioning of these institutions was such that what emerged out of the participation was not a consensus but a series of violent conflicts and, ironically, the functionlessness of the entire system.

(iv) Every consensus, and more so a democratic one, needs a

proper structure of leadership at all levels. What Gandhi gave India was not really a synthesis between traditionalism and modernism as is often assumed, but a novel and working synthesis between the elite and the masses as an instrument of political action. On the other hand, over the last twenty years, not only has the gap between the elite and the masses widened politically, but also the cultural gap has sharply cut the society vertically. At higher levels Nehru, unlike Gandhi, employed a personal vassalage relationship to remain in power. The result, as Bagehot would say, is the legacy of tenth rate leaders desperately and perpetually trying to become ninth rate.

No Militancy

(v) The choice and use of some militant organization by a consensus depend upon the degree and intensity of inequities, exploitation and irrationalism in the society. And there was a formidable accumulation of these ugly forces over centuries which needed a quick sweeping away. Every decision could not be left to natural compromise. The Nehru consensus was unmilitant totally. No wonder that the forces of communalism, caste, faction, etc., have been let loose on the country in a most vicious form.

(vi) Politics is all about power and a political consensus is a balance of power between numerous components of the power structure. Unless there is an effective and operational agreement among the components about some minimum code of conduct and respect for the law, no consensus can succeed. It is wrong to create a model of a politician being either a saint or a crook; it must be of persons working with outer as well as self-imposed limitations. When adult franchise was introduced in Europe, the laws of the land were tightened and were made to be respected. In India we have neither the respect and the effectiveness of the law nor a consensus about the code of conduct. In fact, political fragmentation and ani-

mosities become so deep as to exclude any agreement on the political rules of the game among the major competitors for power. It is a situation of one irresponsibility counterpointing another.

The Final Determinant

Consensus or no consensus, a nation must develop a critical minimum power to defend itself against other nations. If there is also a consensus and it is held as a value system, the minimum critical level of that power has to be raised to meet both physical and ideological onslaughts from other competitive systems. It may not be true or relevant for a small country, but for a large and potentially strong one there is no choice but to compete for power simply because every other comparable political entity is doing so.

We are living in the age of a one-parametric world in which power is the final determinant of a nation's place in the international hierarchy of power. In other words, today one is either a spider or a fly and at best what a small country can do is to avoid being a fly. But the choice for a big country is unique as it is likely to be broken into pieces so as to be reduced to the level of a fly. It is humiliating for India to compete for power with Pakistan in terms of the simple dimensions of the potentiality of India.

Power also determined material goals (including that elusive and most general of all the generalities, i.e., world peace) and the international freedom of action a nation enjoys. 'Usually the assertion that a nation's goal is the welfare of humanity is not an outright lie but a half-truth.' And it turns into a nightmare for a country with little power to back such goals. The weaker a nation at any time, the narrower and more specific must be its goals to protect itself from being dragged into world wide conflicts because global goals are a function of power and the amount of sacrifice a nation is prepared to put in.

If a nation without enough power builds into her national consensus universal goals, it invi-

tes the charge of hypocrisy and possible humiliation when asked to defend those goals. It may or may not be true that power corrupts or lacks principles; the absence of power certainly corrupts. Today it is the weak rather than the strong powers which are corrupt and unprincipled. A powerful nation has a much greater sense of responsibility today because there is too much at stake for her. Finally, power like national consensus is not a state but a dynamic and subtle concept or force. A large country in its transition to growth and power must develop first negative power for quite some time, i.e., the power to prevent others from doing harm to its interests. Positive power comes later. Nehru left India without negative or positive power, for war or peace on our borders today is at the mercy of other powers.

Too Abstract

The Nehru consensus deliberately underplayed the goals and determinants of power. Non-alignment was too broad, too general and too much directed to a distant horizon and thus defied all the requirements of power and, therefore, come to a sorry end. This consensus had very little indigenous quality; it was the projection of an external rather than an internal reality. By denying itself the virtue of being specific and more narrowly defined, it undermined the national unity in favour of abstract universal principles. The more India lost face and prestige abroad, the more loud was the cry of non-alignment and the greater became her dependence on others for succour and security. Nehru turned himself into a professional neutralist after one or two conspicuous achievements. His Miltonic passion for resounding titles led him to stick to the most defiant artificiality. He never understood the reality of the potential power in India which gave him an early success.

Here is the comment of A. F. K. Organski. 'The expectation of true power may also be traded upon, and a nation expected to be great tomorrow may find its present

power position improved for that reason. India is a good example. Part of India's present ability to influence other nations rests upon the peculiar moral position that her leaders, Gandhi and Nehru, came to occupy, but another part of her present power is due to more material considerations. India, with her gigantic population, possesses one of the important pre-requisites for being a great power. If she ever modernizes and mobilizes that population, she will, indeed, be a nation to be contended with. It is with one eye on the future, that East and West are vying for the friendship of India.

The old national consensus is shattered completely now; in fact it was hardly a consensus in the sense of having been nationally arrived at. It revealed itself as an amalgam of Nehru's private myths. A new consensus, therefore, must be created. It cannot be created as an academic exercise but only through the conscientious efforts of the most conscious segment of the political elite taking into account the forces, alignments, power structure and the socio-economic realities, all of which also have to be modified through the working of the same consensus.

The Foundation

The purpose of the rest of this paper is to point out only to the single most solid foundation of a new consensus, namely, nationalism. By now every other power has revealed the all-pervasive force of nationalism and by contrast the Nehru consensus was a national self-abdication. Nationalism has to be absorbed in all its healthy aspects, i.e., as a component of the structure of policies, a dynamic path, even as an ideology, an inescapable instrument, and as a frame of reference, etc. Nehru said in 1960 'how superficial is the covering of what we like to call nationalism, which bursts open at the slightest irritation.' Precisely. He looked upon nationalism as a covering and not as a foundation for the progress of the society.

What is nationalism? This word has been a subject of interminable

discussion and it is not my purpose to disentangle the historical, philosophical, psychological attributes from the political meaning of the word. Nationalism can be classified into two categories; domestic and foreign. The former, as a unifying force, is concerned with internal social economic arrangement, change, struggle, power structure, etc.; in essential conflict with particularism such as sub-nationalism, regionalism, communalism, castes etc. The latter, as defined by Rupert Emerson, is that 'reduced to its bare bones, nationalism is no more than the assertion that this particular community is arranged against the rest of mankind' in the present phase of the world divided into nation-States.

Definition

The second approach does not permit this term to have a pure theoretical construction, in the sense of having logical rigour and perfect internal consistency. We are not living in the 18th and 19th century of which nationalism was the product. In the second half of the twentieth century, when national self-determination is no longer an issue, the term nationalism has to be used contextually as Ernst B. Hass, the famous author of *Beyond the Nation State*, has suggested. That is 'an approach that tries to bridge the epistemological chasm between those who want to derive general deductive laws on the one hand and those who prefer to concentrate of the painstaking narration of discreet, if related, events on the other. Contextual analysis is more ambitious than historical narration and more modest than the effort at deductive science. It sees the phenomenon under investigation as a part of a "whole" but defines the "whole" in relatively modest and easily observable terms.'

Therefore, whether nationalism is good or bad or will prove a curse or a blessing is not a matter of definition. The fact remains that it is not on the wane 'in the countries of its origin'. It remains a great historic process and the

paradox is that nowhere is the emphasis on it so great as in a communist society or in the centre of free nations, i.e., the United States.

Marxist Objection

Let me anticipate the Marxists' objection to nationalism. Lenin wrote in 1913, 'Marxism is irreconcilable with nationalism even the justest, purest, most refined and civilized.' After three decades, the most sympathetic historian of the Soviet Union, E.H. Carr, summed up that 'the socialization of the nation, had its natural corollary in the nationalization of socialism.' What has happened since then is a gruesome story of naked nationalism first revealed in the ruthless exploitation by the Soviet Union of other communist countries and second is the irretrievable clash of national interests between the Soviet Union and Communist China. The greater the global involvement of big powers, the greater has been the rise of nationalist tendencies in the world.

In the historical growth of communism, nationalism was once an enemy but today it is, to use the language of strategy, the highest common denominator of the global competition. Yet, Karunakar Gupta, presumably a Marxist, writes while approving Nehru's foreign policy, that 'under the circumstances, the defense of National Interest in Indian foreign policy would mean safeguarding primarily the interests of the propertied classes.'

I have no doubt in my mind that if communists were in power in India they would defend every inch of territory against the Chinese more jealously and nationalistically than anybody else as, for example, the Russians and Chinese are doing against each other. And they would give the highest priority to make India, a great power. But a weak communist party can easily become the instrument of the nationalist ambition of another powerful communist country, denounce nationalism and also commit acts of treason. What Comrade Mao is doing today is not applying Mar-

xism to Chinese conditions—that he did long ago—but imposing Chinese nationalism on Marxism; it is the latter which has to adjust to the former. No communist movement can succeed today if it goes against the stream of nationalism. Nationalism is the dominant cultural complex of politically divided nation-States.

Nobody can speak better for the United States than Hans J. Morgenthau. 'Throughout its history the United States has pursued a consistent foreign policy. Beneath the clamour of contending philosophies, the controversies of factions, the contradictions and reversals of individual moves on the international scene, the foreign policy of the United States presents a simple coherent pattern—to preserve its unique position as the predominant unrivalled power in the western hemisphere' and now to maintain in Asia 'The permanent power of the United States.'

Until recently, nationalism was considered dead in Europe as if the mature nations were moving towards some permanent union as a historical belief in the inevitability of that development. De Gaulle has clearly given the call for the end of what he called the two hegemonies in Europe and thus brought the neo-nationalism of the industrialized into the world. In Latin America and Africa the struggle for survival is the struggle of nationalism.

The Paradox

A general principle is that whenever international relations or interdependence threatens the prosperity and security of a nation, a nationalist outlook develops among its citizens, whether democratic or communist. The paradox of this age is that it marks the high tide of nationalism and defence of national interests while in theory—but only in theory as any assessment of the U.N. will show—it also points towards the possibility of the end of nationalism as embodied in the principles of world government, technological imperatives, growth of communication, etc. Yet, what Gandhiji said remains true: 'Internationa-

lism is possible only when nationalism is a fact.'

The paradox is due to the uneven distribution of power, military and economic, in the world. For smaller countries the problem is not acute. For large countries like India the problem of lack of power is pressing on each one of their internal and external policies. Nationalism without power is a cry of desperation, and power without nationalism is a source of corruption and brutalization. The philosophy of history as the march of ideas of freedom and progress is really not inconsistent with nationalism; only, it has come to depend upon the latter and the power wielded by it. Power gives a country a choice, the lack of it does not.

India's foreign policy lacked power, rejected nationalism left national interest undefined, proclaimed abstract principles. The supreme principle of foreign policy is that national interests are supreme and that Indian civilization is in fierce competition with other civilizations. The Indian State is in perpetual struggle with other States, and India as a power centre is bound to clash with other power centres. Nehru wanted to buy political idealism and millennium at a cheap price. The price has turned out to be very high—the demise of nationalism. If the term 'nation' had not been able to explain the conduct of communist power, it was because the element of power in the calculus was 'neglected. Now the naked truth is that the nation-State and its national power are the only entities which work within the contemporary world. It does not mean that a nation-State is an end itself. It is the defence of the instrument that is relevant. Nationalism is the most unifying force for weaker countries like India in defence of their States and interests.

Relation to Socialism

Is nationalism inconsistent with socialism? We have shown above that it is not so externally. What about inside the country? Like nationalism, socialism is also a

slippery concept. Today anything from a simple welfare State to a complete communist society can be called socialism. Socialism is a great dream of humanity and an historical inevitability whether realized gradually or otherwise. It is also a matter of degree, means and speed because all over the world the people of the earth are building their societies on the socialist, humanist principles of equality, despite occasional and short-term aberrations.

In the modern world, a welfare State is nationalist in the sense that its psychological foundations lie in people's valuations and expectations. Myrdal has painstakingly tried to show that a growing identification with the nation-State and with all the people within its boundaries is a natural result of the development of the democratic welfare State—a State which is both 'protective and nationalist'. Even a great critic of nationalism, Elie Kedourie, makes nationalism, 'the cohesion of the State, loyalty to it depends on its capacity to ensure welfare of the individual, and in him, love of the fatherland as a function of benefits received.' It is true that in Europe nationalism matured under the national bourgeoisie. It is the experience of the last twenty years that this is no longer true. A part of the national bourgeoisie can be anti-nationalist and subserve the interest of neo-colonialists.

Pragmatism

It is wrong to call pragmatism the philosophy of nationalism, because raised to the level of a philosophy and its logical extremes, pragmatism produces scepticism, nihilism and ultimately despair. They are neither the characteristics of nationalism or socialism. Pragmatism in the garb of Nehruvian ideology has led to the growth of reactionary and particularistic forces in India. Indian socialism came to a sorry state due largely to the rise of particularism of all sorts, caste, communalism, regionalism, religious fanaticism, etc. Only the integrating force of nationalism could remove these barriers to a socialist society, as well as pro-

duce, if necessary, the right type of dialectical conflict. Above all, both socialism and nationalism would insist on rapid industrialization and economic growth and put the burden on shoulders on which it should really rest.

Relation to Hinduism

It is often feared that a return to nationalism could lead to the revival of Hinduism or its reaction, the minority communalism. Irrespective of any logical or historical relationship between religion and nationalism, the politics of the last few years in India has unmistakably revealed that it is the low level of nationalism which has produced a return to religion and virulent communalism, whether of the majority or minority. Besides, Hinduism as a religion and as a social tradition or system is not coterminous with nationalism. Whatever is best or relevant in that tradition has to be fully utilized and even carried forward if vast masses have to have faith in themselves, discover their identity and discriminate between national and other narrow loyalties.

The absence of a nationalist outlook has led the whole class of our western educated intellectuals, strangely both of Right and Left persuasion, to resort to wholesale denunciation of Indian nationalism and Indian values. Having been uprooted from these traditions by their education and class distinctions, they do not feel any loyalty between that and their subcaste or region and to the cosmos. They do not see anything but weakness and rot in the Indian society and it would come as the greatest shock to them if India ever were able to emerge as a strong nation. They do not realize, for example, that Mao has always used the traditional idiom as the medium of communication between the elite and the masses and also between himself and the elite. Both nationalism and the Hindu way of life are not deterministic laws but only ways of acting and thinking.

The real problem is to separate the wheat from the chaff by the consciousness and skill of the

leaders who set and control the pattern of behaviour, and know the goals of the society, because Hinduism is not necessarily nationalist.

Professor Vikas Misra, in his study of Hinduism and economic development, remarks that 'nationalism is by no means an essential attribute of Hinduism; indeed, the history of India often shows the contrary, the predominance of group interests over national interests. The Hindu social structure also strengthens group loyalty.' In other words, nationalism is going to offend some part of Hinduism but not reject the vital in it. Hinduism as a religious-cum-political technique as used by Gandhi has probably outlived its utility. But the spirit behind what he said is worth noting: 'My Hinduism is not sectarian. It includes all that I know to be best in Islam, Christianity, Buddhism and Zoroastrianism.'

Early Muslim nationalists like Sir Sayyid Ahmed Khan likened the Indian nation to a blonde and her two eyes were the Hindus and Muslims. Indian nationalism was dealt a heavy blow by the division of India on religious lines. Only the revival of nationalism can reduce the sectarian force of religion as well as the Indian nationalist tradition, which in the words of Annie Besant is 'not a plant of mushroom growth but a giant of the forest, with millennia behind it.' The cry of the wolf of Hindu revivalism is utter defeatism and lack of self-confidence.

Relation to Modernization

How is nationalism related to modernization and change? Two words coined by Indian sociologists, sanskritization and westernization have done immense harm to the conceptualization of change in Indian society. The former, despite all attempts at its sophistication, has not meant anything more than the creation of new permutations of and the internal convolutions within a social system, i.e., it referred only to 'static change'. The latter, though wrongly equated with modernization,

referred to the absorption of some institutions and certain behaviour patterns from the West, largely its worst features. It has been cruelly disproved by the Indian experience that westernization necessarily implies either industrialization or modernization in the sense of a high rate of investment and savings and a pervasive technological and scientific bias.

Thus, not very surprisingly, the concepts of sanskritization and modernization have not only utterly failed to explain the internal dynamics of the change in India on the national scale; they have, as descriptive parameters of small group behaviour, set up false and misleading indices of change. But something worse than that has happened. The micro theory of small group behaviour excluded the macro approach such as nationalism.

Unbalanced Structure

Nowhere in our plans, institutions and behaviour does the relation between modernization and nationalism appear in any positive form. Modernization without the sanction of nationalism behind it has led, on the one hand, to the development of the 'fascination effect' and apish mentality of an indiscriminate import of bogus cultural values and commodities from the West and, on the other hand, a yawning technological gap between the unchanging primitive *charkha* and a few imported islands of technical excellence, which has further aggravated the dual economic culture from which we began. India has not understood the concept of national or, what D. R. Gadgil calls, intermediate technology and has created an unbalanced structure all along the line.

The so-called modernization in political and cultural life has created a new and more pernicious dualism between the elite and the masses, the privileged few and the poor humanity. The sociologists keep unduly pressing the growth of mobility, cultural transmission, diversification, phenomenon of dominance and resistance, intensity of interest-group activity—all

as symptoms of political and social progress. There is no other more pernicious nonsense that has been kicked about for so long. By their standards, the DMK is very national, the Arya Samaj progressive, caste healthy, religion forward looking and what not! What is needed is a strong force of nationalism to root out these poisonous weeds of divisive and corroding particularism; a unifying force which forces through these groups and their narrow loyalties certain behavioural and institutional compulsions towards efficiency, rational allocations and satisfying national priorities.

One of the features of the Indian nationalism of the freedom movement was its identification with true modernization despite a temporary backsliding by Gandhi. The reports of the National Planning Committee of the Indian National Congress bear testimony to that assumption. No price was too high for the nationalists' commitment to modernizing the society and destroying the status quo. Nationalism would have certainly provided the strongest force in this transition and transformation.

Somehow, modernization was understood by later day Indian leaders to be least concerned with nationalism. In the words of Rupert Emerson, they ignored 'the proposition that the rise of nationalism is normally associated with deep-running solid ferment and change which disrupt the old order of society and bring about a rise in social consequence and awareness of ever-widening segments and classes of the people at large. On this basis nationalism is seen as one of the major manifestations of what Karl Mannheim has spoken of as "the fundamental democratization of society".'

The Danger

Indian democracy has reached a point where unless it is given a new outfit, a new functionalism and a new faith, it is in danger of being liquidated. Democracy in the West slowly evolved, first to arbitrate over a small number of issues and later to expand so much as to manage and settle a whole

range of social, economic and political problems. In India, democracy was intended to perform the latter function right from the beginning and quite obviously it has failed in its allotted tasks. And yet the spirit of democracy has seeped quite deep into the Indian mind, reinforced by the traditional behaviour of tolerance and let-live.

In Europe, in the early days of the rise of democracy, conservatives came to look upon nationalism as an antidote to democracy and a means to check the latter. How sadly it dawned on them that nationalism contained the germs of an anti-conservative revolutionary character. In the last few decades, democracy has fought all its successful battles under the banner of nationalism, not pseudo nationalism but integral nationalism. Modern nationalism 'is peculiarly a product of a response to the distinctive forces which have gone into the shaping of the modern world. These forces are inherently and inevitably democratic in the sense that they mobilize submerged elements and classes of society into a new social role, eat away at traditional attachments and relationships, and work toward the building of a new great society into which, in principle, all men are actively drawn; the general conception, derived from the changing social scene [is] that the people, the mass of ordinary humans, are of consequence, that they are achieving a sense both of their own worth and of their right and ability to do something about it, that leaders must speak in their name. The national era came to be the era of mass communications and mass production, increasingly headed towards mass politics... In the new dispensation, the State could no longer be seen as made up of the ruler and those who happened to be its subjects, but became in principle the nation and instrument of the nation.'

Pseudo-politics

Political activity, like other activities, has its own goals and objectives. In developed societies, democracy has travelled a long way and has made political activity

also a rational end in itself. However, if objectives become blurred and mutually irreconcilable, lack minimum consensus and impart intellectual cynicism and escapism, the autonomous political activity degenerates into pseudo-politics. This phenomenon is quite common in under-developed and unstable societies. India today faces this problem as one of the most serious challenges.

Pseudo-politics is analytically distinguished from rational political activity by the type of motivation or purpose, the alleviation of neurosis and morbid passion for the promotion of private good against an improved satisfaction of human needs according to universalistic values. One other feature of pseudo-politics is that it considers the existing politico-economic system as best and resists change, while noisy professions on grim problems and big change and fundamental transformation are constantly voiced for public consumption.

Growing Gulf

The India of today is a grim example of a growing gulf between profession and practice all over the political field. While politics is fast becoming an end in itself, there is also taking place a general deterioration in ordinary political norms and disregard of the determinants, implications and consequences of this type of political activity. Most of our political leaders talk all the time in terms of total normative dimensions and some often indulge in vulgar and corrupt 'pragmatism'. It is a sign of the same pseudo-politics that political activity in India is massively encumbered by flashes of mutually-hating, pseudo-ideological positions, despite the long and bitter experience that ideological-dominated thinking and activity has had little relevance to the actually controlling factors of the contemporary social structure, politics and change, or rather, the lack of it.

It is amazing how the ideology of equality and socialism has degenerated into non-discrimination against stupidity and incom-

petence, and the ideology of liberalism has become a tool for the maintenance of the illiberal *status quo* and the exploitation of the weakest section of the society. It is my contention that existing forms of political activity and the consensus on which they are based cannot save democracy from its pseudo aspects. Nationalism alone can pull out the weeds of pseudo-politics as well as give faith to the masses to work for a new consensus.

There is no guarantee that nationalism will always lead to democracy. But democracy without nationalism cannot survive. If nationalism ever goes against democracy in newly independent countries, it will simply be a short-term tactical retreat because all over the world democracy and nationalism as political phenomenon have closely coincided.

Significant Sanction

Probably the most crucial role of nationalism in India today rests in our accepting it as an approach to the defence of national interests, as an ideology of unity and as a self-respecting attitude to action for self-reliance and rising by our bootstraps. As a complex of nationality, nation-State and national patriotism, it is the most significant sanction behind some minimum unity of thought and action. Whereas the nationalism of the super powers carries the danger of leading them straight to imperialism, nationalism of potentially strong countries like India constitutes the bastion of anti-imperialism by putting premium on unity, defence preparedness and self reliance. In face of the internal fragmentation of politics and disunity as well as external weakness, the ideological force of nationalism must be fully integrated in India's national and international politics.

Ideological nationalism is revolutionary while pragmatic nationalism moves slowly. Time is running out against India and going back to nationalism as a sober calculation and not as psychotic emotionalism is the inescapable path to survival and rapid change.

Today it remains probably the only reliable means of interpreting the ills, problems and frustrations as well as the goals of our society. It is also the only means left for creating a new, healthy psychological environment out of the chaos of ideologies and non-decision making politics of disfunctionalism.

Nationalism does not mean the rejection of other ideologies or the creation of an ideology-free society, because it itself is not a coherent and a systematic body of doctrines and beliefs, but is a means to get the best workable ideology or ideologies. In short, it alone can create an ideological consensus in the dynamic sense, make the beginnings of a new consensus in place of the old and now defunct Nehruvian consensus. There are enough and lasting shared experiences and political values in India to sustain nationalism and the nation-State as the impersonal and ultimate arbiter of India's destiny.

It is particularly so today because the current ideologies propagated in India have very little intellectual content and even relevance as categories of political sociology. There are all sorts of nationalist movements in the world and around India's borders that are going in search of an ideology. Since the Nehruvian search for an ideology has not been nationalist, it has lost its acquired ideology and nationalism bequeathed to it. The size of Nehru's bite was big and puffy but the quality of his chewing was utterly hopeless.

Not Inconsistent

The preceding discussion has, I hope, yielded at least two important conclusions, both of which are important in creating a new national consensus in place of the Nehruvian consensus. First, nationalism is not inconsistent with the value-system on which the Indian people have been brought up either by Nehru or the national freedom movement. In fact, it was the lack of nationalism which corrupted if not destroyed that value system. Nor is it inconsistent with internationalism except

that so long as wide disparities of political and military power, industrialization, standard of living remain, we shall have to contend with divergent and not convergent nationalisms. High correlation between nationalism and under-development is a sign and urge for creating a more solid and surer internationalism. It is the global involvement of super powers which is hindering rather than helping internationalism. The essence of the new but weak nation-States is not to remain alone in the world.

Revolutionary Instrument

The second conclusion, and more satisfying to high-minded sceptics, is that nationalism is a powerful revolutionary instrument, but nevertheless an instrument. Since it is the principal instrument of world powers, we cannot afford to reject it unless we find a better one to replace it. As Ernest Baker has pointed out in this connection, 'we can judge tools by the efficacy with which they fulfil the purposes for which they are used.' Our rejection of nationalism so far has created for us numerous humiliating positions, and we must grasp it now and fully use it before we discard it again. I doubt if any other nation is going to discard it during the next half century, which is most likely to be a century of national development opportunities and crises.

Nationalism is not a set of principles which tell us how to organize our society. But looking around at a spectrum of nationalism, whether of Right or Left, traditional or revolutionary, democratic or otherwise, it remains the most powerful force for national development. Even Marxism today exists only in some form of national socialism. For India the doctrine of nationalism as a substitute for the fading collective conscience and pseudo-politics is a must for rallying the people in defence of unity, to give them an identity and sense of belonging and civilized optimism, to create a passion for national reconstruction through self-reliance, for power, socialism and democracy, etc., i.e., for a cohesive and refreshing new national consensus.

Moment of criticality

ROMESH THAPAR

'CRITICALITY' was the word our atomic scientists coined to indicate the moment at which their indigenous reactor would begin functioning. Politically speaking, we could also describe the present period of complexity and confusion as the moment of criticality. Will the political system we have given ourselves function in this crisis period despite the tremendous stresses it has undergone since the fateful days of 1962 or will it 'go under' because we do not possess the intellectual capacity and initiative to correct the mechanism in the event of a breakdown?

The doubt arises only because there is apparent, at every level, a marked propensity for the political leadership of all persuasions to mouth platitudes when confronting the series of inter-connected crises now holding the sub-continent in their grip. The indulgence in platitudes reflects a reluctance to dissect the crises which are developing and to study their implications for the unity of India. Until this is done, the fear will remain that there is a tragic inevitability in all that we are witnessing today, and that there is no corrective within the context of the political experiment we have attempted.

The unity of India is as yet too fragile to permit of traumatic changes in constitutional structure. It is necessary, however, within the bounds of a certain continuity, to review the structure every now and then to ensure that it is viable and safeguards our national interests. Any aspect of federal relations and procedures which erodes

political and economic cohesion or damages national interests must come under thorough review. To argue otherwise would be the height of folly, for constitutional structures cannot be immune from interpretation and re-interpretation in a fast-changing world.

What then are the constant factors which must condition the periodical assessment of the validity of the institutional forms we have given ourselves?

First, the unity of India. This is not as obvious as it sounds. We are a federal State comprising many highly developed and nationalistic communities. Indeed, sometimes we have been described as a multi-national State. The unity we speak of is of recent vintage, despite all the talk about Mauryan and Mughal empires. To some extent, in the distant past, the unconscious bond of Hinduistic practice gave a sense of belonging to a single entity. However, the partitioned or fractured unity which we inherited in 1947 was the result of the British imperial presence which demanded consolidation of a most profitable colonial property. To cement this unity, to give it a modern content, remains the central, strategic task of the political leadership of modern India.

Second, the concept of this unity as a mosaic of rich variety, variety that must be properly fused—or 'integrated', as the politicians say. This concept should be based upon the understanding that there must be respect for difference, that conformism to the patterns dictated by a

dominant group is a danger to the stability of a federal State. It demands the disciplining of Hindu obscurantism as much as regional separateness.

Third, the vital economic dimension of this unity. A sprawling sub-continent has to be developed in a balanced manner. The huge gulfs between town and village, between backward area and advanced area, have to be bridged. In other words, a very limited cake has to be very carefully divided among the constituents of a federal State. An unbalanced development would only generate tensions and explosions which would endanger the cohesion of the federal structure.

Fourth, the paramount importance to give traditional attitudes a modern, scientific and technological ballast in a sub-continent where many centuries are telescoped into one. This transformation is absolutely necessary for carrying out a speedy development of resources and freeing the natural initiatives of the people. It is also necessary for our internal self-reliance.

And, fifth, our thrust into the future has to be in democratic involvement. Autocratic posturings can spell danger to India's unity which has to be strengthened and consolidated. In other words, 'coupist' tactics in one part of India need not have any relevance to another part. Autocracy, expressed in continental or regional nationalism, could herald the break-up of the federal structure. The emphasis has to be on the purposeful activity and perspectives of all-India parties and mass organisations which alone can move the country in unity.

The Frame

These constant factors determine the frame within which all the elements of national policy are gathered and sought to be fused. It was fortunate that the leadership of the freedom struggle headed by Gandhi, and the eighteen-year stewardship of free India by Nehru, sought to test every policy by the yardstick of continental unity. The partition

of 1947 was a salutary reminder of what could happen on an even more devastating level. The politics of consensus, so superficially understood by experts and analysts (particularly of the foreign variety!) with their pre-conceived notions of what democratic functioning should be, were dependent for success on the capacity of a leadership to understand the energising, uniting role of a host of contrary elements within the discipline provided by the constant factors.

If Gandhi was for ever stressing the multi-lingual, multi-communal character of India, and preparing the way for the linguistic reorganisation of the sub-continent, there was Vallabhbhai Patel using the same latent pressures to bring princely India to its knees. If the muscle of the freedom struggle was egalitarianism, there was Nehru to project the vision of socialism in democracy and secularism. The politics of consensus were sought to be interpreted in such a way that the transformation of the sub-continent would proceed more speedily and in unity.

Threats

Fortuitous circumstances, and Nehru's ability to assert an Indian presence in world affairs far beyond the reality warranted by his country's independent strength, gave us ten vital years in which to consolidate a partitioned inheritance and to lay the foundations for economic growth. India's unity was being carefully nurtured, but, ironically enough, the more direct threats to that unity were minimised. I refer to Pakistan and China. Both, for different reasons, were interested in India's dismemberment. The minimisation was part of the *rationale* of what could be called 'velvet-glove' development. As soon as the armed confrontations developed along our sprawling land frontier the whole 'surplus' which permitted this luxury was absorbed by massive defence spending and there were immediately uncovered the difficult questions of internal material-cum-human mobilisation which had remained unanswered in our democracy. The answers had been

evaded because they would have to fuse into a total, unrelenting self-reliant approach inimical to the *status quo* of privilege and profit.

New Factors

From 1962, several new factors entered the thinking mind of India, factors which would remain constant in the context of unity and speedy development. To begin with, the heavy defence burden would have to be budgeted from scarce indigenous resources, from year to year, even if the confrontations along the northern frontier were miraculously to dissolve. In turn, this investment in defence would compel a far more rigorous approach to development planning which under the Nehru Era sought to divide available resources on the basis of a broad federal balance, *often uneconomic*. Then again, the strict planning of agricultural, industrial and educational-scientific inputs would increasingly put the emphasis on coordination and control by the Centre.

These new constant factors will inevitably collide with regional and parochial demands now crystallised over twenty years of loose democratic, federal practice. In other words, the future is dependent largely on the degree to which the Centre can assert itself—not as a 'mix' of contradictory regional involvements, but as the supreme arbiter of the nation's interests.

Political opinion in the country, while not sufficiently aware of the implications of present trends to India's federal unity, tends to divide along three levels of response. There are those who put their faith in foreign aid and the likelihood that it will still be received in adequate measure to cushion the economic crises, failing to realise that when internal mobilisation is weak this kind of assistance creates an orientation in attitudes which further vitiates the drive for self-reliance. There are others who advance nationalism as a possible panacea, forgetting that this nationalism will have to be of an aggressive and vicious kind if it is to dominate the emerging

sub-nationalisms upon which our federalism has come to be based. And, in a third group, are the ideologues of Right and Left who would unite the sub-continent on a commitment to their respective policy frames but who are unclear as to what they precisely mean, indulging for ever in mechanical imitation of 'models' which (apparently unknown to them!) are already in the throes of profound change.

All-India Outlook

These three trends—or four!—are competing with each other. Each finds its reflection within the amorphous mass of the ruling party. However, no collective of leadership has yet emerged which attempts a durable amalgam of these many responses. Such an amalgam would represent a viable consensus for the period now unfolding, but it can only be created by individuals and organisations with an all-India outlook. Significantly, individuals made in this mould are today counted on the fingers of one hand. As for organisations, they are few and far between. This is, in a sense, the common kernel of the many crises which engulf us.

Whether it is a question of organising a continental food policy or a coherent attitude to national language and script or a programme of books to enlighten the instructed but uneducated mind of millions or a base for balanced industrial development or a coordinated campaign of mass communication in aid of economic growth or a purposeful mobilisation of human and material resources or even urgent action to place the right men in the right jobs, invariably the Centre's power to discipline the States is brought into question.

Significantly, the Chinese and Pakistani threats to national security, aimed also at India's unity, manifest since 1959, have not resulted in the strengthening of the Centre's leading role. In fact, the opposite trend has been most noticeable. And it is not due to the calibre of leadership, as is so often glibly stated. The truth

is that the Constitution we gave unto ourselves needs to be moulded to assist the tasks which now confront us in the twentieth year of our freedom.

Loose Theorising

A great deal of loose theorising is being indulged in by parties of the Right and Left to support the plea for wider autonomy to the States. Within the same context, scattered individuals and groups talk about constitutional adjustments and reforms designed to strengthen central intervention; even a presidential system has been advocated. But the Government of India moves in *ad hoc* fashion to tackle problems as they present themselves or to procrastinate in the hope that better times are around the corner. The hurried arrangements over a new hill State within Assam; the complex status of Chandigarh, the referendum on Goa and the specialised approach to the Nagas constitute responses to the emerging problems of our constitutional structure which are diffused and lack integrated perspectives.

No constitution is sacrosanct, much less ours which has been frequently amended and interpreted to permit political and economic manoeuvring by an amorphous ruling party which has enjoyed undisputed power since 1947. If continuity is espoused, it is ensured by the provision that a two-thirds majority of both Houses of Parliament is required to carry out any necessary constitutional spring-cleaning. What is imperative is the need to establish a constitutional reforms body which understands the momentums behind our politics of growth and devises the most efficient balance of responsibility between the Centre and the States to guarantee that this sub-continent holds together despite the strains of development. This is not an impossible task, but it might well become so if we adopt an ostrich-like posture.

The field of enquiry could be narrowed to crucial areas. Social scientists, for example, are beginning to investigate the play of factions and the possibility of

strengthening the role of the Centre by encouraging the formation of smaller States carved out of the so-called linguistic monoliths where sub-regional stirrings are already noticeable. In the process, the Centre could take over vital responsibilities hitherto denied to it. Some political analysts point to the rapid erosion of presidential power during the Nehru Era and the possibility of re-establishing this authority as election results prove indecisive from region to region. Such developments would again strengthen the Centre. Others, more committed to the existing constitutional frame of reference, claim that the States in their own interest will have to accept a devolution of certain of their powers to centrally-sponsored inter-State councils or some such bodies, that these might well become the transitional forms to a more centralised constitutional apparatus. Some proposals speak of the system of proportional representation suitably modified to prevent splinter parties or indirect representation based on the panchayat system. And so the debate is joined...

Basic Work

A constitutional reforms body could apply itself to these and many other 'solutions' in an effort to make discussions on our constitution meaningful and creative. Only after this basic work has been done will it be possible to dissolve blockages to constitutional reform in Parliament and the legislatures. Perhaps, at certain stages the referendum technique could be used to re-assert popular sanctions.

Always, the constant factors referred to earlier will have to condition our efforts to reinforce the bonds which have held our Union together. The new consensus will have to be based upon them. And the consensus will have to provide the frame for national policy. There is futility in seeking a political and economic policy of development when we ignore the mechanism by which alone the policy is made viable. If this is not the moment of criticality, I do not know which is.

Books

KASHMIR: A STUDY IN INDIA-PAKISTAN RELATIONS

By Sisir Gupta.

Asia Publishing House, Bombay 1966.

Kashmir is a problem that has been with us since the first day of our freedom; yet there is no widespread acceptance in India of the context in which it has developed or of the perspective in which it should be seen. Quite apart from all those who are ready to salve their sick consciences at the expense of the country and transfer large parts of Kashmir to Pakistan in the hope of buying goodwill, there is a large section of public opinion in India which tends to magnify the importance of internal developments in Kashmir and to exaggerate the impact of Sheikh Abdullah on world affairs. For all such persons, Dr. Sisir Gupta's book should be made compulsory reading; indeed it would do all

our politicians good to read it. Many books have been written on Kashmir, mostly by foreigners, and they all have particular viewpoints. Now at last we have a clear and comprehensive account of the evolution of this problem. Dr. Gupta does not write as a protagonist of the Indian cause but as a disciplined student of international relations, and where the Indian position is weak or has to be criticised he has no hesitation in doing so.

As Dr. Gupta's carefully documented account unfolds, two conclusions make their impact on the reader. It becomes clear that the origins of the Kashmir crisis lie in the years before 1947, in the mutually exclusive positions of the Congress and the Muslim League in Indian politics. The Congress stood for a secular, multi-religious, forward-looking India, and the League for a State based on one religion. These positions dictated the attitudes they

were bound to take on Kashmir, once it became an issue that was still open after the transfer of power.

Kashmir, therefore, is only a symptom of the general malaise that shrouds the relations between the two States. So long as the ill-will exists, Kashmir will continue to be a crisis centre, and if, for other general reasons, India and Pakistan draw closer, Kashmir will cease to be an explosive issue. As Dr. Gupta makes very clear, the problem is one of co-existence of the two States, and of this problem Kashmir is only a part. Seen from this angle, it becomes clear that whether Sheikh Abdullah is in detention or in power is a point of irrelevance. It is, of course, a matter of importance to Indians from the viewpoint of democracy and civil liberties in India, but it is of no consequence to our relations with Pakistan. As Sheikh Abdullah realised when he visited Pakistan in the summer of 1964, internal conditions in Kashmir make no difference to Pakistan's attitude.

The other conclusion which develops in Dr. Gupta's book is that it is not necessary to set out to make the case for India; it is a case that makes itself if one takes the trouble to grasp the evolution of this problem. The Indian position is not based on easy slogans but on principles which have been logically applied; and to understand this one has to make an effort. Dr. Gupta's book makes such an effort possible to all readers. It is a book for which we have long been waiting.

S. Gopal

THE LEFT WING IN INDIA (1919-47) By L. P. Sinha.

New Publishers, Muzaffarpur, 1965.

However explicit the term 'left wing' may be to men of affairs, it remains by and large obscure to academicians. Professor Sinha ventures to define it so as 'to include those parties and movements that demand wider popular participation in government, push actively for reform and draw particular support from the disinherited, dislocated and disgruntled' (p. xi). This is a nebulous definition, as it is capable of covering all significant political movements of the day including those of the Right wing.

It seems that the author does not propose seriously to defend his hypothesis. He traces the French origin of the Left in its relative frame of reference. Moreover, his empirical description of the Left in India more or less coincides with what goes under this umbrella term. Apart from Communists and Socialists, he includes Left-wing Congressmen, Radical Humanists and splinter groups like the Bolsheviks, Revolutionary Socialists, Revolutionary Communists, etc.

His views with regard to the political programme of the Leftists are vague. It is not enough to say that the Leftists in India stands for opposition to the State, government and party in power on the negative side and for social change, nationalisation and planning on the positive one. How about opposition to the government as well as lip-service

to planning in the Rightist circles? His assessment as to the contribution of Leftists is certainly favourable. They did not only play an uncompromising anti-imperialist role in the nationalist movement but also linked it with socio-economic demands and added an international dimension to it.

The author traces the phases and influences which finally led to the emergence of the Left in India and rightly points out that a cognisable Left movement was possible only after social and economic changes had created its basis. He also draws our attention to the role which Gandhiji played in evolving the technique of mass mobilization. He is perhaps not aware of the dilemma which the nationalist leadership faced at a very early date. To put through their demands successfully, they had to mobilize the masses but, in turn, the mobilized masses might not be easy to control. It was to resolve this dilemma that the technique of non-violent non-cooperation was devised. The impact of the Russian Revolution is dismissed in a page and the influence of the Labour Party has also not been given its due space.

The establishment of the All India Trade Union Congress is a definite landmark in the history of the Left in India. The Congress began with the spiritual vision of Lala Lajpat Rai and N. M. Joshi and, later on, transformed into a communist dominated organization. The otherwise brilliant analysis of the roles of local communists, M. N. Roy, *Hijrat* and the Berlin group in founding the Communist Party of India as much as the earlier phase of the AITUC is marred by too much pre-occupation of the author with biographical sketches of the personalities involved.

The different phases of the communist movement upto 1934 is described in considerable detail. The conspiracy trials of Peshawar, Cawnpore and Meerut cut the movement down in size. During 1930-34, the communists were further isolated from the mainstream of the nationalist movement, not only because of their extremist attitude towards the civil disobedience movement but also because the Roy group appeared on the scene as a formidable challenge to their hegemony over the Left movement. The Communist Party was declared unlawful and could revive only in 1936. In all this, Professor Sinha makes numerous assertions, such as the point that communist funds came from foreign sources all of which might have been worthwhile if he had attempted to substantiate it.

These developments found their echo in the Indian National Congress, in which the Left-wing gradually acquired socialist orientation by 1937, when the Congress Socialist Party was formed as an integral part of the movement. A homogeneous group, the new party maintained an atmosphere of complete independence and of socialism within the Congress and exerted tremendous impact on Congress programmes.

The change in the international line as well as the strengthening of the Congress Left-wing prepared

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the ground for what came to be known as the United Front. But, despite the advent of Subhash Chandra Bose as President of the Congress, the Leftists were unable to play the role they should have, because they differed on certain fundamental issues, were disunited and mutually suspicious. Paradoxical as it may appear, the Tripuri Congress, which marked the success of the Left-wing was at the same time, the breeding ground for its disunity.

The confusion prevailing during the course of World War II was a hangover of the United Front period which had a preoccupation with national independence. The Communist Party's sudden shift from the imperialist war to the people's war weakened its position in the nationalist ranks and the popular imagination. Subhash Bose's ultra-patriotism drove him into cooperating with Japanese militarists.

While the transfer of power was being negotiated with the Congress and the League, the Left-wingers failed to influence the course of events as a result of their confusion, weakness and disunity. This state of affairs continued in the post-independence period also.

Professor Sinha concludes that Leftists constituted pressure groups which gave a socialist content to an essentially anti-imperialist nationalist movement. Their emphasis on secularism, rationalism and the scientific attitude contributed a great deal to the emergence of modernism in India. Their social and economic programmes were to a considerable degree the same as those of the Indian National Congress, but there was greater amount of earnestness in seeking implementation.

In a review of a book as voluminous as 600 pages, it is difficult to make an adequate representation of the various formulations. Despite several critical remarks made above, there is no denying the fact that Professor Sinha has made a significant contribution. He adopts an objective outlook, prunes a bulk of literature and brings out an interesting analysis.

A word about production: many printing mistakes have crept in and the formes were not carefully and tightly locked in the machine. It would have been better published by a standard publisher and printed in a well equipped press.

Z. M. Quaraishi

INDIAN MUSLIMS: A Political History (1858-1947)

By Ram Gopal.

Asia Publishing House. Reprinted 1964. pp.X+351.

THE DESTINY OF INDIAN MUSLIMS By S. Abid Husain.

Asia Publishing House. 1965. pp. 276.

The two books under review have one thing in common: the history, not so much of Muslims as of the growth of Muslim politico-communal organisations converging into the Muslim League, culminating in

the demand for Pakistan and ultimately achieving it through partition. Ram Gopal's book, which is the older of the two, having been first published in 1959, stops with the events in 1947, while Dr. Husain's deals with the present state of Muslims and their psychology, and suggests the ways in which they can and ought to shape themselves so as not to be left behind the course and current of Indian national history and culture.

Both the authors substantially agree on the social basis and origins of Muslim organisations in the 19th and early 20th centuries. At the time of the Indian Revolt in 1857, Hindus and Muslims were united in thought and action. But after that, they began to recede from each other. Religion, superficially at least, seemed to divide them. But behind this facade were naked class interests. For historical reasons, the Muslim aristocracy and middle class did not take to English education and jobs. Similarly, they did not take to commerce and industry either. They had their zamindaris, jagirdaris or estates; they had their language, Urdu, and its literature. When, slowly but steadily, the Muslim middle-classes took to western education and became qualified for jobs, they had to face competition from, especially, Hindus who had been there in the field. In addition, in the early '80s, the government issued orders for the exclusive use of Hindi and the Nagari characters in all branches of administration and made a knowledge of them compulsory for those seeking jobs.

The effect of this was two-fold. Firstly, at least temporarily, Muslims would be excluded from service and, secondly, the Muslim aristocracy began to think that the orders were entirely due to Hindu agitations. Muslim organisations to educate Muslims, to fight for jobs for Muslims and to defend them against real or supposed Hindu machinations began to arise. When the Indian National Congress with its economic and political programmes began to gain strength, the Muslim aristocracy, in order to protect its class interest, organised the Muslim masses on communal lines, interpreting the Congress as Hindu. Muslim communalism, thus, arose out of the Muslim landed interests and the Muslim middle class: one wanted security and the other jobs. Hindu landed aristocracy operated through the Hindu Mahasabha. With the rise of communalism, Hindu and Muslim, the original class origin got blurred, and the religious aspects came to the forefront. With the British rulers to take advantage of the situation, even political issues like participation in the Councils took on religio-communal hues expressed in terms of the number of denominational seats.

In other words, communalism. Hindu and Muslim, emerged as an independent force, seemingly based on religious differences, not connected with material interests of certain upper classes in the two communities. The Congress continually tried for Hindu-Muslim unity through pacts and resolutions, and so did the leaders of some Muslim organisations, but their efforts fell through for one reason or other.

But the relations between the two communities, in spite of occasional riots, were on the whole tolerably normal upto 1937. But, during the decade after, the general political and international developments and the fast growth of fascist volunteer organisations of Hindu and Muslim communalism led to social tensions between the two communities culminating in the blood-bath at the time of partition.

This sad history is dealt with by Ram Gopal in greater detail, but it reads like reportage compared with the depth and perspective in Dr. Husain's rendering. Dr. Husain sustains throughout the class-basis of Muslim politics and puts Muslim leaders in their proper perspective and stature while Gopal forgets the class-basis and paints all the developments as owing to bickering, self-seeking personalities backed up by a suspicious, jealous following. Ram Gopal provides some detailed information about Hindu communalism while Dr. Husain deals almost entirely with Muslim communalism. Although Gopal makes a passing reference none of the two writers inquire into the problems of Muslims in the South. In their works, India remains North India.

Neither of the two authors focus attention on certain peculiarities of communalism in pre-1947 India. For example, riots mainly took place in big cities and big towns only and not elsewhere, and they were mostly confined to the U.P. and adjoining areas. Although Bengal and Punjab had vast Muslim populations, the Muslim League had not much following there. The Unionist Party in Punjab never submitted to the League demands; nor ever took to communal politics or to the slogan of Pakistan. The reason, of course, is to be found in the different class structures and interests in these areas. An inquiry into them would have added to the merit of these books.

Similarly, the two writers do not go into the question of the Congress responsibility for the growth of communalism. Gopal stops with emphasising the secular character of the Congress and its policies and with an occasional reference to communal elements in the Congress. But much more than that, the Congress and the League, in so far as they were political parties, had never tried to build sustained political movements. They, both, went in for sporadic campaigns. Even then, they never politically prepared the people before a campaign; nor did they ever politicalise the people after it. The leaders gave calls for a campaign and the people responded spontaneously, that is, more emotionally than with political understanding.

In the case of the Congress, the oft repeated political action was not mass action but individual action called individual Satyagraha which was defined not as a political action but as an act of self-purification. And then, whenever a campaign reached mass proportions, the Congress promptly called it off, frustrating all mass enthusiasm. The result was deep despair rather than political

enlightenment and growth of the movement. The leaders themselves were shut up far away and the masses were left without any guidance or means of keeping up their morale. Under these conditions, politics naturally took a communalist turn and communalism was the only popular force at large. In the absence of the Congress leaders, the field was open for communalists on the rampage. Each section or community put the blame for its failings and frustrations on the other, and, with an alien government and its thoroughly anti-Indian officialdom, conveniently engineered riots took place in the appointed places at the appointed times through the agency of already well-advertised protagonists. The riots had an uncanny way of happening during the lull between campaigns of the Congress or the Muslim League.

In addition to these features, there is the character of the two organisations also. The Congress was popular in content in the sense that its programme was in the interests of united India, but it was formally, mainly, a party of individual leaders, local or national (as it still is). Its membership rolls may show numbers but, in terms of work among the people beyond rhetorical speeches, it has not had much to show. On the contrary, the League, so far as the Muslims were concerned, was popular in form to the extent that it was Muslim by name, although, in substance, it stood not for the Muslim workers and artisans but for the Muslim landholder or businessman, i.e., the Muslim elite. Even those with the best intentions in either organisation never, perhaps, saw and, definitely, never tried to remedy the contradiction between their programme and functioning, between the content and the form.

The moves to Hindu-Muslim unity were moves between the leaders only of the two organisations. Neither before nor after the Hindu-Muslim unity pacts and resolutions were the masses educated in unity. When unity among the masses was achieved, the leaders just could not 'understand the unity from below'. So much so, that the moment the parties parted company, India was partitioned and the common people were most brutally murdered and massacred. An enquiry into these matters would have enhanced the value of these two books.

Dr. Husain gives in Part II of his book a detailed and moving account of Muslims in India today, their multi-lateral difficulties and problems immediately after partition, the suspicion and mistrust which is still meted out to them by certain sections of the Hindu community, the division between the lower classes and the educated Muslims, their disillusionment and gloom, their desperate need for rational education and employment, and so on.

In Part III, Dr. Husain tries to show how Islam is not against the Muslims living in a secular, democratic State with socialist goals. He discusses how important it is for India as a nation to see that Muslim fears about their future are set at rest by sympathetic administrative and social action. He

urges the Muslims to rise above their irrational dogmas, to modernise their outlook and to participate in the life of the nation. He suggests certain reforms in the religious and secular education of Muslims so that while being faithful to Islam, they could practise a rational, scientific and purposeful way of living. He exhorts Muslims to self-reliance, social work and increasing association as equals with other communities. He puts forth certain concrete proposals as to how Muslims can work for their social uplift and cultural development and contribute to the betterment of fellow Indians and to our national culture. At the same time, he persuades the Hindu community to give up their unwarranted suspicions about Muslims in India. Dr. Husain's book is sensitive, persuasive, all-embracing and exceedingly humane.

However, Dr. Husain's prejudice against Marxism, which seems to be entirely based on only certain aberrations, expediences of some communist governments and, more especially, of some leaders, is unworthy of a humane scholar like him. His belief that private enterprise and State planning can reduce inequalities in income and wealth, one is afraid, must remain an illusion. So long as there are people constituted as a class owning private as opposed to personal property, the inequalities are bound to increase; for, private property breeds more and faster than population. Finally, the elevated, semi-mystic chapter with which Dr. Husain concludes his book, one is again afraid, may wake people into a dream instead of into reality.

Kusum Madgavkar

FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION & SECURITY: A comparative study of the Supreme Courts of the United States of America and India, By A. S. Bedi.

Asia Publishing House, 1966, IX+483 pp. (incl. Index).

Dr. Bedi's book contains, in parts, a lively and stimulating discussion of the questions involved, in which he does not hesitate to express his views with refreshing candour and frankness particularly regarding the shortcomings in the functioning of India's highest court. He rightly contrasts the differing and inconsistent approaches adopted by the Supreme Court of India in *Gopalan's Case* 1950, SCR p 88, where the right of personal liberty (as against the State's prerogative of so-called 'preventive detention'), was involved, from that later adopted by it in *Mrs. Bannerjee's Case* A.I.R. 1954, S.C. 170, where the right of property (as against the State's power of acquisition at statutory under-value) was in question.

In the first case, the Court looked at the official reports of the Constituent Assembly Debates to reach a conclusion that the relevant Article of the Constitution (Art. 21) did not guarantee any person the right to a fair trial before he was deprived of his liberty. In the second case, when considering

Article 31, the Court refused to look at the same Reports which would have made it clear that the framers of the Constitution *did* intend to confer upon Parliament the right to legislate for carrying out land reforms upon payment to the proprietors of compensation at only a fraction of the market value of their lands.

Bedi shows a preference for Justice Fazl. Ali's dissenting opinion in *Gopalan's Case*, which certainly had the merits of orthodoxy in the Indo-British juristic tradition and of due regard for the sanctity of personal liberty. If the majority decision in *Gopalan's Case* put the clock back so far as personal liberty was concerned, the decision of the Supreme Court in *Mrs. Bannerjee's Case* delayed land reforms in India by a decade (at a heavy cost in terms of agricultural production and economic self-sufficiency) and also provoked the legislature into a fever of constitutional amendments which has not yet abated and which has, over the years, gravely impaired the stability of our constitutional structure.

Bedi seems to have been unduly harsh in his unexceptionable decision in *Romesh Thapar's Case*, 1950 SCR, p. 594, which has perhaps of all its early decisions, best stood the test of time and has become the sheet anchor of the liberty of the press in India. Bedi has particularly attacked the Supreme Court for its famous ruling in this Case (referred to by him, with a breezy transoceanic familiarity, frequently as '*Romesh*') that 'Where a law purports to authorise the imposition of restrictions on a fundamental right in language wide enough to cover restrictions both within and without the limits of constitutionally permissible legislative action affecting such right it is not possible to uphold it even so far as it may be applied within the constitutional limits, as it is not severable.'

Bedi would have had the Supreme Court of India read implied restrictions into the Indian constitutional provisions regarding fundamental rights, as has been done by the Supreme Court in the United States. In this Bedi has overlooked the difference between the two Constitutions, the American which enacts the various rights of citizens in unqualified terms, leaving to the Court the duty of reading in reasonable qualifications, which has been done by an implied reservation in favour of the State of 'Police Power' etc., evolved by the Court and the Indian Constitution which has meticulously enumerated all the permissible restrictions on fundamental rights, leaving no such function of implication to the Court.

Bedi's book would have been improved by further and better editing. For example, on page 414 there is a needless discussion of the question whether a High Court Judge should or should not, under his oath of office, follow the law as declared by the Supreme Court. This is flogging a dead horse in view of the express terms of Article 141 of the Con-

stitution of India that 'The law declared by the Supreme Court shall be binding on all courts within the territory of India.'

On the very next page, Bedi devotes half a page to an unrelated and apparently surprised reference to the fact that in the *Bharati Press Case* A.I.R. (1951) Patna 12, the Court at a late stage permitted the raising of an issue of fundamental rights under the Constitution. It is a healthy rule of Indian judicial procedure that an issue of fundamental rights under the Constitution can always be raised, *even at a late stage*. There can never be a waiver of fundamental rights. On the contrary, the right to move even the highest Court in the land by appropriate proceedings for the enforcement of fundamental rights is guaranteed and this guarantee is itself a fundamental right. (Article 32). Any inconvenience caused by the operation of this principle is deemed of small moment against the sanctity of the fundamental rights.

The importance of this excellent feature of the Indian Constitution (contributed among many other by the late Dr. Ambedkar) is not noticed by Dr. Bedi perhaps because it has no counterpart in the U.S.A. It might on the other hand have been useful if Dr. Bedi had devoted a section of his book to procedural questions and there he could usefully have discussed how and at what stage and by whom questions of fundamental rights can properly be raised.

Dr. Bedi's evident admiration for American jurists carries him at one place so far as to make the suggestion that when reference is made in the Supreme Court of India to American jurisprudence, lawyers from the United States should be invited, *by the Court*, to address it as *amici curiae*. This may be explained but not excused by the fact that Dr. Bedi happens to be a Doctor of Science of law of the Michigan Law School, U.S.A. In his last chapter, 'Comparison and Conclusion', Dr. Bedi uses the expression 'The Supreme Court' to designate the Supreme Court of the United States; and when referring to the Supreme Court of India he finds it necessary to specify and mention its particular national designation. In a book published in India, written by an Indian who is teaching at an Indian University, perhaps an opposite usage might have been appropriate. Dr. Bedi's affectation reminds one of the anglicised *babus*, who, not so long ago, used to speak of their English Masters' birth place as 'Home'.

The book should prove a useful addition to the literature on the subject.

Danial Latifi

SUCCESSION IN INDIA

By Michael Brecher.

Oxford University Press, Bombay. 1966. p. 269.

The revolution of rising expectations in the developing world has led to a revolution of rising publications in the affluent West. Accounts of political development in the 'backward world' make

fascinating reading to the intelligent westerner, who is sophisticated enough to reject the earlier images but who thinks that the political processes in the East must be mysterious enough to be continuously probed.

Dr. Brecher devotes his first chapter to a discussion of the rationale of writing a book on the 'Succession in India'. Having collected the material, he must have asked himself why a political scientist of his reputation should ever publish such a book! He adduces six reasons for doing so, of which the third is the world-wide interest in the high drama enacted in New Delhi in those days.

In writing this book, it is the third of the 6 reasons given by him which seems to have got the better of him as a political scientist. There are, of course, generalisations of various kinds regarding the political process in India, sometimes quite unrelated to the subject-matter of the book and sometimes quite unsubstantiated by research into the Indian political system. For example, Brecher's discovery of a new assertion by the bureaucracy after Nehru would appear to Indians as a conclusion which does not take note of the great stabilisation of the power of the bureaucracy under Nehru himself.

The present reviewer's objection to Brecher's book is that even as drama, it is not very successful. It introduces too many characters; for example, Mysore's Nijalingappa is mentioned throughout the book as a critical actor in the succession drama. And Krishna Menon, who gave Brecher long interviews, serves as a *Sutradhar*. After all, if Menon was all that powerful or relevant in the decision making process in India, he would have found it hard to spare the time to sit with Brecher and give so many interviews. Nor would he have found himself outside the Congress today!

It is galling enough to have to live on the diet of gossip and rumour which the drawing rooms of Delhi serve up, but when serious political commentary is sought to be made dependent on such a diet we cannot but wonder what the end result will be. Brecher's attempt to produce a 'quickie' on the politics of succession in India is so heavily based on local *gup-shup* that it fails to present a coherent, meaningful background to the power struggle. The cursory reading of a single newspaper during the succession contest would provide as much.

One can hope that the history of those days will be composed of more solid stuff—or else what will future generations think of the processes which moulded these events. Alas, so much of political commentary has been reduced to gossip and rumour. To attempt a review of this book would mean a re-writing project. This is a job for more serious students, preferably Indians who understand the subtleties and nuances of political life in their country. But will they find a publisher as distinguished as the Oxford University Press!

S.G.

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
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

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Studies, New Delhi

CREATING CONDITIONS

A.D. Moddie, business executive,
a student of public affairs

MISGUIDE ATTITUDES

Jagdish Bhagwati, Visiting Professor,
Columbia University, U.S.A.

A CASE STUDY

Surindar Suri, social scientist,
Visiting Professor in the U.S.A.

TECHNICAL ASSISTANCE

Raj Krishna, Professor of
Economics, University of Rajasthan

THE CURE

Sailen Ghosh, journalist and
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'Oil Commentary'

BOOKS

Reviewed by **R.B. Jain**, **Kusum
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FURTHER READING

A select and relevant bibliography
by **Subir Goswami**

COMMUNICATIONS

Received from **Satish Saberwal** and
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COVER

Designed by **Dilip Chowdhury**

The problem

MANY of the most capable and promising scientists, engineers and scholars originally born and trained in India are currently working outside India. Many of those Indian students who go abroad for advanced study do not return to India or return only temporarily. This phenomenon is usually called a brain drain. Such a brain drain is by no means unique to India. Other countries are suffering from the same kind of ailment, notably Britain. But while the brain drain away from Britain is to a large extent balanced by a brain drain into Britain, not the least from India, there is hardly any brain drain from any other country into India.

Nothing is an unmixed evil, and there are certain obvious advantages of an emigration of the talented and the trained. Indians proving themselves equal to others within their countries add to national prestige. Indians earning their bread abroad and sending over their savings add to national wealth. Uppity people are diverted away from where they could and would make established people less secure, and this adds to national stability.

Yet, the evil is clear enough. India is desperately short of capital not only in terms of physical equipment but also in terms of technical know-how. If a substantial number of brains are drained away, their place cannot wholly be taken by foreign technicians and general administrators. Foreign technicians come only if they are paid much more than what they would get at home, are not often the best of their class and are hardly ever inspired by Indian nationalism. The only mitigation is that they are, at least if they stay only for short periods, in closer touch with international realities than the more purely homegrown experts can be. General administrators are indispensable as intermediaries between the professional experts and the lay politicians, who must ultimately decide which expert opinions are more competent and relevant than other expert

opinions. But general administrators cannot dictate to experts in the same way as school-board secretaries do with schoolmasters.

The worst aspect of the brain drain is that it encourages too much stability in the Indian intellectual situation. Self-perpetuating cliques of mediocrities are allowed to form and continue undisturbed. Institutions ostensibly devoted to research become charitable dispensaries of sinecures for incompetent friends and relations. Fiefs in land distribution seem to have been replaced by fiefs in job distribution as the latter day instrument of nascent and obsolescent associations of the socially privileged.

The net effect of a brain drain is that those who are most able to lead the nation in the world-wide competitions are not allowed to succeed those who lead now. The will to compete is not easily divisible and will is necessary for adequate ability. Although sentiment and piety should restrain it there, a certain measure of any aggressive competitiveness is bound to spill over into the home. It is really like the case of a businessman who dislikes the impatience of his capable son so much that he would rather leave the business to his more polite but less capable brother. A brain drain is the path to a polite decline, to a golden sunset.

A policy of golden sunset makes some sense for Britain, protected as she is in all rainy weather by an US umbrella. It fits well with the larger tendency which has already made the umbrella into an umbilical cord. A Britain incapable of independent action will inevitably become a constituent of the USA. For Britain, such a process would be with consent and dignity. But an automatic imitation of British policies cannot guarantee India an equally polite decline, an equally golden sunset.

A brain drain is a consequence not of national poverty but of a misunderstanding between two

generations of experts. No one has complained of a brain drain from France, though France is not richer than Germany which suffers from one no less than Britain or India. In India, the misunderstanding is clearly due to a slump in the flow of Indian students going abroad that occurred during the 30's and 40's. Those who had been abroad earlier find it rather difficult to communicate with those who have been abroad during the 50's and the 60's, and vice versa. Let us call the former generation the Seniors and the latter the Juniors. Both the generations depend on foreigners for advice, though not the same ones. Both have weaknesses to conceal and strengths to parade.

The quarrel which drives off or keeps away many of our most talented younger experts is not over money, for the undoubted pull of money is counterbalanced by the equally undoubted pull of sentiment. It is over the provision of graduated chances to show achievements. A capable scientist on the rise should not be denied access to books and periodicals, or to laboratory equipment and supplies. He should not be weighed down with a need to play politics, which is a game very different from science; or with a need to multiply merely routine applications of unchanging theories which he cannot change. Above all, he should be made to feel that there is no sympathy higher up for his desire to compete with the best specialists of the entire world. Almost every frustration can be suffered except the knowledge that one's superior does not appreciate one's attempt to become more competent.

The cause is a fear on the part of the Seniors about the Juniors. This fear arises out of several sources. One is a just calculation of personal futures in the wilderness of absurdly low pensions. Another is an even more just awareness of certain intellectual limitations of the Juniors. It is a fact that very few of the Juniors know, or can be expected to know, enough about their own country with its vast illiterate masses and intricate social precedences. But there is also an unjust want of faith in the Juniors, arising out of a mistaken identification of them as the Mob.

The Mob is the ever present solidarity of the incompetent in despair. There is certainly an increasing horde of young and not so young persons in the country who have only the illusion of an education. They have MSc's and PhD's without the competitive market values of those degrees either in an earlier India or in some other countries with which India has relations. They feel deceived for having been issued those worthless pieces of paper, although they have themselves insisted the most on being so deceived. They lack knowledge either of their own country or of the world outside, either of the inner traditions or of the outer

competitions. They have neither respect nor sympathy for the pardonable failures of the past or for the unfulfilled potentials of the future. All they feel for is perfect success, total success, unbroken success, never mind the facts and never mind the costs of such an illusion of perpetual forward movement.

The Juniors too have often mistaken the Seniors as the Mob. The biological and administrative seniority of many members of the Mob makes such false identification easy enough. The Mob lives only for the present and has nothing to gain from any act of faith in one's successors. It is therefore the greatest enemy of the Juniors as well. The formlessness of the Mob makes it possible that the Seniors have seen it in the direction of the Juniors, and the Juniors in the direction of the Seniors. It is vague and floating by its very nature, so that any more precisely concrete special group may become its symbolic spearhead.

What prevents a takeover by the Mob is a set of personal memories of individual Juniors for individual Seniors, and vice versa. It is not possible for me to take as part of the Mob an individual I have come to know and respect for his care to maintain and increase professional competence in himself and in others, that is, for his willingness and ability to distinguish himself and others from the Mob. The Mob is kept off only by such individual refusals to treat themselves and others as part of the Mob. It is an ethical problem then, a moral task for which responsibility must be in proportion to power. It is no use claiming lack of power. For no one lacks power absolutely. To the actual extent of one's power, and that extent is usually far wider than one admits or even suspects, it is necessary to distinguish oneself as a connoisseur of competence.

To refuse to have any brain to drain is no way of stopping the brain drain. If study abroad is prohibited, as it almost completely is in today's Burma, there would be no large class of younger scholars confident in using the results and techniques of most competitive science. Only a less immediately threatened country than India can afford the luxury of such a policy. Too few brains among the Juniors might not be able to prevent the Mob taking over.

This *Seminar* is about the concrete reality of the brain drain in India, about its statistical and psychological details, about alternative administrative measures for its full clinical picture, diagnosis and treatment. That there is a brain drain in India has been admitted often enough. But appeals for personal sacrifice are not sufficient to cure a serious social ailment.

PUNYA SLOKA RAY

No loss

MAHENDRA KUMAR

IN a certain sense, the question of brain drain is linked to the process of intellectual growth. For, no brain drain is possible unless there are brains and the measure of intellectual growth is the development of brains. This development need not go against the

knowledge acquired in the past. It should proceed because knowledge about the objective reality is never complete and, hence, search after reality should always continue. The development of brains or the growth of intellect is specially significant in the case of new

nations like India because they are faced with problems of economic welfare and political stability. What is required for solving these problems is, firstly, a correct understanding of the problems and, secondly, the availability of a wide choice of alternate solutions to those problems. Understanding problems and suggesting solutions are, then, the essential elements of intellectual growth. The development of intellect along these lines contributes theoretically to academic disciplines and, practically, to a country's advancement.

It is in the context of the second contribution that one must examine the question whether India has a problem of the brain drain. The poser by Punya Sloka Ray assumes that the brain drain in India is self-evident. The present paper is an attempt to explain why this assumption is questionable and to look for reasons for the existence of the phenomenon which Ray describes as the brain drain but which in fact is something else.

The Assumption

The phenomenon described by Ray as the brain drain is that a large number of our competent men—scientists, engineers, and scholars and even artists—are currently settled abroad. There cannot be any dispute as to the existence of such a phenomenon. In fact, a careful collection of statistics of Indians working outside the country would show that the number is much larger than what the common impression holds. According to the statistics collected by an agency known as Assist, in New Delhi, the United States alone had more than seven thousand Indians in 1964. West Germany and Canada also have Indians working there in large numbers.

But, the mere fact of Indians working abroad is not a conclusive evidence of the problem of the brain drain. For, a brain drain exists only when the intellectuals going out leave a vacuum or a gap in a country's national life, a gap which cannot be filled by other than those who have settled

abroad. This gap in national life obviously refers to a disruption in the process of economic development and political stability or, in one word, in the process of national progress. Thus, India, or any country for that matter, can be considered as having a problem of a brain drain only if it is established that India's progress is hindered by the non-availability of talent and that this non-availability is due to highly qualified Indians settling abroad.

Those who believe that India has a problem of a drain of talent presume not only that the Indians outside the country are of the most brilliant type but also that by remaining outside they create a gap within their country. None of these assumptions seems to be correct. Most of the Indian intellectuals working abroad are there because they got opportunities to be there and not because they are the only intellectuals India can be proud of. This is not to say that those outside the country are inferior to those inside the country. In certain cases, specially in the technical field, Indians receiving higher training abroad would obviously show better promise than Indians receiving training within the country. But it must be stressed that all Indian intellectuals outside the country are not of the highest calibre nor are all intellectuals within the country of the lowest calibre.

Comparative Merits

Let us classify the Indian intellectuals settled in India as resident brains and those outside India as non-resident brains. It is necessary to have a correct view of the comparative merits of the intellectuals of these two categories. Otherwise, one is likely to fall into confusion. What is important is not so much the fact of a considerable number of Indians working abroad as the question whether the non-residents are exceedingly superior to the residents and whether by remaining outside the country the non-residents create a gap in this country's life.

Those who see the problem of a brain drain in India must prove

the superiority of non-resident intellectuals and show that, if there was no brain drain (in their sense of the term), India's progress would have been greater quantitatively and better qualitatively. But unfortunately no attempt has been made to do this. The result is the tendency to underestimate the functions performed by resident brains and to attribute the ills of Indian society to non-resident brains.

Wrong Diagnosis

That the present Indian situation in terms of economic development and political stability is not satisfactory is undoubtedly true. But to say that it is due to a drain of talent is a wrong diagnosis. The problems of India have to be looked at in a general framework set by historical background, domestic conditioning, and international compulsions. These problems have their own logic and their own contours which limit the scope within which intellectuals can contribute to their solution. India has reached a point where the mere increase in the number of first-rate minds would not help. What is required is a correct sense of direction to formulate sound policies. Indeed, providing this sense of direction is the function of intellectuals.

But, even within the country, India is not short of men necessary for performing this function. Research institutes in important fields like economics and science and technology are headed or manned by those whose competence is proven and whose international eminence is unquestionable; and it may perhaps be difficult to find their equals from amongst the non-residents. As such, necessary expert opinion is available for policy formulations and the absence of those outside is not felt.

How far the expert opinion is utilized in the interest of the country is the real question. India suffers not so much from the paucity of talent as from an inability to have full utilization of the

brains available. It is in this context that Ray's criticism about the functioning of centres of advanced studies has some validity. But that does not prove that there is a brain drain. Those responsible for the failure to utilize the available talent cannot take shelter under the pretension that talent is not available. Thus the most urgent problem is to try, honestly and sincerely, to derive from resident brains the maximum and best possible use in society.

The Limitations

But there are limitations on the extent to which a society can utilize its intellectuals just as there are limitations on the extent to which intellectuals can contribute to the progress of their society. In both the cases limitations are inherent in the very structure of the society and the character of its people. Many non-resident Indian scientists and technical personnel are often heard explaining their stay abroad on the ground that conditions in India do not offer sufficient facilities to pursue their academic advances. No less is this true of Indian social scientists settled abroad.

This question is important. For the utilization of a country's talent is not possible unless there are needs for its use. At the present, the level of India's needs is not such that Indians trained in the highest sophisticated reaches of science and technology can be of much use to their society. What would the men of pure mathematics, astrophysics, and endocrinology do in India when there is no equipment for the utilization of their specialised knowledge? If, therefore, the sound judgment of an Indian intellectual tells him that he has no use for his country and should stay abroad in order to sharpen his talents, he should not be condemned for causing a drain but appreciated for adopting the better course. For, by doing so, he is at least able to make some contribution to academic disciplines in general.

Moreover, an intellectual's own choice is also significant. He must have the freedom to choose his profession and draw his own plans

of research. Otherwise, India as a democratic country will be hardly distinguishable from a totalitarian country like China where even intellectuals are not free from the control of regimentation. Individual intellectuals should be allowed to survive individually; they should not be compelled to waste their talents. Intellectual growth thrives on individual freedom.

International Angle

Looked at from an international angle, the non-residents perform in their country's progress a role which they could not perhaps perform by settling down in their own country. A large number of Indians are serving in various international agencies which do not normally permit staff members to be stationed in their home countries. The success of these agencies depends upon the willingness of nations to put a section of their talented people at the service of the world at large.

This willingness itself is encouraged by the expectation that a nation allowing some of its brilliant men to serve in international agencies is sure to receive its share of the benefit for which those agencies are working. India does after all send her men out to participate in the international programme of oceanographic research. Indians engaged in such research activity abroad thus help in discoveries which are available to India also.

Further, it must also be realized that non-resident Indian brains are found not only in advanced countries like those of Africa. It is but also in many underdeveloped countries like those of Africa. It is partly due to the failure to recognize this fact that people complain of a drain of talent in India. Whether working in international agencies or settled in underdeveloped countries, the Indians are contributing to international development which is the practical manifestation of the principle of international cooperation. By finding out for themselves an indirect role in their own country's progress, therefore, the non-residents do not cause a drain but

actually prevent it. For, otherwise, there would have been a complete non-utilization of talent. Thus, even if it is superficially admitted that India has a problem of a brain drain, it cannot be denied that this drain is purposive.

Thus, it is clearly difficult to agree that non-resident brains leave a gap in India or that they have no role to play while remaining abroad. One can of course justifiably argue that highly qualified Indians abroad could have improved the services in the country. For example, Indian doctors who have chosen to settle abroad, mostly in Britain, could have greatly improved the health service in the country if only they had decided to return home permanently after their higher training. The same argument may be put forth about the non-residents of certain other categories too.

Showing Direction

While it is by all means desirable to have improved services in the country, it is not correct to hold that the slow pace of that improvement is a consequence of the brain drain. For, as said earlier, a brain drain exists only when brains are not available to show direction to policies. As such, it is the role of showing direction to policies which constitutes the criterion of the existence or non-existence of the brain drain. This role is different to functions which can or should be performed by technical personnel in the improvement of practical services.

It is the tendency to confuse the role of intellectuals with the functions of technical personnel which is responsible for the belief that India suffers from a drain and that it is so because qualified technical personnel of Indian origin do not contribute to the improvement of practical services within the country. The same confusion runs through Ray's statement that because of the drain the Indians who are able to lead the nation are not allowed to succeed those who lead now.

Besides being based on the wrong assumption that only those Indians are the ablest who are

currently outside the country, this statement does not specify what kind of leadership it refers to—whether political leadership or administrative leadership. If Ray is talking of political leadership, then obviously he is talking of something with which intellectuals have nothing to do. For, the role of intellectuals is performed from outside politics. It is a wrong notion that politics can be handled better by intellectuals. Rather, intellectuals must keep away from politics and be available for expert advice. The United States has been able to develop this role for its intellectuals. Something like that can also be developed in India.

Outside Politics

Ray seems to believe that India suffers from the problem of able leadership and that this problem can be solved by the return of non-resident brains. While the fact of this problem must be recognized, it is necessary to look for the causes of this problem not in non-resident brains but somewhere else. Intellectuals would be misfits in politics. This is not to say that politicians need not be men of ability. But this is certainly to say that their ability is of a kind different from the ability of intellectuals. By entering into politics an intellectual only deprives his society of the direction of purpose which he could have given from outside politics.

In India, a large number of brilliant minds have left universities where they really belonged and have joined politics where they have no utility. Thus they have failed to do in politics what they could have done in universities. Therefore, if India has any brain drain, it is so not because of those brains which are settled abroad but because of those which have chosen the wrong profession of politics. These remarks are valid even if Ray is talking of administrative leadership. Intellectuals are given to provide intellectual leadership, not political or administrative leadership.

Thus, the phenomenon of Indian intellectuals currently settled

abroad cannot be described as a brain drain. It can only be described as the migration of scholars. This migration is the unavoidable consequence of study abroad. After completing his higher study abroad, the Indian intellectual expects a suitable placement and his concept of suitable placement is determined not by conditions in India but by conditions in the country in which he has received his higher education. Consequently, apart from the higher training that he receives, his expectations rise. What happens, then, is that unless there are compelling reasons for returning home, he seeks employment abroad through which his high expectations can be fulfilled.

The fulfilment of expectations has been comparatively possible within India in the case of those Indians who have been able to manage jobs in private firms. But there is a large number of those who do not fit in firms and can belong only to universities, educational institutions, and centres of research. They first of all find it difficult to get positions in such institutions and, even if they do, their new expectations are not fulfilled because the scales of pay are much too low. Foreign qualified Indians often complain of discrimination against them when they return to the country. This is so particularly in the case of social scientists.

Discrimination

The nature of this discrimination is rather peculiar. Discrimination exists not only against foreign qualified persons but also against resident brains. Sometimes resident brains are preferred to foreign qualified Indians and sometimes foreign trained persons are preferred to resident brains. Sometimes discrimination is made even among resident brains as also among non-resident brains. It is here that the criticism of research institutions made by Ray in so forthright a manner is relevant. Nothing can yield results without national character. It is not surprising, therefore, that many talented Indians after their training abroad come back to India with

high hopes but are disappointed by the conditions here and consequently decide to seek employment in other countries.

Discrimination thus is no less an important cause of the migration of scholars. But actually this itself is related to the basic question of the comparative value of Indian and foreign degrees. Often a foreign degree holder is preferred to an Indian degree holder or vice versa. In either case, however, the preference is based not on merit but on extra-academic considerations. When preferential treatment is given to foreign degree holders, it is so in most cases because of the belief that all foreign degrees are necessarily superior. This belief is wrong. A person should be selected not merely because he holds a foreign degree but because he is otherwise also meritorious and competent. And this should not be done at the cost of the growth of local talent. Those returning from abroad should also realize that the purpose of their education is not to create a privileged class of academicians but to contribute to their country's academic life as a whole. Our country has yet to learn that.

Preferential Treatment

There is yet another facet of discrimination. It refers to social scientists specially. Foreign scholars get preferential treatment in India in regard to the privilege of consulting official files and even in regard to going to border areas, while the same privileges are denied to Indian scholars in their own country. The result is that a Verrier Elwin or a Michael Brecher gets in the academic world an edge over an Indian scholar, howsoever exceptionally brilliant he might be otherwise. This phenomenon not only restricts the intellectual growth of the country but also enables westerners like Edward Shils to condemn the writings of Indian scholars as unproductive.

All this is not meant to suggest that non-resident brains do not face any discrimination in countries where they choose to settle down. Surely, they are discrimi-

nated there. But discrimination there is of a different kind. It is based upon considerations of national policies. Indians cannot, for example, easily get permanent positions in Australia because of the emigration policy of that country being what it is. Even in countries which have a larger number of Indian brains, Indians are not given the same treatment as is accorded to the nationals of those countries. This feeling is often expressed by those who come to India for short periods.

To a certain extent this type of discrimination is natural and unavoidable. Let it be realized that in spite of the discrimination, either in terms of permanent positions or in terms of general treatment, Indians do get lucrative jobs outside their country—jobs which India cannot offer to foreigners. Thus the fact remains that Indian scholars do accept and even have a craze for jobs in foreign countries, even if the jobs are temporary and even if they carry discrimination. In the case of India, neither her policy nor her resources permit suitable positions being offered to foreigners (except at a high level of consultation). If India could offer such positions to foreigners, the going out of Indian brains could perhaps be balanced by the coming in of foreign brains.

The Economic Factor

The reason why this balancing is not possible is economic. Other countries attract Indian talent because they have the resources and Indian brains are drawn towards the attraction because they see a hope of the fulfilment of their new expectations. Conversely, India does not attract foreign brains because the remuneration is not sufficient. It is the failure to recognize this truth that leads Ray to underestimate the economic factor of the phenomenon which he calls the brain drain but which should be called the migration of scholars.

The economic aspect is too important to be ignored. India is not the only country whose scholars have migrated. Other countries have also had the same

problem, although the reasons have been different. Thus, German scholars, mostly Jews, migrated because of the anti-Jewish policy pursued at home. Scholars from Italy and Ireland, on the other hand, migrated because of poverty. It cannot, therefore, be denied that the economic factor is significant and that this factor is relevant not only in the case of Indian scholars but also in that of the scholars of other Asian countries too.

Ray contends that France, despite her not being richer than Britain, does not have the problem of migration of her scholars. Surely the contention is unquestionable. But it is not so much a convincing argument in support of Ray's view that the migration of Indian scholars (or the brain drain) is not a consequence of national poverty as it is a statement of the fact that French scholars do not migrate in spite of poverty. Why that is so is a question deserving independent inquiry.

Proper Utilization

By settling down abroad even out of economic motives, Indian scholars stand to gain. Their migration adds to both national prestige and national wealth. Ray is certainly not unaware of this benefit. But he is aware of this benefit alone and of none else; and even the benefit of which he is aware is not given as much weight as it should be. The most important result of the migration of scholars is an exchange of culture and the resultant promotion of better international understanding and mutual self-respect.

In conclusion, then, it can be said that the migration of scholars should not be confused with the drain of talent. The role of intellectuals consists in providing direction. This direction is being provided by resident intellectuals directly and by non-resident intellectuals indirectly. The real problem is to utilize fully the talent locally available and to raise the level of need to such an extent that those outside India can make better use of themselves within their own country.

Creating conditions

A. D. MODDIE

LET us not seize a cliché and get worked up about it. Is there a brain drain from India of any sizeable proportion? If so, what is the extent of the problem? What disciplines and professions are most affected by it? Unfortunately, it is hard to find satisfactory factual answers to these first relevant questions. But some attempt must be made to grope our way towards them before any expressions of opinion.

As on March 1, 1966, the numbers of Indians who had registered themselves on the National Register for Science, Technology, Engineering and Medicine are given in the table below, together with the numbers who have returned. These figures apply for the period 1958 to March 1, 1966. In addition

to 11,215 people who have registered themselves under these disciplines, there are another couple of thousand on the register for such other disciplines as Economics, Accounts and Business Administration.

	<i>Total Regis- tered</i>	<i>Total Returned</i>	<i>Per cent Returned</i>
Engi- neering	5,000	2,316	46
Science	3,413	1,674	49
Medicine	1,910	894	47
Techno- logy	892	469	53
Total:	11,215	5,353	48

No one knows how many Indians who have gone abroad for

various studies have not registered themselves in the National Register. Estimates vary from a third of one half of the figures in the National Register.

A study of the National Register discipline-wise throws up interesting data of the disciplines which have a higher percentage of returnables than those with a lower percentage. The high percentages are Food, Fats and Oils (57 per cent), Leather (84 per cent), Dairy and Animal Husbandry (64 per cent), and Aeronautical Engineering (58 per cent). The low returnables are Plastics (36 per cent), and Chemical Engineering (30 per cent), Industrial (35 per cent), Agriculture (38 per cent), Metallurgical (43 per cent), and Instruments Engineering (13 per cent), General Medicine (43 per cent), Veterinary Science (43 per cent), and Physiology (33 per cent). Most of the others conform to the returnable average of about 50 per cent. It must be explained however, that this does not mean that only 50 per cent of those who have gone abroad for studies have returned to India. These are the figures of those who were still abroad at a point of time, namely, 1-3-1966. We do not know how many of those who were still abroad were undergoing courses of study, and how many may have stayed on permanently or semi-permanently.

Lack of Data

The first need, therefore, is for appropriate bodies like the Education Ministry and the CSIR to try and find out the actual figures of those who had not returned permanently or semi-permanently. This is the area of the lost, and it is this critical figure which we do not really know. In an article in *The Statesman* earlier in the year, Dr. Kamlesh Ray estimated that the figure of this loss was about 5 or 6 per cent. If that is so, the proportion of the loss is not too serious for us to consider it a brain drain in quantitative terms. After all, there are a large number of ordinary jobs which have to be done reasonably well, and which do not require Nobel Laureates.

If a poor country like India happens to lose only 5 per cent of the talent which goes abroad—a much smaller figure of the total talent available within the country—then it is hardly a problem of such proportion as to deserve being called a brain drain.

But when one tries to examine the question qualitatively, we are still more at sea. In fact, this is an area of the incalculable. It is hard to say how many scientists, engineers, technicians, economists or managers we have lost of the very first quality. Some of us may know of one or two remarkable men who are actually making significant contributions to fundamental discoveries, and even in their cases one wonders whether they would be able to make such discoveries if they had remained in India. When Narlikar shot into the head-lines, the Minister for Education himself attempted to secure his services in India, but Narlikar has not yet turned, and it may be for the very good reason that he can only complete his work in Cambridge.

Tentative Study

In the absence of adequate data, one can only come to some tentative conclusions on the basis of the limited data and the limited experience which groups and organisations may have on the subject of the brain drain. This must, therefore, be the first limitation of any study of an issue like this, the absence of adequate factual data of the 'universe' of the problem and its dimensions. The second and deeper limitation is that there are many factors which may make for the loss of Indian talent abroad, and these call for more than a statistical study. They involve a sociological study of environmental conditions of particular disciplines and professions in India, of the family circumstances of a representative sample of cases of those who go abroad and do not return; and of the pulls from abroad in the cases of mixed marriages. All such factors, economic and non-economic, have to be taken into account not only for a better understanding of the pro-

blem, to the extent the problem exists, but also for effective solutions, partial though they must always be. Such a study should precede any hasty decision to ban foreign travel by students, as is contemplated in some quarters.

A Few Assumptions

One must also consider a study of such a problem shorn of emotional overtones. It is only too easy to insinuate or presume that the talented young Indians who go abroad, do so for money or for better living conditions only. To clear the problem of any such emotional overtones in a society which does not yet look favourably upon 'money-mindedness', even though its major aim is economic development or wealth creation, let us begin with a few assumptions which one should make in all fairness to avoid subjective feelings around the problem.

The first such assumption should be that the majority of young Indians who go abroad are at least as patriotic as the majority of those who remain behind. The second should be that they are at least as human in sharing family loyalties and suffering the pangs of separation from the family, friends and the familiar society, as those who have to travel away from these within the country's borders. (Possibly compensated, in some cases, by the joys of freedom and travel!). The third assumption we should make is that it is a quite natural and commendable desire on their part to seek to promote their professional competence in other parts of the world where they may think they can do so better than in India. The fourth assumption should be the equally natural desire of young people to travel abroad and respond to the fascination of new places and new people. Such a desire prompted by youthful restlessness and intellectual curiosity is, if anything, a sign of health, and the absence of it would be a sign of stagnation. If also the sons of the fathers suffer from a hangover from the inferiority complex of earlier days, when it was a distinctly superior thing to be 'foreign

returned', or to have foreign qualifications, one can hardly blame the sons for inheriting the complexes of the fathers. Until such time as the fathers make it apparent by their own exertions and example, that this country has standards and values which are intrinsically high and which are worth seeking, it would be only too human for people to seek them where they can find them.

And here one may touch another aspect of the apparent brain drain, and that is the tendency on the part of many senior persons to find themselves places in the latter part of their careers in the U.N. agencies. In their cases, the material gain seems to be the most apparent reason, at which let him alone cast stones who does not live in a glass house. But such senior people cannot quite say as do many of the younger ones that they go abroad for lack of jobs and opportunities, because they already have them. To crown one's later years with an assignment in a U.N. agency is now a special pursuit of those who think their talents advisory. It may be no bad thing for the country to be left with more operating people!

Tentative Conclusions

Let us now see what tentative conclusions one can come to from the limited data which may be available in the absence of satisfactory comprehensive data. The first, and obvious conclusion, is that we do not really know the extent of the permanent loss of talent; much more so of really first class talents which, if returned to India, could be expected to make really significant contributions, particularly in research and in industry. The second conclusion is that the rate of departures seems to be maintained fairly uniformly, and unless we improve conditions for work and growth in India, the loss may have in it a dangerous potential for growth in future years. The third conclusion is that the two primary contributing factors in this loss are, firstly, the lack of enough opportunities and early recognition within the country itself; and secondly, the draw of foreign wives who, in

many cases, prefer to settle at home even after a trial period of stay in India. In one particular batch of six young men, four married abroad and have stayed on. Besides, it is hard to expect a large number of such couples to stay in India, as foreign wives are an impediment to employment in government, which is the largest employer of scientists, engineers and technologists.

Fourthly, there is some evidence of a loss of the precious few of the very highest order, who are doing fundamental researches of deep consequence. But what can we do about them? Would it be possible for them to continue to make their contribution to fundamental work if they returned to India, without the same facilities and the same environment which they enjoy abroad. If there is one aspect of the brain drain which requires isolated, singular attention at the highest quarters of government and private industry, it is the creation of such conditions as will enable these highly significant few to work in India. If they can find satisfactory working conditions for the development of their talents, as do the Ramans and the Vikram Sarabhais, many others of a lesser order will not be lost either.

Within India

A number of responsible people who have examined this problem are of the view that the bigger problem than the brain drain to foreign countries is the brain drain in India itself, by way of lack of adequate utilisation of such talents as already exist. Somehow, despite the growing opportunities in the last 20 years, we have not been able to create either a sufficient number of worth while jobs for all those who return with good foreign qualifications and specialisations and/or we have not been able to create a climate of work in which, particularly scientists and technicians, feel that they can function with adequate reward and recognition, on one side, and with proper facilities for growth and development, on the other. It may also be argued that the very best men with enough robustness

and character have been able to find a place for themselves to stay in India, make their contributions and also make a mark. These are not a few. It may be that the less robust find both jobs and life easier in the more advanced countries abroad.

There is also the paradoxical situation of a large number of qualified people, on one side, with a large number of unfilled posts, on the other. This seems largely due to procedural delays in placements in government and the public sector; and partly due to the inadequate attempts to find places for such people in the private sector. In the government, and in the public sector, it sometimes takes up to a year to process applications and announce appointments. Talent can hardly wait that long, and in any case, there is a serious loss in both morale and contribution. Most of the private sector is content to advertise vacancies and await responses. This is not good enough. Personnel departments have to do more by way of direct approaches to universities, institutes of technology, and science establishments. But procedural delays alone cannot account for the staggering revelation in an article in *The Statesman* of the 8th August, 1966, in which it states that in a census of technically qualified people by the CSIR, as much as one-third of 400,000 such people were either unemployed or employed in non-technical jobs. Here is a staggering example of a waste of technical education, whatever the reasons may be. Is there a flaw in the manpower planning of technical people? Are we producing more than our needs? Are we sacrificing quality for quantity?

Responsible

To the extent that there may be conditions in India which are not conducive to the retention of the best talent in the country, responsibility for it has to be shared by the whole society. That responsibility, indeed blame, is often put on the government alone, but as the major employer, government would have the major responsibility. If it is recognised that this is

a society which is still traditional, hierarchical and authoritarian in its attitudes and social values; that not enough is done in our academic world to encourage intellectual curiosity, creativeness and original thinking; that research is not adequately endowed or task-oriented; that industry itself has not done all it can do to seek out the best Indian brains either within the country or abroad; that parents themselves encourage foreign education for its prestige value, but expect the young to return to traditional conditions and to safe service jobs; then the responsibility has to be spread quite far. As a consequence, remedial action has to be taken in a large number of places and adequate solutions cannot be left only to scientific pools, which may act as temporary dharamshalas for 'foreign returned' scientists and technologists.

Many a problem has called for a pooling of minds in seminars and committees. Unfortunately, this subject has not yet received the same attention. It may be hoped that this issue of *Seminar* will be one more step towards an effective study of the problem which must precede any effective steps to solve it. There is need for a meeting of minds at the highest levels between government, industry, research and the universities. There is need for a national policy, which will make its impact on the talented young people before they go abroad and while they are there. Indian missions overseas can play a very vital and direct role in this area. If our missions in foreign capitals could directly help in establishing personal contact with the best Indian talents abroad and in helping to re-import such talents, they would be ultimately promoting the development of India where its resources are most scarce. Whatever such a meeting of minds may suggest, we have first to make India itself a fitting and congenial place for the many talented Indians to grow up and find fulfilment in, before we can expect to draw back the few who may have had the privilege of going abroad. We cannot expect to grow our lilies in salt water.

Misguided attitudes

JAGDISH BHAGWATI

ONE important, and pernicious, way in which the opposition to the 'brain drain' is expressed relates to the liberal leave policy which is adopted by some universities towards their faculty members. I wish to write about this specific problem because of immediate experience with such attitudes.

The opposition to leave for spending varying periods at foreign universities on academic assignments takes several forms. It is argued that the major motivation for such foreign trips is 'making easy money'; that the academic value of such trips is meagre; that teaching at home suffers; that we are short, indeed starved, of trained people and foreign trips amount to a serious brain drain in the wrong direction, away from the underdeveloped to the advanced countries. Some of these points are sought to be 'proved' by personal attacks, as when recently an

eminent colleague of mine, who had returned from one of the top-ranking universities in the U.S.A. where he had been Visiting Professor for a year, was described as a 'profiteer' who had gone abroad to make money! Undoubtedly many of these criticisms spring from barely-hidden attitudes of envy. But is there any merit in the more serious objections listed above? And should leave rules be very tight, rather than liberal, at universities today?

Personally, I am convinced that tight rules with respect to leave for visiting foreign universities would be seriously mischievous. I have in mind the fact that, in most disciplines today, India still does not have a large enough number of eminent people to generate purely locally the kind of atmosphere and possibilities of continuing mutual discussions which alone can keep one on one's toes. In my own field, economics, where we already have more than a dozen brilliant young men with international reputations, there are still not enough people in each 'sub-field' (such as International Economics, for example) to change this situation even if we take India as a whole. I am sure that this is true of practically all other fields today.

The Distractions

Also, the Indian sociological scene is such that innumerable 'distractions' are increasingly being built into the academic system, which make sustained academic work difficult. Thus, numerous seminars have sprung up all over the place, for example, where serious academics are dragooned from time to time into turning in second-rate papers, written at short notice, and away from their principal line of research. 'Policy' seminars are another sore on the scene; hasty papers on the 'current situation', without serious academic work, are produced and debated in an atmosphere of supercharged emotion and with a fanfare of participants from 'all walks of life'! With funds flowing around freely from Foundations and the UGC, seminars to celebrate 'centenaries' have also sprung up, even at res-

pectable institutions. The whole atmosphere is thus one which encourages jamborees and tamaras, which multiply endlessly and result in mutual invitations to fly to Calcutta, Bombay, Madras, etc., and in newspaper prominence in some cases. I am convinced that this sort of thing is one of the most pernicious factors in the modern academic life in India (especially in the so-called social sciences) and will inevitably undermine whatever progress we have been making so far by way of building up first-rate departments and centres for advanced study.

Be that as it may, the prevalence and intensification of such an atmosphere, resulting in the availability now of numerous easy ways of committing 'academic suicide', makes it all the more necessary that the talented Indian academic is allowed to get away and get occasional stimuli from a different environment at a respectable institution.

The Danger

In short, what I am arguing is that, in the current state of academic attainment and atmosphere in India in many disciplines, there is a serious danger that stringent leave policies concerning foreign academic assignments will impede the growth of high standards in the country's educational institutions of higher study. To put it differently, the brain will drain away much faster if confined forcibly to India for very long than if allowed to 'drain' away to foreign universities from time to time under more liberal leave policies!

It is also short-sighted to worry about the immediate repercussions on teaching if a large number of members of a department are allowed to go out on such assignments, even if their academic assignments happen to 'bunch'. Obviously, 'inferior' arrangements would have to be made for teaching during such a period. But surely it is more sensible to ensure that your Faculty is first-rate and thus inspires the students into the necessary attitudes for higher learning than to make sure that it stays around, deteriorates and

keeps on teaching. If I may speak from personal experience, what made me go for higher learning was not the sorry spectacle of uninspiring teachers (with no research to their credit, by and large) in my early student years in India, but the atmosphere of creativity which I found in Cambridge. And my Cambridge teachers taught far less and were away far more often than those in my Bombay days or most of us now!

Point of Merit

I would therefore argue quite strongly, and certainly not be on the defensive against short-sighted public opinion, that liberal leave policies are today an inevitable part of the policies for attaining and keeping high standards in our universities. In fact, as some outstanding universities abroad have already started doing, why can we not 'share' an eminent Indian scientist with some famous university abroad? For example, if Cambridge is willing to have Narlikar for six months a year and spare him for the other six months so that he can work as member of an Indian university, I see nothing except merit in such an arrangement. It would be, in fact, the ideal arrangement since Narlikar would stay in the mainstream of scientific ideas abroad, while helping to build up another first-rate school in India.

Prior to concluding, I would make another 'unorthodox' point in defence of different kinds of (apparent) brain drain. The work of many mathematicians (such as Harishchandra at Princeton), physicists (such as Chandrasekhar at Chicago), statisticians and economists at foreign universities, while they were working abroad, has in many cases transformed our reputation abroad, which was previously low in academic circles. This itself is prestigious. It has also made it easier now for us to send our talented students to the really fine universities abroad, so that the profit we can derive from such training abroad has increased very significantly. Would this really have happened if we had followed a short-sighted, 'closed door' policy?

A case study

SURINDAR SURI

I am a drained brain. For the last five years I have been teaching in foreign countries. First in Germany, and at present in the USA. I intend to stay in and continue to teach in Germany, the USA, or Canada, or Britain, or some other western country, or Australia or New Zealand. I have no intention at present of returning to India to take up a permanent or long-term academic, research or any other position there. I ask myself why I have decided to quit India and to domesticate myself in a foreign country. It is a complex matter.

In 1958, after spending a decade abroad, studying, teaching, doing

research, writing, developing my talents as scholar, writer and, I hope, as a human being, I returned home. I had made up my mind to stay and work in India. I knew that the salary I would get would be less, perhaps much less than what I have paid to my own secretaries and assistants in these countries.

I also knew that the working conditions would be poor, libraries would be inadequate, there would be very few individuals with whom I would be able to discuss my own special field of research, such as German social history. There is, to my knowledge, hardly any scholar in India who

has specialized in German social history in recent years and I would be, therefore, relatively isolated. I did not expect to find sufficient source material to carry on this research. I expected a number of other difficulties and troubles. I knew that after having spent a decade abroad, practically all my connections with academic institutions in India, with my old professors, with my old friends, had become so weak as to be of no practical value in getting me a job.

Despite all these misgivings, I returned to India determined to settle there and to contribute as much as I could to its intellectual, social, cultural and political development. And yet within three years of my return, I was on my way out again. If I wanted to be melodramatic, I would say I was being sent into exile. I may apply to myself the category of 'junior' used by Professor Punya Sloka Ray and not the category of the mob, a mobster, nor of a senior.

The Social Structure

What happened? How did my previous resolve evaporate? And why am I now resolved to settle abroad and possibly not in India? Ray has outlined in general terms quite accurately what happens to a student abroad who takes his position seriously when he returns to India. Certain facts about the social structure, especially the class structure of India, the family networks about which I had not learned earlier, came to my consciousness upon my return. For instance, when I returned I could not wait to choose a job. I had no reserves of money. I had a brother with whom I could stay for a while only. Therefore, I had to take one of the positions which were offered to me quite early. Now this position was not necessarily the most suited to my talents, but I had to accept it.

On the other hand, some acquaintances of mine who returned to India from studies abroad after several years did have this reserve of money. They came from wealthier families and they could afford to wait. I could only afford

to wait about two months. They could afford to wait six months, or even a year. With money goes pull. They had pull. I had none. Therefore, they could land positions which I could not. And so initially I became aware that the class structure, the class factors which I had ignored, were of considerable importance in making good in India, at least initially.

And I, despite considerable training, a creditable record of academic and scholarly achievements abroad was at a disadvantage compared to those from better off families. And this connection between social class in India and academic achievement is something which I had to learn as the bitter truth.

Patriarchal Tradition

But this was not the main factor. Something else proved more decisive. Part of it is once again outlined or indicated very clearly by Ray when he says that the 'seniors' are scared of the 'juniors'. I think it is not merely that, but something more. The patriarchal tradition survives and is very powerful in India. And this means, for instance, that a person in a senior position, irrespective of his competence or achievement expects a literary tribute from his juniors. The more brilliant the junior, the more of this tribute is he expected to pay to his senior. The tribute may take the form of writing articles, and letting the name of the senior appear on them; writing or compiling a book and letting it appear as if it had been compiled by a senior. Or writing a book and letting him write a preface.

He may have had nothing to do with the book, he may not be well versed in the subject matter of the book, but he writes a flowery preface, perhaps composed by the author of the book, and so gets his name on the title page. I found to my dismay that this kind of parasitism was widespread and some of the best known people who have a good name, or are famed for their integrity and honesty and dedication to the public good indulged in these practices: the research and the writing

of papers or speeches or memorandum was done by junior scholars but appeared in print or was delivered in lectures as if these were the products of the senior himself.

I could not but be revolted by this hypocrisy and this parasitism. And yet even this was not the decisive factor, although it played a big part because obviously I was not capable of playing the role of a silent, exploited, humble junior.

Politics

Soon after my arrival in India I took up work as director of research of a small information centre in New Delhi, and made plans and suggestions for research to be carried out in Indian politics, Indian education, and the Indian social structure. The first item of research taken up was political, the rule of the Communist party in Kerala. Initially I intended to carry out this research. I met a well-wisher soon after (I had met him somewhere): He said, 'Mr. Suri, what are you doing?' I replied that I was director of research in this centre and had undertaken a piece of research in Indian politics. When asked about the specific nature of that I said, 'On communist rule in Kerala.' He said, 'Well, whom are you going to support? Nehru or the Communist Party or the Americans?' I laughed at his naivete and said I was not going to support anyone, but going out to find the truth and to tell the truth. My friend shook his head and told me: 'Mr. Suri, you won't last long in your job,' and walked away. I did not believe him. I was convinced that my dedication to truth would triumph, would win out, would prevail.

It did not. I gave up this project voluntarily and assigned it to a colleague and I took over another project on the problems of student indiscipline in the universities. This colleague of mine happened to be by inclination anti-communist so he produced an anti-communist tract, which made everybody around the information centre very happy and landed the author a good job in another institution. I do not say that he know-

ingly slanted his conclusions or his analysis in an anti-communist direction. Luckily for him, he is of a conservative bent of mind, and his analysis just happened to fit in to the dominant tendency in this particular area, namely New Delhi.

I did not take over a political subject, but the pressure for conformity, gentle, well-meant, delicate, began to be applied to me. One of the leading lights of this institute came to me one day and, in a paternal manner, gave me some sound advice. He said: 'Mr. Suri, we don't mind what you think, but please be discreet in what you say.' I was 'grateful' for the advice, but I could not accept it. I could not say one thing when I thought another. I could not refrain from saying what I thought. I would place little value on my thinking if I did not express it openly. And the battle lines for the fight were drawn.

Technique of Slander

Other incidents of this kind occurred. Another individual who intruded was an alleged journalist employed in the information services of one of the foreign governments. He tried to squeeze himself into the research institute and into a discussion group which I had started there, but I knew who he was and peremptorily kept him out of both the research institute and the discussion group.

He took his revenge: he wrote to various people pointing out that I had held a party at the centre, where I had served 'foreign' liquor, and that I was a spy for some foreign government, possibly for the same government for which he was then working. Other people in this institute also complained that I was politically slanted, that I was using the facilities of this institute for partisan purposes, which was false. However, I did express my views openly: I criticized the dismissal of the communist government in Kerala by the Government of India.

The upshot of this, especially of my refusal to kow tow to the

'seniors,' was that when the trial period of my employment of two years was exhausted, my services were terminated. I was simply kicked out although I was in the midst of a major research project: I had initiated research into the social background and political dynamics of members of the Lok Sabha. I must add that I was tapped for one or two other positions, one in the African society for research on Africa. I might have been offered the position of the secretary at a good salary. But I saw immediately that I would be there either as a kind of glorified peon or a facade, that I would have no opportunity of carrying out genuine research. I would not be able to express my view frankly and openly. This realization then made me decide to seek a position abroad.

The Juniors

One last factor I want to mention. When I was in hot water with the information centre and later when I was kicked out and sought redress, I came to know other 'juniors,' young scholars, many of them dedicated to truth, warm, friendly, honest, uncorrupted, at least inwardly. They knew what had happened to me and after I had lost my job many of them helped me out with small assignments, writing articles, writing text books for colleges. Without their help, I might have starved. And, yet, there was no real solidarity. They knew that an injustice had been done to me but they were so scattered, they were as perhaps Professor Ray says, so attached to some particular senior, or simply realized that they could not operate in India unless they attached themselves to some senior.

In any case, there was no solidarity among juniors, there was no concrete step undertaken and, if I may say so, the final straw that broke my back was the lack of solidarity, of effective action on the part of my fellow 'juniors'. It's my disillusionment with my peers in India that made of me an intellectual refugee. It is my lack of

disillusionment with them that today keeps me away from India.

To complete this picture. Although I am an alien in the various countries where I have worked or where I hope to work, having no deep, personal connections, no deep personal friendships, yet I cannot but feel a sense of gratitude that institutions and individuals have given me scope to work, have given me a place to work, have provided me with a livelihood. I am not easy to work with. I am difficult. I do not develop public relations with my seniors or colleagues or others who have power and decide things. Despite all this, however, despite my being difficult and other faults, the little merit which I possess as a scholar, as a teacher, as a writer, is recognized and appreciated. When decisions are made about me, then all my faults, many as they are, are matched against the ability that I have and the work that I have done.

It is this balance, it is the faith in the fairness of my peers and superiors which has developed in me a sense of loyalty to the German academic institutions and to the American academic institutions because here I can work with a sense of integrity and with a faith that even if some decisions are made against me, I am denied further employment, that this decision will be made on the basis of a fair appraisal of my weaknesses and my strengths. I will accept these decisions, whether they are for me or against me, with respect and with equanimity.

International Attitudes

I want to make one last point in this connection. I do not believe that a scholar must be a nationalist. I realize that Indian scholars should work in India. But I do not think that only Indian scholars should work in India. Foreign scholars should work in India, should be encouraged to work in India, should be encouraged to work even at disproportionately large salaries that are sometimes offered to them. Foreign scholars should be encouraged to

settle in India, or at least stay for several years and work there. Similarly, Indian scholars should not be discouraged from working abroad if they find a place, if they find the conditions congenial, and if they get positions that enable them to develop their talents. There should be a free international field.

I do not think that in this kind of a free field all Indian scholars would be lured abroad. On the contrary, the psychological compulsion or pressure that is put sometimes not only in India, but sometimes abroad, that Indian scholars who are abroad should go back and work in their home country, has a contrary effect.

Contribution

Secondly, as an Indian scholar working abroad, I believe I contribute in some small way to the intellectual development of India itself. Ultimately it was with the help of the foreign institutions where I worked that I was able to complete the studies of the Indian Parliament and to write on them. It is with their help that I recently made a study of the election in Kerala and the election in Ceylon. I am planning to make a study of the forthcoming general election in 1967. I communicate with Indian scholars and I do not think that in this sense my departure is a loss. I could not work at my optimum capacity in India. The work which I could do in India can be and is being done by others, so that India loses little by my absence abroad. One day I may return when these pin-pricks, these frustrations, these humiliations which I suffered there in my last stay, would no longer matter. Lastly, I must make a comment on Professor Ray's reference to the mob—the degreed but uneducated youth which is growing in India.

I have seen it. I know it. What I find most perturbing about this mob is its lack of moral anchor. People in this group are willing to do anything for anybody so long as they can earn money, or so long as they can get positions or some power. Therefore, there is a natural tendency for an alliance

between seniors who are in a state of panic at their own inadequacy, and the mob which is out to get power and money in whatever way it can. The mob also supplies many of the recruits for foreign and domestic intelligence services.

Positive Approach

A negative approach to the mob would not provide an answer; criticising its members, condemning them, running them down, looking down upon them. There must be a positive approach. There may be established a register of social science scholars where each social science scholar is able to receive some stipend until he gets a job. With expanding opportunities in Indian education, with new colleges and universities, which should be encouraged to expand, the mob will be absorbed. The mob has talent. I think the Indian graduate, the Indian M.A. and the Indian PhD is intelligent and talented. What he lacks is proper apprenticeship, a period of assistantship that most of the American, British and European universities provide to their M.A.'s and PhD's. In this period of apprenticeship, the young scholar is able to experiment and grow and become mature. Indian universities must find some way of providing these kinds of scholarships.

The 'revolution' in academic life in India which would stop not so much the brain drain but, more importantly, prevent the degradation at home, safeguard the scholars from suffering an 'internal emigration' or withdrawal, leading a kind of underground existence, can be brought about by the dedicated 'juniors' with a sense of dedicated and self-confident solidarity. Those who are dedicated to the pursuit of scientific truth must effectuate an Oath of Hippocrates for scholars—a code of conduct that helps to establish their dignity and integrity. They must get the old men of the sea from off their backs. This, and not the return of the dramees to the country, is the answer, for the question is not who is in India and who is not, but what do those who are in India accomplish as scholars and human beings.

Technical assistance

RAJ KRISHNA

IN this paper* I propose (1) to offer a formulation of the objectives of receiving foreign aid in general and technical assistance in particular from the point of view of the developing countries; (2) to delineate briefly some of the hard realities of the psychological milieu in which aid is being given and received; (3) to propose a few working principles which should govern technical assistance programmes in view of these objectives and realities; and (4) to make a few comments on the specific question of increasing the contribution of young career professionals in technical assistance programmes.

The objective of foreign aid from the U.S.¹ point of view has been formulated with great clarity by Prof. Benjamin Higgins:

'to promote the economic stabilization and development of

countries in Asia, Africa and Latin America...and to do so in a manner contributing to the growth of representative, responsible and independent governments which will not be hostile to the West and which can be expected to support the United States or remain neutral in the event of a major war.'²

This formulation gives expression to the fact that America is committed simultaneously to the economic development of developing countries, to the fostering of democratic governments, and to the prevention of their alignment with powers hostile to the West.

An analogous formulation of the objectives of receiving foreign aid from the point of view of the developing countries will be: to realise with foreign aid a higher rate of economic, socio-political, intellectual and, where necessary, military growth than may be realisable without it; to have the government they want; to remain free

*Paper written for a conference on the role of young career professionals in technical assistance held in Princeton in 1965 and addressed to Americans.

1. The argument in this paper is focussed on U.S. policy, though much of it applies to all Western aid-giving countries.

2. *United Nations and U.S. Foreign Economic Policy*. Richard D. Irwin, Homewood, Illinois, p. 175.

to receive aid from *any* nation(s); and to have the maximum possible freedom in the conduct of their economic, foreign and defence policies.

Maximum Autonomy

Having attained political independence, the developing countries want the flowering of this basic independence into rapid growth in other dimensions of their national and international existence. Some of them may choose to have or succeed in having a democratic government but all of them cannot define it as one of their immediate aims. And, even if they have democratic governments, they will have them because *they* want to, and not because the West wants them to. Similarly, the U.S. may want the developing countries not to align themselves with powers hostile to the West. But, the interest of the developing countries lies in having multiple agreements/alignments with *all* powers so that they may avoid excessive dependence on, and domination by, any *one* power. This is the only way for them to maximise their independence and growth in spite of their economic, intellectual and military weaknesses.

It will thus be seen that the objectives of the U.S. and of the host countries overlap only in certain respects: both want economic development. But, in other respects they may diverge. The U.S. may prefer certain types of government, and the avoidance of certain foreign policy attitudes, but the aid-receiving countries would like to have the maximum autonomy in these respects. They wish to receive aid without necessarily bending their forms of government and international policies to suit U.S. preferences.

There is a wide basis for negotiating aid agreements which meet the wishes of the contracting parties halfway. But it is necessary for everyone to recognise that it is inherent in the situation of the developing countries that whatever be the limitations on their freedom they may accept in the short run in order to secure aid, they are bound to shake loose from them as soon as they feel strong

enough to do so without much damage.

Perceptive American thinkers have exposed naive assertions of non-intervention. They have argued with frankness that it is America's right and/or duty to use the leverage of aid to pressurise the host governments to pursue or not to pursue certain kinds of policies at least to ensure that aid is efficiently utilised, and sometimes even to secure political objectives which transcend the efficient utilisation of aid.³ And it is believed that such pressure is not only in the American interest but also in the interest of the host countries themselves, even though the latter may not realise this when the pressure is exercised.

Nationalism

Whether this is true or not, the psychological fact remains that the overt or covert exercise of pressure to mould the policies of developing countries appears to *them* as the continuation of western domination in a new form. The force that produces this reaction is the most powerful force behind the contemporary evolution of the newly-freed nations—the force of nationalism. The positive manifestation of this force is the will to fill the knowledge-gap, the wealth-gap and the power-gap that these nations have inherited from history. But, the negative manifestation is a profound distrust of the West. That is why it is necessary for the governments of these countries not only to try to secure the best possible terms in aid agreements but to keep their peoples continuously assured that aid is being used without any serious infringement of freedom. Sometimes such assurance requires a demonstrative defiance of, and even open hostility to, the United States.

The U.S. has to live with the fact that aid receivers must remain psychologically hostile to it, whether it gives them aid or not, whether it gives it on soft terms or hard terms. If it does not give aid it will be accused of being indiffe-

rent to the condition of the poor and the weak outside its fortress of riches. If it gives aid, it will be disliked for its being in the position of a giver and the receivers being in the position of receivers. If the aid is soft it retards local struggles to solve problems. If the aid is hard, it attracts the charge of exploitation.

Thus, anti-Americanism is not due to the fact that the behaviour of the American abroad is 'ugly'. It is something inherent in the relationship between the aid-giver and the aid-receiver. Niceties of demeanour, public relationing, tactfulness and tolerance may not reduce the fundamental hostility to the West that pervades the developing countries. Their inferiority is too real, and its awareness too painful to permit real friendship with a sense of equality. The slogan of equality only makes the awareness of inequality more excruciating. The sense of equality will become real only in the distant future when the developing countries have acquired a critical minimum of economic, intellectual and military strength and independence.

Psychological Equality

The emphasis laid above on the force of nationalism and its negative manifestation in an elemental hostility to the aid-giving West is necessary to temper the naive internationalism that is popular in some quarters. There is no short transition from worldwide western imperialism to a worldwide internationalism led by the aid-giving West. The developing countries cannot be expected to subscribe to real internationalism until they become self-confident nations. For the time being, the internationalism of the developing nations is intended merely to receive aid *in order to become nations*, and/or to serve notice on the West that they are 'arriving'. Genuine participation in international cooperation will be a reality only when the developing countries feel psychologically equal to the West.

The principles which should govern technical assistance should be evolved in full view of the

3. Higgins, op. cit., 7-10. John D. Montgomery. *The Politics of Foreign Aid*, Praeger, New York, 1962, p. 246-254.

objectives of receiving foreign assistance and the psychological background delineated above. Programmes must be so designed that the receiving countries feel that their objectives are being realised in the maximum possible degree, and the attendant difficulties are minimised.

The Difficulties

The difficulties of administering technical assistance programmes from the point of view of the donor countries arise in connection with (1) the recruitment of the required number of experts of a high standard; (2) the adjustment of technical personnel to the physical milieu of the host countries or the creation in those countries of enclaves with a physical milieu congenial to the technical personnel; (3) the adjustment of personnel to the psycho-cultural milieu of the host countries; (4) the effort to get demonstrably good results from assistance (involving *inter alia* the choice between soft and hard approaches); and (5) the 're-entry' of personnel at appropriate levels of their professional ladders in their own countries.⁴ Numerous concrete proposals have emerged from recent studies of technical assistance to solve these problems. Here our emphasis is on proposals which can help solve the problems which arise from the point of view of the developing countries.

It is clear, to begin with, that any technical assistance programme must be designed as a self-liquidating programme. The knowledge that is transferred must be transferred in such a way that very soon it is no longer necessary to transfer it in the same way at the same level or scale. The intention to foster a *take-off into self-sustained growth of knowledge* in the fields in which knowledge is transferred in the first instance must be the cardinal principle of any technical assistance programme.

At present knowledge is being transferred by the developed to the developing countries in at least

two important ways. There are large and expanding programmes to impart modern knowledge to students and professionals from the developing countries in the more developed countries. In addition, there are the technical assistance programmes proper which involve the assignment of experts from the more developed countries to the less developed countries. The student education programmes and the technical assistance programmes are operating side by side for the same countries and in the same fields.

Alternative Methods

This implies that both types of programmes are needed simultaneously. But I suggest that, in general, student education programmes and technical assistance programmes can and must be regarded as *alternative* methods of knowledge transfer. Having trained a large number of doctors, engineers, agronomists, economists and administrators from a certain country, a donor nation should not consider it necessary also to send to the same country large numbers of Euro-American experts in these very fields. There is no reason why students from a certain country should not be trusted, after they have been trained in the West, to solve the problems of their country in their field without much further help from foreign experts.

The failure to trust and utilise to the fullest possible extent the ability of trained nationals of the less developed countries is mainly due to the policy of these countries themselves. The politicians and the conservative, generalist civil servants in these countries would very often trust a third-rate foreign expert's advice much more than that of their ablest young technicians. It is high time that the absurdity and wastefulness of this policy is realised and developing countries learn to make the maximum use of their own trained manpower.

But, the aid-giving countries themselves should make it their policy not to clutter up aid-receiving countries with their surplus

experts—not always their best—in any field in which a critical minimum number of trained personnel of those countries themselves is available. Student education and technical assistance programmes should be regarded more and more as substitutes; and as a rule, education must be regarded as a more efficient means of knowledge transfer.

This policy would minimise at one stroke the numerous problems created by programmes of sending foreign experts: problems of recruitment and physical and psychological adjustment, problems of getting results in unfamiliar milieus, and problems of re-entry.

The nationals of less developed countries would be naturally adjusted to the environment of their countries. They will be familiar with the relative valuation of different values in their culture and will be able to induce and accelerate change with a minimum of friction. And their work will not be subject to the charge of intervention.

Change Factors

The necessity of what is called intervention arises essentially from the strong complementarity between change factors. Change in any particular field requires or sparks off concomitant changes in related fields. Therefore experts anxious to get results in any field have to force the pace of change in many other fields—some of which may be highly sensitive. Nationals of the less developed countries can plan and foster changes in many fields simultaneously with due regard to the sensibilities of their peoples.

In the training of students from less developed countries, emphasis must be given to instruction in the general principles of each field, the general methods of solving problems in that field, and the particular solutions which have worked in the developed countries. The application or adaptation of these principles and methods to the solution of the particular problems of less developed countries must be left to the trained students

4. R.W. Iversen, *Personnel for Technical Assistance*, Syracuse University, February 1965. (Mimeographed)

themselves. This is the only policy which can bring about the intellectual take-off of the less developed countries in field after field in the shortest possible time.

There are three purposes for which the despatch of Western experts to the less developed countries may be necessary *in addition* to the training of their nationals. It is necessary to send them (1) to render initial help in the creation of new research and educational institutions in the less developed countries themselves; (2) to render initial help in the installation and initial running of plants supplied by the West; and (3) to render specific, residual help in the solution of unusually difficult problems when such help is called for by trained national experts.

Short-run help in these circumstances is necessary in spite of the general rule that student training is better than technical assistance. But, help limited to these contingencies will be required on a much smaller scale than the help now being rendered under flabby technical assistance programmes.

Limitation of Research

A related issue is how far, and in what fields, research should be undertaken by the experts of more developed countries in the less developed countries. On this issue, I would propose that research in non-technological fields such as economics, politics, education, mass communication, anthropology, sociology, social psychology, etc., conducted by western researchers in the less developed areas should be minimised, if not banned altogether. The recent decision of the U.S. Government to restrict research by U.S. researchers in less developed countries if it adversely affects the foreign relations of the U.S. implies an acknowledgement of some of the dangers of such research.

From the western academic vantage-points, the whole world and all its societies (except the ones that close themselves) seem to be attractive research pastures. Research on any and every aspect of the lives of less developed peo-

ples, (liberally financed by official and non-official agencies) is justified partly as the movement of new frontiers of human knowledge in the world as a whole, and partly as an operational necessity for designing and implementing efficient development programmes.

Invading the Privacy

But, it cannot be overemphasised that the peoples of less developed countries cannot and do not see research on them by foreigners in this simple-sounding way. They see themselves in the research process as 'objects' and guinea pigs for the testing of hypotheses. And, this produces a violent feeling of humiliation whether the researchers are aware of it or not. The citizen of a less developed country, already imbued with a feeling of inferiority to the westerner who ruled over him, is again prevented from having an individuality, a feeling of being a self-respecting 'subject' rather than an object, when western researchers invade his privacy in the name of research. Many of the publications based on empirical research about the peoples of less developed countries contain a measure of pity, contempt, criticism and/or advice about the life of these peoples and its improvement.

Whatever be the additions to knowledge that these publications represent, one effect that they do have is to hurt grievously the pride of the ruling elites. The weak-minded among them sink deeper into a morass of diffidence about their capacity to solve the innumerable problems of their societies. The strong ones react with increased indignation against the West. I doubt if these consequences of research by foreigners have been adequately appreciated.

In view of the many negative consequences of such research it is essential that it should be reduced to the minimum. The limited data that needs to be collected for mounting effective programmes should be collected, interpreted and used by trained local intellectuals.

It should be appreciated that the particular variety of empirical

social research which is the fashion in the U.S. today is a unique cultural product. It is not something neutral in its psycho-valuational effects. Its results enter the dynamics of change in any society as much as other objective variables. It is possible that on balance its contribution to growth is positive in the peculiar milieu of American society. But for other societies and peoples the developmental effects of American research may be very deleterious; and it must not be automatically assumed that these societies must remain open books for foreigners to research on.

We cannot lose sight of the fact that the Russian and Chinese societies and peoples lost nothing either in self-respect, or world-respect or even their rate of growth by closing themselves against foreign social science researchers. On the other hand, a society like India, kept open to foreign researchers, is continuously exposed to ridicule on the basis of the results of social science research. And it is possible that if certain kinds of social science research by foreigners is not restricted, Indian society may eventually close itself more thoroughly.

The upshot of the whole preceding reasoning is that as a means of knowledge transfer student education is preferable to technical assistance; that technical assistance programmes should be designed only to meet special needs. The programmes have thus to be limited in their duration, in their coverage and in the number of personnel involved. With regard to coverage they should be concerned mainly with the fields of physical science and technology.

Methods of Operation

The question now is: how best can such limited technical assistance programmes be operated? Should they be bilateral or multi-lateral (United Nations) programmes? What can be the role of young career professionals in such programmes?

There are well-known reasons why developing countries general-

ly prefer multilateral programmes to bilateral programmes. But since all technical assistance programmes cannot be effectively internationalised it is desirable that aid receiving countries should have access to both kinds of programmes.⁵

If programmes are limited in their scope and duration there is no room for establishing careers in technical assistance. There is much to be said for the British practice, and the practice of some U.S. and U.N. agencies, of borrowing personnel from established institutions where they have settled careers and fielding them abroad for short periods. This practice eliminates career anxieties of technical assistance personnel; and re-entry problems do not arise.

Unacceptable Assumption

The proposal to professionalise technical assistance is based on the assumption that a sufficient number of the nationals of developing countries cannot be trained even over a considerable period of time to dispense with assistance. From the point of view of the developing countries, this assumption cannot be accepted. These countries must aim at dispensing with technical assistance in the shortest possible time. Therefore, it is important for them to have their nationals trained as soon as possible; and to invite foreign personnel only to fill transitional gaps in manpower requirements.

On this view, it is unnecessary to professionalise technical assistance. Generalists associated with technical assistance programmes need only be good administrators. Other required personnel are mainly physical technologists. As an incentive for the latter to work abroad, it is necessary that in the rating of professional progress, work abroad should be assigned a high positive value. For, apart from getting adequate economic reward, competent personnel should feel that their prestige and prospects in the eyes of their co-professionals will not be adversely affected by work abroad—as

is now the case in some academic disciplines.

Competence

The age of technical personnel does not seem to me to be a factor of importance. The important factor is technical competence, and ability to aid the nationals of developing countries in solving particularly difficult problems, or setting up new plants or facilities. There is little evidence to show that in this competence any particular age group has a systematic comparative advantage. Perhaps preference for younger persons is indicated on the ground that they are more adaptable to alien milieus than older ones. But, in the context of the kinds of programmes advocated here, no special adaptability is required except the capacity to train and work with students and fellow professionals of the developing countries.

It has been suggested that technical assistance personnel may work on a large scale not in an advisory capacity but in an *operational* capacity, as in the Peace Corps programmes. And, for working in this capacity younger people have an advantage. But, again, sending large numbers of people to man development activities may retard the growth of trained local manpower. And, in labour surplus countries in some professions (such as teaching or nursing or social work) the entry of foreign personnel in an operational capacity may arouse the fear that these personnel work in jobs which would otherwise go to local people.

Attempts to expand and professionalise technical assistance programmes rest on assumptions which are questionable and may bring unpleasant surprises. The greatest contribution that the advanced West can make to the development of less developed countries is to persuade each of them to do comprehensive manpower planning as a part of development planning and to transmit to their peoples the knowledge that they need. Western personnel should only fill temporary gaps in trained local manpower.

5. Cf. Higgins, op. cit., p. 162-163; Montgomery, op. cit., p. 187-192.

The cure

SAILEN GHOSH

WHEN a country with an ancient tradition of exporting intellect has to feel alarmed at the present rate of the 'brain drain', one can be sure that a deep malaise is working within, drying up the springs which produce and nurture the intellect. For about two thousand years, from 500 B.C. to the thirteenth century, numerous Indian scholars, architects and sculptors spent years of their active lives, and even settled, not only in China, Tibet, Iran, Iraq, Syria but also in Japan, Java, Kambuja, Sumatra, Bali, Borneo and Malaya, and some of them even went as far as Europe and Africa: yet, nobody considered it a brain drain. It was regarded as 'cultural ambassadorship,' propagation of Indian philosophy and mathematics, astronomy and medical sciences and architecture.

Why, then, should we be worried now that several thousand Indian scientists and engineers and doctors are working abroad and some of them do not seem

eager to return home? It is because the founts of life which could ever-renew, ever-reinforce the supply of brain at home have not been very active. Moreover, the Indian society of today hardly provides anything of which an Indian abroad will be proud or which will make him eager to return home.

The solution to the problem, therefore, is not to persuade the brain to return but to increase the attractiveness of the home. It is the normal instinct of human beings to return to the country of their birth. It is only when the atmosphere at home is not congenial or is different from what they have come to expect after their naturalisation to the working conditions abroad, that the disruption of the normal process is painfully felt.

The cry of 'brain drain' is thus the anguished cry of Indians who are willing to return but find the conditions unsuitable. They have

a lot of genuine complaints about the repulsiveness of the working conditions at home. At the same time, a not inconsiderable section, which has just acquired some foreign degrees without imbibing the spirit of research, claims a place on a high pedestal, inviting a derisive reply that 'all that has gone abroad is not brain.' The intertwining of these factors makes the problem complex.

The Reasons

Let us first see *how* and *why* a large number of students—good, bad and indifferent—go abroad, and whether the country should not have some policy regarding the foreign studies of our nationals.

The late celebrated Professor J. B. S. Haldane, in an illuminating article, hit the nail right on the head when he said:

'Every year hundreds of Indian students go abroad to return as Doctors of Philosophy. I am absolutely opposed to this practice, and regard a foreign degree as a point against any one who wishes to work with me. But I am aware that such degrees are a help in obtaining posts in universities and elsewhere in India. In the three universities where I worked in England, namely Oxford, Cambridge and London, we were sufficiently aware of ourselves to ignore degrees. Men and women were chosen for academic posts mainly on their published work and their record as teachers. It was unusual, though not unique, to get a series of professorships, as I did, without any scientific degree at all.'

'It is quite common to take a degree in one science and do teaching and research in another. I hope to see this common in India also. One reason why Indian graduate students wish to go abroad is a simple one. They are systematically humiliated by the administrative staff of many institutions, and sometimes by professors, in a manner which is not tolerated in Western Europe or the United States...'

'The students who should go abroad are those who will benefit

most from foreign study. These are young men and women who have done research in India which had brought them some international recognition. They know enough to know their own ignorance; they know where they can learn what they need for their further work, and they are in a position to be welcomed by the leaders of research in their own fields abroad. Perhaps they want to study forest tree breeding with Gustafsson in Stockholm, the formation of bacterial enzymes with Monod in Paris, or invertebrate embryology with Ivanov in Leningrad. They have done enough to find no difficulty in securing a place under one of these masters...'

'Those who actually go are often unfitted for research, however well they may have done in examinations, and neither learn how to do original research, nor are a good advertisement for their country.' (Emphasis added).

Demeaning Craze

No country of India's standard of achievement would ever encourage this demeaning craze for foreign degrees, this utterly debased attitude of inferiority and expression of no-confidence in one's own nationals. An Indian professor of bio-chemistry relates a story which is extremely interesting. While in the U.S.A., he casually asked a Japanese student, 'What are you doing here? Doing your Ph.D?' The Japanese student felt so humiliated that he lost speech for a minute. When he regained his composure, he retorted 'Why? Don't we have universities in Japan?' The questioner had asked many Indians the same question but had never found any such adverse reaction.

The Japanese send only their advanced students abroad, not to lose their time in doing theses for Ph.Ds which they can do at home, but to learn how the world's top scientists do their research, how from abstract hypotheses they deduce concrete questions to subject them to laboratory tests. They seek initiation into the *spirit* and *rhythm* of research. If India accepts the same principle, one

aspect of the problem will be solved.¹

Psychology of Inferiority

But the psychology of inferiority goes very deep. It will perhaps be only a very slight overstatement that this country does not honour its best brains until they win recognition from foreigners. And we are contemptuous of our own people. How corrosive its influence and repulsive its impact can be is revealed by a story from the life of Rabindra Nath Tagore, published a few months back in a Bengali Weekly, the *Desh*. A deeply wounded poet was unburdening himself before his colleagues in Santiniketan: he wanted to leave this country and settle abroad. His listeners were also dumbfounded: the tragedy was too deep for words. At last Acharya Nandalal Bose mustered courage to ask, 'what will then, happen to your poem *I am thankful that I have been born in this country?*' The poet fell into a deep silence. After some days he returned to the theme, and to forestall any question, feelingly said that he, with his own hands, would strike off the lines before leaving!

Decades have passed since then. But the lack of confidence in our capacity for judgment has not improved much. The practice of appointing teachers and filling posts 'on recommendations' has added its quota to the undermining of confidence. An atmosphere of spiteful gossip against the colleague has now spread even to the university campus, rendering single-minded devotion to work pretty difficult, particularly for the sensitive intellectual. Suppression of the intellect is at work in all walks of life—in the administration, in the industrial establishments and in the science laboratories. Is there any wonder

1. It is certainly much better, to secure, when required, the services of eminent scientists and technologists for the training of other students in our surroundings, than to send them in large numbers abroad. It is sad to reflect that in the post-war period and during the early years of our freedom, many German and American scientists who wanted to come to India later found the red-tape (and a host of other unfavourable factors) too strong.

that there is a *continuing* brain drain? Is it also a matter for surprise that the intellect should grow at a much slower rate than its potential would indicate?

The situation has become so serious that we cannot leave the problem at this level of description of the reasons. We must find out the roots of even these reasons. This author's quest has led him to the firm conclusion that their root causes lie in (i) the non-working of nationalist motivation in our society; (ii) the lack of a proper attitude to work, which is the result of a debasement of the religious teaching; and (iii) the total absence of incentives, whether monetary or non-monetary. Naturally, this diagnosis indicates the cure.

Healthy Nationalism

We are a people mortally afraid of ethnocentrism and degeneration into national chauvinism. Undoubtedly, these are our sound instincts. But we have given very little importance to our requirement of a healthy nationalism after the attainment of freedom. Tagore, to whose agonies we have referred earlier, was in fact a victim of his own, as also his predecessor's, one-sided emphasis on preventing ethnocentrism, to the relative neglect of the *essential* and vital force of motivated nationalism as a part of our 'one-world' consciousness. This is a nationalism which is a necessary condition for, far from being antithetical to, universalism; without this nationalism², cosmopolitanism is reduced to an airy existence.

Since nationalism, by its abuse in some countries, has come to acquire a particular ring—'my country, right or wrong'—the Indian mind, steeped in internationalism, has sought to bypass it. But nationalism, which is not based on a 'superior race' theory or on hatred for the other nation, is none else than the recognition of the purpose for which a nation

lives, and which is to be its driving force. Even at a time when 'one world' is within the realm of possibility, there will be, and has to be, a hierarchy of organisations.

In the same manner as the full flowering of the individual's potential is necessary for the growth of the collective, the fulfilment of purpose of individual nations is necessary for bringing out the best in mankind. In the same manner as a group works best when each individual is imbued with *quiet* confidence and *inspired* dynamism, and humility to learn from others coupled with an in-offensive pride in oneself, the comity of nations, too, can be best productive when each of its constituents has best understood the purpose of its national existence and *lives* in that consciousness.

Needless to say, the sense of national self-respect which we lack to a great extent, will have been fully developed when we have set the goal for our national existence. Since we are the people most concerned with universalism, it is our privilege to demonstrate how it can be blended with nationalism which can be an inspiration, as distinct from chauvinism, bigotry or fanaticism.

In the absence of this nationalism the motivation of our men and women, our most precious resource, is bound to remain undeveloped. The development of our finest capital goes by default when the drive for securing money capital and capital goods overrides other considerations. The brain drain and inadequate replenishment are its inevitable result.

Motivation

A nation that seeks to pull itself up by its bootstraps must have a nationalism to spur it to action, stir it to its depths, and challenge its creativity. To run away from a recognition of this obvious need is to refuse to stop the drift.

Anybody who has watched the children born in our society must have been amazed at the level of intelligence they show. It is this which feeds the hope that the population explosion, in spite of all its evils, will lead to an 'ex-

plosion of human intelligence'. But when these children are in the school stage, the hopes recede. It is not that their intelligence has suffered erosion by that time. A sense of purposelessness has seized them. A motivated child, with a sense of purpose before it, learns quickest and the best. A teacher inspired by the ideal of building a glorious India, can teach best and rouse the interest of the children in the subjects he teaches. A motivated Acharya P. C. Roy could inspire a generation of students and produce a Satyen Bose, a Meghnad Saha and one Nilratan Dhar. A Benimadhab Das could motivate one Subhash Bose.

We must restore the motivation of nationalism in our society to solve the problem of intellect at all levels, from the young students to the mature scientists and engineers, so that nobody can rest happy in living abroad without contributing his best to the country of his birth, and none can behave in a manner which repels another who has his contribution to make to the nation. Without this urge within, none can check the rot.

Attitude to Work

Next comes the attitude to work. That work, thorough and honest work, can be its own reward is not at all recognised in our society. Not unoften, in answer to a plea for a little more thoroughness, one can hear the argument 'what difference does it make?' And its root can easily be traced: we have never accepted work for its own sake. Hindu philosophy taught that this world is unreal—this was a relative statement in the sense that it is changeable—and that *moksha* is the goal and one has to transcend the limits of action and the stages of *tama*, *raja*, and *sattwa* to reach heavenly bliss. Its inner content was that one has to progress through successive stages of *work* constantly elevating oneself. But our people have come to expect the heavenly bliss at one leap! Since 'double promotion is impossible in religious life'—these are the words of Swami Vivekananda—the result has been the same as when a person wants

2. We are calling it 'nationalism' advisedly because 'patriotism' is not expressive enough. Patriotism becomes a potent force only when some alien power is ruling directly or when the country is under invasion.

to climb a ten-storeyed building at a leap without taking the trouble of moving up the stairs.

Test of Spirituality

Our limping religious life does not seek after truth in every confrontation with the harshness of the material world: we find refuge in quiescence, in an 'other-worldliness'. We have forgotten that there is a material content to spirituality. A person whose spiritual energy is roused can dive to the depths of the ocean to find wealth for his fellow-men, launch on an uncharted voyage into space to unravel mysteries of nature for the benefit of mankind, live in the Arctic zone and risk all perils. These are the tests of spirituality in the world.

Unfortunately, we are living in a society where these teachings have been debauched and degraded and the values have been turned upside down. The doctrine of transmigration of soul was conceived to inspire defiance of death for the sake of truth. This has been perverted to mean that everything has been ordained on the basis of the *karma* of the previous birth. The law of *karma* which was conceived as a true charter of freedom has been made to promote *nishkarma* (inaction in the present context, indifferent action), and imply pre-determination by an outer power.

One might wonder what relation this has with the brain drain or the development of the intellect. Since the attitude to life and to work has an all-encompassing influence, it determines the growth in every aspect—brain development, thoroughness in study and research, and the passionate quality which fertilises the field of ideation. The crisis is total. It includes social, economic, political, intellectual, spiritual crisis. In different periods of history, such crises have been resolved by the emergence of a new religion which calls forth the deepest emotions in man, integrates the head with the heart which had pulled in different directions, and the individual with the society. In the present-day world, only a new re-

ligion, the real religion of man, religion with a capital R—which sweeps away the accretions of ages and the 'putrid wastes of the past' to release a tremendous force of the spirit and usher in the 'full exercise of faculty, the play of life, the pleasure of mind'—can provide the solution to this waste of man.

Fortunately, in India the idea is widespread that in times of crises godliness descends in man—this is the real meaning of *Avatara*. There need not be any one avatar now. The stirrings of a new urge have already become evident.

Incentives

To come back to the point about incentives. We have shown that the non-monetary incentive (motivation) of nationalism or the urge to find satisfaction in good, honest work does not work in our society. We shall presently see that the monetary incentive, which can spur the development of human capacities to a certain extent, also is not allowed to work. An employee here knows that whatever hard work and good work he may put in, he is not going to be promoted: he has to wait for his due time to arrive. He also knows that in a huge administrative set-up, his inefficient work is also not going to get his dismissal: the unions will protect him.

We have developed a system of cadres which provokes a parody of the famous Mukundalal Das's poem composed during the British regime. He had said, 'when I die this time, I would like to be an *Angrez* (Englishman)'. Now our people wish that in their next birth, they will be enlisted in the cadres. For, once you are a cadre, you need not keep abreast of the developments, you need not be dedicated, you can even be fossilized; promotion is automatically assured.

Meanwhile, this new caste system, by its reservation of top posts for men of particular cadres, depresses the motivation of others who now know that however efficient their performance, they can never get to the top. Naturally, this denial of opportunities induces

the brain drain. (The advantage of a cadre system, i.e., specialisation, could be obtained without inviting other disadvantages if some amount of insecurity as well as an effective efficiency audit could be introduced and if it were left open to all meritorious people to reach the top).

In our economy which attempts centralised and target-oriented planning and does not consciously plan for introducing competition, the top civil service or the industrial management has no need to bother overmuch about giving talent a fair deal. Talent, therefore, gets suppressed all along the line; the tone set from above percolates to the lower levels; Gresham's law (the bad coin driving the good coin) comes into operation in every nook and corner of the society. With the dissipation of this, the most vital force of social development, the debilitating effect on the nation's physical and mental health is becoming permanent. The non-emergence of enough technical brain is obviously the result of this system of planning. Moreover, when we talk of brain drain we must remember that it does not make much difference if the brain is drained or remains at home to be rusted or suppressed and driven underground.

Science Policy

The inadequate growth of scientific brain-power and its flight is also traceable to the Science Policy of the country. The CSIR has recently brought out a pamphlet, *Flight of Scientific and Technical Personnel*, which lists most of the causes of the flight but does not assess the CSIR's own contribution to this flight. The science policy which the CSIR's Director General is advocating and which the Ramaswami Mudaliar Committee had recommended, cannot but lead to a flight. The CSIR has evolved an ingenious plea that the growth of science does not necessarily make a country economically strong but the growth of technology does. Therefore, after apologetically sneaking in a sentence that while it does not underestimate the importance of fundamen-

tal research, it would like the national laboratories to be oriented to *applied* research. This division into fundamental and *applied* scientists is wholly unscientific and it tends to degenerate into mere adaptation technology.³ This policy can only produce some third-rate or fourth-grade scientists and 'adaptation engineers'. Moreover, since applied research is not simply instrumentation but involves understanding of the fundamentals it is natural that without stress on the pursuit of the fundamental, we can never be independent even in the applied field in the same manner as stress on the fruit-oriented culturing of the tree to the neglect of the root, does not yield the fruits.

The CSIR pamphlet itself quotes a leading science journal, *Science*, which says: 'A current fallacy is that "brains go where money is". In fact, brains go where the brains are. Brains go where there is a challenge. Brains go where brains are valued for intellectual as well as practical achievements'. Now if brains go where brains are, how can you retain them by holding out the prospect that they can only hope to be some pigmy scientists and adaptation engineers here in India?

Firing the Imagination

In the India of old, Nalanda and Taxila used to attract students from abroad. In recent times, the young, brilliant, ambitious scientists sought opportunities for work with the Oppenheimers and Niels Bohrs and Haldanes. In order to challenge the creativity of our scientists we have to fire their imagination. We have to tell

them that a country like Britain, with a population less than one-tenth of our own, has produced 44 Nobel Prize winners. We must produce ten times the number of 'inner ring scientists'. Since the speculative mind which gives rise to brilliant discoveries is present in abundant measure in our country, it should be our privilege to produce the world's larger concentration of scientists in India. For that, we can go abroad, learn from others but must keep the country's purpose in view. When science flourishes, technology also will flourish.

Fertile Anarchy

There are times in history when, to use Arthur Koestler's beautiful expression, a crisis proves to be 'a period of fertile anarchy in which rival theories proliferate—until the new synthesis is achieved and the cycle starts again; but this time perhaps aiming at a different direction, along different parameters, asking a different kind of question'. India can yet prove to be a fertile anarchy, as she did several times in the dim past, if we all apply our mind unfettered by dogmas to bring about a new synthesis.

The split personality appeared to Koestler as both the glory and the predicament of the trade (science). 'Its glory, because at best it combines flights of imagination with meticulous respect for fact; having one's head in the clouds and one's feet solidly planted in the mud. Its predicament, because either face can also turn into an ugly grimace—that of the obsessive crank's or of blinkered orthodoxy.'⁴

India today abounds in the split personality. Let us hope that in the 'trade' of nation-building and intellect development, it will prove to be our glory. The production of more and better brains and a twentieth century Indian renaissance is the cure for the brain drain.

3. It is interesting to note how the switch to this disproportionate stress on technology and unscientific division of 'fundamental scientists' and 'applied scientists' took place. It is said that the scientists in the laboratories that were expected to develop new knowledge, were only 'producing papers to their own interest'. The problem could be solved, as Prof. J. D. Bernal and Sir Lindor Brown suggested, by urging restraint on the scientist, who should publish the result of his work once and once only, and not let the rehash of the original paper to appear anywhere a second time. Instead, CSIR wants virtually to throw away the baby along with the bath-water.

4. Quoted from 'Criteria of Creativity'—an address by Arthur Koestler delivered before the Cambridge meeting of the British Association for the Advancement of Science, 1965, and reproduced by *Science and Culture*, Calcutta, of October, 1966.

Books

SCIENTIFIC MANPOWER IN EUROPE By Edward McCrensky.
Pergamon Press, London, 1958 pp. 188.

SCIENTIFIC MANPOWER FROM ABROAD,
National Science Foundation,
US Government Printing Office, 1962.

There has been a phenomenal increase in the number of scientists and engineers employed by governments of all complexions in recent years. This has been partly due to the adoption of the concept of a welfare State and a socialist pattern of society by many nations, and partly due to the race of armaments and scientific and space explorations in which many countries of the world indulged after World War II. The scientific and technological advances which have led to the emergence of new and specialised fields have been at such a terrific pace that even the most advanced countries have at times found it difficult to spot and retain the best of the talents in public services, particularly when the domestic educational institutions produced an insufficient number of qualified personnel. In many countries, the governments have to compete with the private employers whose flexibility of approach to management problems sometimes give the latter a slight edge in retaining the best persons available within or outside the country.

The shortage of competent scientists and engineers for public services is not only acutely felt in the developing countries, but this problem is faced much more severely by the advanced nations because of the tremendous pressure of their economy on the requirement of specialists and also because of the race for status-conflict in which they find themselves involved. The availability of better opportunities for advancement and better working environments have prompted competent professional scientists not only in Asia but also in Europe to migrate to foreign lands resulting in a considerable brain-drain. An international team investigating the emigration of scientists and the 'technical gap' for the Organization of Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) has recently concluded that the brain drain of trained scientists from Britain to the United States is at

least as severe now as it was at any time and probably worse. It has further stated that not only is there one technological gap and one brain-drain, but a pattern of complicated movements in many directions. There are movements to and fro within Europe, across the Atlantic and back again. The movement of highly trained people from Britain to America still remains the outstanding example of a continuous brain drain. The factors leading to this tendency, therefore, need to be analysed in a systematic way.

The two publications under review deal with the timely and significant problem of attracting and holding scientific manpower in public services. In his book on *Scientific Manpower in Europe*, Edward McCrensky has undertaken a comparative study of scientific manpower in the public services of Great Britain and selected European countries, e.g., Norway, the Netherlands, Sweden, Germany and France. The principal theme of the study is concerned with the role of management of scientists in government and in that direction it attempts to furnish meaningful information and concepts on the better management and use of scientists primarily in public service. The second publication in the shape of a report prepared by David Greenwood of the National Science Foundation of the United States attempts to investigate the contribution made to the scientific manpower pool in the United States by foreign-born and foreign trained scientists and engineers. In a way this report is related to the first publication in as much as it gives a statistical account of the extent of US indebtedness to the scientists and engineers of foreign origin who have for some time past constituted a significant proportion of its scientific manpower pool.

In his study, McCrensky has rightly proceeded on the assumption that seeing the scientist in his true perspective requires more than an understanding of the internal programmes and policies of governmental personnel management. A scientist's case differs from the case of a civilian employee as he cannot be entirely detached from his education and training prior to employment or from the setting in which

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The Memorial Fund, held in trust by a board headed by Dr. Zakir Husain, Vice-President of India, will be used to promote activities which were dear to Jawaharlal Nehru. Apart from the Library of Modern India, to be established at Teen Murti House, an academy of advanced studies is being planned and also model Bal Bhavans throughout the country.

DONATE GENEROUSLY

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research administration is accomplished within his country to work in a purely bureaucratic framework. He, therefore, needs to be treated differently to the civil servants.

In the first chapter of his book, the author thus deals with a general description of the special relationship of the scientist to the government, his career outlook and environment and discusses guidelines of a sounder foundation for an attractive personnel system for scientific manpower. In the second chapter, the author has attempted to present a comparative analysis of the practices for attracting and holding scientists in a number of European countries. This chapter dealing with the different philosophies and personnel systems also touches upon the methods of recruitment of scientists in these countries. Analysing comparatively the practices in different countries, McCrensky has generalized various principles, which undoubtedly help meet the pre-eminent need of the public services for an optimum professionalization of the personnel administration of scientists.

In his third chapter concerning the compensation plan for scientific and professional public service, the author has amongst other things advocated a sufficient flexibility for establishing salaries for scientists and engineers by the actual separation of government scientific activities from the civil service system as well as the need for the establishment of an efficient and reliable administrative apparatus which will gather and evaluate current information on the prevailing salaries for comparable positions outside the government. These suggestions are very much relevant in the modern context where the economic factor is more often most predominantly responsible for the flight of technical personnel from their homeland. In a subsequent chapter the author has made another commendable recommendation that the development of better communications of ideas between the heads of government departments and scientific personnel may result in an exchange of ideas and improvements of the work environment that will best serve the interests of management.

In the two succeeding chapters, the author has attempted to give a comparative account of the higher education of engineers and the organization for research in the countries concerned. The study concludes with an evaluation of important aspects of management of scientists and engineers in the continental countries along with comparisons made to the management practices operating in the United States and the USSR. In his conclusion, the author has made a very significant observation that 'a wide gap uniformly appears to exist between the identification and full knowledge of major problems in better management of scientists in the public service especially the civil services, and the initiation of the action programme required to modify or eliminate such problems. The sense of urgency felt by scientists for needed innovation does not seem to get communicated dramatically and fully toward those

holding the key legislative and managerial positions.' This is indeed the core problem.

McCrensky has taken great pains to collect the material for his study through personal contacts, observations and through the study and evaluation of existing literature. The study is mainly descriptive and analytical, confined only to some significant aspects of management of scientific and professional civil services. The author has perhaps deliberately refrained from making a critical evaluation of the management practices, presumably because it is not possible to do so without going into details about the political, social and economic set-up of the countries concerned. The appendices, however, contain some useful information for those who wish to study the problem further. The author on the whole has been successful in his purpose of creating an increasing awareness concerning concepts or methods to improve the management of scientists and engineers in the public services. Yet, the book lacks in the treatment of a very significant and acute problem of the emigration of scientists and technical personnel to the more affluent societies. The author has not attempted to analyse the socio-economic and political causes of this tendency, which has apparently benefitted the other societies where more favourable environments for work exist.

Paradoxically enough, even in these societies the shortage of trained professional and scientific manpower is often felt for which McCrensky does not attempt to give any explanation. The study would have been more useful if it had dealt with this aspect also. Clearly, the reasons for such brain drain lie deeper than merely in the 'unsound personnel management' and are located elsewhere in the whole penumbra of social, economic and political activities of a nation.

The USA has been one of the countries which has largely benefitted by the immigration of foreign nationals from other countries. The report (second publication under review) put out by the National Science Foundation (NSF) gives a detailed account and a statistical analysis of the immigration of scientists and engineers in the United States during the years 1919-61. It has been estimated by the NSF that between these years about 10 per cent of the American scientific manpower pool consisted of immigrant scientists. The percentage of foreign-born scientists in the National Academy of Sciences was 17.3 per cent; while among the US Nobel Prize winners in physics and chemistry, the percentage of immigrant scientists was 37.5 per cent.

The report besides containing various tables showing the statistics with regard to scientists and engineers admitted in the USA as immigrant and displaced persons, also contains tables showing the break-down of the number of foreign-born scientists and engineers serving in the USA according to their professions, occupations, qualifications and countries of origin. The statistical information furnished in the report is very useful from the point of view of

analysing the basic needs of the nations' scientific manpower, and also to know the impact of the high percentage of immigration of scientists and engineers on the persons of local origin. The need of scientists in the USA is so great that its domestic institutions of higher education do not yet provide the country's needed annual aggregate of scientists, and it is reasonable to assume that the American scientific community could continue to absorb foreign scientists at approximately their present rate of entry for some time to come. Thus, the report emphatically stresses that there is no evidence that due to such a large influx of foreign personnel, the native scientists have been placed at any great disadvantage by their presence.

Although none of the above publications directly deal with the problem of the brain-drain of scientists and technicians, nor do they attempt to analyse the various factors for such a phenomenon, yet in a way they are indirectly concerned with this problem. The publications would be found useful for all those who are interested to improve the concepts and techniques of management of scientific manpower in public services. A comparative account of such practices in advanced countries of varying degrees should be of considerable help to the emerging nations who are strangely enough themselves the victims of a brain drain, yet are always looking for specialists and technicians abroad for their domestic requirements.

The case in point is in relation to India. The experiment of the 'Scientists' Pool' in this country has instead of checking this tendency brought enough of frustration and disillusionment to the scores of scientists returning home in their zeal and enthusiasm to serve their motherland. What is perhaps required to improve the situation here is a thorough-going, systematic enquiry into the causes and factors leading to such demoralisation and a vigorous and realistic 'management plan' to check this tendency effectively.

R. B. Jain

INDIAN STUDENTS IN BRITAIN By A. K. Singh.
Asia Publishing House, pp. 208.

INDIAN IMMIGRANTS IN BRITAIN By R. Desai.
Oxford University Press, pp. 154.

Centuries ago, eminent scholars from distant countries came to India, driven by their thirst for knowledge. Today, the positions are reversed. Indian students find themselves abroad, driven to gain a place of vantage in the rat race. There is also a small minority who go abroad for advanced study in their own special fields. Some stay on and make their own contribution to their chosen field. But they are lost to their own country and have become emigrants. There are also other emigrants who have gone to test their fortune abroad, because hard luck and adverse family circumstances made it impossible for them to remain in the home country. The differing, yet in some ways similar, problems facing both Indian students and Indian immigrants in

Britain, are sought to be studied in the two books under review.

The two books, however, have one thing in common—touching only the surface of the problem and remaining there for good. The one on Indian students, in addition to being repetitive, strays into other fields without bringing out their relevance to the main topic. Dr. Rashmi Desai's book on Indian immigrants, which could have been a real contribution if it had dealt with explosive problems like race relations and the socio-economic basis of British society, concerns itself only with innocuous topics like mutual help and the rise and fall of a community leader.

Professor Shils' foreword to Dr. A. K. Singh's book on Indian students in Britain is itself a fine example of the indulgently conniving attitude which foreign university professors often assume towards their Indian or non-British students. Professor Shils discusses the shortcomings of Indian universities and remarks that 'too much of the Indian "human capital" formed by expensive foreign training fails to be as productive as it might have been if it had remained abroad.' Professor Shils adds, 'Dr. Singh's first enquiry...is of course only a sortie into a very vital territory. He covers only a part of the larger problem...'

The part that Dr. Singh deals with is the reasons why Indian students prefer British to other foreign universities, their difficulties on arrival, and their adjustment problems. Dr. Singh's sample consisted of 400 Indian students studying the arts, sciences, medicine, engineering and technology at Oxford, Cambridge, London, Manchester and Leeds. The reasons they gave for coming to England were three-fold. The first was the 'advanced educational system' in England, the second, the prestige of British universities and the third, that British degrees were given preference over degrees from Indian or other foreign universities. The third was probably the most important reason, although with changing times it doesn't hold good any more. The first two never did, although in a former British colony like India, educated people did know English, and Indian students in Britain would not be confronted with classes in a completely unknown tongue.

Among the difficulties which confront the Indian student in England are his 'adjustment' problems, which again, depend on 'cultural factors,' his country's status and 'changes in attitudes' which means becoming conscious of one's own nationality in a foreign country. One would think that a survey of 400 Indian students in England would provide Dr. Singh with enough information and to spare on the subject, but his examples are of Japanese and Swedish students in America. When it comes to showing how the national status of the students also plays its part in increasing or reducing the students' difficulties, he gives examples of Indian students in Britain in 1907 and from 1921 to 1922. The inclusion of this earlier period, when we were a subject nation, would make an interesting comparative study if

brought up to date. But Dr. Singh does not follow it up.

There is also a reference to Germans visiting America after the war—Dr. Singh does not say which war. Nor does he show the relevance of defeated Germans in America to students of a free India in Britain. It is all very well to point out the defects in the research done so far on his topic, but if such studies have 'ignored the role of socio-cultural and personal factors of the students in the adjustments and attitudes,' it is for Dr. Singh to supply these factors and not get lost in superficialities like food and Anglicised families.

If an Englishman—and the story is told by Dr. Singh—could get an Indian student to tell him that he had never been to an English home during his six-month stay, and that his personal experience of England was limited to classes, the library and walks, surely a fellow Indian like Dr. A. K. Singh could have found out more, and could see and help to explain how racial prejudices operate in England. For instance, it is very difficult for an Indian student to find a job, if need be to keep him going while he studies. These difficulties, though real, are treated very casually by Dr. Singh. Nor does he make a thorough study of the humiliations Indian students have to suffer to find a suitable place to stay, another instance where race relations show up in their true colour.

Perhaps, to make his book more comprehensive, Dr. A. K. Singh also gives a history of western education—by which, no doubt he means the modern system of education—in India. Why he qualifies it as 'western' is difficult to say. Dialogues between teacher and pupil were the norm in ancient societies, whether in China, or India in the East or Greece in the West. And how or why the *Upanishads* and Nalanda found their way into this history of western education in India, only Dr. Singh can explain. Also the references to Jallianwalla Bagh and General Dyer's 'crawling order' sound more as though the author is struggling once again for India's freedom instead of studying Indian students in Britain.

All this, perhaps, is sought to be extenuated by calling his survey 'exploratory' and pleading handicaps like limited time and money. But both the limited time and money could have been better utilised by getting down to fundamentals—the basic problems in the lives of Indian students in Britain—instead of getting lost in detail.

Dr. Rashmi Desai's book on immigrants starts with the need for cheap labour to keep a capitalist economy going, but doesn't dwell on the historical perspective. After slave labour was abolished, industry has always been on the look out for the cheapest labour available in the market. In recent times, immigrants to England from former colonies were hard pressed enough to accept almost any terms which they were offered. Their choice of work was limited to jobs which the Britishers turned down.

So, from being exploited at home, they found themselves being exploited in England. Immigration laws applicable to Indians have been tightened up by successive governments, both Tory and Labour. Jobs open to Indians are being restricted, and quite often trade unions suspect—more wrongly than rightly—the Indian immigrants of causing a glut in the labour market.

Estimates of the immigrant Indian population in England vary. Dr. Rashmi Desai puts the figure at about 40,000, consisting of the older seamen immigrants, and the newer ones, better educated, neither having contact with the other. Dr. Desai also talks of their helping to man the National Health Service and going into business, generally with small beginnings. Most of the Indian immigrants, he says, are generally Gujarati or Punjabi, the men as a rule better educated than the women. The men dress the English way, but the women generally retain their Indian dress and jewellery.

Day to day problems like jobs, accommodation, and attitude to colour prejudice has made the Indians form themselves into 'a relatively closed system not unlike that found in villages of India'. It is colour prejudice and race hatreds that make them turn to each other for help and Dr. Desai shows how one Indian immigrant generally gets a job through another.

The author also discusses every problem affecting Indian immigrants separately—their homes, their occupations, their marriages and their leaders. The explosive aspect of the immigrants vis-a-vis their host country and the basic facts of the economic structure of the host country are not discussed in this book. Dr. Desai's study is safe where it could sting, mild where it could start a controversy, voluble only about trivialities like family quarrels. Anything really fundamental to Indian immigrants in their race relations, has been kept far away from these pages.

It is surprising that this scholar talks of a category of immigrants called Azad Kashmiris. One does not know where these exist except perhaps in Pakistani propaganda.

One remarkable thing is that, wherever Indians have emigrated, they seem to have wanted to eat their cake and have it too. On the one hand they were quite prepared to make good in the so-called host country, economically, professionally and even matrimonially. They may even have become citizens of the host country, yet they try to keep their identity as Indians intact, creating problems for the government of the host country as also the Government of India. In this ambivalent attitude lies both their strength and their weakness.

This ambivalence defeats the purpose of any enquiry or questionnaire and beats all sociological investigation. No investigation, questionnaire or enquiry can ever be made proof against the different situations and

attitudes of different individuals. So, statistical investigations, which can measure only numbers and quantities and not the qualities of the individuals, are bound to fail if not prove useless.

Kusum Madgavkar

MODERNISATION OF A TRADITIONAL SOCIETY

By Wilfred C. Smith.

Asia Publishing House, Bombay, 1965 (for the Indian Council of World Affairs).

This book is a collection of three lectures delivered by Professor Wilfred C. Smith under the auspices of the Indian Council of World Affairs in March 1964.

As the title indicates, the theme of these lectures has special relevance and interest for India inasmuch as India is a traditional society groping for modernisation as her leaders see it. And, indeed, the lectures were not only delivered in New Delhi but are primarily addressed to Indians—although their wide sweep and profound analysis should appeal equally to serious readers anywhere in the world.

The author begins by examining the meaning and content of the widely used (often rather abused) expression 'modern' and its various derivatives (especially 'modernisation' and 'modernity'), and by exposing the fallacy of some current misconceptions about these terms. Thus, he argues that modernisation is not synonymous with westernisation—a community may reject westernisation altogether and may yet be modern. Again, modern is not identical with recent or the latest in the chronological order. On this view, the author points out, Hindustan Standard cars should be deemed more modern than Cadillacs, scooters more modern than cars, and (we may add) *Sarvodaya* more modern than Socialism!

From a demolition of popular misconceptions, the author proceeds towards positive construction—to a definition of modern and modernisation. And, starting from the premise (which he considers self-evident) that knowledge—both theoretical and experimental—has grown steadily through the ages, he advances the view that this phenomenon has opened up vast new potentialities and alternatives before us. In this situation, modernity consists in making a deliberate choice in favour of one or more alternatives out of the available ones. In other words, as he puts it, modernisation represents deliberation as against an attitude of drift. It is immaterial whether an alternative A, B or C is chosen so long as a choice is made 'deliberately, self-consciously, responsibly, knowing that it is a fateful choice over against all the others' (p. 20). Again, 'To be modern ... means to live in the environment that *one's society* has deliberately chosen to construct (or to accept)' (p. 20, italicised).

Undoubtedly, this definition of modernity steers clear of the fallacies and inadequacies of the popular notions dismissed earlier. Nevertheless, it is open

to question on two grounds. First, one may question the author's basic assumption that knowledge has been growing all along the line. Probably knowledge has also been lost with the eclipse of different civilizations in the course of the vast historical cycle. In any case, what Professor Smith assumes to be self-evident does not seem to be evident enough, and needs proving.

Secondly, the element of deliberate choice in Professor Smith's definition of modernisation—and choice is central to his argument—leaves a serious gap and poses a problem both at the theoretical and practical levels. The question may be asked as to who should make the choice, and how? The author suggests (as in the italicised parts in the quotation above) that the choice is made by 'one's society'; and at another place, he refers to the special responsibility of democratic legislatures in this regard.

It follows that in the author's view the decisions of an elected legislature adequately represent the deliberate will of the society. Thus, he apparently attributes to the contemporary democratic processes a perfection which no serious student of politics would concede. Even in an ideal representative democracy—and the ideal hardly exists anywhere in practice—the decisions of a legislature represent at best the choice of a majority, and not the whole society, can be called modern. Suffice it to add that the problem is further complicated in non-democratic political systems.

Professor Smith consistently emphasises the role of the intellectuals in the process of modernisation, who should first comprehend the available potentialities and alternatives and then project them appropriately before the rest of the society so as to enable the latter to make its choice. Thus, intellectual comprehension and analysis is prior to materialisation. The intellectuals expound the general framework within which planning and implementation take place. But they do not take decisions themselves; these are for the government to take.

All the same, Professor Smith assigns a high place to the intellectuals in a modern society. Maybe this view of the intellectuals bears some resemblance to the role of the *Brahmana* in the fourfold order in Indian tradition. This is also somewhat reminiscent of Plato's plea for the philosopher's rule in his *Republic*, though, unlike Plato, Professor Smith does not burden his intellectuals with direct government. Indeed, he is reluctant to present a rounded system. And this may signify either strength or weakness, according to how one views the nature and function of theory.

Professor Smith assigns a significant, almost pivotal, role to the universities (presumably taking a university as the embodiment of intellectual leadership) in the process of modernisation. Thus, an important function of a university is to help clarify ideas through theoretical research. Hence, according-

to him, the most vital departments of a university are those engaged in fundamental, theoretical research. Compared to these, the faculties of technology, engineering and other applied disciplines are secondary and less relevant in the context of modernisation. This is an idea, coming as it does from a western thinker, which Indian educational planners need seriously ponder, so that some of the misplaced priorities in our educational planning and organisation may be reviewed and set right before it is too late.

He concludes by expounding the view that problems of prosperity and material well-being are not entirely or even primarily economic problems as the narrow 'expert' and the politician in a hurry are apt to imagine. These hinge on wider intellectual and moral factors, so that they should be conceptualized and studied thoroughly within the general framework of ideas before a decision is taken on how to achieve these objectives in a given situation.

This is, indeed, a highly significant and thought-provoking book; and it can be commended, among others, to scholars and statesmen alike. The Indian Council of World Affairs deserves to be congratulated for publishing, in these lectures, a work of enduring interest—a work which seriously grapples with some of the fundamental, timeless questions confronting mankind, and not just a tract on some passing problem of diplomacy and foreign affairs.

S. C. Gangal

THE INTELLECTUAL BETWEEN TRADITION AND MODERNITY: THE INDIAN SITUATION By Edward Shils.

Mouton & Co., The Hague, 1961: pages 120.

An important feature of the post-1945 world has been the concern of new nations for modernization. This is obviously the result of the achievement of independence by these nations. But since these nations are essentially traditional societies, the task of their modernization is not easy. Therefore, a study of the various aspects of this task provides an interesting field of inquiry.

Edward Shils, however, is not concerned with all the aspects. He concentrates only on the role of intellectuals in modernization. Shils does not come out with any rigorous analysis of the meaning of either 'intellectuals' or 'modernization'. He only states that intellectuals are the independent men of letters, the scientists, the scholars, the university teachers, the journalists, the highly educated administrators, the judges and the parliamentarians; and that modernization means industry, rational administration, applied science, and modern education. It is within the framework of these broad meanings that Shils examines the relationship between intellectuals and modernization. He deals with intellectuals in Asia and Africa in general and with those in India in particular. The focus of the general

treatment is on the common characteristics of intellectuals of all Afro-Asian countries.

Thus, Shils believes that intellectuals in all these countries aspire to modernity as it is understood in the West. For this, these intellectuals have to depend on the intellectual output coming from outside their own countries. But on the other hand, they also assert their claim to autonomy. The desire to promote modernity through the establishment of a national State has created a dilemma for the intellectuals of newly independent nations, inasmuch as they can neither forget their past traditions nor resist the temptation of wearing the modern western standards of living.

It is in the light of this general problem that Shils considers the situation of the Indian intellectual. Out of a total of six chapters, five are devoted to the Indian intellectual, one each dealing with the vocation, the economic condition, the culture, the civic life, and the institutional system of Indian intellectuals. Shils argues that India has been able to establish a modern intellectual class but not a modern intellectual tradition, that the economic condition of the Indian intellectual is deplorable, that the Indian intellectual is uprooted because he has lost contact with his country and culture and that he belongs neither to India nor to the West, that the Indian intellectual is not able to contribute to the civil life of his country, and that the Indian intellectual is not able to direct any well-reasoned argument into the minds of other intellectuals in his country.

Yet, Shils is certain that only intellectuals can fill the gap between tradition and modernity in India. He asserts that intellectuals must provide the administrative leadership and expertise. That the Indian intellectual is capable of performing the suggested role is what forms Shils' ardent hope. His hope is based mainly on the contention that the possession of the English language is a distinct advantage to the Indian intellectual. But, according to Shils, there may be two serious hindrances to the development of a modern intellectual tradition in India: the revival of Hindu nationalism and the politicization of the intellectual.

On the whole, the book makes interesting reading. It is thought-provoking. But the contents are not entirely in keeping with the title. For, the bulk of the book is devoted to a factual account of the various aspects of the existing situation in which the Indian intellectual finds himself. Even there, some of the statements are charged with a tone of exaggeration. In spite of that, the work provides sufficient ground for self-introspection by Indian intellectuals. However, the book under review is only a tentative report resulting from Shils' preliminary study of the position of Indian intellectuals and we are promised a larger book on the subject. In that book, we should hope Shils' treatment would be found more objective and comprehensive.

Mahendra Kumar

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Communications

Having read Seminar 86 (*Aid or Trade*) and 88 (*Students in Turmoil*) as the election results drift in, I wish to discuss some tangentially relevant general issues. Surrounded by weakening institutions several contributors feel despair; I share the feeling. Without suggesting that 'everything will turn out well in the end'—it may not, and quite likely it will not—may I reiterate the fact that the 'mess' in India belongs to a series: China, Indonesia, Nigeria, Ghana. As the memories of authoritarian colonial structures recede, i.e., as the people and their representatives take charge of these structures, difficulties grow. The wonder in India is not that there is a mess; the wonder is that it has taken so long in coming: several factors have helped—Nehru, the Civil Service, the Gandhian tradition, and, perhaps, above all the caste system have contributed to the Indian stability, permitted the political deals which turn out the rural vote, and provided the individual in times of acute stress with a sense of belongingness,—belonging to the kin and caste group.

Though the caste group has had psychologically and politically beneficial functions in India's recent social history, it has also exacted a heavy price. Everyone knows the story: M. N. Chitra's report (Seminar 88) on the caste affiliations in Mysore University politics is an authentic case in point. Now political, judicial, academic, and other twentieth century institutions have relatively low legitimacy in India (as elsewhere in Afro-Asia); i.e., when a government or a judge gives a decision, following the 'due process', interested parties feel free to question the decisions so that 'due processes', which in deeper-rooted systems confer legitimacy—the widely shared feeling of the outcome being binding—do not confer this legitimacy in the minds of the citizens. The Raja of Ramgarh can take decisions, and his subjects accept them as binding, without question; the Indian Prime Minister takes a decision—and the people start going on hunger strikes. Not that the Prime Minister is foolish and the Raja wise; only that the Raja's decision commands

a traditional legitimacy, the Prime Minister's commands much less of it. We have not yet learned to accept the legitimacy of due process as being binding; indeed, we have carried Gandhian civil disobedience to new heights. Therefore, when Chitra (p. 39) proposes 'an efficient machinery to settle student grievances expeditiously,' the question is not one of opening an office and appointing a man, but rather of creating conditions wherein the person in that role will be seen to be taking legitimate, binding decisions—even if these cause hardship to some or to everyone. Lacking such legitimacy, every problem escalates into the political arena, making it impossible for the political decision-makers to do the job they really ought to be paid to do: allocating the nation's resources today so that there will be a brighter tomorrow. (Needless to say, we have to operate on the assumption that those who are legitimately elected have such motivation, that the opposition keeps an eye on them, that they can be rejected at the next elections.)

If we do not accord to our institutions, our courts, our governments, and our Constitution the necessary sense of legitimacy, and if the court judges, the cabinet ministers, the vice-chancellors and the railway parcel clerk do not behave with the propriety that should go with our roles, there are strong reasons to believe that the democratic structure will not survive the imminent Union-State strains. Some people fear no changes; they have not recently visited, or read about China, Indonesia or Nigeria.

McGill University,
March 3, 1967.

SATISH SABERWAL

Few will question the state of the Indian Union, as it is presented (in the February issue of *Seminar*) by M. N. Srinivas. His analysis of the general *malaise* of the nation is notable for another reason. It solicits agreement from many a source within the articulate opinion in our country at present. This is particularly the case with the strictures that Srinivas passes on the role of Gandhi in the history of

modern India. Dealing with the challenge of the sub-national forces and their protagonists, he adds that 'Gandhi has contributed powerful weapons to their armoury, viz., civil disobedience, *bundhs* and fasts' (p. 16). Since it takes account of the current evaluation of Gandhi which is very much in vogue in recent times in India, it seems worthwhile to subject this contention to a closer scrutiny.

It is true that Gandhi is 'the author of civil disobedience'. But it is no less true that Gandhi's civil disobedience must be both *civil* and *disobedience* at the same time. If it is only disobedience without any qualification, it ceases to be Gandhian. Much of the practice of the Gandhian technique we see today in India falls into this category of unqualified disobedience which Gandhi disapproved. He makes a cardinal distinction between *Satyagraha* and *Duragraha*. In his post-prayer speech on 3-10-1947, Gandhi remarked: 'Today, he was getting news of *satyagraha* being started in many places. Often he wondered whether the so-called *satyagraha* was not really *duragraha*. Whether it was strikes in mills or railways or post-offices or *movements in some of the States*, (these italics supplied) it seemed as if it were a question of seizing power. A virulent poison was leavening society today...' (M. K. Gandhi, *Delhi Diary*, pp. 56-57). It will be ironical if the present *duragraha* we notice in India is traced back to Gandhi's *satyagraha*.

If we examine the several campaigns of civil resistance under Gandhi's leadership, we discover that Gandhi is not willing to continue the non-violent movement of the masses when once it becomes violent, and is ready to call off the struggle against formidable opposition by his own followers. When the violent incidents in February 1922 at Chauri Chaura marred the non-violent non-cooperation movement, Gandhi immediately suspended it and advised the Congress to abandon its further plans of non-cooperation.

At that time, the non-cooperation movement was at its zenith, promising spectacular success. But Gandhi preferred to withdraw the mass-movement when it was deviating from the main principle. Such a *withdrawal* from the political organization and its mass movement was often repeated by Gandhi in the long course of his leadership of the Congress. In fact, withdrawal from politics is an integral part of the Gandhian technique.

This feature of Gandhism is in contrast to its exclusively *political* use by all the

forces and parties alike in the national life of India today. The students are no exception to this. What they do about the Gandhian method is not difficult to see. Gandhi freely confessed his 'Himalayan Miscalculation' when he was leading a nation-wide popular protest against the oppressive measures of the Rowlatt Bills in 1919. Has any leader of the student movement at present come forward in the public with any kind of an admission of miscalculation, Himalayan or otherwise? Gandhi called off the struggle when the very freedom of the nation was at stake. Is there any student leader today who has withdrawn the so-called struggle in the middle, on a matter of principle without any bargain for power or success. This eminently applies to the present cult of *bundhs* and fasts we are witnessing today.

It is in this context that we have to review the observation of M. N. Srinivas that 'Gandhi also mobilized the students for the freedom struggle, and student unrest has become a major problem today.' (p. 16). Gandhi no doubt wanted the students of his generation to join the national movement for freedom. But the students under Gandhi's inspiration remained disciplined fighters in the nationalist struggle. Their participation was marked by adherence to non-violence under exceptional circumstances of imminent provocation by the authorities. Violence, as a rule, came from the well-briefed police and the military which the alien government employed to confront the growing upsurge of the nationalist youth.

Again, Gandhi addressed himself to a subject India. He did not live long in an independent India. The pattern of student unrest today, with its distortion of the Gandhian spirit and deviation from the non-violent technique, can hardly be the legacy of the Father of the Nation. It is nothing short of a myth to hold Gandhi responsible for what his teaching unequivocally disowns.

Speaking of the 'chicks of the past', Srinivas attributes linguism, in a similar vein, to the Gandhian influence. In his opinion, 'the concept of linguistic States, hostility to English, and establishment of Hindi as the official language of India, are all ultimately traceable to Gandhi' (p. 1). None of these claims is really tenable. As regards the question of the linguistic States, this matter was actually decided by the pre-Gandhi Congress.

The history of the Congress traces the movement for linguistic States to 1894 even

before Gandhi's appearing in the Congress in 1915. It was favoured by Tilak only. Referring to Gandhi's attitude, the late historian of the Congress wrote that 'Gandhi thought the question might await' (B. Pattabhi Sitaramayya, *The History of the Indian National Congress*, Vol. I, p. 147). It was accepted by the Congress only in 1917.

Subsequently, Gandhi directed his efforts to stress the importance of national unity, and inter-provincial co-operation. Speaking on 25 January, 1948, in New Delhi, Gandhi observed, a few days before his death: 'It would be fatal, if it led to narrow provincialism, mutual bickerings and rivalries—between Tamil and Andhra, for instance, Bombay and Karnatak and so on...we must, therefore, resolutely discourage all fissiparous tendencies and feel and behave as Indians.' (D. G. Tendulkar, *Mahatma*, Vol. VIII, p. 337). Gandhi never surrendered the national ideal to anything else. Even on the policy of the Congress towards the linguistic States, Gandhi was a cultural linguist, and not a political one.

It cannot be shown that Gandhi was hostile to the English language. As regards the national language for India, it is significant that his own choice was Hindustani. It was neither Gujarati, his mother tongue, nor Hindi as such. Writing in *Harijan* on 11 January, 1947, on the national language of India, Gandhi observed: 'I am, undoubtedly, an advocate of Hindustani...I say that Hindustani will win in the end as the Sanskritized Hindi is entirely artificial, while Hindustani is quite natural...I find very little argument in favour of Hindi...I have gone to the length of saying that the name, Hindi Sahitya Sammelan, was not proper for propagating the national language.' (D. G. Tendulkar, *Mahatma*, Vol. VIII, p. 295). In view of this categorical preference of Hindustani to Hindi for the national language of India, citing Gandhi in favour of Hindi alone amounts to wanton heresy.

On the problems of culture and language, Gandhi expressed himself in terms of a world-view. Romain Rolland quotes this interesting thought of Gandhi: 'I do not want my house to be walled in on all sides and my windows to be stuffed. I want the culture of all lands to be blown about my house as freely as possible. But I refuse to be blown off my feet by any of them' (Romain Rolland, *Mahatma Gandhi* p. 105). Gandhi achieves a rare synthesis between nationalism and internationalism.

During the last phase of his life, Gandhi even started a new process of abjuring politics and power. In his deliberate

disinterest in the pursuit of the power he created, Gandhi was singularly alone among the great architects of modern States in the world. At the very height of the success of his technique, he had no use of the political apparatus of the State. He declined to come to New Delhi on the invitation of his political heir for the celebrations of the newly won independence in the capital of the nation. There was not even a message for the people by Gandhi to mark the political freedom. Gandhi wrote in the Last Testament on 29 January, 1948, that the Congress must be disbanded. Gandhi predicted the coming 'struggle' for 'power' and the 'unhealthy competition' among 'political parties' and 'communal bodies'. (M. K. Gandhi, *Non-violence in Peace and War*, Vol. II, pp. 392-93). Subsequent developments in Indian politics after his death proved him to be right.

The current persistence in the manipulation of power and politics is the very negation of Gandhi's message. Just at a time when the encroaching domain of politics began its operation in India leading to excessive and exclusive politics—to quote the current vocabulary of political science, politicisation—Gandhi tried to contest this phenomenon by initiating a counter-process of de-politicisation, and establish a new way of life. That Gandhi did not succeed in this effort would be conceded, and it was altogether a different thing! But, to advance the argument that the failure of the Indian system is due to the pursuit of the Gandhian tenets is to state exactly the reverse of the truth.

We owe our national malady to our not having followed Gandhi. Our crisis is not the result of our implementing the Gandhian programme, but of deliberately repudiating it. Implicit in the treatment of Srinivas is the assumption that India's present ills are occasioned by the adoption of Gandhism. This assumption is not warranted either by evidence or reason and, therefore, it is not valid. Unfortunately, this assumption is powerful now, and remains unchallenged both in India, and abroad. That the lack of India's success cannot be due to the 'supposed' following of the Gandhian path needs to be stated to avoid the considerable misgiving about the Indian problem. This may also help in a re-evaluation of Gandhi's role in the history of modern India in its proper perspective. When our basic failings are due to our not adopting Gandhism, to be reassured now that our maladies are all due to our adopting it, is indeed to voice 'the unkindest cut of all'.

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University of Rajasthan. V. V. RAMANA MURTI

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many implications
of a current agitation

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The problem

UNEXPECTED resources of energy, organisation and dedication have revealed themselves in the fury over the cow agitation during the last year. This has its positive aspects: if such fervour could be let loose 'all over the country in fighting drought, illiteracy, backwardness, India could assume a different look. The fact that the cow has acquired a position of such symbolic consequence, denotes the seriousness of the problem. No political party, no candidate seeking votes, dared open his mouth against the agitation whatever his personal persuasion. This only proves that the problem needs to be looked at soberly so that national energy should not be wasted.

It all began with Article 480 of our Constitution in the chapter on the Directive Principles of State policy. '*Organisation of agriculture and animal husbandry* — The State shall endeavour to organise agriculture and animal husbandry on modern and scientific lines and shall, in particular, take steps for preserving and improving the breeds, and prohibiting the slaughter, of cows and calves and other milch and draught cattle'.

Since then, a rash of legislation appeared in the different States. There is now a total ban on killing cows in Gujarat, Madhya Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh and Orissa. Here, cattle other than the cow can be slaughtered if they have passed the milch stage, or when they are of no use for breeding, or work, or if they are

incapacitated. Some States like Orissa have another proviso: the incapacitated cattle should not have been deliberately disabled. (There are instances of peasants, breaking the arms and legs of useless cattle which they cannot support, in order to sell them for slaughter.) States like Bombay, West Bengal and Gujarat allow cattle to be slaughtered for bona fide religious purposes. Among them, Gujarat has the additional restriction of not allowing cows to be slaughtered although other animals over 15 years of age can be. Punjab, Bihar and West Bengal, despite other restrictions, do allow cattle, including cows, to be slaughtered for research.

Most States allow older or disabled cattle to be slaughtered, the age limit varying from ten years in Madras to 14 or 15 in other States. Madhya Pradesh has an additional precaution: no cattle can be sent out of the State in case they be slaughtered there. In the Punjab, killing a cow by accident or in self defence does not amount to slaughter.

The Andaman and Nicobar islands follow the UP law, while Kashmir, Tripura and Manipur have their own laws formulated in the pre-independence period. In Jammu and Kashmir, under the Ranbir Penal Code of 1932, the entire bovine family, wild or domesticated, could not be slaughtered, despite the demands of the climate and of the Muslims who are the

predominant religious grouping along with other smaller communities who have no objection to eating different types of bovine meat. In Manipur, the law promulgated in 1936 does not allow cattle to be slaughtered in the valley, and Tripura does not allow the slaughter openly.

In 1959, in the famous Quareshi case, the ban in Bihar was challenged as being a violation of the fundamental right of butchers to practice their profession as guaranteed under the Constitution. The Supreme Court ruled that a total ban on slaughtering cows, calves and she-buffaloes was valid so long as they remained milch or draught cattle. But, when they ceased to be useful, either as the one or the other, a total ban on their slaughter would not be in the public interest. In this connection, it found that 'for the preservation of useless cattle, the country will pay Rs. 19 or Rs 18 per head of such useless cattle per annum, whereas our total national expenditure on education (Central and State including local bodies) in 1955-56 was only Rs. 4.9 per capita as against Rs. 104.6 per capita in the United Kingdom and Rs. 223.7 per capita in the United States and our target for 1957-1958 works out at Rs. 5 per capita per annum.'

In 1954, a committee of experts had studied the problem. Their opinion was that the resources of fodder and other requirements for cattle maintenance did not meet the needs of extant cattle. A total ban on cow slaughter

would further increase the numbers and make it more difficult to look after cattle.

As the demand of the agitationists is for a total ban on cow slaughter, whatever the consequences, and as this would involve an amendment to the Constitution, the question must be studied in its entirety. For one, in this maze of whimsical legislation, what is happening to our professed secularism? Can the government deny the right of the Muslims, the Christians, the scheduled tribes, the lower castes, to eat beef if they so wish? Some Hindus would also be included in this category. Is it in the tradition of Hinduism to impose its will through law over others, or has persuasion been the main form of change? Is rationality going to be the arbiter of our policies or does custom have the final say? In the areas of conflict between man and the cattle population, where both struggle for the same resources, who is to win? Surely, there are no two opinions that our cattle have a vital place in our economy, are a part of our wealth and, also, that the treatment meted out to them by our people is a disgrace to our so-called non-violent, vegetarian attitudes. But, is sentiment going to guide us in our approach towards the half starved, beaten, neglected cattle once they are of no use, or is the situation dependent on a rational assessment in the primary interest of man and of humane practices?

In history

H. D. SANKALIA

TO allow or not to allow cow slaughter has literally become the 'burning' problem of the day. A brief historical review will show that cow slaughter has been with us from times immemorial.

Even during historical times, in what is called the 'Hindu Period'

of Indian history, there never was a total ban on the slaughter of cows or any other animal, and this even when rulers like Asoka and Kumarapala were the champions of *Ahimsa* (non-killing).

The ban on cow slaughter is indeed of comparatively recent

growth, mostly as a reaction against Islam rather than genuine, real love and reverence for the cow.

Ever since man has been on this earth, the cow or ox has been one of the most common sources of man's food. Throughout the pleistocene, that is a geological period ranging from about hundred thousand years to ten thousand years, bones of the cow/ox have been discovered more frequently and at a large number of places in the river and other deposits than of any other animal. Often these bones have been associated with the stone tools made by man.

Some ten years ago, my colleague, Dr. Z. D. Ansari, and I happened to discover an almost complete skeleton of a wild ox, with stone tools embedded in the skull of the ox at Kalegaon, District Ahmednagar, on the Godavari.¹ From the type of the animal and the tools, both can be confidently placed to about twenty thousand years ago. Recently, the remains of the ox have been discovered in the old bed of the Mula river near Rahuri, and dated by C-14 method to about 40,000 years ago, whereas on the Narmada these have been found at a large number of places since the last century.

Preference for Beef

It may be said that the man who hunted the wild ox/cow was a barbarian and naturally lived on animals which he could get very easily. Not so. Even after man became civilized and even during the times when the cow and ox formed the main sources of wealth (*Pashudhana*), these bovine animals served in all possible ways; as milch-cows, as transport and draught animals and also as food, and this continued during the time when man began to learn to grow his own food. That is from some 3,000 B.C. to c. 700 B.C., man in India, as elsewhere in the world, continued to prefer beef to all other forms of animal diet.

This has been amply proved by all the excavations in India carried out since 1921 and of which we have fairly accurate records

of animal bones found during the excavations. The oldest so far known in India is the Indus Civilization. This had spread throughout Sind, Punjab, most of Uttar Pradesh, northern Rajasthan, Kutch, Saurashtra and coastal Gujarat.

Everywhere in the excavations,² bones of the cow or ox have been most numerous, although we also know that in this civilization the bull was most artistically and realistically portrayed on the so-called seals and also sculptured in the round and perhaps worshipped.

Kitchen Evidence

The excavations, it should be pointed out here (to avoid deliberate misunderstanding by scholars otherwise interested), were different from excavations by the P.W.D. Archaeological excavations pertain to past habitations (towns, cities, villages, or small settlements) and are very often of kitchens or kitchen refuse. Thus the things recovered from a kitchen refuse give a fairly accurate idea of the food habits of the people. Again, the excavations at Mohenjo-daro, Harappa, Lothal and Kalibangan and at Navdatoli were extensive, and are truly representative of the life of the people at that time.

Further, from a study of the bones, it is possible to say whether the animals were wild or domesticated, and slaughtered when young or old. Bhola Nath has identified a large number of bones of young humpless bull/cow from the excavations at Maski,³ Andhra Pradesh. These bones range from c. 1500 B.C.—A.D.—B.C. The bones of young animals have also been noticed at Hastinapur and elsewhere. (For references see footnotes 5-9).

Although one cannot distinguish between the bones of the cow and the ox, the zoologist or palaeontologist is able to say whether the bones belong to the cow/ox or to the buffalo.⁴ The technical names for the two respective species are *Bos Indicus* and *Bos Bubalis* Linn. The experts in India and outside who have identified the bones from Indian sites have left no

doubt that the bones of oxen or cows have been found from the houses where these were slaughtered for food.

The same was true of the other contemporary and later cultures which we have been able to discover during the last 20 years. Whether it be in Uttar Pradesh⁵ or Rajasthan,⁶ Gujarat⁷ or Madhya Pradesh,⁸ Maharashtra⁹ or Mysore,¹⁰ Andhra or Madras, most prolific are the bones of *Bos Indicus*, that is the domesticated Indian ox/cow.

Thus, from about 3,000 B.C. to at least 700 B.C. man depended upon the cow and the ox for his food, although as mentioned previously, this also formed the main source of his wealth. This has been described very vividly in the *Mahabharata* and the *Ramayana* as well as in various other *Puranas* and the *Vedas*.^{10a}

Country-wide Practice

In this connection, it is pertinent to note that the bearers of the Painted Grey Ware Culture whose remains have been found throughout Uttar Pradesh, upto the Nepal Terai, and in Rajasthan, also loved to eat beef. Large quantities of animal bones have been found in the early layers at Hastinapur, the home of the Pandavas and Kauravas, and according to one view, these are the people who belonged to one of the Aryan groups, probably the last one, and dated to about 1,000 B.C. (See footnote 5.)

This provides additional proof to what we are told in the *Rig-veda* and all later Vedic literature. This evidence has been discussed by Mahamahopadhyaya P. V. Kane.¹⁰

From this it is clear that although the cow was venerated and regarded as a divinity, still, throughout this period (c. 1500 B.C.), the cow was killed on several occasions and particularly in (i) *Sraddhas*, (ii) for a distinguished guest in *Madhuparka*, and (iii) in the *Astika Sraddha*.

This account might be brought up to the beginning of the Chris-

tian era by citing Pāṇini.¹¹ In his famous *Sūtras* a guest is called 'Goghna,' 'one for whom a cow was killed.' As a great Poona Sanskritist told me (after my article was published in *The Times of India*) that this term cannot be explained in any other way except taking it literally.

It may be argued that the cows might have been killed in sacrifices, etc., but otherwise they were held immune and not slaughtered. To this the reply might be given in the words of Nachiketas' father.¹² The problem of the old, milkless, uneconomic cows was ever present, as it is today. While milch-cows should not be killed, the old ones had to be. Hence to Nachiketas' question, 'To whom will you give cows as these, cows which have drunk their last water, eaten their last grass, have given last milk and will breed no more?' The father replied, 'To death do I give.' This is the meaning one has to derive from this otherwise philosophical text.

Inscriptions

Excavations of numerous earlier historic sites reveal a similar story. Cattle were eaten in the early centuries of the Christian era as before.¹³ Unfortunately, the subsequent history cannot be documented archaeologically, for the bones from the top layers of any site have hitherto not been collected carefully and studied. So we have to fall back upon another type of archaeological evidence, viz., inscriptions.

The inscriptions ranging over a period of some 1,600 years (c. 300 B.C.—1,300 A.D.) reveal an interesting development about the attitude to cows and Brahmanas and sectarian deities and in a way confirm what little we know from archaeology.

The earliest epigraphs are the edicts of Asoka carved on rocks and pillars throughout the length and breadth of India, and on the north-west frontier at Kandahar. In these the King makes a very significant admission. He tells us: 'Formerly numerous animals were killed in the king's kitchen. Now

only two peacocks and one deer are killed, and this deer too not daily.'¹⁴

From this it might be argued that cows were not slaughtered. But let it be remembered that the ban on non-killing relates to the king's own way of life, but not to the whole of the capital or to his empire.

Thus, for nearly 300 years after the Buddha and Mahāvira, the two greatest preachers of *ahimsa*, flesh-eating had flourished in India, and we can legitimately infer that the cow/ox were not spared. It was Asoka's zeal and State patronage that must have helped the spread of *ahimsa*. But it must be emphasised it was not a promulgation of a ban on killing, but a gentle persuasion, and a precept practised by the ruler himself.

From the second century A.D. onwards the inscriptions frequently mention that the king looked after the welfare of the cows and Brahmanas, whereas one record of Budhagupta,¹⁵ A.D. 484-85, ends thus: 'Let prosperity attend all the subjects, headed by the cows and the Brahmanas.' Another record specifically says that the guilt of violating the grant made by the king to a Buddhist shrine and Bhikshus is 'as great as slaughtering of a cow or a Brahmana.' Four centuries later—an inscription of Rashtrakuta Amoghavarsha I, A.D. 866, raised the number of cows and Brahmanas to one thousand and that too at Varanasi.¹⁶ Evidently, the old *Dharmaśāstra*, and *Smṛiti* injunctions against the wanton destruction of cows and Brahmanas were not enough.

Behind the Injunction

From such references, protagonists of a ban on cow-slaughter might argue that cow-slaughter was non-existent in India during this period. On the contrary, reading behind the words, this continuous injunction, century after century, only underlines the fact that cow slaughter in some form or other, mostly of barren cows, or cows otherwise useless, must have continued and some sections of the people must have also been

eating the animal. This is also proved by subsequent history.

The reference in the *Uttarārama-Charita* to a slaughtering of a 'poor, tawny calf' when the sages Vasistha and others arrived, either echoes the old Vedic practice or is an example of what was happening in the VIIth century. Anyway, Bhavabhūti had no qualms in using this old method of hospitality and his audience also must have appreciated it as a known and accepted method of hospitality.^{16a}

Chinese Travellers

Before we turn to the closing phase of the Hindu period, a reference must be made to the accounts of the Chinese travellers, Fa-hien, Yuan Chwang and I-Tsing who give glimpses of India and Indian culture between the fifth and the seventh century A.D. These Buddhist pilgrims refer to several taboos on food in India, such as non-eating of onions and garlic, but there is no reference to non-eating of beef. Both Yuan Chwang and I-Tsing, on the other hand, cite the Buddhist practice which allowed the eating of three kinds of meat, obtained without destroying the animals intentionally. According to the examples cited by Yuan Chwang, these would include beef.

While I-Tsing merely mentions the 'three pure kinds of flesh' viz., 'unseen, unheard, unsuspected,'¹⁷ Yuan Chwang discusses at some length the different practices prevalent in his times and earlier among the Hinayana and Mahayana Buddhists. He mentions how some of 'Buddha's disciples begged for beef and mutton and asking to have animals killed for them;' how this led Buddha to prescribe the kind of flesh his disciples should eat. Yuan Chwang also cites cases of Mahayanists who allowed the use of animal food of certain kinds, and these included calves, geese and deer.¹⁸

Here then is a living picture of a religion which preached *ahimsa*, but for practical purposes made several exceptions.

Thus, slaughter of animals for food including that of the cow, had continued in India. With a view to

lessening it, if not preventing it completely, King Kumarapala of Gujarat in the 12th century had to issue a proclamation banning animal slaughter. This *amari-ghoshana*, as it is called in the contemporary records, followed when the king, though a Hindu, actively patronized Jainism. However, it was not a total ban. Wisely, the animal slaughter was prevented only on three days, the 8th, 11th and 14th of each fortnight. Further, it is interesting to note how the punishment of violating this order was laid down. The officers of the King were fined one *dramma* only, but others five *drammas*.¹⁹

Partial Prohibition

Thus, the prohibition was partial, and indeed provides a useful lesson to us after eight centuries. Even in a complete Hindu State, wedded to *ahimsa*, the king and his Jaina advisers could not think of a total prohibition for all times. Various animals, including the ox/cow must have been slaughtered for 24 days in a month!!

If any additional evidence is required, I may cite the story from *Uttara-Adhyana-Sutra* — an early Jain text of the fourth century before Christ. Here there is a reference to a story of Arista-Nemi who was the younger brother of Vasudeva. He was going to marry the Princess of Mathura, Rajimati. When he approached the palace of the bride, he found in one corner animals (cows, etc.) kept ready for slaughter. Now this reference could not have been made by a writer of the 3/4th century B.C. if this was not in actual practice among Kshatriyas at that time.

The most interesting thing is that this story has been sculptured in great detail in the 12th century Jaina temple of Neminatha at Mount Abu.²⁰ Thus, there is both archaeological and literary evidence to show that cow slaughter was in existence.

It is only in mediaeval times, after the 12th century, that the commentaries on the *Smritis* prohibited *go-vadha*, and eating of meat on other occasions, and other

Vedic practices as things prohibited in the Kaliyuga (*Kali-Varjya*).

However, this prohibition was not universal nor followed by all. As late as the 17th century, Visvanatha,²¹ a great logician wrote in favour of flesh-eating by Brahmanas in sacrifices, *sraddha*, *madhuparka*, in danger of life and when ordered by a Brahmana and charged those who argued for a total prohibition as Buddhists, and illogical (for they did many other things not liked by society).

A Summary

This brief survey about the position of the cow or the attitude to cow-slaughter shows that until the beginning of the Christian era the cow/ox were regularly slaughtered for food and for the sacrifice etc., in spite of the preaching of *Ahimsa* by Mahavira and the Buddha. Beef-eating, however, did decrease owing to these preachings, but never died out completely. Some of the Buddhists practised it even in the 7th century when Yuan Chwang visited India. This was also the case with the Hindus, though now the *Smrites* prohibited *go-vadha* as *Kalivarjya*, among other things. This prohibition was not and could not be universal as the restricted prohibition of non-killing ordered by Kumarapala in the 12th century proves.

Although after this, owing to the advent of the Muslims and as a reaction against their indiscriminate killing of cows, the attitude on *go-vadha* further stiffened, still the resentment against this attitude by a 17th century Hindu scholar undoubtedly proves, if any proof be necessary, how very impracticable and unreasonable prohibition of *go-vadha* was regarded even in Hindu society. The old and un-economic cow/ox had to be killed as the Upanishadic example illustrates.

What the cow/ox in India needs today is good treatment—whole-some food, fodder, and water, and freedom from exploitation by the Hindus at all levels. Their reverence for the cow is always superficial. This was noticed and recorded by the authors of the *Bhagavata Purana*²² and the

Ramayana,²³ centuries ago and regarded as one of the symptoms of the *Kali Yuga*!! The *Kali Yuga* has increased in its intensity and so also the exploitation of the cow. It is against this exploitation that we must all strive, not for a blanket prohibition of *go-vadha*.

References

1. Sankalia, H.D., Deo, S.B. and Ansari, Z.D. *From History to Prehistory at Nevasa*.
2. B. Prasad, 'Animal Remains from Harappa,' *Mem. Arch. Surv. Ind.* No. 51 (Delhi, 1936) and Bhola Nath, 'Animal Remains from Rangpur,' *Ancient India*, No. 18 and 19, (1962-63) pp. 153-54. R.B.S. Sewell and B.S. Guha in *Mohenjo-daro and the Indus Civilization*, Vol. II (London 1931).
3. *Ancient India*, No. 13 (1957), p. 125.
4. Bhola Nath, 'Animals of Prehistoric India' *Records of the Indian Museum*, Vol. 59, for December 1961; (1966), pp. 335-67.
5. It may be of interest to add some details. Even a limited exposure of the houses of this period at Hastinapur yielded 73 bones of cow/ox. And almost all these bones are either charred or bear cut marks. Two or three bones are of a young one. Thus, one has to conclude that these animals were slaughtered for food (*Ancient India*, Nos. 10 and 11, pp. 111-112).
6. The excavations at Ahar, near Udaipur, Rajasthan were on a large scale, and a number of houses along with *chulahs* were uncovered. These have also yielded bones of cow/ox both from the historical and prehistorical periods (C. 200 A.D.—1800 B.C.). Based on the Ms. report by Dr. (Mrs.) Shah.
Excavations at Maski, Tekkal-kota, Sangankal and Hallur in Andhra-Mysore have also given bones of cow/ox in large quantities. *Ancient India*, No. 13 (1957) p. 125 for Maski. The rest based on Ms. reports.

7. Bones recovered from the excavations at Nagara, near Cambay, by the M.S. University of Baroda have been studied by Dr. (Mrs.) Shah. On her authority it can be said that cows/ox were eaten by the inhabitants of ancient Cambay, right from the 4th-5th century B.C. upto almost the 12th century A.D.
- Evidence of a similar nature is available from Hastinapur. Here bones of cow/ox have been found from later periods (Periods III, IV, V, 400 B.C.—1200 A.D.) as well. (*Ancient India*, Nos. 10 and 11, p. 114).
8. The excavations at Navdatoli in 1953-54 as well as in 1957-59 have yielded considerable number of bones of ox/cow, along with those of the pig. And these, in spite of the fact that the inhabitants produced several foodgrains—wheat, rice, gram, sesamum, linseed and peas. See Sankalia, H.D., B. Subbarao and Deo, S.B., *The Excavations at Maheshwar and Navdatoli*, Poona and Baroda 1958, p. 256 and Ms. copy of the 1957-59 excavations by Dr. (Mrs.) Shah of Baroda.
9. The small excavations at Nasik also gave bones of ox, pig, deer from the layers of the Early Historic Period, as well as later periods. See Sankalia, H.D. and Deo, S.B., *Report on the Excavations at Nasik and Jorwe*, Deccan College, Poona, 1955, p. 142.
- At Nevasa, District Ahmednagar, Maharashtra, the bones of domestic ox are numerous in the layers of the historic period. See Sankalia, H.D., Deo, S.B. and Ansari, Z.D. *From History to Prehistory at Nevasa*, Poona, 1960, pp. 532-36.
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11. *Paniniya Sutra*, III. IV. 73, *Dasagoghna Sampradane*.
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13. See references 5-9.
14. First Rock Edict, Girnar in Sircar, S.C. *Select Inscriptions bearing on Indian History and Civilization*, Vol. I, p. 17.
15. Inscription of Budhagupta. *Inscriptionum Indicarum*, Vol. IV, p. 89.
16. *Epigraphia Indica* Vol. VI, p. 107.
- 16a *Uttaramacharita* of Bhavabhuti, Introduction (*Misra-vishkambha* to Act IV).
17. I-Tsing, *A Record of the Buddhist Religion as practised in India and the Malay Archipelago* (A.D. 671-695) Tr. by J. Takakusu (Oxford, 1896), p. 59.
18. Thomas Watters, *On Yuan Chwangs' Travels in India* (629-645 A.D.) Ed. by T.W. Rhys Davids and S.W. Bushnell (London, 1964), Vol. I, pp. 54-57.
19. Kiradu and Ratanpur Stone Inscriptions. *Epigraphia Indica*, Vol. XI, p. 44, and *Bhavanagar Prakrit and Sanskrit Inscriptions*, p. 205 and Sankalia, H.D., *Archaeology of Gujarat*, pp. 236-237. Dr. D.R. Bhandarkar who edited the Kiradu Ins. thought the Brahmanas and others might have been eating flesh on the Sivaratri, etc. To prevent this, the ban was promulgated.
20. The story is discussed and illustrated in Sankalia, H.D. 'The Great Renunciation of Neminatha,' in *Indian Historical Quarterly*, Vol. XVI (1940), pp. 314-317.
21. Kane, P.V. *History of Dharma-sastra*, Vol. III, p. 946, citing *Mansattava Viveka* of Visvanatha. *Sarasvati Bhavana Series*, Banaras, 1927, pp. 28-29.
22. *Bhagavata Purana*, I. 16-17.
23. *Ramayana*, II, 14, 15, Verses 22-23 and Critical Edition, Baroda, II, 68-75, 21-22. For this reference I am thankful to Dr. N. M. Sen.

Social background

PRODIPTO ROY

So much has been written about the inviolability of the cow, so many people in India are concerned, so many cows exist that any clear yet comprehensive discussion on this topic is fraught with scores of tangential irrelevancies. One may attack the sacred cow from one of several viewpoints each of which presents so partial a picture that the totality remains relatively un-

scathed. Any serious controversy to 'solve' this Himalayan problem must first comprehend its broad dimensions and circumscribe the boundaries within which fruitful discourse can take place. In short, even so comprehensive a problem must be defined.

Few social problems have so hoary a past. Our folk ways and

mores come to us from so long ago that seldom can one raise the veil of mystery which clouds their origins. Historical and religious writings, however, present glimpses of life in India in the Vedic and Puranic ages which partially raise this veil of myths and legends. Careful, historical documentation can trace eras in India when cows were sacrificially killed by revered brahmins, sold in the public market place by *goghatakas* and beef formed a common part of the diet of all castes of Hindus. Religion, the hand-maid of social and economic forces, conspired to illustrate how an economic rationale in one age led to the crystallisation of making the cow sacred and, subsequently, in another age the same mores crucify the economy it strove to protect.

Pragmatic social scientists often question the utility of historical analysis. In the present study, history may help to demythologise the sacred cow, propagate images of a beef-eating golden Hindu age and take much of the wind out of the politico-religious sails of Jagatgurus. The analects of modern Hindu sages quoting that Hindu culture began to degenerate when it stopped eating beef, may be the shock treatment necessary to jolt the modern Hindu into the re-examination of his sacred psyche.

Economic Consequences

The economic consequences of the inviolable cow provide us with a classic Malthusian essay. In this century, the rising pressure of cattle and men on the limited area of arable land poignantly provide the economist with scores of potential studies. Is there really an overpopulation of cows and is there competition with men for arable land or do the cows complement and supplement land as a resource for man? Or to put it more precisely, assuming all other factors are kept constant, can the X acres of India's land having Y (+?) human beings support Z cows, and have the number of cows already passed the point of no return? What are the hard economic inputs and outputs of different economic classes of cattle in terms of

draught, milk, manure, hides, bones, horns and hoofs? How much will the uneconomical extra cow-years cost the national exchequer and can we afford it?

Appraising the Sentiment

The social-psychological dimensions of cow-slaughter are equally intriguing. How much sentiment is there to protect the old and economically useless cattle and can it be measured? (Economically useful cattle are not part of the problem as they are already protected by both rationalists and traditionalists). Is the value of cow protection a super-ordinate value to economic utility? There are in India separate castes for various utilitarian functions related to cattle, e.g., the *gwalas* and *ahirs*, as they are called in the North, tend to milch cattle; the *chamars* deal with cattle hides and skins. Do the utilitarian-oriented castes have less sentiment towards cattle? To what extent do other cattle-owning farmers share this sentiment?

Perhaps the purest and strongest proponents of the sentiment are preachers and politicians who see in the inviolable cow the symbol of Hindu *ahimsa*. The economic cow can therefore be sacrificed to the preservation of Hindu culture. The Congress President, Purushottam Das Tandon said in September, 1950, in his first speech after election to the Congress *gaddi*, 'that in reference to possible harmful economic effects resulting from nation-wide ban on cow-slaughter, he stood for the protection of the cow even if it meant torpedoing the economy of the country'. Fortunately, all politicians are not quite as sanguine as Tandonji, but the present election, a decade and a half later, has proved the utility of the sacred cow at the polls.

India's 'sacred cow' is the prototype of inviolable myths and symbols of various societies. It is one of the painful stumbling blocks on our march to a secular modern nation State. Other societies and cultures also have irrational, dysfunctional prejudices: Pakistan has pigs breeding out of hand; the Catholics have contraceptive dogmas; America has its Negro prob-

lem: England has her Queen. But they are all painfully examining the nature of their irrational prejudices and moving toward a more rational solution. Here, in India, in the last third of the 20th century after 20 years of independence we are turning back the pages of history (only so far as it suits our present cow prejudice) and passing laws that fly in the face of rational economics and that, too, in a year of acute food shortages.

In short, the problem the cow presents is a multi-faceted one which basically counter-poses a politico-religious ethos of a society against its purely rational-economic utilisation of cattle. For either the entire nation or any one State, with insight, an accurate appraisal of the politico-religious force of anti-cow slaughter and its tension management is a first prerequisite to solving the problem.

Second, there should be an accurate appraisal of cattle resources, fodder resources, cultivable land and the most fruitful allocation economically to exploit them for a maximization of income. Third, to determine how much burden the non-economic classes of cattle are putting on the scarce resources. Then, finally, while giving political concessions to the sentiment only when necessary, intelligently to minimise the economic burdens and steadily move toward a completely rational policy of making cattle highly productive and completely economic.

Historical Evolution

The slaughter of cows was prohibited in Egypt long before India. The sacred *Ra* and the sacred *Horus* from whence the royal line had sprung was the mythological cause of ancient Egypt's sacred cow. Moses about 1,000 B.C. had to walk a 3-day journey into the wilderness to perform a cow-sacrifice for fear of offending the Egyptians (Exodus VII, 26). Hindu priests were sacrificing propitious and useful cows 2,000 years later.

The prohibition of cow-slaughter in India developed rather slowly

out of more complex and sophisticated philosophical, economical and political causes. Although historical analysis has not been able to date very precisely when the prevention of cow-slaughter became part of the mores of the Hindu social system, some philosophical and historical predecessors throw light on possible causes and probable dates of this concomitance of events.

Ahimsa

The philosophy of *ahimsa* is the ethos around which the reverence of all life is centered. *Ahimsa* today pervades much of Hindu thought, folk-ways and mores. Gandhi states that if he were asked to define the Hindu creed, he would simply say it was the search for truth through non-violent means.¹ He equates *ahimsa* with non-violence which is the abstention from causing pain to any creature either in mind or in body. The word *hims* is the desiderative form of *han* which means the will to kill or to damage. So the substantive form, *ahimsa*, means the renunciation of the will to kill or to damage.²

Although *ahimsa* is mentioned in the Vedic teachings and the *Upanishads* it does not form any great part of them and *ahimsa* was certainly not the dominant ethos of the Vedic era. However, one can trace the origins of *ahimsa*, to the *Vedas*, the earliest *Smritis*, *Upanishads*, the Jain texts, the Buddhist texts and the Epics—the *Ramayana* and the *Mahabharata*. These writings describe sylvan retreats where the doctrine of *ahimsa* is practised. Even secular writings like the *Arthashastra* documents these sanctuaries. Hence the doctrine of *ahimsa* existed in the sacred texts dating from before 600 B.C. to about 400 A.D. At the same time, these texts describe sacrifices of all animals but particularly cows and also describe eating of all meat including beef. The *Rigveda* in particular has

frequent references to sacrifices of cows, buffaloes and goats.

No Taboo

Atindra Nath Bose, in his dissertation on the social and rural economy of northern India, states:

'In the Vedic and Buddhist classical literature, there is no dearth of allusions to cow killing or the taking of cow's flesh... In the *Satapatha Brahmana* Yajnavalka is fond of tender beef (III 1.21. 21). Apastama permits the slaughter of a cow at the reception of a guest, at the worship of the manes and at nuptial celebrations (*Gryasutra* 1. 3. 9; of *Satapatha Brahmana* II. 4. 1. 2; *Vasistha* IV. 8; *Vishnu* LXXX. 9; *Yagnavalka* 1. 19). In the beginning of Act IV of Bhavabhuti's *Uttararamacharita*, a heifer is stated to be slain by Valmiki in honour of Vasistha's visit to the Asrama.

'In the Buddhist works the "goghataka" (purveyor of beef) is a familiar figure, and his profession, according to *Dasabrahmana Jataka*, (this profession) was widely followed by straying *Brahmanas* (IV. 361 ff). Slaughter of ox for flesh was very common (*Sut.* III. viii. 7; *Jat.* II. 50. 135; VI. ii) and there were special slaughter houses for beef (*gavagathanam* *Mv* V. 1. 13). Even cows did not necessarily find exemption (*An* IV. 137; *Ch Dhp.* p. 60; *Apast.* I. 5. 17, 30). The *Suttas* present this very unedifying spectacle at the most prominent place of the town or village; as the cattle butcher or his apprentice, when he has killed an ox or cow, displays the carcass piecemeal at the crossing of the four high roads as he sits: (*Dn* XXII 6; *Mn.* 119).³

It is interesting to note the reaction of the 20th century Hindu, Bose, living under the modern mores of Hinduism who finds the display of a cow's carcass 'a very unedifying spectacle', and one is unlikely to find a cow's carcass displayed anywhere in India except

in the centre of a non-Hindu locality and hidden from view so as not to offend the Hindu populace. Customs and mores toward cow-slaughter were entirely different in the days of the Buddhist writers. Bose goes on to state that apparently beef was the commonest flesh consumed and that cows never came in the list of animals prohibited even for the Brahman table.

Romesh Chandra Dutt, Albert Schweitzer and Max Weber also document the eating of beef in this era.⁴ J. C. Banerjea, writing about the social life in the Puranic age which dates to about the end of 1000 A.D., indicates that Brahmins at a funeral ceremony were commonly fed with beef. 'In several places in the *Puranas*, specially where Jain doctrine and non-killing is sought to be contradicted, the need of killing is argued with great force and cogency.'⁵

The Distinction

The Jain religion has been attributed with the origin of the commandment of not killing animals and giving ethical significance to world and life negation. It is important to note that *ahimsa* does not develop out of a feeling of compassion 'but from the idea of keeping undefiled from the world' (Schweitzer p. 80). It is this subtle distinction which permeates the whole attitude of the pious ancient and modern Jain and seems to characterize the modern pious Hindu. It is not a feeling of empathy but an avoidance of violence. *Ahimsa* arises from the general principle of non-activity in order to avoid re-incarnation. Jainism which founded the commandment has never been a widespread religion and consequently its influence has never been great in India throughout its 2,500 years of history.

In sharp contra-distinction to Mahavira's philosophy regarding

1. D. S. Sharma, *The Gandhi Sutras*. Devin Adair, New York, 1949, pp. 37-38.

2. Albert Schweitzer, *Indian Thought and its Development*, Henry Holt, New York, 1936, p. 79.

3. A. N. Bose. *Social and Rural Economy of Northern India*, Vol. 1. Calcutta University Press, 1942. pp. 76-77.

4. See R. C. Dutt. *A History of the Civilization of Ancient India*, Truebner & Co., London, 1893; Schweitzer *op. cit.*; Max Weber, *The Hindu Social System*.

5. J. C. Banerjea, *Social Life in the Puranic age*, *Hindustan Times*, Vol. 38, No. 227, July 1918, p. 34.

animals is that of his great contemporary, the Buddha. The Buddha stresses the further commandment that man should meet all living things with a feeling of kindness and compassion. The second major contribution of Buddhist teaching to the formation of the mores against cattle slaughter was his economical rationale against the wanton slaughter of animals for sacrifice, particularly useful and productive cattle.

As a result of the conversion of great political leaders like Emperor Asoka and Harsha, Buddhism spread throughout the length and breadth of India. Buddhism was probably the predominant religion throughout India for nearly a thousand years. During this period, however, custom permitted the eating of beef and although the sacrifice of cows was considerably reduced it was still practised by Hindu priests.

The Facts

There seems to be no simple explanation as to how the mores of Hindu India came to make sanctions against cow slaughter. Let us recapitulate the forces militating for and against cow-slaughter toward the end of the first millennium of the Christian era.

(1) The Jain religion for 1500 years had been preaching a total ban against taking all life but not specially singling out the cow. Since it did not have many adherents, Jainism did not have any widespread effect on cattle-slaughter. (2) The Buddha preached against the wanton slaughter of cows particularly for sacrifice and probably reduced cow sacrifices considerably. (3) Both Buddhists and Hindus were still eating beef as a common form of meat at this time. (4) Muslim invaders were making inroads both from the North and from the South. The Mughals in the North were more fanatic about religious conversion and were therefore setting up counter-forces and religious resistance. (5) Sankaracharya's followers had begun to re-instate Brahmanical Hinduism and Buddhism seemed to be on the decline and

was finally effectively stamped out of India about this time.

As a concomitance of these forces, somewhere between 800-1200 A.D., the Hindu religion emerged with certain rigid dogmas: first, caste seems to have been deified during this period; second, *ahimsa* became a far more central ethos of Hinduism and the cow became singled out as the symbol of *ahimsa*. The precise historical and logical sequence of events still remains a mystery. Historical evidence shows a non-sacred cow up to 800 to 1000 A.D. and then the writings after 1500 A.D. like the *Ain-I-Akbari* or Abbe Doubois' description of Hindu customs, manners and practices depicts the worshipping of cows and the ethical prescription of beef as a meat for any Hindu.

The Malthusian hypothesis that any given area of land can only support a limited number of human beings (and/or cows) was never really tested empirically and, with radical alterations of agricultural technology, is no longer very tenable. There are countries like Denmark and the Netherlands which have a denser human and cattle population than India, but where their agricultural resources are very productively husbanded and complement each other. A country or a State may extensively

adopt dairy farming or mechanise its agriculture with radical alterations of its cattle population.

In short, there is no fixed optimum solution to cattle and human numbers: there are several possible solutions given certain conditions and a society can make alternative choices. The sentiment toward cattle and the strange political economic structure of India tend to limit the alternatives and make these solutions far more restricted.

Even though no 'climax' solution to the Malthusian cow-man-land equation can be given, certain trends may be shown which would logically dictate possible solutions. Let us examine the trends in human population, the land utilisation and the cattle population.

What we may generally deduce from these data are that after 1921 there has been a steady increase of human population and consequent pressure on arable land. This pressure has taken place in the face of a steady increase in the net area sown: the cultivable waste lands are being steadily brought under the plough and more land is being irrigated and double-cropped. Europe, which is about as densely populated and intensively exploited has only 33 per cent of its land under the plough and

Year	Population (in millions)*	Acres cultivated** (in lakhs)	Acres per capita	Cattle population*** (in millions)
1891	236	890	1.09	
1901	235	840	1.03	
1911	249	915	1.09	
1921	248	937	1.11	90
1926				92
1931	276	943	1.04	98
1936				103
1941	313	958	0.94	97
1946				94
1951	357	991	0.84	

*Population figures are extrapolated backwards for the present area of India (1951 Census of India, Vol. I. Part I Report page 122).

** (a) Acres of arable land and (b) acres of per capita are computed from a special study of trends of arable land per capita (c) Census of India 1951, Vol. I Part I. Report pages 138 to 141.

*** Taken from Livestock Census of India, 1945, p. 1. The figures provide trends from only those areas common to all five censuses. These areas cover 44% of the total oxen and 52% of the total buffaloes in the country.

about 60 per cent are permanent meadows and pastures. In India over 43 per cent of the land is already under the plough but not nearly as much of the remaining land can even loosely be called pasture or grazing land. It is the pressure on this uncultivated area which poignantly demonstrates the problem of acute shortages for cattle feed. The grazing area per head of cattle has been estimated to have declined from 1.65 acres in 1900 to 0.61 acres in 1940.⁶

In spite of the above trends demonstrating acute shortages of fodder, there have been some interesting counter-trends that heighten the economic problem. First, there has been an increase in the demand for draught cattle: this is a consequence of the increase in rural population (which proportionately remained constant at 82 per cent between 1951 and 1961) resulting in an increase of farm units, each of which wishes to have its own source of draught power.

One immediate corollary of this increasing burden on marginal lands is the deplorable practice of 'scraping up an existence'. Around major cities with a large fodder-shed for their milch cattle, one can see cycle jobbers, bullock-carts and headloads bringing in the sheaves of scraped up cattle fodder and thereby baring the scant grass cover of these marginal lands to the winds of the dry months and the waters of the monsoon. Many pious politicians and officials have passed 'orders' to prevent this 'malpractice' but the dictates of economics are far more eloquent. The precious topsoil floats down the muddy *Mata*-rivers and our marginal lands march on to even lesser marginality.

Dairy Industry

It is most strange that this land that reveres the cow and has preached the many virtues of milk, butter and curds has never developed a modern dairy industry. One may go further and say that there is scarcely one single efficient

dairy in the entire nation which could compete with even an average European dairy; or to take the argument illogically even farther, there is scarcely one dairy cow in the nation which could compete with an average dairy cow in Europe or America. This is the culmination of 5,000 years of breeding dairy cattle, dating from the coins of Mohenjodaro, through the epic stories of kings and merchants who kept legendary dairy herds, and selectively produced a dozen different breeds of dairy cattle, we have now sunk to this low ebb. Unless some strong physics is given to this ailing sacred dairy industry the milk producing capacity of cows will continue to diminish.

The efforts of the veterinary-biased animal husbandry departments have not resulted in any rigorous economic production-oriented policies for milk. Urban milk supplies over the decade are characterized by rising milk prices, progressive dilution and adulteration of milk. The metropolitan cities have made valiant efforts to consolidate their milk-sheds in various milk supply schemes: Calcutta's Heringhata, Delhi and Bombay milk supply schemes, etc., and the schemes of smaller metropolitan cities are but palliative measures.

Few Exceptions

One should strike at least one positive dairy note. Efforts of the Khaira district dairy co-operative have resulted in India's single largest dairy enterprise. It was preceded by Polson's private corporation, which has now been outstripped by Amul. Exemplary as this may be on the Indian dairy scene, it is still a far cry from an efficient dairy: average production per animal is reportedly still in the neighbourhood of 2,000 pounds per year.

Perhaps, the only really systematic efforts in dairying have been the Allahabad Agricultural Institute, the Keventers of Darjeeling, and the military dairy farms in the outskirts of army headquarter cities. All these dairy enterprises introduced either pure European

breeds, or cross-bred with pure Indian breeds. The myth of acclimatization was exploded 50 years ago by the introduction of European breeds in tropical parts of Australia, South America, Africa, United States and India. Yet, while we blindly introduce Middle White Yorkshire pigs and White Leghorn chickens, practically on animal husbandry department has widely accepted European dairy cattle.

A Solution

One solution to the milk problem is this author's patently simple formula which is entitled 'buffaloing the sacred cow': to reconstruct a sociological concept it may be called the two-step flow of milk.

Step 1: Start replacing cows by the relatively less sacred buffaloes as milk producers (as has been done in Khaira district), the super-ordinate economic values seem to be quite convincing even to the vegetarian cow-loving Gujarati farmers who find buffaloes to be more efficient than cows as milk producers.

Step 2: Introduce a non-sacred highly productive European milk cow; preferably one that is un-aesthetic looking like the Holstein for volume of milk production or the dish-faced Jersey for butter-fat. Like the High Yielding Variety programme let this be introduced only to selected cattle men who will adopt High Yielding Dairying as a package of practices: (1) The units should be not less than 10 to 20 head of milking cows. (2) Pucca, well-designed cattle-sheds with screened milking parlours. (3) Hygienic dairy equipment. (4) Co-operative membership for scientific feeding and for sale of clean milk. (5) Registration papers for all cattle. The co-operative dairy association would control breeding and disposal of male calves ostensibly for sire testing but actually also for culling. The sheer economics of this High Yielding Dairy operation in the Indian milk vacuum will dictate its own pace of diffusion.

The average Hindu in India, whether he belongs to the upper clean castes or the lower castes sanskritizing towards ritual clean-

6. L. S. S. Kumar: 'Problem of Pressure of Grazing': paper presented at Sixth International Grassland Conference, 1952.

liness, is socialized to revere cows, consider them as mothers and providers possessed of divine qualities, look upon *Nandi* as the vehicle of Shiva, and regard killing cows tantamount to Brahmi-cide and abhor beef-eating as a heinous sin and any one who eats beef as unclean. All this sacred complex is carefully instilled into the entire child-rearing practices of the Hindu from the time he is a young innocent child through his adolescence to maturity. The negative sanctions are so severe that any questioning of this cardinal dogma is never even entertained. It ranks besides murder and incest as one of the core values of Hinduism and is girded about with innumerable proscriptions, rites, ceremonies, attitudes and values.

Social Conditioning

The average Hindu who has been socially and psychologically conditioned in this manner is not likely to question a core value so deeply enshrined. (A few Hindus escape this sacred socialization on account of secular parents). Some, in their later years who attempt rationally to find their way out of the sacred maze, find themselves pathologically unable to eat beef on account of earlier psychological conditioning.

The power of this social conditioning should not be underestimated and any alteration of this basic ethos of Hindu society will entail a long chain of changing beliefs, rituals, attitudes and practices. A discourse on cow-slaughter with a revered village Brahmin today is an enlightening experience. His faith is so secure, his arguments so girded with absolutes, so decorated by *slokas*, that any hope of moving the mountain of faith of this veritably venerable man is an extremely forlorn one. The present generation of older Hindus sacredly conditioned may be considered 'lost' to any significant alteration of their beliefs or practices: they may be considered what psychologists called 'closed' to any changes with respect to cows.

The cow keeping castes in general are conditioned in a similar

manner with some other added elements which make the *Dharma* of their castes in some ways more sacred but in other ways more practical. Probably none of the clean castes like *Ahirs* and *Gwalas* would themselves ever kill cows or eat beef. But their cattle-rearing occupation takes them often to cattle markets in order to exchange their old and useless cattle for younger ones, as their common way of life. Or sometimes even trading dry cows for cows just freshening is part of their economic life.

The knowledge that other people at the cattle market like outcaste Hindus, tribals, Christians or Muslims who buy cattle and slaughter them for beef is accepted as part of the division of labour and the order of *their Dharmas*. These clean castes may look down their ritual Hindu noses at the unclean castes, but they also recognise the complementary economic utility of these professions. They recognise that the economy of their way of life is organically linked with other ways of life, some of which kill cows and eat beef. The unclean castes like *Chamars*, who are occupationally more closely linked with other lower caste Hindus or non-Hindus who eat beef, are more conditioned to beef-eating or cow slaughter.

The general farmers who keep draught animals traditionally used to sell them in the same cattle markets when they became too old and infirm. Some farmers who could afford it and were ritually higher up the caste hierarchy kept the older cattle when they became useless. The author feels that this practice has increased after independence as a result of the general propagation of sacredness and the bans on cow slaughter legislated in several States.

Institutionalization

As in any other society, much of the preaching about the virtues of cows is institutionalised in people who are not economically concerned with cows today. In earlier Hindu eras, Brahmins who made their livelihood by practising cow-

sacrifices were certainly not about to prohibit cattle slaughter. Now, since cow sacrificing is out of vogue, Brahmins, Sadhus and Jagatgurus can freely preach the virtues of the *Gomata* and indeed a veritable literature and rhetoric on the virtues of cows now exists in India.

The preaching and teaching have been symbolised and institutionalised in ceremonies and organisations like the Goshalas and Pinjra poles, the Goseva Sangh, Shiva temples, cow-worshipping ceremonies, cattle fairs, etc. Let us never underestimate the artistic excellence, the craftsmanship and the aeons of tender worship of the innumerable *Nandis* in lesser or greater temples of India. The Hindu religion has over a thousand years successfully embodied the general ethos of *ahimsa* into the cow. Today, the sacred cow in Hinduism stands as a symbolic edifice of mighty stature which can only be compared to the dogmatic complexity of the Virgin Mary in Catholicism or the defecation of Gautama in Buddhism.

Political Use

Last but not least has been the political use of the sacred cow symbol as a rallying point during the last 1,000 years but particularly during our recent struggle for freedom. Bal Gangadhar Tilak, the Maratha fire-brand of India's freedom movement, often conjured up the cow into his speeches. Throughout the national movement the Arya Samaj, the Hindu Mahasabha, the R.S.S., have all to a greater or lesser degree used the cow as a rallying point. Mahatma Gandhi was certainly not innocent of using the cow politically. Among politically important leaders, Nehru stands out alone like a rational bulwark who for some time stemmed the sacred tides.

Politically, the use of the cow as a rallying point was undoubtedly one of the divisive forces causing Hindu-Muslim riots for centuries and its use in our freedom movement undoubtedly contributed to the division of this great nation. In order to protect

itself politically against the forces of invading Muslim *Jehads* in the first millenium, the Hindus created the sacred cow as a barrier and a thousand years later the belief has become so reified that this contributed to the creation of a new truncated nation in our sub-continent. Although the skeins of religious and political thought and action are here so intertwined, for purposes of analysis it is desirable to separate political cause and effect to measure the political force of the sacred cow.

Fruitful Research

Where do we go with the cow policy? First, do we really have the 'facts' about the 'problem'? This paper has suggested at least three fundamental areas of fruitful research: (1) an accurate historical and religious study of the philosophy of *ahimsa*, cow-sacrificing, the eating of beef and when these practices were banned, (2) An accurate appraisal of how much sentiment there is today or a definition of its precise nature, its degree and the significant differences between various castes and groups in India. (3) The biological bias of veterinarians in the animal husbandry departments have tended to derogate hard economic analyses in the animal industries and a sound production-orientation or profit analysis. Harder facts on the elusive economics of milk production under village conditions or draught cattle utility and a more specific costing of the dys-utilitarian cow-years are needed.

From these studies, perhaps, some logical inferences can be made of super-ordinate values: whether indeed the sentiment for protecting cattle is more important than its economic utility? Which castes, classes and socio-economic levels of people have the highest degrees of sacredness or secularity? How does one expediently circumvent or surmount barriers to economic development? Which groups need to be appeased with palliative measures, and where and when are real concessions to be given which would be economically least damaging. In short, what should be the overt

and covert policy of overcoming the growing pressure that cattle numbers are putting on the overburdened agrarian economy?

Obviously, the problem has been allowed to drift for too long. Many deep scars have already been inflicted on our agricultural resources. It is high time we took stock of the extent of our poor husbandry and initiated long-term and short-term measures. Conditions are going to deteriorate even further before they can get better but, like the population problem, a halt must be called, the 'problem' must be publicly declared and propagandised.

Unlike the population problem, what public proclamation can be made, how far secular elements can pull up a sacred population by its traditional bootstraps, are moot questions. How does one educate or circumvent the sacred elements within the political and bureaucratic elite itself?

No Simple Solution

One patently simple method of buffaloeing the sacred cow has been humorously presented as an illustration of the tragi-comic aspects of this national drama which has been drawn on the vast canvas of over 2,000 years of our cultural history. One needs not only an objectivity and wide perspective, but also a sense of humour to examine closely, yet comprehensively, the tricks that fate has played, the economic havoc that a deeply-engrained religious value has wrought and how so many good intentions have gone awry so far.

The sacred cow in India unquestionably is one of the most poignant 'problems' in the modern world for which there are no simple solutions. It will take a long unravelling of economic, political and religious practices and beliefs to make the cow in India once again a purely utilitarian animal of the economy. The problem presents a challenge to the social scientists of modern India to provide the most rational approaches that a modern secular government can take with the least cultural, political and economic damage.

The agricultural reference

SURENDRA SINGH

IT is not for the first time that religion and science have drawn swords. The present controversy over the 'cow', therefore, should not pose insurmountable obstacles provided religious and scientific forces seek light rather than heat.

Nehru has said, 'We are strange mixtures of good and evil, of civilisation and barbarism, of the divine and the base. We talk in one language and act in another way. We hold aloft noble ideals and shout many slogans, but in our behaviour we belie them. We talk of peace and our manner of

doing so is often aggressive and warlike.

'In India, perhaps even more than in other countries, there is this difference between precept and practice. In no country is life valued in theory so much as in India and many people would even hesitate to destroy the meanest or the most harmful of animals. But in practice we ignore the animal world. We grow excited about the protection of the cow. The cow is one of the treasures of India and should be protected. But we imagine that we have done our duty by passing some legislation.

This results not in the protection of the cow but in much harm to it as well as to human beings.

The 'cow' problem has religious, social and political aspects which can only be commented upon with competence by experts and celebrities claiming eminence in these vital spheres of the nation's life. The 'cow' in India, however, also poses economic problems of an exceedingly grave nature. The economic aspect can be further split between the industrial-cum-commercial and agricultural sectors. This contribution is confined to the latter.

Higher Productivity

In 1961, India's bovine population was enumerated at 226.7 millions. This included 175.56 million cattle and 51.21 million buffaloes. The total bovine population of the world is estimated at 1076 millions with 972.9 million cattle and 103.4 million buffaloes. In other words India claims one fifth share of the world's bovine population yet only 1/40th of the land resources available to support it. In addition, in India, we have 60.86 million goats, 40.22 million sheep, 1.33 million horses and 7.25 million other livestock.

The significance of cattle in our national economy is a fact far too established to need elaboration. In India despite our enormous cattle population, its contribution to the national income has been very poor. In modern times, higher productivity rather than numbers is the aim of all scientific planning in animal husbandry. The position in India, however, despite developmental programmes included in the first three plans is quite the reverse.

Thus, the net value of livestock products forms a very low percentage of income from agriculture. Studies confirm that the present cattle population is considerably in excess of available fodder resources. Large numbers exist on poor feeding, which in its turn restricts productivity. There is thus a vicious cycle which development programmes find impossible to break through.

In India, livestock censuses have been conducted at five year inter-

vals ever since 1920. The number of cattle and buffaloes enumerated between 1920-1951 are shown in table I. It will be observed that between 1920-1945, the population of cattle in erstwhile 'British' India, remained almost steady at approximately 112 million heads. In the case of buffaloes it registered an increase to the extent of about 16 per cent, from 27.3 million in 1920 to 32.54 million in 1945. A sharp upward trend in the rate of increase becomes evident between 1945 and 1961. In the case of cattle, their numbers have increased from 136 million to 175 million at the rate of about 28 per cent, and buffaloes have also maintained an equal rate of increase swelling their numbers from 40 million in 1945 to 51 million in 1961. It is worthy of note that the rate of increase has registered a sharp upward trend since independence when sentiments against cow

slaughter began to take firmer roots.

During these years, mortality due to natural hazards like famine, floods and epidemics has been reduced. This factor has joined hands with legislation in a number of States, which have imposed either total or partial bans on the slaughter of cattle and buffaloes. Keeping in view present and future trends of increase in the bovine population at an average annual rate of approximately 2 per cent, it is expected that their numbers would exceed 300 million by 1976.

Parallel trends in the human population are likely to register a total human population of about 630 million by the same year which means that in 1976 we may expect about 50 heads of cattle per 100 human beings

If adequate resources for proper and scientific maintenance and

TABLE I

Trend of Cattle and Buffalo Population in India					
Year	Cattle		Buffaloes		Remarks
	Number (in millions)	Increase (+) or decrease (-)	Number (in millions)	Increase (+) or decrease (-)	
1920	112.52	—	27.37	—	1920-45 data for the former territory of 'British' India.
1925	115.20	+ 2.4%	28.48	+ 7.7%	
1930	117.81	+ 2.3%	30.60	+ 3.8%	
1935	119.42	+ 1.4%	32.94	+ 7.6%	
1940	115.61	- 3.2%	32.89	- 0.13%	
1945	111.94	- 3.2%	32.54	- 1.5%	
1945	135.96*	—	40.59*	—	*Calculated figure for the territory comprising Indian Union.
1951	155.29	+ 14.2%	43.35	+ 6.8%	
1956	158.67	+ 4.9%	44.95	+ 2.5%	
1961	175.56	+ 10.6%	51.21	+ 13.9%	

utilization of our cattle population were available, any increase in their numbers would be welcomed. But the fact is far too well known that available supplies are equally far too inadequate to meet the nutritional requirements of our livestock population. It is a common sight all over the country in areas both rural and urban to see herds of starving animals fend for themselves on almost barren grazing areas in the villages and garbage in the towns. Mass under-nourishment results in keeping productivity at the barest minimum level.

Problem of Feed

After a thorough study of the problem of human nutrition vis-à-vis animal nutrition it has been found that there is a very wide gap between available feeds and their requirements and experts have expressed the view that it would be difficult to bridge this gap unless large areas of land could be exclusively earmarked for the production of feeds and fodder. In India, 41.6 per cent of the entire area is put under agriculture crops. This is far in excess of the proportion of the total cropped area to areas under forests, pastures, etc., when viewed through scientific considerations. The question, therefore, of earmarking any additional or exclusive acreage for the production of feed and fodder alone does not arise.

A Committee of the Central Council of Gosamvardhana which examined the cattle-feed position a few years ago came to the conclusion that the available fodder supplies were hardly sufficient for two-thirds and concentrates for only one-third of the minimum scientific requirements of the cattle population. The requirement and availability of cattle feeds as estimated by this Committee are shown in Table II. Any further increase in the cattle population, therefore, would further deplete whatever limited resources are available.

Inadequate and improper feeding results in poor productivity,

TABLE II
Estimated Requirements and Availability of Cattle Feeds in India
(1961)

In Million Tonnes			
Feeding Stuff	Requirements	Supply	Deficiency
Green Fodder	390	132	(—) 258
Straw and Kadbi	168	142	(—) 26
Grazing	288	288	—
Oilcakes	7.3	2.3	(—) 5.0
Maize	7.0	—	(—) 7.0
Barley	7.0	—	(—) 7.0
Gram	5.2	0.5	(—) 4.7
Brans	3.3	3.2	(—) 0.1

slow growth rate, late maturity, longer calving intervals and poor working and milking capacity. Against an average maturity age of 3½ years and calving intervals of two years, the average annual milk production is calculated at 200 litres for cattle in India. Countries with better standards of animal husbandry claim corresponding averages of 2 years, one

year and 3,000 litres. In Table III a comparison is drawn of the availability of land resources for cattle in India and some other countries. It is quite evident that even the existing population is far beyond the sustaining potential of available resources.

It will be observed that for a head of cattle in India there are

TABLE III

Agricultural Area					
Country	Cattle population (in thousands)	Under Crops including permanent crops (thousand hecets)	Permanent meadows & pastures (thousand hecets)	Average milk yield per cow (Kg)	Annual milk production (thousand metric tonnes)
India	2,26,765*	1,62,883	14,002	200†	20,933
Denmark	3,504	2,740	328	3,810	5,233
Netherlands	3,817	977	1,291	4,180	6,959
U.K.	11,859	7,439	12,225	3,680	13,375
U.S.S.R.	82,077	2,30,286	3,69,689	1,690	63,100
Canada	10,904	41,845	21,003	2,890	8,395
U.S.A.	1,00,002	1,85,152	2,56,214	3,580	57,424
Argentina	43,300	19,472	1,18,357	—	4,581
Australia	18,033	33,214	4,46,123	2,130	7,002
New Zealand	6,598	792	12,840	2,800	5,690

* Including Buffaloes

† Approximately

about 3/4 hectares of agricultural land against about 1.6 hectares in the United Kingdom, 2 hectares in New Zealand, 3.5 hectares in Argentina, 4 hectares in the U.S.A., 6 hectares in Canada, 7 hectares in the U.S.S.R. and over 20 hectares in Australia. It will be of interest to note that in the case of Denmark and the Netherlands, the availability of land per head of cattle is also less than a hectare. These countries, however, overcome this handicap by maintaining a highly developed and export-oriented dairy industry so that although they meet part of their requirements of concentrates through imports, their animals are well-fed and economically sound. In India the situation is, however, aggravated by the fact that available agricultural land has to sustain a large human population of 439 millions in addition to a huge cattle population of 226 million.

Under-Employment

In India, one of the most important functions of cattle is to provide motive power in agricultural operations, rural transport and lifting of irrigation water. The number of working animals in 1961 was 80.54 million. Official studies in the economics of farm management in selected zones of States in India have revealed that by and large draught animals remain considerably underemployed. This observation will be confirmed in Table V.

It will be observed that while in West Bengal and Orissa, average utilisation of bullocks was reported to be 16 to 17 per cent, in erstwhile Bombay State the percentage of utilisation was 44.7 per cent, in Madras and Punjab and Uttar Pradesh the number of work days for bullocks were 116, 124 and 136 respectively. In the case of smaller holdings which constitute a major proportion of our total number of holdings, the percentage of utilisation of bullocks was much lower than the average just mentioned. It is an established fact that in India bullocks are not being fully utilised throughout the year.

Under-utilisation of work animals is mainly due to the existing

TABLE IV
Number of working animals maintained in India in 1961 (In thousands)

Class of Animals	Number
1. Male Cattle used for breeding and work	1,964
2. Male Cattle used for work only	68,730
3. Cows used for work	2,150
4. Male buffaloes used for breeding and work	493
5. Male buffaloes used for work only	6,644
6. Female buffaloes used for work	486
	<u>80,467</u>

pattern of small holdings and the mono-cropping system prevalent in the country. As work animals have to be fed and maintained all the year round, the cost of crop production tends to increase to the extent they remain idle. There is no immediate possibility of reducing the number of work animals to any appreciable extent but any further increase in their numbers would be reflected in further in-

TABLE V

Average Animal Employment of Bullocks

Holding (Group Acres)	W. Bengal percentage utilised	Madras days of work	Orissa % utilised	U.P. Bullock labour days	Punjab work days (8 hour day)	Bombay % utilised (Dist. Ahmed-nagar)
0.01—1.25)	10.94	123	9.78	39	72	46.5
1.26—2.50)	15.22					
2.51—5.00		119	16.18	82	103	
5.01—7.50		116				
				131		
7.51—10.00		129	18.20	152	130	43.2
10.01—15.00	16.86	128	16.04	188		45.0
15.01—20.00		140		247	157	48.2
20.01—25.00		131	20.30	294		39.6
				411		42.6
25.01—30.00		123				48.4
30.01—50.00						
50 and over					195	43.4
Average	15.09	124	16.95	164	136	44.7

TABLE VI
Number of cows and buffaloes over 3 years of age kept for breeding and milk production (1961)

<i>Class</i>	<i>Number</i>	<i>(In Millions)</i>
CATTLE		
Females over 3 years		
(a) In Milk	20.66	
(b) Dry and not calved even once.	30.33	50.99
BUFFALOES		
Females over 3 years		
(a) In Milk	12.46	
(b) Dry and not calved even once.	11.77	24.23
Total:		<u>75.22</u>

creases in the cost of agricultural production.

Mechanisation of operations like ploughing, lifting irrigation water and road-transport is increasing steadily and with a parallel increase in rural electrification programmes, the justification to maintain a large population of draught animals has to taper off.

While the dependence on work animals for agricultural purposes is progressively decreasing, the need for an improved quality of cattle for milk production is on the increase. The country's rapid urbanisation, industrialisation, increased consciousness of the nutritive value of milk and milk products have multiplied their demand. Despite our very large cattle population, however, the annual milk production in the country is estimated to be about 20 million tons only. This provides a daily per capita availability of 131 grams of liquid milk against the minimum of 280 grams recommended by the National Nutrition Advisory Committee. The number of cows and buffaloes kept for breeding and milk production is indicated in Table VI.

The average annual milk yield of an Indian cow is perhaps the

lowest in the world. A cynic has remarked that the Indian cow being holy need only give 'darshan' and not milk. In the Punjab, Delhi and parts of Uttar Pradesh, the average annual yield is approximately 500 Kgs. while in Manipur it is about 100 Kgs only. The average for the whole country amounts to 200 Kgs. In the case of buffaloes, the average annual yields vary from about 800 Kgs in Delhi, Punjab and Uttar Pradesh to 200 Kgs in Assam. Compared to these figures, the average annual milk production per cow is as high as 3,810 Kg. in Denmark, 4,180 Kg. in the Netherlands, 3,680 Kgs. in the United Kingdom, 3,580 Kgs. in the United States, 2,800 Kgs. in New Zealand and 2,130 Kgs. in Australia. Efforts to improve the quality and productivity of cattle therefore need to be greatly intensified.

No substantial increase in the production of milk, however, can be expected without improving their feeding. It is common knowledge that milch animals in the Punjab, Delhi, Western Uttar Pradesh and Gujarat, where farmers have been growing fodder crops are comparatively better producers than those in other States. Scientific studies have indicated that the level of milk

production of existing cows can be increased by about 50 per cent through proper feeding alone. Such an achievement can be possible through an approach of increased and improved production of fodder side by side with programmes aimed at the reduction in the number of cattle.

In the face of increasing pressure on land, any dramatic improvements in the production of fodder will be a very difficult task to achieve. The existing cattle population is neither being properly managed nor fully utilised with the result that the number of cattle being maintained is far in excess of available resources and the proportion of unproductive and uneconomic cattle is alarmingly high. As far back as in 1947, the Cattle Preservation and Development Committee estimated that about two per cent of the cattle population in the country (or 28 lakhs) were unserviceable and another 8 per cent (or 112 lakhs) were unproductive. Up-to-date figures for these categories of cattle must be all the more depressing.

Utter Neglect

The economic consequences of having to maintain such a large number of unproductive stock on already limited resources is one of the most serious obstacles in the scientific development of Indian agriculture. Surplus cattle are invariably let loose by irresponsible owners to fend for themselves causing wide-spread damage to standing crop and aggravating soil erosion. The problem of stray cattle is a nightmare for farmers all over India. It is an exceedingly tragic admission that the burning passion aroused in favour of cow protection is not reflected to any degree of even meagre consonance in the utter neglect which falls to the pathetic lot of old and infirm cattle even in a very large majority of institutions like Goshalas, which though sponsored by 'devotees' of the cow mostly fulfil a symbolic and ritualistic role only.

The Asoka Mehta Committee on Foodgrains reported that "The

problem of cattle in India seems to have remained as baffling as it was before. The number of useless stray and uncared-for cattle is alarmingly on the increase. The total number of useless and unproductive cattle is estimated to be 16 million. This large cattle population undoubtedly makes serious inroads into the agricultural output of the country. Besides, it also accelerates the problem of soil erosion. In fact, in many parts of the country there is already a serious competition between man and cattle for subsistence from land. We feel that the seriousness of this should be recognised by the government and steps should be taken by them for effectively decreasing the number of such cattle.'

The Agricultural Production Team sponsored by the Ford Foundation (1959), came to the conclusion that the country's cattle population was far in excess of the available supplies of fodder and feed and this problem was getting more difficult by annual increases in the cattle population. The Central Council of Gosamvardhana while considering this problem, some time ago, felt that the country's cattle population was already too large in relation to the feeds and fodder resources and recommended that steps should be taken to stabilise it.

Effective Checks

Cattle population in India will continue to increase unless effective steps are taken to check it. In view of the limited resources available with the farmer and restrictions imposed on cattle slaughter, cattle are being neglected and often starved to death. This is most evident in the case of male buffaloes. According to the Livestock Census, 1961, there were 6.51 million male buffaloes of the same age group. This is, what is happening in the case of cows also. As against 72.52 million adult oxen in 1961, the number of adult cows was 54.23 million. These surplus animals pose the biggest problem when the subject of banning cattle slaughter is considered.

The Expert Committee on the prevention of cattle slaughter has

strongly advocated against a total ban on cattle slaughter as such a step would result in a rapid increase in the cattle population by as much as 11.5 million annually with consequent increases in the number of unproductive and stray cattle. The problem before the country, therefore, is whether the country's cattle industry should be a growing economic asset contributing to the well-being of our people or a fatal drag on the country's economy. So far, programmes for reducing the number of useless cattle other than cattle slaughter have not made any significant progress.

General Reluctance

State Governments have been slow, if not, reluctant to enforce cattle development legislation empowering government to reduce useless breeding by limiting the number of inferior scrub bulls through castration. Wherever legislation exists, implementation of such programmes is facing the disadvantages of government's inability to provide the required number of quality breed bulls in replacement. Similarly, programmes of artificial insemination are also making limited progress because of deep-rooted prejudices, storage and transport hazards.

Ironically enough, a ready market to absorb the entire surplus cattle population of India exists in several foreign countries who have a large demand for it to meet their increasing requirements of food, leather, bone-meal and other allied raw materials. Such an export programme would, apart from solving one of India's main agricultural problems, also earn valuable foreign exchange.

In a country where every animal ranging from the mighty elephant to the humble mouse can claim various degrees of religious sanctity, it is not for any student of Indian agriculture to process or pursue such a suggestion. It is for the leaders of religious, political and social thought to give it their consideration.

Repercussions on industry

SANJOY SEN

At the present moment, some 20 million cow hides are available to the leather industry. The systematic ban on cow slaughter in different States has had an adverse effect on the leather industry, and its ability to earn greater foreign exchange. It is also believed that over 100 crores of national resources are lost to the country due to lack of carcass recovery of dead animals in outlandish areas. Un-

fortunately, these figures are at best a good guess as there is no readily available statistical data on which reliance can be made. Needless to say, apart from the loss in hides to the leather industry, such valuable by-products as fats, guts, oesophagus, glands, meat and horns and hooves are lost.

A curious fact, which has been brought out whenever there is any

agitation against cow slaughter is the decreased availability of hides. This leads one to believe that what is sold to the trade as fallen hides is really not obtained from dead animals. One cannot believe that the mortality rate of cattle decreases coinciding with the anti-cow slaughter agitations. It is now generally known that unorganised butchers go in for clandestine slaughtering in provinces where cow slaughter is banned. Unfortunately, there is a dearth of statistical data to establish the extent to which this slaughtering exists. The decreased availability during any period of an anti-cow slaughter agitation is due to the fear and apprehension of the local butcher of discovery and consequent punishment. Whilst the figure of legitimate slaughter stands only at 4.5 million, the balance of 15.5 million is made up of animals beaten to death or slaughtered on the quiet by individual butchers apart from the general fallen hide which is collected from dead animals.

Fallen Hides

If the status quo is to be maintained, the chances of increasing the availability of raw hides for finished leather production would be remote during the fourth five-year plan period as has been estimated by the various committees formed by the government. If ban on cow slaughter were to be effectively introduced, the repercussions on the tanning industry would be severe as one would then have to depend entirely on fallen hides and the total availability would be substantially reduced as there would be no production from normal or clandestine slaughtering.

Recently, some experiments conducted by the Central Leather Research Institute have borne out that there is hardly any difference between the physical property of a so-called fallen hide in the trade and slaughtered hides. It is common knowledge that a fallen hide is obtained from a dead animal and consequently suffers deterioration due to the time lag of collec-

tion and flaying after the animal's death. The fact that the fallen hide shows the same leather making characteristics as a slaughtered one, bears further weight to the thinking that what is known in the trade as fallen hide is really not so.

Clandestine Eating

The lowering of availability of cow hides due to any agitation on banning of cow hides is yet another proof of the above theory. Whilst no definite figures can be given, in my opinion, the banning of cow slaughter will result in substantially lowering the availability of raw hides as even now the unorganised sector devoted to carcass recovery has never been able to find enough dead animals to keep the carcass recovery centres going. The Khadi and Village Commission has been tireless in its efforts on carcass recovery. They have various schemes by which loans are given to establish carcass recovery centres solely for the purpose of better utilisation of carcasses. The majority of these centres complain about the lack of availability of carcasses to feed their capacities. Whilst one reason for this is the difficulty of collecting the dead animals and transporting them to centres, the other is the clandestine eating of the dead animal's flesh by the poorer classes.

A survey team set up by the Development Council of the Leather and Leather Goods some years back, were lead to believe that the colossal wastage one speaks of in India due to lack of proper carcass recovery does not really exist as the dead animal serves as food for our poorer classes in many parts of the country. Whilst this may be a controversial matter, one cannot entirely disregard it as every dead carcass eaten is one more hide lost to the industry. The social stigma associated with eating cattle meat and also dead animals is such that people given to such practices normally leave no traces behind for fear of detection. Therefore, it will be very difficult for social workers or others to find out the

extent to which such practice is prevalent in the country.

Rendering

Rendering or carcass recovery in western countries finds its place as a commercial proposition. It is common practice in large cities in the western world to have rendering operations where the hides of dead animals are taken for full carcass recovery, the meat being used as fertilisers or chicken feed. If India ever decides on completely banning cow slaughter, it would have to take proper steps for rendering on a commercial scale in big rendering plants. This will enable the concerned departments of the government to collect accurate data on the number of animals that die and are rendered. The task in big cities would not be difficult as collection of the dead animals would present no major difficulties.

In villages, however, the problems of collection would be difficult. Organised rendering on a countrywide basis can only be successful if the economic status of the poorer classes are improved. From a technical point of view, a hide of a dead animal, which is called a renderer or fallen hide, cannot have the same physical properties or leather making qualities as that of a freshly slaughtered hide. The reasons are obvious since, by and large, a slaughtered hide is a by-product of the meat industry where a well-nourished young animal is slaughtered and the hide taken off is of prime quality with a fine grain texture and compact weave. The fallen hide is principally obtained from old, aged and decrepit animals which are thoroughly ill-nourished. Nobody has any use for such useless animals and they are, therefore, not even fed. Depending on where the animal dies, the postmortem damages will be more or less. In many instances, collection is delayed up to two or three days and decomposition of a large part of the hide takes place during this period.

So far as the leather making quality of a hide is concerned, one requires a good tight textured

grain and a compact fibre weave to make it supple and attractive. It should further be devoid of any grain damage either from decomposition or from scratches. The chances therefore are that in every instance, the quality of the slaughtered hide will be superior to that of the fallen hide. If, however, mechanised rendering plants are established and dead animals are collected within hours of their death, the instances of postmortem damages can be decreased considerably. The deterioration in quality due to age and ill-nourishment cannot however be taken away.

Grave Situation

In a country with a chronic food shortage one can hardly hope to think of a continuously increasing useless cattle population as a result of banning cow slaughter. Government will have to weigh the economic and social issues involved in banning cow slaughter and arrive at a practical decision based on reality and not on sentiment or emotion. In my opinion, right thinking people in and out of government should try to pin point the gravity of the situation that may arise with the banning of cow slaughter in our country.

The effect on the tanning industry would be to lower the availability of hides and reduce its power of earning more foreign exchange. It will also necessitate further drainage of foreign exchange to import hides to keep the capacities going. The effect on the community will be much greater as a stage may be reached where we would have to decide whether the cattle population should survive at the expense of the human population.

As I indicated above, hides are a bye-product of the meat making industry. All over the world, organised slaughtering by mechanised methods takes place in abattoirs or large mechanised slaughter houses. Whilst meat is the principal produce outside of hides, a number of other bye-products are reclaimed. To mention but a few—fat, guts, oesophagus, blood, horns and hooves are principal products. The endocrine glands and pancreatic glands pro-

duce base material for the pharmaceutical and chemical industries. The deterioration of these glands after death is rapid and quickly renders them useless for the above purposes. In the case of fat, blood, oesophagus, horns and hooves, reclamation is possible to a large extent. However, experience at present shows that carcass recovery or rendering in India is such that much of these bye-products are wasted.

The success of our future planning hinges mainly on our ability to increase exports. All raw materials having a high export potential should be exploited to the fullest extent. Since our slaughter houses are outdated and slaughtering is done in unhygienic and insanitary conditions, we are unable to utilise the export potential of the animal bye-product industry. There is a large demand

fetch us foreign exchange to the tune of 1.21 crores. Due to lack of proper certification, a larger proportion cannot be exported.

The report suggests improvement of slaughter houses in India, which they feel would encourage the export of meat and meat products and make the other slaughter house bye-products acceptable to developed countries. This would result in the loss of slaughter house bye-products being salvaged and create opportunities for small industries to be set up around these new processing industries thereby increasing the employment potential. In case the present slaughter houses are modernized and equipped according to the report's suggestions, exports of the principal slaughter house products can be increased by 70/71 to the values indicated in the table below.

	Qty. in m. tonnes		Value in million rupees	
	1963-64		1970-71	
	Qty.	Value	Qty.	Value
1. Meat & Meat products	65,000	32.5	1,30,000	65.00
	1964-65			
2. Animal casings	370	10.7	1,037	30.00
3. Raw wool	11,955	76.1	20,000	120.00
4. Goat hair	3,119	7.9	3,896	9.8
5. Bones, bone grist etc.	71,322	27.5	1,06,983	41.3
6. Horns and hooves	2,230	1.6	4,460	3.3
7. Pig bristles, hog bristles etc.	178	13.8	259	20.00

for meat and animal bye-products abroad provided these materials are properly processed and sterilised and hermetically sealed. The report on Leather and Allied Industry in India published by the Ministry of Commerce brings out the loss in foreign exchange arising out of insufficient recovery of animal bye-products from slaughter houses. According to this report, approximately 1 per cent of the total production of casings

Whilst the export target takes into consideration only some quantity of the total indigenous availability, the table at the end gives an idea of the envisaged availability targets in the fourth plan for slaughter house bye-products hitherto lost to the community.

The entire subject of slaughtering and its consequences requires to be made known to the public at large. There is tremendous

misconception in the minds of our people regarding slaughtering. In our country, the cow is held sacred by religion. Why then is the cow treated so shabbily? Why is it that a community which treats the cow as being sacred does not take upon itself the onus of looking after the animal, of feeding it, and keeping it in the best of health? Foreigners travelling through our country cannot understand why our cattle stock is qualitatively one of the poorest in the world being ill fed and ill nourished. Would it therefore not be more human to slaughter the cattle in the best of health by humane methods of slaughtering where the animal is unlikely to feel the effects rather than to starve it to death.

The reason in India for not looking after one's cattle is that we are principally not a beef eating country. Since on religious grounds, the introduction of eating beef will be difficult, my suggestion would be to have large abattoirs established in the principal port towns in India where cattle could be slaughtered for exporting the meat to foreign countries. The demand created by such slaughter houses would give sufficient incentive to the farmers to look after the cattle well, as a well fed and well bred animal would fetch a bigger price.

Whilst the common man is happy to let the cow die a cruel natural death, by education one should be in a position to impress upon them that the indifferent manner in which they treat the cow to-day produces more suffering to the animal than humane killing in slaughter houses. The common man is also unaware of the fact that the cow will ultimately be

competing for his own food. It is not uncommon to hear about useless animals being pushed over the border of one Indian State into another because of banning of cow slaughter. One cannot understand why it should be morally incorrect to slaughter when murdering the animal by not feeding it seems to hurt nobody's moral ethics.

In conclusion, I would sum up detailing out the salient effects of banning of cow slaughter on the leather industry and animal by-product industry:

- a) India would become a producer of low quality leather if the tanning industry has to work only on fallen hides.
- b) Since the internal demand for leather shoes as well as the export demand are continuously growing, the full requirement of raw hides will have to be met by importing larger and larger quantities from abroad.
- c) Due to the unfavourable rate of the Indian rupee in the world market since devaluation, the internal price of leather and footwear will keep on rising.
- d) A complete ban on slaughter will do away with the clandestine slaughtering and the availability of raw hides may be seriously affected.
- e) The exports of casings will completely disappear as certification of casings out of dead animals will not meet world requirements.
- f) Most of the endocrine and pancreatic glands will be lost to the pharmaceutical and chemical industries.
- g) The export of meat and fat will never establish itself as a valuable foreign exchange earner.

Envisaged availability targets in the 4th Plan

1. Blood in the form of blood meal	1,000 m. tonnes
2. Useless meat in the form of meat meal	5,000 "
3. Horns and hooves	25,000 "
4. Hormones and glandular products	
(a) Adrenaline	20 Kg.
(b) Pancreatin	10 "
(c) Progesterone & analogues including Methyl testosterone	100 "
5. Enzymes:	
(a) Pepsin	20 m. tonnes
(b) Pancreatin	15 "
(c) Fungal amylase	15 "

Many dimensions

- VISHNU DUTT

THE General Election constitutes a dimensional change in the political and economic life of the nation. Its impact is pervasive. Even the outlook on an issue like cow slaughter, which figured prominently in the weeks preceding the poll, stands radically altered. Apart from the fact that the popular verdict is clearly in favour of more modern and realistic policies, on the procedural level itself the suggested ban on cow slaughter becomes an impracticability. Even if the Congress were to declare itself willing to amend the Constitution for this purpose it would be unable to muster the requisite two-thirds majority in the Lok Sabha. For argument's sake, one could assume that the S.S.P. would go along with the Jana Sangh in the matter, but although this will ensure the necessary voting strength on paper, its actual mobilisation in the House would still remain highly doubtful.

There is an even more important consideration militating against any such line of action. Three of the major States, where there is no ban on the slaughter of cattle or where this is only partially banned, are Kerala, Madras and West Bengal. All three have now passed under the control of non-Congress parties or groups which are unlikely to look upon any further tightening of these restrictions with disfavour. It may be recalled that the Congress government of West Bengal itself returned a flat 'no' to the Centre's recent recommendation on this issue. Madras

and Kerala were evasive but their attitude is clearly unsympathetic.

Anybody who thinks that a weakened and clearly sceptical Centre would, under the changed circumstances, be in a position to ram this down the throats of the Communists and Muslim Leaguers in Kerala, the D.M.K. in Madras or the projected coalition in West Bengal, clearly lives in an unreal world of his own. The question of the States' rights *vis-a-vis* the Centre under a federal constitution has already been raised by the non-Congress parties. In view of the fact that agriculture, which embraces cattle development, is a State subject, the Government in New Delhi is unlikely to take on a quarrel with the new State regimes in a matter where it patently lacks jurisdiction.

In the above argument we have assumed that the Jana Sangh's basic approach in the matter will remain unchanged. It could be argued that it is bound to interpret its enhanced electoral support in Northern India as popular approval of its stand against cow slaughter and a mandate for it to pursue the issue to its logical conclusion. Most observers, however, are agreed that this facile line of reasoning ignores the deeper lesson of the elections. This is that although the voter may be swayed here and there by regional and religious issues, his basic demand is for the government to get on with the business of governing and ensur-

ing for the people the wherewithals of a decent life.

Its newly-found legislative strength is likely to make the Jana Sangh a more respectable political entity in the public eye. But with respectability comes responsibility. If the party begins to look upon itself as the alternative to the Congress in the political life of the nation, it must fit itself for the task by discarding slogans in favour of policies and programmes clearly calculated to ameliorate the lot of the common man. Since the big problem before us today is the economic, it is not impossible that the Jana Sangh may, in course of time, come to soft-peddle suggestions so patently indefensible as this one.

The Supreme Court judgment, putting amendment of the Fundamental Rights beyond the ken of Parliament, is another blow to any move for widening the ban on the slaughter of cattle. This, it is true, is a verdict handed down by the narrowest of margins, and could possibly be modified by the Court at a future date, but for the time being anyhow it places an insurmountable hurdle in the way of people trying to get round the earlier Court decision, laying down that a ban on the killing of overage or otherwise useless bullocks or male buffaloes is not mandatory in terms of the Directive Principles of Policy.

Consensus

There is also a positive argument which militates against making the existing ban more pervasive and complete. The victory of the D.M.K. in the best administered State of the Union is a warning that regional urges and passions continue to be strong and policy needs to take note of this. With the prospect of four or five States passing under the control of parties other than the Congress, the situation becomes explosive with all kinds of problems and difficulties. The obvious need, therefore, for all concerned is to work for a consensus on major national issues. The Jana Sangh and other political groups could press forward blindly with their fads but they would only be pav-

ing the way to disunity and destruction.

This is a vast and variegated land, where a people with a multiplicity of religious faiths and social habits live. To try and impose an inhibition on all at the behest of a section would be to strike at the national nerve centre. Indeed, this would be an assault on the genius of Hinduism itself, which has prided itself through the centuries on its catholic outlook and its wide tolerance of other religions and faiths. Gandhiji's name is sometimes brought into the controversy but his injunction is clear: the Hindus, he declared in the *Harijan*, cannot impose their religious or other prejudices on Muslims, Christians, Sikhs, Zoroastrians and other communities which are equal partners with them in this nation.

Background of Sentiment

There is little doubt that the Hindu abhorrence of cow slaughter is grounded in sentiment, which has grown through a combination of circumstances. There appears to be little religious sanction as such behind it. The *Vedas* as well as other scriptures like the *Ram Charitra* and the *Mahabharata* make it clear that not only was cow-killing and beef-eating permitted in ancient India but that these practices were an essential part of many religious and social ceremonies. The *Rig Veda* says, 'Oh Indra, for you we, jointly with the priests, cook the fat ox.' and again, 'Indra says, she cooks for me fifteen—even twenty—oxen.' *Satapatha Brahmana* tells how the great sage Yajnavalkya was wont to eat the meat of milch cows and bullocks if it was tender or firm.

The *Brihadaryaka Upanishad* has this prescription for a vigorous progeny: 'And if a man wishes that a learned son should be born to him, famous, a public man, a popular speaker, that he should know all the *Vedas* and that he should live to his full age, then after having prepared boiled rice with meat and butter, he and his wife should both eat, being fit to have offspring. The meat should be of a full-grown or of an old bull.' The killing of the fatted calf ap-

pears to have been as much the thing done among the ancient Hindus as with the Biblical Jews when a guest was to be honoured. The *madhupark*, which forms an important part of the Hindu wedding ceremony, originally involved cow sacrifice—today recalled by the symbolic breaking of a piece of straw.

Beef-eating has a continuous history in the Indian subcontinent. According to Hastings (*Encyclopaedia of Religion and Ethics*) the finds from Mohenjodaro and Harappa conclusively prove that the cow was slaughtered for the kitchen though the humped bull was considered sacred as the symbol of fertility, probably being associated with phallic worship prevalent in the Indus Valley Civilisation. The association of the bull with the Siva today is an extension of the ancient religious belief. This does not necessarily mean that the bull was not slaughtered for religious purposes or for food. In ancient Egypt, where the bull was also held sacred, it was sometimes killed.

About the time of the last additions to the *Mahabharata* (about 600 A.D.) however, the cow was beginning to be looked upon with some reverence and its killing for the kitchen was on the decline. It seems plausible that Vaishnavism, which was about this time strong in the South and was much influenced by Jainism prevalent there, gradually led to the suppression of cow slaughter. The Gupta emperors were ardent followers of Vishnu and they must have extended their mighty arm in protection of the cow, made sacred by certain cults probably originating in the South.

Reaction

In more modern times, the exaggerated veneration for the cow among some Hindus derives from the hostility to the Muslim practice of offering it in sacrifice at Bakr Id. This is a phenomenon confined to Northern India and it found little currency in the South or in Bengal. The almost exclusive cause of Hindu-Muslim riots during the latter part of British rule was

the Muslim practice of taking out in procession a decorated cow for sacrifice at Bakr Id. That is why the feeling against cow slaughter is so strong in the North and practically non-existent in the South, where apparently it originated. It may be noted here that another practice engendered among the Hindus of North India by distrust of the Muslims was the *purdah*, from which the South has remained remarkably immune.

There is little doubt that the sentiment against the slaughter of cows is part of the creed of *ahimsa*. The vegetarianism of the Hindu derives in great part from the abhorrence of taking life, which is such a dominant feature of Buddhism and Jainism. With the gradual switching over of large numbers of Hindus to meat-eating the emphasis on cow protection is likely to be considerably modified.

Economics

Finally, there is the economic argument against proceeding any further in the direction of an absolute ban on the slaughter of cattle. This is indeed the basic justification for those who advocate a steady, selective elimination of useless or surplus cattle in the interest of a sane programme of animal husbandry. The reasoning is simple. India supports a disproportionately large number of cows and buffaloes, which it is unable to feed properly. The result is the multiplication of sub-standard cattle, which because of the sentiment against their killing, have to be maintained at the cost of healthy and productive milch and draught animals. These useless or inferior cattle are a drain on our agricultural resources. In the present difficult food situation, when we are trying to maximise agricultural production, such an archaic system cannot be tolerated.

A few facts and figures would be instructive. The number of cattle in India in 1961 was 226.77 million, or more than one-fifth of the world total. The land resources of this country with which to support this large population, on the

other hand, are only about one-fortieth of all the other countries put together. Owing to a number of States having completely or partially banned their slaughter, the cattle population has over the last two decades shown a more or less steady rise of 2 per cent and would top 300 million by 1976. The position with regard to feed supply has been deteriorating: a committee found a few years ago that the fodder produced in the country was barely adequate to meet the needs of two-thirds of the number of cattle and the available concentrates for a mere one-third. This has had a disastrous effect on their productivity. Whereas our cows do not mature till the age of 3 and a half years, calve once in two years, and have an average milk yield of 200 litres in a year, the corresponding figures for Europe and the U.S. are 2 years, one year and 3,000 litres.

So far as draught animals are concerned, it has been established that because of the seasonal nature of agricultural operations in this country, they remain grossly underutilised and thus economically a burden on the farmer's slender resources. The utilisation of bullocks in the country varies from as little as 17 per cent in West Bengal and Orissa to about 40 per cent in the agriculturally advanced Madras and Punjab. Operations like deep-ploughing and water-lifting are beyond the physical capacity of most Indian bulls, and power-tillers and lift pumps have been replacing them on an increasing scale. Mechanisation of transport has narrowed avenues for their employment for draught purposes. In fact, the whole strategy of economic development adopted by us militates against the use of draught or other work animals, and will at not too distant a date render them more or less completely superfluous.

Useless Cattle

The Indian peasant is acutely aware of the economic aspect of cattle-rearing. It is not for nothing that despite his veneration for the cow he does not look forward to a heifer in its progeny. The reason is plain—the bull brings a

better price than a cow. With the buffalo, it is the female that is prized, the male being useless for work except in the swampy tracts of Assam and West Bengal. Once the cow is past its useful span it is promptly disposed off. The Hindu may not himself sell it to the butcher but he knows the purpose for which the third party takes it off his hands. In States where cattle slaughter is banned, dry cows are turned loose by the thousand and prey on standing crops, with grievous consequences to the country's food output. Under a pilot scheme, the Punjab, Delhi and Uttar Pradesh governments rounded up more than 26,000 such animals in a twelve-month period.

Selective Elimination

Nothing could be more absurd than a system which insists on the nation carrying on its shoulders a cattle population beyond its powers of maintenance. What is required urgently is a programme of selective elimination of inferior breeds. This would help improve the quality and output of the remaining cattle and ensure a higher provision of feed and fodder for them. The Chairman of the State Trading Corporation has warned the nation of another setback likely to accrue should the present cattle slaughter ban be extended. He has pointed out that this would seriously jeopardise our ability to fulfill the order for Rs. 4 crores worth of shoes from the U.S.

The Food Grains Policy Committee has summed up the situation in the following words: "The number of useless, stray and uncared-for cattle is alarmingly on the increase. The total population of useless and unproductive cattle in India is estimated at 16 million. This large cattle population makes serious inroads into the agricultural output of the country. It also accelerates the problem of soil erosion. In fact, in many parts of the country there is already a serious competition between man and cattle for subsistence from land. We feel that the seriousness of this should be recognised by the government, and steps taken by them for effectively decreasing the number of such cattle."

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Mother

K. R. MALKANI

ON November 4, the Union Home Minister made a statement in the Lok Sabha. He said the States where cow-slaughter was not yet banned had been advised to ban it. And immediate steps, he said, were being taken in Union territories to ban cow slaughter 'in terms of the directive principle of State policy'.

We wish he had not made this statement. For it not only betrays his helplessness *vis-a-vis* the States, it betrays his ignorance of

the intensity of feeling in the country on this issue. A weak Home Minister is not a very seemly sight.

We say it is a crying shame that cows and bullocks and calves should be slaughtered in the country by the hundred thousand every year. Government should hang down its head in shame for its failure to respect national sentiment twenty years after it assumed power.

The Constitution with its directive principle on cow protection (Art. 48) was adopted sixteen

* Reprinted from the Editorial in 'Organiser' of November 11, 1966.

years ago. But to this day, the cow is not protected in West Bengal, Madras, Assam, Andhra (minus Telengana) and Maharashtra (minus Vidarbha)!

Article 48 itself is so faultily drafted that so-called useless cattle can be slaughtered even if there is a cow slaughter ban law. The Supreme Court itself remarked:

'It has been found to be extremely difficult to enforce the regulations for inadequacy of staff and veterinary inspectors, little or no check on the veterinary inspectors, who succumb to the butchers and pass animals not really useless as and for useless and aged animals.'

Total Ban

The demand of the people, therefore, is that Art. 48 should be amended to put a total ban on all cattle slaughter. And their second demand is that under the amended article, the Centre should avail of Art. 249 to pass a Central Law on the subject (even if it is accepted to be a 'State Subject') so that errant States may not go their wayward way in search of communal votes.

These are the two demands and Mr. Nanda's announcement does nothing about them. The aroused people of this country will therefore reject it wholly. They will, on November 7, stage a protest demonstration the like of which neither Mr. Nanda nor his New Delhi have witnessed in their life. We hope wisdom will dawn on the government before it is too late to save the saintly lives that are going on a fast unto death on November 20. If it doesn't then God forbid!

Cow protection is of course the religious demand of the Hindu world. But let it be clearly understood that the scientific *dharma* of Hindus has picked on the cow for solid earthly reasons. And let us add that prophets the world over have saluted the cow. The Hindu's reverence for the cow is of course proverbial. But the Bible also says: 'He that killeth an ox is as if he slew a man'. (Isaiah-66.3). And

even Prophet Mohammed has said (to his wife Ayesha): *Cow's milk is the chief cause of 'recovery and health. Ghee is a medicine and beef is a disease. Cow's milk is the means to cure diseases.'*

The Muslims in Bharat took to slaughtering cows not because that was a religious duty (Koran prescribed *qurbani* of a quadruped like sheep or goat). They took to it because the invading Muslims saw in cow slaughter a means of humiliating and browbeating the Hindus. We repeat that while it is the religious duty of Hindus to protect the cow, it is neither the religious duty nor the religious right of anybody else to destroy the cow. It is a shame that the Congress Government should follow the bigoted Muslim rulers in destroying the cow and not the enlightened Muslim rulers in protecting it.

Misconceptions

Many people, educated people, ask—uneducated people know better—why 'useless' cattle should not be slaughtered. Some of them go further and ask: Why not slaughter useless cattle and thus save the fodder they would otherwise consume, and use their meat to supplement our scarce food supplies? We submit that 'useless cattle' is a contradiction in terms. Even the most aged and the worst disabled cow pays its way. Here we can do no better than quote from the government's own reports.

According to the Government's Cattle Census Report of 1955-56, our cattle yields 68,39,000 maunds of dung—and a little less of urine—every day. And according to the Report of the National Income Committee, 1951 (para 44-A, page 68), the annual income from cow dung is Rs. 621 crores—or Rs. 38 per head of cattle. The income from urine would be Rs. 14 per head of cattle per year. And according to the Cattle Preservation and Development Committee Report, aged or disabled cattle costs only Rs. 23 per year per head in Gosadans situated in areas with ample jungle growth otherwise not marketed. So the problem is not that of maintaining so-called

useless cattle; the problem rather is of properly organising their maintenance. And the government has done nothing about that.

We will again quote; and we'll quote not a sadhu or a sanyasi but government's own experts. Shri L. C. Sikka, first Chairman of the Delhi Milk Scheme, has written:

'In India, with its serious shortage of proteins of animal origin, which for her predominantly vegetarian population could have been made up much more economically and easily by developing the milking qualities of her very large number of cows, production of draught bullocks has come to be accepted as the primary function of the cow.'

And Dr. D. N. Khurody, first Milk Commissioner of Bombay—the man who organised the Aaray Milk Colony, wrote: 'It would not be wrong to say that there is not a single cattle improvement project in the country today, which has made any progress, including the various key village schemes. There is not one government cattle breeding farm, which has produced an outstanding cow or buffalo...It is also relevant to state that India has programmes to develop its fisheries, its pigs, its poultry and broilers, goat and sheep industries for human food and even for export. But we have not undertaken anywhere concentrated efforts towards cattle or dairy improvement.'

Useless Argument

Coming back to the useless argument of 'useless' cattle, we would like to point out that such cattle can be kept in jungle areas where there is ample water and foliage, which is not otherwise used for cattle. There would, in that case, be no question of saving fodder by killing cows. We can both save fodder and save the cow.

And as for using beef to supplement food—what a former P.M. used euphemistically to describe as 'change of food habits'—our humble submission is that those who want to eat beef can go and eat the flesh of cows dying a natural death. We cannot permit them to

kill cows for their flesh, because too often it is the best cows that go to Bombay and Calcutta and are slaughtered there after the first lactation period. So long as there is any loophole in the law, good cows will continue to be slaughtered for their soft hides and ample meat on false medical certificates of being 'useless'. Vegetarian India cannot permit the continuing loss of milk so that others may eat meat. It is a serious threat to the health of the nation. Killing a milch cow for meat is like killing the hen that lays the golden eggs—of milk and manure.

If there is anybody who should change his food habits it is the beef-eater. For, a given plot of land can maintain two and a half times more men on a vegetarian diet than on a meat diet of the same nutritive value. As James Scott Watson, former Scientific Adviser for Agriculture in the U.K., has said: 'To manage food for a growing population, more and more milk and vegetables should be used in place of meat; secondly, those who depend heavily on meat should change their food habits.'

More Facts

There are people who ask: buffaloes yield more milk than cows; why not abolish the cow and adopt the buffalo? They add: tractors are more productive than bullocks; why not replace bullocks by tractors?

In the first place, the buffalo is not more economical than the cow. According to Dr. Khurody:

'In a recent experience in Aaray Milk Colony, Bombay, all we have done is to feed a hundred newly brought cows properly and look after them well. They have responded exceedingly well. Several of them have reached a daily yield of 10 litres and above. The average is about 6 litres. Their production capacity thus compares favourably with that of high-grade buffaloes. Cost of production of milk is about 10 to 12 per cent less than that from buffaloes under identical conditions. Investment in keeping a commercial herd of cows to produce the same quantity of milk

daily is only half of that needed for a corresponding buffalo herd. This is another important factor so vital to the producers.'

Some people prefer buffalo milk to cow's milk, because they think it is thicker and, therefore, more nutritious. It is not. On the other hand it dulls the mind; its fats and salt are not easily absorbed in the human body. Buffalo milk is spreading only because milkmen find that it can stand heavier adulteration!

Also, cow's milk is more suitable for humans because its composition is nearer to mother's milk than is buffalo milk. Thus while mother's milk has 87.41% water and cow's milk has 86.27% of it, buffalo milk has only 82.14% water. The fat percentage is 3.76 in the mother, 4.80 in the cow and as much as 7.44 in the buffalo. Sugar percentage is lower in both animal milks—4.78 in the cow and 4.81 in the buffalo—than in mother (6.29). Protein percentage is 2.33 in the mother, 3.42 in the cow and 4.78 in the buffalo. Ash percentage is 0.31 in the mother, 0.73 in the cow and 0.83 in the buffalo. Perhaps our westernised Doubting Thomases will have their lingering doubts dispelled by the fact that neither Europe nor America drinks buffalo milk; they all drink only cow's milk.

Tractor Disadvantages

At the same time, tractors can't replace bullocks for a variety of reasons. Tractors need huge farms; they are destructive of the small farms where personal attention yields better results. That is why Russia's kitchen gardens yield vastly more per acre than its tractorised farms. Also, tractors require quantities of steel, village repair shops and trained personnel, none of which is available. While tractors can only plough the land, bullocks can also cart goods. In India, bullocks carry more merchandise (60%) than all our trains, trucks and planes combined! One-fifth of our national income and half of our agricultural income comes from cattle!

Also tractors don't increase production per acre; they only in-

crease it per farm-hand; and we have no shortage of farm hands. As Shriman Narayan, former member of the Planning Commission and our present Ambassador in Nepal, has said:

'It is wrong to think that in India the bullocks can be dispensed with for agricultural purposes by persuading the Indian farmer to use modern machines and tractors. Economic studies and research throughout the world have proved beyond doubt that through the mechanisation of agriculture we cannot raise the yield of crops per acre. Machines and tractors can increase the productivity per unit of labour, but not per unit of land. In a country like India with a high density of population, it is therefore essential to utilize our existing animal and human resources to the full before thinking of introducing large-scale mechanisation in the sphere of agriculture.'

We have to bring diesel for tractors from long distances and even from beyond the seas. And above all tractors don't calve! They have to be bought every time you need them!!

The Prayer

In view of all these facts it is of the utmost importance that cattle slaughter is stopped completely and immediately.

We will remind the Congress rulers of what one of the earliest Congress Presidents said on the subject. Sir William Wedderburn said: 'I am ashamed to confess that we have rather helped extinction of India's cattle. I can dream of a cattle without a Nation but I cannot imagine of a Nation without a cattle.'

In the next few months we will be celebrating the fourth centenary of Shri Guru Govind Singh, who said: 'May I destroy the Turks. May I remove from this earth the sorrow of cow-slaughter. Fulfil this desire of ours that the cow be freed from agony so that we may be free from deep sorrow.'

Same is the prayer of the people today. We hope the government understands.

A personal statement

P. KESAVA DEV

IT is said that cow slaughter and beef eating is against the Hindu *dharma*. As a student of Hinduism and Indian culture, I refuse to believe that the Hindu *dharma* is such a slender thing as to hang on the life of a cow. Hinduism is more human, more tolerant, and more universal, as not to allow human beings to kill each other in the name of cow protection. It is an earnest attempt to understand the secret of human existence and the universal truth. Moreover, it will not be surprising to the students of Hinduism when I say that the great Rishis who are the authors of the *Vedas*, the *Upanishads* and the *Puranas* were beef eaters.

It is stated in the *Rig Veda* that killing of a calf is the main rite (*amgakriya*) in the Agnihothra yaga. 'Vayavyam Swathamalabheda' says the *Rig Veda*, which means that those who desire prosperity should sacrifice a fat calf to propitiate Vayu Deva (wind god). A portion of the flesh of the

slaughtered calf should be offered to the sacrificial fire and the rest should be cooked and eaten there itself.

The *Brihadaranyaka Upanishad* is hailed as the 'King' of the *Upanishads*. In that *Upanishad* it is stated that parents desirous of having sons who would become famous scholars, with the ability to win the love and respect of the audience by their speeches and who are capable of learning and interpreting all the *Vedas* and who would be blessed with a long life, must prepare a dish of the flesh of a white cow with equal quantity of ghee and rice, and eat it.

I will take two examples from the *Puranas*. Vasishta, the great priest, was the guest of Valmiki, the author of the *Ramayana*. The great Valmiki killed the best calf in the ashrama to prepare dinner for the great priest.

In the *Mahabharata* it is stated that the kind hearted Ranthideva

invited brahmins for a beef feast. Two thousand cows were killed, but there was not enough beef for the invited brahmins. Hence Ranthideva apologised thus: 'Please be satisfied with what is available. We do not get beef in plenty as of old'.

It is clear from the examples cited above that Hinduism does not ban cow slaughter and beef eating. On the other hand, the Hindu holy books sanction both.

Question of Survival

'Ahimsa Paramodharma' is the great ideal of the Hindu Rishis. I am not against this ideal. But let me ask a few questions to the readers. Does this ideal of *ahimsa* apply only to the cows? Is it not *himsa* to kill and eat bulls, buffaloes, pigs, cocks and ducks? Has it not become a national necessity in India to kill the rats that steal our food from our homes and fields? Will they not kill us by starvation, if we do not kill them? Are we to allow ourselves to become extinct by upholding the ideal of 'Ahimsa Paramodharma'?

Suppose India bans *himsa* by an act of Parliament. Then the number of cows, bulls, buffaloes, pigs, cocks, ducks and snakes will increase day by day, not in hundreds, but in millions. After five years, will there be living space for human beings in India? Will it be possible for us to move about? Will these animals and birds allow us to eat and sleep? Will it be possible for us to sustain our civilization and culture? Now, the question of questions is this—is man to survive?

Suppose cow slaughter is banned in India. What will be the number of dry cows after five years? Will it not go into crores? Who will feed them? Who will protect them? Even milch cows are starving in India. Can we feed and protect crores and crores of useless dry cows? Even after killing thousands of cows every day, do we not see starving cows wandering about? In India, cow protection means cow starvation and cow misery. Real cow protec-

tion should be cow feeding, and not banning cow slaughter.

From pre-historic days, the cow has been the main food of man. The early man drank cow's milk and ate its flesh. Even today in all countries, the cow is an important item of man's food. Those who do not want beef need not eat it. No one has the right to compel them to eat beef just as no one has the right to ban beef eating.

Let me now turn to the political aspect of this cow problem. 'It is not possible for cow-worshippers and cow-eaters to live as neighbours' was the slogan of the Muslim League before the partition of India. After partition, Pakistan was declared an Islamic State and a military dictatorship was established there. On the other hand, we in India have established a secular democracy. During the last 19 years we have not deviated from our secularism and democracy. We proved by our action that cow-worshippers and cow-eaters can live as neighbours. This secularism is India's heritage through the centuries. This religious tolerance is the basis of Indian culture.

Fundamental Right

The so-called cow protection agitation, started from certain quarters, scuttles our heritage, culture and democracy. I also believe that anti-cow slaughter agitation is an attack on the fundamental rights guaranteed to the Indian citizens. I have no desire to prevent the freedom of the cow-worshippers. But I will resist, with all my strength, any attempt by any one to deny my right as an Indian citizen to eat beef.

The argument for banning cow slaughter has no backing in Hinduism. I am a Hindu. My religion sanctions cow slaughter and beef eating. I am a citizen of the secular Democratic Republic of India. It is my fundamental right to eat beef if I like it. I am a proud follower of the great Indian cultural tradition. Hence, I want to maintain the religious tolerance which is the basis of Indian democracy and culture.

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POWER PATTERNS

a symposium on
the post-election
scene in our states

symposium participants

THE PROBLEM

A short statement

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the Study of Developing Societies, Delhi

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FURTHER READING

A select and relevant bibliography
prepared by D. C. Sharma

COMMUNICATIONS

Received from Amar Kumar Singh,
Susheela Kaushik, Dalip Kapur and
N. S. Jagannathan

COVER

Designed by Dilip Chowdhury

The problem

The fourth general elections brought into focus a variety of developing power patterns in the States of the Indian Union. These will influence profoundly the future of our federal democracy and, therefore, need careful study and analysis. The techniques of arriving at a political and economic consensus, once exercised within an amorphous, diffused ruling party which monopolised all power, have now to be designed to forge agreements at the Centre and in the States between more sharply demarcated parties which are sharing the totality of power in the sub-continent. In other words, the techniques of consensus, so characteristic of the Nehru Era, have to find an institutional frame. The study and analysis of the developing power patterns in the sub-continent makes possible the structuring of such a frame.

Rajasthan

IQBAL NARAIN

A DEMOCRATIC polity everywhere, and more so in developing countries like India, is not born overnight; it is the result of a tedious and none-too-smooth process of growth which is not always perceptible either. Elections here

are not merely the means of according legitimacy to one regime or the other; more importantly, they are at once the index and the instrument of the dynamics of the democratic process through which qualitative changes steal into the

traditional order struggling its way to modernity through politicisation. One may not always succeed in measuring these qualitative changes; yet, even an imprecise and impressionistic idea about the nature and direction of the change may import both meaning and life to political analysis in which one has also to depend a good deal upon the immensely useful but not exclusively important tool of statistics for the understanding of electoral and party behaviour. A modest attempt of this type is being made here in the specific context of Rajasthan.

Rajasthan can be cited as a microcosm of the country as a whole in terms of the infra-structural and political forces to which the Indian political system has been exposed through the fourth general elections. The crescendo of anti-ruling party feelings and essentially negative desire for change, the playing up of the cow in politics, the feudal challenge as crystallised in and outside the Swatantra Party, the direct entry of big business in the electoral politics of Jhunjhunu, the Swatantra-Jana Sangh pre-election combine to oust the Congress from power, the role of Congress break-aways under the leadership of Kumbha Ram Arya, the overwhelming number of independent candidates, the role of panchayati raj leaders and institutions and, finally, the inter-play of the forces of infra-structure and politics—these factors cumulatively offer a close parallel to the all-India pattern. And, yet, the perspective and the context remain peculiarly *Rajasthani*, to some aspects of which we briefly turn now.

Feudal Background

Firstly, the Congress cannot be called a nationalist movement turned political party in Rajasthan in the same sense as in the former British Indian provinces with their long tradition of the national movement. There were, of course, the sporadic *Praja Mandal* movements which were stronger in some erstwhile princely States than others. Popular participation in these movements was limited. The Congress, therefore, did not so

much inherit mass support in Rajasthan as it tried to cultivate it in the post-independence and post-integration period. Yet wide gaps remained between the ruling party and the widely scattered masses in this second largest State of the Indian sub-continent. There thus still remained vast masses of people in the grip of a feudal psychology which could be made to rally behind their erstwhile rulers all the more when the discontent against the ruling party became widespread as on the eve of the fourth general elections.

This is important because of two reasons. First, it shows that Congress has not been merely living on its past laurels in Rajasthan; its mass support has a functional base and as such perhaps a greater retentive potential, although perhaps it did not go very far in its span. Secondly, there was great scope for old bonds of feudal loyalty.

Political Circumstances

Secondly, although Rajasthan had established panchayati raj institutions in the year 1959, their full impact was not felt during the third general elections. Yet, it was obvious that these institutions were destined to play a crucial role later. Thus, during the 1965 elections the political parties tried to capture as many panchayati raj institutions as they could with an eye on the fourth general elections. And Congress was reported to have emerged most successful of all the other political parties.

Thirdly, it has been fashionable to explain politics in Rajasthan within the confines of *Rajput-Jat rivalry*, as if it were its *raison d'être*. No one would deny that this rivalry has been a fact of Rajasthan politics. It is also true that the two castes would more often than not tend to behave as mutually exclusive categories. And, yet, it was not always perceived how politics was making inroads both in the pattern of this rivalry as also in their mutually exclusive character.

Fourthly, Sukhadia in his twelve years tenure as Chief Minister has

not succeeded not merely in forging an identity for Rajasthan as a developing State but has also given to its people a taste for the fruits of political stability. It was, therefore, feared whether the State would retain its political stability and developmental tempo if the Congress lost at the polls. It is difficult to say how far this consideration motivated the voter and yet it cannot be denied that it was there. In fact, the factor was harped upon by the Congress, time and again, in its election campaigns.

Finally, the Congress system in Rajasthan can be cited as a one party dominant system in terms of its political influence, if not so much on the score of its numerical strength.¹ This has imported a sort of negativism in Rajasthan politics with the opposition political parties tending to be more *anti-Congress than pro their own programme*.

It is against this background that electoral and party behaviour in Rajasthan in the wake of the fourth general elections can be analysed and interpreted.

Present Picture

Let us begin by looking into the party position as it has emerged after the fourth general election.² A four-fold indice are being used here for purposes of this analysis—the number of seats contested and captured, the votes polled, the extension in the area of influence and the loss of securities. When we do so, the following pattern emerges.

(i) There were 8 political parties in the field, besides the Independents. The political parties and Independents together put up 892 candidates for 184 Assembly seats and 116 candidates for 23 Lok Sabha seats. The Congress spon-

1. The Congress had captured 82 seats in an Assembly of 160 in 1952; 119 seats in an Assembly of 176 in 1957; and 82 seats in an Assembly of 176 in 1962.

2. The author is thankful to K. C. Pande, Research Officer in the Cell of Applied Research in Social Sciences, University of Rajasthan, Jaipur, for helping the author in this analysis.

sored candidates for 182 seats;³ the Jana Sangh and Swatantra alliance for 170 seats; the Jana Sangh individually for 63 seats; the Swatantra individually for 107 seats, the C.P.I. for 20 seats, the Communist (Marxist) for 21 seats, the S.S.P. for 38 seats, the P.S.P. for 17 seats and the Republican for 6 seats. About 50 per cent (438) of the total sponsored candidates had been Independents. The Congress captured 89 seats (48.9 per cent of the contested seats), the Jana Sangh and Swatantra alliance 71 seats (41.76 per cent of the contested seats), the Jana Sangh individually 22 seats (34.92 per cent of the contested seats), the Swatantra individually 49 seats (45.79 per cent of the contested seats), the C.P.I. 1 (5 per cent of the contested seats), the S.S.P. 8 seats (21 per cent of the contested seats), and Independents 15 seats (3.42 per cent of the contested seats). It would be interesting to note that as a result of the poll verdict three political parties have been completely eliminated; these are the Communist (Marxist), the P.S.P. and the Republican.

On the basis of the foregoing election results it could be said that 48.37 per cent seats were won by the Congress as against the 50 per cent of the third general elections.⁴ It would also be seen that the Jana Sangh and Swatantra alliance could capture 38.59 per cent of the total Assembly seats. The Jana Sangh individually captured 12 per cent seats as against 8.52 per cent in the previous Assembly and the Swatantra 26.63 per cent seats as against 20.45 per cent in 1962. The S.S.P. also registered a marginal increase from 5 seats in the 1962 Assembly to 8 seats in 1967. In contrast, the C.P.I. strength of 5 members has been reduced to one.

The Independents

It also deserves a mention that, although in the 1962 general elections the Independents had sponsored

390 candidates and captured 22 seats, in the 1967 general elections they sponsored 438 candidates and won only 15 seats. And yet it would be wrong to conclude that the Independents are losing importance in the pull and swing of power politics in Rajasthan, as their crucial role had been too obvious in the post fourth general elections politics in Rajasthan which has recently passed on from a brief spell of Presidential rule to a period of renewed Congress rule.

Polling Strengths

(ii) Before we turn to examining the people's verdict in terms of the votes polled by different political parties, it would be worth while to mention that the electorate had increased from 1.03 crores in 1962 to 1.22 crores in 1967. Again, the percentage of total votes polled had also shot up from 52.35 per cent in 1962 (of which 51.3 lakh were valid) to 57.92 per cent (of which 67.50 lakh were valid). These two factors should be borne in mind while analysing the quota of votes polled by different political parties in the fourth general elections.

The Congress, which had secured 40 per cent of the total votes polled in the last general elections, increased it to 41.43 per cent in 1967. There was, again, an increase in the poll strength of the Jana Sangh and the Swatantra, both jointly and individually. While the Jana Sangh and the Swatantra together polled 26.26 per cent in the last general elections, they increased to 34.13 per cent this time. Individually, also, the Jana Sangh increased its poll strength from 9.15 per cent in 1962 to 11.70 per cent in 1967; and the Swatantra from 17.11 per cent in 1962 to 22.43 per cent in 1967. Except for the S.S.P., the poll strength of all the other political parties registered a decrease in the 1967 elections. The Communist vote dwindled from 5.4 per cent of the valid votes to 2.15 per cent.⁵ The P.S.P. which had secured 1.64 per cent in the last general elections secured less than 1 per cent of the votes this time. The

S.S.P. poll strength improved from 3.68 per cent in 1962 to 4.76 per cent in 1967. The independents who had polled 20.88 per cent last time had to be content with 15.56 per cent this time. Table I meaningfully sums up the position on this point for 1967.

District-wise Positions

(iii) We may now turn to look at the district-wise party positions against the comparative perspective of the 1962 general elections with a view to finding out whether there has been an extension or strengthening of the area of influence of the various political parties.

We could begin with the ruling party. The Congress gained substantially in Ganganagar (from 1 seat in 1962 to 7 in 1967), in Bikaner (from 1 seat in 1962 to 3 in 1967), in Tonk (from no seat in 1962 to 3 out of 5 seats in 1967), in Dungarpur (from 1 seat in 1962 to 3 seats in 1967), in Udaipur (from 5 seats in 1962 to 12 seats in 1967) and Jodhpur (from 4 seats in 1962 to 6 seats in 1967). The Congress losses have also been telling. No Congress member has been returned from Kota, Jhalawar and Jaisalmer while the three districts under reference had sent 3, 3 and 1 members respectively in the 1962 elections. Similarly, the Congress position has been reduced from 4 seats in 1962 to 1 seat in 1967 in Churu, from 7 seats in 1962 to 2 seats in 1967 in Sikar and from 6 seats in 1962 to 3 seats in 1967 in Nagaur.

The Jana Sangh had members from 7 districts in the last Assembly while this time it has extended its influence to cover 10 districts which include Churu, Alwar, Ajmer and Jodhpur. It has captured all the 10 seats in the Kotah district thereby doubling its strength. It has, however, been ousted from Udaipur and Chittor. So far as the Swatantra Party is concerned, it had its contingent of members from 11 districts in 1962 which has now been reduced to 9 districts, viz., Ganganagar, Sikar, Alwar, Jhalawar, Sirohi, Jalore, Barmer, Jaisalmer and Jodhpur. Incidentally, most of them happen to be former princely States. The Swatantra Party has, however,

3. The Congress did not put up candidates against Maharaja Harish Chandra in Khanpur (Jhalawar) and against Abdul Hadi in Chohtan (Barmer).

4. The Congress had, however, increased its strength by 1 in the Assembly.

5. Both the wings of the CPI have been treated in a combined fashion for the purpose of this analysis.

TABLE I

**District-wise Disbursement of Percentage of Votes Secured by Parties
(Vidhan Sabha) in the 1967 General Elections**

Districts	Congress	Jana Sangh	Swt.	Comm.	Comm. (M)	SSP.	PSP.	Repb.	Indpt.
1. Ganganagar	41.09	3.13	21.61	0.52	6.42	10.83	—	—	16.40
2. Bikaner	32.71	5.34	9.34	1.01	0.29	6.53	9.45	—	35.33
3. Churu	31.13	13.66	2.71	1.03	4.22	—	0.68	—	46.57
4. Jhunjhunu	42.52	1.69	38.10	—	2.38	—	—	—	15.31
5. Sikar	40.16	20.61	10.56	—	4.88	—	6.64	—	17.15
6. Jaipur	34.66	7.35	43.99	0.32	0.15	0.11	0.40	0.28	12.74
7. Alwar	36.88	8.75	11.95	9.08	2.45	11.08	—	—	19.81
8. Bharatpur	28.28	1.16	7.84	1.74	—	23.18	—	2.01	35.79
9. S. Madhopur	41.72	16.17	22.59	—	—	1.19	—	—	18.33
10. Tonk	51.25	—	44.57	—	—	—	—	—	4.18
11. Ajmer	37.93	17.86	32.32	2.01	—	0.27	—	0.08	9.53
12. Bundi	42.67	36.58	—	—	—	7.71	6.76	—	6.28
13. Kota	36.60	53.41	—	—	—	1.22	—	—	8.77
14. Jhalawar	22.27	26.70	19.00	—	—	1.95	—	—	30.08
15. Chittorgarh	47.58	17.94	9.27	—	0.31	3.16	—	—	21.74
16. Banswara	48.17	1.99	—	—	—	47.05	—	—	2.79
17. Dungarpur	59.10	—	38.03	1.84	—	—	—	—	1.03
18. Udaipur	56.41	18.14	17.01	0.27	—	0.86	0.31	—	7.00
19. Bhilwara	55.91	9.13	12.81	—	0.66	7.47	1.52	—	12.50
20. Pali	40.96	—	45.28	0.56	3.11	—	—	—	10.09
21. Sirohi	38.96	8.47	28.60	—	—	—	—	—	23.97
22. Jalore	38.96	10.36	36.05	—	—	—	—	—	14.69
23. Barmer	49.00	4.74	18.78	0.56	—	—	—	—	26.92
24. Jaisalmer	40.27	—	52.14	—	—	—	3.36	—	4.23
25. Jodhpur	48.54	18.17	22.52	0.42	0.21	—	1.20	—	8.94
26. Nagaur	41.64	8.05	33.70	0.54	—	—	—	—	16.07
Rajasthan	41.43	11.70	22.43	0.97	1.18	4.76	0.81	0.16	16.56

been ousted from the districts of Chittor and Bharatpur. If we were to talk about the performance of the Jana Sangh-Swatantra alliance, it could be said that the two have covered 22 districts out of 26 (84.6%), the exceptions being Bikaner, Banswara, Bhilwara and Chittor.

Now, a word about other political parties may not be out of place here. The C.P.I. retained its only seat in Alwar. The P.S.P., which had 2 seats in Bikaner, scored a duck on the polling board. The S.S.P. which had five members in the previous Assembly from Bharatpur and Banswara not only retained these seats but increased its strength by 3 seats, spreading itself to two new districts, Ganganagar and Alwar.

Table II speaks for itself in regard to the district-wise position of different political parties in the 1962 and 1967 elections.

(iv) We may now turn to the phenomenon of the loss of security deposits by the candidates of different political parties in Rajasthan during the 1967 general elections. Out of 93 Congress candidates who were defeated, only 3 (3.2%) lost their securities. From among the 100 candidates belonging to the Jana Sangh-Swatantra alliance, 27 (27%) forfeited their securities. In their individual capacities, out of 41 and 59 defeated candidates of the Jana Sangh and Swatantra parties, 11 (26.8%) and 16 (27.1%) candidates respectively lost their deposits.

The other political parties were much worse off. For example, out of 19 C.P.I. candidates who lost, 17 (89.5%) forfeited their securities. Again, from among the 17 candidates of the P.S.P., 14 (82.3%) lost their deposits. The performance of the S.S.P. has been slightly better in comparison to other Leftist parties in the State. Out of the 38 candidates who lost at the polls, 18 (47.4%) lost their deposits. At the top of the ladder, however, were the Independents in whose case out of 422 defeated candidates 387 (91.7%) forfeited their deposits which constitutes 88 per cent of the total independent candidates who contested the elections. If we were to take an overview we could say that about 55 per cent of the total contesting candidates forfeited their securities. We could re-capi-

TABLE II
District-wise Number of Contestants and Party-wise Position of Elected Candidates

District-wise Number of Contestants and Party-wise Position of Winning Candidates																	Average No. of contesting candi- dates per seat												
No. of contestants			No. of constituencies			Party-wise position of winning candidates																							
1967			1962			1967			1962			Cong.			Swt.		J.S.			SSP.			CPI			Ind.			
1967	1962	1967	1962	1967	1962	1967	1962	1967	1962	1967	1962	1967	1962	1967	1962	1967	1962	1967	1962	1967	1962	1967	1962	1967	1962	1967	1962	1967	1962
1. Ganganagar	45	27	7	9	7	7	1	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
2. Bikaner	34	30	4	4	4	3	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
3. Churu	37	29	6	6	6	1	4	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
4. Jhunjhunu	36	32	7	7	7	3	3	4	3	2	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
5. Sikar	30	59	7	7	8	2	7	2	—	2	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
6. Jaipur	90	109	17	17	17	4	2	11	13	2	2	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
7. Alwar	65	53	10	10	10	5	6	1	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
8. Bharatpur	75	62	10	10	10	4	2	—	2	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
9. S. Madhopur	51	36	9	9	8	4	3	3	2	2	3	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
10. Tonk	20	16	5	5	4	3	—	2	4	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
11. Ajmer	47	55	9	9	9	2	6	5	2	2	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
12. Duudi	13	15	1	1	1	1	2	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
13. Kota	39	39	7	8	7	—	3	—	—	8	4	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
14. Jhalawar	20	22	5	5	5	—	3	2	—	2	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
15. Chittorgarh	28	26	7	7	7	6	5	—	1	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
16. Banswara	13	12	4	4	4	2	2	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
17. Dungarpur	13	11	4	4	3	3	1	1	2	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
18. Udaipur	43	47	13	13	13	12	5	1	5	—	3	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
19. Bhilwara	31	40	8	8	8	7	7	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
20. Pali	32	41	7	7	7	2	5	5	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
21. Sirohi	15	13	3	3	3	2	3	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
22. Jalore	20	22	5	5	5	2	4	3	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
23. Barmer	23	19	6	6	5	4	2	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
24. Jaisalmer	5	5	1	1	1	—	1	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
25. Jodhpur	35	35	7	8	7	6	4	—	—	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
26. Nagaur	33	35	8	9	8	3	6	5	1	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	—
TOTAL:			893	890	176	89	88	49	36	22	15	8	5	1	5	15	22	(2 PSP) (3 Rep)		4.85		5.1							

tulate the State-wise position in regard to this aspect with the help of Table III.

The pen-picture of the poll results will not be complete unless a passing reference is also made to the Lok Sabha results. Here the Congress reverses were more marked. While the Congress had 14 seats in the outgoing Lok Sabha, it could capture only 10 out of 22 (45.5%) in the 1967 elections. In contrast, both the Jana Sangh and the Swatantra parties improved their position. The Jana Sangh could secure 3 out of 7 (42.9%) thereby improving its position from 1 seat in 1962 to 3 in 1967. The performance of the Swatantra Party was still better. It could secure 8 out of the 14 seats (57.1%) that it contested, thereby improving its position from 3 in the last Lok Sabha to 8 in the present Lok Sabha. Two Independents could get elected, while in the last Lok Sabha there were 3 Independents. No other political party could secure a single seat in the Lok Sabha.

It is interesting to note that the reverses of the Congress in the

Lok Sabha elections are not reflected in the votes secured by it. In the 1962 elections, when the Congress had captured 14 seats, it had secured 37.58 per cent of the vote; in 1967, when its position has been reduced to 10, it has secured 39.95 per cent of the votes. Similarly, the Swatantra Party with 3 seats had polled 10.1 per cent of votes in 1962; with 8 seats in 1967 it has secured only 27.05 per cent of votes. Again, the Jana Sangh with 1 member in the 1962 Lok Sabha polled 9.28 per cent of votes; it has 3 seats now with 10.27% of the votes.

We may now turn for a while to reflect on the Jana Sangh-Swatantra electoral alliance. The two parties hoped to oust the Congress and form the government by joining hands with each other as allies in electoral contests. While the Swatantra expected to take advantage of the organizational strength of the Jana Sangh, the latter looked forward to reaching rural areas and winning over Muslim votes with the help of the latter. The alliance in the ultimate analysis turned out to be more a marriage

of convenience than the proverbial meeting of minds; it at best could yield marginal utility to the partners.

The alliance perhaps had more moments of embarrassment than satisfaction. Quite a few aspirants for tickets in both parties felt that the alliance was at the cost of their candidature. In some cases they even decided to stand as independents. The organization of the Jana Sangh could be marshalled in favour of the Swatantra Party only in a half hearted manner. The Swatantra leaders would tend to avoid canvassing among Muslims for Jana Sangh candidates. It is difficult to say whether the Jana Sangh reached the villages more through the cow and the Sadhus than through Swatantra support. It is equally difficult to say how far the alliance added to the individual polling strength of the allies. To a political analyst, the alliance may seem to hamper the process of political polarisation between the political parties rather than to facilitate it, despite the fact that most of the contests virtually became straight fights

TABLE III
Party-wise Position of Contesting Candidates, the Strength in the Assembly,
Loss of Security and Votes Secured

PARTY	No. of candidates Sponsored		No. of candidates Elected		Average No. of candidates sponsored per elected candidate	No. of defeated candidates losing their deposits	% Total	% to the total % of candidates sponsored	Votes secured as % to total valid votes
		%		%					
1. Congress	182	20.4	89	48.4	2.04	3	0.62	1.64	41.44
2. Swatantra	109	12.1	49	26.6	2.22	16	3.27	14.81	22.46
3. Jana Sangh	62	7.1	22	11.9	2.82	11	2.24	17.46	11.61
4. S.S.P.	40	4.3	8	4.4	5.00	18	3.67	47.36	4.76
5. C.P.I.	20	2.2	1	0.5	20.00	17	3.47	85.06	00.95
6. Communist (M)	21	2.3	—	0.0	—	18	3.67	85.71	1.15
7. P.S.P.	16	1.9	—	0.0	—	14	2.86	82.35	0.81
8. Republican	6	0.7	—	0.0	—	6	1.22	100.00	0.16
9. Independents	437	49.0	15	8.2	29.13	387	78.98	88.55	11.66
Total:	893	100.0	184	100.0	4.85	490	100.0	54.87	100.00

between the alliance and the Congress.

Congress Breakaways

We may now turn to dilate for a while on the phenomenon of Congress breakaways and its implications for electoral and party behaviour on the one hand, and Rajasthan politics on the other. It was almost on the eve of the general elections that Kumbha Ram Arya and his group with his friend, the late Maharaja Harish Chandra of Jhalawar, decided to leave the Congress and form the Janta Party. The Swatantra-Jana Sangh alliance began to assume the form of some sort of a triple alliance when the Janta Party came to an electoral understanding of mutual support and co-operation with it.

It is no denying the fact that the Congress breakaways adversely affected the poll prospects of the Congress, particularly in the pockets of influence of Kumbha Ram Arya, which were largely Jat dominated. Still, one could say that the Congress breakaways did more good than harm to the parent organisation. The Congress has emerged politically more homogeneous and compact after the exit of Kumbha Ram and his followers from the organisation than before. The difference according to some Congressmen was one of internal sabotage during electioneering with which they had to put up with so long as Kumbha Ram Arya and his followers were an intra-party competing and bargaining faction rather than the overt opposition as a rival party now; they preferred the latter to the former.⁶

The development has also been important for other reasons. It has meant at least a marginal split in Jat voting because important Jat leaders were also retained in the Congress fold, who tried to wean away the Jat voters from the fold of Kumbha Ram Arya. Further, political considerations tended to cut across traditional Jat-Rajput rivalry. The very fact that Maha-

raja Harish Chandra left the Congress along with Kumbha Ram Arya paved the way for a rapprochement. Kumbha Ram Arya was seen canvassing for Swatantra Rajput candidates. Jats are also reported to have voted for Rajputs under the influence of Kumbha Ram Arya. The Swatantra Party also put up some Jat candidates.⁷ However, this is only the symbolic first blast of change which is yet to stabilize.

A Case Study

The Congress had not merely to put up with the opposition of its own breakaways, it also found almost all the leading princes supporting the alliance and the Independents against the ruling party, the royal houses of Bikaner and Udaipur being the exceptions. That may not be surprising in view of the fact that Congress had itself encouraged the princes to be actively associated with politics and the princes had in the Swatantra Party a platform which they could stand by and support. What, however, created news was the defeat of the glamorous Maharani Gayatri Devi in the Malpura constituency where her son had contested and won in the last general elections against the present contestant, Damodar Lal Vyas. She lost by a margin of 9026 votes.⁸ A survey of elite opinion accounts for the success of Vyas thus.⁹

(i) The attitude and behaviour of Vyas towards the constituency after his becoming a minister through a bye-election remained extremely considerate and helpful, although he had lost from this area. This had an overwhelming influence on the voters in the constituency.

(ii) An allied phenomenon was the role that Vyas played in boost-

ing up the tempo of developmental activities in general, and relief work in particular, in the Malpura constituency. This point has been conceded even by almost all the elites who had affiliations with the Swatantra-Jana Sangh alliance in one way or the other and also by the uncommitted elites, let alone the question of the Congress elites.

(iii) The foregoing two advantages had a sweeping effect because of the supreme indifference and apathy of the sitting M.L.A. to the woes and problems of the constituency. He would seldom visit the constituency, nor could the constituents approach him. He, of course, could be no match to the favours that a minister could bestow on a constituency. But what the constituents seemed to mind most was the attitude of the sitting M.L.A. and not so much his failure to bestow favours. This factor, again, has been corroborated by some Jana Sangh-Swatantra elites and by all the uncommitted elites.

(iv) Panchayati raj institutions also played a helpful role, which we will discuss in the next section of this article.

(v) Other reasons mentioned in the survey relate to such factors as the local roots of Vyas who belonged to the constituency, the support of the Muslim minority and the use of the official machinery. The last two points have been made by some Jana Sangh and Swatantra elites and a few uncommitted elites.

Panchayati Raj

We can now discuss the role of panchayati raj institutions in the general elections. So far as the specific situation of Malpura is concerned, the Congress is reported to have captured 27 out of 30 panchayats in the 1965 elections. Although Vyas had lost in the Assembly elections, his cousin became Pramukh of the Zilla Parishad. Vyas decided to withdraw his brother in favour of a Jat candidature for Pradhanship in Malpura, because the constituency had about

6. Interview with a leading Congress candidate in Churu district which happens to be a stronghold of Kumbha Ram Arya.

7. Brij Bihari from Ramgarh in Alwar district can be cited as an example.

8. Even in the Parliamentary elections where she had polled 192,909 votes as against 63,209 of her Congress opponent in 1962, she could secure 196,892 votes against her Congress opponent's total of 102,642 votes.

9. The author is thankful to P. S. Varma, Research Associate in the Cell of Applied Research in Urban and Rural Politics for conducting this survey.

9000 Jat voters. With this perspective planning, he succeeded in securing Jat support, in spite of all the efforts of Kumbha Ram to canvas against him. The 27 panchayats also served as media for mobilising support.

From this, however, it should not be concluded that the Congress dominated panchayati raj institutions always served as vote banks for the ruling party. The discriminatory dealings of the ruling group, the division of the panchayati area into dominating and minority groups, and the rivalry between M.L.A. and panchayati raj leaders, and the growing number of panchayati raj leaders as aspirants for Congress tickets which they could not get in all cases, made the panchayati raj institutions play as much a negative as a positive role in the general elections. But the trend towards linkage between local and State level politics only became unmistakable in the wake of the fourth general elections.

An Exciting Contest

Finally, we move to the exciting parliamentary contest in Jhunjhunu, where R. K. Birla was contesting on a Swatantra symbol against Congress candidate, Morarka. It was in the main a triangular fight with Ghasi Ram, the Left Communist Jat candidate, moving about in his only jeep, largely in rural areas, and yet polling about 70,000 votes. While he tended to monopolise the Jat vote, it, once again, got split here, at least marginally, particularly in favour of R. K. Birla under the influence of Kumbha Ram Arya and big money. The success of Birla is too complex to admit of any single factor explanation. His overwhelming resources in terms of the fleet of vehicles and personnel (the Birla executives belonging to the area on leave), role of money, mobilisation on caste grounds, the work done by the Birla house in Shekhawati area, particularly in Pilani, the playing up of the cow in politics, the support of the Jana Sangh-Swatantra alliance and also of the local Jagirdars and the charge that Morarka had been apathetic to his

constituency¹⁰, altogether account for the defeat of Morarka, who by all estimates was only a darling of the intellectual elites whose support can do precious little by itself.

Major Trends

It will be presumptuous on our part to draw any general conclusions based on this analysis which should be treated more as snapshots of the varied, complex and vast panorama of the general elections in Rajasthan rather than a systematic, empirical study. Still, the following major trends are being identified more by way of hypotheses than empirically formulated conclusions.

- (i) Altogether, the position of the ruling party would at best emerge as one of *near status quo* and at the worst as one of *marginal decline* which tends to be steep at the parliamentary level.
- (ii) The Rightist political parties, the Swatantra and Jana Sangh, have substantially improved their position both individually and collectively.
- (iii) The Leftist political parties have registered a decline.
- (iv) The position of the Independents, in spite of their overwhelming numbers, shows a distinct downward trend in terms of poll verdict, if not in political importance.
- (v) There is no definite co-relation between votes polled and seats captured by a political party.
- (vi) Politics has shown the potential to secularise the infrastructure.

10. In an interview with Morarka, the author asked his reactions to the charge that he had done nothing for his constituency. His explanation was that there was very little scope for a representative in Parliament to feed his constituency. He differentiated between the role of representatives to local bodies and the State Assembly on the one hand and representatives to Parliament on the other. It was perhaps too sophisticated an explanation to satisfy the masses. It was also being alleged against him that he opposed cow slaughter in Parliament. According to him, it was a case of misleading propaganda because he had only voted on the issue whether cow slaughter was a State or a central subject. The electorate, however, hardly bothered about these niceties.

Maharashtra

ALOO J. DASTUR

MAHARASHTRA has given the Congress Party the biggest hand in the recent elections; and it was certainly heartening to a shattered Congress leadership that while the voters from other States relegated the Congress candidates to places below the first, Maharashtra returned 202 out of 269, a little over 75 per cent; this of course falls short of its remarkable performance in 1962 when the party polled 52 per cent of the total valid vote and secured 215 seats out of 264. This time its poll fell steeply to only 48 per cent. A Congress Government is safely ensconced in power; but this achievement does not disguise the subterranean rumblings.

This is the only State which has two Pradesh committees — the Maharashtra Pradesh Congress Committee (MPCC) and the Bombay Pradesh Congress Committee (BPCC). The latter is an organisational aberration in the Congress set-up which in the past justified its separate existence by making Bombay City the nerve-centre of the country during the struggle for freedom and since independence by delivering the votes to the Congress even in the most keenly contested election of 1957 over the issue of the break-up of the bigger bilingual Bombay State. More recently, its existence

is challenged by the MPCC on the plea that a PCC's jurisdiction should be co-extensive with that of the State; pressure tactics have involved moving the headquarters from Poona to Bombay. The issue is not one of principle or policy; rather it is a clash of personalities — Y. B. Chavan and S. K. Patil.

Morarji Desai catapulted Y. B. Chavan from a minor portfolio in the old Bombay Cabinet to the Chief Ministership of the bigger bilingual Bombay State. A protege of Morarji, he committed parricide. Having undertaken, if not pledged, to consolidate the State, he very cleverly, even assiduously, worked towards undoing it. He and his colleague, Naik-Nimbalkar, the former ruling prince of Phalton, publicly pledged themselves and their loyalty to Jawaharlal Nehru; and to that extent antagonised the people who were deeply stirred about the State. However, without taking his cabinet colleagues in his confidence, he managed with the help and advice of the then Congress President, Indira Gandhi, to divide the State and its assets into its two language units—Maharashtra and Gujarat. It was suspected then, it has been established since, that this break-up was brought about by surrendering the border areas of Dangs to Gujarat and Belgaum, and

its environs to Mysore. The latter is a running sore in Mysore-Maharashtra politics. But this was a matter of detail. The people rejoiced and Chavan was acclaimed a great leader. Today he is the leader of Maharashtra.

Rapid Rise

Chavan's rise in the party hierarchy has been rapid. Till today he has the Prime Minister's ear and is tipped as a future Prime Minister himself. Patil had worked himself to leadership in Bombay City but was studiously kept out of the all-India limelight for the first ten years until he came to be included in the Union Cabinet after the election of 1957. Chavan's early training under the celebrated M. N. Roy has made him cultivate a subtlety and finesse which Patil cannot match. There never was a convergence either of interest or office between the two; but their attitudes and outlook clashed over the place of Bombay in a linguistic organisation of States. In the first skirmish between the two, Patil came off second best.

More recently, the fissures between the MPCC and BPCC widened when all the legislators from Bombay tendered the resignation of their membership from the State legislature and Shantilal Shah also from the State Cabinet. The occasion was the abstention of the government from giving protection to the citizens against demonstrations by the Sampoorna Maharashtra Samiti on the issue of the boundary dispute between Mysore and Maharashtra. The Bombay *Bandh* and *Ghera Dalo* on two successive days in August 1966 disorganised life in the city and the BPCC was particularly hard on Home Minister D. S. Desai who had ordered the police not to intervene with the demonstrators. Although the resignations were ultimately withdrawn, Shah insisted on ceasing to be a minister; the incident left a bitter taste all around.

Similarly, while the MPCC is emotionally exercised over the separate existence of Goa, the BPCC takes a detached view and has laid itself open to the charge

of striking discordant notes which do not help towards the solution desired by the MPCC and also by the Left parties in the State. The Opinion Poll misfired from the point of view of the mergerites, both Congressmen and others, but spread no gloom in Bombay.

There is not much of a meeting ground or areas of collaboration between the MPCC and BPCC either on party or political issues; but the delimitation of constituencies makes them share the North East Bombay Parliamentary Constituency, where four Assembly constituencies fall within the purview of the BPCC and two of the MPCC. S. G. Barve was jointly adopted the candidate. But it is of interest that Chavan addressed meetings and appealed for support for the Congress candidate only in Kalyan and Thana which are outside Greater Bombay. It was here that both Barve and, in the bye-election, Mrs. Sapre secured their winning lead wiping out the deficit incurred in each of the other four which are organisationally related to the BPCC. Division of labour and boundaries of areas of operation even in the interest of the party have thus come to be strictly delineated.

Although Bombay returned 3 Congressmen to the Parliament out of 5 and 20 out of 28 to the Assembly, the BPCC did not celebrate its electoral success, being in deep mourning for Patil's failure. He still commands respect and loyalty among the average Congressman; he is certainly not the lost leader which some of his adversaries within the party would like to believe. It is widely suspected, nay, even believed that some Trojan horses contributed substantially to his defeat. Whether they can bring about his downfall is another matter. The general expectation is that phoenix-like he will rise from his current embarrassment.

The Brahmins

The birth of Maharashtra started a new course in and for State politics. The Brahmin who had dominated whether in politics, social reform, education or admini-

nistration now became a back number. Congress cabinets till then were predominantly Brahmin in composition. It is interesting to recall that the swearing in of the first cabinet of Maharashtra was delayed by over four hours as N. V. Gadgil insisted on the inclusion of a Brahmin as cabinet minister. It is still more interesting to remember that after S. G. Barve resigned to join the Planning Commission over three years ago, there has not been a single Brahmin in the successive cabinet or even ministries and what is significant is that nobody gives a thought to it. The Marathas among the non-Brahmins have come to bestride the political scene in the State; constituting about 36 per cent of the population they have more than 70 per cent representation in the legislature and as much on the cabinet. The Malis may be more cultured, and with the Jains and the Lingayats may make better cultivators but the Marathas, justly reputed as good fighters, hold both office and power.

The Maratha Cult

This is a new phenomenon, not a continuation of the old non-Brahmin movement of which Bhansheb Hiray was the leader. There is the revival of the Shivaji cult to emphasise the political superiority of the Marathas. Chavan is being hailed as the second Shivaji; particularly since the Chinese attack and V. K. Krishna Menon's forced resignation from the Indian Cabinet, his elevation to the Home Ministry, his reputed influence with the Prime Minister, contribute to the growing image of the man among his own people. Ten years ago he had publicly pledged his loyalty to Nehru; more recently he has done as much to Mrs. Gandhi. This touch of realism has been his forte.

How is the current Maratha influence to be viewed? Is it only in caste terms or is there another reason or explanation? Anti-Brahminism is present but it is not easily visible. The Brahmin with his background and education finds many avenues of employment open to him and he is still conspicuous in the administration. The non-

Brahmin continues to be essentially the cultivator, and the other field which has opened out to him is politics. The phenomenon may be seen as a class struggle although the losers have preferred not to make a stand or give a last ditch battle. Hence the socio-economic scene is not disturbed or blurred.

Irrigation has been a great boon to the people and the greatest beneficiaries are the Marathas and Malis. A commercial crop like sugar-cane and the setting up of sugar factories, and expansion of cooperatives have thrown up a new class of rich peasants. Sugar factories are great seats of finance and political power and these factories again are in the hands of the Marathas and Malis. These two are fast becoming rivals both in the economic and political fields; the leadership in the main is with the Maratha; but the day is not far when the Malis will also throw up strong local leaders. But numerically they are far behind the Marathas. Both these are with and in the Congress today. They assure economic security to the poor peasants who want work, who want to cultivate commercial crops and in turn themselves join the ranks of the rich peasants. They furnish the votes for their benefactors.

Regional Pulls

The Congress is deeply rooted in Maharashtra: It had a fine leadership in the pre-Independence days. More recently, too, dedicated Congressmen like S. K. Patil in Bombay P. K. Sawant in Ratnagiri, D. K. Kunte (he defeated a Congress candidate in the recent election) in Kolaba, to mention only a few, have striven their utmost to keep the party close to the people. This cannot be easily changed or modified. Its position is unassailable although this fact does not mask the rifts and fissures in the party, both horizontal and vertical. There are regional pressures and personal pulls. Vidarbha originally was the reluctant unit of Maharashtra; its efforts and *andolan* for separate status bore no fruits even though the veteran M.S. Aney staked his name and reputation.

Marathwada, the former unit of Hyderabad State, is universally

acknowledged as an economically backward tract. It has its own problems. Its integration into the State has been smothered by Chavan's support to a new young Vinayakrao Patil against Balaschel Sovnekar. In western Maharashtra, Vasantrao Dada Patil enjoys his confidence and today heads the MPCC. Chavan's political astuteness lies in this that he has successfully eliminated the older leadership from the State in an unostentatious manner. He has not tread on their corns but cut the ground from under their feet before they became aware of their discomfiture. The new leadership is obliged to him for his support and also patronage. He has not only lopped off the tall poppies of yester-years but is cautious to see that the new growths are somewhat stunted. Even those like Naik-Nimbalkar who were on a par with him or who befriended him and carried him along in his green political years have been by-passed on his quick march to all-India status. He is not abrasive in his method; he even appears to be persuasive; but ultimately he achieves what he sets out to do. Those who know or claim to know him put down his desire to eliminate opposition to his early association with M. N. Roy and his training in Marxism.

The Akola Pact pacified the fears and misgivings of Vidarbha that it may be swamped by the rest of the State. The region was honoured by the assurance that a Chief Minister would be selected from among its representatives. When Chavan moved to Delhi, M. S. Kannamwar was unanimously elected the Chief Minister; on his death in office, V. P. Naik again from Vidarbha was voted to lead the cabinet. There was an understanding that a convention would or should be created that the Chief Ministership should rotate from region to region.

Encouraging Tensions

On the face of it, the idea is undesirable; it should be unworkable. Instead of integration of the

regions in one wholesome political unit it sustains and encourages aloofness and narrow regional consciousness. It was expected by interested individuals that in 1967 Marathwada should have the privilege of giving the State its Chief Minister. D. S. Desai, the Home Minister in the last government was the only one to be returned uncontested to the new Assembly. He himself harboured ambitions to be the chief now that the Akola Pact had been twice honoured. Chavan thought otherwise and practical politics strengthened his position. V. P. Naik was unanimously re-elected.

There were smiles all around though they veiled heartburns. The strong man of the previous cabinet, Desai, was deprived of the Home portfolio and had to be content with Revenue. Naik's team is a large team of 25 ministers, 16 of whom are in the cabinet; for every 8 Congress members there is one minister. This reveals the pulls of regions and even of districts. Vidarbha has 6 ministers, 5 of cabinet rank, 2 each from Nagpur and Akola districts; the figures for Marathwada are 5 and 3 respectively, Aurangabad district boasts of 2 cabinet ministers. There is an equal number of cabinet ministers and deputy ministers, 6 each from western Maharashtra, 5 being from Satara district from where Chavan hails, and 2 from Greater Bombay. For the first time, two Deputy Leaders were appointed—D. S. Desai from western Maharashtra and S. B. Chavan from Marathwada; thus were hurt feelings assuaged and regional vanities respected. The Maharashtra Government in the past has had a reputation for giving the State good administration; the new team holds promise of continuing the tradition.

The Dissidents

This is not to say that the Congress in Maharashtra is a homogenous party; no. In every district almost there are dissidents. It is strange but true, and therefore sad, that the Congress does not and cannot relish self criticism. The leadership at every level has become smug and differences of

opinion are equated with disloyalty both to the leaders and ultimately to the party. Election time unveils the thin veneer of unity and it was so on the last occasion. When new entrants were preferred to several of the old guard, there was discontent; resignations from the party preceded contests against Congress candidates. In Bombay they failed to win popular support; in some districts, specially Kolaba and Kolhapur, the Congress rout was there for all to see. Not only did the Congress lose the parliamentary seats but lost the majority for the Assembly too.

D. K. Kunte, a former Speaker of the Bombay Assembly had a comfortable time against the Congress candidate and carried with him 5 out of 7 Assembly seats. The Rajmata of Kolhapur heavily defeated Lieutenant General S. P. P. Thorat, a close friend and associate of Chavan. The Union Home Minister was an active campaigner in the State; but he dared not go to Kolhapur. He skirted the area but did not project himself forward into it lest he invite unpleasant demonstrations. In Nasik there is only an *ad hoc* Congress committee; the rift is so wide and deep. In Ratnagiri both the president and vice-president have resigned. Other districts where the party appears to be disintegrating are Aurangabad and Sholapur.

Growing Disillusionment

There is dissatisfaction; worse, there is growing disillusion with the organisation and its policies. The knowledgeable believe that what appears on the surface is just a small bit of the prevailing unhappiness. In August 1966, Congressmen who had at one time or other borne the brunt of the struggle for freedom met in a convention at Bombay and called for a 'mass movement of correction'; other laudable objects were:

To devise ways and means by which the Congress and the government which have been alienated from the people could be persuaded to return to the people;

To create a climate of opinion which would transform the

Congress organisation from an apologist of the government and the administration to act as their critic, guide and philosopher and thus regain its position as the tribune of the people which it once was;

To combat fissiparous, divisive and disruptionist forces which imperil the freedom of the country and integrity of the nation.

This meeting in Bombay followed an earlier conference at Kolhapur. The Congress in the State has begun to talk of reform; the bolder members of a revolt from within. This has not assumed proportions of defections in the mass; but the old ties of emotion and loyalty have worn thin. There is not much of an ideal to work for. Leadership dedicated to a noble cause is absent. In the big bee-hive that is the Maharashtra Congress, strange as the analogy may seem, Chavan is the Queen Bee; the rest are workers and drones.

The Impetus

The elections have provided the wanted impetus to those who did not formerly have the courage to leave the party to do so. What were till recently murmurs and mild criticisms took a rebellious turn and in the middle of April 1967 nearly 500 former Congressmen met at Nasik and decided to form a new political party in the State. The Bangla Congress and Jana Kranti Dal of Bihar provided the inspiration. Nearly 15 districts out of 25 already have some nucleus of the Jana Congress. Even before the elections, several districts of Vidarbha formed units of the Jana Congress which was convened in Delhi. In western Maharashtra, the move was set afoot by those who were not given the Congress ticket. In Marathwada, Ahmednagar district leads in the Jana Congress move.

Kunte, who inaugurated the Nasik meeting, warned the rebel Congressmen against the pitfalls of splinter groups or inviting or welcoming power seekers. He would rather seek areas of co-operation with like-minded parties in the State—the Praja So-

cialists, Samyukta Socialists, Peasants and Workers and the Republicans. Barring the last mentioned, all the other three in origin are break-away groups of the Congress; hence the meeting of minds and ultimate co-operation between them is not a remote possibility. They are heartened by the coming together of parties as disparate as the Swatantra, Jana Sangh, the various socialists and even the communists on a limited programme or for temporary purposes.

There are no fundamental differences between Congressmen who left the party earlier and who are leaving now. The odds as of now are that this collaboration will be tested first at the forthcoming Zilla Parishad elections. They are aware of Chavan's hold on the Zilla Parishad. To minimise this advantage they intend coming together under the banner of the Sampoorana Maharashtra Samiti to contest the elections.

The Praja Socialists kept aloof and fought independently during the general election; its leaders are having second thoughts and there is possibility of their forging unity to oppose the Congress. The winds of change are blowing in a southward direction from the north; and the forthcoming elections will provide the barometer. The Congress has run away with so many seats because of the non-Congress and anti-Congress vote being divided among several contestants; in a straight contest, perhaps, the opposition's expectations may prove to be other than day-dreams.

Apparent Strength

The Congress in Maharashtra is neither flabby nor emaciated. To all appearances it is strong. Its apparent strength is not the strength of the healthy but one provided by the crutches of a divided opposition. As things stand, the Peasants and Workers Party have dug roots in certain areas, Kolaba and Kolhapur districts in the main. In the recent election it captured 12 seats from the Congress, 2 from the Praja Socialists and retained 5 for the Assembly and has sent 2 to the Parliament. It is the largest

party in opposition and secured the second place in the number of votes. While the Congress obtained 62 lakh votes, its tally was 11 lakhs

The Jana Sangh came third with 10 lakhs but managed to get 4 seats only. Of the two communist parties, the Dange group has made a better showing with 6.6 lakh votes and 7 seats while the Marxists have 4 seats with 1.2 lakh votes. The Praja Socialists, at least in Maharashtra, have an edge over the Samyukta Socialists with 8 members and 5.2 lakh votes as compared to 4 members and 5.9 lakh votes. Their performance is more creditable as they preferred to go it alone while the others forged links with the Sampoorana Maharashtra Samiti. The Swatantra ran away with 1.5 lakh votes but failed to push in a single member.

Congress Failure.

The electoral score-board does not hold out much promise for the future of the Congress. The parties in opposition, disgruntled or dissident Congressmen, for that matter even the people, now know the Achilles heel of the once great institution. United opposition or straight contests can whip the party off the electoral map of a State. Kerala, Madras, West Bengal, Orissa have established this beyond doubt. In the past two decades the Congress won over people with offers of office; the opposition parties are returning the compliment with interest, the Congressman of yesterday is the Chief Minister of a non-Congress government today in Uttar Pradesh. Has the Congress learnt its lesson? If the central leadership has not, is it strange that the State leadership does not? Smugness, self-complacency, above all self-satisfaction, punctuate the two Pradesh Congress Committees. The BPCC received a jolt with the defeat of Patil and has begun to talk of going back to the people. The MPCC still lives in a happy day dream.

Patil's proud boast is that Bombay is one per cent India with its multiplicity of people, languages, religions. And in this same city

has risen to the surface the Shiv Sena out to spread the cult of Maharashtra for the Maharashtrian, implying by Maharashtrian not a resident of the State but the Marathi-speaking Indian. And no Congressman has had the courage to denounce such narrow parochialism. It is not a passive organisation; it forces its will by harming the non-Marathi speaking Bombayman, specially if he hails from South India. It worked surreptitiously against V. K. Krishna Menon in the general election; emboldened, it worked in the open against him in the bye-election. The Congress has reached such straits to win elections.

Future Prospects

Morarji Desai in a recent interview took heart from the fact that while Congressmen were leaving the Congress others came to it. In Maharashtra, one group of the Republican Party founded by Dr. Babasaheb Ambedkar and led by R. D. Bhandare joined the Congress on the eve of the election and Bhandare himself was elected as a Congress candidate to the Parliament defeating P. K. Atre, a local journalist, who fills his pen with vitriol rather than ink, against heavy odds. Efforts are now afoot to entice another group of the Republican Party led by P. K. Gaekwad to strengthen the Congress at the Zilla Parishad elections. But unlike Bhandare, Gaekwad does not desire to merge his identity in the Congress. Do these inflows contribute to the strength or prestige or image of the old party? The answer is anybody's guess.

Dissensions in the Congress in Maharashtra are not allowed to rise to the surface; nonetheless they keep on simmering. Congressmen register satisfaction at the discomfiture of their party members. Pride in the party is non-existent; self-interest, prospects of office keep several where they are. If the opposition parties can find the greatest common factor of collaboration within and outside the legislature, and they seem to be in a mood to do so, they will relegate the Congress to the background sooner than anticipated or expected.

Gujarat

ANIL BHATT

MUCH before the 1967 elections it was evident that the 'Congress System' was on trial¹ in the country, and that the pattern of one party dominance which in its own way provided stability to the system for so long was breaking down. The political observers were jubilant over the election results and by the mere fact that Congress has emerged out of the election as a shattered and dishevelled party. The defeats of big Congress leaders in large numbers

made them infer that the Indian electorate had started exercising its own will and had become mature. However, the election results and its after-events have shown that while the overall strength of one party dominance has declined, any clear and viable alternative to the 'Congress System' has not emerged. Gujarat and Madras are the only two States which provide interesting deviations from this overall situation obtaining in the country today.

1. Rajni Kothari, 'Congress System on Trial', *Asian Survey*, February 1967, Vol. N, No. 2.

In Gujarat, while the Congress has won with absolute majority

TABLE 1

Performance of Congress, Swatantra and other parties in four general elections

Parties	1952		1957		1962		1967	
	% Seats won	% Votes polled	% Seats won	% Votes polled	% Seats won	% Votes polled	% Seats won	% Votes polled
Congress	89.81	56.23	75.7	56.92	73.30	50.79	55.00	45.89
Swatantra	—	—	—	—	17.70	24.32	40.00	37.48
Other parties	3.82	24.54	24.3	36.01	5.50	14.63	3.60	9.64
Independents*	6.37	19.23	—	7.07	4.50	10.28	1.40	6.99

*Independents with party support have been excluded from this category.

TABLE 2

Poll difference of Congress and Swatantra Party in the last two elections District-wise

Name of the District	Congress			Swatantra		
	1962 % of the votes polled	1967 % of the votes polled	Poll difference	1962 % of the votes polled	1967 % of the votes polled	Poll difference
1. Kutchha	33.78	45.61	+11.83	61.24	41.10	-20.14
2. Surendra Nagar	61.19	34.84	-26.35	6.22	52.37	+46.15
3. Rajkot	51.03	40.76	-10.27	1.00	33.76	+32.76
4. Jamnagar	58.40	37.00	-21.40	9.22	42.46	+33.24
5. Junaghad	59.75	41.00	-18.75	0.46	28.98	+28.52
6. Amreli*	67.96	47.00	-20.96	—	17.64	—
7. Bhavnagar	45.64	40.48	-5.16	3.79	21.02	+17.23
8. Banaskantha	55.26	41.09	-14.17	27.87	42.00	+14.13
9. Sabarkantha	51.09	35.24	-15.85	34.58	55.48	+20.90
10. Mehsana	53.53	42.18	-11.35	35.83	43.88	+8.05
11. Ahmedabad	51.17	38.44	-12.73	16.08	30.20	+14.12
12. Kheda	43.53	48.63	+5.10	50.27	45.10	-5.17
13. Panchmahal	40.10	37.97	-2.13	45.61	46.47	+0.86
14. Baroda	51.30	43.61	-7.69	29.58	35.81	+6.23
15. Broach	50.65	43.94	-6.71	23.31	32.45	+9.14
16. Surat	53.41	55.35	+1.94	9.10	22.68	+13.58
17. Bulsar**	—	56.50	—	—	24.73	—

*The Swatantra Party did not put up a candidate in 1962 in Amreli.

**Bulsar district was newly created after the 1962 elections.

and has been able to form the government, the opposition has emerged as a very strong force. More important is the fact that the opposition to the Congress has been consolidated in a single party—the Swatantra Party.

In Gujarat, Congress has been consistently loosing its hold since 1952 but it was still a dominant party and was always returned to power with an overwhelming majority. Up to three general elections, it secured more than 70 per cent of the votes. (See Table

1) In the last election, the Congress strength was reduced to a great extent. Congress could form the government as it secured an absolute majority, but the margin is very small. For the first time Congress won the elections in Gujarat on minority votes. In the last election Congress secured only 55 per cent of the Assembly seats and polled less than 46 per cent of the votes.

In comparison to the 1962 election, in this election Congress

has lost 18 per cent of the seats while the Swatantra Party has gained by 23 per cent. In all districts except in Kheda, Kutchha and Surat, Congress has secured less votes than in the previous election. In all districts except three the electoral support of the Congress Party has been reduced in comparison to the previous election. (See Table 2) Thus, both at the State and district levels the strength of the Congress has been reduced with the speed and margin that was not witnessed before.

What is noteworthy is that unlike most of the States, in Gujarat, the major contending parties were only Congress and Swatantra and all other parties lagged far behind in the competition. The Congress and the Swatantra between them have shared 95 per cent of the Assembly seats and more than 83 per cent of the electorate (see Table 1). In the Lok Sabha elections, out of the 24 seats only one seat was taken by a third party—the Maha Gujarat Janta Parishad—while Swatantra secured 12 seats and Congress secured 11 seats. What is more, the Swatantra Party secured second position in more than 70 per cent of the seats that it lost.

Not only has the party position in the Assembly been bipolarised, but the electoral behaviour has also been bipolarised between the Congress and the Swatantra. If the strength of the Congress Party has been reduced, it is only the Swatantra Party which has gained. All other parties together have polled less than 10 per cent of the votes which is less by about 5 per cent than the votes they polled in 1962. The other parties, together, have won 3.60 per cent of the Assembly seats which is less by about 2 per cent than the previous elections. The Independents have also made a poor performance in comparison to the previous election. In this election the Independents have secured 1.4 per cent of the seats which is less by 3 per cent than what they secured in 1962. They secured 3 per cent

votes less than the previous election (see Table 1).

The Swatantra Party has gained not only from Congress but also from Independents and other parties. The competition between the Swatantra and the Congress has been very close. In 1962 the ratio between the Congress and the Swatantra in terms of votes polled was 2 to 1; in 1967 it was reduced to 1.2 to 1. In terms of seats, secured the ratio of strength between the Congress and the Swatantra was 4 to 1 which was reduced to 1.3 to 1 in 1967. If the electorate of Gujarat voted against Congress they did not register their opposition by voting for several parties but preferred to consolidate their opposition by voting for one party.

Bipolarisation

While the Congress strength has been reduced all over the country, it is in Gujarat that this pattern of bipolarisation of political power is to be found. Here the situation in Gujarat differs from Madras, because in Madras the D.M.K. has been able to win the elections by entering into a coalition with other parties. In Gujarat, while the Swatantra made electoral alliances in certain constituencies, it stands on its own and has preferred to remain as a major opposition rather than capture power by the help of other parties. In fact, the D.M.K. never expected to form the government. If the Swatantra Party in Gujarat was surprised by its defeat, the D.M.K. was surprised by its victory.

A more fundamental difference between Gujarat and Madras is that even though Congress has captured power in Gujarat, the situation is still highly competitive, while in Madras Congress has been subdued. Unlike Gujarat, in Madras Congress dominance has been replaced by D.M.K. dominance.²

In fact, the process of polarisation had started since 1962 when

2. While the DMK has secured more than 59 of the Assembly seats, Congress has secured only 21 of the seats. The ratio between the DMK and Congress strength in Madras is 1 to 35.

the Swatantra Party emerged as a party next to the Congress. In 1962 it was the only party which put the largest number of candidates against the Congress. In the period after 1962, the Swatantra Party consolidated its position and proved to be the strongest opposition against Congress, so much so that on the eve of the election it was hopeful and even Congress feared that it would be able to capture power. Within seven years, the Swatantra has acquired a good mass base and has been able to compete in rural areas also; it is as much a rural based party as the Congress. The minorities like the Muslims and backward sections like the Harijans and tribals, which were considered to be the monopoly of the Congress, have in many places supported the Swatantra. For the first time Congress is facing an opposition which has all the weapons and resources of the Congress.

Competition

The Swatantra Party is not competing with Congress only in the general elections but at all levels. It has started organising and participating in non-political and voluntary organisations. It is also competing with the Congress for capturing panchayati raj institutions and cooperatives. In its organisation and composition, the Swatantra Party has acquired all the characteristics of the Congress Party. As a result, the Swatantra Party is facing all the problems of factionalism and accommodation of various groups that the Congress Party of Gujarat used to face until today.

For Congress, while its dominance has declined it has emerged as a more cohesive and organisationally stronger party.³ At the time of the selection of the candidates, it knew that it was in for a tough fight and therefore great care was given to the selection of the candidates. This time the Congress leadership in Gujarat had decided to have a more cohesive team and was determined to clear

3. Letter from Gujarat, *Economic and Political Weekly*, March 4, 1967.

the house. This resulted in the exodus of certain leaders and their groups from the party. Here the emergence of the Swatantra Party as a strong opposition party made it easier for the dissident Congressmen to go out of the party.

Up till now, as the opposition was very weak and fragmented, the discontented in the Congress preferred to remain in the party and contest for power by forming a group within the party. This created a network of factions and faction chains from top to bottom. The membership of the factions so formed was based on personal loyalties and personal rivalries. So, the factional loyalties remained very weak, resulting in a great mobility between factions. This created an atmosphere of insecurity for the leaders who had constantly to devote their time and energy to keeping their followers satisfied. Such a system of internalised opposition can in no case be a substitute for open political competition based on a well developed party system.⁴

The Change

With the rise of the Swatantra, the pattern of politics has changed from one party dominance with the opposition internalised within the party, to polarisation of political competition between the two parties. This has brought political competition into the open and made elections much more real and vital. The situation as it was before, that real elections in India take place at the time of the selection of the candidates and the electorate have to merely rubber-stamp the decisions taken by the PECS and the C.E.C., is no longer true, at least in the case of Gujarat, although undoubtedly the selection process in the Congress contributes a great deal to its internal cohesion and consequently to the opposition's ability to exploit its internal differences.

On the one hand, then, the rise of a strong, resourceful party like the Swatantra has helped the

4. Anil Bhatt, 'Two Party System Emerging in Gujarat', *Economic and Political Weekly*, December 19, 1966.

polarisation of forces in Gujarat. On the other hand, however, it has helped to prevent further polarisation of social groups and cleavages on party lines. Like the Congress, the Swatantra has tried to take within its fold all sections of society. It has brought the Patidars and Kshatriyas—the traditionally rival caste groups—on the same platform. It has also been able to mobilise support from the landlords and small peasants, from the rural and urban sections of the population, the big businessmen and petty shopkeepers, the big bureaucrats and the small salarieds.

Middle Path

It is sometimes mistakenly believed that the Swatantra Party is only a party of princes, landlords and businessmen. It is not. Therefore, while Congress represents certain interest groups, the Swatantra represents others. Both the parties represent most of the interest groups including politically significant caste groups. (The Swatantra Party has, however, not made any organised effort to mobilise labour support.) Thus, the bipolar party competition in Gujarat has cut across social cleavages and divisions.

As both the parties represent most of the interest groups, they will have to remain in the middle of the ideological mainstream of Leftism and Rightism, both in policy and performance. This is evident from the fact that in Gujarat, the Swatantra under the pressure of the Kshatriyas and the lower sections of the masses has been pushed from its Rightist posture to just the 'Right of the Centre' posture and has been made to adopt a lot of welfare connotations. In order not to alienate any of the major groups from their fold, both the parties will have constantly to try for compromise and consensus. Unlike many other States, in Gujarat this might prove to be of great help in preventing the social cleavages from taking extreme and violent form and in helping the smoother functioning of the democratic system.

The possibility of an alternative to Congress has brought a tremen-

dous sense of relief among certain sections of society. There has been a deep feeling among the urbanised and educated sections of the society that the Congress regime is a 'dictatorship of the proletariat'. These sections feel that the Congress Government is meant for the welfare of only the rural people, the farmers, the labourers, the backward castes and minorities like the Muslims and Sindhis. This feeling led to frustration and desperation among the middle classes. This resulted in alienation and withdrawal from public affairs of certain groups like the intellectuals, merchants, salaried people and urbanised and educated middle classes. For satisfying their particular needs, these sections tried to operate at the level of implementation rather than at the level of policy. Operating individually, they used their influence or connections or corruption. Those who did not have the resources to use these methods felt a sense of total helplessness and alienation.

Hope of Alternative

But, the possibility of an alternative has injected hope and has brought about increasing involvement of these sections in the political process. Congress is no more a *fait accompli*. Never before was this urbanised sector more vocal and openly participating as in this election. Its involvement and participation may help to bring about an increasing sense of efficacy towards the system and, consequently, the sense of legitimacy of the system may also increase. It may be that the involvement of upper, urbanised and intellectual sections of the society may not deliver all the goods, but the alienation of these sections from the political process for a long time is dangerous to the functioning of any democratic system.

Further, the rise of a strong alternative to the ruling party has not only started the process of bipolarisation but has helped to increase, among the masses, identification with parties and to create a greater preference for organised politics. It is indicative that out of 178 Independents who contested in the Assembly elections only two

got elected. All the Independents put together could secure less than 7 per cent of the votes. In the Lok Sabha elections also, out of the 20 independents who contested, 17 lost their deposits and not a single got elected.

The fact that the Swatantra Party rather than any other party forms the main opposition in Gujarat has certain implications for the political system. The Swatantra is a party committed to the management of public affairs through the parliamentary system. The Swatantra Party has a stake in power and therefore it has a stake in the system. Over the last five years its record as the main opposition in Gujarat has been creditable and on the whole it has behaved as a responsible opposition party. The Swatantra Party on its part has made conscious efforts to prepare its representatives as good legislators. It has started a research cell, formed some sort of a shadow cabinet, allocated portfolios and asked some of its MLAs to specialise in certain subjects.

On the other hand, the Congress as the party in power has begun to take into confidence the leaders of the opposition on important policy decisions. Between the two parties there are continuous consultations on major issues. The opposition has been given due weightage on important committees. The agreement between the Congress and the Swatantra on the sharing of Speakership and Deputy Speakership is noteworthy. The performance of the legislative system in Gujarat over the last five years has been on the whole creditable. This might go a long way in legitimising the system in the eyes of the masses.

Support Structures

The pattern of bipolarisation of political competition between two parties, however, should not lead one to conclude that in Gujarat a 'two-party system' has developed. The pattern of party system in Gujarat is still far from the classical model of the two-party system. Neither parties have constant, committed and loyal support struc-

tures. From the point of view of fighting elections, the Swatantra Party is still an 'anti-Congress' party rather than a party in its own right. It still does not have constant and committed support structures. Table No. 2 indicates that in Kutchha district, the Swatantra Party polled less than 20 per cent votes from what it polled in 1962. Similarly, in Kheda district it polled 5 per cent votes less than in the previous election. In fact, Kutchha and Kheda districts were its main strongholds in 1962, but in 1967 the Swatantra lost its hold to the Congress. In 1962, in Kutchha district the Swatantra won 100 per cent of the Assembly seats but in 1967 it won only 33 per cent of the seats. In Kheda, again, the Swatantra had won 75 per cent of the Assembly seats in 1962 but this time it could secure less than 50 per cent of the seats. Where Congress has intensified its efforts, it has been able to regain its lost hold and stage a comeback. The Swatantra Party has, as yet, to create stable and committed pockets of support. Similarly, as Table No. 2 shows, this time Congress has polled less votes in all but the three districts of Kutchha, Kheda and Surat than what it polled in 1962.

Shifting Loyalties

Politically significant groups are constantly shifting their loyalties from one party to another. The two major and dominant caste groups of Kshatriyas and Patidars are divided in their support to the two parties. In 1962, the Swatantra Party got wholehearted support from the Kshatriya Sabha—an all Gujarat caste association of the Kshatriyas—but this time there were dissensions from the Kshatriya Sabha on the issue of giving support to the Swatantra Party. It is true that the Swatantra has been able to bring various important socio-economic groups of Gujarat within its fold, but it has still to create wider and more permanent ideological commitment towards the party among these groups. The Swatantra Party is still the spearhead of variegated discontent and lacks cohesion. It has to go a long way in streamlining its base and preparing a cadre of committed

rank and file members. It must create an able and viable organisational net-work in order to become a successful alternative to Congress.

Swatantra's Future

Nevertheless, the Swatantra Party has got the potentialities to institutionalise itself in Gujarat. The available socio-cultural milieu in Gujarat is quite favourable for the development and institutionalisation of a party like the Swatantra.

Much depends on whether (i) the Swatantra Party which is so different from the Congress and yet so similar will be able to forge a distinctive and positive identity for itself; (ii) it can identify, mobilise and consolidate its support structures so that it can create a committed and loyal support base; (iii) it can develop groups in urban areas; (iv) its leadership would allow it to become broadbased in economic ideology and not allow it to be arrested by the upper sections of the society; (v) there is a possibility to consider political organisation and support building on the basis of single party identities rather than coalition making among many parties; (vi) it will have patience to wait to get into power and prefer to remain in opposition and act as a mature and able opposition party so as to help to stabilise the functioning of the party system and the legislative system.

Mere bipolarisation of political competition is not enough for the development of a sound party system. In Gujarat, while the pattern of one party dominance has declined, the Congress system is being replaced by a system which shows potentialities of development towards a mature and sound party system. Although, if the Congress Party fails to hold on during 1967-1972, a short phase of transition through coalition cannot be ruled out on the whole, a more clear picture of political competition than any other State in the country is emerging in Gujarat.

Meanwhile, Gujarat is functioning as a laboratory of political development in India.

Punjab

SURINDAR SURI

THE Punjab election of February, 1967, differed sharply from that held five years earlier. The author visited the State on both occasions. He encountered considerably greater excitement in 1962 than on the more recent visit. In 1962, partisanship and passion aroused by the Chief Minister, Partap Singh Kairon, was felt everywhere. Long before the present election, however, Kairon had been dethroned and soon afterwards decapitated, leaving behind a tragic rather than a bitter memory.

The Punjabi Suba was the issue that stood in or near the centre of political battles in 1962, but it was settled by 1966. Thereafter, a sense of denouement prevailed in the political drama. The climactic struggles had been fought and

largely decided; the major protagonist—hero or villain according to taste—had been felled. But political life has to go on and elections must be held at least once every five years. Hopefully, new dramatic issues would arise. Present indications are that the hope is not in vain.

One would have thought that when the Punjabi Suba came into existence on November 1, 1966, the political troubles of the State were ended. But this was not entirely the case. On December 17, 1966, Sant Fateh Singh undertook a fast to press his party's demands. He announced that if the demands were not satisfied within ten days,

1. 'Sant's Renewed Threat of Self-Immolation,' *The Statesman* (Delhi edition), 6 December, 1965.

he and seven others would commit suicide by fire. The demands were 'merger of (remaining) Punjabi-speaking areas, including Chandigarh, with the Punjabi Suba, and abolition of common links between the Suba and Haryana.

The Dispute

Chandigarh was designated a union territory under the provisions of the Reorganization Act that set up the Punjabi Suba and Haryana and that involved some territorial readjustments with Himachal Pradesh. Thus, Chandigarh was placed directly under the authority of the Union Government although it served as the joint capital of the Punjabi Suba and Haryana, which shared the same secretariat building, the same governor, and the same high court. There were several State-owned corporations and utility boards which remained common to the two States. Six of these, including the Electricity Board, the Financial Corporation, Small Industries Corporation, Industrial Development Corporation, Agro-Industrial Corporation and the Export Corporation were divided on the initiative of the State government of the Punjabi Suba which was led by the Congress Party under Giani Gurmukh Singh Musafir as Chief Minister. But, a number of other enterprises continued under the joint management of the two States, and these included the Punjab Dairy Development Corporation, the Punjab Poultry Corporation, and the Land Development and Seed Corporation.

In an interview with the United News of India, Sant Fateh Singh stated: 'We wanted a full-fledged Punjabi-speaking State on linguistic basis enjoying the status of other full-fledged States. But taking over of Chandigarh and certain other administrative rights of this State by the Union Government, exclusion of Punjabi-speaking areas from it and introduction of common links have made the

present Punjab a second-rate State. I want its end.' When he was asked by the UNI correspondent why he did not protest at the time when the Reorganization Act was discussed in Parliament, Fateh Singh replied: 'After all, assurances by top ranking leaders meant something and it would not have been proper for me to start criticizing them.' One may hazard the guess, however, that the Akali leader did not want to delay or obstruct the setting up of the Suba, hoping to gain his further demands by a kind of salami tactic. But, it is also possible that the minds of political leaders, like those of other mortals, work slowly and they see the next step only after they have taken the first.

Apart from Chandigarh, the areas demanded by Akali leaders for inclusion in the Punjabi Suba were Hamirpur, Narpur, Dehra Gopipur, and Kangra Tehsils of Kangra district; Nalagarh and Ambala Tehsils of Ambala district; Guhla Sub-tehsil of Karnal district and Sirsa and Fatehabad tehsils of Hissar district. Sant Fateh Singh claimed that these were Punjabi-speaking areas. The Boundary Commission, presided over by Justice J. C. Shah, had discussed

a vote of 2 to 1 that 'Kharar Tehsil, including the Chandigarh Capital Project be merged with the Hindi-speaking State.'⁴ S. Dutt filed a minute of dissent arguing 'that Chandigarh is more centrally situated with respect to the Punjabi State than with respect to the Haryana State.' He recommended that 'the whole of Kharar Tehsil minus Kalka Police Station but including Chandigarh should be merged with the Punjabi State.'⁵ The Central Government, as mentioned earlier, decided to make Chandigarh a union territory.

The unstated argument behind the quarrel over Chandigarh and the other territories in dispute was that many persons who said they were Hindi-speaking were in fact Punjabi-speaking. It is true that many students, including many Sikhs, prefer to answer their school or college examinations in Hindi rather than in Punjabi (just as at one time they used to prefer English to either), but this does not make them Hindi-speaking. However, in the Sachar formula, agreed upon between Hindu and Sikh leaders in 1949, it was laid down that the decision of the parent as to whether his child should

Rural Hindi speaking	...	86,770	(43.3%)
Punjabi speaking	...	112,723	(56.2%)
Total Rural	...	200,425	
Urban Hindi speaking	...	96,683	(73.3%)
Punjabi speaking	...	33,045	(25.1%)
Total Urban	...	131,936	
Chandigarh-Kharar as a whole			
Hindi speaking	...	183,453	(55.2%)
Punjabi speaking	...	145,768	(43.9%)
Total population	...	332,361	(100%)

the allocation of several of these areas, including Chandigarh.

In Chandigarh and the surrounding tehsil of Kharar, the composition of the population according to the 1961 Census was as given in the above table.

After a lengthy analysis of the figures in different towns and rural areas of Kharar-Chandigarh, the Boundary Commission decided by

be considered Hindi-speaking or Punjabi-speaking would be accepted 'without questioning.'⁶

Be that as it may, the Sant Akali Dal was greatly dissatisfied with

2. 'Punjab to withdraw from six common links,' *The Hindustan Times*, December 2, 1967.

3. 'Centre has failed to keep assurances,' says Sant,' *The Hindustan Times*, December 1, 1967.

4. *Punjab Boundary Commission, Report, Presented on the 31st May, 1965.* Delhi: Manager of Publications, 1965, p. 41.

5. *Ibid.*, p. 53.

6. Full text of Sachar Formula reprinted as Appendix V in *Ibid.*, pp. 62-63.

the situation after the Punjabi Suba was formed. He wanted to secure territorial adjustments, especially Chandigarh, and to snap the common links: these demands might appear trivial to the uninitiated, but important political issues were involved. At first the Akali Dal decided to send volunteer groups from Amritsar to Chandigarh to court arrest, but Sant Fateh Singh discovered that another popular movement was out of the question.

Compulsions

The special correspondent of *The Statesman* reported from Chandigarh: 'As things stand today, the Sant can at best carry out his threats by staging small demonstrations here and there—demonstrations that will fail to muster large-scale support and make much impact. In fact, for the Sant group the real fear is that its politicking has probably come to a conclusion at least on the issue of a Punjabi-speaking State. It is hardly likely to provide a plank for the Sant's political activity on the Suba issue for an indefinitely long period now.'⁷

Fateh Singh had to take some dramatic steps. Early in December he announced that he would commence a fast on the 17th and, if his demands were not met within ten days, he would burn himself to death, as would seven other companions on December 27. He undertook the fast. At the eleventh hour, Sardar Hukum Singh, the then Speaker of the Lok Sabha, held two prolonged discussions with Fateh Singh, whereupon the latter broke his fast and announced that his mission was accomplished satisfactorily, although some of his followers dare not share his optimism. Publicly it was announced that Mrs. Indira Gandhi, the Prime Minister, would arbitrate the disposition of Chandigarh and other

issues. Privately, assurances were said to have been given that Chandigarh would be assigned to the Punjab. As reported in *Patriot*, Hukum Singh announced in the Akal Takht: 'Chandigarh belongs to the Punjab and must go to the Punjab.'⁸

There is ground for speculating that the fast by Sant Fateh Singh did not merely centre around Chandigarh. The Akali leader apparently wanted to ensure that credit for the formation of the Punjabi Suba would not be annexed by Congress Party leaders in Punjab or Delhi. After all, Sant Fateh Singh more than any other individual was responsible for the Suba and he wanted no ambiguity on that point. A correspondent of the *Hindu* hazarded a similar explanation: 'The Akalis are in an extremely sullen mood,' he reported in mid-November. 'They, along with other opposition parties boycotted all functions in connection with inauguration of the Punjabi-speaking State. They feel that, while they had waged a relentless struggle for the formation of Punjabi Suba since independence, when it actually came into being, the political power has been assumed by the very set of politicians who had consistently opposed the linguistic division of Punjab all these years.'

the general election, Sant Fateh Singh succeeded in focusing popular attention upon himself and in putting the Congress leaders into the shade. Actions and reactions in politics are frequently opposite and sometimes equal. Fateh Singh's moves also strengthened the Jana Sangh by exacerbating the misgivings of the Hindus.

How essential Sant Fateh Singh's fast was became evident when the results of the election in the Punjab came out. The Congress Party failed to win the majority by just four votes. (See Table below) Fateh Singh may well claim to be the architect of the post-election political dispensation in the Punjab. The strengthening of the Akali Dal and of the Jana Sangh at the cost of the Congress Party was apparently suited to his purposes, although this development went contrary to the plans being made by communist brain-trusters. Some of them would have liked to form a progressive front comprising Rightwing Communists, Sant Akali Dal, and the Congress Party which, in the Punjab, includes avowed socialists, such as the late Chief Minister of the Punjabi Suba, Giani Gurmukh Singh Musafir. In the event this plan did not materialize.

Driven to the wall by their party's defeat in the election in several States, the Congress high

TABLE

Party	Seats		Votes Polled		Candidates	
	1962	1967	1962 (%)	1967 (%)	1962	1967
Congress	50	48	45.63	37.42	87	102
CPI (Right))	5)	4.85)	19
CPI (Left))	3)	3.27)	13
Akali (Sant))	24)	20.49)	58
Akali (Master))	2)	4.56)	62
Jana Sangh	4	9	7.66	9.36	42	19
Republican Party	3	—	3.28	2.16	14	17
Swatantra	—	—	2.38	0.51	20	10
P.S.P.	—	—	0.73	0.51	3	9
S.S.P.	—	1	0.01	0.72	1	8
Independents	5	9	10.42	16.15	151	255

(From: *Patriot*, Feb. 25, 1967)

7. 'The Punjab Tangle, I, Pointless controversy over "assurances", *Patriot*, January 1, 1967.

8. 'Punjab-Haryana. No Abatement of Tensions in New States,' *The Hindu*, November 16, 1966.

command came out against the party entering coalition governments. To be sure, the high command relented thereafter but the damage had been done. Moreover, factional struggles in the Punjab Congress paralyzed it during the crucial fortnight following the election. There were bitter manoeuvres between the Swaran Singh group, which had been weakened by the defeat of its leader in the Punjab Assembly, Giani Gurmukh Singh Musafir, and the Darbara Singh Mohanlal group, which had opposed Partap Singh Kairon and expected to come to power after he had been deposed following the investigation of charges of corruption and misuse of power against him. But the Kairon faction survived the fall of its leader, having acquired a new boss in Swaran Singh, who until then lacked a power base in Punjab. The Maharaja of Patiala, who loomed on the sidelines as saviour, was sidetracked by the dominant faction. Eventually, Gian Singh Rarewala was elected leader of the Congress legislature party but, in the meantime, the opposition parties had captured the initiative.

Dramatic Alliances

Developments that helped to bring the non-Congress coalition to power in the Punjab occurred in distant corners of the country—Kerala, Madras, West Bengal, Bihar. The Congress Party's loss of majority in several States was accompanied by the emergence of a plethora of divergent political groups. The initial expectation was that the multitude of parties would not be able to unite to form governments. It was predicted that Governor's rule would be imposed in Bihar. Governor's rule was also foretold for West Bengal, where the situation of the parties was only a little less chaotic than in Bihar. Encouraged somewhat by the dramatic victory of non-Congress alliances in Madras, Kerala, and Orissa, the divergent groups in West Bengal and, soon afterwards, in Bihar forged united fronts and formed governments. Swatantra leader Minoo Masani had foreseen well before the election that attrition of the Congress Party strength

in the election would require coalition governments.

The New Compromise

In Punjab, Sant Fateh Singh achieved the dual objective of crushing Master Tara Singh's group and establishing his own as the dominant non-Congress party and senior partner in the coalition government. In this as in other respects, Punjab shares with the rest of India the broad political trends set in motion by the election. These include the disintegration of the great Congress compromise. The Congress Party over the decades had forged an alliance of diverse and sometimes contradictory political, economic and cultural forces, which straddled past and present, tradition and modernity, Left and Right, East and West. The compromise, tenuous but vital, was forged to provide united opposition to foreign rule, but it endured beyond national independence. Secularism, as propounded by the Congress leaders, was an aspect of this compromise. The 1967 election marks the beginning of its end. A process of fission is under way, but present indications are that it is accompanied by the process of fusion. A new compromise is likely to emerge.

Various social groups, political forces, religio-cultural or linguistic movements, that were previously held together by the Congress Party, have been let loose. No less striking than their increased numerical strength in the legislatures is the enhanced self confidence. The Jana Sangh and Akali Party do not apologize for being communal just as the D.M.K. is unashamedly pro-Tamil, or the communist parties anti-capitalist. Emergence of fragmented political parties, each of which represents a well-defined and well-articulated interest, permits a new kind of bargaining and compromise: it is open, not shame-faced or underhand. Therefore, it is likely to be durable, possibly also satisfying to the participants. But, at present, this is speculation, even though not lacking some basis in facts.

The election is a milestone in the evolution of Punjab politics, for

the situation in Punjab is highly labile. My assessment is that the process of self-definition and self-determination among the people of Punjab has not attained stability. Who is a Punjabi and by what fruits shall we know him? Questions such as these are as yet far from answered in an acceptable manner. There is no agreed answer even to the empirical question, what language do Punjabis speak? It has been pointed out that Punjabi was never the official language of the Punjab, not even under Sikh rule.⁹ Grierson noted as late as 1914 that Punjabi had a very scanty literature.¹⁰ But the backwardness of Punjabi as a language and with a literature is only relative; other Indian languages and literatures are also backward. Even today an objection one hears in non-Hindi speaking areas to Hindi as the official language is that it is among the least developed of Indian languages. Compared to the great languages of the present-day world, and in terms of the demands of modern technology and the contemporary culture, all Indian languages are backward. Yet, the fact remains that Punjabi is among the more undeveloped languages in the country. Whatever growth it has experienced is very recent.

Sikhism

The Sikh religion is also in the process of evolution. The Sikhs constituted a very small minority in the Punjab at the time of Sikh rule. Numerically and theologically they prospered after the fall of their kingdom, partaking of the religious revival experienced in many parts of India in the late nineteenth century and in the twentieth century. Numerically, as Kingsley Davis pointed out, 'during the period since 1900 the Sikhs have had a remarkable growth, second only to the growth of Christianity. Within four decades they have nearly tripled their member-

9. Cf. Baldev Raj Nayar: *Minority Politics in the Punjab*. Princeton, 1966, p. 44.

10. Grierson on *Punjabi*. Patiala, Language Department, Punjab, 1961, p. 12, cited in Nayar, *op cit*, p. 48.

ship.¹¹ Apart from an above-average natural increase, the growth is ascribed to conversions from the lower castes of Hindus. The low caste converts continue to suffer from many disabilities, yet they experience a perceptible rise in status and self-esteem.¹²

The growth in numbers, both absolutely and relatively, has been accompanied by the growth of a Sikh consciousness which is perhaps somewhat more tortured than the awakening of other religious communities. Secular learning provides tools for elaboration of religious beliefs and researching their history but it also challenges their validity. The emphasis on external forms among the Sikhs adds a complication that does not trouble other religions in the same manner.

Religion and Language

To make the confusion in the Punjab more confounded, an awakening and changing religious self-awareness became entangled with the issue of language. In Indian Punjab, Sikhs own Punjabi and many Hindus reject it. Thus, the demand for the Punjabi Suba could not be disentangled from the demand for a Sikh State, and the demand for a Sikh State could be lodged on linguistic justification. Denial of Punjabi Suba by the Congress Party leaders served to exacerbate feelings among the Sikhs; granting it antagonised many Hindus. But the dye has been cast. We are no longer forced merely to speculate on the good or evil that the formation of Punjabi Suba would do; we can now observe the consequences. The election has set the stage for the consequences to unfold.

Contradictions mark the presently visible pointers to the future. Sant Fateh Singh proclaimed that his concept of the Punjabi Suba was a linguistic community, not a religious one. Master Tara Singh

emphasized that he strove for a Sikh State. The decisive victory of the Sant's party over the Master's followers is not without significance. Equally important is the decision of the Jana Sangh and the Akali Dal to share in governing the Punjab which evoked much popular enthusiasm. According to *The Statesman* correspondents, felicitations were offered to the united front ministry from all sides and buildings were illuminated in Simla.¹³

Coalitions

In the debate on the interim budget, the ministers of the united front government countered the opposition Congress Party's charge that the coalition was 'heterogeneous, conflicting and ideologically irreconcilable.' Lachman Singh Gill, Education Minister, replied: 'We are prepared to sacrifice not one but 100 united front governments for the sake of the Hindu-Sikh unity that we have achieved.' Dr. Baldev Parkash, Jana Sangh member and Finance Minister, added: 'Stability and unity have now come to the Punjab.'¹⁴

But, the rioting which occurred towards the end of March in Calcutta, and which involved the Sikhs, shook the Punjab. The government's defeat on a motion to amend the Governor's address may or may not be related to the riot, but it showed that the reconciliation in the Punjabi Suba was still fragile. The future remains uncertain. Relations between religious communities, economic classes, and political parties are volatile and subject to sudden shift. The external boundaries are impermanent. Internal consolidation would appear to be related negatively to this external stability. Developments in the Punjab impinge directly on the neighbouring States and indirectly on the politics of India as a whole. The ability of Punjab to give a constructive lead to India in solving its manifold problems, or to unsettle them, is larger than life. We may be certain that Punjab's crises or their resolution will not be quiet.

11. Kingsley Davis: *The Population of India and Pakistan*. Princeton, 1951, p. 184f.

12. Many members of low castes such as Chuhra and Chamar adopt Sikhism in order to escape the inferiority complex, *Census of India, 1931*, Vol. 17 (Punjab), Part I, p. 308, cited in Davis, *op. cit.* p. 165.

13. 'Rejoicing in Amritsar,' *The Statesman*, 10 March, 1967.

14. 'Congress Attack in Punjab Assembly Boomerangs,' *The Statesman*, 30 March, 1967.

Bihar

RAMASHRAY ROY

ONE of the victims of the recent general elections has been the phenomenon of the one-party dominance system. It is a system in which 'other parties' exist legally but, for reasons largely unrelated to legal questions of government coercion, find themselves unable to challenge effectively the dominant party's hold of public power.¹ It has been argued that in a country where democratic traditions have not taken root and where fragmentation of the party system poses a threat to the stability of the political system, one-party dominance provides stability of the

political regime and continuity of leadership—two indispensable conditions for easing much of the pain of a growing nation.

Moreover, by mobilizing diverse sections of the society in support of the political regime and developmental goals, socializing them in a democratic value system and behaviour patterns, the dominant party lays the foundation of institution-building and strengthens the processes of integration, legitimization of the democratic regime and economic development. It is true that struggle for political articulation, recognition and control between diverse socio-economic interests represented in it transforms the dominant party in a conflict system. But it is one of

1. B. I. Blanksten, quoted in Jerzy J. Wjatr and Adam Przeworski, *Control Without Opposition*, Vol. 1, No. 2 (January 1966), p. 230.

the attributes of the dominant party that it translates conflicts into consensus. Particularly its sub-coalitional structure makes the party 'more representative,' provides flexibility, and sustains internal competition. At the same time it (the dominant party) is prepared to absorb groups and movements from outside the party and thus prevent other parties from gaining in strength. It is a system that concentrates strength within the dominant party and then builds internal checks to limit the use of this strength.²

When the future of a political regime is supposed to be so much bound up with the stability of the dominant party, its near collapse brought about by the recent elections inevitably raises vital questions. What factors can the decline of the dominant party be attributed to and what repercussions will it have on the party system? Inasmuch as stability of the political regime is inexorably linked up with the smooth functioning of the party system, it becomes necessary to examine the implications for the political system of political forces thrown up by the elections. Bihar provides an excellent case study and we will begin with a discussion of the Congress, for years the dominant party.

Early Days

'A party is dominant when it is identified with an epoch; when its doctrines, ideas, methods, its style, so to speak, coincide with those of the epoch.'³ Undoubtedly, the Congress Party fits this description. As a mass organization which fought for and won the country's independence, the Congress functioned in pre-independence days as a front accommodating dissimilar and at times discordant elements bound together by the overarching objective of national freedom. Various movements swelled its ranks and its organizational roots reached even far off villages. In the course of its eventful life, the

Congress developed a well-stretched organization, attracted bands of dedicated workers, and produced courageous and experienced leadership.

Change in Motives

This was enough to endear the Congress to the people. But it also represented a party through which people could satisfy their aspirations for status mobility and power inasmuch as it at times came to control public offices at various levels. The lure of power was like heady wine for many and turned their attention away from the objective of national freedom; pursuit of power became for them the prime motive of organizational activities.⁴ The selfless worker was joined by professional politicians which acted to broaden the support base of the party. With its conversion after independence into a ruling party, it was increasingly joined by those who would use it to realize their aspirations of power and prestige. Moreover, the necessity of winning votes for remaining in power made the Congress all the more receptive to those who would join its ranks. As a consequence, if professionalization of politics accelerated,⁵ it won for the Congress numerous workers and supporters.

The Congress has also been instrumental in bringing about a structural change in the power distribution in Bihar. In politics as well as in social and economic realms it was the upper castes who dominated the scene. When fresh avenues of advancement in educational and economic fields opened up, the privileged social sections benefited most from them. But

when politics came to be more pervasive, the search for new support bases led the upper castes in Bihar to draw under-privileged social sections into politics thus broadening political participation⁶ and the trend of cumulative inequality was replaced by a trend of dispersal of inequality. It is to the credit of the Congress that sharing of political power by the underprivileged social sections has been achieved without serious displacements.

In addition, Congress has been affording shelter to persons of all ideological preferences. Tensions accentuate in such a system, but they also require the Congress to take recourse to compromise and conciliation for resolving conflicts in order to ensure consensual identification with the party, on the past various socio-economic interests.

Personal Ambitions

All these factors taken together have accounted for Congress dominance. However, certain structural properties of the Congress which made for its dominance are responsible also for its debility. First, the Congress has increasingly come to be characterised by what we may call subordination of party goals to individual and sectional interests. The process started in the twenties, was temporarily checked by the exigency of the freedom movement, but again gained strength after independence. Motivated primarily by capture and control of power bases, Congressmen did not hesitate to rise in revolt against or bolt the party when frustrated in their attempt to realize their personal interests.

Secondly, once personal ambition and aggressive pursuit of sectional

2. Rajni Kothari, 'The Congress System in India', *The Asian Review*, Vol. IV, No. 12 (December 1964), pp. 1164-65.

3. Maurice Duverger, *Political Parties*. London: Methuen & Co. Ltd., 1954. p. 308.

4. Lest I be accused of distorting the Congress image, I will refer readers to Anugraha Narayan Sinha, *Mere Samsaran (My Reminiscences)* Patna: Kusum Prakashan, 1961, passim and *Proceedings of the Bihar Pradesh Congress Working Committee*, January 30, 1942; March 6, 1942; July 22, 1942.

5. This is indicated by the fact that the percentage of intellectuals in the Executive Committee of the Bihar Congress dwindled to about 52.00 per cent in 1962 from 82.00 per cent in 1934. For details see my *A Study of the Bihar Pradesh Congress Committee* (Ph.D. dissertation, University of California, Berkeley, 1965), Chap. 6.

6. It is of interest to note that in 1934 upper castes formed about 77.00 per cent of the Bihar Congress Executive Committee but only 60 per cent in 1962. The lower castes as well as scheduled castes and tribes had no representation in 1934 in the Executive but their representation shot up to 37 per cent in 1954 but again declined to 24.00 per cent in 1962. Although the upper castes still dominate the Congress Party in Bihar, the trend towards a structural change in power distribution is however clear. See *Ibid.*

claims came to sway the minds of Congressmen, formation of alliances and coalitions became a dominating feature of the Bihar Congress. The bases of alliances changed according to the change in political situations; regional loyalties, caste considerations, divergence in economic interests and personal ambition all provided bases for forming coalitions. But personal ambition was the motive force which exploited varieties of affinities—caste being the most important one—for making political alliances.

Caste Divisions

Space does not permit us to discuss sub-coalitional manoeuvrings in detail. However, two important features of coalition making in the Bihar Congress can be noted here. First, the factional structure in the Bihar Congress has been based primarily on caste divisions in the society. Starting with the political rivalry between the Kayasthas and the Bhumihars, factional feuds gradually spread out to include all the caste groups in the State. In order to escape from being swamped in the numerical superiority of the Bhumihars, the Kayasthas hitched their political wagon with the Rajputs—an equally numerous caste.

With growing intensity in political rivalry, the leaders of the upper castes were compelled to co-opt supporters from the lower and other underprivileged caste groups. In due course, the co-opted leaders terminated their political apprenticeship by forming their own groups taking support mainly from their own caste groups. As a result, *factions* proliferated and in a period of about the last fifteen years, seven or eight caste factions emerged.⁷

Second, mutual accommodation in factional interactions has gradually given way to rigidity and intolerance. With the number of claimants for share in political power increasing, sub-coalitional interaction assumed a virulent

form. The existence of intense competition among the leaders and the consequent move on their part to consolidate their political support base by eliminating those elements which could not be relied upon or posed serious threats, led to a situation where sub-coalitional relationship became increasingly hostile and destructive. The ruling sub-coalition would not hesitate to annihilate the minority if its design for power were threatened or challenged.⁸ Conciliatory methods of conflict resolution tend to strengthen the factional basis of the party because the vanquished party partakes of some of the elements of the victor and succeeds in getting what it could not through normal procedures.

Serious Threats

The subordination of party interest to personal interest, rancorous sub-coalitional conflict, and non-adherence to the rules of the game—all these factors have adversely affected the party's capacity to function in its proper role. Aggressive pursuit of sub-coalitional demands has increasingly collided with the party's grand design for power and has thus endangered its existence on the one hand and has alienated individuals and social groups by frustrating their attempts to get their due share in political power, on the other.⁹ Frequent change in

group alignments¹⁰ has immobilized leadership. Discipline has atrophied and power in the party has become diffused, with the result that party decisions decorate party files. When loyalty to the organization is weaker than loyalty to one's own self, when political ambitions push individuals to exploit all kinds of differences for their own benefit, when individuals change sides with amazing frequency and when decency and fair play are thrown to the winds for the attainment of individual or group objectives, conflict could be assumed to pose serious threats to the very existence of the party.

Uncertain of getting any stable support, the leadership has been forced to the situation of a horseman 'who is so fully engrossed in trying to keep in the saddle that he cannot plan his ride...'¹¹ Implementation of development programmes has suffered because of the *immobilisme* produced by instability and flux in the support structure. The stagnated economic growth, the lowest per capita income and the present famine or near famine conditions in the State point to Congress failures. Growing economic distress is bound to antagonise people against the Congress. The Congress Party in Bihar fully justifies E. Shil's remark about a dominant party that 'it itself ages becoming soft and perhaps "corrupt" and increasingly fails to satisfy public demands.'¹²

Popular Dissatisfaction

The growing popular dissatisfaction with the Congress is reflected in its electoral performance. As

8. In 1946, a non-Bhumihar Congressman from Muzaffarpur complained against the Bhumihar D.C.C. president that 'he is always attempting to bring certain charges against non-Bhumihar workers who are associated with me and take disciplinary action against them so that they may not be in a position to contest the next delegates' election'. *Communication from Thakur Ram Nandan Singh, MLA, to Dr. Rajendra Prasad, dated March 2, 1946.*

Again, in 1959, Special AICC Forum reported 'In view of the coming General Elections in 1962 before which Congress candidates have to be selected, the fight is all the more intense. The second group led by Shri K. B. Sahay entertains fears that it may be wiped off by the other groups especially after the way in which recent organizational elections have been conducted'. *Indian Nation*, June 22, 1960.

9. One index of growing dissatisfaction with the Congress in Bihar is its dwindling primary membership; the number of primary members dwindled in 1962 to 110,505 from 6,212,303 in 1949.

10. Corroborating evidence in support of this comes from the fact that out of a total of 60 leaders in the Bihar Congress as much as 30 leaders have changed sides twice in the course of 17 years. Out of these 30, 10 leaders have changed sides more than twice.

11. Joseph A. Schumpeter, *Capitalism, Socialism and Democracy*. New York: Harper and Brothers, 1950, p. 287.

12. 'Political Development in the New States', *Comparative Studies in Society and History*, Vol. II, No. 3, (April 1960), p. 289.

7. For an elaboration of this theme see my 'Intra-party Conflict in the Bihar Congress', *The Asian Survey*, Vol. VI, No. 12 (December 1966), pp. 706-715.

will be apparent from Table 1, the Congress has been heavily losing its hold on the electorate; in the course of four general elections, the Congress share of seats in the Bihar legislature dwindled in 1967 to 39.60 per cent as against 72.72 per cent in 1952. More importantly, the Congress failed to obtain an absolute majority in 1967 with

sure, but what are the trends discernible in the party system and what do they mean for political stability in Bihar? These questions are important but available data are insufficient for providing answers. However, an assessment of the election results will yield some significant indications in this regard.

TABLE 1

Relative Party Positions in Bihar Assembly 1952-1967								
Years	Cong.	CPI	PSP SSP	JS	SWT	Other Parties	IND	Total
1952	240	—	23	—	—	67	—	330
1957	210	7	31	—	—	52	18	318
1962	185	12	36	3	50	20	12	318
1967	126	25	80*	27	3	27**	25	313***

* Includes 64 seats for SSP

** Includes 23 seats for Jan Kranti Dal

*** Results for five seats not available.

the result that it failed to form a government in the State either by itself or with the help of other parties. Opposition to the formation of a Congress ministry was so intense in the party as well as outside that a belated attempt at ministry formation by the new leader of the Bihar Congress Legislature Party was abandoned.¹³

The Congress dominance in Bihar has come to an end, to be

Generally speaking, the Congress has lost heavily to Left opposition groups: the latter (Communists 25

13. It is reported that M.P. Sinha was all set to form a ministry but due to a threat by B. N. Jha that he along with his supporters would walk over to the opposition prevented him from pursuing the matter further. Moreover, public resentment against Congress misrule was at such a high pitch that it was feared that the events of Rajasthan might be repeated in Bihar also.

seats, PSP 16 seats and SSP 64 seats) account for 105 seats as against 126 seats for the Congress. But the gains of the Rightist parties are by no means slight. In an election year marked by intense and widespread economic distress, a vote for Left opposition groups is not surprising, but what is surprising is the sizeable gain made by the Jana Sangh. It may mean that improvement in economic conditions will pose greater threats to the Left parties than other parties. Available evidence confirms this. For example, Patna and Dhanbad ranking very high on both literacy and urbanization have preferred either a centrist or a Right party. (See Tables 2 and 3).

It is of interest to note that the electorate has not totally rejected the Congress Party. Its percentage of votes has markedly declined in a large number of districts, and the ratio between the votes it secured and the seats it won is poor, still its share of votes is larger than that of any other single party except in Darbhanga and Monghyr where the socialists polled more votes than the Congress. Here also the Congress polled 30.51 per

TABLE 2

Relative Party Positions in each District of Bihar, 1967

Districts	SEATS WON BY							Total seats	Rank order on literacy	Rank order on urbanization
	Congress	Communists	Socialists	Jana Sangh	Swa-tantra	Other Parties	Independents			
I. Districts where Congress lost heavily										
Saran	9	1	7	2	—	3(2)	3	25	9	16
Champaran	6	4	6	2	—	(1)	2	21	17	12
Darbhanga	10	5	14	—	1	—	—	30	11	15
Gaya	11	3	7	1	—	(1)	1	24	6	8
Monghyr	2	2	14	1	—	1	1	21	8	4
Santhal Parganas	3	2	—	5	2	(1)	4	17	13	11
Bhagalpur	2	3	3	4	—	—	—	12	5	5
Patna	8	2	2	3	—	4 (3)	—	20	1	3
Dhanbad	3	—	—	—	—	4 (3)	1	8	2	1
Saharsa	5	—	8	—	—	—	—	13	15	17
II. Districts where Congress remains more or less static										
Muzaffarpur	16	1	7	1	—	(3)	—	28	10	14
Shahabad	12	1	5	—	—	(1)	2	21	4	9
Purnea	12	1	4	1	—	—	2	20	12	10
III. Districts where Congress improved its position										
Palamau	6	—	1	1	—	—	—	8	16	13
Ranchi	9	—	—	2	—	(1)	3	15	7	6
Hazaribagh	5	—	1	1	—	(7)	2	16	14	7
Singhbhum	7	—	1	3	—	—	3	14	3	2

Figures in parenthesis indicate seats won by the Jan Kranti Dal.

TABLE 3

Percentage of total votes polled by each political party in 1957, 1962 and 1967 General Elections in Bihar in each district arranged by increasing, declining & static Congress votes												
Districts	Descending Rank order		Number of seats		Year	Congress	Communist (R & L)	S.P. & P.S.P.	Jana Sangh	Swatantra	Other Parties	Independents
	Lit.	Urb.	57-62	1967								
Declining Votes												
1. Saran*	9	16	26	25	1957	46.01 (17)	2.60 (—)	25.31 (6)	1.35 (—)	..	6.69 (1)	18.04 (2)
					1962	45.16 (18)	3.38 (1)	24.40 (3)	4.10 (1)	19.11 (3)	0.64 (—)	3.21 (—)
					1967	36.69 (9)	6.64 (2)	23.43 (7)	10.43 (2)	1.59 (—)	12.60 (2)	8.66 (3)
2. Champaran*	17	12	21	21	1957	50.95 (16)	7.01 (1)	13.91 (1)	2.59 (—)	..	7.00 (—)	18.54 (3)
					1962	47.54 (15)	7.57 (2)	11.82 (1)	1.37 (2)	20.04 (3)	— (—)	9.66 (—)
					1967	29.00 (6)	14.80 (4)	20.34 (6)	9.61 (2)	3.97 (—)	9.95 (1)	11.60 (2)
3. Darbhanga*	11	15	31	30	1957	47.29 (29)	5.66 (—)	20.24 (2)	1.15 (—)	..	2.73 (—)	22.93 (—)
					1962	42.15 (22)	6.71 (3)	28.04 (5)	2.65 (—)	14.49 (1)	— (—)	5.96 (—)
					1967	30.51 (10)	11.08 (5)	34.62 (14)	5.85 (—)	2.73 (1)	5.87 (—)	9.33 (—)
4. Gaya	6	8	25	25	1957	39.87 (23)	4.33 (—)	20.84 (1)	0.54 (—)	..	7.90 (—)	26.52 (—)
					1962	43.20 (16)	6.85 (—)	21.23 (2)	3.84 (1)	16.84 (5)	0.07 (—)	7.97 (1)
					1967	33.08 (11)	11.23 (3)	22.48 (7)	10.03 (1)	1.15 (—)	10.03 (1)	11.99 (1)
5. Monghyr	8	4	23	22	1957	50.36 (17)	17.71 (2)	13.30 (3)	1.52 (—)	..	1.03 (—)	16.08 (1)
					1962	49.07 (19)	11.76 (1)	23.16 (3)	3.92 (—)	5.08 (—)	0.37 (—)	3.64 (—)
					1967	31.67 (2)	11.09 (3)	37.73 (14)	8.45 (1)	0.42 (—)	3.08 (—)	7.15 (1)
6. Santhal Parganas	13	11	19	18	1957	32.57 (7)	0.88 (—)	6.28 (1)	1.87 (—)	..	37.98 (9)	20.42 (2)
					1962	37.58 (6)	5.52 (1)	3.77 (1)	0.46 (—)	13.74 (3)	32.68 (8)	6.25 (—)
					1967	28.36 (3)	8.16 (2)	4.01 (—)	18.43 (5)	7.15 (2)	4.50 (1)	29.40 (4)
7. Bhagalpur	5	5	12	12	1957	45.99 (10)	10.52 (2)	14.46 (—)	3.83 (—)	..	11.00 (—)	14.20 (—)
					1962	48.46 (10)	16.88 (—)	11.84 (—)	7.99 (—)	12.26 (2)	0.60 (—)	1.97 (—)
					1967	27.01 (2)	20.54 (3)	16.25 (3)	20.12 (4)	2.07 (—)	7.14 (—)	6.87 (—)
8. Patna	1	3	21	20	1957	42.96 (16)	3.31 (1)	15.90 (2)	1.93 (—)	..	13.55 (2)	22.35 (—)
					1962	44.54 (15)	6.05 (—)	11.85 (3)	7.20 (1)	14.81 (1)	0.70 (—)	14.85 (1)
					1967	33.53 (8)	6.00 (2)	14.15 (2)	13.24 (3)	0.63 (—)	19.29 (4)	13.16 (1)
9. Dhanbad	2	1	7	8	1957	44.49 (7)	8.49 (—)	7.86 (—)	— (—)	..	14.63 (—)	24.53 (—)
					1962	34.78 (4)	11.26 (—)	5.63 (—)	1.79 (—)	30.72 (3)	2.26 (—)	13.56 (—)
					1967	27.57 (3)	11.65 (1)	3.38 (—)	9.46 (—)	— (—)	29.18 (3)	18.75 (1)
10. Saharsa	15	17	11	13	1957	40.85 (9)	4.11 (1)	14.42 (1)	— (—)	..	0.14 (—)	40.48 (—)
					1962	41.26 (9)	3.72 (—)	39.69 (4)	— (—)	12.69 (1)	— (—)	2.64 (—)
					1967	36.07 (5)	3.30 (—)	39.29 (8)	7.99 (—)	0.47 (—)	3.37 (—)	9.24 (—)
Increasing Votes												
11. Palamau	16	13	8	8	1957	33.32 (4)	— (—)	12.93 (1)	— (—)	..	49.09 (3)	4.66 (—)
					1962	24.43 (1)	— (—)	6.86 (—)	— (—)	57.20 (7)	7.75 (—)	3.76 (—)
					1967	43.91 (6)	— (—)	21.34 (1)	15.40 (1)	3.84 (—)	10.16 (—)	5.34 (—)
12. Ranchi	7	6	15	15	1957	32.36 (2)	— (—)	— (—)	— (—)	..	52.98 (12)	14.66 (1)
					1962	24.56 (2)	0.29 (—)	1.16 (—)	0.51 (—)	30.38 (6)	36.73 (7)	7.53 (—)
					1967	29.20 (9)	2.44 (—)	0.75 (—)	18.19 (—)	10.93 (—)	8.62 (1)	28.73 (3)
13. Hazaribagh	14	7	16	16	1957	30.26 (1)	2.50 (—)	1.10 (—)	— (—)	..	62.10 (15)	14.04 (—)
					1962	33.32 (4)	2.83 (—)	5.54 (—)	0.91 (—)	51.91 (12)	0.97 (—)	4.88 (—)
					1967	31.67 (5)	5.89 (—)	9.94 (—)	13.30 (1)	0.98 (—)	30.09 (7)	8.13 (2)
14. Singhbhum	3	2	14	14	1957	20.97 (1)	7.76 (2)	1.91 (—)	— (—)	..	33.83 (9)	35.59 (2)
					1962	26.57 (2)	14.98 (3)	4.44 (—)	— (—)	3.93 (1)	26.85 (5)	23.23 (3)
					1967	25.27 (7)	12.97 (—)	5.76 (1)	16.30 (3)	0.64 (—)	4.84 (—)	34.22 (3)
Static Votes												
15. Muzaffarpur	10	14	29	28	1957	43.01 (19)	1.87 (—)	23.55 (7)	1.49 (—)	..	4.45 (—)	25.63 (3)
					1962	39.44 (18)	4.11 (—)	26.75 (7)	1.88 (—)	11.85 (—)	0.04 (—)	15.93 (4)
					1967	39.33 (16)	4.29 (1)	28.59 (7)	7.99 (3)	1.41 (—)	11.96 (3)	6.42 (—)
16. Shahabad*	4	9	22	22	1957	41.53 (15)	4.12 (—)	28.76 (7)	— (—)	..	5.00 (—)	20.59 (1)
					1962	42.48 (17)	4.40 (1)	27.42 (3)	1.09 (—)	17.23 (—)	1.83 (—)	5.55 (1)
					1967	34.49 (12)	5.17 (1)	32.50 (5)	6.89 (—)	3.59 (—)	5.20 (1)	12.16 (2)
17. Purnea*	12	10	18	21	1957	50.30 (16)	1.93 (—)	18.45 (1)	2.42 (—)	..	7.37 (—)	19.53 (1)
					1962	44.74 (10)	1.05 (—)	27.35 (4)	3.47 (—)	13.93 (2)	0.17 (—)	9.29 (2)
					1967	31.45 (12)	2.82 (1)	27.06 (4)	11.40 (1)	3.89 (—)	6.47 (—)	18.25 (2)

* Results for five Assembly seats for 1967 elections are not available.

Note: Figures in parentheses indicate seats won.

Lit. = Literacy Urb. = Urbanity R = Right L = Left S.P. = Socialist Party P.S.P. = Praja Socialist Party

cent and 31.67 per cent in Darbhanga and Monghyr respectively but won only 10 and 2 seats respectively. The socialists, on the other hand, secured 34.62 and 37.73 per cent in Darbhanga and Monghyr respectively winning 14 seats each in both the districts. In other words, the Congress still occupies a strong position in the districts and is able to gain support from a sizeable portion of the electorate although its dominance has dwindled. The opposition parties on the other hand remain fragmented although in a better position than in any previous election.

Opposition Parties

It should also be noted that of the opposition parties only the Communists and the Jana Sangh have consistently improved their positions in almost all the districts. Excepting the districts of Monghyr, Saharsa, Palamau and Singhbhum, the Communists got more votes than in previous elections. The Jana Sangh, on the other hand, has improved its position in all the districts. In contradistinction to these parties, the socialist parties have remained more or less static in all but six districts (See Table 3). In three districts, that is, Santhal Parganas, Dhanbad and Ranchi, they polled less votes than what they did in the previous elections. But the fact remains that the socialists won more seats with lesser votes in contrast to the Congress' performance of winning fewer seats but polling larger votes. This again strengthens the fragmentation tendency among the parties opposed to the Congress.

Apart from the general trend of preference for Left parties and persisting fragmentation of the parties opposed to the Congress, some very interesting features become discernible when we analyse the voting patterns in the districts. In ten out of seventeen districts the Congress lost very heavily (See Tables 2 and 3), where its votes ranged between 27.00 and 36.00 per cent. In the districts of Monghyr, Santhal Parganas and Bhagalpur it was almost wiped out inasmuch as it won only 2, 3 and 2 seats respec-

tively. It is of interest to note here that the Congress has lost heavily in districts where it was strongly entrenched. Moreover, except one or two exceptions, these have been the districts where factionalism has also been rampant. In other words, internal conflict in the Congress has tended gradually to erode its support base in these districts. The Congress has more or less maintained its position in three districts.

One significant factor that stands out relates to the voters' preference for a party other than a dominant one. Where the Congress has been stronger, the electorate has voted against it and where it was weaker it has favoured it. In other words, the second strongest party with longer organizational experience has benefited most from the general resentment against the dominant party. Also noteworthy is the fact that in the districts of Palamau, Hazaribagh, Ranchi and Singhbhum where either the erstwhile Janata Party or the Jharkhand Party had held sway, the Congress has made a break-through and won the majority of seats. Interestingly enough, these were the districts where personalized politics (symbolized by the Janata Party) and parochial politics (symbolized by the Jharkhand Party) were dominant styles. In contradistinction to this, in economically more advanced districts, such as, Patna, Dhanbad and Bhagalpur, either a breakaway group of the Congress or the Right opposition or both have effectively challenged the dominance of the Congress. But in backward and heavily rural districts, Left parties either of the Communist variety or of the PSP-SP variety have tremendously gained in strength.

Fragmented

However, in spite of the gains made by the opposition parties, they still remain fragmented. It is only in the districts of Monghyr, Darbhanga, Saharsa and Dhanbad that a strong party in opposition to the Congress (S.P. in the first three and the breakaway Congress group in the last) has emerged to take the place of the Congress. In

the rest of the districts, no clear preference for a single party is discernible.

Another interesting factor pertains to the phenomenon of independent candidates. Where opposition to the Congress comes primarily from either the Rightists or the centrist political group, independent candidates have greater chances of winning. Santhal Parganas, Ranchi and Singhbhum illustrate this. It may be that where institutionalized opposition forces are either non-existent or weak, independent candidates reap the most advantage out of general resentment against the dominant party.

To summarize, the tendency toward the Left is clearly established with the SSP emerging as the second strongest party with 64 seats. However, no clear tendency towards bipolarization of political forces is discernible except in three districts. Although people have voted against the Congress, they have not totally rejected it nor have they opted for one single party to take its place. Further, there seems to be no clear-cut relationship between economic progress and advantage for Left parties; if anything, the reverse is indicated. Finally, the influence of traditional loyalties on voters seems to have diminished.

Future Implications

We still have to answer the question raised above, namely, what do the election results portend for the party system and what implications do they have for the stability of the political regime in Bihar? It will be altogether simplistic to assume that the disintegration of the Congress Party is just around the corner. Those who argue this way conveniently forget the fact that the Congress is still the largest party in Bihar endowed with the largest organizational net-work capable of bringing about its recovery. Whether or not the Congress reasserts its dominance or at least continues as a strong party depends on two sets of factors: the nature of internal interactions in the Congress Party itself and the performance

of the opposition parties now partners in a coalition government.

As we indicated earlier, the tendency of the Congressmen to indulge in mutual annihilation, accentuated after the selection of candidates and during elections, has been a major factor in the decline of the Congress.¹⁴ This is undoubtedly a manifestation of putting personal claims for power positions before party interests as well as a scant regard for the 'rules of the game' for resolving conflicts and making decisions. It is not to suggest that it is only the Congress which suffers from this disease; as a matter of fact, this is perhaps inherent in Indian culture. But this is most pronounced in the Congress Party and unless steps are taken to streamline the organization in a way which will reassert the primacy of party interests and enable the party to function as an effective link between society and polity, its recovery cannot be assured.

The Cement

Regarding the performance of opposition parties, it cannot be denied that their banding together in a coalition is motivated primarily by the idea of keeping the Congress out of power. How powerful a cementing force this is, is yet to be seen. However, the fact that each of the coalition partners is a potential successor to the Congress carries a great implication for the success of the coalition. The necessity perceived by each of the coalition partners

to forge a stable single majority will perhaps create in the coming months stresses and strains among them and it will take great political acumen to avert splits.

Instability

In addition, the coalition government, in order to acquire popularity, has shown its readiness to take popular measures whereas the acute economic crises and growing indiscipline require effective measures. Here a dilemma faces the coalition government: if it goes on taking measures which are popular it will fail to provide correctives to the ills the State is suffering from; on the other hand, if it tries to take effective measures it will antagonize various social sections. It is very difficult to foresee how the coalition government is going to escape the horns of this dilemma. If, however, it fails effectively to grapple with the problem, it will adversely affect its future power prospects. And such a failure will create bad blood among coalition partners making it difficult for them to work together in the future. Even if the coalition succeeds in surviving the many perils it faces, its very success will create intense competition for power among the coalition partners. No group wants to share power with others for long and coalition partners are no exception to this.

In any event, Congress monopoly of power has broken but one-party dominance has been replaced, at least for the time being, by a multi-party situation. This means that it will take several electoral battles to arrive at a bipolarization of political forces. But, until such a bipolarization occurs, volatility in the party system will remain a characteristic feature of Bihar politics. This further means that political instability due to the non-emergence of a stable majority will also be a recurrent feature of Bihar politics for some time to come. It may be that in this amorphous situation the Congress may loose both to the Left and the Right and gradually disappear from the political scene of Bihar. Whether it so happens is yet to be seen.

14. In 1957, for example, the members of the centrist group who had risen in revolt against the ruling sub-coalition were refused party tickets with the result that most of them left the Congress and formed a new party called the Jana Congress. Widespread sabotage by Congressmen against their rivals was reported which the Vyas Report later confirmed. Again, in 1961 the two rival sub-coalitions in the Bihar Congress failed to come to an agreement about selection of candidates which was later done by the High Command. In 1966 also the two contending sub-coalitions failing to evolve an agreed list, submitted two lists of candidates to the High Command. After the declaration of the names of candidates many Congressmen bolted the party and fought against it as the Jan Kranti Dal. Moreover internal sabotage also damaged Congress chances.

Uttar pradesh

BASHIRUDDIN AHMED

THE main participants in electoral politics in the U.P. have been the Congress, the Praja Socialist Party, the Jana Sangh, the Samyukta Socialist Party and the Independents. They have between themselves shared on an average about 90 per cent of the votes and nearly the same proportion of the seats in the State. Changes in the fortunes of one have affected the fortunes of others. Constituencies have changed hands, and votes have shifted primarily amongst them. The other parties have remained largely on the margin. Their gains and losses have not affected in any substantial way the prospects of the main participants or materially altered the pattern of electoral politics in the State.

Among the main participants, the Congress, as elsewhere in the country, started with overwhelming strength. In 1952 it polled 47.9 per cent of the valid votes in the State and bagged 390 of the 430 Assembly seats. The next largest group in terms of votes in 1952 were the Independents who polled 26.95 per cent of the votes and secured 18 seats against the PSP's 20 seats and 17.82 per cent of the votes. The SSP which was formed in 1955 came into the picture later. But the newly formed Jana Sangh, on the other hand, was trailing behind the rest with only two seats and 6.4 per cent of the votes.

Ever since 1952, the Congress continued to farm the major portion of both the seats and votes in the State, but over the successive elections the proportion of its votes and seats have shown a continuous decline (see Table 1). Although the Congress today is still the largest party, it no longer has the absolute majority in the Assembly which had assured it the position of dominance in the past. In this same period, the PSP votes also registered a consistent downward trend, except that in 1957 the

party almost doubled its seats from 20 to 44. But this trend did not continue as the PSP seats dropped to 38 in 1962 and 11 in 1967.

Precise data on votes polled by the SSP in 1957 is not available,¹ but a rough estimate indicates that its share of votes in 1957 could have been between 4 to 5 per cent. But what is most impressive is that the party in the very first election after it broke away from the PSP gained 24 seats in the State Assembly. In 1962, the SSP polled 8.21 per cent of the votes without, however, adding to the number of seats it had won in 1957. The party has had more success in terms of seats in 1967 when it increased its tally from 24 to 44 but its votes increased only by 2.10 per cent.

Among all the parties the success of the Jana Sangh has easily been the most impressive both in terms of votes and seats. Starting with a modest 6.4 per cent votes and only 2 seats the party increased its votes to 9.8 per cent and its seats to 17 in 1957. In 1962 its votes increased by 6 per cent while its seats went up to 49. This upward trend has continued for the Jana Sangh. The party polled 21.53 per cent votes and gained 98 seats at the fourth general elections. The Independents, taken as a whole, have experienced, on the other hand, more ups and downs than any of the other parties discussed so far. Their votes fell from 27.19 per cent to between 24 to 25 per cent in 1957, although their seats increased from 18 to 50. In 1962, the Independents dropped both a substantial proportion of

1. Since the SSP or Socialist Party (as it was known then) formed in 1955 was not a 'recognised' party, its candidates were treated as Independents by the Election Commission which lumped their votes with those of the other Independents while publishing the results.

their votes and seats. But once again at the fourth general elections their seats increased by 6 and their votes went up by a little over 6 per cent.

In contrast to the main participants, the gains and losses at successive elections have generally been modest for the other parties. The Swatantra and the Republican parties, making their debut in U.P., as elsewhere in the country in 1962, have for instance registered only minor fluctuations in their votes and seats and polled between themselves a little over 9 per cent votes in 1962, and slightly over 8 per cent in 1967. As for seats, the two got a total of 23 in the third general elections and 21 in the fourth. The Hindu Mahasabha which participated in the first three elections, in fact, never quite made the grade. It only won 2 seats in 1962 and its votes were at no time more than a little over 1 per cent.

The Communists

The Communist Party which is the only one of the small parties to have participated in all the four elections showed great promise in 1957 when it gained 9 Assembly seats for the first time and increased its votes from 0.93 per cent in 1952 to 3.83 per cent in 1957. In 1962 while the party did increase its seats to 14, its votes went up only by a paltry 1.25 per cent. In 1967 the performance of the Communist Party has been of a piece with that of the Swatantra and the Republican parties. For, if we combine the 14 seats and 3.43 per cent votes won by CPI (R) with one seat and 1.19 per cent votes

gained by CPI(M), we find that the Communists increased their seats by one, while their votes registered a slight decline.

Increasing Fluidity

But the trends in party fortunes which we notice over the successive elections must be seen in the context of fluidity which has characterised electoral politics in the U.P. All major participants, without exception, have gained and lost constituencies with such rapidity that any reasonable estimate of their relative strength cannot be made entirely on the basis of the increase or decrease in their votes and seats at the different elections. In what follows, therefore, we will try to identify the extent of this fluidity and describe the pattern of party gains and losses during the last three elections in the U.P.

It must, however, be pointed out here that in estimating shifts in seats and votes we are, unfortunately, faced with problems arising from the changes made in constituency boundaries between 1952-57 and 1962-67. Although a delimitation of constituencies was also undertaken in 1961, it only involved the bifurcation of the 1957 double member constituencies without making any other alterations. With constituency-wise comparison between 1952-57 and 1962-67 made difficult due to delimitation, our main analysis of shifts will, therefore, be for the 1957-62 period. For the earlier and later periods, however, we will try to sketch the broad outlines of the shifts by making gross estimates

on the basis of the available voting statistics, and with the help of what we know of the composition, size, and geographical distribution of support for the major parties from different case studies and newspaper reports available.

The Loser

Beginning with the second general elections we notice that all parties and groups, except Congress, added substantially to the number of seats previously held by them, or gained a good number for the first time in 1957. (See Table 1.) But the votes they polled did not register an increase commensurate with the size of the seats they gained. In the case of the PSP and the Independents the percentage of votes in fact declined. As experience in the same election elsewhere and in subsequent elections in U.P. itself shows, the skewed ratio between votes polled and seats gained may have been due to the large number of candidates in the field, nearly 39 per cent of whom were Independents. As in the case of others, their presence also affected the ratio between Congress votes and seats, since the loss in the party's seats was strikingly higher than the fall in its votes. While it lost 104 seats, the Congress votes dropped only by a little over 5 per cent.

The major cause for the Congress setback in 1957 and the major beneficiaries from its losses in terms of seats were the Independents who increased their share from a mere 18 seats in 1952 to a substantial 50 in 1957. The Inde-

TABLE 1

Party Seats and Votes in Four Elections																		
Year	Total Seats	Cong. Votes	Cong. Seats	CPI Votes	CPI Seats	PSP Votes	PSP Seats	SSP Votes	SSP Seats	J. S. Votes	J. S. Seats	Swa. Votes	Swa. Seats	RPI Votes	RPI Seats	Ind. Votes	Ind. Seats	O.P. Votes
1952	430	47.93	390	0.93	Nil	17.82	20	—	—	6.37	2	—	—	—	—	19.54	18	7.41
1957	430	42.42	286	3.83	9	14.47	44	N.A.*	24	9.84	17	—	—	—	—	29.44	50	—
1962	430	36.33	249	5.08	14	11.52	38	8.21	24	16.46	49	4.68	15	3.74	8	12.63	31	1.35
1967	425	32.10	199	3.43 (R)	14 (R)	4.02	11	10.19	44	21.53	98	4.73	12	4.01	9	18.80	37	Nil
				1.19 (L)	1 (L)													

Source: For the first three elections the figures are taken from the reports on the General Elections published by the Election Commission. 1967 data is based on the results released by the PIB, Government of India.

*Since the Socialist Party (SSP) was not a recognized party in 1957 its candidates were treated as Independents by the Election Commission which lumped their votes with the votes of the other Independent candidates.

pendents were largely the Congress's own creation. Their ranks were made up mostly of those who once held important leadership positions in the Congress at the crucial level of the district and were subsequently pushed into the background for one reason or the other.

In most cases they were displaced during the factional struggle which raged within the U.P. Congress from the mid-forties until after the first general elections. But some were pushed back because they lacked the backing of numerically large social groups which the new entrants to the party fold could mobilize. In many cases individuals so pushed out were brought back into the party later. But their displacement in this period affected the Congress fortunes adversely.

Class Threat

Along with the 'politically displaced', the Independents also contained in their ranks some zamindars and talukdars or their nominees. As a class the zamindars and talukdars constituted a group which saw in the U.P. Zamindari Abolition Act of July 1952 a threat to their status and their interests. Their fears in this regard were further accentuated by the rise of the 'politician-influential' who, on the basis of the governmental patronage he could command, was beginning to usurp their positions as lords and masters of their traditional domains.

The ire of the zamindars on this score, as in the case of the land legislation, was against the Congress, for the politicians they resented were Congressmen, and the government that abolished zamindari was a Congress Government. Commanding support in their areas the zamindars and talukdars succeeded along with the other Independents in inflicting large losses on the Congress in 1957.

Next to the Independents, the PSP made the largest gains from what was lost by the Congress. But while the Independents and the PSP made gains at the expense of the Congress, the other parties,

including the Congress, registered advances in areas where the two had shown considerable strength in the past. The SSP (which was then known as the Socialist Party) which separated from the PSP in 1955 gained part of its strength from the parent party. The CPI also benefited in some areas from the PSP due to the split in PSP ranks, while along with the SSP it (the CPI) also picked seats and votes in former Congress strongholds.

In the case of the Jana Sangh most of its gains appear to have been at the expense of the Congress though it also made advances in districts where the Independents had done well in 1952. But a more vivid example of parties gaining from others even while they are losing to them was provided in the period between 1957 and 1962 when the Congress increased its tally of seats in the Assembly from 286 to 303 by picking up 17 seats in the bye-election held during this period.

Continuing Picture

The picture in 1962 varies only in some detail from 1957, but otherwise remains the same in its essentials. As in 1957 the Congress suffered heavy losses. The PSP and the Independents who had only lost votes in 1957 but had increased their tally of seats, registered a decline on both counts in 1962. However, the quantum of votes lost in the third general elections was the largest in the case of the Independents. If we assume, as we did earlier, that of the 29.44 per cent votes shown against the Independents (see Table 1) between 4 to 5 per cent are SSP votes, then the fall in the votes of the Independents from an estimated 24 to 25 per cent in 1957 to 12.63 per cent in 1962 amounts almost to a drop of 50 per cent, while the drop in their seats was also as high as 45 per cent.

Although the Congress percentage of votes dropped was less than that of the Independents, the party lost a greater proportion of its votes in 1962 than it had in 1957. While in 1957 the Congress losses in terms of votes amounted to 11.4 per cent of its total votes in 1952,

the quantum of its losses increased to 14.1 per cent in 1962. In terms of seats, however, the position was the reverse. It dropped nearly 13 per cent of its seats this time as against the 26.6 per cent it had lost in 1957. The seats lost by the PSP were, both in terms of absolute numbers and in terms of its 1957 total, small.

In case of votes, the PSP proportion of losses was slightly higher than in 1957. But the loss of both votes and seats in 1962 was an ominous sign for the party. On the other hand maximum gains were made by the Jana Sangh. The CPI also picked up some extra votes and seats while the Swatantra and RPI between themselves cornered over 8 per cent of the valid votes and won 23 seats. While SSP seats did not increase, it added about 3 to 4 per cent to its share of votes.

But, as in 1957, underlying the increase or decrease in votes and seats of parties was the element of fluidity, as all parties both lost and gained seats and votes to and from the others. The Congress Party, for instance, lost 119 of the 286 seats it had won in 1957 to others, but at the same time gained 80 from them. 48.75 per cent of the seats it gained came from the Independents, while the next highest block of 37.5 per cent seats came from the PSP. The Congress also gained 8 seats from the Jana Sangh and 3 from the CPI. The Jana Sangh retaining only 8 of its previous 17 seats picked one and five seats respectively from the PSP and the Independents while cornering 85.36 per cent out of its total of 49 seats from the Congress (see Table 2). Among the other parties, the PSP took 21 seats from the Congress and gained 5 from the Independents only. The SSP and the Independents secured almost all their seats from the Congress, except for the one seat the Independents took from the PSP, and one the SSP gained from the Independents.

Greatest Loss

Thus, in terms of range the Congress gains and losses was the widest. The Congress gained from four sources while all parties, in-

cluding the new entrants, the Swatantra and the RPI, secured seats from it. Among the other parties the Jana Sangh gained from three sources and the others from two (see Table 2). Variation was also found in the range of losses the other parties suffered. The Jana Sangh and the SSP lost to two parties, the PSP to four and the Independents to all the other parties and groups.

As in the matter of the range of gains in terms of size also, the Congress gains from all parties were the largest (see Table 2). Likewise, the Jana Sangh, which had only 17 seats in 1957 against PSP's 35, the SSP's 24 and 50 held by the Independents, took the highest percentage of seats from among those lost by the Congress, while it took the same number of seats from the Independents as did the PSP (see Table 2). Equally significant was the fact that among the major participants, both the Congress and the Jana Sangh retained the highest number of seats they had gained in 1957. The percentage of seats retained by the Congress was 57.09 and that by the Jana Sangh was 47.06. While the PSP could keep only 27.27 per cent of its old seats, the Independents kept 20 per cent and the SSP 16.66 per cent.

The Fourth Elections

Turning to the 1967 elections, we find that the pattern of electoral fortunes remained essentially the same as in the past. The Congress and the PSP continued to exhibit a downward trend both in terms of seats and votes while the Jana Sangh and the SSP registered considerable gains. The Independents who had lost both votes and seats in 1962, increased their seats from 31 to 38 and their votes from 12 per cent to 18 per cent.

Although, as was pointed out earlier, the data on the size and direction of gains and losses between 1962-67 is not as detailed or precise as for the 1957-62 period, the evidence we have indicates that, as in the past, all parties irrespective of their over-all position in the election, both lost and gained constituencies to and from

others. An analysis based on approximations between 1962-67 constituencies done for the Jana Sangh, the SSP and the PSP shows this in some detail. The Jana Sangh and the SSP we find were able to gain seats this time from a wider range of sources than in the past. Covering virtually the entire party space, the Jana Sangh got 57.14 per cent of its new seats from the Congress as against the 85.36 per cent it had gained in 1962. But it picked 8.16 per cent and 5.1 per cent seats respectively from the Swatantra and the PSP and also took 3 seats each from three others and one seat from the CPI (see Table 3).

The SSP, drawing this time from four sources, secured 54.54 per cent of its new seats from the Congress, 22.7 per cent from the PSP and 3 seats each from the Jana Sangh and the independents. There was, however, no major change in the capacity of the SSP to retain seats (see Table 3). But this time the Jana Sangh could keep only 38.7 per cent of the 44 seats it held in 1962. The PSP, crippled by the exodus of State and district leaders from its ranks in 1964, showed a different pattern of gains and losses. Its seats slashed to 11 in 1967 and the party retained only one out of the 38 seats it held in 1962. Further, while it lost to the Jana Sangh, the SSP, and the Congress, the PSP got its new constituencies only from the latter.

The evidence available for the Congress is unfortunately incomplete. The analysis of gains done above for the three parties gives us only some idea of Congress losses. As for its gains, a district-wise analysis shows that the party increased its seats in 14 districts and gained 36 new seats in the process. But this obviously is a partial picture. The actual number of new seats in its 1967 total of 199 may have been much larger than we can determine without a constituency-wise analysis.

The Shifts

However, a most vivid demonstration of shifts was provided by the way in which whole blocks of seats passed from one side to the

other in Rae Bareilly, Pratapgarh, Bahraich, Hamirpur and Rampur. In Rae Bareilly the Congress, which had only 2 seats in 1962, took this time all the 8 seats in the district, securing 3 from the SSP, 2 from the Jana Sangh and one from the Independents. Likewise in Pratapgarh, where the Jana Sangh and the Congress had 3 seats each in 1962, the latter now has 6 out of a total of 7 in the district, while one is held by the PSP. The Jana Sangh on the other hand gained all the 9 seats in Bahraich where it had no seats at all in 1962, taking 5 seats from the Swatantra and 4 from the Congress. In Hamirpur it took all the 4 seats which were held by the Congress in 1962. Likewise, the Congress lost all the 4 seats of Rampur District to the Swatantra.

Areas of Support

But even amidst all the flux over the years when a large number of constituencies have passed hands between the political parties, each party has managed to acquire what appears to be a relatively stable area of support for itself. This is partly reflected in the distribution of seats won by parties during the last three elections in the Oudh, the eastern, the western, and the south-western districts of U.P. If size and stability of gains is taken as an index of strength, then we find that some parties have greater strength in one region rather than the other (see Table 4).

In the case of the Jana Sangh, for instance, the highest proportion of seats won by it has always come from the Oudh region. From the South-West have come its next largest block of seats, while the party has been weak in the West and more so in the East. The PSP on the other hand, has shown greatest persistence in the West, although its greatest strength was in the South-West till a good part of its leadership decided to leave its ranks in 1964. In the other two regions, however, its performance has been marked by a high degree of fluctuations.

With data from only two elections available for the SSP, the

party appears to be strongest in the eastern region and weakest in the western region where it had failed to gain even a single seat in 1962. Its seats in Oudh have declined from 9 in 1962 to 7 while the party has improved its position in the South-West primarily at the expense of the PSP and partly the Congress. In complete contrast to the other parties, the difference in Congress strength in the four regions has not been very marked though its strength in the western region has always been more than in the other three.

Social Composition

Although we have no direct data on the social composition of the support base which each party has, some indirect evidence on this point is available. It consists of demographic data on the Congress, Jana Sangh, PSP and SSP MLAs elected to the U.P. Assembly in 1962.² We consider this to be relevant evidence because we assume that at least some of the social characteristics of the elected representatives correspond closely with the social characteristics of a substantial number of their electors. In India, as several studies have shown, this particularly happens to be the case with caste. Proceeding, therefore, on this assumption we find that the Congress, the Jana Sangh, and the PSP appear to draw more support from among the elite castes than from the lower castes (see Table 5). The SSP on the other hand draws equally from the two, but within the lower castes tends to draw slightly more from among the Backward than the Scheduled Castes. Among the lower castes, the PSP seems to have some support in the Backward Castes only, while support for it amongst the Scheduled Castes is insignificant.

The Congress, with only 6.3 per cent of its MLAs from among the Backward Castes appears to have mobilized very little support amongst them. It, however, shows

considerable strength among the Scheduled Castes. Additional confirmation of this has been provided by the fourth general elections in which the party's share of wins in Reserved Constituencies, in spite of consistent decline over the previous elections, was 52.9 per cent. In contrast to the Congress and the PSP, the Jana Sangh on the other hand reflects a balance between its strength among the Backward and the Scheduled Castes.

Using more specific caste categories, Angela Berger, however, reports further differences in support, within the broad caste categories, for the major parties.³ While, as we saw, all parties draw a substantial portion of their support from the elite castes the Congress tends to have far greater support among the Brahmins than the other elite castes, while the other parties draw more support from among the Thakurs. 'In the first general election,' points out Berger '28 per cent Brahmins and 13 per cent Thakurs were elected on the Congress ticket; in 1962, the Brahmins were still the largest caste represented in Congress with 30 per cent to the Thakurs 19 per cent.'⁴ In contrast to the Congress, 16.6 per cent of the Jana Sangh MLAs were Brahmin while 27.1 per cent were Thakurs. In the SSP there were 27.3 per cent Thakur MLAs and 18 per cent Brahmins. In the case of the PSP, however, the difference was not very marked; 15.2 per cent of its MLAs being Brahmins and 18.2 per cent Thakurs.

Differences in Support

Among the Backward Castes the PSP is associated more closely with the Yadavas while the SSP draws considerable support from among the Yadavas and the Kurmis. In fact, in the case of the PSP the proportion of the Yadav MLAs, as compared to the other castes, was the largest. In the SSP, Yadav and Kurmi MLAs together equalled the number of Thakur MLAs, who constituted the largest single caste group among the party's legislators. The Jana

Sangh, on the other hand, with a smaller proportion of Backward Caste MLA's than were found in the PSP and the SSP ranks, had its support equally distributed over all the Backward Castes.

Among the Scheduled Castes, the Jatavs (Chamars) who constitute the largest single group have been mobilized mainly by the Congress and the next largest group, Pasis, have largely divided their support between the SSP and the Jana Sangh. In terms of the social base then the picture that emerges is one in which the non-Congress parties appear to be associated more with one set of castes and the Congress with the others. What such a patterning of social support means along with the other factors for the strength of parties is what we will deal with next.

Jana Sangh Consolidation

Considered in the context of the pattern of gains and losses and the regional and social contours of party support described earlier, the prospects of development in the future appear to be the brightest for the Jana Sangh. The Jana Sangh's strongest point is its organisational strength. Although the party's organisation is not as wide-ranging as that of the Congress, it is better structured and more dynamic⁵ than that of the latter. The Jana Sangh's organisation was initially limited to urban areas, for that is where the RSS was to be found in the early '50s. But in the period between 1957-62, encouraged by its 1957 success, the party began to expand and consolidate its organisation.

Although its efforts in this direction have continued ever since with equal vigour, it was in the 1957-62 period that the Jana Sangh first began to reach out, on a substantial scale, into the countryside. The success of its efforts in this regard and the effectiveness of the organisation that was created, were amply demonstrated by the gains the party made in the third and the fourth general elections. The party, as we saw, nearly

2. Angela Sutherland Berger, *Opposition in Dominant Party System: A Study of the Jan Sangh, Praja Socialist and Socialist Parties in Uttar Pradesh*. (Ph.D. dissertation, University of Wisconsin 1966), p. 83.

3. Angela Berger, *Ibid*, p. 83.

4. Berger, *Ibid*, p. 82.

5. Cynthia Postler, *Modern Political Forces in India: The growth of the Jana Sangh* (unpublished paper), 1966.

trebled its seats in the Assembly and increased its votes enormously in 1962, and went on to repeat the performance in 1967.

The organisational strength of the party also enabled it to register advances in regions where it was weak in 1957. As Table 4 shows, the Jana Sangh was in fact the only party to register continuous increase in its seats in all the regions. The Congress on the other hand showed persistent decline, while the PSP's performance was erratic. Even the SSP, which had picked seats in all other regions dropped two seats in Oudh in the fourth general elections.

But there are, however, indications that the electoral advances of the Jana Sangh may have outstripped the increase in its organisational capacity. For, we notice that while the party could retain 47.06 per cent of its old seats in 1962, the percentage of seats so retained came down to 38.7 per cent in 1967 (see Tables 2. & 3).

So far as the social base of the parties is concerned, our analysis indicates that the Jana Sangh has drawn support from a wide variety of social groups and has managed to avoid heavy dependence on any single caste. This is reflected in the fact that, though among its MLAs in 1962 the party had more Thakurs than other elite castes, their number was not overly large as was, for instance, the case with the Brahmins in the Congress (see Table 5). Likewise, its support between the Backward and the Scheduled Castes was also evenly distributed. Furthermore, within both the Backward Castes and the Scheduled Castes, support for the party was found amongst all groups. This is in complete contrast to the dependence of the PSP on the Yadavas among the Backward Castes, and the Jatavs among the Scheduled Castes; or the low degree of support for the Congress among the Backward Castes as a whole, and its overwhelming dependence on the Jatavs among the Scheduled Castes.

The S.S.P.

The SSP on the other hand shows a more even distribution of its

support among the elite and the lower castes than the Jana Sangh. But considering the realities of the social situation in U.P. where individuals of the elite castes have considerable influence over electors in their areas, and where political loyalties remain essentially personal in nature, it is doubtful if such a situation can be regarded as advantageous for the party. Another handicap for the party is its weak organisation. The party, as we saw, is particularly weak in the western region and in Oudh. Furthermore, its ability to retain seats has not been very adequate. Although it has managed to improve its organisation by drawing many PSP leaders and workers into its ranks after the split in that party in 1964, the SSP still has a long way to go before it can cover the gap between itself and the Jana Sangh.

Competing Spheres

While the decline of the Congress has both been desired and hailed by all opposition parties including the SSP, the accretion of strength to the Jana Sangh in the process may well prove to be a greater obstacle to the SSP's expansion than has been recognised so far. Unless the SSP and the Jana Sangh agree to carve out areas of influence and operation, and continue to work together at the State level, the two may find themselves pitted against each other in more constituencies than has been the case in the past. While this may or may not help other parties, the SSP is likely to find the Jana Sangh to be a more tough rival to defeat than was the Congress. But whether the SSP works with the Jana Sangh or competes with it, there is no doubt that, given its association with the up and coming peasant castes of Kurmis and Yadavas, the party is going to be among the most important elements in the politics of U.P.

On the other hand, the PSP, reduced to a rump not so much by electoral defeats as by desertions and splits in its ranks, is now a spent force. It no longer attracts activists or makes efforts to mobilize support among new groups.⁶

It survives because a few leaders of long standing, for one reason or the other, prefer not to leave its ranks. Until the time they leave the party to join another, or retire from active political life, the PSP may well continue to return few members to the Assembly, but as a force in State politics it must now be counted out.

Congress' Future

The same, however, can hardly be said of the Congress. If nothing else, the Congress is still the only party to have some sort of organisation in all the regions and districts of the State. Although, we must hasten to add, this may no longer be adequate as a condition of its development or even survival in the future. For, over the years due to complacency and arrogance born out of its position of dominance, and due to the internecine quarrels and factionalism which dominance encouraged, the party neglected its organisation and allowed it to atrophy. In several places the organisational structures of the party became mere adjuncts to the personal networks of influence created by local influentials on whom the party became increasingly dependent for its electoral successes. Since most of these individuals had joined the Congress because of the promise of power it held out to them, the problem of its survival will in no small way depend on how far these individuals will be prepared to go with it now that it has been pushed out of power.

Much will, of course, depend on the coalition ministry which has replaced the Congress after the fourth general elections. If the disparate groups in it stick together and prove that a coalition government can be a viable and stable proposition, then their success in this regard is likely to hasten the process of Congress disintegration. But if they fail in this, then the Congress would get another lease of life, though it is doubtful if it will ever again be able to gain the position of dominance it once enjoyed in the politics of the U.P. (See remaining Tables given at the end.)

6. Angela Berger, op. cit; p. 63.

TABLE 2

Sources of Seats Gained and Lost for All Parties — 1962

Parties	Congress	Jana Sangh	PSP	SSP	Independent	CPI	Seats Gained
Congress	★ 169 (57.09)	8 (10.00)	30 (37.5)	—	39 (48.75)	3 (3.75)	80
JS	35 (85.36)	★ 8 (47.06)	1 (2.44)	—	5 (12.2)	—	41
PSP	21 (80.77)	—	★ 12 (27.27)	—	5 (19.23)	—	26
SSP	19 (95.00)	—	—	★ 4 (16.66)	1 (5.00)	—	20
Ind.	20 (95.24)	—	1 (4.76)	—	★ 10 (20.00)	—	21
CPI	7 (77.78)	—	—	—	2 (22.22)	★ 5 (55.55)	9
Swat.	11 (73.33)	1 (6.67)	1 (6.67)	—	2 (13.33)	—	15
Rep.	5 (62.5)	—	—	—	3 (37.5)	—	8
Others	1 (50.00)	—	—	—	1 (50.00)	—	2
Seats Lost	119	9	33	Nil	58	3	222

* Figures in the inner box represent seats retained by parties from among those won by them in 1957.

TABLE 3

Sources of Seats Gained by J.S., PSP & SSP — 1967

Parties	Cong.	PSP	SSP	JS	Ind.	CPI	Swat.	Rep.	Other	Total Seats 1967
Jana Sangh	56 (70.88)	5 (6.33)	3 (3.8)	★ 19 (38.77)	3 (3.8)	1 (1.27)	8 (10.12)	3 (3.8)	—	98
PSP	★ 10 (100.00)	1 (9.09)	—	—	—	—	—	—	—	11
SSP	24 (60.00)	10 (25.00)	★ 4 (16.66)	3 (7.5)	3 (7.5)	—	—	—	—	44

* Figures in the inner box represent seats retained by parties from among those won by them in 1962.

TABLE 4

Distribution of Seats Won at Three Elections by Party and Region — 1962

OUDH										WESTERN
	Year	Cong.	PSP	SSP	JS	Cong.	PSP	SSP	JS	
	1957	55 (19·2)	13 (29·55)		10 (58·9)	76 (26·7)	10 (22·65)	—	2 (11·8)	
	1962	57 (23·0)		9 (37·5)	25 (51·0)	79 (31·8)	7 (18·4)		7 (14·3)	
	1967	47 (23·61)	2 (18·2)	7 (15·9)	36 (36·7)	53 (26·63)	6 (54·5)	4 (9·1)	18 (18·36)	
EASTERN										SOUTH WEST
	1957	73 (25·5)	8 (18·2)		1 (5·9)	81 (28·4)	13 (29·55)		4 (23·6)	
	1962	52 (20·7)	15 (39·5)	9 (37·5)	8 (16·3)	61 (24·5)	16 (42·0)	6 (25·0)	9 (18·4)	
	1967	48 (24·1)	1 (9·1)	14 (31·8)	16 (16·32)	51 (25·62)	2 (18·2)	18 (41·0)	28 (28·57)	

TABLE 5

Caste Affiliation of MLAs of Four Parties — 1964

Caste	Congress	Jana Sangh	PSP	SSP
Elite Castes	63·5%	62·5%	60·6%	50·0%
Brahmins	30·0	16·6	15·2	18·2
Thakur	19·0	27·1	18·2	27·3
*Vaishya	N.A.	12·5	6·1	—
Muslim	N.A.	—	6·1	—
*Kayasth	N.A.	4·2	9·0	4·5
Bhumihar	N.A.	2·1	6·0	—
Backward Castes	6·8%	18·8%	30·3%	27·3%
*Kurmi	N.A.	4·2	3·0	9·1
*Yadavas	N.A.	6·2	21·2	13·6
*Lodhi	N.A.	4·2	3·0	—
*Others	N.A.	4·2	3·1	4·6
Scheduled Castes	20·0%	18·7%	9·1%	22·7%
Jatav	15·0	6·3	9·1	—
Pasi	N.A.	10·4	—	18·2
Others	N.A.	2·0	—	4·5

* Separate percentages for all specific castes under the broad caste categories are not available for the Congress.

Note: This table is based on data given by Angela Berger, op. cit., in Table 6 on p. 82 and in the body of the text on p. 33.

Bengal

ASHOK MITRA

IN the present Indian context, psephological speculation is a hazardous game. The social and political milieu are much too unstable to offer any firm base for quantitative predictions. Even the availability of a mass of data on the results of the four general elections cannot raise significantly the quality of prognosis. For, the turns in the political situation, in the individual States and in the country as a whole, tend to reduce the operational significance of the results of past polls. This note, starting off from the results of this year's election, offers some commentary on the possible evolution of the political alignments in West Bengal. But most of the comments are illustrative, and no aura of scientific validity can or should be claimed for any of them. Despite Eliot, time future need not be immanent in time present.

In the February elections, the Congress Party for the first time lost its majority in the West Bengal Vidhan Sabha, and a heterogeneous United Front Government has assumed office. But outwardly the performance of the Congress, despite the loss of office, has not been too severely bad. The party has obtained as much as 41.3 per cent of the total valid votes cast, as against 18.5 per cent polled by the Left Communists, the second largest party in the State, and 26.9 per cent and 22.3 per cent secured respectively by the two electoral

combinations, the United Left Front (sponsored by the Left Communists) and the People's United Left Front (led by Bangla Congress). The vote polled by the Congress candidates on the average is as high as 18,602 for the Vidhan Sabha elections; the corresponding figures for the Left Communists and Bangla Congress are 17,302 and 16,844 respectively; the figures for the average ULF and PULF candidates are 16,411 and 14,256 respectively. (Tables I and II).

The Congress, even though it failed to secure a majority of the Vidhan Sabha seats, could still capture as many as 127 constituencies, as against only 44 on the part of the Left Communists. In fact, as has been shown elsewhere with just a little bit of extra luck, if 11,000 and odd extra votes were in the aggregate cast for the Congress candidates, the party could have come back to power in the State. From this point of view, certainly, West Bengal has been an extremely narrow miss for the party: a marginally better performance in the two major districts—24 Parganas and Midnapore—and it would have been re-installed in power in the State. In any subsequent election, a 1 or 2 per cent across-the-board swing in votes in its favour should, other things remaining the same, restore West Bengal to the Congress Party.

TABLE I
West Bengal Vidhan Sabha Elections, 1967. Average Votes Polled per Candidate

Name of District	Congress	United Left Front	Left Communists	People's United Left Front	Bangla Congress	Right Communists
West Dinajpur	13,073	10,973	8,577	6,388	7,641	5,619
Cooch Behar	20,374	13,327	13,327	18,295	—	2,690
Purulia	12,299	8,604	8,589	12,379	7,569	12,103
Birbhum	13,401	10,658	9,804	8,399	6,552	5,738
Hooghly	21,609	19,752	18,918	13,857	8,789	12,677
Howrah	22,381	20,307	20,665	11,288	11,426	6,790
Malda	18,828	16,666	11,604	6,574	3,827	9,681
Midnapur	18,999	9,199	9,877	23,811	24,493	24,940
Calcutta	20,801	18,299	18,515	16,521	10,888	23,235
Darjeeling	13,093	7,777	7,777	5,268	9,066	1,470
Jalpaiguri	15,464	13,333	11,376	8,192	7,184	12,814
Nadia	18,307	20,406	20,983	25,698	26,159	22,935
24-Parganas	19,663	21,506	22,061	16,265	19,846	12,203
Bankura	20,115	9,086	12,078	12,502	13,216	9,611
Burdwan	17,944	16,693	17,373	5,303	10,525	4,069
Murshidabad	18,987	15,678	13,017	12,536	14,170	7,635
	18,602	16,411	17,302	14,256	16,844	13,385

TABLE II
West Bengal Vidhan Sabha Elections, 1967. Percentage of Total Votes Polled

Name of District	Congress	United Left Front	Left Communists	People's United Left Front	Bangla Congress	Right Communists
West Dinajpur	35.1	24.1	11.3	12.5	5.6	3.9
Cooch Behar	43.4	15.8	15.8	34.1	—	0.7
Purulia	35.5	6.7	2.3	12.9	3.9	3.2
Birbhum	40.7	19.0	9.9	21.3	4.1	1.4
Hooghly	43.7	31.0	25.6	21.8	5.9	5.6
Howrah	40.3	32.0	27.9	19.1	3.8	1.5
Malda	44.9	23.9	8.3	12.9	3.6	9.2
Midnapore	40.1	10.0	5.9	41.8	25.1	15.2
Calcutta	44.5	32.5	25.8	13.8	1.0	8.6
Darjeeling	39.2	14.0	14.0	6.3	—	0.9
Jalpaiguri	41.6	32.6	8.3	14.0	7.2	6.2
Nadia	38.4	24.6	15.7	27.0	23.5	3.4
24-Parganas	36.9	31.6	25.8	24.5	14.2	6.9
Bankura	44.8	16.3	12.9	22.5	18.9	3.4
Burdwan	45.8	39.3	35.5	6.5	3.2	2.5
Murshidabad	46.1	31.7	5.3	6.8	5.7	1.1
	41.3	26.9	18.5	22.3	10.7	6.0

Other things, however, do not generally remain the same. And it is only fair to point out that, even as the votes lay, this year's general election could have ended in a much more severe set-back for the Congress if the two anti-Congress combinations, the United Left Front and the People's United Left Front, were to succeed in forming a solid phalanx on the day of the poll. The Congress Party's actual tally of 127 seats in the Vidhan Sabha, from this point of view, may even be considered as a near-optimum achievement. For, in case the votes actually polled by the parties and the groups which now constitute the United Front Government in the State are pooled (ULF, PULF, Praja Socialist Party,

and Lok Sevak Sangh), a retrospective analysis would indicate that the Congress has won 50 seats which hypothetically belong to the United Front.

Table III reveals the magnitude of advantage the Congress has enjoyed because of the failure of a single alliance against it. Such an alliance would seemingly have reduced its strength in the Vidhan Sabha to a mere 77, and the Left Communists would have been breathing down its neck with as many as 71 seats. Most of the other parties too would have gained at the expense of the Congress, but such gains would have been put in the shade by the giant strides made by the Left Communists.

There is thus no question that the Congress was lucky to have got off with a relatively light licking. A minuter examination of Tables I and II would suggest the same inference. If the ULF and PULF votes—both the combinations had separate candidates in at least 200 out of the 280 constituencies—are considered together, both in terms of votes polled per average candidate and in terms of percentage of total votes polled, the strength of the combination exceeds that of the Congress in an overwhelmingly large majority of the districts.

The picture turns out to be similar for the Lok Sabha elections. In the February election, the Congress succeeded in securing

TABLE III
West Bengal Vidhan Sabha Elections, 1967

	Actual Seats Won	'Realigned' Seats
Congress	127	77
Left Communists	44	71
Bangla Congress	34	39
Right Communists	16	22
Forward Bloc	13	17
Samyukta Socialist Party	7	8
Revolutionary Socialist Party	6	6
Praja-Socialist Party	7	8
Socialist Unity Centre	4	6
Lok Sevak Sangh	5	5
Workers' Party of India	2	2
Gorkha League	2	2
Revolutionary Communist Party of India	0	1
Marxist Forward Bloc	1	2
Swatantra	1	1
Jana Sangh	1	1
Independents	10	12
Total:	280	280

14 out of the 40 Lok Sabha seats from the State. In 7 of these seats—Howrah, Ghatal, Uluberia, Malda, Raiganj, Serampore and Birbhum—the Congress is, in a sense, the interloper; an alliance between the two United Fronts would have given these constituencies to the non-Congress parties. The Left Communists would again have been the major beneficiary, capturing five out of these seven.

Table IV carries forward the hypothetical story a little further. The 77 seats in the Vidhan Sabha which 'genuinely' belong to the Congress are peculiarly exposed to

the forces of erosion. The Table illustrates that if the present United Front had been in effect at the time of the elections and if the votes had swung a further 1 per cent against the Congress, the party would have lost another 13 seats, reducing its strength in the Vidhan Sabha to only 64. In contrast, assuming that in each constituency the United Front vote would have gone to the leading opposition candidate, the Left Communists would have captured 10 out of these 13 seats (Syampur, Kalighat, Domjor, Sankrail, Memari, Asansol, Keshpur, Kushmundi, Tehatta and Habibpur).

This would have raised the party's strength in the Vidhan Sabha to 81, thus elevating it immediately to the position of the largest party in the State.

On the same basis of hypothetical estimation, a 2.5 per cent swing away from the Congress would reduce its strength in the Vidhan Sabha to 56. And if the swing could ever assume the magnitude of 5 per cent, the Congress would be left with only 38 seats in the Vidhan Sabha.

Similarly, of its seven 'genuine' seats in the Lok Sabha, the Con-

TABLE IV
Vulnerability of 'Genuine' Congress Seats

Seats Likely to be Won by 'United' Front with Swing in Votes					
Less than 1 per cent	Between 1 and 2.5 per cent	Between 2.5 and 5 per cent	Between 5 and 7.5 per cent	Between 7.5 and 10 per cent	About 10 per cent
Shyampur Kalighat Domjor Sankrail Memari Asansol Keshpur Kushmundi Tehatta Naoda Khargram Nabagram Habibpur	Mangalkot Nondanghat Kumargunj Sitajl Bhatpara Bharatpur Berhampore Barjora	Howrah South Narayangarh Daspur Kheshiari Champdari Ketugram Mayureswar Cooch Behar West Kaliganj Ranaghat West Nabadwip Kulpi Sagar Darjeeling Mal Bhagabangola Sagardijhi Ramanagar	Beliaghata South Howrah North Pursurah Serampore Manteswar Arsa Garden Reach Madarihat Kalchini Kumargram Taldangra Chhatna	Polba Hansan Labhpur Mohammed Bazar Jaipur Basanti Siliguri Nagrakata Murshidabad Gazole	Barabazar Bowbazar Jamalpur Itahar Tufanganj Kakdwip Hariharpor Beldanga Kandi Jalanji Ranibandh Onda Malda Sujapur Chowrinjee Jarsako

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
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



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gress would be left with only two—Calcutta North-West and Jangipur—in the event of a 5 per cent swing against it.

The present writer would not demur if the speculations of the above species are taken with a pinch of cynicism. Such types of analysis are nonetheless useless, at least beyond a point, for formulating judgments in regard to the course of political developments in the State during the next few years. Despite superficial impressions to the contrary, it is unlikely that the Congress Party would ever be able to recover, *on its own*, the ground it has lost in this year's elections. The Congress bereft of power is not altogether dissimilar to Samson shorn of the lock of hair. Much of the Congress magic had a mundane base: money, and the ability to wield the power of the State to further party causes, allowed the party to build and sustain a vastly influential organisational structure. The money is still there, but with the withering away of the monopoly of State power, the Congress would find it extremely difficult going to swing back into effervescent action. At least for the Congress in West Bengal, nothing fails as much as failure.

Pragmatic Possibilities

The Congress can be bailed out, and helped on the way to recovery, possibly only by the medium-sized parties which now constitute a segment of the United Front government, such as the Bangla Congress, the Right Communists and the Forward Bloc. Until now, the strategy of these parties and groups vis-a-vis the Congress has been to work out battles of isolation and annihilation; to achieve the objective, alliance with the Left Communists—as in the present United Front Government—has been acquiesced in. But the force of historical circumstances, and the urge for survival on the individual plane, may soon call for a re-assessment of strategy and a fresh definition with respect to the identity of the major adversary.

Psephological trends, as discussed above, clearly suggest that the

bulk of the gains from any hypothetical decline in the strength of the Congress would accrue to the Left Communist Party. The other parties and groups in the present United Front government would also profit from the diminution of the Congress, but the dividend flowing to them would be infinitesimal compared to what the Left Communists would reap. If these other parties were to become ideologically totally neutral between the Congress and the Left Communists, they would then soon be confronted with an acute dilemma of policy, namely, whether it was worthwhile to align with the Left Communists in order to bring down the Congress, or whether it would not be prudent to arrange some sort of pragmatic arrangement with the Congress in order to contain the snowballing organisation and influence of the Left Communists.

The Political Plane

At the political plane, the contours of likely developments are emerging clear day by day. It was but natural that, with the current eclipse of the Congress, the party which stood next in terms of resources and organisational ability, would move in to fill the vacuum of power. From this point of view, the epilogue to the elections, as unfolded in course of the last four months, is even more revealing than the actual results of the poll. By moving into the government, the Left Communist Party has at least been able to stall some of the forces which were set athwart to check its furious pace of progress in the State. At the same time, by maintaining and asserting the party's freedom to criticise and disown some of the individual policies and measures of the United Front Government, it has somehow been able to retain the initiative on issues which engender widespread discontent, and to prevent excessive rankling among the rank and file. Besides, and over-shadowing the rest of the factors, the party can claim a large batch of dedicated workers whose allegiance to ideology cannot be matched

by the cadres of any other party active in the State.

In any case, ideologically the Bangla Congress would be hard put to claim an identity which is separate from the Congress. So far as parties like the Right Communists and the Forward Bloc are concerned, they may gradually succumb to the point of view that, if it is a question of their own survival, the Left Communists constitute a larger potential threat than the Congress. On ideological issues, there is little hazard that these parties would find their identity blurred by the engulfing influence of the Congress; because the respective ideologies are so much at variance, there could be no worries about protecting the cadres from contamination.

The Implications

But, the growth of the Left Communists would have more dangerous implications for these smaller parties. The ideological proximity might, sooner or later, lead to mass desertion of the cadres and the following to the Left Communist fold, thus hastening the process of polarisation in the State. The results of the elections to the several local bodies, to the works committees in the factories and elsewhere, have already demonstrated that, since the general election, a spectacular breakthrough is taking place all over the State in Left Communist strength.

The experience in Kerala suggests that even alignment with the Congress on the part of the other parties might not succeed in turning the Left Communist tide; on the other hand, such a step might isolate these parties from the mainstream of their erstwhile supporters. It is clearly therefore a difficult choice for such parties as the Bangla Congress and the Right Communists. What started in the beginning of the year as an attempt to dislodge the Congress from the State has, in the course of six swift months, been transformed into a desperate manoeuvre to hold down the Left Communists. This is how the post-election scene in West Bengal appears to at least one observer.

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Communications

I get the impression that Kusum Madgavkar has reviewed my book *Indian Students in Britain* (Asia, 1963) in the April 1967 issue of SEMINAR without properly reading it. More than anybody else, I am myself aware of the limitations and defects of the book. But the criticisms in this review seem to arise from the lack of understanding of the reviewer, or her negligence to read carefully the book.

Let me give a few examples relating to some specific points made by the reviewer.

1. The reviewer has said that though I have criticised earlier studies for ignoring the role of socio-cultural and personal factors of the students in their adjustment and attitudes I have myself in my study failed to do so (p. 39). This is not true. The entire analysis of the data is based on comparisons of students coming from upper and middle class families (pp. 37-116). The importance of social class has also been stressed in the Conclusions (pp. 122-124). Relevance of factors such as age, place of residence, level of study, duration of stay, social skill, social need, and emotional instability have also been examined (pp. 94-116). Association between

adjustment attitudes and several factors such as financial strain, academic difficulties, emotional strain, previous foreign education in the family, degree of westernization, etc., have been tested statistically by Chi-square technique (pp. 177-180).

2. The reviewer has said that I have treated the problem of racial prejudice 'very casually' and have undermined the difficulties of finding accommodation and job. This again is not true. The reviewer should have at least consulted the index on page 207 and would have found that the problem of colour discrimination has been described in pages 58-62. This has also been stated in the Main Findings (p. 178). Let me quote: 'Colour discrimination was the most important reason mentioned by both classes (upper and middle) for their difficulties in finding accommodation... Apart from seeking accommodation some students experienced colour discrimination in other circumstances too, mainly in public places such as hotels, tubes, and dance halls... The problem of colour discrimination considerably affected the social life of Indian students. It discouraged them

from visiting public places. It increased their sense of insecurity in a foreign country and further alienated them from the British people' (p. 118).

3. The reviewer has failed to understand the relevance of brief references to the studies of Japanese and Swedish students in America and the Germans visiting America. According to the reviewer, these should have found no place as I was writing about Indian students in Britain! Incidentally, I have also mentioned non-Indian students in Britain, especially from the study of Political and Economic Planning (PEP) entitled *Colonial Students in Britain*. The study of Indian students in Britain is the study of the experiences of sojourners in a foreign country. Hence the relevance of such comparisons. It is a standard procedure to refer to similar studies in the past. If the reviewer had looked carefully, she may have found in these comparisons similarities and differences resulting from historical and cultural factors.

4. The reviewer has also found a discussion on the development of western education in India irrelevant. This discussion was necessary to give a historical frame of reference to the attitudinal data of the survey. This was considered helpful to understand ambivalence towards western values, cultural marginality and western education as a means of upward social mobility, which are the main themes of discussion in the book.

Perhaps the bias of the reviewer comes from the belief expressed in her concluding sentence: 'So, statistical investigations, which can measure only numbers and quantities and not the qualities of the individuals, are bound to fail if not prove useless.'

Incidentally let me mention that this is perhaps the only review which has found no merits in the book.

AMAR KUMAR SINGH

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India has had another election, by all accounts a successful one, though not a very peaceful one. The months preceding the elections witnessed the political parties taking the law into their own hands and making a desperate, sometimes even a violent bid, to win by hook or crook. This desperateness, on the one hand, showed the nervousness and the impatience on the part of the opposition parties to better their previous records. On the other hand, it

also demonstrated the decline in the morale and strength of the ruling party, which enabled the other parties to challenge the authority of the former, boldly.

The months following the elections were comparatively peaceful, marked by an attempt to consolidate the gains—a short respite which enabled the various parties to assess the changed political situation and formulate their future strategy in the context of the coalition governments that came into existence after the elections. Already these coalitions have begun showing cracks and the honeymoon of the non-Congress parties seems to be coming to a close. This has inevitably raised the question of stability of these governments and led to various fierce speculations ranging from an early military take over to foreign intervention; or alternatively from a unitary form of government in the guise of successive President's rule to such a decentralised federation as to allow even an independent contact with the outside world. Unfortunately, none of the articles in the last SEMINAR issue has dealt with the question of such a constitutional breakdown, though almost all of them believe that the fall of Congress means a possible fall of democracy in India.

The poser itself starts with such a gloomy and pessimistic forecast; it views the future of India as marked by instability and uncertainty. J. D. Sethi in his article laments the growth of mushroom parties and feels that this would lead to, among other things, foreign intervention and military interference. On the whole, one is left with the feeling that things would have been better for India and its democratic system, if the one-party dominance had continued, as it would have yielded stability to the security-conscious Indians and would have meant more of certainty and less of problems—a phenomena that would suit the slumbering and unimaginative political scientists of our country. J. D. Sethi, especially, has been so nervous and so thoroughly shaken as to see the emergence of 'Populism' in India (by 'Populism', he possibly means the awakening of the Indian masses, their keen participation in national politics, and their choice of non-Congress candidates) as leading to 'princes' intervention'. (What a link-up between the princes and the popular movement).

He even forecasts that such a movement, if allowed to continue, will lead to a chaotic situation and to foreign domination and then, to an army intervention. A new political concept, indeed, to say that the masses of a nation, by choosing their own representatives, would invite foreign intervention. The economist in him attributes this to a 'political overdeve-

lopment' and that this would and should prevent the holding of another general election in India—a repetition of the 'trade cycle' in economics? It is only Kothari who concedes, albeit reluctantly, that the present fluid situation in Indian politics might lead to a better democracy, as it would make the various Congress and non-Congress governments more responsible and pragmatic in their demands. The needs of the various coalitions would make them more compromising and responsible.

Actually, the present election is a turning point in India's political life as for the first time it has shattered the Congress' dominance over the nation and reduced its massive majority in Parliament to a mere 40. It has enabled the various other parties to hold office and prove (and disprove) their claims. In a way the next five years are the most crucial period for these political parties to emerge stronger; or, alternatively, to perish in this game of the survival of the fittest. The present distribution of power among the parties would lead to a more positive unity in the nation, rather than to a chaotic disintegration—unless of course one identifies 'unity' with centralisation and monopoly of power.

The compulsion of the times would be such as to necessitate a smooth working between the Centre and the States. This would be possible only if the Centre concedes the States' freedom of action, and the States recognise a national image and adopt a national outlook. Again, the present redistribution of seats among the various parties would forge a common bond among them and lead to greater compromises and agreed solutions. The day may not be far off when we will have a multi-partisan approach (they call it a bi-partisan approach in the U.S.A.) to both domestic and foreign problems with both the regional and national interests well balanced and integrated.

A multi-party system by itself is not a weakness; a bi-party system, not a virtue. The stability of a government is not determined by the number of seats alone. After all, Wilson has been able to steer his government for now more than two and a half years, and for some time with a bare majority of one. A huge majority for the Democratic Party, between 1964 and '66, did not mean President Johnson could have his own way. The less the margin, the better it is for democracy, even if it means an end to the monopoly of power and the overconfidence of the Congressmen. The few instances after the elections, like the two 'no-confidence motions' and other divisions in the Parliament, the Presidential and Vice-presidential elec-

tions, have not confirmed the fears of instability of the present government. If anything, the Congress has emerged intact in these challenges.

A two-party system, as advocated by these writers may not be a blessing in a country like ours, with a variety of languages, religions and regional differences. It would only lead to a repetition of another Congress Party, embodying within itself a coalition of various elements and would, within itself, contain the seeds of a split. One should, however, disparage the trends in this country towards more and more splits. Many a political scientist hoped for and even forecast a polarisation of the political forces in the post-election period. On the contrary, more and more factionalism and personality-conflicts are coming to the surface even in the Right and Left Communist parties. Nevertheless, one would hesitate to agree with Sethi's comparison of the present situation with that of pre-Hitler Germany, or with his belief that a reformation of the electoral laws would remedy the situation.

What the elections have done is to boost all types of political forces by reducing the strength of the Congress. The Congress' losses and the delimitation of constituencies have helped both the Rightist and the Leftist forces in the country though not to the same degree. As to what the trends are in the future, towards the Right or the Left, depends on the interpretation one gives to these much-used phrases, and the classification one makes of the various parties in the country. If one agrees with Mohan Kumaramangalam, that the Swatantra is the only Rightist party, then of course the recent elections have been a great success for the leftist forces. On the other hand, if one classifies, along with Swatantra, the Jana Sangh, the two Akali Dals, the Muslim League, and the D.M.K. as parties born of and based on narrow regional, religious and other regressive considerations, and hence Rightist ones, in that case the elections have shown a swing in favour of the Right.

However, one should be wary of attributing too much of ideological content to the present election outcome. An ideological commitment is true only of a portion of the electorate: much of the votes gained by the non-Congress parties were based on an eagerness on the part of the people for a change born out of resentment against corruption, malpractices, economic distress and more especially food scarcity and rise in prices (and not merely due to the 'organisational drag' and factionalism within the Congress as Kothari has argued at length). As to what the future is going to be, depends on the performance

of parties in the various States where they have formed a government.

Finally, mention should be made of De Costa's article bemoaning lack of any research into the electoral behaviour of the Indian masses and the political patterns in this country. Much of his thesis could be accepted, though it should be mentioned that of late, especially in the fourth elections, there has been a greater interest in this field. A study of this type cannot be undertaken except by institutions or by individuals with a good amount of financial aid. It is these sources of encouragement which are lacking in India. More encouragement to research and channeling of such financial help through perhaps the Nehru Memorial Fund, to such fields of study, are the needs of the hour. In this context, the SEMINAR should be congratulated for bringing out such a prompt issue on the elections.

SUSHEELA KAUSHIK

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New Delhi

A look at the map, and the position in the State Assemblies, shows that the Congress is in power in a circular region. The top, the bottom and the eastern wing have gone; but the centre remains. Is it the beginning of the end, or can we expect a new renaissance?

The election results, being now a matter of history, raise four questions of the utmost significance. Firstly, on the basis of the fading position of the Congress at the Centre, can one safely predict the present to be the last Congress Government? Secondly, can the *status quo* of the various doubtful coalition governments in the States be maintained for any length of time? Thirdly, can the defects in the provisions of the Constitution, now dramatically exposed, be eradicated or remedied? Fourthly, are these events to the benefit of the nation and, particularly, to the benefit of the survival of democratic institutions in this country. I will not even venture to answer any of these questions, but will content myself to refer only to certain aspects of these problems which provide food for speculation.

Almost all the candidates for election in the last election, or so it appears to me, were members of the Congress or former members of the Congress. The rare exceptions were, mostly the princelings or near-princelings of the former Indian States. I venture to suggest that even they would not hesitate

to join the Congress, if prospects were good. All the elaborate statistics and charts that have been prepared from the results, suppress the salient fact; that all the returned candidates are Congressmen of some hue or other. We have Congressmen in white, blue, pink, red, saffron and even mauve. We have multi-coloured Congressmen. They all have the same tailors, only different dyers. Viewed in this way, the voter has had no choice but to vote Congress, and all the statistics are defective. The voter has always been pro-Congress but he is not quite clear as to who is the real Congressman. The Congress itself, being so wide-based an amalgam of diversive and opposing views, has never really been clear as to what it stands for; and this confusion has now permeated to the voter.

Another factor, which needs to be considered, is the fact that several million new voters are added every five years to the electorate. These young men and women, have no knowledge of the inspiration and awe that the Congress held in pre-Independence days in the hearts and minds of the common man. What is there about the Congress today that can inspire them? The truth is that the Congress is dying of old age. Its members slowly fading away, getting no inspiration from the youthful soul of the nation. Nobody has made any investigation, and there are no figures or facts but human psychology being what it is, it is these new voters who find it difficult to support the Congress. They seek new goals, which they cannot easily foresee or perceive. They vote anti-Congress. Unless the Congress can find something to hold the young mind, I am afraid, the swing away from the Congress—to Left or Right, who knows where?—is bound to continue, to its logical end.

We must not forget, however, that the elections have been drastically affected by certain extraneous factors. It may therefore be that the entire analysis is defective, because those factors cannot be properly assessed. For example, the failure of the monsoons leading to widespread famine conditions and the rise in commodity prices, the effect of devaluation, and the failure to explain this to the public in readily understandable economic terms; the organised 'ban cow slaughter' movement; the student agitation and labour troubles—all these have had an immeasurable impact in influencing the voter. The only protest available to him, in the final analysis, was to vote against the government.

The tendency of members of political parties to cross-the-floor is one of the most

serious manifestations of the falling standards of political morality. On any logical explanation of the democratic process, the successful candidate is the representative of the common man. He is the mouth-piece of a whole area; the vote of a large group of individuals. He stood before them as representing a particular viewpoint and was elected. He therefore represents that view *qua* that area; if he had represented another view, he would never have been elected. If he now proceeds to change his politics and abandon his avowed policy, he is letting down his electorate. He is no longer representative of their mass voice. He has betrayed them. He has betrayed democracy. He has put a nail in the coffin of democracy.

The constitutional defects now exposed, show the mistake the Constituent Assembly made, in adopting the Government of India Act, 1935, as the framework on which to hang the fundamental rights and the directive principles. The Government of India Act was essentially a British legislation; not the will of a free people. The British wanted a strong Centre for obvious reasons. The Indian Constitution has adopted most of the provisions giving power to the Centre and also many of the anomalies. We thus find that we are the only country where agricultural income is not subjected to income-tax. The States with the new opposition governments are naturally anxious to gain popularity by reduction of taxes and want the Centre to pay the bill. In short, it may be that the strong Centre may give way to the loose federal union.

This aspect of the Centre losing its grip is even more emphasised by the disastrous language policy. The regional languages, if given importance, will lead eventually to the States being unified only in name; because they will be bound together by no ties of language, culture or common sentiment.

Lastly, I cannot help feeling that the new scene is to the benefit of the common man. A ruler, sure of himself, can do whatever he likes; can ride rough-shod over the aspirations of the public. But a ruler who has an uncertain future has to win their regard. This means reduction in taxation, reduction in top-heavy expenditure, more beneficial administration, more regard for individual problems, less government control. The Congress in opposition in the States will also in the end be beneficial to the States.

In short, the election outcome is of real significance in the future history of the country.

DALIP KAPUR

New Delhi.

This has reference to the article by H. D. Sankalia on the 'Cow in History' in your admirable SEMINAR on the cow.

One does not have to be a cow worshipper to be shocked by Sankalia's grotesque mistranslation of verses in the *Kathopanishad*. The correct version is somewhat as follows.

Nachiketas, who was disgusted with his father's attempt to palm off useless cattle as gifts to the poor, asked his father: 'To whom will you gift me'. After he had pestered his father thrice with the same question, the old man lost his temper and said, 'To death do I give thee.' There is thus no question of the father giving away decrepit cattle to death and justifying across the centuries a modern argument.


I have not seen '*The Yoga of Kathopanishad*' by Sri Krishna Prem cited by Sankalia. But the relevant verses (*Kathopanishad*, Chapter I—Verses 3 and 4) are easily accessible in any number of modern editions.

The reader has a right to expect rather greater regard for accuracy in your journal and from one you describe as a professor of archaeology. One can hardly be surprised if the rest of the 'history' of the cow from so fallible an authority is received with scepticism.

Perhaps I should add that I am against the ban on cow slaughter.

N. S. JAGANNATHAN

The Hindustan Times,
Delhi.



Veedol

LUBRICANTS

HAVE SERVED
INDUSTRY IN INDIA
FOR
50
YEARS

TIDE WATER OIL CO (I) LT
8, CLIVE ROW, CALCUTTA-1. PHONE : 22-
AND AT BOMBAY AND MADRAS

96

ASIAN SECURITY

a symposium on
power and its balance
on our continent

symposium participants

THE PROBLEM

a statement which raises
many inter-related questions

STRUCTURE OF STABILITY

Sisir Gupta, Research Director,
Indian Council of World Affairs, New Delhi

GEO-POLITICAL ROLE

Shiv K. Shastri, former member of
the Indian Foreign Service

EXTERNAL PRESENCE

Romesh Thapar, publisher of Seminar

THE CHOICE

S. Gopal, formerly Director of the
Historical Division, Ministry of
External Affairs, now at Oxford

DOMINANT POWER

Girilal Jain, Assistant Editor, 'The Times
of India', Delhi

CONVERGING INTERESTS

M. S. Venkataramani, Professor of
American Studies in the Indian
School of International Studies, Delhi

BOOKS

Reviewed by, R. B. Jain, Maharaj K. Chopra,
R. P. Kaushik and Mahendra Kumar

FURTHER READING

a select and relevant bibliography by
D. C. Sharma

COMMUNICATIONS

Received from M. M. Sankhdher
and Gajanand Pandey

COVER

Designed by Dilip Chowdhury

The problem

IN a largely peaceful world, Asia presents a picture of great political and military instability. The Arab-Israeli conflict continues unabated without a solution in sight. Yemen, a different kind of political problem, is taking the form of a local war; there is an uneasy peace between India and Pakistan with both involved in an arms race. Between Afghanistan and Pakistan there are unsettled questions which often threaten the quiet of that region. India and China, the two largest nations of Asia, are locked not only in political but in military conflict. In Burma, the central authority finds it hard to assert itself in distant regions of the country. A brutal war is raging in Viet Nam where external intervention is open and blatant. There are other tensions in the Indo-Chinese peninsula. In the South, Indonesia no longer confronts Malaysia, but a great deal of political uncertainty exists about the future of that region. In brief, Asia is in turmoil. What is more, the search for political and military stability in Asia is in all probability going to be a long and arduous one.

Yet, it is necessary to pursue the goals of peace and stability in Asia not only for the sake of the impoverished people of this unfortunate continent but also for the sake of peace and

stability in the world as a whole. It is not possible to quarantine the rest of the world from Asia. Considerable thinking on the future of the Asian political system has been made in non-Asian circles, although it is hard to discover a meaningful long-term approach towards Asian problems in any of the world capitals.

Asian problems, however, are essentially for Asians to solve. In fact, it is extremely important from the point of view of peace and stability in Asia that the notions and ideas of persons who are not emotionally involved with the region, and for whom the Asian situation is a matter to be resolved by cold mathematical calculations, do not overwhelm us and determine the pattern of our thinking. The need of the hour is the growth of ideas in Asia, among the elites of the Asian nations, big and small, on the problems of Asia.

Twenty years ago, Jawaharlal Nehru talked of the resurgence of Asia and attempted to provide a framework within which Asia could reassert itself in the affairs of the world. Non-alignment, *Panch-Sheel*, Asian co-operation, were all methods through which he aspired to make Asia a major factor in international poli-

tics. To a large extent, the process in resurgence has been arrested in recent years. It is easy to talk of Asian brotherhood and that a zone of peace in Asia is the ultimate objective of Asian States. But, it is obvious that Asian nations pursue different objectives and do not always perceive these needs. Some of them act as voluntary projections of non-Asian forces; attempt to re-construct the map of Asia on their own lines before peace and stability is restored to this continent.

It is clear that the search for Asian stability has both a political and a military dimension. It is not through mere political contrivance that Asian stability can be secured. The kind of stability which the European system has now acquired can be achieved only if it is demonstrated that military methods of undoing such stability would prove futile.

What are the threats to peace and stability in Asia? How do the Asian nations view the threat to their security? Are the threats mainly internal or external? What are the intentions and capabilities of China? How far has the Chinese cultural revolution affected Chinese political goals and Chinese capability to achieve them? Where are the other major

Asian nations going? What kind of policies and objectives have they set before themselves? What kind of role are the external powers playing in Asia today? What kind of role on their part would be most conducive to Asian peace and security? At what level can the Asian military situation be stabilised? Does it need the strengthening of certain Asian countries and the emergence of independent power centres in Asia or is it possible to conceive of stability in Asia at the present level of the military capabilities of various Asian countries? What kind of a State system in Asia is best suited to the needs of Asian stability? Can the Asian States co-operate among themselves to build up a structure which will be so balanced as to be self-sustained?

These are some of the problems to which we must address ourselves and encourage our fellow Asians in China, in Pakistan, in Indonesia, in Japan and in various other States to address themselves. It is inevitable that at the present stage of our development, many of these ideas would be half-baked and rudimentary. The present issue of *Seminar* is not meant to provide an answer to these problems but to initiate thinking and deliberation on some of these problems.

Structure of stability

SISIR K. GUPTA

THE problem of Asian security is the problem of building up a structure of peace and stability in Asia. The roots of instability in this unfortunate continent are not merely military, although the military imbalance or the balance, as it currently exists, is admittedly a major source of instability and insecurity. In viewing Asian problems and in making an approach to security in this continent, it is necessary to tackle such long-term problems as economic development and political progress in every Asian country. It is also necessary to bear in mind that security is promoted not merely by building up defence capabilities of insecure nations but also through such methods as regional co-operation, arms control agreements, settlement of disputes and problems, and efforts to promote a viable international order. It is not possible to deal extensively with all these problems in a short paper. An attempt, however, is

made below to identify some of the sources of insecurity and analyse the relevance of the various methods mentioned above in the present Asian context.

The two fundamental sources of instability in Asia are: (1) the fact of the poverty and economic backwardness of Asian countries; and (2) the fact that each Asian society is now engaged in evolving its own political system which will be best conducive to the fulfilment of the growing aspirations of its peoples. The per capita income in some of the major Asian countries is below \$100 (China \$95, India \$90, Pakistan \$90, Indonesia \$70, Burma \$60, Afghanistan \$85, Ceylon \$130, Nepal \$70, Laos \$60, North Viet Nam \$100).

Each one of these countries, however, is engaged in forcing the pace of growth and there can be no stagnation in Asia; in the process they are discovering the inadequacies of the various political

systems within which they function. One of the major problems, therefore, is that of permitting uninhibited social and political change in Asia and to so define Asian stability as to differentiate it from the perpetuation of *status quo* within these societies.

The efforts to defend the international *status quo* in terms of maps and boundaries are, of course, necessary. In fact, the road to Asian stability would be a long and arduous one if one were to cease to regard the present political map, accepted by the United Nations, as legitimate and necessary. There is a difference between internal *status quo* and the kind of international *status quo* which needs to be defended.

The Misconception

Not a few of Asia's problems arise out of the fact that some powerful external forces do not make a difference between internal changes and disturbance of the international *status quo*. The fear in their minds is that internal changes of certain kinds tend to upset international balance and, hence, there is a correlation between internal and international *status quo*. Whatever might have been the validity of this assumption a decade back, it is now clear that so long as a nation retains its distinct personality, a mere change in the political system does not automatically lead to its servility before the more powerful nations which have adopted the same political system.

What is more, it is only the dynamic and growing nations which are able to withstand the expansionist pressures from other nations. One of the issues in Viet Nam happens to be the issue of desirability of political change within the existing Asian nations and it is here that American policies in Viet Nam seem to ignore some of the long-term realities of the Asian situation. If the Asian nations are successfully to tackle the problems of peace between themselves and stability in their continent, it is necessary for them to create conditions under which political changes will not only be

regarded as permissible but also desirable in certain circumstances.

Any approach to Asian security, which pursues short-term policies without keeping in view the long-term needs of Asian security, can only be self-defeating. For Asians who will inevitably be engaged in the coming years in the search for Asian stability, it is extremely important to bear in mind the long-term aspects of the problem. The point is simple. Security in Asia cannot be promoted by an effort to underwrite fundamentally unstable, unproductive and unmeaningful social systems.

Exact Relationship

The second important problem that one must face in analysing these issues is the problem of determining the exact relationship between the needs of an international order protected and promoted through the creation of an international political system and the needs of Asian stability and security. How far does an international political system exist today? How adequate is it for the Asian situation? To what extent is it effective in dealing with Asian problems? Can an international political system be effective in Asia if the major guardians of the system are non-Asian? What kind of changes in the present international political system are necessary in order to make it effective in Asia?

Many of these issues have been brought into sharp focus by the proposed non-proliferation treaty. The underlying assumptions of the treaty, quite apart from the motivations behind it, are: (1) there is a world political system in existence and the three pillars of the system are the United States, the Soviet Union and western Europe; (2) the system provides an effective frame-work of security and international order; (3) if and when China qualifies to be a fourth pillar of the system, it will be accommodated in that role; and (4) it is in the interests of other nations to help promote this system, even if it is not based on perfect justice and equity.

It is undeniable that a world political system exists and that in

a cumbersome but effective manner, it guarantees a large measure of peace and security for the world as a whole. The relevant point, however, is that the guardians of the system are yet to provide sufficient evidence of the fact that their mutual relations have reached a level where the system has acquired a degree of permanence and stability. They have indeed displayed a common aversion towards the growth of new and unmanageable centres of power.

In certain situations, like the Indo-Pakistan conflict of 1965, they have also demonstrated a degree of efficacy in dealing with local problems. But, the relationship they seem to be able to build up in the present context of distribution of power in the world is a relationship in which conflict and concord, amity and animosity, competition and co-existence exist side by side.

The Negative Aspect

The first problem about the present international order that worries Asian minds, therefore, is that while the positive aspects of these relations between the guardians of the world political system would continue to be demonstrated in areas like Europe, the negative aspect will have full play in troubled continents like Asia. An imperfect international political system may well be contented with peace in some parts of the world and the lack of it in others, and, should such a situation arise, Asia in all probability will be treated as the zone of competition.

It is not merely a question of what the great powers wish to achieve. There can be no doubt that other things being equal, they would like to see the same kind of peace and stability in Asia that they have ensured in some other continents. The problem is that other things are not likely to remain equal. There are intense pressures being generated within Asia which create conditions of instability and if the efficacy of the great powers in enforcing stability is going to be limited, the question

for them at that stage would be of now best to take advantage of the inevitable instability in Asia, without unduly straining the overall structure of stability for the world as a whole in which they are admittedly interested.

The Dichotomy

If Asian developments could threaten or upset the overall pattern of stability, there would be one kind of situation. It would be entirely different if the overall pattern of stability remains unaffected by Asian developments. For Asians, it will be little consolation to know that world peace is guaranteed although instability, conflicts and wars persist in Asia.

The point can be best illustrated by a reference to the problems India faces. India is a *status quo* power *par excellence*. We are interested in global peace and in stability throughout the world, we are, however, equally interested in peace and stability in our region. It is not merely a global *status quo* but a regional *status quo* in which India is vitally interested. The world political system underwrites the global *status quo*. But it does not as yet regard the *status quo* in one or all the regions of the world as important for the maintenance of the global *status quo*. What is more, it is possible that a contradiction is perceived between the needs of a regional *status quo* and the needs of a global *status quo*.

In such a situation, not only is disturbance of the regional *status quo* permissible but it is actually desirable. It is Pakistan's attempt, for example, to prove that a recasting of the map of the sub-continent is essential for the maintenance of the global *status quo*. It is India's attempt to prove that the maintenance of the regional *status quo* promotes global *status quo*. The decision, however, is entirely that of the guardians of the world political system and they will naturally take into account many local factors in arriving at a decision.

Similarly, one of the major problems for Asian nations is the great uncertainty which exists today

about the terms and conditions under which the eventual accommodation of China in the world political system will take place. There are signs already available that even the United States is preparing itself for the long drawn-out bargaining which will occur between the recognized great powers of today and China regarding her role and place in the system.

From the Indian point of view, it would be a great tragedy if this process of accommodating China in the world system does not go on uninhibited. But it would be an equally great tragedy if in the process of accommodating China, there is a disposition towards ignoring other Asian nations.

Undue Emphasis

The greatest unreality of discussions on international affairs today is the emphasis accorded to China. There is no doubt that as the largest of the nations of the world and as the only country which has been kept out of the international system, China poses a special problem. There is also no doubt that the development of nuclear weapons by China has made it a major contender for international status. But it is an extremely short-sighted view of Asian problems to think of the accommodation of China as the only real and serious problem of building peace and stability in Asia.

The power of China has been greatly exaggerated. The potential of countries like India and Japan has been greatly underrated. Even if non-proliferation succeeds in legitimising this familiar approach to Asia, the pattern thus constructed would be so unreal that it would face enormous problems of survival.

What I am trying to point out is that whereas a world political system no doubt exists, it is neither adequate nor just from our point of view. Also, it does not show as yet any capacity to evolve an approach towards Asia which could

be considered meaningful by the major Asian nations.

The Power Game

There is another aspect of this question. The basis of constructing the system, of limiting the number of its pillars and of eventually expanding its base will always be the power realities of the world. The under-powered countries of the world will have little, if any, role to play in the whole affair. This kind of a thinly veiled legitimization of power as the sole criterion of status in international politics can over a long term only result in a determined search for power in the under-powered countries of the world. The fact that the world political system will have considerable means at its disposal to discourage and frustrate this search for power, can only mean that the struggle will be a long and grim one and not that it will never be waged.

The Asian situation may, as a result of this short-sighted approach, remain disturbed for a long time and the Asian countries may, in turn, prove to be the major causes of concern for the world political system. The conclusion seems inescapable, therefore, that to be meaningful and relevant for Asia, the emerging world political system has not only to accommodate China in her legitimate role but also expand itself to admit other major Asian nations into its fold.

Whether this can or will be done in the absence of modern military power in the hands of Asian countries is the most important single question of today's world politics. No Asian country will, in the present state of development, indulge in the power game for its own sake. But none of them can refrain from doing so if no ideas emanate in the world for the creation of a different kind of world political order.

In seeking peace and security in Asia, countries of this area have to explore other methods as well. As mentioned above, regional co-operation, arms control agreements

and settlement of disputes and problems between Asian nations are some of these methods. In reality, however, there are limits within which these methods can be pursued in the present Asian context. Regional co-operation, admittedly an important goal for Asian nations, can prove to be a political contrivance to legitimise the presence of external powers in Asia if nations, which co-operate among themselves, remain still dependent on others for their security. An Asian power balance is not a credible concept in the absence of power in Asian hands.

Similarly, while efforts to settle disputes and problems must continue, the fundamental truth to be borne in mind is that such disputes and problems essentially reflect the anti-*status quo* urges of some Asian powers and without a change in the power situation in Asia, mere settlement of one set of disputes can only lead to the creation of another. Should countries like Pakistan and China find it possible to alter the map of Southern Asia through power confrontations, it is highly improbable that minor territorial concessions to them would convert them into *status quo* powers.

Arms Control

Lastly, there is some apparent relevance of undertaking arms control arrangements between Asian nations. But there are certain types of ideas of arms control in currency today which can be positively harmful from the view point of Asian stability.

It is here that the much boosted concept of arms control arrangements between India and Pakistan needs to be viewed in the wider context of Asian stability. There can be no two opinions regarding the need for peace and stability in the sub-continent; nor can it be denied that it is one of the pre-conditions for such peace and stability that India and Pakistan cease to fear each other. But what is being sought is an internal balance in the sub-continent, a rough parity of effective military power between the two countries, a situation in which the power of

India does not outgrow that of Pakistan.

No Quarantine

Carried to its logical length, such a concept can only mean the neutralization of the Indian sub-continent and the inability of both India and Pakistan to play any role except that of balancing the neighbour. Quite apart from the fact that this may appear as the unkindest cut being applied on India, it is necessary to note that such a situation in the sub-continent, the situation of enforced uneasy peace between India and Pakistan, is not even going to be viable if the environment in Asia is going to remain disturbed.

The withdrawal of the Indian sub-continent from Asian affairs can only mean full and free play of external forces in this area which, in turn, means prolonged tension and instability. To hope that India and Pakistan can be quarantined from what happens in the rest of Asia, just because they have evolved an internal balance between themselves, is the worst possible fallacy of thought. Peace between India and Pakistan must be conceived in terms of what India and Pakistan can contribute to the stabilization of the Asian situation rather than in terms of a mutual cancellation of the potentialities of two of the largest nations of Asia.

It is worthwhile to speculate a little more on the meaning of this concept regarding the sub-continent for the future of Asia. It is Pakistan's attempt to prove that the situation in the sub-continent must be such as to satisfy not only the two super powers but also China because it is in the involvement of China in the affairs of the sub-continent that Pakistan sees her best hopes of institutionalising the weakness and insignificance of India. In many ways, Pakistan may seem to be doing what India did a decade back, i.e., converting the sub-continent into an area of agreement among all the great powers.

But, the analogy is only superficially valid. For one thing, India

sought to promote her own role in international affairs through the cultivation of friendly relations with all the great powers and not to limit it; for another, India's emphasis was on the retention of maximum possible independence for these countries and not on the conversion of this area into an area of negative virtues. The very fact that in pursuing this policy, India ultimately found herself locked in a conflict with China, illustrates the nature of India's policy aspirations.

Pakistan, however, sees her own role as one of limiting and curbing India. It is her advantage that unlike the situation which Nehru faced in the early fifties in pleading the case for the accommodation of China in the world political system, the situation today is one in which this need is widely felt and recognized by everyone. The question which policy-makers in Pakistan should keep in mind is whether an externally imposed internal balance in this sub-continent is not going to exacerbate tensions in Asia. At any rate, countries like India which are less obsessed with their neighbours and more concerned with the wider problem of building a stable peace in Asia cannot but reject such concepts.

Inter-Asian Balance

It is extremely important that before these kinds of ideas crystallize and a pattern for Asia is evolved from outside, Asian countries begin to project other models of Asian peace and security. In constructing such models, one would not merely take note of the specific national interests of Asian countries but also of the fact that no model for Asia can be workable unless it has reduced the role of external powers in the continent to a marginal one. The problem being posed by Asia today is two-fold: it is at once the problem of rebuilding the world system on the basis of full recognition of what Nehru described as the resurgence of Asia and the problem of constructing an inter-Asian balance which would discourage the anti-

status quo fervour and manoeuvres of some Asian nations.

On both these counts, it appears that the building up of national military capabilities in Asia is of considerable importance. In fact, at the moment there is no substitute for important national capabilities as a starting point for building an adequate system of security in Asia. The other approaches to security could be pursued with greater profit when such national capabilities have come into being.

An arms control dialogue among Asians can be meaningful only when they have the necessary arms. Unresolved problems and disputes between Asian nations can be viewed in a different perspective when there is no fear of large-scale political changes because of an imbalance in the power system. Alliances and regional co-operation can be meaningful only if Asian nations have got the capability to erect a credible system for the security of all Asian nations, big and small. And, finally, the efficacy of the world political system would be vastly improved if it was not called upon frequently to undertake the role of *gendarme* in Asia.

The question essentially boils down to one of what kind of a power system one envisages for Asia. It is clear that a grand Asian alliance against China is neither possible nor desirable nor even called for by the nature of Chinese power. It is also clear that there is no easy way out from other intra-Asian disputes and problems which retard such co-operation. Further, while unipolarity in Asia is a source of instability and insecurity, bipolar stability is ruled out by the simple fact that no other Asian power can by itself hope to match the power of China. Inevitably, one would envisage a polycentric Asia, an Asia where independent centres of power have come into existence and have learnt to coordinate their efforts and conduct their foreign relations in a manner which would permit a stable power balance to be evolved in this continent.

Geo-political role

SHIV K. SHASTRI

FOR some time international politics has been concerned with the interplay of three forces. The first is the clash and conflict of the super powers in practically every region of the world. The global power of Russia or America is not restricted by boundaries. Where

it is not directly exerted, it penetrates by its contingent availability as a check on the other.

Secondly, there is the power conflict among States on a regional basis. Here the issues have to do with the heritage of the past, the present aspirations based on them and the obstacles to their realisation—all of them within the perspective of the region concerned.

Thirdly, there is the phenomenon of colonialism. The parties in this case are the West and the newly liberated States. While colonialism of the older and classical variety has more or less disappeared, the power complex and the vested interests accompanying it seek fulfilment by other means. So long as the newly liberated States and their erstwhile colonial masters reflect the old inequality of power, their unavoidable intimacy is tempered by the incidence of colonialism in new forms.

• The Distortions

These three forces do not function in water-tight compartments. They penetrate each other and distort each other's development. Thus, the 'independent' development of the liberated States is hindered by the intra-regional conflicts between them. These are often engineered, instigated or controlled by colonialism. Likewise, colonialism and anti-colonialism penetrate the global rivalries of the USA and the USSR and distort their mutual interaction. Colonialism has been absorbed by the United States as inevitably as the anti-colonial liberation struggles have been absorbed by the Soviet Union. A further complicating factor is the concept of the 'free world' and its rival, the 'peoples democracies.' Behind them lie the struggle for men's minds—ideologies, religions and what may be called 'disestablished knowledge' like the various sciences.

The human mind can never comprehend all the varieties of thought—and their objects—at one and the same time. Awareness is always limited and partial and it must therefore be selective. Since selec-

tive awareness is never uniform, doubts and conflicts always remain. This is so in all the spheres of thought and action, and it is so in politics, national or international.

While awareness can never be complete, it can certainly become rigid and unchanging. Concepts then lag behind phenomena and lead to a lack of correspondence between events and an understanding of them. Could it be that the elites of Asia are undergoing a process of intellectual ossification in this sense? There surely has been for some time a lack of confidence in the expected outcome of the freedom movements in the world—the world hitherto encompassed by colonialism.

Neo-Colonialism

We all know that the postwar years have been described as the age of decolonisation. Yet, one cannot avoid the feeling that colonialism still exerts its influence; still manages to extract the advantages of domination—albeit not in the forms of direct rule. Through economic assistance it ties the economic development of the liberated countries to its own needs and requirements. Through military assistance it subordinates their intra-regional affairs to its own strategies and through a combination of both it endeavours to direct their foreign policies.

This phenomenon has very often been described as 'neo-colonialism.' Many of its facets have been analysed but no abiding conclusions follow except perhaps a state of mind in which the use of the word 'neo-colonialism' generates a feeling of indignation. Neo-colonialism is, however, like a wily fox. Not only does it disguise itself as the apostle of 'freedom' but it seeks to tar its most implacable foe—communism—with its own brush. The expression 'communist colonialism' was devised as a propaganda slogan and it has penetrated even some academic circles in the United States. Many West Europeans apply this epithet to Russian control of eastern Europe and many of us in India look with sympathy on this expression when thinking of Mao's foreign policies

and the plight of Sinkiang and Tibet.

Yet, this slogan will not work for the simple reason that it is a contradiction in terms. Colonialism has emerged and developed historically with the rise of capitalism in Europe. Its essential features as we know them are (1) the maintenance of a technological gap between the metropolitan countries and the colonial territories, (2) practice of racial superiority and (3) a denigration of native cultures. One need not labour the point that none of these attributes are a feature of communism. To be sure, communism is authoritarian and intolerant but only for the specific purpose of securing the transition from capitalism to socialism. It does not discriminate on the grounds of race or religion or abject poverty. Its discriminations are different. To the extent they display an abuse of power, the term 'imperialism' is perhaps more apt than 'colonialism.'

Inaction

A terminological change however does not help to remove the gap between our analysis of Asian problems and a creeping sense that it is inadequate to provide the needed answers. We watch events but we cannot anticipate them. If we anticipate them, we stop at the point where concrete solutions can furnish the basis of an active and dynamic policy. This is specially so in India. The Indian Government has been lacking in conviction for a number of years. It has no solution to the constant and continuing aggressiveness of Pakistan. We are in a state of deadlock with China and there is no movement one way or the other. We can be sure that if there is such a movement, the initiative will come from the other side and of course it will be a violent one. This, however, does not mean that inaction is always to be avoided. Where it has a purpose it becomes a part of deliberation in diplomacy and is evidence of subtlety in Statecraft. Frequently, however, it is a cover for the lack of a policy, the failure of a policy

or the sense of helplessness at the odds one has to face.

The same can be said of Indian thinking on other Asian problems, particularly the intractable ones like the Arab-Israeli conflict and the problem of Viet Nam. Clear thinking on such issues is bogged down by a number of compulsions. There is the concept of 'permanent interests' as distinguished from 'permanent friends.' There is also the impact of 'basic principles' like non-violence, non-alignment, secularism, the preference of an ethical approach to international affairs and the like.

The Super Continent

It may be that in other regions of Asia there are similar hesitations and doubts and similar compulsions of history and of outside forces. The result is a general feeling of uncertainty and a sense of insecurity about the trend of events in Asia. Asia is in a melting pot and what is emerging from the process of change has elements in it to cause frustration. Can we pinpoint the causes and can we think of any remedies?

Such a quest, I think, will be idle unless there is clarity in basic concepts. If we speak of 'Asian insecurity' we must think of Asia as it is, and not through the romantic haze of anti-colonialism. A bit of geo-political analysis will also be worthwhile. Looked at this way a number of insights become available.

In the first place, Asia is in the nature of a 'super-continent.' A transpolar view of Asia shows the remaining five continents to be somewhat like its outer supports. Europe is merely a peninsular projection. Only the Arctic Ocean prevents North America from being another appanage of Asia. Australasia and South America undoubtedly appear distant but their present power position fits them for the role of island outposts rather than independent centres of power. As for Africa, its northern portion has been a part of Asia since antiquity.

It is clear that if there ever is to be a single State ruling the

world, it must have its centre in Asia—what Halford Mackinder called the 'World Island.'

The size of Asia, its land surface is about one third that of the earth, is more than matched by its population, which is over 58 per cent of the world's total. Asia has been the cradle of practically all the major civilisations of the world, including 'western civilisation.' Indeed, the latter comes to be distinguished from the others merely by the historical accident of a technological leap which was brought about by western Europe's 'industrial revolution' and which now has its primacy in North America.

The extreme continentality of Asia leads to its second characteristic, its self-sufficiency. This is reflected in ways other than its physical features. Of the three forces I have mentioned earlier, namely, the global, regional and colonial aspects of international politics, all of them coexist in Asia. This is not the case with other continents. Colonialism found its home in western Europe and migrated to North America. Africa is an example of regional and anti-colonial conflicts. Russia and America are of course the symbols of global power as also the inescapable protagonists of its use by other means.

It is only in Asia that all of these elements are to be found together. Thus, South-West Asia—the Arab world—is largely the arena of regional conflicts on which is superimposed global power with colonial overtones. South-East Asia, while displaying all the characteristics of an anti-colonial struggle, is also the site chosen by North America for clamping its ring round the explosive power of Asia. Finally, in the heartland of Asia, Russia is a super power with global interests and China is on the way to becoming one.

Colonialism From Within

It seems to me that the projection of Chinese power in international politics has taken forms of expression which have heightened tensions in Asia. They have

shown that Asia is not uniformly anti-colonial and that it is possible for a colonialist outlook to spring from within Asia.

There is no doubt that such a development has caused disarray among the anti-colonialists and given tremendous encouragement to the neo-colonialist forces. Yet, there is a constructive side to it. What Chinese power has in fact done is to explode the myth that the sufferers from colonialism are bound to be anti-colonialists for all time—the antics of Sukarno and Nkrumah are still fresh in our minds. China has also demonstrated that it regards India as an obstacle to its manifest destiny and therefore an 'enemy' in the geo-political sense.

The Fringe Areas

The geo-political view also indicates that there is a certain amount of sense in the global policies of the United States but a lot of stupidity in their implementation. We assume for the purposes of argument that the tremendous size and population of Asia is mobilised either under Chinese or Russian leadership and a world empire is in the offing. Such a prospect would undoubtedly cause concern to the inhabitants of the fringe areas. These are Europe—which is really West Asia; South-West, South and South-East Asia, and the Far East. All of the significant States in these regions are oceanic powers—actually or potentially, and it must be consistent with logic for them to get together against the threatened danger.

The same reasoning in reverse would impel an aspiring world ruler to immobilise as many such fringe areas as possible. Since Europe has dominated the world for some centuries, excessive attention has been paid to the geo-political role of Europe. Struck by the spectre of communism in Russia, Sir Halford Mackinder wrote in 1919:

'Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland;

Who rules the Heartland commands the World Island:

Who rules the World Island commands the world.'

It would seem that in 1919 the control of Europe meant the control of the world. Since Europe dominated the seas, no danger obviously threatened from that quarter. But its back could be broken by a land power that seized its eastern half. It was, precisely to prevent such an outcome that Hitler sought to unify Europe under Germany and to control at least the European segment of Russia. Japan also endeavoured to establish an empire in East Asia including as much of China as possible, thus ensuring a defence in depth against an expansion from the 'heartland.'

The geo-political drives of Germany and Japan were frustrated by Russia and the United States. With the new feebleness of western Europe—compared to its old status—Mackinder's doctrine requires a reformulation and it would today be truer to say that whoever commands the heartland rules East Europe and whoever rules East Europe is the potential overlord of West Europe.

Encouraging Counterforces

Such a formulation is implicit in the yearnings of the greatest geopolitician of modern times—General de Gaulle. De Gaulle wants a free Europe, including its eastern half, precisely for the reason that western Europe cannot defend itself against an expanding heartland without the assistance of the United States. Neither can other fringe areas under the disabilities imposed by colonialism. India and Pakistan need to be reunified if South Asia is to become an effective counterforce. The Arab world needs submission to Nasser's leadership for the same reason. And it is obvious that a viable counterforce in South-east Asia requires the unification of Viet Nam and under the given conditions, certainly under Ho Chi Minh.

At this point, one can examine the tricks played by history. First, there is an unevenness about the concept of an expanding heart-

land. From the viewpoint of West Europe it is obviously Russia. But in South and South-East Asia the assigned role is being claimed by China. Were China and Russia to unite, there would be a correspondence between theory and fact.

Irrelevant Obsessions

Secondly, it would appear to be a fundamental interest of the United States to encourage the growth of as many 'counterforces' in the fringes of the 'World Island' as possible. But the United States has done just the opposite. To take only two examples—that of South and South-East Asia—what the United States has done is to prevent such an outcome to the best of its ability. In South Asia its thinking seems to be: 'Who rules Pakistan commands the Indian subcontinent.' Needless to say, Mao's China has copied this slogan. But India is too big to be commanded and the only result of making Pakistan the military equal of India is to frustrate the geo-political role of South Asia. In its efforts to subdue Ho Chi Minh, the United States is doing precisely the same with respect to South-East Asia—all because of its irrelevant obsessions with communism and its pathetic belief that it has enough power to command the whole world.

Thirdly, if American beliefs about 'communist colonialism' are correct, it is Russia which should have done what the United States is doing. In other words, it is Russia which should be preventing the rise of counterforces on the fringes of the World Island. But Russian policy so far has been to encourage rather than frustrate such a development.

The foregoing indicates that, in the long run, there is an identity of interests between the United States and the other fringe areas of the World Island. In so far as the US policy makers are blinded by their obsession with communism or the legacy of colonialism, they are using the power of the United States to create avoidable tensions in Asia rather than to anticipate the geo-political consequences of the rise of Asia.

External presence

ROMESH THAPAR

ANY realistic study of the situation in Asia, particularly the economic and political, gets inextricably involved with contrary assessments of the actual strategic objectives of the major external powers—and the resources they are likely to mobilise to achieve these objectives. More often than not, whether in South-East Asia or West Asia, it is the external presence in our continent which dictates the dimensions of the challenges and the kind of responses which have to be fashioned. Those who attempt, therefore, to turn the blind eye to this uncomfortable fact will produce theories on security which willy nilly make Asian interests subservient to those of the advanced nations.

Naturally, the objectives and resources of the external powers

vary. We should, however, be concerned in the present period with the business of locating the common factors which tend to motivate the several external power centres in their interpretation of Asian realities—and whether these factors are likely to undergo any substantial changes as a result of other developing influences. There are contradictions, tensions and conflicts between these power centres with the interests of the major centres (the USA and the USSR) buttressed by junior partners in their respective regions, but at the same time areas of agreement are emerging which are of vital concern to Asia and the rest of the developing world.

Broadly, the external powers, headed by the USA and the USSR,

are acting in unison at various levels, that is if we gauge the impact of their nuclear-enveloped policies from the end-results of their initiatives. Despite their different standpoints, they seek:

- a. To preserve a mutually convenient *status quo* in Asia based on existing realities of Japan, China and India with the States of South-East Asia and West Asia providing zones of competition where changes in political balance and alignment to the external power centres are reflected;
- b. To prevent the purposeful coming together of diverse Asian opinion to project the common interests of a sprawling continent in international organisations;
- c. To dictate, in one way or another, unequal terms on which economic growth will be aided in the under-developed part of Asia, terms which damage or erode the sovereign spirit of free peoples;
- d. To deny the bigger States of Asia the possibility of an independent military role on the plea that it is a danger to stability in a particular region and to make this role subservient to the interests of the external powers, thereby securing their economic presence; and
- e. To impose norms of political and economic behaviour which in the long run make inter-Asian security dependent on various types of external 'protection', including economic.

Imposed Polarisation

The end-results of these policies can be seen in the developing polarisations—within Asian nations and between them—at political, economic and military levels. These, in turn, create cultural polarisations. The surface *status quo* situation is in this manner charged with explosive content. The stability of national governments is threatened and at the same time their security is exposed to grave risks. Polarisation

sparked by external powers over whom we have no control create unnecessary and crippling economic-political burdens for developing societies. Not enough attention is being given to this fact of the problem of Asian security:

If we are not to become the unthinking victims of the present discernible parallelism of the external powers, often referred to as a 'detente' forced by the realities of nuclear confrontation, we have to act with skill. The parallelism is shot through with many contradictions rooted in the transitions which our world is making. We must exploit these contradictions to our advantage—and this demands a conscious effort to break the tendency on our part to see the 'detente' exclusively through spectacles provided by the external powers or in isolation from certain significant and developing trends.

China

For example, the so-called Cultural Revolution in China is usually seen only as an aberration affecting the internal pattern of power, but its ideological impact on the communist world, particularly the Soviet Union, is not studied in depth. Mao Tse-tung's theory of the 'continuing revolution' in a socialist society, and his stress on the need at regular intervals to purge Communist Man of bourgeois infection, may be implemented most strangely, and might end in sudden chaos but we would be blunting our own sensitivity if we were to ignore the backdrop to the 'Red Guard' rampage.

The Soviet Union, startled by the uncontrolled and ugly passions of the Maoist strategy which has linked minor and major ideological issues with the traditional power ambitions of an imperial China, cannot afford to be insensitive. The lash of the Cultural Revolution in China will stir thinking in neighbouring lands, including the USSR, whose revolutionary elite is accused of being adrift from its proletarian moorings.

To retain its ideological relevance, the Soviet Union will search

for the ideological trappings—essentially economic—to reinforce the enlightened facets of its presence in the under-developed world. The momentum for such a role can only be created from an economic surplus generated from within the Soviet economy or through economic collaboration with a number of highly developed industrialised smaller nations. Significantly, the first steps are already being taken.

Then again, China is seen only as a military threat, but there is a tendency to play down the potential role she is capable of exerting in the trade and commerce of the under-developed world. Such a role is dictated by her self-imposed isolation and the need to import vital industrial inputs through an aggressive and highly competitive export programme. The Soviet Union gave China a balanced industrial base—a fact which is slurred over. This base, under careful management, can make her a powerful competitor in several fields, particularly with a ready-made, marketing organisation of Overseas Chinese.

Japan

Japan is seen only in the context provided to us by the external powers—a dynamic industrial workshop which is going to help to underwrite the *status quo* in Asia for them. But we fail to take serious note of the fears of her policy planners. Japan sees herself at the mercy of an export programme based on the mercurial US market which may, sooner or later, be compelled at the expense of Japanese goods to absorb those of its manufactures which are rejected by a revived Europe. She also does not underestimate the competitive challenge of China in South-East Asia where the memories of militarist Japan's rampage in World War II are not easily forgotten.

Conscious of her predicament, and not without solid economic reasoning, Japan seeks a massive collaboration with the Soviet Union in capital and consumer goods—and she is more than con-

scious that the raw materials of Siberia near at hand would make her even more competitive! Recent events in China make the Soviet Union only too responsive. And there is now the distinct possibility of such collaboration yielding for the Soviet Union a meaningful economic surplus which can be used effectively in the developing world, particularly in South and South-East Asia.

Military Balance

At the other end of disturbed Asia, the Arab nations are presented as manipulatable powers, unreliable allies at war among themselves and now at the mercy of Israel. The story sticks, because the surface scene confirms this superficial analysis. However, in power-political terms, the ferment in the Arab world and the strategic position of this region can only be underestimated at our own cost. Israel is an unfortunate and tragic problem, but the attempt by the external powers to place the guilt of Europe on the Arabs and to exploit Israel in the context of Asian resurgence has to be fought. Again, rational thought is discouraged in the interests of a tense *status quo* which serves the needs of the external powers.

Much the same pattern unfolds as we study the relationship between India and Pakistan. The calculations of the external powers feed the polarisation on the sub-continent without the slightest regard to the disastrous consequences on the economies of the two countries. A vicious system, euphemistically called 'military balance', is the modern rendering of the old policy of divide and rule. Sections of the dominant elites on both sides of the border are willing partners in this quiet conspiracy. Deliberately under-played is the realisation that such problems erode both stability and security in the long run.

Meanwhile, Britain, Australia, New Zealand, and now various island pockets in the Indian Ocean, are projected as providing a so-called invisible stabilising external presence. There is deep reluctance to view their role through Asian

eyes. These remnants of an empire should no longer be accepted by us as independent factors, only as junior partners of the USA. More relevant in the Asian context is the industrial muscle of Europe and how it can be used to break the parallelism of the major external powers. Asia is beginning at last to seek more flexibility in her trade and commerce—and this is a significant pointer to the future.

The USA

The USA is paraded as the main bulwark against communist aggression—the Chinese variety or otherwise—but the dangerous polarising effect of the physical US presence in Asia is minimised. This polarisation places an unhealthy emphasis on expensive and politically explosive military establishments, wrecks genuine economic growth and creates frustrations which open the way for violent take-overs. The story of Viet Nam, as considered by us, is very different from the accounts popularised officially by the external powers. Indeed, we are deeply disturbed by the possibility of these cynical interventions increasing in Asia and Africa and embroiling our peoples in military escalations over which we have little or no control. Yet, so assertive is the continental presence of the external powers, that no coordinated moves have been made to highlight the dangers of this kind of 'protection' and to evolve alternative, transitional systems of security.

It is important to realise the transitional nature of the immediate security psychosis. The carefully phased withdrawal of the external powers—through a skilful mix of compulsion and persuasion—would create in its wake a profound metamorphosis in Asia. It would nurture more viable concepts of co-existence within Asia and between Asia and the rest of the world at political, economic, military and social levels. China, isolated and angry, still posing the major question-mark in any debate on Asian security, would be put under new disciplines, and we would strengthen those sections of Chinese opinion which oppose

Maoist aberrations. Political, economic and military polarisations only feed her traditional ambitions by seriously disturbing stability in Asia.

If the nations of Asia are serious about the business of 'protecting' themselves, they will have to establish a dialogue among themselves on all problems and to insulate these problems from incendiary external influences. There are no problems which cannot be tackled in rationality and in good faith. The external presence distorts the dialogue, often makes it a recognisable echo of the conflicting needs of the major powers. Too long have we accepted this depressing and frustrating state of affairs as inevitable.

Within the framework of such an assessment, India would have to design a policy which would safeguard her national interests and also strengthen Asian security and stability. So long as no spheres of influence are sought, it is possible for India to fuse her national interests with those of the region. A policy which reinforces Asian sovereignty in Asia has to be consciously sponsored at various levels—political, economic and military. The slurring over of this perspective in the course of the cold war, and the conflicts spawned by it, is one of the critical and central facts of the present situation.

The Objectives

The objectives of such a policy would be in terms of the following priorities.

- a. Full recognition to the nations of Asia in the United Nations as the first step towards evolving a mutually agreed Asian machinery for the solution of outstanding questions inherited largely from an imperialist-colonialist past.
- b. A disengagement plan to be implemented on critical Asian problems even as the external powers begin their withdrawal from the continent, including peripheral areas.
- c. Active encouragement to the formation on a federal basis of

larger compact groupings of nations, particularly in those areas where the existence of partitioned or tiny helpless States attracts local and external intervention.

- d. The sponsorship of Asian institutions which cut across the present tension enveloped divisions within the continent and which help foster the opinion for genuine co-existence and stability on the continent.
- e. Sponsorship of Asian collaboration in all fields, including science and technology.

Admittedly, the broad formulation of such a policy, and its breakdown into a plan of action, is immediately confronted by the misunderstandings and tensions inherited by and created in Asia during the first half of this century. We should be only too aware from the start of these challenges to rationality, for only then will we develop the courage and dynamism required to break the present acceptance of a damaging *status quo* based on the deliberate and cynical partitioning of countries, or panicky pressures to isolate this or that Asian trend on calculations which have no relevance to the genuine and long-term interests of Asia.

A New Frame

We cannot accept the subtle popularisation of an Asian polarisation on the plea that there is no other way to security. Positive and meaningful answers are not to be found in the lazy acceptance of present-day aberrations as the valid dimensions for future action, but in a vigorous effort to evolve a new frame within which a more durable balance of power can be achieved in Asia by the Asian nations. A total approach is demanded comparable to the total approach of the external powers.

I believe that the political mood which could create the sanctions for this approach exists in large measure, even though it needs careful focusing. The implications of a new strategic line in foreign

policy thinking also need to be understood more thoroughly, for only then can appropriate tactics be designed to achieve the twin objectives of Asian security and stability. India's attitudes will condition developments and for this reason it is vital that her present vulnerable economic and political condition should not be exploited to paralyse her initiatives for an Asian solution to Asia's problems.

Fusion of Thought

Our foreign policy and defence planners tend to take divergent paths. The political and economic cost of this exercise is crippling. A fusion of thought is demanded and it will have to base itself on three inter-locked concepts which are beginning to crystalise.

- a. That the policy of non-alignment will undergo transformations to the extent that Asian motivations and aspirations dictate.
- b. That the nations of Asia will increasingly formulate their basic policies on realistic adjustments within Asia, particularly as they tend towards economic independence.
- c. That the attitude of the nations of Asia to the external powers will be moulded by the common interests of the continent.

Such conclusions may appear idealistic and startling in the context of the assumptions normally made about Asia. But why should Asia develop responses different from those formulated in Europe, North America or Latin America. This approach may be criticised as largely economic, but we must ask ourselves why it should be otherwise when the mechanics of markets and economic growth are beginning to impact policy more profoundly than concepts of military power. We must take note of these qualitative changes in our world system or continue as manipulatable pawns in the power game of super powers, pseudo-super powers and their junior partners. The choice in the final analysis is ours.

The choice

S. GOPAL

CONSIDERATION of the security of a whole continent, in contrast to that of any individual country, will clearly have to be at two levels—security from external danger as well as security from internecine disruption. The countries of Asia may no longer have the same sharp sense of shared interest that they had in the years when they were all under colonial masters—the period for which Panikkar's *Asia and Western Dominance* is a guide and the beginning of the termination of which was marked by the Asian Relations Conference at Delhi in 1947. Once the peoples of Asia had become independent, it was natural that each would want to develop its own destiny, unhampered even by Asian fellow-feeling. But, still, the Asian sentiment is alive and strong enough to resent interference from outside the continent; and this sentiment is to be found even in countries which are in military alliance with non-Asian powers.

The spirit of nationalism is still the dominant force in Asia, and there can only be stability (on which rests security) if the continent consists of a number of sove-

reign States living in amity with each other but not in dependence on any power, Asian or non-Asian. One cannot envisage for Asia international blocs or communities as in Europe; nor would a peaceful future for her seem to lie in dominance by one power belonging to the continent, such as we find today in the Americas. Asia must be secure both from the interfering non-Asian and from any expansionist Asian State; and in many ways the two dangers are interlinked, for external interference weakens the political and economic framework of the continent and exposes it to inner pressures.

Asian security was, at the start, a non-problem. The free countries of Asia offered no threat to each other and sought for the most part to remain out of the 'cold war'. Non-alignment was in one sense the assertion that there was no threat from which Asia needed to be safeguarded; it constituted what Nehru was fond of terming an 'area of peace' and should continue to be respected as such. Friendship and assistance were welcome, but there should be no effort to drag the continent into the vortex of international contention. Nehru's insistence was not shaken by the

establishment of a communist government in China. The complexion of the regime made no difference to his attitude of support and sympathy for the Chinese peoples and he continued to urge that they should be left alone to work out their own future.

Deliberate Creation

But, however ill-considered the determination to contain the Soviet Union might have been, even more disastrous was the effort to contain communism as such. It was a policy which, especially after 1949, could know no geographical limits. Military alliances and commitments sprang up in the 'fifties in the various parts of Asia, pushing the States of these regions under the aegis of non-Asian powers. Defence was no longer a local problem. One might almost say that the issue of Asian security had been deliberately created.

It is infructuous to discuss whether, if this had not happened, China would have evolved as an inward-looking State, intent only on her problems of social and economic progress. What is certain is that she has been convinced that the United States is determined to destroy her. The exclusion from the United Nations and the crossing of the Yalu have rankled deep. These have given strength and determination to her efforts at spreading revolution and promoting instability everywhere; and the conviction that the Soviet Union has not been as unqualified as China expected her to be in countering the policies of the United States is a powerful element in the Sino-Soviet rift. If China is now the rogue elephant of the international jungle, the fault is not wholly in her stars or even in herself.

So, alongside the dragging in of Asia into the tensions of world-power politics, there has been the parallel development of an Asian State to whose actions the normal modes of anticipation in world affairs are not relevant. How much one is responsible for, or has been encouraged by the other, is a question which can now be left to the scholars; and so too may the question whether any strong govern-

ment in China would sooner or later have turned expansionist. It is sufficient to note that Asian nations find themselves, through no action or fault of their own, faced with twin problems of security. They are weakened by the activities in Asia of non-Asian powers who would not permit Asians to interfere in the affairs of their own continents but regard Asia as a legitimate ground for their jack-booting. Does anyone in Europe consider seriously that Iran, for example, should have a decisive say in the settlement of the Berlin question; or are the inhabitants of America convinced that Japan should be heard on the problem of San Domingo? Yet, on the future of Viet Nam all claim to have a voice, that is, if they are not fighting over it. On the other hand, the Asian nations have also to reckon with an over-powerful fellow-Asian State, who did not hesitate to cross in strength the borders of a friendly neighbour and who no one can be sure will not do so again.

Two Fronts

To India these problems are crucial. She has to be alert on two fronts. She has incessantly to ensure that the stability of Asia is not undermined by the thrusts of outside powers even while she strengthens herself against possible Chinese aggression. *Prima facie*, success in the first task would seem to entail failure in the second one, for the stock argument in favour of non-Asian presence in Asia is that it provides protection against China. The events of 1962 are cited in justification of the manoeuvrings of the Seventh Fleet and the British 'East of Suez' policy.

But, since 1962, there has been 1965 when India, acting on her own, stood up to Chinese bluster and thwarted the Chinese efforts at 'squeeze-play' in collusion with another Asian State. It is only when Asian defence is left to Asian organization and production that Asian stability can be confirmed; and the real answer to the expansionism of an Asian State can only be provided by other Asian States. The permanent security of Asia demands the withdrawal of non-

Asians; only then can Chinese pressures be effectively and conclusively arrested.

The place of India in China's picture of the future is not a subject on which there is unanimity. The spectrum ranges from the assertion, born of prejudice, that India provoked a peace-loving China to the opinion that China can never afford to accept a united and stable India. It is not necessary for our purpose to pursue this argument, for one need not be committed to any view of China's bellicose intentions in order to reach agreement on what should be the policy for India. So long as China has massive strength in conventional ways of waging war and displays hostility to India—whether this hostility is temporary or permanent is beside the point—no responsible authority in India can afford to cast away India's defence on a mere hunch that China will not attack, and as 'China-watchers' have discovered in recent months, no opinion on China can be anything more than speculative. We made the mistake in 1962; it would be outrageous even to begin to make the same mistake again. It is not necessary, even if it were possible, to try to match China's enormous strength in conventional war; it is sufficient to be able to repel an attack on India.

Nuclear Blackmail

In addition to her armies, however, China has now gone ahead with the manufacture of nuclear weapons, and this raises a separate set of questions. The major issue here, so far as India is concerned, is not one of first and second strike, but that of nuclear blackmail. Between peace and war there is a large territory—ultimatums, threats, retreats, compromises—and here nuclear weapons provide a powerful leverage. The problem is best posed by framing a specific hypothesis. In a few years China will be in a position to threaten some of the cities of the Soviet Union and the United States. Suppose, after that stage has been reached, China repeats the 'squeeze-play' of 1965 but at a more advanced level;

suppose she threatens to obliterate a few Indian cities if the Government of India do not reach a compromise which is acceptable to the Government of Pakistan on Kashmir. What answer should India give to such an ultimatum?

In considering such a contingency, some irrelevancies should be set aside. It is not relevant to say that China would never use nuclear weapons. This may well be so, but it would be an irresponsible government that acted on that assumption. Again, it is beside the point to say that if China attacked Vladivostok or San Francisco, in the second strike the whole of China would be devastated. The issue is whether the Soviet Union or the United States would be prepared to risk even a minor first strike,—and that too on Kashmir, a problem on which, it has to be faced, India does not have a large section of world opinion on her side. In the policy planning of the United States, Srinagar does not have the priority of Berlin; and it would be a rash analyst who would be certain that in the post-Tashkent phase, the Soviet Union would be prepared for a nuclear war in order to ensure that Kashmir continues to be a part of India.

What is more likely is that the nuclear blackmail of China would be taken advantage of by outside powers to impose a 'Munich' on India—that is, if India will let them. Any answer to Chinese threats supported by nuclear weapons will have to be found by India out of her own resources. She must have sufficient political, military and diplomatic deterrence to resist, or she must yield. There is no third alternative.

Naive Talk

It is this that makes all talk about a 'credible guarantee' to India somewhat naive. There is no such thing as a credible guarantee; it is, like ghosts and perfect love, something which people talk about but never see. No guarantee is credible because no guarantee, given by one State to another, to use nuclear weapons, can be automatic. No nuclear power would be willing to embark on a nuclear war with

somebody else's hand on the trigger.

Even if a guarantee is given in unconditional terms, obviously any issue on which that guarantee was invoked would be considered on its merits—has the country complaining of nuclear blackmail or aggression really been the guiltless victim or has it provoked the crisis; is the territory involved expendable; is the issue worth a nuclear war. Indeed, the government of a nuclear power which acted without any consideration of the merits of the specific issue, on a 'blind' guarantee given to another State, would be abdicating its responsibility to its own people; if it executed the guarantee without regard to the context it would have transferred its decision-making powers on such a vital issue to another government.

Self-reliance

India, therefore, would be misdirected if she placed her faith in guarantees; and one can only assume that the Government of India, when it speaks of guarantees, is performing a diplomatic exercise. With China, a hostile neighbour developing nuclear weapons, there are only two courses open to India. She can either renounce nuclear weapons because she does not believe in them and puts her trust in faith and the future; this would be a noble policy. Or, India can keep open her option to make nuclear weapons and, if nothing is done soon to control China, take a firm decision in favour of manufacture; this would be a hard-headed policy. But to renounce nuclear weapons because of some generalized guarantee from either of the two super-powers, or from them jointly, or even from the four nuclear powers under the auspices of the United Nations, would be neither ethically commendable nor realistic but a policy of ignoble folly. Whatever the decision—for renouncing the option or maintaining it—it must be based on self-reliance. Then alone would India have made the contribution to all aspects of Asian security which the continent has the right to demand of her.

Dominant power

GIRILAL JAIN

NO student of problems of security in South and South-East Asia can possibly fail to recognise that the United States is there in the region to stay indefinitely and that neither the debate at home nor frequent statements by foreign leaders is likely to persuade Washington in the foreseeable future to reduce, in any significant measure, its military presence in the area. This is by far the single most important fact of the political situation in South and South-East Asia.

Both the protagonists and the antagonists of the United States and its role in South and South-East Asia continue to confuse the issue. The protagonists maintain the pretence that the level of American military presence in the Pacific and on the Asian mainland in Viet Nam and Thailand has been determined solely by the magnitude of the Chinese threat and that it will be suitably reduced or even withdrawn if, as and when Asian powers like India, Japan, Indonesia and Australia are able collectively to ensure the security of the area.

The antagonists, on the other hand, keep up the posture that America can be forced to retire from Asia leaving the countries in the region to work out some form of *modus vivendi* and establish peace on that basis. Neither of these can be regarded as a practical proposition at present.

It is possible that the situation in Asia would have been vastly different if the United States had not imposed unconditional surrender on Japan and compelled it to disarm in 1945 or if India had in 1949 or even in 1954 agreed to become America's ally or otherwise acquired the means to match China's power. In either case, a second centre of power could have emerged and served as a nucleus for an Asian balance. Although it is doubtful if this by itself could have led to the elimination of America's active involvement, the U.S. military presence could probably have been kept at a much lower level than at present.

But, a discussion of what could have been achieved through the

pursuit of a different policy by India is now at best a matter of academic interest and at worst idle speculation. The relevant point is that, as things are, the United States alone balances China's power in South and South-East Asia and that Washington has come to the conclusion that it is neither possible nor desirable to enable New Delhi or even Tokyo to be strong enough to stand up to Peking in the military sense and that it can contain China by itself. India is regarded as a weak country which can at best be expected to muddle through one crisis after another and achieve a measure of economic well being and political stability at some distant future. Japan is considered a useful ally but it too is being encouraged to limit its role to providing a certain amount of economic aid to other countries in the region. In any case, Japanese public opinion has become deeply pacifist and at present at least it is not interested in a military role for the country.

Weak Opposition

As for the opposition to the U.S. military presence, there is hardly a government in South and South-East Asia which is particularly keen to see it withdrawn even from Viet Nam. This applies to Cambodia and Burma, two countries which shun U.S. economic aid and are aggressively neutral. Asian leaders call for a negotiated settlement in Viet Nam from time to time but it does not follow that they want an agreement on North Viet Nam's or Vietcong's terms. Most South-East and South Asian governments are friendly to America and dependent on it. Thanks to the Sino-Soviet split, China's aggressive posture towards India, disarray in the communist movement and a variety of other factors, there has hardly been a popular movement in any Asian country worth the name against U.S. actions in Viet Nam. On the whole, the anti-imperialist and the anti-U.S. movement is pretty weak in our region.

It appears to be a safe inference that the United States is not interested in promoting a purely Asian balance of power and that the anti-

American sentiment in the area is not strong enough to compel Washington to reappraise its policy. There is however one obvious qualification. So long as the Viet Nam war goes on and a militant China continues to move rapidly towards nuclear capability, it is legitimate to doubt whether the American military presence in the region can be stabilised. That is the single biggest factor for uncertainty regarding future developments. But, it is a near certainty that the United States will never agree to a total withdrawal from the Asian mainland. In Viet Nam itself the outcome may well be not victory for either side but a stalemate which can be used to justify America's continued military involvement. The present programme for constructing new bases in Viet Nam and Thailand should leave little scope for doubt regarding Washington's long-term plans.

Implications

This is in no way intended to be an endorsement of U.S. policy. What is necessary is to spell out some of the more important implications of U.S. presence in the area. One obvious implication is that the concept of 'Asia for Asians' has become redundant—it was never wholly valid—unless America is recognised as an Asian power. In fact, if the proposal to form a Pacific Economic Community with America, Canada, Japan, Australia, New Zealand and Philippines as members goes through, the United States will have become inextricably involved in Asian affairs.

The other implication is that the belief that it is not only desirable but also possible to eliminate western influence from Asian affairs has proved ill-founded. Asian countries themselves have been keen to ensure that the departing imperial powers retain a measure of interest in them. India is not an exception in the sense that it deliberately decided to maintain links with Britain under the Commonwealth formula. On its part, the West has not given up its effort to establish a world order based on its value system, economic hegemony and military power.

Only, the leadership has passed from western Europe to the United States which also provides the larger part of the resources. The process of westernisation, at least in the superficial sense, has if anything been accelerated in Asia in the post-independence phase. The expert has taken the place of the bureaucrat as the principal agent of spreading western influence and aid giving agencies that of Christian missions.

On the Defensive

It is to be seriously doubted that China can effectively challenge America's position in Asia. In fact, it may not be an exaggeration to say that, in spite of all its bluster, Peking has always been on the defensive and remains on the defensive. There is some reason to believe that Mao Tse-tung has gone in for nuclear weapons for defensive and not aggressive purposes. It may well be his intention to use nuclear capability as an insurance against external attack when he uses subversive methods to extend China's domination. But, the more likely outcome is that China's acquisition of nuclear weapons would, in the context of Peking's crudely abusive attitude towards other countries, help to legitimatise the U.S. military presence in the region and thus weaken rather than strengthen China's own position. Witness the manner in which New Delhi has found it necessary to soft-pedal its criticism of American policies and to seek a joint Russo-American guarantee against the nuclear threat from China.

The myth has been created that the possession of nuclear weapons will by itself confer on China the status of a super-power and make it obligatory for Washington to seek accommodation with it in the same way as it has been trying to do in the case of the Soviet Union. The analogy is not valid because of China's economic weakness and backwardness which is not likely to be overcome for decades. But, taking the analogy at its face value, it is notable that Russia has not been able to extend its sphere of influence much beyond the areas which it occupied towards the

end of World War II as a member of the grand alliance.

World System

In fact, Moscow now finds itself playing largely a regional role limited to areas close to its borders. Russia, for instance, has more or less been eliminated from Africa and South-East Asia. It has not been able to win much influence in Latin America beyond Cuba. In Eastern and Central Europe itself Russia is on the defensive against local nationalism on one hand and the increasing appeal of the West for the communist youth on the other. In the case of countries like Iran, Pakistan and Turkey, the Soviet Union is clearly accepting a position subordinate to that of the United States. In a sense that is true even in the case of India. If there is a world system, it is America's creation with the support of its allies and friends the world over. Moscow is coming to terms with this reality and Peking has no alternative but to follow suit sooner or later. It may be sooner than most people suspect.

On a close view, it will be seen that this is a realistic appreciation of a confused situation. The Sino-Soviet split has written a *finis* to the pretence that a new world order is going to be built on the basis of the communist theory. But, even before the split became public, it was obvious to discerning observers that the initiative had long ago passed to the West under U.S. leadership. Khrushchov's exposure of Stalin at the 20th Party Congress and the revolt in Hungary in October 1956 may well be regarded as watersheds in that communism has been on the defensive since then. In fact, that was the situation even earlier. Only, it was not so evident as it has been since 1956. Khrushchov openly recognised the need to come to terms with the United States in 1959 and this aggravated the conflict with Mao Tse-tung. There is nothing to suggest that the communist world now is capable of either unity or of seizing the initiative. If Russia and its East European allies have stopped even trying to compete with the West in respect of economic assistance to developing

countries in the third world, what chance has China to do so? And who wants to buy the thought of Mao Tse-tung?

This assessment would have been valid in the long-term sense even if China was not facing a major leadership crisis. As it happens, the so-called cultural revolution leaves no scope for doubt that the Chinese have lost their greatest asset—a united leadership capable of settling all differences in private behind-the-scene discussions. The struggle for succession is on and, as we know from Russia's example, such struggles in communist societies are not easily settled. In China's case the whole system based on the hegemony of the communist party is being endangered as the army assumes more and more powers over the administration. Maoism may turn out to be something totally different from communism—a kind of neo-isolationism in international relations. The country's economy has gone through a series of difficult periods ever since Mao Tse-tung initiated the great leap forward movement in 1958.

Outside the Race

As for China's influence abroad, the massacre of the communists in Indonesia is only an extreme illustration of the debacle which has overtaken its foreign policy. Even North Viet Nam and North Korea have veered towards Moscow. It will not be surprising if under the cover of ultra-revolutionary slogans on the one hand, and some kind of nuclear capability on the other, China once again withdraws into its own shell—a modern version of the Middle Kingdom psychology. In any case, in terms of its history and tradition China is not equipped to play a world role. The same is true of India whatever the pretensions New Delhi acquired during the 'fifties. In fact, the Maoist leadership has proved itself incapable of playing even a regional role. Its attack on India in October 1962 and the policy of active hostility ever since show that Peking under Mao is utterly incapable of a large approach.

India's failure to master its economic problems, its pathetic

dependence on western aid, uncertain leadership since 1962 when Nehru's intellectual powers began to decline and its inability to win a position of influence in neighbouring countries have distracted attention from the incompetence of the Chinese leadership. China and India have regarded themselves competitors for the leadership of Asia. But, as things have turned out, both have been knocked out of the race leaving the field open for the United States and its principal Asian ally, Japan. So far as one can see, Japan will be the chief attraction for Asian countries in the 'seventies and not China.

Relevant Context

The problem of South and South-East Asian security should, in my view, be discussed in this context of the dominant U.S. position, the Japanese miracle which has made it the third biggest economic power in the world, next only to America and Russia, and growing co-operation between Japan, South Korea, Formosa, Australia and New Zealand. Should Indonesia, Malaysia and the Philippines find it possible to revive the Maphilindo concept now that Jakarta is rid of Sukarno's influence and is settling down to normalcy, this anti-Chinese Malay grouping will strongly reinforce the present trend.

My conclusions are obvious. China does not constitute a threat to the security of the area as such. It is not a practical proposition to think of an Asian balance without U.S. participation. America is here with us to stay. Peking has primarily been responsible for the debacle leading to the present level of U.S. influence.

I must hasten to add that this does not mean that the Chinese cannot continue the policy of harassing India on the Himalayan border and of inciting Pakistan. The chances in fact are that as the Chinese begin to feel bottled up, they may come to regard controlled incidents on the Himalayan frontier as a useful device to distract attention. As for Pakistan, it has to operate broadly within the world system, particularly in view of the developing Russo-American understanding regarding the stabi-

lity of the area. But President Ayub Khan is trying hard to involve China in the affairs of the sub-continent as an insurance that the two great powers do not compel him to accept the *status quo* favourable to India. Washington and Moscow appear to be willing to reconcile themselves to the Pakistani plan provided that China's influence in Rawalpindi is kept within well-defined limits. Pakistan can be tempted to risk another trial of strength over Kashmir with tacit Chinese support if New Delhi allows its defence preparedness to be run down either under external pressure or in the mistaken calculation that it can afford to lower its guards and reduce the burden on an over-strained economy.

The experience in connection with the search for the US. arms aid and the Pakistani aggression in 1965 should leave India in little doubt that the United States and its allies accept Rawalpindi's right to claim parity with New Delhi and that they do not care if India's position in Kashmir is undermined or if the Chinese compel it to make certain readjustments of the frontier in the Himalayas. These developments would in no way hurt America's position *vis-a-vis* China. Also, New Delhi must remember that the country's entire northern border is soft because the people there have not yet been fully assimilated into the mainstream of national life. Unless it is vigilant it may find that its position there has been damaged beyond repair. Thus India is particularly vulnerable and New Delhi cannot afford to take the same view as Washington, London or even Tokyo.

The Practical Way

The above analysis can be interpreted to mean that I am advocating either a close understanding with the United States so that Washington can be persuaded to take a more understanding view of our difficulties or a renewed attempt to open a dialogue with China in the hope that Peking will now be ready to recognise that its policy of hostility towards us has not been particularly fruitful. Neither of these alternatives is

without some advantage. But neither appears practical or even wholly desirable. The United States, for instance, has not been interested in a military alliance with India for years and there is no reason to believe that New Delhi's assessment will prevail if it gets into some kind of arrangement with Washington. In fact, it can be taken for granted that by acceding to such an arrangement India will have made itself even more vulnerable than it already is to American pressure not only on the question of non-proliferation but Kashmir as well. All that the United States has been wanting from us is that we endorse its policy on Viet Nam and on non-proliferation, if not in return for, then as a mark of our gratitude for economic and food aid.

Nothing Spectacular

As for China, the leadership is caught in a crisis which may go on for a long time. Moreover, it is time we realise that the initiative to be effective must come from Peking. The role of Indian diplomacy was marginal even in the past although the myth has been built that Nehru was the architect of the policy of Sino-Indian friendship. This is not to deny him the credit due to him. This is only to point out that it was Peking which decided in the past whether its relations with New Delhi would be friendly or hostile. That, in my opinion, remains the position. Only, it should be added that this is not the time to expect an initiative out of Peking. For the time being it is stuck with its absurd policy of seeking to contain U.S. influence in Asia by humiliating and embarrassing New Delhi!

In any move that India makes it has of necessity to be sensitive to the possible Russian reaction. Moscow cannot be expected to welcome India moving closer to America or seeking some kind of rapprochement with China. It is no use pretending that we can afford not to be inhibited by this or similar other considerations. In short, no spectacular move is open to New Delhi. It has to move with extreme caution and not close a possible opening.

today a far more formidable American military presence in the Asian region than at any previous time since the end of the second world war. The total number of American troops in Viet Nam has reached 440,000. The U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff have reportedly informed President Johnson that in course of time a commitment of 600,000 soldiers might be necessary. A huge construction programme involving bases, airports, and harbours is under way in South Viet Nam. Similar activity in Thailand has also been stepped up. American attacks on North Viet Nam have been of a character and intensity that few could have predicted two years ago.

The military posture of the United States in the Asian region is far stronger today than it was at any time even during the Korean war. In its actions and its responses to developments in the region, the United States has been adopting a far harder line than ever before. American policy makers are apparently convinced that they have today greater strength and manoeuvrability than in the past years.

Two far-reaching developments have contributed to the easing of America's position in Asia: the widening gulf between the Soviet Union and China; and the continuing rift between China and India. Another important factor is the change which has occurred in Indonesia and the installation of a firmly anti-Chinese regime in Jakarta. These developments have been attained much earlier than had been deemed feasible; thanks mainly to the unintended, co-operation extended to the United States by Peking.

U. S. Objectives

What are the basic postulates governing American policy in Asia—postulates from which are evolved U.S. policy objectives in any particular period? In American literature the postulates are described as follows: (1) to support free governments in Asia against the onslaught of communist expan-

sionism; and (2) to help them to build up their economy by means of aid. Such descriptions must, however, be translated into somewhat more realistic and earthy terms.

The first basic postulate of American policy has been and will continue to be to prevent or slow down the rise of a power in Asia that may develop a capability to pose as a threat to the United States and its interests.

Preventing Influence

The United States, secondly, will seek to counter and limit the spread of the influence of such a power in other countries of the area. This objective will be achieved through diplomatic activities and assistance programmes of various kinds directed at the 'other countries.' Especially active will the United States be to promote developments which may induce elite groups—particularly the civil and military bureaucratic elite—to remain 'oriented' towards the United States. The extent of American interest in any particular country will be determined by its present and potential role *vis-a-vis* the identified opponent of the United States; its human and material resources, and its geographical location. If the United States is in urgent need of important resources or facilities for vital operations which only a certain country can provide, the US. will give favoured treatment to that country so long as the need for its facilities or resources remains urgent.

The third postulate of American policy in the region is seldom to be found in books on American diplomacy, but it is nonetheless of considerable interest to us. While rendering assistance to and maintaining contacts with countries other than the identified opponent, the United States will try to ensure that the most important of them does not develop such capability as eventually to pose problems for the United States. This means that even while a confrontation is under way with the identified opponent of the time, certain options will always be re-

tained by the United States to enable it to work out a *modus vivendi* and to reach an eventual settlement with the opponent.

Similarly, even while giving assistance to the principal nation among countries other than the identified opponent, the United States will be careful to ensure that the country receiving aid does not become so strong economically and militarily as to make it unamenable to appropriate management.

This is the situation as I see it. The attitude of the Soviet Union towards the Asian region is not intrinsically different. This is the way the super powers function. They have heavy problems and they are undoubtedly convinced that their respective policies not only protect their own interests but also those of the rest of mankind. We need not debate the issue with them. It is necessary for us, however, to understand the facts of life and conduct our affairs in such a way that our own objectives are promoted. Of course, we too will claim that our policies promote the welfare of mankind!

Priority Number One

A brief examination of American policy in Asia will illustrate the operation of the postulates which I have outlined above. In the early post-war years the identified opponent of the United States was the Soviet Union. When the communists led by Mao Tse-tung established their sway over the Chinese mainland, the United States tried very hard to convince them that it was ready to do business with Peking. It was Chinese intervention in the Korean war and the subsequent build-up on a systematic basis of Chinese military power that led the United States to view China as a growing threat. The location, population and natural resources of China were such as to make it potentially a formidable antagonist. It became the most important objective of the United States to bring about the weakening and dissolution of the Sino-Soviet alignment at the earliest possible time. That was prio-

rity number one on the American agenda.

Operative Postulate

Second in order of priority was to forge closer links with the country in Asia which could be some sort of match for China. With Japan securely under American control, the obvious candidate for the position, in the eyes of U.S. policy makers, was India. It is not without significance that during the very week in which Mao Tse-tung proclaimed the People's Republic of China in Peking, Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru of India was scheduled to arrive in New York on his first visit to the United States. Despite mentally designating India as the principal country to be supported in South Asia, the United States tailored its assistance to India in careful fashion. It has made no serious attempt to build this country industrially and militarily by the kind of massive help that was given to Western Europe.

I am not at this point going into any discussion of our own policy of non-alignment. I believe that the postulate governing American policy would have been operative even if we had agreed to sign on the dotted line during the days when John Foster Dulles was shopping around for countries that would be willing to enter into military pacts with the United States. Had Nehru accepted President Eisenhower's offer in 1954—made immediately after the announcement of forthcoming US aid to Pakistan—it is doubtful whether the quantum of aid from the United States might have been such as to have made India a substantially stronger military power than it is now.

Even overlooking for the moment the domestic political complications which an alignment policy would have evoked at that time and the alienation from the Soviet Union which it would have brought about, one is led to conclude that the scale of military assistance to an aligned India would have been kept within fairly modest bounds by American policy makers. Military assistance to Asian countries

has only been provided by the United States at a level consistent with its own overall force objectives in any particular country. The decision-making in respect of what the force objectives should be was done in Washington. Finally, the availability of such military assistance in 1954 would have inhibited the development in India of indigenous capability and self-sufficiency in many areas. Pakistan found this out to its cost during its military adventure against us in 1965.

Our Mistake

The United States has been in no hurry to equip us militarily after the Chinese attack of 1962 and after receiving our request for military assistance. It is my personal conviction that a serious mistake was committed by our government in pleading with the United States and other countries for help following the Chinese attack. We should have proclaimed our determination to combat aggression, continued the fight against the intruders vigorously—and awaited the reactions of the United States and other countries.

It is illuminating to contrast the action of our leaders with those of Josef Stalin. In 1941, as the danger to his country from Hitlerism appeared to be mounting, Stalin replaced his glum ambassador in Washington with the courtly and friendly Litvinov. When the massive Hitlerite invasion began, Stalin made no appeal for assistance to the Americans and the British. He waited and watched. It was Churchill and Roosevelt who wrote to Stalin expressing their willingness to support him. Stalin responded graciously, indicating his readiness to accept help. The United States immediately announced a credit of \$1,000 million to the Soviet Union and followed it up a few weeks later with another credit of \$1,000 million. Subsequently, the Lend-Lease Act was applied to the Soviet Union and the enormous flow of US equipment to the Soviet Union began.

No such response was forthcoming to India from the United

States even after our appeal for help. Recently, the United States officially announced that there would be no further military assistance on a grant basis to India. American policy reflects the appraisal of U.S. policy makers that China was not then and is not now in a position to mount any major offensive against India. It is believed that only a major invasion of India with a drive by the Chinese into the Indo-Gangetic valley and towards Calcutta and Delhi can conceivably pose a threat to American security interests in the region. American policy makers do not think that such an invasion is on the cards. For that reason they are unwilling to provide India with materials other than those needed for countering a limited Chinese attack on the Himalayan border.

Thus, the United States shows a disposition to help India keep its nose above water economically and to attain a capability to resist a limited Chinese offensive on the border. No longer are the Americans fearful that there might be a swing of opinion in India away from the United States and towards the Soviet Union. The American-Soviet *detente* which has been evolving and intensifying over the last three years is a factor of great significance to India and other countries in the Asian region. American and Soviet policy objectives in India appear to be the same: to sustain this country as a counter to China but not to help build it into a powerful entity that may turn on them one day as a Frankenstein.

Nuclear Independence

The attitude of the United States—and of the Soviet Union—towards the issue of India 'going nuclear' serves further to illustrate the point which I am trying to make. With China making substantial progress in the field of nuclear weaponry, the issue is no longer merely of academic interest to us. But the two super powers are not only not evincing any noticeable interest in enabling us to build up our military strength significantly, but are actually pressing us to

renounce any thought of acquiring a nuclear capability of our own.

It is the path of prudence for us to bear in mind the fact that neither the United States nor the Soviet Union has officially recognized the validity of our position on the border issue with China. There is no statement from them specifically recognizing the MacMahon line. This situation has particular relevance to us in view of the growing Chinese nuclear capability.

Ineffectiveness . Guarantee

It is very unlikely that the United States will risk a confrontation with China over the latter's dispute with India, except in the case of a threatened or actual Chinese nuclear attack on India. An American or even a Soviet-American nuclear guarantee to India will come into play only if a clearly identifiable nuclear situation is posed by China. But if China were to engage in nibbling operations, say in NEFA, it is very unlikely that the United States Government or public opinion will favour a speedy or vigorous American response to assist India.

China's policy makers, who are careful students of American decision-making processes, can be expected to avoid actions which may lead to a direct confrontation with the United States. Without rattling their nuclear bombs too noisily, they can still engage in activities which may seriously threaten our security and territorial integrity. Guarantees against Chinese nuclear blackmail by the United States and/or the Soviet Union will not be of any help to us under these circumstances.

American policy makers appear to be reluctant in conceding that we have legitimate grounds for anxiety. They want us to put our trust in the Great White Father in Washington. The Big Brother in Moscow also exhorts us to put our trust in him.

It appears to me that the United States and the Soviet Union are jointly and separately striving to keep India frozen in its present

power posture *vis-a-vis* themselves and other Asian countries and to inhibit the acquisition of a nuclear capability by us. This was one of the objectives seriously discussed by American policy makers before the Partial Test Ban Treaty came into force. Soviet discussions are not published, but it is reasonable to assume that the objectives of the USSR were the same. The United States and the Soviet Union wanted the Treaty because, among other things, they knew it would delay the acquisition of nuclear capability by countries like India. They do not relish the prospect of an India that will have an independent nuclear capability.

American Defence Secretary Robert McNamara spoke candidly on the matter during hearings before Congress. Said McNamara:

'A number of countries, in addition to the four present nuclear powers, will be able to acquire at least a few nuclear weapons and a crude delivery capability — possibly including medium-range rockets — during the next 10 years.

'With [atmospheric tests outlawed and] testing limited to the underground environment, the potential cost of a nuclear weapons development program would increase sharply for all signatory States. And since testing underground is not only more costly but more difficult and time-consuming, the proposed treaty would retard progress in weapons development in cases where the added cost and other factors were not sufficient to preclude it altogether.'

Growing Awareness

This was the Treaty which our government was so eager and anxious to sign, standing first in the queue both in Moscow and Washington. Fortunately there is greater awareness now of the implications of the Non-Proliferation Treaty which again is being sponsored by both the United States and the Soviet Union.

In the U.S. Congress there is a growing demand for safeguards

and inspection in respect of the atomic installations which have been provided by the U.S. and Canada to India. A recent debate in the Senate clearly indicates that it is India that they have in mind.

It is also clear that in case we adopt a line on nuclear development contrary to that advocated by the United States, the displeasure of the United States might be made known to us in unmistakable fashion. Senator Robert Kennedy made the following comments some time ago and their implications are quite clear: 'I would hope that the new look at foreign aid which the President has promised includes in its planning provision for encouraging all recipient nations to abstain from the development of nuclear weapons.'

There is little reason to assume that Soviet thinking on the issue is at variance with that of the United States.

Pakistan

What about American objectives in Pakistan? A study of available material indicates that American interest in Pakistan was slow in developing. It was only a considerable time after Pakistan became an independent country that the United States began to devote to Pakistan the kind of attention which its size, population, location and resources warranted. On the basis of those very factors, however, India had appeared to the United States to be a far bigger prize than Pakistan. Why then did the United States enter into a military pact with Pakistan in the face of stubborn opposition from India?

Such evidence as is available indicates that in 1953 American planners regarded the availability bases and related facilities in Pakistan to be so vitally important as to warrant the risk of a temporary deterioration in their country's relations with India. It is now known that Peshawar was a U-2 base. It is probable that RB-47 reconnais-

sance air craft were also located in bases in Pakistan for probing operations into Sino-Soviet territory. Electronic and other devices might also have been installed in the bases for such purposes as monitoring missile firings and satellite launches in the Soviet Union.

This was the invaluable *quid pro quo* that Americans obtained from Pakistan and they were willing, in return, to take some steps in order to keep their client reasonably happy. Pakistanis, however, were never satisfied that the quantum of military aid which they received was commensurate with the services which they rendered to their ally.

At least since 1960, it had been evident to Pakistan that the United States had no longer any urgent need of the bases and related facilities which had been made available to it by Pakistan. It was this realization that was responsible, in part, for the Pakistani drift in the direction of China. The United States has not made a serious effort to prevent the drift. It has seen in it an opportunity gradually to disentangle itself from its involvement with Pakistan.

Similar Views

The recent US decision to stop grant assistance in respect of military items to Pakistan as well as India is a noteworthy step in this direction. American planners obviously do not believe that Pakistan's relations with China at present are such as to jeopardize US interests. American spokesmen say that they are unhappy over Pakistan's course, but they hasten to add that Pakistan has continued to fulfil its Treaty commitments to the United States. It is interesting to note that the Soviet Union too has not expressed any special concern over Sino-Pak relations and has, indeed, been courting Pakistan with well-publicized ardour.

The growing convergence of the views of the super powers on broad issues relating to the Indian sub-continent has implications for both India and Pakistan. Since the super powers are the principal sources of aid for India and Pak-

istan, a combined demand from the former can hardly be brushed aside light-heartedly. This was clearly brought out at the time of the Indo-Pak conflict of 1965 when both the United States and the Soviet Union virtually acted in concert.

The Only Deterrent

Recent moves of the super powers—the American ruling in respect of supply of spares to Pakistan and the reported Soviet interest in the sale of arms to Pakistan—provide further evidence of the capacity that the super powers possess to keep the two countries of the sub-continent at any desired level of tension. Such a state of affairs can benefit neither India nor Pakistan. It can be ended only when India and Pakistan cease to work at cross purposes and achieve a level of collaboration which will deter outsiders from attempts to play off one against the other.

The months ahead constitute a trying time for India and our diplomats will have to put forth highly sophisticated efforts to bring about a state of affairs which will contribute to our security. The right to take whatever measures are necessary to safeguard our territorial integrity and ensure our survival should be asserted and never compromised. We should make the super powers understand that such a posture does not mean that we will rush headlong into a nuclear weapon programme, in disregard of economic, political and diplomatic factors. When our problem is rearmament and not disarmament, we should spend less time exhorting the super powers on what they should do in progressively reducing their armaments. The super powers and their associates also happen to be sources for the sale of military equipment to us. It should be our aim to get from them the kind of equipment that we need on terms which are least disadvantageous to us. At the same time we must develop our own military strength on a vigorous and planned basis. In the final analysis, our own strength will be decisive in deterring those who do not wish us well.

Books

INDIA'S DEFENCE AND FOREIGN POLICIES Edited by A. B. Shah.
Manaktalas, 1966, pp. 169, Bombay.

India's defence and foreign policies have recently been subjected to varied strains and pressures—especially since the outbreak of Chinese hostilities in 1962 and the undeclared war with Pakistan in September 1965. The two events, occurring within a short span of three years, have shaken the faith of those who believed that India was destined to play the peacemaker's role in the international society. The events have also led to some serious thinking on the part of statesmen and scholars, who have vehemently argued for adopting a flexible, non-dogmatic, and pragmatic approach in our defence and foreign relations consistent with our national interests. The two basic issues which have largely come under fire are India's policy of non-alignment and her stand against the manufacture of the atomic bomb. The present compendium on *India's Defence and Foreign Policies*, edited by A. B. Shah, is a collection of nine articles contributing largely to the debate on these two significant yet controversial issues.

The first two articles by V. B. Karnik and N. R. Deshpande attempt a critical but a balanced assessment of India's foreign policy since independence and until the Tashkent declaration. In an objective analysis of India's foreign policy during the Nehru era, both seem to suggest that 'the policy of non-alignment as developed by Nehru was in the interest of India as a developing nation. It gave her peace and ensured economic assistance from the Russian as well as the western blocs. It was only later, after the U.S. Pakistan military pact, that India's obsession with Kashmir gave his non-alignment a pro-communist slant and blinded him to the danger of a resurgent communist China.' The third article by A. B. Shah on 'Indian Foreign Policy—Review and Perspective' is a refutation of the above views in as much as the author shows that 'non-alignment has not yielded significant differential gains in any field of real importance for India as a developing modern democracy.' In a critical appraisal of India's defence and foreign policies, the author concludes enjoining a strong ideological bias that Indian policies 'revolved round Moscow, Peking, and Cairo, rather than strike out a path of its own.'

In the fourth article, Rajni Kothari, as a rejoinder to Shah's comments, has made a vigorous defence of the policy of non-alignment. He criticises Shah's views as suffering 'from a lack of understanding of

what is involved in political and institutional development in the absence of which the building of a strong military base can do as much harm in one area as good in another.' He argues that Nehru's achievement 'lies in giving to his country a durable political base and institutional legitimacy.'

Replying to Kothari's charges, Shah in the next article makes a strong defence of his viewpoints. To Kothari's belief that 'non-alignment mitigated India's fate as Russia's camp follower,' he asks, 'How else would India have behaved if she *had been* Russia's camp follower?' In a more practical way Shah, therefore, argues: 'Would it not be more realistic for India to define her national interests, their priorities and the context in which they are to be realized, to rate her friends and to have a clear idea of the price she would be willing to pay for their friendship?' In a similar tone, V. K. Sinha in the next article, examines Indian foreign policy in its bearing on South-east Asia. Although not directly related to the main theme of 'non-alignment', Sinha concludes that 'in spite of the strong anti-West sentiment, India's foreign policy has all along been primarily directed to the West, resulting in the neglect of the need to cultivate close and friendly relations with the countries of South-east Asia, including his own immediate neighbours.'

The last three articles provide a very interesting debate on the question—which has once again become topical—whether India should manufacture the atomic bomb? In the first article, M. R. Masani, taking shelter behind the conventional argument that such an undertaking would be at a cost that would make a mockery of all plans for raising the living standards of the people, argues for an Indian understanding with the U.S. and the U.S.S.R., in order to create a deterrent to a possible nuclear threat from China. In the next article on 'Chinese Nuclear Challenge to Indian Democracy,' M. R. Dandavate has merely lent passive support to India's case for the manufacture of nuclear weapons. He thinks that 'the production of the bomb should be undertaken only by mobilizing the necessary public opinion.'

The last article by Raj Krishna on 'India and the Bomb', presents a very forceful and convincing plea for India's going in for the manufacture of nuclear weapons. Although one might not agree with his estimates of the cost of such a programme which seem to be too conservative to-day, yet his conclusion that 'limited nuclear armament has now become an inescapable requirement for the preservation of our real independence which constitutes the core of

our non-alignment' is quite significant in the context of the 'nuclear non-proliferation treaty' now being proposed by the nuclear powers.

The selection of articles by A. B. Shah for his 'anthology,' as he prefers to call it, is indeed discerning. He has quite succeeded in his purpose of giving the readers balanced views on the two controversial issues of India's defence and foreign policies. By providing conflicting viewpoints, he has been able to evoke a rational and a dispassionate discussion on these problems. However, as the editor himself admits, the scope of such discussion has been rather too narrow. A discussion on the 'economic strategy of the country' could have been certainly included, despite the editor's belief that this would have been more technical and specialised—beyond the comprehension or interest of an average citizen.

Further, most of the articles in the present compendium—with the exception of a few—are content only with making 'speculative generalizations', without making any concrete and realistic suggestions—which are the need of the day. For example, many of the articles have suggested 'self-reliance' without adequately defining as to what is meant by it, or how it is to be secured. Lastly, many of these articles were written about the time when the people in India had shown an unprecedented psychological unity. Hence, these do not take into account the present confusion and the disintegrating factors, which have a considerable bearing on the formulation of such policies. There is, therefore, a need to continue the dialogue for a searching re-examination of our defence and foreign policies in the changed circumstances—especially after the fourth general elections, which have completely changed the internal power pattern. This set of readings provides an excellent perspective for all those attempting to undertake such a study.

R. B. Jain

WAR IN THE DETERRENT AGE By Major-General D. K. Palit.

Macdonald, London, pp. 224.

The advent of nuclear weapons has introduced significant changes in political policy and military strategy. In his book, *War in the Deterrent Age*, Major-General Palit has sought to study these changes. As a background to his theme he has first provided a summary of the traditional concepts governing warfare. This is useful and covers half the book. One may note in passing that the concepts have been taken almost wholly from European military history and relate to the European system. On the other hand, there is a good deal of non-European material available which is worth study, particularly today when the European ideas and system are not measuring up to the military challenges at numerous places in the Orient.

But the summary is enough to illustrate the point that some of the old tenets have become unaccept-

able as well as dangerous in terms of nuclear weapons. 'The average-size nuclear bomb has the equivalent power of ten million regiments of field artillery,' says General Palit. A 20-megaton bomb may cause damage of the order of 20,000 million dollars and 7 million casualties. There are thousands of small and big bombs existing now. Against such weapons the strategy prescribed by Clausewitz that 'war is an act of violence pushed to its utmost bounds' or the principle of war enjoining 'concentration of force' has become militarily wasteful and politically absurd. Today, more than ever in the past, policy is concerned not so much with the strategy of launching a total war as with the strategy of avoiding it. This fact is at the heart of the strategy of deterrence.

Deterrent strategy has been accepted after some defence experts toyed with such alternative concepts as preventive and pre-emptive wars or massive retaliation and counter-force. Both the USA and the USSR, who are not only the leaders of the West Bloc and East Bloc but also the two great powers capable of waging a global nuclear war, have adopted it. Under it some kind of a military balance and, consequently, political stability has been established. This balance or stability is of course a make-shift affair: its bi-polar character, on which it has largely depended, is already being challenged by France and China, while the possibility of the emergence of an anti-missile missile is giving it a jolt.

And yet the stability is credible enough to make strategists take account of wars which are short of the absurd and can be fought while the deterrent lasts. Three kinds of wars are envisaged: guerrilla wars, conventional wars of all kinds in which nuclear weapons are not used, and limited wars in which tactical nuclear weapons are employed. General Palit devotes a full chapter to the first, defining the stages in which it develops and describing how, in the hands of the Red Chinese, it is neither unscientific nor concerned only with the defensive, as is sometimes supposed, but has become thoroughly organised and an instrument of aggression. He also places it in the context of the Chinese nuclear bomb, which is likely to give rise to deterrence under the main deterrence and provide an umbrella for the waging of guerrilla wars.

It is to counter the threat of sub-deterrents and marginal conflagrations that France has been wanting its *force de frappe*. General Palit suggests a similar sub-deterrent for Asia; he does not say which country should produce it, but as things are, India is the only answer.

General Palit is a serving officer, a fact which is both an advantage and a disadvantage to him as a writer. He is up-to-date and authoritative. At the same time he is constrained and inhibited—there is no other explanation for the fact that even though he is intimately acquainted with both the major wars

India has fought since independence and indeed was the Director of Military Operations during NEFA, no illustration whatever has been given out of his own experience to illustrate his theme. But this is a small point. *War in the Deterrent Age* is a knowledgeable, well-written book on a matter of topical interest, and should be well received in higher military circles.

Maharaj K. Chopra

THE SECURITY OF SOUTH ASIA By D. E. Kennedy.
Chatto and Windus, London, 1965. p. 305.

The security of Southern Asia is at once a critical and controversial problem. It is critical in the sense that the countries of this area are faced with many challenges, both from within and without. It becomes controversial because no two scholars seem to agree on a way to define what constitutes the defence for the region. Economic distress, political instability and the changing pattern of society of these countries are serious issues engaging the attention of scholars.

Besides, the clash of national interest, as between China and Taiwan, China and India, Pakistan and India, Indonesia and Malaysia and between North and South Viet Nam, are a persistent threat to a breach of peace in this region. Above all is the ideological polarization of the communist and non-communist powers which sweeps the entire continent of Asia leaving a very bleak future for peace.

Dr. Kennedy, an Australian scholar and a senior lecturer in history at the University of Melbourne, is fully seized of the above problems in his present work. The book has seven chapters. It is followed by a stimulating conclusion and appendix and punctuated by interesting footnotes and citations. Synthetically speaking, the book centres around one major theme: what can prevent the countries of South Asia from falling into the communist line. Therefore, it is an addition to many other works in the West which believe that a new approach is needed in the changed situation to provide sustenance to the countries of South Asia. It urges considerable reorientation of the present policies of the western powers.

What is this changed situation, then? 'China and the Asian Balance' is the first important discussion. That China has emerged as a great power, capable of disturbing the security of Asia or the so-called 'balance of power' is beyond doubt. It has increased its nuclear capability and by the recent test of its hydrogen bomb—many people had not expected it so early—it has confirmed its position among the few thermonuclear powers.

That China has yet to master its delivery system can hardly be a solace to anyone. The fact remains that the monopoly of the few big powers in the field of nuclear weapons is broken. (Dr. Kennedy wrote the book in 1965 and some of the latest developments on this aspect have not been included). Any

scheme of collective security, therefore, from the western viewpoint has to reckon with this development. The author has found this a great threat to many smaller countries of Asia who are on the periphery of China.

But it must be said here that several other works, apart from the present book, have shown significant interest in the nuclear power of China in recent years. Alice Langley Hsieh: *Communist China's Strategy in the Nuclear Era* (1962) and H. C. Hinton: *Communist China's External Policy and Behaviour as a Nuclear Power* (1963) had already stressed the nuclear potentialities of China and its effect on its conduct with the outside world. Professor Morton Halperin, on the other hand, has written three books: *China's Nuclear Strategy*; *The Early Post Detonation Period* (1965), *China and the Bomb* (1965) and *China and the Nuclear Proliferation* (1966) which equally emphasized the nuclear menace of China to the western interest. But what has caused great anxiety to the present author is the result of this development on the old security system and SEATO which are based on outdated premises and need a new approach in order to cope with this problem so as to reinstate the confidence of the allies of the western powers.

Chinese scholars have now realized that the Peking regime is no longer a transitory one. Communism has come to stay. It shows every sign of enduring and in some ways the Chinese system is the most viable government in Asia. Dr. Kennedy also subscribes to this. He is fully aware of the strong points of the Chinese system and proceeds to emphasize those measures which can meet the Chinese challenge in the context of Southern Asia.

The latter half of the book which includes 'The Threat of Communist Subversion', 'International Defence and External Assistance' and 'An Indigenous Defence System', is equally revealing. The author has found India's policy, relying on mere moral platitudes, meaningless. He buttresses his view on the basis of the Sino-Indian clash of 1962 when India resorted to aid from the western powers and the Soviet Union, thus turning its non-alignment policy into a myth. The present reviewer agrees with the author in levelling this criticism against India. Too much of dependence on foreign aid and lack of internal strength can lead to the failure of any independent foreign policy. Non-alignment is still the only course suitable to India's foreign policy but it needs self-reliance, consistency and courage to steer such a policy in time of difficulties which India ought to prepare itself for.

The threat of communist subversion, in which the Soviet Union and China seem to be divided on the 'means' and 'ends', preoccupies the author throughout. One claim about the future effects of the Communist split with respect to subversion can reasonably be made at the outset. It is that, whatever the respective roles of the Soviet Union and China in Southern Asia, in the future, any competi-

tion between them will more probably lead to an increase of subversive activities in the area than to a decrease.' (p. 132)

Indo-China and the surrounding countries have been cited as fitting illustrations of the tactics of communist subversion. In view of this, the author also suggests a reorientation of the aid programme, irrespective of the fact whether the recipient countries happen to be allies or non-allies; their internal defence system should be developed so as to suit their indigenous capabilities. This would mean a thorough overhauling of the system of collective security which has been the key policy of the western powers.

One may, however, suggest a somewhat unconventional hypothesis although not altogether irrelevant in the context of the present scheme of collective security of South Asia. It is not very much ruled out that Russia may seek more and more collaboration with the western powers in its own national interest as well as to preserve the *status quo* in Asia, in view of the increasing aggressive national pride of China. The Russians also share a big border with China. The nuclear capability of China can pose a threat as great to the Soviet Union as it does to the United States.

Therefore, in view of such a development, the concept of security for South Asia assumes a different dimension. One would, however, wonder if any historian in this very fluid situation of Asia can afford to be prophetic. Dr. Kennedy wrote the book in 1965 when Malaysia and Indonesia were opposed to each other. Now the two seem to have drawn closer. Sukarno is gone and the 'Peking governed' Communist Party of Indonesia does not appear to be strong enough for a revolution. The calculations regarding North Viet Nam are not coming true either. Despite the increasing military pressure of the United States on North Viet Nam, Ho Chi-Minh has not budged from his stand. We have reached a stage where alliances and collective security and aid programmes are proving the antithesis of the security of Asia. The time has come for the scholars of the South Asian countries themselves to engage in formulating a new system for the security of South Asia. The region could be spared from one defence system or the other and this could in return constitute a more stable security for Asia than any other system devised so far.

R. P. Kaushik

THE SPREAD OF NUCLEAR POWERS By Leonard Beaton and John Maddox.
Chatto and Windus, London, 1962.

MUST THE BOMB SPREAD By Leonard Beaton.
Institute for Strategic Studies, London, 1966.

THE DISPERSION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS Edited by R. N. Rosecrance.
Columbia University Press, New York, 1964.

A WORLD OF NUCLEAR POWERS Edited by Alastair Buchan.

Ever since research on nuclear weapons began in 1940, a number of issues have dominated strategic and political thinking concerning nuclear weapons. The first relates to the possession of the weapons. In the beginning, the issue was simply to prevent Hitler from getting the bomb first and then to delay the Russians from getting it. More recently, this question has become increasingly important in the wake of the development of nuclear power by France and China and with the possibility of a number of other countries following suit. This question is called the 'Nth Power Problem' or the 'spread of nuclear weapons.' The second issue concerns the function of nuclear weapons. Whether it is to give prestige, or to deter, or to guarantee victory in a war?

These issues have engaged the attention of scholars all over the world and have become the subject of a very extensive and still growing literature running into several books and filling volumes of periodical articles. This review is, however, concerned with only four selected books. The first of them is *The Spread of Nuclear Weapons* by Leonard Beaton and John Maddox. This volume which has the whole field largely to itself, has been prepared with great care and is based on the essential combination of technical knowledge and political sophistication.

The authors analyse the requirements for nuclear power status and this analysis has the great advantage of combining technical, economic and political aspects. Beaton and Maddox properly emphasize the need for a large number of skilled technicians, the enormous costs and complexities of modern delivery systems, and the prospects for effective defences against small or primitive systems.

It is maintained that atomic energy programmes for peaceful uses are the most essential, if not the only source, for the spread of latent weapons capabilities. The policy implications of this, however, should have been spelled out more emphatically.

The authors present a discussion of nine leading cases of those countries that may acquire nuclear weapons in the foreseeable future. The discussion contains a wealth of interesting information. Particularly the chapters dealing with Canada and India bring out facts which even well informed people in Britain and the United States were not aware of.

Beaton and Maddox have lifted the discussion of this topic to a higher plane. They have placed the problem on a solid foundation of factual information and careful political judgement.

But since Beaton and Maddox published their book, a number of significant developments have taken place in the nature of international relations and weapons technology. It is with a view to taking

these developments into account that Beaton published another book, *Must the Bomb Spread?* This book is different from *The Spread of Nuclear Weapons* both in context and conclusion. In the 1962 publication, only nine cases of potential nuclear powers were discussed. But, in the 1966 publication, almost all countries of the world are seen as being capable of developing nuclear weapons in the long run.

These countries are divided into three categories: those capable of becoming nuclear powers by 1975, those by 1985, and those by 1995. The treatment of *Must the Bomb Spread?* reflects a change in the conclusion reached by Beaton in his book that he wrote with Maddox. In the earlier book, Beaton's conclusion was that 'there was nothing inevitable about proliferation', but, in the latter, the conclusion is that 'non-proliferation is no more inevitable than proliferation.' This was just as true and nearly as evident in 1962 as it is now. The difference is that today proliferation is nearly out of control.

Beaton is at his best when he marshals technical facts. The chapter in which he examines the probable rate of proliferation in terms of the plant, technology, and materials available to the various proliferatory powers is very systematic and informative.

Beaton's book is a reminder that massive proliferation could be just round the corner. He outlines a political strategy of allaying the motives of security and prestige that are making some countries incline towards nuclear policies. He suggests that the prestige attached to the possession of nuclear weapons must wane. He also opines that the nuclear guarantee by nuclear powers to non-nuclear countries already exists in some measure in the policies of great powers. On the whole, this book presents the idea of a 'non-proliferation system.'

The third book, *The Dispersion of Nuclear Weapons*, also deals with the nature of the problem of the spread of nuclear weapons. It is a collection of papers by seven scholars from the Rand Corporation, edited by Professor R. N. Rosecrance. Points of view of various countries, especially those of the great powers, to the problem of the spread of nuclear weapons are examined. Five articles deal with British topics; one article each with France and China, two with NATO; and two with future developments in technology and nuclear weapons. Rosecrance provides an excellent introduction and a thought-provoking conclusion.

In the introduction, he discusses the motives behind the development of nuclear weapons programmes in France, Britain, and the United States. In the case of Britain and the United States, two main motives are suggested. Rosecrance believes that one of the motives that drove the British and the Americans during the second world war was the fear that the other side would use nuclear weapons first. The second motive was the achievement of great power status. The French motives are, first,

the attainment of prestige and, second, the belief that Americans cannot be relied upon in an event of an attack which may be confined to Europe.

Clearly, there is something in the latter argument. But it is difficult to allow any such misleadingly simple formulation to stand. For, if defence of one's homeland is the only basis of nuclear credibility, then even a French nuclear force cannot yield any credibility for attacks confined to Germany or to Turkey, or to any other member of the Nato alliance. It seems, from the point of view of western European countries, that nuclear disarmament by the United States and the Soviet Union is the only way to persuade Nth Powers not to go in for nuclear weapons. Rosecrance suggests that certain steps could be taken in order to dissuade the potential nuclear powers from going nuclear. Important among such steps include 'the isolation of the potential Nth Power from rewards and the provision of benefits for those who renounce nuclear capability.'

However, there seems to be the assumption throughout the book that the rest of the world is happy about American and Russian nuclear weapons and that the existing bipolar nuclear monopoly is reasonable and widely approved. While such a situation would be preferable to the impending danger of the dispersion of nuclear weapons, it is doubtful if world public opinion would be satisfied with the retention of the bipolar nuclear monopoly as a permanent feature of international life. For, the acceptance of this situation implies a prior acceptance of the assumption that ideological orientation is the chief motive force in international relations.

The latest book on the subject is *A World of Nuclear Powers?*, edited by Alastair Buchan. It is based on an International Assembly on Nuclear Weapons seminar, sponsored by the Canadian Institute of International Affairs, the Institute for Strategic Studies, the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, and the American Assembly, and held at Ontario in June 1966. This book represents a distilled product of qualified observers and includes an excellent introduction by the editor. The merit of this collection of essays lies in the fact that views are presented for four nations at different stages of the evolution of the debate on nuclear weapons. Karl Birnbaum writes about the debate in Sweden, whereas Kei Wakaizumi presents a dispassionate account of the nuclear debate in Japan. The dialogue on nuclear weapons in India is examined by Sisir Gupta in a balanced and objective tone, even though Gupta is otherwise known for his pro-bomb views. The essays that deserve special mention are 'Nuclear Proliferation and World Politics' by Stanley Hoffmann and 'Inhibition Through Policy: The Role of the Non-Nuclear Powers' by Urs Schwarzs. These two essays examine the issue of proliferation in the general context of world politics and draw theoretical postulates relevant both to the present and the future.

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
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*Seminar issues on 'The Bomb', 'India's Defence Pattern', 'We and the World', are highly relevant to problems of 'Asian Security'.



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Communications

YOUR July issue of *Seminar* is doubtless useful and perceptive in so far as it delineates the infra-structure of power politics and unfolds the power patterns involved therein. The question of discerning the trends and tendencies unleashed by the great electoral revolution of February has assumed significance partly due to a new style of politics which has emerged with the burial of one party dominance. The precarious relationships forged by non-Congress States with the Centre is a problem pregnant with different possibilities. This is a phenomenon worth examining, but I found it completely missing in your journal. Perhaps, 'the problem' has not been stated adequately. At least, the general implications of the erosion of the political structure as a consequence of the increasing consolidation of anti-Congress forces on the one hand and a somewhat distinct bipolarization of politics into Right and Left on the other, should have prefaced the discussion. I don't know why it has been capsuled?

Then, the choice of States for study seems rather arbitrary if not illogical. For, although there are characteristic distinctions which impart an identity to each State pattern, no scheme of selection could have justifiably omitted Madras, Orissa and Kerala. The picture of the patterns looks agonizingly incomplete. This is not to say that it does not give what it is meant to give, entirely.

In the States that it deals with, there is every ground for satisfaction: only if it could have provided for more.

While Dr. Iqbal Narain's study on Rajasthan is both analytical and discursive, Professor Dustur's is an exceedingly generalized attempt on Maharashtra. Bashiruddin Ahmed has highlighted the most intricate developments in U.P.'s electoral behaviour, Surinder Suri has, more or less, strayed into irrelevancies. The rest of the pieces belong to the usual run of academics and impart technical sort of information. On the whole, some ground has, after all, been covered which is itself a compensation.

M. M. SANKHDHER

New Delhi.

IN the July issue of *Seminar*, the features by different writers on the problems of power patterns attracted the attention of most of the readers. Miss Aloo J. Dastur in her paper on politics in Maharashtra has covered the problem in its depth and breadth. The conflicting interests between the M.P.C.C. and the B.P.C.C. made her presume that Chavan and S. K. Patil are the two rival leaders in Maharashtra politics. Although her observation is largely true, politics in Maharashtra have also been greatly influenced by the rift prevailing between the Desai

and the Naik group. Even Naik's own region, Vidarbha, is also not immune from this. Supporters of S. K. Patil in Bombay identify themselves with Desai. He, unlike V. P. Naik, has been able to maintain his group in the party outside Bombay on his own. It is this rift which may break the backbone of the Congress in Maharashtra in some years to come.

Zilla Parishads play a very vital role in the politics of Maharashtra and so also do the Zilla Parishad elections. The strategy of the Congress in forging ties with the R.P.I. group in contesting Zilla Parishad elections has not served the purpose of the party fully, but at the same time has helped the Congress by creating two groups within the R.P.I.

In rural Maharashtra, where political awareness reached the people before government's literacy drive could affect them, there is a struggle for power between the old guard and the new guard. Although there is general dissatisfaction lingering in the minds of Congressmen, the pendulum of power is safely on the side of the Congress and hence less instances of defections are witnessed. But the anger of the dissidents in the Congress may turn into a flame any time.

The writer has rightly taken up the Shiv-Sena movement, but has overestimated its role in Maharashtra politics. This movement, started by a fanatic editor of a Marathi weekly, was to oust South Indians from the positions they are occupying in the private firms in Bombay. All of a sudden, a few months before the general elections, it drifted into the political scene at the instance of S. K. Patil. But, except for a few cases of manhandling, the Shiv-Sena has not been able to do much.

In Thana and Kalyan where Menon failed to get a majority, are the newly added Assembly constituencies in the North East Bombay Parliamentary constituency. These are the two constituencies where Menon or the late Jawaharlal Nehru never went for campaigning in the last three general elections. The meetings addressed by Chavan helped Barve to gain a lead in these constituencies. In the bye-election, the emotional element persuaded the voters at large, but still the Shiv-Sena was allotted a minor role. The North East Bombay election in fact became a contest between the Sampurna Maharashtra Samiti and the Shiv-Sena—and not between Menon and Barve or Mrs. Sapre. The war of wall posters in this constituency is enough to prove that it was a clash between the white guards and the red guards. If the activities of the Shiv-Sena are not checked in time, it may

jaundice Maharashtra politics and the administration in due course.

Anil Bhatt's analysis of the politics in Gujarat needs appreciation except for a few statements made by him. If the Swatantra Party in Gujarat was surprised by its defeat, the D.M.K. was surprised by its victory, seems to be a baseless statement as the D.M.K. was sure to wield power in the State for the following reasons: (1) The attitude of Kamaraj on the language problem; (2) Alliance amongst opposition parties; (3) Entrance of the post-independence generation in the political life. On the other hand, the Swatantra Party in Gujarat, though apparently making an expression of hope was doubtful of taking over the administration of the State. The differences of opinion between Daya Bhai Patel and H. M. Patel and their different assessment of the pre-election situation in the State led the Swatantra Party to occupy the opposition benches.

The paper on politics in Bihar by Ramashray Roy is a true representation of how the caste factor can be mobilised by the party in power to maintain one party dominance. The intra-party factions combined with the grievances of the people on the economic front made them choose the Left side of the road. This factor was superbly taken up by the writer with some reservations due to the limitation of space. Economic dissatisfaction is a temporary phase in Bihar politics which may succeed in casting a shadow on the voting behaviour of the people of Bihar but will not be able to hold the strings of politics for long. The timely integration of the groups prevalent in the Congress and the chances of the coalition of the Congress with parties other than the Left may enable her (Congress) to make a safe come back to power in the next general election.

Unlike Roy's and Miss Dastur's papers, the paper of Bashiruddin Ahmed on Uttar Pradesh politics is tragically only full of data. To call it a mere reproduction of data will not be a matter of exaggeration. It seems that the writer has taken the least pains in critically analysing the facts or perhaps he believes in presenting facts with figures rather than with words. Ultimately, in the writer's experiment with figures, the paper has turned into a government publication and ceased to remain a problem-oriented study on power politics.

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
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
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97

BOOKS

a symposium on the
main facet of the
educational problem

symposium participants

THE PROBLEM

A short statement

THE FACTS

Om Prakash, publisher and bookseller,
'Radha Krishna Prakashan'

A NATIONAL ATTITUDE

P. S. Jayasinghe, publisher,
'Asia Publishing House'

GOVERNMENT POLICY

R. J. Taraporevala,
publisher and bookseller

IMPORT PRACTICES

B. S. Kesavan, Director of the
Indian National Scientific Documentation
Centre and **A. S. Raizada**, scientist, also
working in INSDOC

DISTRIBUTION

D. N. Malhotra, publisher and bookseller,
'Hind Pocket Books'

NEED OF THE TIMES

Mulk Raj Anand, well known
writer and Chairman, Lalit
Kala Akademi

PROBLEM OF SUBSIDY

B. V. Keskar, Chairman,
National Book Trust

COVER

Designed by Dilip Chowdhury

The problem

The debate on education and the language for education is sweeping the country today. Whichever way you look at the problem, books and their availability should become the pivot of the debate. And books do not grow on trees just as authors do not suddenly fall from the heavens like fertilising rain and no magic wand can defy the logistics of paper availability and printing press capacity. Politicians can legislate education in regional languages but can students, however eager and willing, be taught without books? And can books be written in languages which, barring the few major ones, are in no position at the moment to serve the complex and precise needs of modern science and technology, of modern economics and politics? These are facets of a problem which cannot be slurred over even though a beginning has to be made somewhere.

Language is the sensitive soul of books. It has its own laws of development, laws which can be helped forward but not mutilated in the interests of political expediency. Mutilation will make the books which feed the mind of man barren: man will become a moron. No movement forward is possible if the cart is put before the horse. We know this to our cost. One has just to open a school textbook to realise with horror the quality of the raw material which we are stuffing into the mind of India. And, so, the battle for meaningful books in our many languages must be joined in the spirit of a crusade. Books and more books alone can salvage the thinking process. In this issue an attempt is made to provide one facet of the great debate now joined.

The facts

OM PRAKASH

RELIABLE and detailed statistics of book production are not collected and made readily available in India. Figures published by the Government of India, National Library, Calcutta, are scant and do not tally with those put out by UNESCO. According to UNESCO a total of 13,128¹ titles (world production: 408,000) were published in 1964 in India; this figure, according to the National Library, is 25,870² for that calendar year. This discrepancy is all the more confusing as it is the National Library which is the source of supplying statistics to UNESCO.

Reasons for this confusion, though, can be explained and are manifold. UNESCO defines a book as 'a non-periodical printed publication of at least 49 pages, exclusive of the cover pages.'³ The National Library, on the other hand, would count in all 'publications having some subject value and containing about sixteen pages.'⁴ While forwarding figures to UNESCO, the National Library discards pamphlets and ephemeral publications and, as UNESCO wants

subject-wise statistics—its emphasis being on the subject value of publications recorded—includes only those which, according to its judgment, possess enough subject value.⁵ It is obvious that out of the 25,870 books proclaimed by the National Library as having been published in 1964, about half were only pamphlets, or not of enough value to be intimated to UNESCO.

Besides, there is no current recording by the National Library of the number of copies of each title published so as to ascertain the total volume of books published in India in any particular year. If these figures were available, they would show that we do not only publish an insignificant number of titles per year, but the editions per title are equally low in comparison to the world's average of 10,000 copies in 1952 and 13,000 in 1963.

India's population was about one-seventh of the world's in 1964; its share in the production of books came to 1 in 31. The number of titles published per million of inhabitants in the world was 127 that year. This number was 48 per million for Asia, but for India it worked out at less than 27 titles,⁶

1. *Statistical Yearbook*, 1965. Unesco., Paris. p. 436

2. Letter of the Deputy Librarian, Government of India, National Library, Calcutta. Ref: F. 83-Acq-D. 1524 of June 1, 1967.

3. *Statistical Yearbook*, 1956. Unesco., Paris. p. 426.

4. Letter of the Deputy Librarian, National Library, referred to above.

5. Ibid.

6. Estimates of India's population in 1964: 471, 624 m. Unesco *Statistical Yearbook*, 1965.

or 1 book for about 36,000 of its people.

Prevailing Situation

This indeed is a regrettable state of affairs for an ancient country, proud of its traditional erudition and its attempts to modernise itself in the last two decades, as well as calling itself a 'welfare State' and wedded to democracy and socialism. Our percentage of illiteracy around the 1960s was 72.2, having declined from 80.7 in the 1950s, but during this decade the number of illiterates actually increased from about 174 million to 187 million,⁷ and is still increasing due to the uncontrolled spurt in population. Public expenditure on education in 1960 was 2.4 per cent⁸ of the national income while it was 5.5 per cent in the same year in Japan. Consumption of printing and writing paper was 0.7 kg. per capita in India in 1964⁹ (less than half of the Asian average of 1.5 kg.) and bore no comparison to the consumption of 12.9 kg. per capita in Japan.

Causes for this appalling gap between the Indian situation and the situation prevailing in the advanced countries of the world are not far to seek. Customary dependence on the spoken word in preference to the printed word is a built-in hindrance to the wide use of books. The removal of the blot of illiteracy is a goal difficult to achieve and requires tremendous budgetary allocation which this country can hardly manage. Reading habits are unformed; to inculcate them would need all the drive and the harnessing of powerful mass media that is possible. There is also the problem created by the multiplicity of languages; people in rural areas converse in dialects in which few books are published; most of the urban people, too, use dialects in their homes in preference to the constitutionally accepted, sophisticated urban languages. The average purchasing power of the people is low, based on a per capita income of Rs. 34.00 per month, and the vast majority con-

tinues to struggle for bare existence.

The library movement, the most important support for the book industry in any country, can be said to be in its very initial stages in India; Japan, with about one-fifth of India's population, had 752 university libraries with 39 million volumes (1964) as against India's 59 with 5.6 million (1960).¹⁰ The U.S.A. had, for a comparison, 2132 similar libraries (1964) with 228 million volumes for a population about 40 per cent of ours. One more important cause of the torpid book industry in India is the scorn and apathy in which the publishing community is held; it is a much maligned community and its task made ever more difficult because of this attitude. Lack of a brisk market for books has kept it at a low level of economic activity and failed to attract any particular capital or talent to it.

It has been asserted that most of the new literates in India backslide into illiteracy because of the lack of proper follow-up printed material; printed material is not purchased because it cannot be afforded; no wide net-work of active libraries exists which can make this material available to intending readers. Consequently, fewer books get published. The initiative to break this vicious circle lies with the government but this has not made itself apparent in policies clearly 'enunciated or actions vigorously pursued.

Cultural Inertia

World production of books increased from 399,000 in 1963 to 408,000 in 1964; in India, according to UNESCO, it fell from 18,236 to 13,128 in these years. According to figures released by the National Library, which, as stated above, are not compiled in accordance with international standards and definitions for comparable purposes, production fell from 29,373 in 1965 to 19,551¹¹ in 1966—or a dec-

line of between 28 per cent to 33 per cent. Book publishing languishes in India like no other industry, but lack of vitality in this field is symptomatic of a depressing cultural inertia; it is also a pointer to the grave and injurious dearth of functional books and the resulting lack of suitable tools for education.

Where the 'written culture' of today is concerned, India thus appears to be a primitive country. The book-gap is as frightening here as anywhere else in the literary low-pressure zones of Asia, Africa and Latin America. Books have become the medium of cultural communication today—the 'very stuff'¹² of culture—but we do not produce them in comparable quantity and quality to the materially and culturally advanced countries of the East or West.

Education

We do not even produce enough of functional books, essential instruments for education at all levels. It has been estimated that it was the school and technical books which accounted for 90 per cent of the book consumption in the economically developing countries.¹³ India has a great paucity of books required at college level education in the humanities, the sciences or in teacher-training and in vocational and technical fields. The number of students at the first, second and third levels of education and the second level of vocational education and teacher-training in India rose, according to UNESCO, from 24 million in 1950 to 46 million in 1960, showing a growth of about 91 per cent. Book production has gravely failed to keep in step with the requirements of this growth.

India has about a century-old tradition, since the days of British rule and the organisation of the modern school system, of textbook publishing. Besides, there has been a long history of publishing

7. Ibid, p. 41.

8. Ibid, p. 354.

9. Ibid, p. 555.

10. Ibid. p. 402.

11. Figures specially supplied, according to the calendar year, by the National Library, Calcutta, vide their letter No. F. 83-Acq-D. 1524 of June 1, 1967.

12. Prof. Robert Escarpit in *The Book Revolution*.

13. Conference on the Role of Books in Social and Economic Development, Washington, 1964, quoted by Prof. Robert Escarpit.

religious texts to meet the requirements of the literate minority or those who would revere them as items of worship along with idols. But the production of books, for general and specialised fields of education and for cultural pursuits in numbers and varieties considered essential, can at the most be said to have just commenced.

In English

What percentage in India which speaks and reads English as its mother tongue can find satisfaction of cultural urges and expression in books published in that language? And, yet, ever since the attainment of independence, book publishing in English is the most active as compared to publishing in the major Indian languages. Out of the 13,128 titles published in 1964, 6044 or about 46 per cent were published in English.¹⁴ According to calculations made on the basis of figures supplied by the National Library, the share of publishing in English in comparison to publishing in other major languages has been as follows over the last decade:

Year	English	Hindi	Gujarati	Bengali	Marathi	Tamil	Telugu	Others
1957	40.8%	17.5%	4.9%	7.2%	5.4%	6.7%	4.9%	12.6%
1966	51.2%	12.8%	5.6%	5.8%	8.6%	3.3%	2.5%	10.2%

The only conclusion is that cultural expression through the Indian languages is dormant, has not been encouraged since we became politically independent or, rather the opposite, is being continually discouraged, in effect, through the socio-political and economic domination of the scant English-speaking minority in India. Or, it can be said that it is this minority which is interested in books; for other language groups, books do not play much of a role in their cultural or educational life.

Interesting questions are further raised if we analyse the number of titles published in the major languages of the country. As we noted, 127 titles were published for every million of the world's population in 1964, the Asian average

being 48 and India's 27. Excluding English-language publications, this figure, according to the statistics for 1964 from UNESCO sources, works out as follows, per million of people speaking different languages:¹⁵

Marathi	31.2
Gujarati	29.2
Bengali	24.7
Malayalam	21.7
Punjabi	13.5
Tamil	12.6
Telugu	12.3
Hindi	9.6
Kannada	8.8

This would show that the production of books for every million of persons does not reach the Asian average in any Indian language and, in fact, is much less. It is notably less in Hindi, the official language of the country besides English. The only other languages at the still lower rungs of the ladder are Urdu (6.5 titles per m. of Urdu-speaking persons), Oriya (6.1 titles) and Assamese (1.1 titles). Not a single title was published in Kashmiri in 1964.

In Hindi

Book publishing activity in the Hindi-speaking areas, comprising some 40 per cent of the land and population of the country, is at an extremely low pitch. It is no solace if some other areas, like those of Mysore, Orissa, Assam and Jammu and Kashmir, present a more dismal picture. This backwardness in a cultural field like book publishing is a serious lag for the progress of the whole country. Lack of books in appropriate numbers and in a variety of subjects does

not only denote a cultural deficiency, it also speaks ill of the socio-economic and technological situation of the area.

Book publishing in languages other than Hindi also continues to be cramped, failing to show progressive trends. The Calcutta weekly, *Desh*, recently gathered statistics about books published in Bengali, showing a decline of some 40 per cent in 1966-67 compared to publications in 1965-66 (a little above 1000 titles as against 1422 in the previous year).¹⁶ Despite the organised activities of the Sahitya Pravarthaka Cooperative Society, Ltd., of Kottayam, Kerala, and the fact that their sales increased from Rs. 1,35,218 in 1952-53 to Rs. 6,31,790 in 1963-64,¹⁷ production of books in Malayalam, according to the National Library, Calcutta, did not show any growth, having remained as follows over the last eleven years, from 1956 to 1966: 1245, 829, 877, 746, 816, 796, 587, 531, 648, 603 and 563.

Analysis of Subjects

We have noted the extremely inadequate quantity of books published in India; let us now examine the kind of books that get published. In the absence of a subject-wise analysis of books published, analysis is available (latest for 1964), according to the universal decimal classification, of the quantity of titles in different subjects published in all the languages of the country combined:

Generalities	1113
Philosophy	228
Religion	952
Social Sciences	4524
Philology	151
Pure Sciences	304
Applied Sciences	1121
Arts	153
Literature	2775
Geography/History	749
Unspecified	1058

13128

As would be seen, there is a preponderance of books in the social

15. India's population in 1964 has been estimated to be about 472 million (Unesco), an increase of about 7.5% over the 1961 figure of 439 million. To arrive at the above analysis, a 7.5% increase has been calculated over the number speaking different languages according to the 1961 census. The Hindi speaking population is the total of those who speak Hindi, Bihari, Bhojpuri, Rajasthani and Pahari, or a total of about 176 million in 1964.

14. *Statistical Year Book*, Unesco., Paris. 1965. p. 448.

16. *Monthly News Bulletin*, Sahitya Akademi, New Delhi. June 67.

17. *A Cooperative of Writers*, issued by Sahitya Pravarthaka C.S. Ltd., Kottayam. March, 1965.

sciences which, obviously, belong to the educational field. Imbalance in the modern technological world of today continues to be on the side of books on religion while books on pure and applied sciences continue to be ruefully neglected. Figures given above for books on generalities (reference works and the like) are confusing; no country in the world publishes such a high proportion of reference books. Subject-wise analysis of titles published in some countries of the world, as a percentage of the total, is given below :

<i>Generalities</i>	<i>India</i>	<i>Japan</i>	<i>U.K.</i>	<i>U.S.A.</i>
	8.5	2.0	1.2	1.9
<i>Philosophy</i>	1.8	2.9	2.2	2.7
<i>Religion</i>	7.3	1.6	6.0	6.7
<i>Social Sciences</i>	34.5	16.1	15.6	17.6
<i>Philology</i>	1.1	6.5	2.3	2.9
<i>Pure Sciences</i>	2.3	7.3	10.2	10.3
<i>Applied Sciences</i>	8.5	14.4	16.5	12.5
<i>Arts</i>	1.1	7.3	6.4	6.3
<i>Literature</i>	21.2	28.2	28.0	25.7
<i>Geography/History</i>	5.7	7.6	10.8	13.1
<i>Unspecified</i>	8.0	5.3

A comparison based on the above table will reveal India's great shortage in books on pure and applied sciences, and the need to cut the high proportion of titles on the social sciences and religion. The figure of an 8.5 per cent production in the applied sciences is misleading; generally books in the regional languages on this subject lack authenticity. No country publishes four times as many books on applied science as against the books on pure science. The erratic nature of these figures is clear when we find that while the number of titles in pure sciences has remained more or less stationary, the number of titles in applied sciences has inexplicably varied :¹⁸

<i>Year</i>	<i>Pure Sciences</i>	<i>Applied Sciences</i>
1961	426	67
1962	506	853
1963	514	1775
1964	304	1121

Apparently, there is need for much greater scrutiny and vigi-

lance in the classification of titles, and their rejection if they are not worthy of inclusion in the officially compiled lists.

It is not the purpose of this article to attempt to locate the causes of such a state of affairs in the field of publishing in India today. Despite the serious and basic impediments to the wide use of books, such as the high percentage of illiteracy and low purchasing power, the book situation can improve substantially if the Indian society and the authorities realise

the importance which attaches to books due to cultural and technological reasons. They should provide for the establishment and maintenance of a comprehensive net-work of libraries, the main support of the book industry anywhere, and a smooth mechanism for books to be procured and displayed on their shelves. Our authors have also to create a greater faith in the books published in our languages.

The book industry is seriously starved for capital; no private or public sources of credit are open to it. The main activity capable of bringing in profits to the industry is textbook publishing, involving large numbers, which the Union and State Governments have more or less nationalised all over the country. It is debatable if and to what extent nationalisation has benefited education or the student community; it has certainly left the publishing community high and dry, and an outline of the consequences can be seen above.

¹⁸. *Statistical Yearbook*, Unesco, Paris, 1965. p. 438.

A national attitude

P. S. JAYASINGHE

THE path of the book publisher in India bristles with problems, but the aspect to which I wish to devote this article is the discrimination meted out to the book publishing industry by the Government of India. To begin with, the Indian Copyright Act discriminates against Indian publishers and Indian authors. Article 31 of the Act defines an Indian work, and, while an

Indian work is subject to certain restrictions, all other works are dealt with separately and with considerable latitude.

While modern Indian scholarship has now come of age and can hold its own against the best from any country, Indian publishing has had to battle against enormous odds. The cost of labour and

materials has shot up during the last two decades and is on the increase even today. Besides, the actual cost of materials themselves, government duties and taxes are very heavy. For example, on paper alone an excise duty of approximately 24 per cent of the value of the paper is being levied. The publisher, therefore, has to price his books right out of the reach of the potential buyer, even if he has merely to recover his cost of production, let alone make a decent profit.

Present Position

The potential buyer of books in India is still a rare species. If our statistics are to be depended upon, India's population is now put at 510.2 million. Of these it is said that 24 per cent are literate. While 17 languages are officially recognised by the Constitution, we have no statistics available either from governmental or other sources about the percentage of literates in each individual language. Be that as it may, the educated still form an insignificant minority and, even among these, persons with the wherewithal to buy books are fewer in number. The position of the Indian publisher, then, who has to meet the fantastic rise in the costs of production and yet price his books within reach of the potential buyer, can well be imagined. Is it, therefore, surprising that a number of publishers have almost given up this pioneering and elevating task of promoting Indian publishing?

Many of them have entered into agreements with foreign publishers to reprint, with a generous subsidy, well-known and, therefore, 'safe' books originally published abroad. This is most pernicious to the development of the Indian publishing industry. The generous subsidy enables these publishers to price these books so low that the Indian publisher who has to keep himself afloat entirely on his own and yet compete with these subsidized books, is elbowed out.

It is here that the government can play a very useful role in

organising the industry along the right lines. Its efforts for the most part have been halting and, in some instances, misguided. In the first place, a definite distinction should be made between the publisher and the bookseller. In India we have the curious spectacle of every bookseller calling himself a publisher! Very often in the eyes of the government a bookseller is considered and even classified as a publisher merely because he styles himself so. Nothing could be more dangerous to the publishing industry than this most arbitrary classification. A suitable subsidy should be granted to the deserving publishers for the publication of textbooks initially so that these publishers could compete at the same level with imported books without being bothered about the problem of returns. The government could also enable the setting up of good presses and binderies on easy credit terms and easy import of material and machines. These would go a long way in removing the ills that the Indian publishing industry suffers from.

Publishing in India today, is an extremely hazardous business depending as it does on such diverse elements as the scholarship potential, the general educational level of the people and also the economic level of the book-reading community. In order that the publishing industry be organised on sound lines, it is necessary not merely to raise the economic and educational standards of the people but also to take positive steps to organise and further a network of public libraries throughout the country. Even more than this, it is urgent that the present practice of discrimination against Indian books published by Indian publishers be replaced by one of active cooperation and inducement to such publishers.

Unequal Terms

There was a time in the early years of our independence, when American publishers were satisfied with the usual 15 per cent royalty

on the Indian published price of their books. But the Americans are an ingenious people. They have sought to convert a portion of the non-convertible PL 480 funds in India by paying the American publishers royalties in U.S. dollars. This the Government of India has accepted without even obtaining the views of the independent Indian publishing industry and without caring to examine the overall damage that this would cause to Indian publishing. All this in the name of, providing a cheap reprint for the Indian student!

Under the PL 480 programme, standard American works are reprinted and made available in India at approximately one-third the original U.S. price. On a close examination of the economics of this programme, one realises that this is no act of selfless service on the part of the U.S. publisher. He is more than amply compensated for by his efforts in this country. On the other hand, it delivers a crippling blow to the Indian publisher, who refuses to be tempted by the blandishments of foreign governments and publishers to become mere reprint houses for their books and who insists on performing a more exalted task—that of presenting and promoting the finest in Indian thought and scholarship. He has to compete on grossly unequal terms with the foreign publisher whose vast resources are more than amply augmented by generous subsidies from his own government.

Government Assistance

While the patronage extended by our government to these programmes is insulting enough to our intellectuals and scholars and damaging enough to the efforts of the national publisher, the least that could be done was to extend the same support to the national publishing industry as that given by foreign governments to their respective publishers' efforts in this country. It is only then that the prices of Indian books could be reduced to a level comparable to that of the subsidised foreign books. Several Indian books have been recommended as textbooks

and reference books by the recognised Indian universities. Obviously, recommendation as a textbook or reference book by the Board of Studies of any recognised Indian university should be taken as sufficient criterion of a book's worth. The Government of India could provide generous assistance to the publishers of these books so as to make them available to the academic community at a far cheaper price than would be possible if the publishers were to do it on their own.

Considering the level of literacy, let alone education, in the country today and the lack of book-buying potential among the educated few, it need hardly be stressed that the national publisher could not exist as an economically viable unit if he were to devote himself entirely to the publication of general books. He has to break into textbook publishing as his 'bread and butter' line. It is recommendation (both official and non-official) of his textbooks in schools, colleges, universities and, consequently, the possibility of multiple sales, that make his venture a financially stable one. It is only after he has established himself thus that he can step into the extremely uncertain and hazardous terrain of general publishing. It should, therefore, not be difficult to appreciate the hardships that an independent Indian publisher is put to when the government of his country actively encourages the PL 480 programme which is essentially calculated to cut his life-line.

Incentives

Another important corollary of India's patronage of the PL 480 programme is its impact on Indian scholarship. The abundant and inexpensive availability of standard foreign textbooks will result in the teaching community in India losing its incentive to write worthwhile textbooks and reference books which they are certainly capable of. Thus, we find at one end of the scale Indian scholars bringing out only highly specialised research publications in the shape of doctoral or post-doctoral theses, while, at the other, junior lecturers and even profes-

sors at some colleges indulging in writing cheap 'guides' which are 'hogged' by the general run of students. In fact, strange as it may seem, the most unseemly popularity of these 'guides' is itself an indication of the tremendous potentiality for worthy Indian textbooks, written with the special needs and aptitudes of the Indian student in view.

While some people have sought a way out of the present impasse in the field of textbook publishing in the form of translations of the better-known foreign books into Indian languages, this will just succeed in leading us up a blind alley. The point at issue is the stimulation of Indian thought and scholarship. This is not likely to take place if any move for a large-scale translation programme gains ground. For a country's intellectual progress to be measured in real, tangible terms, what counts is the amount and worth of original work done in the country. While borrowed ideas adapted to suit local conditions have their value, it is of the utmost importance that original work be done in the country. This effort at original work will be stifled by foreign subsidised book programmes and translation programmes.

Language Policy

The adoption of the regional language as the official language in various States and the Education Minister's recent announcement in Parliament that it had been decided that the regional language would be the medium of instruction at universities up to the highest level and even in the field of professional education, augurs very badly for a publisher of national status. Amid the vivisection or balkanization of the country that will be the ultimate result of the short-sighted language policy of the government, it is the national language which will be the only cohesive force in this country, be it English or any other language. With regional languages being accepted as the medium of instruction, the publishers will have to set up a costly and time-consuming translating apparatus if they have to sell their books all

over the country. I therefore feel that it is most undesirable that the government should legislate so frequently and indiscriminately on languages. The growth of a language is best left to itself and its gifted users. Any artificial attempt to bolster up its weaknesses or speed up its growth is bound to fail.

Possible Measures

The best ways of helping the Indian publishing industry are the establishment of a Book Development Board, a Book Finance Corporation and a proper textbook subsidy scheme. The total investment required for these important institutions and schemes would not exceed Rs. 10 crores a year, but this expenditure is well worthwhile if India is to progress intellectually and if its publishing industry is to help in the creation of an Indian personality. The establishment of a Book Development Board is certainly a welcome move, but it should not be regarded as anything more than what it is, namely, a first step towards organising and rehabilitating the publishing industry. The Book Development Board is merely an advisory unit under the Ministry of Education. I would suggest that a Book Development Council should be established as soon as possible as a follow-up measure. The Council should, unlike the Board, be an independent body outside the ambit of governmental control. Its membership should largely be non-official comprising primarily Indian publishing interests. The officials represented on the Council should merely act as a liaison between the government and the Council in the interests of Indian publishing and scholarship.

In addition, if the government vigorously pursues its announced policy of encouraging the setting up of book production plants by granting the necessary licences to publishers interested in setting up such plants and who have exported their publications on a scale adequate to justify the granting of such licences, it would not be difficult for the industry to meet the growing textbook needs

of the country over the next fifteen years or so.

At present, because of many restrictions, the printing industry is able to offer very little by way of variety in type faces—both display and text. These needs will not be met if the existing printing industry is depended upon, as there is a growing demand on the services this industry can offer for non-book printing which is often more profitable and gives quicker returns than book printing. Hence, special encouragement will have to be given to those printing plants that concentrate on the printing of books.

My experience is that there is a substantial market for Indian books abroad, not only in English-speaking areas but also in continental Europe, including Eastern Europe and Russia, and in Japan and other non-English-speaking countries of Asia as well as Africa and the South American continent. However, the exploration and exploitation of these markets is difficult, time-consuming and expensive and unless this is understood by the government authorities and the necessary facilities by way of foreign exchange, etc., are provided for the necessary spade-work and for participating in international book fairs, etc., it will be extremely difficult for Indian books to establish themselves abroad. In this connection, we must add that while valuable foreign exchange can be earned on a limited scale through the export of books, it is necessary to appreciate that these exports have a value far beyond their commercial value as it is Indian books which will convey to the rest of the world the achievements of Indian scholarship and which will project the Indian image abroad. While periodical material and publicity hand-outs are extremely valuable, their effects, though perhaps wide, are rather thinly spread. Books, particularly scholarly and academic works and works of art and literature make a much deeper impact on vital, influential sections of opinion abroad.

Government policy

R. J. TARAPOREVALA

THIS article surveys major aspects of the policy of the Government of India in relation to the book publishing industry and suggests improvements to it. It primarily refers to the publishing industry producing textbooks and general books in the English language in India.

The recent formation of the National Book Development Board by the Government of India is the first official step taken to develop the book publishing industry. Until the formation of the Board, there was no statutory body or development council in which the problems of the industry and government's policies towards it could be discussed and solved. During the last 20 years, since the country achieved independence, the book publishing industry has been neglected by the government and has therefore remained in its very early stage of infancy. Even today there are less than six major Indian firms engaged in the book publishing industry in India on a large scale.

In assessing the problems of the industry it is necessary to stress that the industry had to face a continuous flow of imports and the structure of its costs was inflated by indirect taxation. Hence, it was put at a handicap in facing competition from British,

American and Japanese publishers who freely exported their books to India. The costs of production of books in foreign countries are much lower than the costs of production of books in India. Paper, strawboard, binding cloth and other raw materials used in book production cost between 20 per cent and 70 per cent more in India compared with their costs in Europe, the U.S.A. and Japan. Printing costs in India for book production are higher than such costs in foreign countries because the size of editions printed in India is small on account of the limited nature of the market. Further, printing costs are high because printing machinery has to be imported and bears the cost of freight and high import duties. Various raw materials used in the process of printing, like films and plates, also have to be imported and are subject to very high import duties.

Imports

Paper, strawboard, binding cloth, printing machinery, spare parts and other raw materials used for book production in India are all subjected by the Government of India to either import duties or local excise duties but imports of books are allowed to flow into India without payment of any duty or taxes. The Indian book publishing industry thus faces competition from foreign publishers who export their books to India duty-free whereas all the raw materials used for book production by Indian publishers are subject to indirect taxation which raises the costs of production of books in India to very high levels. These factors have retarded the growth of the Indian book publishing industry in the past and made the country largely dependent upon imports for its book requirements.

The import policy of the Government of India for books has fluctuated in the past entirely depending upon the availability of foreign exchange in the country. It has never been geared to afford either a measure of protection for the book publishing industry and to spur its development or to save

foreign exchange which was spent in importing trashy and undesirable types of literature and foreign editions of titles which had been reprinted in India. During the years 1961-1962, 1962-1963, 1963-1964 and 1964-1965 the import policy for books was so liberal that in effect unlimited imports were allowed. During these years the total value of import licences issued for books in each year was around Rs. 5 to Rs. 6 crores, whereas the actual imports effected averaged around Rs. 3 crores per year.

This indicates that a large number of import licences for books remained unutilised and the import licensing policy was so ridiculously liberal that it granted licences for exceeding the maximum value of imports which could be effected and sold in the Indian market. During 1965-1966, the acute shortage of foreign exchange faced by the country resulted in a temporary curb on the import licences issued for books, which dropped to around Rs. 1½ crores for the year. But, after the devaluation of the Indian rupee and the resumption of foreign aid, imports of books were again licensed in the former recklessly liberal fashion and for 1966-1967 import licences valued around Rs. 6 crores were issued. For the year 1967-1968 such an absurdly liberal policy for import of books has been announced that import licences of the total value of Rs. 10 crores may be issued under it during the year. The past import policy of the Government of India has been the major factor which retarded the growth of the book publishing industry in India and made the country pathetically dependent upon foreign imported books to meet its needs.

Unhealthy Effects

The past policy of allowing excessively liberal imports of books led to a number of unhealthy effects. First, it prevented the growth of the book publishing industry in India because it was very difficult for most Indian publishers to compete against their foreign rivals, who were free to dump vast quantities of books in

the Indian market and who enjoyed lower costs of production for the reasons outlined above.

Second, the import licensing policy resulted in the unhealthy growth of monopolies in the import trade. A study of the distribution of import licences issued in the past indicates that more than 50 per cent of the total value of import licences was controlled by three to four leading firms of importers. More than 80 per cent of the total value of import licences was controlled by around twelve of the largest importers. Only 20 per cent of the total value of licences was distributed amongst hundreds of importers or booksellers throughout the country. The growth of this monopolistic situation in relation to the import of books resulted in all sorts of abuses and undesirable effects which need to be curbed and which are outlined below.

Third, the import policy and the structure of the importing trade organised as a monopolistic or oligopolistic group resulted in the vast imports of lurid detective fiction, thrillers, comics and all sorts of undesirable and trashy literature. Indeed, it is estimated that more than half of the total imports of books was accounted for by such trash.

Monopoly Interests

Fourth, liberal import licensing also resulted in some British and foreign publishers not being keen or willing to license the reprinting of their books in India by Indian publishers. Instances are known where some of the large monopoly importers actually dissuaded foreign publishers from licensing independent Indian publishers to reprint their books in India. In some cases even the existing collaboration arrangements between Indian publishers and foreign publishers for reprinting foreign books in India were sabotaged by some monopolistic importers who urged foreign publishers to export their books to India and not allow them to be reprinted in India.

Fifth, some of the large monopoly importers in league with

some foreign publishers or jobbers even violated the copyrights held by Indian publishers and flooded the market with imports of cheap editions of titles which had been reprinted in India. For example, enormous quantities of Dale Carnegie's *How to Win Friends and Influence People* were illicitly imported into India in the American paper-back edition by one of the large importers, even though the title had been published by a leading Indian publisher who owned the copyright for it in India, merely because the American edition was slightly cheaper than the Indian edition and could therefore kill the sales of the latter in the Indian market.

Sixth, large sums of foreign exchange were wasted in the import of non-copyright material such as the classics, merely because the cost of producing them in India was higher than in the U.K. or the U.S.A. and their imports were allowed to flow into the country unfettered by any restrictions in the import policy.

Seventh, the large monopoly importers rigged up their profit margins by ruthlessly squeezing the discounts granted by them to small booksellers and in some cases by arranging for exclusive distribution rights within India under which other importers were not supplied essential books published by foreign publishers so that profit margins on such items could be kept at abnormally high levels. A careful investigation of the pricing structure of some of the large monopolistic importers would show that their profit margins were kept at artificially high levels because the import licensing policy was such that they could control the terms of sale and prices within the Indian market.

No Protection

The Government of India recognised books as an item of highest priority for allowing imports on the grounds that books were needed in the fields of education, research and knowledge. Yet, it steadfastly refused and failed to formulate any long term policy

for the development of the local industry and laid it open to fierce international competition by allowing free imports of books. Every other industry producing goods within India, is protected by the government by a ban on an import of its products or by a levy of stiff customs duties in cases where limited imports of the products are allowed.

But, in the case of the book industry, the government has even freely permitted the imports of books of which Indian editions were available within the country and allowed large sums of foreign exchange to be wasted annually on the imports of such books as well as on imports of an amount of trashy literature, detective novels, fiction, comics, etc. This wastage of foreign exchange in a country where imports of essential medicines and drugs are restricted causing hardship to millions of sick and ailing persons and various other essential commodities are not allowed to be imported, is strange and totally unjustified.

Curtailling Imports

If the book industry in India is to be developed over a period of time, the government must adopt a properly phased, long-term policy to reduce the import of books. It may be announced that every year the import licences for books will be reduced gradually until the total value of import licences for books comes to around Rs. 2 crores after, say, five years. In order to ensure that essential books required by colleges, schools and research institutions, scholars, etc., are imported it should be provided that no imports of books of a trashy nature such as detective fiction, thrillers, comics or of books which are reprinted in India or of books which can be reprinted in India, i.e., non-copyright literature such as the classics, will be allowed. In order to encourage foreign publishers to license the reprinting of books in India, the government should discourage the import of books which can be economically reprinted within the country, i.e., those titles for which there is a demand of at least 750 copies per year. It may therefore

be provided that not more than 100 copies of a title will be allowed to be imported by each licence holder.

In order to ensure an equitable distribution of import licences and to curb the undesirable growth of monopolies in the import trade in books, the government should impose a ceiling on the total value of import licences issued to one importer. It may be provided that no importer will be issued licences in excess of an amount equal to say 3 per cent or 5 per cent of the total foreign exchange allocated or sought to be released for the import of books. This would ensure that the gradual reduction in imports of books takes place primarily at the expense of the big monopolistic importers and that small booksellers who have groaned under the tyranny of these monopolists are not adversely affected to the same extent. Such changes would ensure that the import policy for books is related to the need for the growth of the local book publishing industry. The National Book Development Board has constituted a sub-committee to investigate and report on the import policy for books and it is hoped that this committee will soon carefully formulate a proper long-term import policy for books.

Copyright

During the last eighteen months, various sectors of the Indian book industry and trade have pressed the Government of India to either withdraw from the Berne Convention on copyright or to secure an amendment in the Berne Convention under which the copyright of foreign publishers and their authors will be restricted by the developing countries. Reprinting of foreign books will be allowed in India on a compulsory licensing basis against payment of small royalties and, in the case of educational, scientific and scholarly books, without payment of royalties. The pressure for such removal or restriction of copyright of foreigners in India has come from primarily two sources.

First, it has come from a number of Indian publishers who be-

cause of their poor quality of production and other reasons are unable to persuade foreign publishers to allow them to reprint their books in India. Second, some of the large monopolistic importers who act as agents or representatives of foreign publishers have also been in the vanguard of this movement because they hope to gain a direct benefit therefrom in so far as they expect that if foreign publishers are compulsorily forced to allow reprinting of their titles in India, they will be given the first option to reprint the books of the foreign publishers whom they represent in India.

I believe that any restriction on or abolition of copyright of foreigners in India will be an incorrect step. It will not be only unethical but also commercially unsound in the long run. It will have adverse repercussions upon exports of Indian books to various countries. It may also result in various abuses and problems within the trade. If the Government of India wishes to encourage foreign publishers to allow reprinting of their books in India, it can adopt other measures to secure this end. If a phased, long-term programme of reduction of book imports is announced clearly, it will surely tempt many foreign publishers to allow reprinting of their books in India.

Various other steps like freely allowing liberal remittance of royalties to foreign publishers and persuasive or voluntary measures to encourage the growth of reprinting of foreign books in India would be preferable to destroying or curtailing the copyright of foreigners within India. The Government of India should carefully consider such measures before taking any steps in relation to the Berne Convention or the Copyright Law in India.

Export Potential

The export potential for books is very substantial but largely unexploited. Up to June 1966, the Government of India had operated attractive Export Promotion Schemes for books under which exports of books were encouraged

and subsidized by the grant of certain import entitlements. The schemes were evolved and developed slowly over the years and a stage had been reached at which the continuation of the last scheme would have developed the export trade in books on a very large scale. Thus, exports of books had risen from around Rs. 65 lakhs in 1960-61 to around Rs. 1 crore by 1965-66. The export potential of books is estimated at around Rs. 3 crores per annum. However, after the devaluation of the rupee the Export Promotion Scheme for books was suddenly withdrawn causing a severe jolt to the industry and also causing substantial losses to many book publishers.

After June 1966, the government announced a scheme for import replenishment of speciality papers and other imported items required and used in book production linked with exports of books effected after 6th June, 1966. However, this scheme will only enable book publishers to replenish the raw materials which are used in the export of books. It will not compensate the industry for losses which are incurred in exporting books to foreign countries under conditions of fierce international competition.

Question of Subsidy

After the devaluation of the Indian rupee, the Export Advisory Committee for Books and Periodicals of the Board of Trade of the Ministry of Commerce carefully studied the question of the need for cash subsidy to be granted for the export of books. At a meeting held in Bombay on 2nd September, 1966, the Committee worked out the figures of cost of production, f.o.b. realisation and loss incurred on export of books. As a result of these calculations, the Committee recommended to the Government of India that a cash subsidy of 37½ per cent on the f.o.b. value of exports was necessary to spur the export of books from India.

The Government of India unfortunately did not accept the recommendations of the Committee

which were worked out in consultation with various officials who were connected with the Committee's work. It is ironical that although the Government of India agreed to give a cash subsidy of 10 per cent on the f.o.b. value of exports of various types of paper, calendars, playing cards, diaries, greeting cards and all sorts of luxury items made from paper, it decided not to give any cash subsidy against the export of books.

Change in Attitude

This harsh and unfair decision had an immediate impact on the export of books. According to a speech of the Chairman of the Chemical and Allied Products Export Promotion Council delivered in Bombay on 21st March 1967, the exports of books during the first ten months of the year ending in January 1967, amounted to only Rs. 59.9 lakhs against the corresponding figure for the same period of the previous year of Rs. 119.9 lakhs—a drastic fall of almost 50 per cent. It was also announced that a target for books and other printed materials exported for 1967-68 had been fixed at Rs. 239.40 lakhs, but it is difficult to see how even half of this target can be achieved without a substantial change in government policy.

The Government of India should encourage the export of books not only for commercial reasons but also for spreading knowledge of Indian conditions, Indian culture and various Indian topics in different parts of the world. Therefore, it should treat the case of books on a special basis considering the fact that even today it allows the imports of books to flow freely into the country and releases over Rs. 7 crores in foreign exchange for such imports per year. A cash subsidy of 37.5 per cent on the f.o.b. value of exports may appear to be high but it must be remembered that an outlay of Rs. 75 lakhs on such a subsidy will ensure an export of Rs. 2 crores of books, resulting in a tremendous impact on millions of minds around the world who may be made favourable and sympathetic towards India and be made aware

of the conditions, problems and progress of the country in an effective fashion by such exports. The Government of India has sanctioned cash subsidies of upto 20 per cent of the f.o.b. value of exports for many engineering items. Under the circumstances, if 20 per cent is the maximum subsidy it can sanction, it should at least sanction such a subsidy for books.

Priority Basis

The export of books may be treated on a special footing by the government just as the imports of books are allowed freely on a special and priority basis today. The export of books involves a very difficult marketing operation in so far as Indian books have to compete in fiercely competitive international markets and the selling of Indian books in Asia, Europe and America is a very difficult job. If the Government of India wants to encourage and build up a sizeable export trade for books produced in India, it is recommended that the following steps should be taken.

First, books should always be included as an item for export under various trade agreements and agreements to give long-term credits to countries signed by the Government of India. It is regrettable that in a recent agreement to give Rs. 10 crores long-term credit to Indonesia, the Government of India did not include books as one of the items which could be exported under the agreement although paper was included in the list of exportable items.

Second, book publishers should be allowed freely to advertise books without restrictions on the value of such advertising in the initial years in various foreign newspapers and journals. The Reserve Bank of India should be directed to allow, in the initial years, large scale advertising of Indian books even though sales in the initial years may not be substantial. A long range view must be taken that investment in sales promotion in the earlier years will yield results in subsequent years once the foreign markets get used

to the idea of Indian books being sold in them.

Third, the Reserve Bank of India should be asked to give permission to book publishers and their representatives to travel frequently in foreign markets to sell and introduce their books. Here, again, a long range view must be taken and it must be appreciated that books are not like other commodities which can be exported in bulk like textiles, jute or tea and books need specialised personal selling efforts to introduce them in international markets.

Fourth, the Government of India should advise the Reserve Bank of India on the importance of promoting exports of books on a top priority basis and issue instructions to the banking system through the Reserve Bank of India to give all possible assistance to provide finance for stimulating the export of books. If these steps are taken the export of books will soon cross Rs. 2 crores and may even exceed Rs. 3 crores per annum in the very near future.

Essential Industry

The Government of India has treated books as an item of the highest priority for allowing imports. But it has strangely not recognised book publishing as a priority industry for other purposes. The book publishing industry has to date been considered a non-priority industry. In India for some purposes book publishers have even not been classified as industrialists but have been wrongly treated on the same footing as ordinary traders. The National Book Development Board at its first meeting correctly recognised the problem and urged that the Government of India in its Ministries of Finance, Commerce, Industrial Development and through the Reserve Bank of India should recognise that books are different to every other commodity and that publishing should be regarded as an essential industry on its own and should be given the treatment of a priority industry. If this recommendation is accepted by government, various steps for the development of the book publish-

ing industry can be taken by it to spur its growth.

Book publishers are not given any priority treatment for the purposes of the Income-tax Act. Indeed, there is considerable litigation or dispute over whether book publishers should be treated as belonging to an industry or as traders for the purposes of the Income-tax Act. The National Book Development Board has recommended that the Government of India should add books as an item under the Fifth Schedule of the Income-tax Act, so that book publishing companies are given the treatment accorded to priority industries for the purposes of income-tax. The Board also recommended that the Government of India recognise that book publishers should be treated as manufacturers or producers of books for the purposes of the Income-tax Act irrespective of whether they print or bind their books themselves or get these processes performed by others. It is hoped that the Ministry of Finance will accept these recommendations of the National Book Development Board so that book publishing is given its due status as a priority industry for the purposes of taxation.

Import Licences

After the devaluation of the Indian rupee, the Government of India announced a list of priority industries which could get 'actual user' import licences for essential raw materials used in their production process. It is ironical that book publishers were not included in the list of priority industries for the purposes of import licensing and hence they continue to have problems in relation to the import of essential raw materials used for book production. It is indeed strange that whereas the imports of books are licensed freely and almost without restriction, book publishers in India are not freely given import licences to get the raw materials required for printing books in the country. It is therefore hoped that, acting on the recommendations of the National Book Development Board, the Ministry of Commerce of the

Government of India will include book publishing in its list of priority industries which are issued import licences for raw materials on actual users basis freely.

Financial Risk

The book publishing industry has also, to date not received any preference or encouragement in relation to its financial requirements. The financial problems of the industry stem not only from its peculiar characteristics, but also from lack of appreciation of its needs and the importance of its development by the government. Book publishing requires a very substantial investment to be made in the production of books. It takes a very long time before the entire edition of a book can be sold and the initial investment recouped with small profits. Further, the book publishing industry involves an enormous risk for if a book fails to sell on account of lack of public acceptance or changes in reading habits, its value is almost nil.

It is for these reasons that, internationally, the book publishing industry is considered the second most risky industry—the most risky industry being the film industry. Thus, whereas the expansion of the book publishing industry in India requires large amounts of finance, the commercial banks are naturally reluctant to lend monies against hypothecation of stocks of books because they cannot easily value the same. Indeed, it is ironical that banks can and do lend monies against printing machinery and paper relatively freely because they can ascertain their value, but they are reluctant to lend money against stocks of books the value of which may depreciate due to changes in reading habits and tastes.

The result of this factor is that the book publishing industry suffers from a very acute shortage of the finance required for its development and growth which are thus retarded. To overcome these difficulties, it is necessary that the government should recognise the importance of the industry, classify it as a priority industry and that the Reserve Bank of India should direct the commercial banks

to grant credit so far as possible to the book publishing industry. Under the present tight money conditions and credit restrictions, the Reserve Bank of India has issued a list of priority industries to which the banks can lend monies on a special or preferential basis but the book publishing industry is conspicuously absent in this list. This omission should be promptly rectified. The government should accept the recommendation of the National Book Development Board that book publishers be given specially favourable treatment as a priority industry by the banking system acting on directives to be issued by the Reserve Bank of India.

Providing Facilities

Further, since the book publishing industry by its very nature is very risky, the government should recognise that commercial banks may not be able fully to perform the function of financing the industry. The government has set up a Finance Corporation for financing the film industry. It should set up soon a Book Finance Corporation solely for the purpose of financing the book publishing industry within the country so as to ensure its growth and development.

In July 1966, the Ministry of Industry recognised book publishing (separately from printing or binding) as an industry eligible for loans and other financial facilities from government lending institutions like the Industrial Finance Corporation of India and the Industrial Credit and Investment Corporation of India, etc. It is hoped that, as per the recommendation of the National Book Development Board, the Ministry of Industry will grant book publishing the status of a priority industry.

The book publishing industry in India stands on the threshold of gigantic expansion, growth and development. It is confidently hoped that the Government of India will change its policies as suggested in this article in order to ensure the long-term progress of this essential industry.

Import practices

B.S. KESAVAN & A.S. RAIZADA

THERE are no absolute figures for book demand in India, yet the fact that our requirements of books and other reading material have multiplied in recent years is undoubted. The factors which have contributed to this are the literate population of our country and increase in educational, scientific, technical and industrial activity. The number of university students has grown from 3 lakhs in 1950 to 11 lakhs in 1966 (Fig. 1). The setting up of research laboratories by bodies

such as the CSIR, ICAR, ICMR, and the Ministry of Defence and Atomic Energy are examples of increased tempo in scientific research. With the advent of India's five-year plans, industrial activity both in the private and public sectors has had a tremendous fillip.

In order to sustain this increased pace of activity, the demand for non-fiction reading materials is becoming more and more pressing. The high cost of this type of material precludes individual enterprise and forces libraries to take a lead in meeting this demand. In this area, the requirements can be grouped as: (1) standard textbooks, (2) standard reference books, (3) research and technical periodicals. From the language point of view, our need for books and other reading material in the English language is predominant.

The quantitative and qualitative aspects of book production in India are best illustrated by giving the figures over a few years. In 1964, India produced about 13,000 books (including pamphlets) of which roughly 30 per cent accounted for books in the social sciences, 16 per cent in literature, 10 per cent in the generalities and 16 per cent in

GROWTH OF UNIVERSITY EDUCATION
(NO. OF STUDENTS)




FIG. 1

philosophy, the arts, religion and philology. Book production in the pure and applied sciences accounted for only 9 per cent. Further, even in this meagre figure of 9 per cent, more than half were produced in English.

Standard books and textbooks form a major portion of this output, understandably so, since there is a ready-made demand from schools and colleges. Reference books are far too few. Most of the standard books in science that are brought out in India are through agencies of scientific organisations, universities and a few leading publishers. These are very few in number, and do not satisfy our needs at the university and at the research level.¹ The figures for the years 1963 and 1962 also reveal that book production, which is after all linked with printing and paper technology on the one side and increased creativity and authorship on the other, is yet to go a long way before we can achieve any measure of self-sufficiency.

Filling the Gap

It stands to reason that the wide gap between book requirements and production has, of necessity, to be filled by importing books and other reading material. This need becomes imperative specially because: (a) standard textbooks and reference books are published abroad, (b) research and technical periodicals that are vital to sustain scientific and technical activity; developmental projects, industrialization, educational, social and cultural research and awareness in the country, are in the main published outside the country and in very large numbers. The import of books is controlled by the government through its import policy.

The Government of India, in formulating its policy for imports of books, has categorised the importers into two groups: (1) Actual Users, (2) Established Importers. The term 'Actual Users' includes

libraries; technical and educational institutions; research institutes, societies and centres and individuals. The other category consists of business organisations and publishers. The term 'books' covers newspapers, periodicals, booklets, brochures, etc.

Established importers are allotted a 'quota' licence. By the term 'quota' is meant the value of the best imports in respect of an established importer during the period 1952-53 to 1960-61, which has been designated the basic period. These quota licences are further issued subject to the condition that: (1) not more than 20,000 copies of a single magazine shall be allowed to be imported against each quota licence, (2) not more than 50 per cent of the face value can be utilised for import of fiction and permissible non-technical journals and magazines, (3) within this 50 per cent of the face value of the quota licence, the import of fiction is restricted to 10 per cent of the face value of the licence, (4) children's books can be imported up to the full value of the quota licence for books, but import of comics of undesirable types is not permitted, (5) quota licences can also be used to import film strips, slides of scientific and educational character, provided the orders for supply are received from educational institutions.²

Apart from quota licences, applications from established importers are also considered for supplementary licences. Such licences are, however, valid: (1) only for import of standard technical books

or books of reference concerning law and legal practice or for use in connection with medical practice as detailed in Appendix 60 of the Red Book, (2) for the import of books on subjects other than those mentioned above, provided fiction, non-technical journals and magazines are not sought to be imported. To facilitate this the licensing authority asks for a list of such books to be imported for scrutiny and permission, and (3) for import of books in sheet form. This concession being restricted to books specified in Appendix 60 of the Red Book, (4) import of map globes is not permitted against such licences.

Another feature of government policy (1967-68) is to welcome new dealers in books, other than those established importers (i.e., those who were importing books in the basic period). This, it is hoped, will lead to a healthy competition in this trade enabling readers to have scientific and technical books at reasonable rates.

Actual users may import books provided they have the adequate licence issued to them on application. Orders against such licences should ordinarily be placed through established importers unless the actual users can prove that they are in a position to effect import on a competitive basis. By competitive basis is meant importing only after calling for quotations from foreign book dealers. Actual users may also import film strips and slides of scientific and educational character against their licences for imports of books. Licences to individuals are issued up to a maximum of Rs. 400 without formal application. The import policy for the last 6 years is summarized in Table I.

Table I

Period	Licences Granted to Established Importers
April 61 — March 62	100% of Quota + Supplementary
April 62 — March 63	—do—
April 63 — March 64	—do—
April 64 — March 65	—do—
April 65 — March 66	50% of Quota = Supplementary
April 66 — March 67	150% of Quota = Supplementary
April 67 — March 68	150% of Quota = Supplementary

1. Kesavan, B.S.: Needs of Asian Countries in the Field of Scientific Publishing. *Annals of Lib Sci. & Docum* 1966, 13 No. 2, 53 - 83.

ACTUAL IMPORTS OF BOOKS DURING 1957-66




FIG. 2

In the context of difficult foreign exchange during 1965-66, the import quota for books was reduced to 50 per cent. This caused a serious restriction in the flow of non-fiction books in the country, and hence an additional quota of Rs. 2.10 crores was granted for the import of technical and reference book material in the same year. Out of this, an amount of Rs. 15 lakhs was placed at the disposal of the University Grants Commission for recommending licences in favour of actual users, like libraries, colleges, universities and technical institutions. During 1966-67 this import policy was liberalised by increasing the quota to 75 per cent. As a result of the devaluation of the rupee, this quota was further increased by 57.5 per

cent with provisions of supplementary licences. Further, the policy envisaged the free issue of licences in favour of libraries, universities, colleges, etc. As announced in the Red Book, the import policy for 1967-68 restores 150 per cent quota licences to established importers, individuals can import books up to Rs. 400 and licences to the actual users are to be issued freely.

A comparative idea of the amount spent for the actual importing of books during the period January 1957—March 1966 is presented in Figure 2. These figures have been taken from the 'Monthly Statistics of Foreign Trade of India'. It will be seen that the major import of books is from the UK and the USA which account

for nearly 90 per cent of total imports. Further, the UK being declared as the 'soft currency area' up to 1960-61, the import has been progressively increasing during the period. Table II gives the percentage of imports from the UK, the USA, Japan and other countries during this period.

Figure 3 compares the value of import licences, and the value of actual imports during the period. Although the import of books has been continuously increasing during the period, the import quota has never been fully utilised. 1965-66 has been an understandable exception to this general trend, when the value of imported books has slightly exceeded the value of import licences. In fact, the value of imported books in the remaining

TABLE II
Imports (Percentage)

Country	Years									
	1957-58	58-59	59-60	60-61	61-62	62-63	63-64	64-65	65-66	
USA	50.8	39.2	38.5	41.0	32.1	30.3	34.9	30.5	36	
UK	40.1	52.8	53.6	46.5	50.7	54.5	50.8	47.3	49.2	
Japan	1.6	4.0	3.7	5.5	9.1	9.3	9.0	9.0	9.8	
Others	7.5	4.0	4.2	7.0	8.1	5.9	5.3	13.2	5.0	

period has never exceeded the fifty per cent of the total value of import licences in any year.

From Figure 3 it is clear that more than 50 per cent of the total value of the import licence remains unutilized. This non-utilization is present both in the case of established importers and actual users. But, some of the reasons for non-utilization of the total value of the import licence on the part of established importers are procedural delays in the issue of import licences; late execution of the supply orders by foreign agents or publishers, late arrival of books in India, less profits and commission on non-fiction books and inability of buyers to pay handling charges in addition to the published price on publications which carry small or no profit margin. In fact, established importers utilise their full quota for importing 'fiction' books on account of the ready market.

Even the import allocations for 'Actual Users' remain unutilized to a large extent. In fact, invari-

ably the 'Actual User' happens to be a library. In this case, some factors responsible for this are procedural complexities and delays in obtaining the licence; inadequate staff; extra staff needed for correspondence, accounts and submitting the returns to the licensing authority as per requirements and specifications and the condition that books are obtained on a competitive basis.

This situation indicates that even the liberal books import policy of the government is likely to be ineffective in encouraging more books in the non-fiction area and in enthrusing more utilisation of import allocations of the books.

Most libraries being the major consumers of imported non-fiction books do not appear to be very enthusiastic for getting an Actual Users licence. Apart from the procedural complexities involved, there is always a bigger chance of the book budget remaining unused at the end of the year. This happens because of the late issuing of the licences and conditions

attached for obtaining these. These conditions are time consuming. However, the book budget is always utilised and effort is made to get the periodical runs as continuous as possible.

Since it is easier to purchase books through Indian book-sellers than to obtain and avail of the Actual Users licence, every library tries to procure as many books as possible through Indian book-sellers. This is one reason that many libraries are unable to obtain books not available through normal commercial channels. The books and reading materials published in the USSR and other communist countries are not available through normal commercial channels. Libraries try to procure these by exchanging them with Indian materials. The exchange of research and technical periodicals is one of the most frequently used practices for importing a periodical.

Simplification of Procedure

In the foregoing paragraphs an attempt has been made to illustrate from the available data, how ineffective is the import policy for books. Even the recent attempts to make it more liberal seems to be ineffective. What is needed is the simplification of the procedure and minimisation of the record-keeping at least in the case of Actual Users. Such steps may yield effectiveness in importing non-fiction reading material. The question of the setting up of a national agency for importing non-fiction material on a co-operative basis is worth considering. Such an agency may take care of the interests of 'Actual Users'. Such an agency may be a procurement centre or a clearing-house for technical and non-fiction reading materials. For instance, The National Library, Calcutta, and the National Science Library at Indoc, New Delhi, may be strengthened to organise these co-operative acquisition programmes in the area of non-fiction reading materials. This appears to be a right step in the context of the acute foreign exchange situation which our country is facing.

BOOK IMPORT LICENCE & ITS UTILISATION DURING 1958-66




FIG. 3

Distribution

D. N. MALHOTRA

THE word 'distribution' in the realm of books has a meaning which may not be easily understood by the readers of books. Broadly, it means the arrangement and the mechanism by which books are made available to the book buyers from their source of production. The preparation and production of books is organised by publishers who get manuscripts

from the authors, buy paper from the mills, get printing done from presses and get them bound in final shape from book-binders. This briefly describes the process of book production by the publishers who are the entrepreneurs in the book business.

But, this enunciation of the work of the publishers is only half

the story. The other half of the work of the publishers which ostensibly begins after books are ready is really the more important job in which all their energy and skill is tested. This latter work is 'distribution' through which publishers make arrangements with the book-sellers all over the country and abroad to make their books available at shops for sale to the readers.

As a matter of fact, arrangements for the distribution of a book start immediately a publisher decides to publish it. In sequence it comes later but, in preparation and planning, it is of first importance, for books without their being distributed for sale and reaching the readers have no purpose except to occupy valuable space in the godowns of the publishers. Books have meaning only if they are read by the public for whom the author wrote. Without that, books are just printed manuscripts on which a bulk of paper and ink has been consumed to multiply them. Thus, the fulfilment of a book, of its author as well as its publisher lies in its widest distribution.

Today, we find that in India the distribution of books is not organised properly and therefore the sale and circulation of books is very limited. On the one hand, publishers complain that books do not sell and business is small except in the case of textbooks which, too, are being progressively nationalised by the various States and even the universities. Authors complain that the remuneration they derive from their writing in the form of royalties is very meagre and it is not possible for them to live on just the writing of books. It is a common phenomenon that many authors of repute get their books published abroad because they get better remuneration due to the large sales effected by foreign publishing houses.

The Reasons

What is the reason? Is it that the Indian public does not want to read books or does not have the purchasing power to buy books?

These reasons may be partially true; people have not inculcated the book-reading and book-buying habit. And this, in turn, stems from our system of education by which at a young age, while at school and college, students come to look upon books only as tools for passing examinations and then to be discarded for good. They are not initiated into the wonderful world of books in which they can live for pleasure or profit.

Again, the argument of low purchasing power does not hold good. It applies to life in general for most Indians. But, in contrast to books, other commodities of entertainment and means of acquiring knowledge draw far more fans and devotees. Cinemas attract ever-increasing crowds even with mounting ticket rates and far more people travel even with increasing railway fares.

Organisational Inefficiency

Really, there is something wrong with the internal efficiency of the organisation of the book industry in India. Education is spreading and government is spending large sums of money on adult literacy drives. Anybody can imagine and calculate that India should be one of the biggest bookmarkets in the years to come. With the expanding population of this country, even one per cent increase in the numbers of educated people can make a lot of difference in the book-buyers numbers. Today, in terms of percentage, literacy in India is only 22 per cent but calculated in terms of total numbers it becomes a very big market. Even leaving a margin for the low purchasing power and lack of proper reading habits, people in this country cannot be very much different from people elsewhere in their love for books.

On the other hand, readers complain that they do not get the books they want. Bookshops in this country are few and far between in relation to the great mass of population which has to be served. Even cities with a population of a hundred thousand do not have more than one decent bookshop of general books. Book

business until now has meant only school and college textbook shops outside these institutions which sell books at the beginning of the school session and then stay idle the rest of the year. Thus, the book-selling business is not paying even for these textbook vendors.

Another aspect of the whole situation is that although the number of book-readers by itself is quite sizeable, yet it is difficult to serve because it is mixed up and scattered all over this vast country including far-flung rural areas where it is not feasible to set up bookshops. Therefore, we are faced in India with this tragic spectacle in the field of books wherein on the one hand people are starved of books and on the other the publishers and authors wail that books do not sell. That there is a vast untapped potential for the sale of books has been proved by the successful ventures made by some enterprising people in the book industry here and there in different parts of country. Where people thought that only an edition of 2000 copies could sell, they sold 10,000 and 20,000 and even more, creating new landmarks. Thus, a very large potential market for books remains unsatisfied under the prevailing conditions.

So, the question is how this situation can be remedied, what are the obstacles in the way, how these can be removed and how new methods can be introduced in the mechanism of the distribution of books.

Prevailing Methods

Basically, the distribution of books is organised by publishers themselves after they have produced them. The usual method is that they get wholesale orders for their books from book-sellers all over the country by advertising their books in trade journals and magazines and newspapers. Also, publishers send books for review to magazines and newspapers. On reading these advertisements and through the publishers' personal approach, book-sellers send orders specifying the number of copies of different

books they require based on past experience of sales in a particular type of book. The publishers fulfil these orders of the book-sellers either on a cash basis or give them a credit of one or two months depending upon their mutual arrangements.

Publishers give about 25 per cent discount to the book-sellers on the face price of the books. This discount is the gross profit of the book-seller out of which he incurs expenditure for the running of his shop and ultimately saves something as his net profit. Again, the book-seller has to part with some of his discount when he is selling his books to libraries or to other permanent customers. Sometimes, in order to attract libraries and other big customers, some book-sellers indulge in a race of giving more and more discount in competition with book-sellers even to the extent of losing their own margin of profit.

Enlightened librarians do not encourage this race of discount among book-sellers because they realise that book-sellers play a useful role in society by meeting the cultural needs of the community by maintaining an adequate supply of good books. If book-sellers do not get a fair margin, they will fail and society will lose their services. A book-seller usually has a small margin and his resources are also meagre. He depends on publishers for credit and on the other hand on his customers for prompt realisation. If he fails anywhere, his future supplies are cut by the publishers and he goes out of business.

Credit

In order to maintain a proper flow of cash and credit facilities in this difficult business, much discipline is required among the book-sellers which can only be maintained by their own voluntary professional associations. Unfortunately, in India the book-sellers and publishers' associations are in their infant stage and are unable to achieve any discipline in this matter. The result is that sometimes unscrupulous book-sellers cheat publishers leading to a

squeeze in credit and contracting of business.

Now, all this process has been described in detail because the book industry is the one exception which does not get credit from banks; stocks of books are not considered a worthwhile commodity against which money can be advanced. Therefore, the book-industry in order to keep its wheels moving has to depend on mutual cooperation of its different segments. But, due to the lack of strong professional associations and self discipline among the trade, we find an ironical situation in which bookshops don't have adequate stocks and a variety of books, and publishers on the other hand have their godowns full of unsold books. Some way has to be found by which the flow of books will not only be kept up but also increased greatly to meet the potential demand.

Book-buying is mostly done on impulse. A person visiting a bookshop takes a fancy to a book displayed there and purchases it. If by chance he has already read an advertisement or review of the book in a magazine, that is an additional incentive to buy that book. The percentage of buyers who visit book-shops with a view to buying a particular book positively is very small. So, the essence of the problem of the circulation of books is their proper distribution and display at bookshops situated in towns and cities all over the country.

Code of Conduct

An efficient organisation of distribution is possible if book-sellers and publishers of the country adhere to a professional code of conduct and bow to the discipline of their respective organizations. Then, this becomes very simple. Suppose there are 500 big bookshops in the country and every publisher, the day he publishes a book, sends two copies of that to these book-shops for sale. Then, after a month, these book-sellers remit to the publisher the amount of these books if they are sold or a statement if not sold. This will ensure a sale of about 1000 copies

of every worthwhile book within a month. It could be even more if a book is ordered in larger numbers. If here is a paper back low-priced book, it could be displayed and sold not only at big bookshops but even at small book-corners and hundreds of railway book-stalls in which case the total sales avenues can be over 2,000. In such a case, if 5 or 10 copies each of these books are supplied to these sales-points on the same basis, a sale of 10 to 20 thousand books could be effected in no time.

The present tragedy is that beautiful books are published but customers never come to know of their appearance because these never reach their local bookshops. If every book gets a chance to be displayed at the various bookshops of the country, it is quite certain that the sale of books in this country will be multiplied manifold.

Book Clubs

Another important method of the distribution of books is through direct sale to individuals by book clubs. The book club institution first began in Germany and then it spread all over Europe and to the U.S.A. Now book clubs are playing a very important role in the distribution of books direct to individuals. The operation is very simple. The book club enrolls members who are usually offered a choice of one book or many books every month at a concessional price. As the number of members of book clubs is very large, special editions of books are published for them and due to economies of large scale production, members get books at lower prices. But much more important than concessions in price is the attraction of a very real convenience of books being delivered at their door step by the postman. In the very busy life of any man today, it is quite difficult for him to visit a bookshop after a whole day's work in office. The information sent by a book club through the post is so convenient that subscribers usually accept most of the offers and build their own home libraries through this method.

One great advantage of distribution through a book club is that

an individual living anywhere in a remote village can benefit when his own place may not have a bookshop. This factor is important specially in reference to the prevailing situation in India where there is a great dearth of bookshops. Hundreds of thousands of people can quench their thirst for knowledge through books by becoming members of book clubs. Thus, from the point of view of better and wider distribution of books in the country, there is need to start book clubs and give them all encouragement.

Postal Rates

But, unfortunately, the present situation in India with regard to the operation of book clubs and even ordinarily sending books by post is very distressing. The postal rates for books in India are prohibitive and their ever-increasing burden is only stifling the growth of book clubs and transmission of books by post. It is a strange irony of the situation that people living in cities where there are bookshops are in a privileged position to buy books at face value while their counterparts in rural areas have to get books by post and pay almost as much money on postal charges as on the price of a book. For instance, a low-priced paperback for which a city dweller pays one rupee costs Rs. 1.80 to any one who receives it through the post. The government of this country which professes to work for the welfare of the rural populace is just indifferent to this anomalous situation. In the budget of 1967, from August 1, the registration charge has been further increased from 55 paise to 60. The few book clubs working in this country were already groaning under the strain of heavy postal charges and may have to close down if some relief is not given to them in postage.

One thing has to be understood by the framers of law in this country that the post office should be run as a social service organisation and especially that the carriage of books by post should be a subsidised service. A packet of jewellery worth one thousand rupees can surely bear a postage of five rupees instead of two rupees. But

a book packet costing one rupee cannot bear a postal charge of 80 paise. It must be just a nominal charge of 10 or 20 paise and there should be no compulsory registration charge on a V.P. packet containing books. Government spends crores on mass literacy campaigns but people are then starved for books due to their non-availability locally. As a consequence, these neo-literates fall back into illiteracy extinguishing the light of knowledge that kindled their lives so briefly. All the money spent on this work literally goes down the drain. Therefore, it is but commonsense that the availability of books in the country should be made widespread and cheap, and postal charges should be nominal.

Training Required

UNESCO organised a meeting of book experts of Asia in Tokyo in May 1966 and made a recommendation to all the developing Asian countries that for a quicker pace of social and economic development, the governments of these countries must give a flip to the circulation of books. It was maintained that books are the cheapest medium through which the masses in these countries can be enlightened and their energies harnessed for the implementation of development plans.

In concrete terms it means that the distribution of books should be organised more efficiently using the latest techniques developed in the advanced countries of the world by adapting them to local conditions. There is need to set up an institute for the training of publishers and book-sellers in the various techniques and disciplines of book distribution. It can be done by the joint efforts of the Ministry of Education and publishers' associations with technical assistance from UNESCO. Perhaps, the National Book Development Board could show the way. Undoubtedly, distribution is the crux of the problem in the present-day book industry of India and it must be tackled urgently. And there is no problem in the world which human ingenuity cannot solve if genuine efforts are made with courage and conviction.



seminar

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Need of the times

MULK RAJ ANAND

'GOD was the first writer,' said a publisher in Allahabad to me. Ostensibly, he was exalting the profession of the writer to the very highest pedestal in order to fob me off with a contract through which I would be paid an honorarium of Rs. 1000 for the work which I had prepared after ten years research.

This is not a typical instance of the relationship of the publisher and the author in our country, because quite a few publishers, in the advanced centres of this trade, do pay royalties to authors on the basis accepted throughout the world. And some also supply statements of the royalty position twice a year.

But these conditions apply mostly to publishing in the English language, although in a few languages, particularly Hindi, Bengali and Malayalam, the normal conditions of contract on royalty basis are observed. But, in most other languages, the verbal agreement applies; and, of course, this is often broken.

If one asks such a publisher why he does not pay the author, he invariably says 'books don't sell'.

He seldom accepts his own inefficiency in organising sales, his lack of faith in promotional publicity or reluctance to pay for advertising, and his ignorance of the methods of contemporary market research.

As, apart from a very few big publishing houses, most of the publishers are booksellers turned publishers, they tend to behave as traders rather than as initiators of the book industry.

There is no adequate system worked out by most of the publishers for the preparation, production and distribution of books. There is very inadequate training for the trade and rarely has anybody been given specialist training in typography, design, binding, sales talk and counter decoration to attract custom. Most bookshops look like dusty godowns where it is difficult to move and select books.

The author is generally made to feel that he is lucky to have a book accepted for publication and should be grateful that he has been promised a royalty, and beholden to the entrepreneur that

his name and book are mentioned in the price list.

I have seen the figures for the currency which books enjoy in the various States of our federation prepared by Professor Mahalanobis's Institute for the National Book Trust, about seven years ago. Since then, publishing may have changed its character somewhat in the various parts of India. But, according to the figures given in that survey, it was clear that in most parts of the country, books of religion have the largest sales. Commercial fiction, passion stories, crime and detection enjoy the next highest circulation, whereas general knowledge, science, creative fiction, poetry and art, sell in comparatively small numbers.

For instance, the Geeta Press religious books from Gorakhpur enjoy the highest sales in Uttar Pradesh. The *Koran*, published in Bombay, Delhi and Lucknow is the next best seller. The indifferently printed and badly produced Gurmukhi *Japji* and other Sikh religious texts sell widely in the Punjab. Books on politics enjoy fairly high circulation in Kerala. General books, science and fiction sell fairly well in Bengal. Poetry and cheap novels dominate the Urdu market. Books on philosophy, science and art sell in the most negligible quantities.

Economic Crisis

Under these conditions, one can say that, apart from a dozen authors in Bengal, the members of the co-operative publishing house of Kottayam in Malayalam, and a few authors in Hindi, no writer can earn even a modest income and subsist on the standard of living of a clerk in the whole of India.

There may be exceptions to this general statement. But from my personal acquaintance with hundreds of writers in all languages of India, I can vouch for the fact that most authors are forced to earn a living by some other work in order to survive and raise any kind of a family.

This economic crisis in the life of writers in India intensifies the

social and moral crisis. And the intelligentsia as a whole tends to disintegrate, so that it is not possible for it to play a significant role in national reconstruction.

I do not wish to blame any one person or any institution for the prevalence of this unhappy state of affairs. I would like to analyse the relationship of the author to the general situation (a) in terms of the status of the intelligentsia in the present decay, (b) the relationship of the author to the reading public, and (c) the possible author publisher relationship in the future, and ask if it is possible to transform the book trade into an industry in our technically under-developed country.

Status

Let us consider the status enjoyed by the intelligentsia in India and whether it is called upon to fulfil a role and has it failed or succeeded in approximating to our needs. At the end of the 18th century, before the British infiltration, it may be conceded that, in spite of feudal decay, the poet, the philosopher and the holy man who looked after the sacred books or wrote commentaries, was given an exalted status in the princely courts. The John Company also began to patronise learned men and paid large sums for the translation of indigenous works, the compilation of dictionaries and editing of their newspapers in the basic Indian languages. And the Christian missionaries employed *munshis* to help them to render the Holy Bible into the native tongues. The people also honoured the learned man by exalting every literate person to the position of 'Babu'.

As the first printing presses were mainly founded by the alien missionaries to print Christian religious tracts in the languages of the country, secular publishing did not make much headway, except in the production of letter paper for the government offices, textbooks for the schools and colleges in the English language, which was appointed, after Macaulay's minute

on education, as a *via media* for instruction in the universities.

The Tradition

The Indian intelligentsia accepted the low status of clerkdom in the British-Indian bureaucracy as against the white Sahibs and did not evince much interest in general knowledge. The few exceptions, like Raja Ram Mohan Roy, Ishwar Chander Vidyasagar and the Tagores, who wished to say important things on the cultural, social and political situation of the country, became the publishers of their own thoughts. This tradition has continued until our day and most publicists, creative writers and journalists have found themselves, until lately, becoming the publishers and purveyors of their own work.

In the years since the transfer of power from British to Indian hands, the position has altered very little. Quite a few big and small booksellers turned to publishing on the models supplied by the original western booksellers and publishers of the medieval period. But, as the book business makes its gains still mainly through textbooks, the publishing of general knowledge books as well as the works of passion, which give status to the philosopher, the poet and the creative writer, is considered a gamble. Very few of the conservative shopkeeper minded of these booksellers-publishers take any risks. As the poet Tagore once said: 'Indians prefer the retail business and dare not aspire to the wholesale trade.'

The author-printer-publisher, although he may seek economic security through this sideline, is generally unable to give, even to his own books, the attention they deserve from the point of view of production, circulation and profits. But, as his status depends on the money he makes and not on the books he writes, his salesmanship is more highly honoured than his capacity to write meaningful words. The Publications Division of the Government of India has done fairly good work in promoting mass sales, but it prefers to pay

an honorarium to the writer and not royalty for the tracts and officially orientated books it brings out. The position of the writer is reduced to that of a propagandist hack.

A number of authors in Kerala got together and formed a co-operative publishing house which has been the most successful venture from the point of view of the writer. This is because ownership of the means of production, and the honest payment for work done, has given to the works of the members of the cooperative dignity, security and a sense of responsibility to the community for whom they write.

Lure of the West

This example has not been followed by authors in many other languages of India because, at the time when India became free, the world market also seemed to become accessible to Indian books and the authors began to feel that they were living in New York, London and Moscow, where their books could get published without much effort on their part. So, they did not think of *swadeshi* publishing, but were inclined to follow the example of the legendary Indians, writing in the English language, who were supposed to be making vast fortunes from the publishers in the developed countries of the West and East. These ambitious writers felt flattered to be published abroad, even if their books were inimical to foreign taste and they self-censored themselves to appeal to the erstwhile alien masters, all in the hope of being considered eligible for the Nobel prize.

The myth of 'get rich quick and kick everyone else in the ditch' has thus worked havoc on the minds of many of the writers and they have begun to imitate Emerson, Thoreau, Tagore or the existentialists of Europe, or the beatniks of America, in order to achieve fashionable postures, money and great fame. As the sensibility, the social background and the experience of the writer in India is essentially made up of a different texture, even though the

problems of human destiny are universal, the writings produced in imitation of western literature have remained like echoes of distant voices, or become the songs of the mocking bird and degenerated into meretricious adaptations of alien moods. All this has led to the failure of the intelligentsia, by and large, to reflect our time and thus to its lapsing into the background as the provider of entertainment or soft syrup to soothe the troubled lower middle class hungry for spiritual comfort or seeking escape from low wages and high prices.

The lack of major initiative on the part of publishers, booksellers and authors, provided good opportunity for the European and American book industrialists to dump the Indian market with some of their good books and a still larger quantity of their remainder stock, specially in horror, crime and hagiology perpetrations. This means that the Indian author either became part of the paper back racket of the West or sank into the torpor of frustration which can only feed the puja holiday special features to keep the family budget somewhere near the subsistence level.

A Sterile Solution

To be sure, there was one solution to which quite a few of the Urdu or Hindi writers adapted as an answer to their economic, personal and social problems—the film. The emergence of the need for a Hindustani picture, which could be understood with the help of songs and dances all over India rather than in only one third of the country, meant the employment of Hindi and Urdu poets, short story writers and novelists, often by the most vulgar and ignorant producers. Many of these writers have not published an original creative book for several years. And though they have helped to evolve a *lingua franca*, which may lead to one Hindustani speech throughout the country, the rhyming of rat with cat and the more febrile sentimental make-belief, has led to the decay of creativeness and further degraded the intelligentsia to the role of

hacks in one of the most corrupt industries of India.

The blame for this loss of status consequent upon the evasion of responsibility by the writers, must be laid squarely at the doors of the publishers. Apart from a few enterprising Hindi publishers, the rest have remained booksellers who would like to be considered publishers in order to come in the fifth schedule and avoid the norms of taxation, but refuse to commission authors and pay them their just and fair emoluments and value the written word as much as they value their own new large flats.

The Betrayal

The intelligentsia is not altogether faultless. In the search for security, it has resorted to such desperate expedients that it has by and large lost all sense of proportion. It prefers easy money in the 'filums' to school mastering or professoring, or organising the kind of co-op formed by the Malayalam writers.

Apart from the opportunity for a noble and visionary free society in a country which has been under feudalism for a thousand years or more, there was the possibility of a comprehensive world outlook which the three leaders of India, Tagore, Gandhi and Nehru, had inaugurated, and which the new intelligentsia could have carried forward, winning genuine respect for itself. But the general lack of original thinking, the suburbanism and search for security, has led now to a betrayal which is the most pathetic considering the explosive role of its progenitors played from the late 19th century till after the second world war in the attainment of political freedom, with its ancillaries in social and intellectual liberty.

It is not likely that many of the men of talent in creative literature, who are now in the late fifties or sixties can now stimulate those questionings on the social, moral and political experiences which go to build the individual in emergent societies.

Perhaps, the opposite of what happened in the West may happen

here to give dignity to the intelligentsia. Unlike the western philosophers, poets and writers, Marx, Ruskin, Morris, who were disciplined in the humanities but led with their revolutionary hypothesis to the scientific and technological age, in our country the scientists and technologists as well as the men and women of specialist studies may open up the universe of discourse of re nascent thinking from which the philosophers, poets, and novelists may take their own passion.

This is not a vague hope but a fairly precise formula for giving significance to the thinkers because it is science and general knowledge which alone can usher in the age of criticism. And criticism is necessary to subject everything in our experience to scrutiny before the material is sieved as a residuum for effective action or contemplation with the impurities discarded and the coordination of thought, word and deed achieved in a country where the whole of life, in all sectors, has to be renewed for our own and the new generation.

Is there a reading public beyond the prayer-saying, or escapist, sugar-coated-pill-taking clientele for the Kisch book, which may respond to the scientific and general ideas that may be thrashed out through the age of criticism into which we are to be ushered as part of the advance of world knowledge during the last two hundred years?

Also, are there the potential authors for our time and the potential reading public?

Lack of Contact

As in the past we have tended to borrow the values of the West in almost every sphere of life; the relationship between the author and the reading public has remained an indirect one. They seldom come into personal contact with each other and tend to become legends. The author likes to imagine that, like his compeer in the West, he is addressing a large

mass of unknown people through books produced by a big combine. And he wishes, like the popular authors of Europe and America, to produce a best-selling masterpiece. The reading public also, used to the tit-bits, gossip and fabulous photographs of successful authors in the glossy magazines, thinks of the writer as a romantic figure—a rich man who lives in a house on Juhu beach and whose autograph is more valuable than his book. This vague relationship, built on nebulous reactions on both sides, has prevented a genuine connection between the author and the reading public.

Actually, many people cannot afford to buy books at all and still seek emotional sustenance from the poetry recital in the *Mushaira* or *Kavi sammelan*, or from the film song, or the radio broadcast.

No Platforms

The hunger for consciousness, stirring beyond the routine life, somewhere out of discontents is perennial. But it has not yet been moulded in our democratic society, because there is no platform, few literary societies or study circles where the writer and the reader may both have equal opportunities to accept or reject ideas and teach each other the basic values on which the new society may be built.

In the more complex societies of western Europe and America, where a large number of professional authors practise their craft either in pursuance of serious educative aims or as commercial writers, and where there is a vast reading public for almost everything written and printed, the problem of establishing a direct connection between these two elements of the book world, is now extremely difficult. And it is only solved through literary lunches, autograph parties, book-club functions, question and answer meetings and study circles. The bad values of commercialism have, however, crept into every nook and corner of western society and John Stienbeck, Agatha Christie and James Bond command a larger reading public than T. S.

Eliot, D. H. Lawrence or Allen Greenberg. The human values, which are shared between some authors and some part of the reading public, are only ensured by the honest publisher with an adequate market who only publishes purposive books.

The long tradition of book reading in the West, built up since the coming of total literacy through the 19th and 20th centuries, helps, in spite of all other handicaps, to build up a healthy respect for the works of the creative imagination as well as for books which impart knowledge. It is true that literacy has not proved to be a complete blessing because of the pressures of commercialism and vulgarity in literature, mechanically stimulated by the yellow journalism of the press lords and bad fiction turned out like sausages by big monopoly publishing concerns. And yet literacy potentially means awareness. And the fact that good books tend to drive out the bad, ultimately leaves a residue of civilised values and sensitiveness in the reading public, through the continuity of honest publishing and distribution of books.

Vicious Circle

As our readers and authors have accepted only the superficial aspects of the West, the relationship of the writer with the reading public is one of complete frustration on both sides. The author may want to address a large reading public. But the reading public is prevented by the undue emphasis placed on profits by the bookseller-publisher, who knows he can get his major gains on badly printed textbooks and not well got-up general books or creative literature. In the case of some pioneer publisher, there is the real difficulty that, except in rare cases, the government has not subsidised his business without political strings attached. And although he may want to publish good books he has to maintain a commercially sound institution to survive at all. His natural ambition to expand his trade makes him adopt the easiest approach towards security rather than indulge in pioneering fantasies.

The whole situation is, therefore, a vicious circle.

The author is the Cinderella of the book trade, a poor relation who is not supposed to be interested in money because he is, after all, giving a message. The publisher, working on small investments in a backward economy, is trying to make maximum profits. The semi-literate reading public has a very limited buying power, except for the subsidised libraries (where librarians select books whimsically with an eye to personal discounts). The result is a serious crisis in the book world, confused by shrill cries of despair all round.

Is it possible to establish anything like an author-publisher-reading-public relationship in the future?

I am not sure that anything like the integration of the various interests involved can be brought about unless all the parties concerned in the crisis first become calmly aware of the need for self-criticism, admission of defaults and the will to remedy the situation.

The basic and important realisation has to be achieved that India is now a free sovereign State, with the professed goal, 'Destination Man', and that it has to put content into the life of the individual in a period when the rich monopolists of the West are thinking of super profits, while we are beginning to build, almost from scratch, a welfare State in a landscape where the per capita income is the lowest in the world.

Comprehensive View

This is a strange situation—very different from that of the West and requires the *swadeshi* spirit, modernised to reconcile maximum self-help with some borrowing of technical know-how and the belief that both books of knowledge and books of passion are important in the preparation for human life.

The assertion of this philosophy means the renovation of the outlook of the political and social leadership of our country about the fact that the humanities, sciences and technology are all necessary

disciplines and cannot be separated, if we wish to avoid the creation of a new generation of vipers and scorpions, as in the technology run mad western society.

The education report of 1966 has to be revised in the light of this view and the skeleton of the British Indian education system, which is unfortunately still intact, has to be tilted on the side of a more comprehensive view of man as a creator of new social values based on mutual aid and not a self-centered exploiter with exalted thoughts sitting on the shoulders of other people as the superior brain.

If this premise is accepted by the State, then it follows that there has to be a new kind of education system, with new books and the creation of new values, suitable to the new conditions in which we find ourselves. The creation of these new values becomes the responsibility of the new intelligentsia. And the publication of the works of the intelligentsia becomes the undertaking of the enlightened publisher.

Question of Language

The question of the link language and the mother tongue here becomes important. There has to be the absolute recognition of priority in accepting a uniform policy by which the mother tongue is accepted as the main basis of education, with Hindi-Hindustani as a link language, and one international language (in our case English) has to be recognised as the connecting pragmatic link with world knowledge for a long time to come. There has to be some liaison machinery which may make education nearly a concurrent subject in the federation if the States won't accept the formal application of this principle, in order to help uniformity of teaching the sciences and the arts in all parts of the country.

Above all, the whole approach towards education must be from the recognition of the fact that we do not want mere specialists in techniques, but organically growing individuals who may be creative in the single realm of the arts and

the sciences. This would imply that implicit in universal literacy is education and that, if this is not kept in view, India will be open to the dangers which have already brought about something like the breakdown of human values in the West.

Subsidies

In order to pursue this broad educational policy within the framework of our social democracy, every five-year plan of the country must provide a budget to subsidise book publishing, both from State publishing houses and private firms. The public and private sectors should be in direct consultation with each other about the number of books to be published and the quality of books to be issued.

A list of possible authors and translators in the link language as well as in the mother tongues should be compiled, and a number of them must be trained in Japan, the Soviet Union or the U.K. in chosen publishing houses for the position of editorial advisers.

Apart from the only printing school so far established in Bombay, there must come to be such a school in every linguistic area where comprehensive training can be given in typography, cover design and book production on a professional level. There must be a network of half a million printing presses, machine and hand binders and paper manufacturing firms, to fulfil the needs only of book production.

The Centre owes a further responsibility to authors, publishers and the reading public, besides subsidising work, to initiate mobile bookshop-libraries. At the moment, only 10 per cent of the literate public goes to a bookshop because of the lack of spending power, social disabilities and distances in a dominantly rural economy. Ninety-nine per cent of women do not go to a bookshop at all. The Geeta Press mobile bookshops have shown tremendous sales of cheaply priced books in the small towns and rural areas.

There must be set up a children's book trust in all the

languages of India, which takes responsibility, in the initial period, of opening art and science workshops for training authors, artists and designers in the peculiar psychological areas for books which may open the budding generations to awareness on all those things in which early childhood education lays the basis for later total awareness.

One of the revolutionary means of instruction is the radio book, the television book, and the film book, specially for children. This needs special training of authors, producers and technicians. In the transitional stages of our society, where there is still mass illiteracy, it is necessary to use these media immediately to fill the gap that lies between theoretical teaching and practical work, by evolving 'do-it-yourself' series in regard to all production, techniques in farming, making of fertilizer to handling machines of all kinds.

All these innovations will entail the services of a million authors and translators and technicians. The basic contract between them and the publishing agencies, public or private, must be defined, the translators fees uniformly fixed and copyright conventions evolved, so that the author can live as in any civilised society, with his dignity unimpaired in the practice of a profession which has the highest value in every culture.

Proper Organisation

The publishers, both in the public and private sectors, must be organised in every language group and their genuine grievances must be listened to, and a code of honour established between them which they must be asked not to infringe in the interest of a developing society.

The reading public can also be organised in book clubs in every language with incentives given to build home libraries, and public libraries, in almost every village, panchayat area, Zila parishad, jurisdiction and municipal boundaries.

The self-perpetrating seminar of authors-publishers-readers must

come to be through each library, so as to increase consciousness of books, criticism and inventiveness. The school library and the university library as well as the big research libraries, must become centres of diversified education, so that education can move from the elite of our society to wider and wider sections of the people.

As these basic initiatives cannot be brought about by a fiat of Parliament, there is much room for continuous discussion between the governments, both central and State, the publishers, booksellers, authors and representatives of the reading public. The recent establishment of the All India Book Development Board promises to open up the whole field for active discussion and may adopt radical measures to remove disabilities all round and promote books in the languages of India for the building of cadres of our promised welfare State.

Creating the Expert

There is emphatic need, however, for a reorientation of our outlook towards the needs of a unitary State, so far as Indian culture is concerned, because it is the cultural unity (in diversity) which is holding our people together, in spite of the fissiparous tendencies we have allowed to be built into our political system. This is not to suggest the emergence of a vague idealism, through which the State suddenly begins to expend large sums of money, or subsidise incompetent individuals. But it means the recognition of the lack of technical know-how, the extreme failing of individualism run mad, the defects of the laissez-faire economy of selfishness, specially at this stage of our nation building. And it means the creation of the enlightened expert, whether he be an author, publisher, printer, designer or bookseller, or communicator of mass media.

There is no reason to believe that the publisher will go bankrupt if he pays royalties and advances to authors to write books. And there is no reason to doubt the

hunger of the people for enlightenment if one goes by the number of our poor students reading by street lamp light in the towns of India or the young girls in the orthodox homes evading the vigilant eyes of the parents to go to borrow books, or the children crowding round the radio for the brief hour given to them by A.I.R.

I have the assurance from the large fan mail which every author receives in India, from the young hopeful writers, that millions of 'mute Miltons' are groping their way out of the dark into some illumination.

A Plea

In conclusion I would like to offer a plea to all those who expect authors to fulfil their proper role in our new emergent society; that no one should expect to starve his way to early death by the neglect of his economic interests in a highly competitive society, where everybody's wages have gone up but the royalty of the pen pusher seems to be dwindling into insignificance.

The State which wishes to educate the people but leaves the educator to fester in the mire can never last in India. The businessman who thinks it is his divine right to own ten houses while the author cannot have 'a room with a view' and even the basic Rs. 500 a month, is merely an early capitalist trader who will never build an industry. The bookseller who is content to do a little retail selling in complete ignorance of the vast potential reading public is just a small minded store keeper, with the mentality of the petty bourgeois, who can't even help himself. As for the author, who is a long-haired neo-Brahmin, thinking of his personal salvation like one of the sages of the forest books, he will lapse before the inexorable need of our society for a self-conscious intelligentsia which can ask questions, suggest possible answers, and help to intensify awareness. The halo of immortality for the saint poet will have to give place to the shining morning face of the schoolboy who wishes to grasp the globe.

Problem of subsidy

B. V. KESKAR

ONE of the important tasks facing India after freedom is the urgent necessity for spreading knowledge and raising the intellectual standard of the country as a whole. Under British rule, our country was woefully backward in even ordinary literacy. We find that even the educated public was ignorant of the tremendous strides made by man in different fields of activity. During the last two centuries man's concept of thinking has undergone a revolutionary change and modern science and technique have changed the idea of the whole world completely. If

it is desired that our country comes up to the level of other advanced nations, it is essential to take some drastic measures for increasing the general fund of knowledge in the public. Real education lies not simply in going to school or getting degrees, but in reading books and acquiring knowledge of what is happening in the world today.

After independence there has been a drive for primary education and even adult education. Literacy is increasing and efforts are being made to increase the institu-

tions for higher education such as the universities and academies. We have put before ourselves the objective of a welfare State.

Books are essential both for general knowledge and also for educational purposes. For education, good textbooks are necessary of which there is a great dearth in the country. This applies both to textbooks for lower classes and also for the higher university standards. For increasing the general knowledge of the average educated person, good books on different subjects are essential. These books form a permanent store house of knowledge and it may not be an exaggeration to say that the accumulated knowledge and culture of countless generations of humanity are stored in the precious books that we have been able to preserve and inherit in different countries of the world.

Index of Standards

The production of books is the index of any peoples' intellectual standard. Modern technique has made book production a highly specialised and fruitful art and in these days of mass movements no country can advance which is backward in book production and distribution. If we compare the production of books and periodicals in India with those of some of the important countries of the world we will be shocked to find that we are practically at the bottom of the list. Generally speaking, the developing countries of Asia have only about one-half of the annual book supply they need. Educational books are a particularly acute problem as only about a third of the textbooks required is available. According to a UNESCO survey, book production in eighteen countries of the region is only about 7.3 per cent of the world total although their population is about 28 per cent of the population of the world. The per capita annual rate of book consumption in the world's leading book publishing countries is about 30 to 60 times greater than in the Asian region.

In considering the question of book development in the country

certain problems will have to be tackled if we want to make any rapid advance in making the people book minded. The most important question is the low standard of living in the country which makes it impossible for the ordinary reader to buy the books he desires. There is also the question of the multiplicity of languages. If we want books to reach the farthest corner of the country, they have to be written in the different languages of the country and the development of book writing and publishing and distribution of books is still in a very undeveloped form in the majority of languages.

Costs

Most important is certainly the question of price. The standard of living in India is so low that it is not possible for an average reader to buy a sizeable number of books. He cannot afford it. The situation is further aggravated by the phenomenal rise in the cost of book production in the post-war years and more especially in this last decade. The price of paper has gone up. So also has the cost of printing. Labour charges have also increased tremendously. As a result the cost of book production has gone up many times. This phenomenon is not peculiar to India but to some extent it has occurred all over the world after the war. The only difference is that in other countries incomes and standard of living have kept pace with the increasing cost and, therefore, the rise in price of books has not affected them to any great extent. In India it has made a bad situation worse because the rise in income or standard of living is woefully behind the cost of living. We must not also forget that books are written by authors and they have to get sufficient payment for writing, otherwise no knowledgeable person will be attracted to write. This increases the price while peoples' capacity to buy has not increased to any great extent.

The position of book production is worse in the Indian languages.

No doubt there is greater publishing activity in many of our languages after independence, but it cannot be considered that the progress made is in any way adequate to the requirements. Even in the advanced languages the number of books published, excepting fiction or textbooks, is not rapid enough. It is true that the public is not very much inclined to buy books as the habit of book reading has not caught on, but at the same time those who want to buy books are not able to do so because they cannot afford it. In the comparatively less developed languages there are hardly a few books published besides textbooks and fiction. The total is pitifully small. In fact, there is a vicious circle of the absence of book mindedness side by side with an inability to spend money on books.

The commercial publishers price the books keeping in view the cost of printing; distributing cost, royalty and their margin of profit. Naturally, this is the ordinary method of the publishing industry everywhere, but in India the consequent price is too high for the average reader. In order to attract the potential reader it will be necessary to tempt him by making it possible for him to buy books and this is the only way that the vicious circle can be broken.

For this purpose it appears necessary to subsidise the production of good and desirable books so that they can be made available at a very reasonable price to the reader keeping in view the buying capacity of the average middle class Indian. This is an urgent necessity.

Government's Responsibility

As things stand this is only possible for the government to carry out. It is no doubt possible also for some foundation to be established by philanthropic bodies or firms as in the U.S.A., but there is little likelihood of this happening here. We need not, therefore, expect that or try for it. Moreover, in a welfare State it is the government's responsibility to see

that cheaper good books are made available to the public in various ways.

If the work has to be done on an effective scale in all languages, a sufficient sum of money will have to be allotted for this purpose. Otherwise, we cannot expect fruitful results. Keeping in view the importance of the project, the vastness of our country and the multiplicity of languages, we might safely estimate that a minimum of Rs. 1 crore should be devoted to this purpose. I do not think that for a big country like India the sum is great or adequate but is the minimum necessary to produce some good results.

The selection of proper books for such a subsidy is, of course, essential. It appears desirable that it should be done by a committee of knowledgeable persons who will select books or translations of books which will add usefully to the knowledge of the average reader and will be of national utility.

Possible Methods

There can be different ways of producing subsidised books. Trusts or foundations which will plan this on a big scale would be an excellent way of giving a big start to the production of cheap books. Such a Trust or Trusts can publish directly a large number of good books at a reasonable price. Some start was made in this direction but has been hampered by financial inadequacy. On the other hand, if we desire to produce cheap books at a reasonable price on a very big scale, the field of activity will have to be extended by making arrangements with other publishers, both private and institutional, so that they can publish books of desirable quality. Such publishers can be helped in keeping the price of books at a reasonable level in different ways. It is also possible to provide them with prepared books or translations done by competent persons, theirs being only the responsibility of publication. In such a case, the cost of preparing the books or their translations, would be the subsidy which will permit the

publishers to price at a reasonable level. A part of the cost of production can be met by subsidising agencies. The book can then be priced at a reduced cost. An outright grant can be made to the publisher which will cover the difference between the commercial cost and the low price that might be put on the book.

Another way of subsidising which is prevalent is making bulk purchases of books for distribution to libraries and institutions. This enables the printing of a large number of copies and helps in reducing the printing cost, thereby lowering the price at which it can be sold. A specific percentage of copies published can be bought for distribution to libraries, etc. This helps the publisher to recoup his investment in the printing of a book and enables him to sell it at a reasonable price. Great help can be given by providing indirect relief to the printing of books by controlling the cost of paper, reducing postage rates on books and giving other such facilities. In fact, various different ways of subsidising might be necessary to suit particular cases, the object being to get low priced books published on a large scale. As it will be necessary to harness all publishing units for this work, it might not be possible to follow one particular method.

An Experiment

The English Language Book Society and its series of publications is another way of subsidising the production of good books at a cheap price. This was planned by the British Government to make available certain good quality books at a cheap price. It has established a high powered committee headed by a distinguished scholar and educationist and consisting of a large number of distinguished men both from educational and literary circles, and also government departments, to make a proper selection of books. The selected books are offered to all the leading publishers in England for publishing at a reasonable fixed price. Generally, the books are taken up and divided amongst the different

publishers who undertake to publish them. Though the publishers are different, the format and the cover page is identical thus ensuring a common personality for all the books published in the series. The object of the series is mainly politico-cultural and aimed at spreading English culture and the English language to large areas of Africa and Asia.

But conditions for the British are very different. First of all, they have a very large number of books from which they can make a selection. They have only to order a re-print of one such book after making arrangements with the original publisher. In English, the number of books in different subjects is very large and such a selection can, therefore, be easily made keeping in view the market for which it is being planned. As our books will be mainly meant for being published in the Indian languages and the subjects also will not be of such a varied nature, this method cannot be copied here. Moreover, here it is not the case of a simple re-print but in large measure of translations of books. Translation of high quality books is not an easy job and will require a great organised effort. We might, however, be able to get some good hints from this experiment as for example assigning books to different publishers while ensuring that the personality of the series and its outward get-up remains the same.

ELBS books have an assured market as many of the books they are publishing are known and already appreciated. The government through the British Council also buys a large number of copies for distribution in Africa and Asia. They are also sold in large numbers in African and Asian book shops. There is also no difficulty in printing to specific standards as first class presses are easily available at competitive rates.

Our Situation

Our problem is more complicated and we will have to fashion our own project. The choice of indigenous books which can be selected for this purpose is limited

because the number of books published in the country in the languages as well as in English is not great. Neither is it so varied in the subject matter as in the European languages. Books from other languages will have to be taken up and for that purpose the question of translation will have to be tackled adequately in order to make them available in all the languages in the country. This might probably require the greatest effort and expenditure because the translation of high quality books will require a group of competent translators who will have to be adequately paid for doing this important work. Certain classics might require specialised translators for the purpose. Such qualified people may not be available at a moment's notice and some arrangements will have to be made for that purpose, including even training and laying down certain guide lines. It is also more than probable that in many cases original books might have to be prepared for being published as subsidised books because on certain subjects books might not be available and books that are available in foreign languages might not be found suitable.

All this means that we will have to set up an important foundation or foundations or trusts for doing such work which will have to be adequately financed. The financial aspect is important as by experience we find that many schemes prepared by government did not make much progress later on because adequate finances were not made available for what was originally a big national scheme. The work of foundations or trusts will have to be supplemented by a well-thought out scheme of helping private publishers to collaborate in the over-all plan.

Quality of Textbooks

A reference has also to be made here to the question of higher types of textbooks for our colleges and universities especially in technical subjects. The matter is very important. On really first class textbooks for our colleges and universities will depend the quality of education they give. At

present the available textbooks are too costly for the average student. An effort is being made to get from foreign countries textbooks of the requisite quality. While this might be a temporary measure it is doubtful whether the policy of allowing foreign foundations and governments to furnish textbooks at a subsidised price for our students is a wise one. If this is continued on a big scale it is likely to subordinate our intellectual up-bringing to particular countries and does not appear desirable. Already there is cold war rivalry between countries like the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. in trying to furnish books to our students for higher studies. In the long run we must have such books prepared in the country or if this is not possible adopt foreign books for our requirements, get them published in the country and make them available at a subsidised price to our students. No publishing industry for textbooks can be built up in this country if we leave this work to foreign publishers. Such a dependence also does not appear to be healthy for our country.

Export


The question of subsidising books for the purpose of export might not at present be an important question as the amount of books likely to be exported from this country is not yet large. But there is a great potential market which can be tapped and this question is not getting the attention that it deserves. Important foreign countries, like the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R., have a formidable list of private and government book promotion programmes. These are mainly used for helping exports. The American Book Scheme is meant to help the publishers to lower the price of books to developing countries. The U.S. Information Agency pays the cost of translation of specified books and guarantees to buy a minimum number of copies which are distributed abroad. The Franklin's Book Programmes Inc. uses various techniques to promote the export of books in different ways with the help of the American Government. It is estimated that Ame-

rican publishers receive subsidy to the tune of 18 million pounds for export. The U.S.S.R. Programme of Export is a direct government effort and it aims at selling books at a cheap price in all the developing countries of Asia and Africa in different ways. The Government of India is trying to help many industries by subsidy and otherwise. It appears strange that they should pay no attention to this important potential market that India can develop.

Realising the Urgency

The importance of subsidising books for making them cheap enough is not yet fully realised in political and governmental circles. This is clear from the fact that the few autonomous bodies which are trying to go forward in this direction are hampered in many ways. The Auditor General objects and insists that they must make their books pay all expenses. The government has not tried to issue any definite directive which will clear the way in this direction. This appears an un-understanding attitude to a national requirement. Sometimes there is parliamentary criticism which is mainly due to not understanding the necessity for a subsidised book programme. Questions are asked as to why autonomous bodies are not able to earn sufficient profits by selling their books to become self-dependent. All this goes to show that a lot of effort will have to be made to make government and the public realise the urgency of the problem.

Any national effort in this direction will have to be on a big scale and sufficient amount of money will have to be made available. Then only will it give real results. The late Prime Minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, had some such idea when he originally laid the foundation of the National Book Trust. A beginning was made but adequate financial help was not forthcoming, nor was sufficient interest taken in the progress of this idea in practical form. Even now it is not too late for us to take up this important task for national intellectual development and educational progress.



SEMINAR ON SEMINAR

a symposium on the many
ideas thrown up in the
past ninety nine issues

symposium participants

THE PERSONALITY

Surindar Suri, social scientist, visiting professor in the USA

POLITICAL VIEW

S. Gopal, formerly Director, Historical Research Division, External Affairs, now teaching at Oxford

FOREIGN POLICY

S. Mohan Kumaramangalam, lawyer, commentator on current affairs

ECONOMIC ATTITUDES

Rajni Kothari, Director, Centre for the Study of Developing Societies

THE INDUSTRIAL SCENE

Baldev Singh, Director, Research Coordination and Industrial Liaison, Council of Scientific and Industrial Research

AGRICULTURE

Sugata Dasgupta, Joint Director of the Gandhian Institute of Studies, Varanasi

SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY

M. M. Suri, engineer-scientist, Director, Central Mechanical Research Institute

DEFENCE PERSPECTIVES

Ashok Desai, economist, actively associated with industry

LANGUAGE AND EDUCATION

Sukhamoy Chakravarty, Professor of Economics, Delhi School of Economics

IMPLEMENTATION

Dilip Mukerji, political correspondent, 'The Statesman', New Delhi

THE CULTURAL CRISIS

Ashok Rudra, visiting professor of Economics, Delhi School of Economics

A SOCIETY IN CHANGE

Rasheeduddin Khan, Head of the Political Science Department, Osmania University

IDEOLOGY AND PRAGMATISM

B. Natarajan, Deputy Director General, National Council of Applied Economic Research

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a complete index of a ninety nine issues prepared by D. C. Sharma

COMMUNICATIONS

Received from Anees Chishti (Delhi) and Achal (Delhi)

COVER

Designed by Dilip Chowdhury

The personality

SURINDAR SURI

THERE is something outstanding about SEMINAR, —something that sets it off from the other journals I know. What makes it different are its various unique features. To begin with, let us note one of the unique aspects, namely, the layout. I don't know of any other journal that regularly makes up its articles from the bottom upwards. SEMINAR sets the articles from the back and moves forward. This is symbolic of SEMINAR's approach. All human beings stand on the same earth, but because of their different, distinctive heights, they don't reach the same elevation. But they are equal when they stand on level earth. The equality of all contributors to SEMINAR is that they all sit on the same bottom. The reach differs for each contribution. In fact, the make-up portrays the writer whose bottom is fixed to the seat of a chair. And one may picture each article in the SEMINAR as a crouching figure, ready to spring. Each individual crouches somewhat differently, but there is enough similarity to make them all look alike.*

Of course, the title page is always different.

To harmonise with the layout, Seminar should have started with a high-numbered issue. The original issue might have been numbered, say, 250, and the next one 249, and so on. Even now it is not too late. What about making the next issue 99-A? The next centennial number will then be Seminar 0.

Someone once remarked that the unity of Asia consists in its intense, almost excessive internal diversity—the different parts of Asia have little in common geographically, and this sets it off from other continents which are geographically much more homogeneous. Asia is, internally non-homogenous, but, nevertheless, different to all other continents, which makes Asia one continent, sets it off from the others and lends it unity of a higher kind. The same may be said of the title pages of SEMINAR. They are all so different to each other that on the surface there is no uniformity or continuity. But the covers of SEMINAR are so different to those of any other journal that their very diversity creates a kind of unity. In fact 'e pluribus unum'—the Latin saying meaning unity in diversity—is something that probably describes the spirit of SEMINAR. Its contents are very diverse. Its contributors come from all shades of the political and intellectual spectrum—from ultra-violet at one extreme to infra-red at the other—from the super-sophisticated intellectuals on one edge to the relatively direct thinkers at the other edge. This diversity exists without any attempt on the part of the editor to impose a pattern of thinking or a unified outlook.

There is no SEMINAR standpoint. There is no SEMINAR ideology. Everybody has a free run. In fact you might think that the ideal, if one might talk in those terms, of SEMINAR's editorship is an anarchistic one: and everybody does what he pleases. Even the length of the articles varies from a monograph to an epigram. And yet, the total freedom to run his own way, given to each contributor, somehow gives rise to a personality. In other words, the intellectual personality of SEMINAR is emergent. It has not been imposed nor, I suspect, even been forethought. It could not be predicted. Yet, out of the diversities and idiosyncracies of the contributions a kind of personality arises. The SEMINAR personality has not yet taken a very clear-cut form. One may hope that it will never become so much a mature personality that it begins to overlay the thinking of the contributors.

A contributor comes to SEMINAR without any preimposed patterns that he must follow. When one writes for any other newspaper or journal, with its distinct viewpoint or literary style, one adapts to it instinctively or unconsciously, or deliberately. When writing for the *London Times* or *The Statesman* of Calcutta or the *Hindu* of Madras, one knows what kind of newspaper it is. Being a reader of these newspapers, one knows their personalities. And, more or less unthinkingly, one adjusts one's

writing and indeed approach and style to that of the newspaper.

But when one is writing for SEMINAR, there is no pattern to which one could conform, knowingly or unknowingly or deliberately, or even through deliberate disregard. Rebellion, on the intellectual plane, is as much an influence towards conformity as the deliberate effort to harmonize. This is another unique feature of SEMINAR. Each contributor sits in the chair of the editor. He tends to express himself and to establish a style that is entirely his own. The invitation to write for SEMINAR evokes the creative impulse not only on the purely intellectual plane, but in the sense of wanting to create a newspaper according to each contributor's own desires. In other words, there is a kind of collective editorship. Collective, of course, not in any totalitarian sense where collectivity must abide by some monolithic purpose or goal, but in the artistic or aesthetic sense.

And, yet, out of this very independence which the journal offers to its contributors, a kind of personality is emerging. Before we analyse what kind of a personality it is—whether it is schizoid, paranoid, involuted manic depressive, regressive or merely normal—something must be said about the poser. A poser for SEMINAR, in my experience, serves a negative rather than a positive function. It is as if the contributors are invited, even challenged, to ignore the poser. What the poser says is something taken for granted. Or it marks out a field of taboo that the other contributors must avoid. The poser is something intended to be ignored, but ignored deliberately. One must be careful not to fall even accidentally into the argument initiated by the poser. This is a most important function, and a creative one.

Similarly, the role of the editor in SEMINAR is essentially a negative one. Namely, one does not know what the editor wants. And the editor is, in fact, eminently successful in generating this void. Undoubtedly, the lack of direction is at times confusing to the contributors, who may not know what to do, because there are no firm indications of what is expected. However, the success of SEMINAR in attracting contributors—it never seems to be short of contributions—indicates that there are enough writers in India who are willing to pour out their ideas into a relatively indeterminate format without having any compulsive pattern being imposed upon them.

SEMINAR may be said to have arrived on the scene in India at the right time. And this is an important factor—the date of the birth of SEMINAR. I do not know if the editor and

publisher had a horoscope cast for the venture. I would like to have a copy of the horoscope, and perhaps also some expert astrological interpretations. Did they consult a properly qualified astrologer at the time they conceived the journal, or at the time the journal was delivered? Let us hope the editor in one of the articles in the anniversary issue will tell us how the conception and the preparations for the birth of the journal took place. It will be of interest and importance for the intellectual history of contemporary India.

The observer who looks in from the outside naturally takes an historic view. It is interesting, therefore, to note that the journal appeared in a period of thaw. The thaw was brought about by a series of developments in world politics. People say that the thaw occurred because of Stalin's death and the emergence of a less fanatic and less aggressive leadership in the Soviet Union. I believe this is not entirely true. The cold war was not entirely of Stalin's making. Stalin, Molotov and all the other frightening figures of world politics were keen on collaboration at the end of the second world war. The truth about the origins of the cold war is just beginning to emerge, and in the years ahead we shall have adequate information about it. Only the direction is visible now.

The cold war was inflicted on mankind primarily by the British and American political leaders. And the thaw in the cold war set in by the middle of the 1950's not only because Stalin died, but also when the western powers realized that they must accept the Soviet Union as an established fact for it did not collapse; accept that it had grown into a super power, it had developed nuclear weapons, and that it had achieved economic reconstruction after recovering from the devastation of the war. John Foster Dulles, among the most fanatical of the cold warriors, realized that the Soviet Union could not be rolled back, it could not even be contained, and that the United States must come to terms with it. Let us acknowledge at the same time that the cold war had served its purpose: it had stabilized western Europe, permitting it to re-establish the capitalist economic system, and the old ruling class had returned to power. The vulnerable position in which it found itself at the end of the second world war had essentially been overcome. Therefore, the cold war in Europe was no longer necessary.

The combination of these and other factors led to the thaw. This unfroze ideological fixed positions and permitted political and economic exchange across fixed lines. A new kind of dialogue became possible after the gradual disappearance of the morbid fear of showing any weakness in one's intellectual armour or political responses. Certain intellectual and

emotional, cultural and political interchanges became possible across entrenched positions. The situation became somewhat more mobile. SEMINAR appeared in this period of unfreezing of the fixed lines, across which until then little or no communication had been possible. But SEMINAR is not merely a product of the development in the international field. It is peculiarly Indian. It is the Indian idea, and responds to the ever-urgent need that Indian intellectuals and political leaders should do their own thinking. They must develop their own categories of thought and of action, not behind any kind of a curtain, but out in the open. SEMINAR is a dialogue, a multilogue, or a polylogue. It is conversation. The conversation is possible because nobody is forced to be on the defensive.

SEMINAR harks back to the Greek tradition of Socrates, Plato and Aristotle. But the editor of SEMINAR is more Socratic than Socrates. He does not intrude into the dialogue, he does not pretend to hold the last word of wisdom. He does not drive the participants in the dialogue towards a preformed conclusion. He appears on the scene only as one of the conversationalists. The editor is rather tongue-tied. He has no ace up his sleeve. In fact, the SEMINAR has no conclusions. The dialogue is an end in itself. Each of the conversationalists has his own conclusion, if any. It is a symposium of diverse conclusions or of none. But the presence of a pluralistic philosophy or the lack of a philosophy has a distinct impact.

Let us examine the situation in India at the time of the birth of SEMINAR. The first issue came out in 1959 which marked a turning point in Indian politics and in social and economic developments. In 1959 Nehruism got into a crisis. Although the second five-year plan was doing well, coming to be considered the most successful of the five-year plans, the impasse in economic development was visible in 1959. The crisis was primarily the lack of a dynamic approach. The economic and, indeed, the political thinking of the ruling personalities was static. They had certain well-defined goals and ideas. The trouble was that these were being exhausted. The goals could be reached. Once they were realized, there was a vacuum and a sense of exhaustion. There was a sense of ennui, for one had attained what one had set out to do and that was that.

After that kind of fulfilment comes death. What was needed was that before the goals of the second five-year plan had been achieved, new goals should have been set. And the perspective should have been such that it was interminably dynamic. But the Indian personality is essentially perfectionist. It culminates in the perfection attained by an

individual—an esthete or a seer, the prophet or the great man. But it is not the ever incomplete, the ever finite but ever dynamic personality that generates the never ending movement, change and progress in contemporary society.

So you might say that 1959 was the year when the signs of obsolescence of the traditional Indian personality became poignantly visible. It seems that a result of the impasse was India's growing conflict with China. I believe that the conflict with China is one of the most tragic things that has happened to India. One cannot argue that the other difficulties into which our country has fallen all spring from this, but they are related. They spring from India's failure to solve its own domestic problems. A householder who cannot run his own home efficiently and harmoniously, who cannot manage his own family is likely to quarrel with the neighbours.

Similarly, the Indian leadership in 1959 was in the position of the householder unable to manage its own domestic problems. It was beginning to get involved more and more in quarrels with its neighbours. These quarrels were to some extent an attempt to offset the discord within the household. But the neighbours were not going to take the quarrelling lying down. It was only a matter of time before the external conflicts would spill over and exacerbate the discord within the family. A process of disintegration would set in.

It may sound like an exaggeration, but SEMINAR appeared at the crucial juncture, and set the pattern for a new kind of personality—the open ended personality, the non-perfectionist personality that India needs so desperately in order to survive and flourish in the 20th and 21st centuries. India must develop a society in which no one individual dominates. For this it needs individuals who not only permit or encourage but creatively assist others to develop their personalities by acting as catalytic agents.

The SEMINAR is what all those who work for it have made it. And yet every contributor to some degree bears the stamp of the editor, without which he could not be what he is. This is certainly true of many contributors including the present one. They owe their own intellectual development to a significant extent to the opportunity to express themselves in SEMINAR. In fact, SEMINAR is archetypal. There should be individuals in all of our colleges, factories, and planning bodies who do not try to impress their own selves on the institutions they work for, do not try to impress their personalities on the country as Nehru or Gandhi did and all other leaders, but whose work lies in evoking the best in others. In the darkening picture of India today, the success of SEMINAR is an encouraging sign. If we had SEMINARS in the

government and in other institutions, the problems of India might be nearer solution.

Let us review briefly what has happened in the eight years and four months since the first SEMINAR appeared. The situation in India has deteriorated and the picture today is much bleaker than it was. In what way has SEMINAR counteracted this? I would say: in a tangential sense. SEMINAR represents a countervailing force. In a complex society, living and vital, there are forces moving in all directions. There are forces of disintegration, and there are forces of integration. There are signs of decay and trends of regeneration. It seems that SEMINAR is one of the countervailing forces that counteract disintegration, decay and demoralization. Its personality is complex, for it is a mosaic of the personalities of its contributors. These reflect the full gamut of ideas and attitudes in India. The personality of SEMINAR is, in intellectual terms, the emergent personality of India. If we take the first hundred issues of SEMINAR, all views and attitudes that we may discover in India would have found expression.

What can we say to predict the future of SEMINAR and, indirectly, of India? India's striking character lies in its tremendous variety. It is universal, a microcosm. An attempt to turn this into a monolithic personality would be futile. There is no need to make India monolithic, because all monolithic viewpoints, ideologies, or perspectives can be accommodated within it. On the other hand, what is India's unity? Until now, the diversities in India have tended to be essentially mechanical. A friend of mine once described an adult marriage as the capacity to tolerate. Such a tolerance has been a characteristic of political India, but it was a mechanical tolerance. What we now face is a dynamic interaction between all the diverse attitudes, viewpoints, personalities and perspectives. They must mutually enrich; indeed, in this process they must mutually conflict. They might clash and in this clash of opinions some may fall, some may fail, some may be changed. SEMINAR may well prove the catalyst.

The past decade was also one of the great sell-out. Many a respected figure was found, on examination, to have compromised his integrity for the sake of money, position or prestige—for a directorship here, an editorship there. The deterioration has reached a point where one does not know in whom to repose one's trust. One is sure only of oneself. In this situation it is reassuring to turn to SEMINAR and know that it can be subscribed to, or single issues purchased in bookstores, but that it cannot be bought. Its quiet and unassuming integrity is a beacon in the sea of demoralization. SEMINAR is needed.

The political view

S. GOPAL

THE centenary issue of SEMINAR is a fit occasion to pay tribute to its consistent endeavour these many years to pool views and good thought on the diverse issues confronting our country. It also provides an opportunity for retrospect, to see how much SEMINAR has been prescient and how far its efforts have been effective; and we may even draw benefit from the experience and the lessons in the days to come. For, human history is not just a dead past but its totalization by us in the present as part of our orientation of ourselves towards the future.

About fifty years ago, in the Ashe murder case at Tinnevely, a British judge observed, 'A subject country has no politics.' To that the reply was promptly given, 'A subject country has nothing but politics.' India is now politically free, but the obsession with politics not just among the intelligentsia but even among the ordinary people has remained. In few countries is the average citizen so much of a political animal. And yet, if there is one conclusion on which all thinking Indians of whatever political colour seem to

be agreed, it is that the Indian politician has failed his country and that the Indian political view is dismal.

This is well reflected in SEMINAR's assessment, published in February 1967, of the state of *Our Union*. It was an angry issue. Professor M. N. Srinivas, whom no one who knows him would describe as a scare-monger, was convinced that the two basic assumptions underlying a democratic country were fast disappearing in India—that India is a single country and all Indians owe it primary allegiance, and that all disputes over all issues within the country should be settled peacefully.

What Shamlal found most disturbing was the way in which so many Indians seemed to have all of a sudden lost all faith in the future. Dr. Sethi agreed: 'From disenchantment to weariness, and from indignation to helplessness is the current national mood. There is a nasty stench in the air and everyone, except those who sit on the rot, knows where it comes from. The nation is decomposing at its vitals...' Harsh words,

but who can say they are not justified?

Multiple Ancestry

This leprous state of Indian politics has a multiple ancestry. Even Gandhi is not free of guilt, for he it was who strengthened the political aspects of religion and language, the two major corrosive forces in India today. As for Nehru, it is not to minimize his immense contribution to the building of the Indian nation to remember that on some vital issues he merely papered over the cracks. But both Gandhi and Nehru were big enough leaders, with a national perspective and a national influence, to tide over problems and hold India together. It is our misfortune that 'Gandhi's and Nehru's chicks', as Professor Srinivas almost endearingly terms them, have come home to roost after the two giants have gone. The post-Nehru leadership was cast on an altogether Lilliputian scale.

Readers of SEMINAR had no reason to be surprised at this, for many of its contributors had been stressing the probability of such a development. One of the legacies of Nehru, wrote Dr. Sethi, was that 'of tenth rate leaders desperately and perpetually trying to become ninth rate'. However, Dr. Jitendra Singh was not worried that there was no likelihood of Nehru's successor being anywhere near his calibre; he argued (Issue 51, November 1963) that Nehru himself had made the need for another Nehru redundant, for it was one of his successes that he had made India mature enough to move beyond the cult of personality. In the United States, Britain and the Soviet Union, party organisation had replaced personal leadership, and a similar process could be received with equanimity in India.

This, was all very well and reassuring in the abstract; but the thesis that there was no harm in the professional Congress politicians taking over from national figures was vitiated by two factors in India. The first was the low ebb which the Congress Party had

reached. In the very first issue of SEMINAR, Sisir Gupta had drawn attention to the wide gap between the hopes aroused by the Congress and its actual ideas and attitudes; and nothing that Nehru did in his last five years served to inject purpose and dash into that party. From this point of view, the Kamaraj plan deceived nobody. But even more disastrous was the failure of the Congress to attract fresh blood and draw upon the new, post-1947, generation to rebuild its strength and quality. It increasingly became, in the years after Nehru, the party neither of those who had struggled in the years before 1947 nor of those who had anything contemporary to offer but of self-seekers inimical to thought and service, hard-headed exploiters who were determined to do well out of freedom.

In a remarkably perceptive article written in July and published in November 1963, Dr. Amlan Datta warned that 'India seems to be moving steadily and unmistakably towards a leadership of a semi-fascist character'. The histrionic patriotism and hysterical belligerency aroused by the fighting with Pakistan cannot conceal the vast amount of ground lost in these years within India, thanks to the strengthening of the divisive aspects of region, language and religion.

However, the Shastri regime proved but an interregnum. Mrs. Gandhi's succession was primarily the result of two causes, the desire to return to charismatic leadership even if of the second degree, and the yearning to be led by someone who belonged in more than the nominal sense to the twentieth century and could be expected to be abreast of modern events and aspirations. The professional politicians had had their chance and had failed. India had become mature enough to respond to impersonal leadership, but the latter could not rise to the level demanded of it.

Sophisticated Voting

The general elections of 1967 were the most promising development in India politics since the

transfer of power. They demonstrated that illiteracy and poverty are wholly divorced from political sensitivity, and that the Indian voter cherished his franchise and was aware of what and for whom he was voting. No analyst need ever again wonder if universal suffrage has taken root in this country.

The poser in the issue of February 1962 speculated as to whether the secular liberalism of the parliamentary system was a weak sun, and exactly five years later Professor Srinivas thought it possible that that sun might set. He drew attention to the danger that politicisation through adult franchise was not always a force for modernization; given a largely illiterate and backward electorate, the back lash from it might well destroy the slender plant of modernization which a small, westernized elite had nourished in India for over a century. In fact, however, the Indian electorate displayed in 1967, by and large, an unexpected degree of sophistication. Democracy in India may be destroyed, but it will not decay because of the inadequacy of the electors. The sun may be eclipsed but it will not go down of its own.

Triumph of Youth

This heartening common sense of the electors is illustrated by the general trend of the results. There would seem to be almost a subconscious grape-vine linking the masses of India together and giving a unity to the far-flung verdicts of the polls. Everywhere the people asserted with decision that they were tired of the old men, irrespective of party, who had been for so long the limpets of Indian politics. The Krishna Menons and the Kamarajs, the Khannas and the Kamaths, had only age and defeat in common; those who were victorious were the young, of whatever affiliations.

The consequence of this cutting across party loyalties has been the weakening of such coherence as existed in India on the basis of one-party dominance. This is basically a healthy process. The unity of India would be worth

little if it depended largely on the monopoly of power by the Congress. The federal constitution, which till now had been in virtual abeyance, has now to be operated with new conventions and understandings, and this assumes responsible attitudes on the part both of the State governments and of the Centre. But evidence of this is not plentiful. The DMK Government has not yet even begun to justify its electoral success; and elsewhere the disparate elements in the coalition ministries are held together only by a dislike of the Congress and a thirst for office, and there is little of administration or of policy.

Centre and States

SEMINAR, I would suggest, should have an issue on the functioning of the 'Opposition' parties in office. There is reason to believe that power, with its perquisites, is in many cases and end in itself, without any sustaining principle. Even the Left, which elsewhere thrives on ideology and commitment, in India does not appear to be immune from office-hunger. As for the Central Government, it seems mentally unable to adjust itself to the new situation. The electoral defeats of the Congress are treated as aberrations to be ignored. A Congress government was stabilized in Rajasthan in defiance of constitutional propriety. If in Madhya Pradesh the Mishra Cabinet could not be saved, it was not, apparently, for want of trying.

But the latest lifting of the curtain on Centre-State relations has provided the most damning revelations. In the abortive effort to eject the Government of West Bengal, no one's behaviour is seen to advantage—not that of the authorities in Delhi nor that of the various constituents of the coalition in Calcutta. To all of them politics is no more than a continuous intrigue. This disclosure can do no harm to those who have no credit to lose. But it, if true, cannot benefit the Prime Minister, whose main assets are an image and a style. Much can be said in criticism of Jawaharlal Nehru; but can anyone conceive of such

an episode in the Nehru age? Even in Kerala in 1959, his action may have been unfair, but there was nothing clandestine and sordid about it.

Language Policy

The public exposure of such low—and thwarted—cunning has heavily damaged the bonafides and intelligence of Mrs. Gandhi's Government in the eyes of watchful Indians of all parties and of none. There can be not even the semblance of charisma without confidence. And this episode has come in the wake of the reckless short-sightedness of the language policy. On no issue has SEMINAR been more discerning and prophetic.

The poser in the issue of July 1961 set out the problem clearly. It noted that whatever their several reasons for doing so, Andhra, Madras, Mysore and Kerala found it natural to group themselves in a category which distinguished them from the rest of the country; but this differentiation between North and South constituted no rejection or even violation of the concept of Indian unity. Rather, the enemies of Indian nationalism were those who tried either to convert regional cohesion into separatism or to submerge it under a monolithic uniformity. There need be no permanent North-South problem if the Indian nation were consolidated upon the highest principles of equality and democracy. But the chief danger, warned the poser, was linguistic bigotry. Persistence with the original design to force Hindi on the South as the language of the Indian people would provide the one plank upon which all of South India could be mobilized against a northern hegemony.

Writing exactly two years later, Dr. Alman Datta again underlined the danger. The only form of government under which the North and the South could live peacefully together was one which did not appear as an imposition on the South, and such a government by its very nature, should have moderation and compromises built into it. In a country with India's

diversity it was rather narrow-minded to speak of the national language; we perhaps need one national language just about as much as we need one national religion.

The best arrangement, concluded Dr. Datta, would possibly be to have the principal regional language and English as official languages in the States and Hindi and English as official languages at the Centre for an indefinite length of time. It was irrelevant to cite the precedents of other countries, because nowhere else could one find so many major languages at approximately the same level of development and of co-ordinate status.

Sociological Aspect

Nehru recognized this, but the wisdom apparently departed with him. With the decline in the authority of leadership and the quality of the Congress, the pressure of the Hindi protagonists grew. There is also, as writers in SEMINAR have repeatedly observed, a sociological aspect to this. The Hindi-speaking people live in areas of social and economic backwardness. Sixty per cent of the children in the age group of six to eleven who are not attending schools are to be found in these regions, Orissa and Jammu. These areas are also some of the poorest in the country. If they had been economically more prosperous and socially more forward-looking, it is possible that their inhabitants might have been willing to be more generous to the non-Hindi-speaking peoples. As it is, they are inclined to be intolerant in all respects. It is here, for example, that the Jana Sangh flourishes. So the making of Hindi into the national language, the sole official language and the common language of higher learning in all parts of India would in course of time lend, and be intended to lend, strength to conservative cultural trends. It would effect, too, a qualitative change in the character of the academic elite and the administrative and political leadership of the country. If the process were allowed to work itself out, it

would, as Dr. Datta has said, create in all probability a more uniform, inward-directed 'Hindu' India, and the corresponding type of leadership; and this in turn would meet with very great resistance and provoke separatist tendencies.

The fears expressed in SEMINAR have been borne out by events. In the Shastri phase the supporters of Hindi were given full rein, with the result that there were widespread riots in the South. The language policy of the Shastri Government was the most powerful single factor responsible for the formation of a DMK ministry in Madras. The attitude of Mrs. Gandhi at that time, coupled with the Nehru inheritance, ensured for her the decisive support of the South in the contests for the succession. But one is rapidly being driven to the conclusion that her government is determined to dissipate this trust. Its language policy has meandered wildly, has rushed to the brink and rushed back.

One can hardly believe that such irresponsibility is possible when the unity of India is at stake. The fact that at the moment Andhra and Mysore, primarily because they have Congress governments, have not openly supported the sentiment in Madras on this issue, and that Kerala is otherwise preoccupied, should not lead to the delusion that the Tamils alone feel strongly about Hindi and can therefore be defeated in isolation. Rather, the demand for secession, banned constitutionally and renounced formally, is powerful below the surface; and public sympathy for the anti-Hindi cause is widespread throughout the South. The drift is, towards disintegration, and a positive attempt has to be made to stem it.

Revolutionary Situation

India has for some time now been in a revolutionary situation, comparable in many ways to the situations in France in 1789 and Russia in 1917. Famine, drought, increase of numbers and soaring prices have combined to produce a context in which the prevalence

of legitimacy can only cause surprise. What requires explanation is why, in such a revolutionary situation, there is—as yet—no revolution. The essence of revolution, Trotsky has said, is 'the direct intervention of the masses in historic events'. Why do the long-suffering masses of India not intervene?

It is true that by nature and tradition the Indian people can put up with a vast amount of misery and wretchedness, but one would have thought that the threshold even of their endurance has by now been reached. Nor is it that the Indian masses lack experience of intervention in events. Right down from the twenties till 1947 they had a proud record of resistance, which became so intense and widespread in 1942 and after that administration in large parts of India was virtually at a standstill and the British had no option but to leave—the only questions were how and when. Much that is irrelevant has been written about which individual gave India her freedom or which leader won it for her. The truth is that the Indian people claimed their birth-right and no one could stop them. The mutiny of the Indian navy, for example, is on a par with that of the Russian navy in 1917 and was as significant.

Lack of Leadership

What, then, has happened to the surge and vigour of the Indian people? Why are they now dormant? The answer, it is suggested, is twofold. The masses cannot intervene with effect unless they have revolutionary leadership. They had such a leader against the British in Gandhi. They lack such a leader or even a revolutionary group or class now. This primarily is the failure of the Left in India. Neither the Communists who sought to promote revolution in India before the war nor the fervent nationalists who organised the underground movement in 1942 created a continuous tradition of revolutionary initiative and endeavour. They themselves—or such of them as still remain alive and active—have had their thought

diluted and are only different, if at all, in degree from other Indian politicians; and they have had no inheritors of their earlier phases. Gandhi was the last of the Indian revolutionaries. Certainly now there seems to be no one in India aflame with political passion, eager to transcend the present and move towards a new future.

As Shamlal wrote in the issue of February 1967, nothing in the national scene is more dispiriting than the prevailing poverty of thought—and, one may add, of spirit. The Indian people have merited a leadership that is worthier of them. Exactly a hundred years ago, when the franchise was extended in Britain, a British politician, nervous of the power of the vote in the hands of so many, said that it was necessary to 'educate our masters'. In present-day India the situation is exactly the reverse; it is the voters who have to 'educate our leaders'.

Objectives and Credentials

In this, perhaps, lies the second part of the answer as to why in India we have an unstarted revolution. Unlike in other countries where politics have erupted, here democracy has taken firm root. The people have cast their votes in a decisive way, and now await the consequences. Whether these consequences will be adequate to avert a violent upheaval depends mainly on the wisdom, foresight and effectiveness of those in the seats of power at Delhi. On Mrs. Gandhi rests a greater responsibility than that borne by her predecessors, if only because the situation has worsened so sharply. A failure to command the revolutionary situation, and dictatorial attempts to impose regional dominance, religious intolerance and linguistic hegemony—and the India that we know may cease to be. 'In this' wrote Dr. Datta in the article published in the issue of November 1963, 'lies the case for, and the hope of, a liberal leadership in India.' There could be no clearer statement of what one trusts is the objective, and what could be the credentials, of the Prime Minister.

Foreign policy

S. MOHAN KUMARAMANGALAM

IN these 11 issues of SEMINAR there is material on every possible aspect of India's foreign policy, of India's relations with its neighbours, of India's place in the world. Interestingly enough, we can break up these issues roughly by half and half; six devoted to the relations between India and its neighbours, taking both the African countries and the Soviet Union as neighbours of India and five others which may be considered to have covered India's position in the world.

The only subject, one of the utmost importance which needs separate treatment, is that of the war in Viet Nam, of the highest importance from the point of view of Indian security and world peace. Perhaps, that lack will be remedied in the near future. For with the American Presidential election approaching closer, a discussion on the situation in Viet Nam will have to be posed before our country.

Of the issues that deal with foreign policy, most interesting is to compare issue No. 19, entitled *Our Foreign Policy* with No. 45 entitled *Non-alignment* and issue No. 77 entitled *We and the World*.

Issue No. 19 came out in March 1961, a year and a half prior to the Chinese aggression on our country. Three of the principal contributors to issues No. 19 and 77 are common; K. P. Karunakaran (who also figures in issue No. 45), Vidya Prakash Dutt and the Editor himself. Issue No. 45 (May 1963)

comes after the Chinese aggression but before the Pakistan attack; and No. 77 (January 1966) after this attack.

Although Chinese aggression was yet to come when issue No. 19 was published, we cannot but mark the important position given to Indo-Chinese relations when considering foreign policy. The hostile attitude to India displayed by China had laid the basis for questioning the very fundamentals of India's foreign policy. Sisir Gupta who poses the problem in that issue puts it this way: 'The crux of this controversy—India's growing security needs on her northern frontiers and the prospect of prolonged tension with neighbouring China—brings into sharp focus the question whether this country can remain non-aligned or separate from the other countries of South and South-east Asia in matters of defence.'

Lakshmi Menon, then Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs, also reveals the concern in official circles. She wrote: 'The growth of the economic strength of China, the recent threats from our northern neighbour and a certain frustration caused by the relatively slow progress in our economic development have been responsible for the doubt in the minds of our people as to the wisdom of our policy of non-alignment in our political relationship.'

In fact, the attack on the policy of non-alignment came from those

who adopted the Anglo-American criticism of it. It is this policy, they argued, that ultimately in a crisis will leave us without friends.

Naturally, the question was posed: 'What is the alternative?' And the answer was given in the article of Frank Moraes in the same issue, significantly entitled 'New Look'. That new look boiled down to the need for ending the hostility between India and Pakistan and the establishment of unity between these two countries. Noting Pakistan's consistent opposition to Communist China entering the U.N., Moraes pleads for 'an understanding with Pakistan' which would 'immeasurably strengthen India's hands and reinforce the position of the entire sub-continent vis-a-vis China.'

Lines of Difference

Thus, if one is to sum up the first SEMINAR on *India's Foreign Policy*, it reveals the crucial lines of difference in the country, of difference regarding international policy. Despite the stab-in-the-back delivered by China, the supporters of Nehru stood for continuation of non-alignment, pointing to the nations the world over who continued to be friendly with India. Non-alignment remained, according to them, the only workable policy. And the alternative posed was of turning away from China and even away from non-alignment towards a foreign policy, the centre of which would be friendship and alliance with Pakistan.

Issue No. 45 (May 1963) coming soon after the aggression of China, does not carry the discussion very much further. Raj Krishna's article on 'Optimum Commitment' is valuable for it is a bitter attack on Jawaharlal's policies, not difficult to launch in view of the recent Chinese betrayal of his confidence. But my interest in it arises from a different angle: that the most extreme critic of Pandit Jawaharlal's policies actually has little concrete to offer when it comes to the framing of a positive policy. Moraes at least had an alternative path—Indo-Pakistan

unity under western patronage. But Raj Krishna is mainly vituperative. He writes:

'Even if a little bit of freedom, in some sense, is indeed surrendered in an agreement, the crucial question is whether it is better to lose this little bit of freedom to an ally (not defined-SMK) or to lose the whole of it to an aggressor. Nehru, the pure non-alignmentist does not face this question. That is why he could assert that he would rather see India reduced to dust than give up non-alignment.'

'It is fantastic that Nehru should say so despite the dismal results of non-alignment. He fought for freedom; but unfortunately as the first Prime Minister of free India, he misjudged India's greatest enemy in spite of overwhelming evidence, confused the country and kept it hopelessly unprepared for an obviously predictable aggression, presided over the liquidation of Tibetan freedom and Indian control over thousands of miles of Indian territory.'

And after all this eloquence, what is the panacea? 'A concrete programme to optimise our relationships not only with the nations who give us *military aid*...

(emphasis S.M.K.)

Raj Krishna seems to have wanted military bases to be given to the never-particularised ally; but he goes only to the brink of expressing such a view and then holds back!

Vindication

Over four years later, the position has become much clearer. Pakistan and China have become friends, if not allies. There is no question of making up with Pakistan in order to defeat the Chinese. The proponents of the policy of closer relations with Pakistan also had in mind the achievement of an Indo-Pakistan alliance under the comforting aegis of the United States. But the attitude of the United States in the Indo-Pakistan conflict of 1965 was a sad disillusionment. And, by and large, we can claim that the country has once more accepted that the only

possible foreign policy is the one enunciated by Jawaharlal Nehru.

Hence comes the sum-up by Romesh Thapar, posing the problem, in SEMINAR No. 77: 'Suffice it to say that despite the absence of a coherent foreign policy at the moment, we are, under the impact of events, adhering more or less to the broad principles of non-alignment laid down by Jawaharlal Nehru.' (January 1966).

The trend of development in the last 18 months has more than confirmed this approach. There is a growing recognition that no longer are power blocs the dominant feature of international relations; rather, it is the existence of the two super powers, the U.S.A. and the USSR, super powers who are primarily interested and, naturally so, in safeguarding their own interests. The conclusion is irresistible that ultimately India's foreign policy has to be a foreign policy which does not depend exclusively on the friendship of this or that country but strives to maintain friendship with all countries, keeping at its centre the twin aims of the security of India and the maintenance of world peace.

But it must be emphasised that such a foreign policy cannot be negative or half-hearted, where the policy of either of the super powers or of any other country runs contrary to these two aims. U.S. policy in Viet Nam which any moment may lead to escalation is an immediate example. The aggressive postures of the Israelites in West Asia and their openly proclaimed determination to retain the fruits of their aggression is another instance. India's foreign policy must be swift to react to changing world events in such a way as to maintain our essentially non-aligned position, while fighting vigorously against those policies which endanger India's security and world peace.

Our Neighbours

And it is against this background that we have to consider our policy to our neighbours. We must start of course with China

and Pakistan. SEMINAR has covered the question of Indo-Pakistan relations in its 48th issue, published in August 1963, i.e., pre-aggression of 1965. Relations between India and China are dealt with almost immediately afterwards in issue No. 50 published in October 1963. A reading of these two issues is extremely heartening. For, if during the last decade, prejudice and lack of reason have dominated discussion of any problem facing India, it has been the problem of Indo-Pakistan and Indo-Chinese relations. Yet, in both these issues of SEMINAR we find a sober and responsible approach.

Indo-Pak Relations

In the issue concerning Indo-Pakistan relations the problem is posed by Pran Chopra, then *The Statesman's* New Delhi editor. Rightly he emphasises that 'the two countries have a common background and history.' After analysing the various differences he concludes: 'And finally can the two countries form the nucleus of a common southern Asia grouping, or must the two continue to diverge as in the past, one striking a non-aligned path leading away from all groupings and the other bound with whatever reluctance lately, to more than one group, each equally unsympathetic to India.'

Considerable attention is also paid to the difference between the political systems of India and of Pakistan. Our democracy is contrasted with their authoritarianism. But ultimately we come back to the crucial problem that bedevils Indo-Pakistan relations, the problem of Kashmir. Balraj Puri is the contributor in issue No. 48 who deals with that problem and he puts forward a powerful argument in favour of a solution of this most vexed problem.

'A settlement with Pakistan', he observes, 'does not entirely depend upon the amount of concessions. The mutual attitude is no less important. India's attitude must also change. Pakistan must be treated as a very special country, deserving the greatest claim of

India's affection.' More realistically also, India should give up building Indian patriotism in Kashmir on the basis of anti-Pakistanism.' How important this observation is today, when we have yet to achieve a solution of this most difficult problem.

It is, of course, a positive development that the release of Sheikh Abdullah is imminent. But one doubts if this governmental decision to release him has behind it any clear-cut perspective or policy. The emotional over-tones to the problem continue to dominate and though the gravity of the issue is recognised by all, the difference in approach is wide.

Interestingly also these differences cut across the usual Right-Left distinctions; the communists (both Right and Left) the Congress Centre and Left and a considerable section of the Swatantra urge a conciliatory approach, which involves the taking into account of both the wishes of the Kashmiri people and the need for achieving a *modus vivendi* with Pakistan. Greater autonomy for Kashmir, a guarantee by Pakistan and India—different ideas are in the air; what is common to all of them is the recognition for the need to have a fresh look, an uninhibited approach to the problem.

In contrast, we get the Jana Sangh attitude, shared by elements in the PSP and SSP and even in the Rightwing of the Congress, which is essentially communal in character though clothed in patriotic revivalist slogans. This is frankly a 'no-settlement' outlook, one that looks essentially to a solution not by agreement but by force. And caught as it were, between two fires, the official policy is difficult to determine, swinging one day this way and another day in exactly an opposite direction.

China

SEMINAR No. 50 on China is an equally useful issue, again of great value because of the balanced and objective assessment attempted by the contributors. Rasheeduddin Khan's observations are particu-

larly worth recalling today. He warned even then: 'Peking's interpretation of the revolutionary content and formulation of the tactical line appears more relevant and locally apt to many Asian parties, than the internationally-oriented and strategically logical statements of the Soviet leadership of the second generation...'

He, then, contrasts China's appeal to the oppressed peoples of Africa and Asia as being far more effective than India's for, 'India's moderation and synthesis lacks revolutionary fervour for others, largely because India is concerned more with establishing a precedent than with propagating a principle.'

Objective Study

The running thread of SEMINAR No. 50 is a plea for closer and a more objective study of our greatest neighbour. As Khan points out, China occupies about 1/8th of the total land area of Asia, making up the 3rd biggest country in the world. Its population is in the region of 700 million; thus there is one Chinese in every four men who live in this world. '12 million overseas Chinese are spread throughout Southeast Asia, about 5% of the region's total population' and acting 'as a cementing force in favour of China.'

Articles by Karunakar Gupta and Mohit Sen are most illuminating, the first giving a very competent review of India-China relations, the second a critical analysis of Chinese communist policies from the Marxist angle. Gupta's article is excellent background material for a study of Indo-Chinese relations. And, finally, mention must be made of Thavaraj's article: 'Potential for War'. This summing-up of China's military potential is worth looking at even when today, four years later, China's explosion of the atom bomb has lent even greater importance to this aspect of the problem.

The two issues on China and Pakistan therefore drive home most forcibly the lesson: these two countries are India's closest neighbours and the question of

relations with them, our closest neighbours, cannot be left in a state of drift. It is in India's interest continuously to watch and pose the problems which are at the heart of the relationship between India and Pakistan and India and China. It will be to India's peril if we ignore or neglect them. A resignation to the acceptance of permanent hostility between these two countries and India means not only to live continuously in danger of a repetition of October-November 1962 and August-September 1965. It also means the locking up of more than half India's wealth in the production of weapons of offence and defence that have to go to arm an army. This is the logic of a position which accepts increased military strength as the only way of dealing with Pakistan and China.

The U.N.

The issue on the U.N. (March 1962) puts forward the main problems of the development of the organisation. B. Rajan in his article on 'Evolution on the East River' emphasises the changing character of the organisation with the entrance of the newly independent countries who today virtually command a majority in it. The membership of the U.N. in 16 years had more than doubled. Seven years ago (1955) only 3 States in the U.N. represented Africa. That number had multiplied 8 times by 1962. 'The Asian-African groups which Sri B. N. Rau called into being in response to the Korean crisis consisted of 12 members when it first met. Today it consists of fifty-one, a number larger than the original U.N. membership.'

But, at the same time, he drives home the point that the weakness of the U.N. is that it has not yet achieved universality. He, comments on the weakness in the structure reflected in the obviously inadequate representation of Asia and Africa in the Security Council. But he emphasises rightly that any improvement in the field obviously cannot be expected without the entrance of China, for minus China no world problem

including the reorganisation of the U.N. can be effectively tackled.

K. P. Karunakaran (one of the most frequent contributors to SEMINAR on international affairs) contributes a very interesting article on 'Structure and Organisation'. Both persuasive and convincing are his arguments on the retention of the veto. To those who grumble at its frequent exercise, he replies: 'The constant exercise of veto is not an international disease, but only its symptom. A situation such as Goa (or Kashmir or even more recently the West Asian crisis—S.M.K.) indicated that a non-aligned country had to depend upon the Soviet Union and its power of veto to defend her interests.'

Another point most validly made is that the crux of the matter is not the exercise of the veto but the existence of divergent views among the great powers, the permanent members. The USA-G.B. combine can usually prevent a decision contrary to their views by rallying their friends in the Security Council. The USSR is not so fortunately placed, particularly because of the unreal presence of Chiang Kai-Shek's Taiwan as China.

Emerging Problems

The third question on which Karunakaran throws considerable light is on the role of the UNO in 'revising' the status quo. At its birth, the western powers expected the UNO to help to freeze political developments in the dependent countries—in the name of collective security and peace. But in actual fact, what happened? 'On many questions concerning the freedom of the dependent countries', answers Karunakaran, 'various organs of the UN have exercised their influence and power in favour of the promotion of freedom. This started with the Indonesian-Dutch dispute in 1947. It was tackled by the U.N. as a political and security question, but the ultimate effect of the world organisation's action was to ensure Indonesian independence and give international recognition to it. Other questions discussed on the

same level referred to the freedom of Tunisia and Morocco. But with regard to these issues, the U.N. could exercise only a moral influence and Algeria still remains a problem.'

Looking back these five years, it is clear that the blocks in the way of dependent countries achieving independence in the main have been cleared away. Portugal's dominions remain. But, for the rest, independence has been achieved—the U.N. can proudly claim. But in the train of these political victories have come much more difficult problems—the problem of reconstruction, of bridging the gap between the 'advanced' and the 'under-developed'. And to face up to this problem, it is perhaps other organs of the UN—UNESCO, ECAFE, ILO and others not directly under the U.N. like the World Bank—which must play a positive role. Unless the battleground is extended into this area, mere achievement of political independence may only be a precursor for the triumph of neo-colonialism when foreign capital rules through 'native' agents.

Before parting with this issue, reference must be made to Dr. P. S. Lokanathan's article on 'An International Civil Service'. It needs attention on two counts; first it shows the scope of study of problems found in the pages of SEMINAR; secondly, for its contents—giving a succinct description of a very important problem, often forgotten. Put briefly: what is the method of developing a loyal and effective international civil servant cadre—which at the same time does not become 'denationalised, rootless and stateless'? How is the danger of 'national prejudices and biases' to be overcome without such 'denationalisation' developing? Dr. Lokanathan's answers to these questions command attention even today.

Africa

Of particular interest is the issue on *Indians in Africa* brought out very early, being issue No. 10 (June 1960). What is written there is of very great value even today.

In fact I doubt if there is any issue of *SEMINAR* which covers such a wide field and poses so frankly the difficult problems facing Indians in this area.

Perhaps this is not essentially a foreign policy question. But there can be no doubt that the conduct of Indians in these countries, their achievements and their failures in integrating themselves with the local African population, is going both to affect India's foreign policy and be affected by it. Hence the need to have a first-hand knowledge of what Indians in Africa are doing and what is being done to them.

SEMINAR's issue No. 10 is worth reading in order to appreciate where exactly Indians are in Africa today. The difficult heritage of the past still pursues them and stands, in a sense, as a barrier between them and the African people; for the Indians went as traders, big and small, in the towns and rural areas. The African feels resentful because too much of the trade is controlled by Indians. The Indian feels resentful because he knows that by showing enterprise and vigour and initiative he helped greatly towards the development of the African market and trade. How are these two conflicting approaches with so much justice in each of them to be reconciled? A reading of *SEMINAR* No. 10 will help towards answering this question.

Other Issues

The above is only a cursory review of what struck the writer as important in these eleven issues. But, necessarily, space restricts mention and discussion of many vital questions. Issue No. 37 (September 1962) is an instance; rich in material on India's neighbours, it contains three very useful articles on communist neighbours (Vidya Prakash Dutt), Pakistan (Sisir Gupta) and Nepal (Anirudha Gupta). Perhaps the last is most important because the author covers much ground that is new and untrodden.

Issue No. 73, *Indo-Soviet Link*, also deserves mention; particular

reference needs to be made to D. K. Rangnekar's article on 'Economic Cooperation'. It stands out in the issue because it is a studied article, where propositions are supported by facts. It deserves re-reading even today two years later, when in the wake of Indira Gandhi's participation in the 50th Anniversary celebrations, there is a general vague euphoria developing round Indo-Soviet relations.

Rangnekar rightly warns: 'The Soviet Union is supposed to rank third or fourth in the list of India's trading partners, but the gap which separates this country from other prominent suppliers and buyers is far too large to make the glorified new position meaningful. For example, India's sales to the Soviet Union in 1963 formed about 6 per cent of India's total exports, but the sales to Britain formed 22 per cent and to the United States 16 per cent.

'What is even more discouraging is that, in the Soviet Union's growing volume of trade, India's share has been dwindling, something which is lost in the sea of wishful thinking in Delhi'.

Against this background, he makes a number of suggestions for stabilising and expanding Indo-Soviet trade and commercial relations which can well be considered today.

The articles by Balraj Madhok and P. C. Joshi follow the expected traditional lines of criticism and support for Jawaharlal Nehru's policies. But, as always, K. P. S. Menon's contribution is fresh and thought-provoking—that though India has, like every country, no 'permanent friends' but only 'permanent interests', yet such interests themselves provide a basis for a 'permanent affinity' in their (Indian and USSR—link) outlook on world peace and their attitude to its would-be 'disturbers'.

Asian Security

Issue No. 96, *Asian Security*, out just two months ago, poses once again the perennial questions, considered in the light of the latest developments. In an issue

that contains a wealth of good objective discussion, special if invidious mention, must be made of S. Gopal's article on 'The Choice' posing the newest problem of Indian security—China's possession of nuclear weapons of war.

Here is the neat and excellent sum-up he puts before the reader: 'With China, a hostile neighbour developing nuclear weapons, there are only two courses open to India. She can either renounce nuclear weapons because she does not believe in them and puts her trust in faith and the future; this would be a noble policy. Or, India can keep open her option to make nuclear weapons and if nothing is done soon to control China, take a firm decision in favour of manufacture. But to renounce nuclear weapons because of some generalised guarantee from either of the two super-powers... would be neither ethically commendable nor realistic but a policy of ignoble folly. Whatever the decision—for renouncing the option or maintaining it—it must be based on self-reliance.'

Summing Up

How then is one to sum up these eleven issues which cover a period of 8 years and more? Would not the best way of summing them up be to attempt once more to pose the problems that upset India's foreign policy? And these problems would appear to lie broadly in four main areas.

Firstly is the field of the super powers, the USA on the one hand and the USSR on the other. The aim of the super powers is to preserve peace,—which will enable them to consolidate their own position. But one startling difference cannot be forgotten. The USSR, in its own interests and born out of experience of war, with 22 million killed and half its economy destroyed, has refused to be 'provoked into an armed conflict outside its own frontiers since the end of World War II; in contrast we have the Americans neck deep in the war in Viet Nam.

Thus, although there is much in common in the policies of these

two super powers, there is a vital difference also. The USSR sincerely wants peace and desires peaceful competition between the two opposing systems, the capitalist and the socialist. But the USA is always chasing an ideological hound whether in Viet Nam or Cuba or Bolivia and in the process endangering world peace. Moreover, it is often overlooked that war is a profitable affair for those who make armaments; and this is even more true for the mighty American trusts, the biggest beneficiaries of the spreading conflagration in Viet Nam.

Hence, in the anxiety to see 'similarity' between the policies of the super powers, we should not forget the basic difference, that the USSR has no extra-territorial ambitions towards the achievement of which it will resort to war. Even in Eastern Europe it pursues a policy of friendship based on recognition of independence and equality, revealed in the USSR attitude to Rumania. But in contradistinction we have the present rulers of the USA always light on the trigger when it comes to protection of what they consider their vital interests.

This difference brings India and the USSR closer and the experience of 20 years of Indo-USSR friendship is enough to show that this friendship must continue, must remain a central pillar of our foreign policy.

Does this mean hostility to the USA or to the British? Not necessarily for friendship with the USSR need not mean hostility to the West. In many fields, India has to work along with the USA and the British. But we cannot and should not depend on them; that also is the lesson of Goa and Kashmir, of the days of Chinese and Pakistani aggression.

An Asian Policy

Secondly comes our policy to our neighbours. Perhaps it is here, that we need to show the greatest initiative and energy. An Asian policy must be the centre of India's foreign policy. For, an Asian policy that builds up an Asian

opinion, effective in UNO and outside, will be the biggest safeguard of India's future. We have seen the development of the European economic community, the Council of Europe, the organisation of American States and the organisation of African States—regional groupings the world over. But in Asia the development of such regional relations is negligible. A cardinal and central point in India's foreign policy must be to develop such relations.

This naturally demands live and vigorous diplomacy. The centre of gravity of India's diplomatic activity must shift from the Moscow-London-Washington axis to give equal importance to the Karachi-Rangoon-Jakarta axis, today so much in the background. And a warning note needs to be sounded here—that such diplomatic activity must not have as its core an anti-Chinese objective but a pro-Asia goal; the goal of removing the misunderstandings and tensions in Asia today; of cutting across the national barriers in order to achieve a consolidation of friendship between countries in this region whose interests and problems are so greatly in common.

Will China look on this favourably? Perhaps not the China of today's cultural revolution. But the countries round China have suffered from the excesses of this phase and will be ready to discuss, to hammer out on equal and friendly terms an Asian policy beneficial to all. This may help to bridge the gulf between these countries including India and China. Such must be the direction of our policy in Asia.

Disarmament

Thirdly comes the field of armament and disarmament, of crucial importance for the developing nations. If half India's resources are to be devoted to the manufacture of arms (and more, if we are compelled to initiate a programme of nuclear armament), then what happens to economic development? And this is true not for India alone. Even the Asian policy which must be worked out should give a foremost

place to the need for disarmament. It is here that an independent and determined policy in Asia may be of the most vital significance. Here again the problem of China sits in the foreground, for any talk of disarmament without China present is unreal and to no purpose.

Active Indian diplomacy therefore has to address itself to this task. And perhaps in this field, such diplomacy can be of particular value since the USSR will undoubtedly wholeheartedly welcome it while the U.S.A. cannot afford to be hostile.

Active Diplomacy

Fourthly comes the field of Africa. Again, too little attention is paid despite the obvious enormous potentialities of this continent. Each Indian diplomat pursues his own course, depending on his individual vagaries. A coordinated policy, based on an effective and continuous study of developing trends in Africa, is totally absent. Hence the majority of Indian diplomats in Africa, already not very friendly to the peoples of Africa, easily take refuge in isolation and inactivity. The result is that for the African people the image of India is little else but that of the trader who burrowed into Africa for profit.

A Commissioner-General for Africa; the head of all India's diplomats in that area, who, acting under the Minister for External Affairs, would coordinate Indian diplomatic activity in Africa would be a first step towards improving the situation. Then, development firstly of Indo-African trade and secondly of friendly close relations between Africa and Asia—these will lay a basis for opening up a new phase in Indo-African relations.

These are the broad issues of foreign policy that await study and demand action. SEMINAR's 11 issues contain a wealth of material that can help towards the evolution of a proper policy, a policy not of mere pious non-alignment but of positive intervention by India to shape the developing future of international relations.

Economic attitudes

RAJNI KOTHARI

IT is an irony of recent Indian history that economic thinking, on which the nation has depended so much for its 'development', has been so greatly confined and limited by our traditional mould of thought and empiricism. Contemporary trends in world social science, consequent upon the decline of political economy and the increasing preoccupation with methodological sophistication, have no doubt contributed to it, but the basic 'mould of thought' is very much indigenous and has a long

pedigree in our scholastic traditions.

A highly rigorous and self-contained system of *economic reasoning* which is however at considerable remove from *economic behaviour* is what characterises the great bulk of writing and analysis of economic problems in this country. Deductive brilliance and a high level of abstraction are their great points; insensitivity to empirical ground forces and to the indigenous contexts, differentiations and implications their great weakness. While

providing a few refreshing exceptions, the SEMINAR issues under review (13, 57, 78, 86, 91) represent a fair sample of the different strands in such thinking.

Pedantic Punditry

One of the consequences of such a mould of thought is a striking similarity in views expressed and issues raised over the years—and this at a time when the country has witnessed such an enormous shift in the problems it has to face and has generated so much practical insight into the empirical processes at work. An important consequence of this preoccupation with the same themes is the growth of a considerable consensus in economic thinking (with a matching coherence and dogmatism in 'dissident' thought). A pedantic punditry which is by and large self-contained, linear and non-contextual, characterises the style of this consensus. As the content of the consensus depends upon the authority of macro statistics internal to the system, the only differences that result are either aesthetic—one is a pessimist or an optimist—or ideological—you either blame the government or the 'vested interests'.

Sophistication in the interpretation of statistics, elicitation of their theoretical and practical bearings and identification of their linkages with extra-system variables are things on which most of our economists find no great challenge. Nor have the economists by and large (there are always exceptions like D. R. Gadgil and R. K. Hazari) been greatly interested in the study of actual economic behaviour, whether of the entrepreneur, the economic bureaucrat, the peasant proprietor, the trader or the consumer, or of institutions affecting economic behaviour—land rights, dominant castes, emerging structure of local power, education, unionism, economic lobbies, and so forth—carried out through field studies in different parts of the country.

Similarly, even in filling in their logical constructs of 'development', the economists have until recently failed to build in the implications

of our important institutional patterns and commitments on which a pervasive national consensus has prevailed over the years and, rather than wish them away, the task has been to turn these into crucial 'factors' and 'resources'.

The overall result of all this neglect is both a high degree of insensitivity to the behavioural forces and institutional compulsions at work and the predominance of a 'frame of thought' that has developed into an orthodoxy—not so much in the sense of an authoritative dispensation for action (one wished it were so!) as a conformist mould of thought and disputation that, even if irrelevant to pressing issues, keeps on going the circles in great confidence and abandon. If we keep in mind the fact that the Indian economists have exerted such a powerful influence on the decision-making apparatus, the pathology of such scholasticism would come home quite clearly.

Recurring Themes

Several themes keep recurring in these pages. There is the usual plea for what one author calls the 'heavy strategy'. The argument is by now fairly familiar and need not be repeated here. The crucial role of the capital-output ratio is discussed, usually as part of a systems analysis of input-output relationships (few have bothered to think of 'output' in organisational and morale terms). Some stress is laid on the mutual relationship between investment and resource mobilisation (although the circular chase of targets and resources is not settled even in the language of game theory). New avenues of taxation are explored and agricultural incomes emerge as the inevitable major target. (Not one author had even dreamt of the clamour for *decrease* in revenue from the agricultural sector in which political parties devoted to both heavy and light strategy were to join.)

The role of the government and the public sector in mopping up a larger surplus from the economy is discussed at great length, though with differing emphases as to

whether to rely essentially on controls and fiscal and monetary instruments, or to resort to nationalisation, or to adopt even more fundamental 'institutional' changes in economic structure; and with obvious challenge to all this from the representatives of the 'private sector'.

Finally, how to make the economy self-reliant in its external balance, and thus free from dependence on foreign aid and 'indiscriminate' foreign collaborations has been dealt with in great detail in all these issues, with one issue being given over specifically to it and more ably done than the others.

Indeed, on this problem of somehow bringing to an end our overwhelming dependence on forces outside our control, an almost complete agreement—across ideological barriers—has emerged in great detail and concrete content as seen in the issue on *Aid and Trade*. It shows how, when the country learnt the hard facts of life in a harsh manner—in this instance when a political decision on the part of a foreign power following our conflict with Pakistan dramatically exposed the abject dependence of our economic strategy on external aid—we were not slow in thinking through in a most pragmatic and contextual fashion.

Forced Realism

Brushing aside all the grand theorems and projections, both the economists and the non-economists applied themselves to the pressing question of attaining 'self-reliance' from sudden decisions outside our control and approaching this as not an ideological milestone or a theoretical 'perspective' to be achieved but rather as a practical, hard-headed, political, orientation towards which our energies must be pragmatically diverted in as short a time as national interest and economic efficiency would warrant, in the meanwhile phasing ourselves out through other practical arrangements. There is reason to hope that this approach, developed under extreme pressure which has not continued in the same intensity will, however, con-

tinue to inform our economic and political thinking.

Agriculture

Another area in which only extraordinary and traumatic events have forced us to adopt realistic policies, a pragmatic orientation and a relatively determined drive, is agriculture. Here the illusions of our economic thinking, for long, duly reflected in the SEMINAR, is most educative. The thinking was highly deductive. Speedy industrialisation was a 'must' and should receive immediate priority over everything else, certain normal inputs like irrigation and agricultural extension could be trusted in course of time to take care of the food deficit and ensure an adequate marketable surplus, and for the rest, the PL 480 was quite handy.

The last element of opportunist strategy in this calculation was the only 'pragmatic' item in this thinking but it was an item whose implications were not thought through. There is a vital difference between economic aid and food aid: the former is designed to build long-term capabilities; the latter to stave over current shortfalls. The former is by nature self-reversing; the latter can, unless very great care is taken, lead to a permanent dependence at a probably increasing scale, with built-in justifications like droughts and 'a backward peasantry'.

Any strategy of 'self-sustained' growth must necessarily have relied on complete self-reliance in the very basic necessities of life. It should also have been clear that agriculture too is an industry—a vital industry in a country that will continue to remain agricultural for a long time to come—and that its development called forth certain other inputs from key sectors of the economy which required as 'heavy' an approach as any other. The ideological controversy was thus quite irrelevant and unnecessarily lent a dogmatic edge to our plan processes.

But what today appears so self-evident somehow escaped the com-

prehension of the 'system-builders'. As their intellectual reference group existed in academic centres—and journals—outside this country, they also managed to escape that nationalist credo which would have brought home to them that not only was such a scale of external dependence for our food needs nationally humiliating but that any aid arrangement that institutionalised such dependence may well prove a substitute for local effort.

Before long the planners, and even the national politicians, began to assume PL 480 as almost an internal resource. (That this has been our general approach to external aid as such does not take away from the folly of adapting it in respect of our food needs.) It needed two severe droughts, the situation of near famine and threat of large-scale starvation deaths, the Johnsonian pressure of aid ethics and *realpolitik*, and the growing 'politics of food' at home in all directions which nearly hitched the fate of the whole political system to what was done on the agricultural front; it was this mixture of compelling forces and the crawling condition of being driven to the wall that forced out of our economists and economic bureaucrats a major revision in thinking and action.

Peasant Attitudes

Other things have also happened. For long our thinking was tuned to the concept of a 'backward farmer' lacking in motivation and 'achievement orientation', resistant to 'innovations', satisfied with a bare subsistence, and generally a prey to religious and cultural obscurantism. The pages of SEMINAR are full of this bemoaning, and the consequent emphasis on utilization of inputs rather than their speedy multiplication. Now suddenly we find the farmer demanding more and more inputs and a better price for his produce, holding out threats of political reprisal if his demands are not met, wanting to hold back a substantial part of his produce for

improving his own standards of consumption, and getting ready to judge the various bidders for his produce—the government, the private trader, the cooperatives—in terms of his own crude economic 'rationalism'.

All this has been happening at a time when our politicians and not a few economists—used to thinking out all problems in terms of choice of techniques—have been engaged on hair-splitting debates on the relative merits of public sector versus private sector fertilizers, home-based naphtha versus liquid ammonia, whether to import fertilizers or machinery to produce fertilizers, how much time limit to give to foreign private capital, and so on. Surely, as Professor Khushro points out in his article (91)—'A Breath of Fresh Air'—the time is not for 'either-or' logic: the country needs all of this and whatever else can be mobilised. Again, what sounds simple and self-evident to the common man seems to have escaped the pundits for so long.

Shift Towards Realism

Both these rather simple and self-evident issues on which traumatic experience has forced us to turn away from our traditional mould of thinking—self-reliance in our external economic balance and self-sufficiency in agricultural production—have together brought about a considerable shift towards realism in our total economic thinking. The result is a rather striking reassessment of many of our premises, a considerable infusion of pragmatism and the need for the here and now rather than some remote prospect in our thinking—and above all, a slowly articulating policy vis-a-vis political pulls and pressures. The latter are very real; it would be foolhardy to consider them as extra-systemic (and to keep referring to the 'politician' as the scapegoat for all our shortcomings) and, indeed, with imagination and a more sophisticated policy frame, it should be possible to turn them into a resource and a capability. The challenge has so far been understood in terms of the need to dis-

discipline the polity to the demands of economic development.

Experience is now showing that not only is economic development more than merely economic, but the real challenge is how to generate an economic strategy (and concomitant administrative policies and implementation structures) that would withstand political feasibility tests, adopt a style and a posture that would absorb a great deal of bargaining and *quid pro quo*, attain internal flexibility and sensitivity, and provide enough elbow room to other sources of creativity and productivity in society. These other sources are fast maturing and economic wisdom demands that in the preoccupation with purely governmental aspects of development, their value is not only not neglected but positively identified and raised.

The farming class is just one instance in this approach. Small and medium-scale entrepreneurs, as well as the great industrial 'empires' (even if they are empires) are an obvious second. The rural entrepreneur and the industrialist in the many developing regions and growing towns are also increasing in number. Above all, there are so many types of 'link men' and 'politicos' between agriculture, industry, organised commerce, the co-operative sector and the public sector undertakings that have come up all over the place.

The task of policy is neither to be indifferent to their behaviour nor be 'in principle' either belligerent or benevolent to them, but to consider them as centres of action (and possible dissipation as with parts of the tertiary sector) and to respond to them on criteria of efficiency and priorities.

Other Aspects

There are other aspects of the economic situation dealt with in the SEMINAR issues which bear upon the social and political structure of economic development. The relationship between rates of saving, investment and income growth and economic disparities is closely examined over a num-

ber of articles and a powerful case built up against the popular notion that reduction of disparities will affect the rate of saving (and therefore investment), establishing instead that a strategy of income redistribution can both raise productive effort and morale at the lowest levels and prevent the evils of black money, conspicuous consumption, 'aggressive salesmanship' and the resulting dissipation of savings, distortion of economic goals and accumulation of social and political tensions. (No behavioural data or insights are, of course, provided, not even of a pilot or experimental nature, and much of the reasoning is *a priori*, though undoubtedly very forceful and plausible).

The involvement of the population in the plan processes, the adoption of regional and low-level planning, implementation of programmes with a view to carrying the benefits of development to the 'average' and the 'deprived' sections of the people, attempts to make visible the fruits of development and to base taxation strategies and pricing policies upon such visibility, and attention to the motivational dimensions of economic development and to make 'investment in man' the crux of the whole effort have all been argued in these pages.

Pessimism

They are given as fragments of prescription, sometimes as sarcastic strictures on the government, at other times as voices of belief which are at the same time uttered as voices of despair. On the whole the dominating mood in these issues is one of pessimism and despondency, born partly out of disillusionment with the development model and partly out of despair at forces beyond the economist's control, such as democracy, the post-Nehru leadership and the 'administration'.

And yet is not the infusion of pragmatism in our economic policies pressed by immediate constraints as shown above, a greater comprehension of the crucial linkages in the development pro-

cess and the growth of high level technical, 'perspective' and manipulative skills in the administrative and technocratic leadership of the country, and indeed the free working of an open system of planning, criticising, 'demanding' and bargaining—aren't these precisely the levers of a major re-orientation, of a larger and more ambitious pushing forth, of releasing energies and arresting imbalances and 'evils', of putting such things as sense of disparities and class antagonisms to political and economic use, and of mobilising all this for extracting a growing surplus value out of the economy? (The lowly and deprived strata are beginning to get organised and will soon draw out their share of national development. Both political democracy and economic efficiency will compel their due recognition).

The Political Problem

The political problem of economic development in India is not so much that of devising an appropriate political and institutional means for a given economic end (which seems to be the major value assumption underlying much of the current economic thinking and which in fact represents a major somersault from the classical 'scope and limits' of economic science). The problem is rather one of attending to strategic minutiae and piecemeal engineering, of so phasing and patterning economic strategy as to flourish in an environment of open politics and a changing social structure, of turning the 'demandingness' of such an environment into organisational assets as much as points of resource allocation, of developing a system of discipline out of the fragments of such a welfare-oriented and distributive polity, and through all this clearly setting the scope and the limits of the possible which indeed is what politics is all about.

In a country as poor as ours, it is not by any means difficult to point out the limitations of what can be expected at any level of political bargaining, and of ex-

plaining therefrom how the extraction of an economic surplus (and its investment rather than consumption) provides the only key to any prosperity, personal, local or national—and all that this involves, and all that can be expected in return for the effort.¹ There are signs that the enlightened agriculturist is beginning to understand this language. So would the small and big entrepreneur as well as the consumer who is also a producer of some sort.

It is for the 'pure consumers', the urban parasitic class and the *lumpen proletariat* that either economic or political logic alone would not make sense, and which would call for more stringent restraining and controlling measures from the administrative leadership. There is little doubt that this can be done at this stage in our political development, and enough support from public opinion will be forthcoming for the same. Indeed, what may seem difficult in the logic of the economic system alone becomes all too easy when the perspective is shifted to cover other types of action dimensions as well.

Administrative Crisis

Above everything else, then, the crisis of this nation is neither political nor economic; it is an administrative crisis. And it is a crisis of administrative and executive leadership, a failure of nerve, and a lack of drive and imagination. This is an unprecedented situation for a planned economy, indeed for any organised economy of any standard. And hence it is that it becomes imperative for economists, economic

technocrats and plan administrators—as well as other types of social scientists—to attend above all to operational tasks, to the organisational details of action perspectives, to the implementational minutiae of immediate tasks, and to the behavioural and attitudinal underpinnings of the actors involved at various levels and in the various sectors.

Science of Means

It is on these operational and behavioural aspects that the writings under review generally fail to throw light. And, *reductio ad absurdum*, it is because of this lag that they prove to be so brilliant and bold in macro conceptions, in overall design and in total comprehension. And again it is because of this lag that the immediate and the here and now has been sacrificed to the long term and the relatively remote. Yet, the important lesson of Indian failures and successes is precisely the importance of the short term, the need to have bold action rather than bold policy, and the necessity optimistically to optimise our chances than systematically despair at the stupidity of the full enterprise.

To live in a country like India and yet strive to do something, the philosophy that is needed cannot be utopian; it has to be incremental. Hence the need to keep down the temperature of expectations while allowing full scope to the positive forces at work in the various segments of society, and to push on at the frontiers of implementation of decisions that have already been reached and policies that are already known. It is the neglect of this implementation and organisational perspective — and the overwhelming weightage to policy and ideological issues—that characterises the major weakness of economic thinking in the country as brought out in these five issues of SEMINAR. It is a weakness that stems from the failure to make of economics an appropriate 'science of means' which is its proper role, and upon whose success the nation's development still very largely depends.

1. All the 'self-evident but bothersome' problems of economic efficiency such as large scale tax evasion, grotesque profiteering in certain sectors and the diversion of national resources to non-essential luxury items, the need to restrain certain types of consumption and divert resources to export earnings can be made part of this general approach towards political communication and purposive bargaining. This alone will also ensure a greater diffusion and legitimacy for the plan effort as a whole and rescue it from its present precarious base in the country.

The industrial scene

BALDEV SINGH

SEMINAR has been a unique attempt to expose important issues to study by a group of persons who may look at these from differing viewpoints and in this manner try to evolve a rational attitude to the affairs of public life. The Indian industrial scene is fascinating since it has a novelty and a challenge. It is an attempt by an underdeveloped country to evolve, through the democratic process, into a modern industrial State and claim a seat in the comity of advanced societies. Undoubtedly, the industrial development of India has been one of the major factors in the country's economic growth in the last twenty years since Independence. The five issues of SEMINAR between 1960 and 1965 related to the industrial scene have dealt with such important subjects as the two (public and private) sectors, taxation, the workers, the consumer and then an entire issue on the public sector.

Ten years of its operation should provide sufficient facts and data for some evaluation of the success or otherwise of the functioning of the Industrial Policy Resolution of 1956 which has formed the guideline for the country's approach to industrial development. The Mahalanobis Report on the development of monopolies and concentration of economic power and the more recent Hazari Report on the functioning of the machinery for industrial licensing which has resulted in the capacity for a large

number of industries being cornered by a prominent industrial group in the country, raise fundamental questions as to whether the country has been moving in the direction in which the sponsors of the Industrial Policy Resolution intended.

Immediately after the war and at the dawn of political independence, the country started with a sizeable accumulation of sterling balances. Within twenty years not only has the entire deposit of sterling balances been expended but the country has incurred a monumental debt, the servicing of which by way of interest payments alone costs Rs. 510 crores of the total current budget of Rs. 2900 crores. The role of international aid, assistance and loans in promoting and accelerating industrial development is more than counter-balanced by the economic indebtedness resulting, which in its wake generates all types of social, political and economic compulsions.

No description of the Indian industrial scene could be complete without reference to the role played by foreign technical collaborations involving import of technical know-how and, in a large number of cases, equity participation in the share capital by industrial firms abroad. Some among these represent powerful monopoly groups of companies controlling petroleum, fertilisers, petrochemicals, pharmaceuticals and instrumentation interests at inter-

national level. Thanks to the Indian policy of non-alignment, foreign technical and financial assistance has flowed in from socialist countries as well. Developments in the peaceful uses of atomic energy and setting up of nuclear power stations have brought the country at the fringe of a modern industrial era; even if the bullock cart and primitive agriculture serve to remind us of the widespread concurrent underdevelopment.

The Question Mark

The Industrial Policy Resolution stated that the Government of India would welcome foreign investment as a tool of speedy industrial and economic development in areas and in a manner as would be in the best interest of the country. Whether the three thousand and odd collaboration agreements entered into during these twenty years, some of them repetitive for the same product and process know-how, and some with majority foreign holdings resulting in management control in foreign hands, have really worked to fulfil the objectives of the Industrial Policy Resolution is a matter which would bear careful scrutiny. A number of representatives of the public, industrialists and even the Union Ministers have expressed their concern at the continued dependence of the country on foreign know-how, foreign capital, plant, equipment, spares, raw materials, components, etc.

The negative aspects of the situation of excessive dependence for industrial development on foreign sources was clearly demonstrated a couple of years back during the conflict with Pakistan when the foreign sources of financial and technological help suddenly changed their attitude. The country's defence would have been jeopardised but for improvisation of equipment and material by the Indian scientists and technologists. Another example has been the pressure brought by foreign firms and governments against amendments in the Patent Laws which are at present admittedly against

the country's development and economic interests.

Indigenous Contribution

What has been the role of Indian know-how in moving the country towards at least a reasonable degree of self-reliance and whether the policies of the country in regard to foreign collaboration have been such as to accelerate its growth and movement to the take off stage, have worried the Indian scientist no less than the Indian economist. The Mudaliar Committee set up by the Government of India has pointed to the serious handicap from which Indian industries wanting to use Indian know-how suffer in regard to obtaining essential plant, equipment and raw materials which result in foreign collaboration being entered into not for technological reasons but because the licensing procedures are more favourable to foreign collaboration than to the utilisation of Indian know-how.

A description of the Indian industrial scene would not be complete without some reference to the role and limitations of the small scale industries sector which accounts for a sizeable contribution to industrial production. While on the one hand it has provided an outlet for initiative and enterprise to the lone individual and small capital investor, provided large scale employment and served as an ancillary industry, it has also led to the establishment of uneconomic units, unable to use modern, advanced and sophisticated technology with a vested interest in backwardness. The financial and other subsidies and governmental assistance have mostly served to perpetuate a stunted industrial growth and sustain the parasitic existence of a number of units in the small scale sector. While in no way minimising their contribution to industrial production, a clear policy of their role in the integrated pattern of industrial development has yet to evolve.

The dependence on imported foodgrains which accounts for a

major chunk of the foreign exchange expenditure on imports has led to the belated realisation that until modernisation of agricultural inputs by way of fertilisers, nutrients and continuous research are resorted to, the total economy of the country including industry will suffer. It is only recently that fertilisers, pesticides, tractors and agricultural implements and agro and food industries have received the attention overdue by at least a quarter of a century.

What has been the role of the Planning Commission and the planning process during the last 17 years and to what extent has the concept of planning of the mixed economy directed towards socialism helped in promoting rapid industrial development? The economic crisis which overtook the country since 1965 resulted in repetitive revisions of the size of the fourth five-year plan. The reconstitution of the Planning Commission and its approach of year-to-year planning are too recent to permit an assessment of their impact on industrial development.

Increasing Dependence

The conclusion is however inescapable that the planning process and State policies at the end of 20 years of political independence have resulted in a situation where the country is in the grip of heavy foreign indebtedness, technologically and industrially more dependent and has still to turn the corner even in regard to its basic food requirements for the increasing population. Some knowledgeable circles even fear that we are nearer a situation of technological and economic colonialism even if shrouded in the garb of political independence. Technological self-reliance, a self-generating economy and the take-off stage have been attractive slogans but have remained an elusive goal.

How near the country is from the cherished goal of socialism, should now be looked at from a situation where the ruling party

at the Centre is not in command of more than half the States in the country. Ruling groups in some States do not share the Congress enthusiasm for or allegiance to socialism, while others are doubtful believers in the democratic process and mixed economy as conceived earlier. Linguistic, regional and sectarian tendencies are on the increase and the law and order situation has not been the best one would imagine.

Devaluation of the Indian currency has not led to a boost in industrial production and exports as imagined, nor have the Super Bazaars held the price line. There has been an inflationary spurt in the prices of foodgrains and consumer goods which has cut further into the standard of living and real wage earnings of the people. The defence expenditure has been going up and now accounts for Rs. 845 crores—a little less than a third of the national budget and almost as much as the total export earnings of the country.

Vast Strides

Physically speaking, the country has made vast strides in the field of industrial development. The production of iron and steel, ferro-alloys, cement, caustic soda, sulphuric acid, has multiplied manifold. Petroleum refineries have been installed and fertilizer factories have been started, synthetic and man-made fibres are being produced in the country, heavy organic chemicals and intermediate drugs and pharmaceuticals, heavy engineering, light engineering, electrical, automobile and electronic industries have come up, employment in the industries has increased; electricity generating plants—hydro or thermal, agro industries, plastics, brick building and a whole spectrum of industries has come into existence during the last 20 years. But to what extent are we nearer the goals of levelling of inequalities, economic prosperity and socialism which we set out to achieve in the Industrial Policy Resolution is a matter open to serious question!

The industrial development in India, apart from the small scale

sector, has taken place through the public and private sectors. Increasing investment in the State sponsored and managed public sector is considered an essential factor for the promotion of industrial development in keeping with the concept of a mixed economy, economic planning and development towards socialism. Because of this ideological tilt, the public sector has been the target of criticism from the private sector and their representatives in the press, public and Parliament. The protagonists of the public sector have eulogised the government for the setting up of heavy and capital goods industries in the public sector as instruments for control of the commanding heights of the economy and of its intent to march towards socialism.

Justification

Arguments have been advanced that the public sector has a regulatory function in regard to prices and justification sought for its extension to consumer goods, State trading and exports. Apart from armaments, atomic energy and defence hardware reserved for strategic reasons, it is contended that the investment in the public sector is justified for the opening up of areas which require heavy capital investment, long gestation periods and comparatively meagre returns by way of profit. Notwithstanding the importance of basic industries for machines to manufacture machines such as Foundry Forge, Heavy Engineering, Heavy Electricals, the private sector would neither have the resources nor be attracted to such low-profit propositions. Some of the public sector concerns have been established through agreements with socialist countries who would prefer to deal at State level.

The ideological justification for the public sector entry into consumer industries has attracted criticism from the private sector and an example is cited of defence establishments taking up truck manufacturing while capacity in the private sector lies idle. The methods of working, management,

lack of accountability and low profitability (or losses) of the public sector undertakings have been condemned as products of a mistaken ideological concept. Thus, Morarji J. Vaidya in SEMINAR (No. 6) has called the arguments in favour of the public sector a myth and has questioned the economic feasibility, managerial efficiency and political justification of these undertakings.

Those who advocate the setting up of the public sector argue that the capital in the public sector is thrown into heavy machine building industries in which the private capital in India has not made any progress at all. It has mostly flowed into either consumer goods or building industries giving heavy returns. The banking system also controlled by the private sector has mostly invested its funds in enterprises dealing in trading rather than industry. Figures have been quoted to prove that private capital has kept clear of essential nation building industries while exercising control over a sizeable proportion of the capital accumulated by banks and insurance companies owned by it.

Investment in public sector and nationalised industries has been rising as also the number of public sector undertakings. Their number has risen from 51 in 1961-62 to 65 in 1962-63 and the investment has risen from Rs. 1170 crores to Rs. 1372 crores in the same period. According to the Perspective Planning Division of the Planning Commission, almost one-fifth (20%) of the nation's assets would belong to the public sector by 1975-76 entailing a fixed capital stock of the order of Rs. 22,350 crores including investments in the railways, posts and telegraphs, power, road transport, steel, fertilisers, machine building, oil, mining and other industries.

Equation With Socialism

However, even those who strongly support investment in the public sector do not equate it with a march towards socialism. Indrajit Gupta has classified it as State capitalism (No. 72) and assigned to it a vital, strategic role in the

economy of a developing country. It does appear however that the Planning Commission genuinely believes that, in perspective, the public sector is synonymous with the goals for socialism. Ashok Mitra has complained that a number of managers and top personnel of public sector undertakings do not share the socialist ideals and hence has advocated that 'it appears essential that ideological education may be imparted to the managers of the public sector enterprises if they have to take these undertakings on the march to the socialist goal'. (No. 72)

The Drawbacks

The main emphasis in the discussion on the public sector has however been on the lack of managerial efficiency, profitability and accountability of public sector enterprises. Even those in favour of the public sector as a desirable development in the Indian economic and industrial scene have found themselves critical of its functioning and results. B. G. Verghese in his discussion on the forms of organisation (No. 72) has put his finger on some of the most serious drawbacks from which most public sector undertakings suffer: absence of autonomy, criticism of minor deviations from rules and procedures, financial control by the financial advisers and the Ministry of Finance, employment of retired service personnel and others on deputation for short periods, overmanning under the mistaken concept of the social goals of maximum employment and the generally inhibiting rule of parliamentary scrutiny and secretarial grip which have made the public sector undertakings more like government departments than like industrial enterprises.

Habibullah has made a realistic assessment of the problems of management of a public sector enterprise in his 'View from Within', apparently based upon his own experience. He has listed State and Central government interference, inadequate training of staff, inefficiency of the top management who are in their positions more through reason of

personal relations with the higher-ups than through any criteria of efficiency, preference to seniority over talent and political interference in the trade unions which make them perpetual sources of labour trouble rather than useful partners, as the bane of public enterprises. Habibullah ends by advising every honourable person to keep away from the public sector (N. 72).

Indrajit Gupta puts the situation in the right perspective when he says that in regard to accountability and public scrutiny the public sector undertakings have a far cleaner record. He challenges the private sector management to agree to be measured and tested by the same standards as are currently applied to public sector undertakings. The Committee on Public Sector Undertakings has classified these standards as bold experiments in the field of parliamentary control and it is an incontrovertible fact that whatever be the ills, management inefficiency, over-capitalisation, low turn over, faulty planning, longer gestation periods, these are at least exposed to public control and scrutiny. Ironically, these have been sieged upon by the private sector spokesmen to castigate and denounce the entire concept of the public sector.

One would wholeheartedly agree with Indrajit Gupta that if similar criteria were applied to private sector undertakings they would hardly survive the trenchant criticism which would be levelled at them. A corner of the veil lifted in regard to dealings of some private sector undertakings is indicative of the fact that the largest safeguard of their respectability is the cover of secrecy and privacy from public gaze enjoyed by them.

Continuing Coexistence

Whatever be the ideological interpretation of the public and private sectors, it is all round accepted that they will continue to coexist in our mixed economy for a long time to come. There may be relaxation in regard to the areas hitherto reserved for the public sector or it may gain entry into

consumer goods industries and trading but a mutual adjustment between the two sectors is a *sine qua non* for speedy industrial growth.

Taxation

The entire industrial development is dependent on availability of resources for which the taxation of the individual through income-tax, commodity taxation, company taxation and land taxation have been the major source. It is generally agreed that India is one of the most heavily taxed countries in the world. Taxation has been considered necessary not only to generate funds for industrial development but also raise finances for defence. Taxation has also come to be understood as a means of State policy for levelling inequalities and thus serves as an instrument for mopping up part of the idle resources of the rich and spending them in social amenities for the poor. Various types of taxes such as development levy, import duties, excise duty besides individual, commodity and corporate taxation have been used and the government has been steadily increasing its draft on the people's income.

R. N. Bhargava states (No. 43) that tax revenues of the Union and State governments formed 7.4 per cent of the national income in 1951-52 and increased to 9.4 per cent in 1961-62. Palkhiwala has advocated the reducing of corporate and personal taxation and has quoted the example of Japan which has been reducing personal taxation year after year from 1951 to 1962 and this has actually resulted in the increase of national income and increase in its product trade. Japan has realised that lowering of tax rates provides a powerful incentive and thereby boosts production and expands national income. He has pointed out that with a lower rate of taxes revenues actually go upwards. He has advocated the broadening of the base and introduction of indirect taxes.

The number of people taxed in India under direct taxation is

surprisingly low. The income-tax assesseees in 1961-62 were only 8,28,000. There were only 1664 assesseees with an annual income of Rs. one to two lakhs who paid on an average 58 per cent in taxes. There were 257 assesseees with an annual income of Rs. 2 and 3 lakhs who paid 66 per cent in income-tax. The number of assesseees with an annual income of Rs. 3 and 4 lakhs was 103 who paid 68 per cent while just 40 assesseees had an annual income between Rs. 4 and 5 lakhs paying 72 per cent by way of income tax. Palkhiwala recommends that 'if there is one lesson to be learnt from the experience of our own fiscal administration as well as other countries it is that increased tax revenues cannot come from increased tax rates; they can only come from the broadening of the tax base which in India is extremely narrow.'

H. M. Patel has drawn attention to the functioning of the income-tax machinery operated as it is by junior income-tax officers working in an atmosphere of suspicion against the assessee but holding vast powers. He has pointed to the widespread evasion of individual and corporate taxation and has said 'in spite of use of such extraordinary powers evasion continues and corruption has increased'.

The Abuses

P. C. Malhotra points to the abuse of exemption of tax derived from property held under trusts for charitable institutions while government has no control on the manner in which money is spent by these institutions. He has also questioned the basis of taxation whereby higher profits mean a bigger liability of tax. It means that an honest and well run business house will have to pay more taxes than an inefficient and corrupt business house. He has advocated that all limited liability companies should be exempted from taxes based on profits but should be subject to a business profit tax.

Bhargava has also pointed to the fact that most of the tax revenue

is collected by the Central Government and the proportion of that collected by the State governments is strictly limited. This results in the Central Government collecting all the taxes and later on doling out these back to the State governments. A strong case is made out for the revision of the financial Centre-State relations to lessen financial dependence of the States on the Centre. The most widely practised commodity taxation hits the consumer the most who indirectly pays through an increase in price and lowering of his real income. Methods have been tried for the levying of selective commodity tax. Articles which are consumed by the low and middle income groups may be taxed lower than luxury articles and services used by more prosperous sections of the community.

The Consumer

At the receiving end of industrial and consumer goods production is the consumer who pays for and purchases the products of industry. SEMINAR has taken cognisance of his role by devoting one of its issues (No. 62) to him alone. Technological advances have produced a bewildering variety of consumer goods to meet the old needs and the consumer has no means of distinguishing between the different varieties and brands offered. This results in wastage of the meagre earnings and resources that middle class and lower income households can claim for their subsistence. Aggressive advertising, publicity of trademarks and trade names of the same or similar articles through the press, radio and television has been used to push into the market goods of different manufacturing houses.

P. S. Lokanathan has advocated the large scale introduction of standardisation of consumer goods to protect the buyer from losing through the purchase of costly brands with the same material content. He has quoted the examples of consumer cooperatives and consumer associations in the U.K. and the U.S.A. which run maga-

zines like *Consumer Bulletin*, *Consumer Reports* and *Which* providing guidance to the consumers as to what to purchase and how not to be misled by advertisements. He deplores the fact that in India the consumer has not shown sufficient awareness to safeguard his own interests although a preliminary effort was made by the Indian Standards Institution to start a Consumers Association of India (CAI).

Shroff has advocated the extension of quality control, standardisation and preshipment inspection of all goods sent out to the foreign markets. He has pointed to the need of setting up quality control laboratories in order that our exports command the confidence of the consumers abroad. With recent complaints about the quality of frogs legs imported from India which are suspected to carry a disease and the suspicion that the bone-meat exported from India has an admixture of human bones, the importance of safeguarding our interests in the export market through proper checks at source can hardly be over-emphasised.

Standardisation

For a country which has based its industrial development on multiple collaborations and on the import of technical know-how from a large number of countries, the standardisation of raw materials, process and products and components is of economic importance. It has been reported that the various industries were importing and using more than 500 types of stainless steel for spares, equipment, etc., which have been brought down to 15 types through standardisation.

While the Indian Standards Institution has done pioneering and extensive work on the setting up of standards of various consumer goods and products, the consumer is still not able to get reliable quality products because of the fact that he is at the mercy of the producer. Compulsory standardisation and exemplary punishment for deviation

from quality may be a remedy for the errant producer but the Indian legal machinery and ISI are insufficiently equipped for the task of inspection and enforcement.

The Worker

The principal actors in the process of industrial development are the industrial workers and their trade unions. Their role as seen by leaders of opposite viewpoints is discussed by Bharat Ram from the private industrial sector and trade unionists like Maitreya Bose and Indrajit Gupta. There is common recognition that the surplus wealth created by labour is the foundation of industrial development. Should labour be entitled to a continuous wage increase with profits and if so to what limit? Should it take a bigger slice of the cake and if so how is there to be accumulation of capital for industrial expansion, development and growth? Should the trade unions justifiably demand neutralisation of the rise in living cost through higher wages, bonus and a share in profits, or should they sacrifice the immediate needs in the hope of better times when the economy reaches the take-off stage. Is the public sector, which is the hope of progress of planned development towards socialism, setting an example of fair treatment to its labour force and their organisations!

The representatives of management, capital and labour all agree that production and productivity must be stepped up in the overall national interest. George Fernandes and Peter Alvares effectively argue that the present sub-subsistence level of wages for labour can hardly be an aid to higher production. Maitreya Bose hits the nail on the head when he declares that 'today's suffering and inhuman degradations cannot be wiped out or justified by tomorrow's glories and happiness'. A precise, reasonable and lucid statement of labour's case is made by Indrajit Gupta when he quotes chapter, verse and Gulzari Lal Nanda to prove that while real earnings of factory workers according to official figures of cost of living index have hardly

gone up from 105.4 in 1956 to 109.8 in 1961; the profits have risen from 109.7 in 1956 to 166.1 in 1960.

The surplus capital generated by labour's sweat has not always flowed into channels of 'common standpoint of building the economy of an under-developed country in such a way that the economic base of our national independence is strengthened...' Not many are aware that in the tripartite Indian Labour Conference, held in New Delhi in 1957, the government, employers and trade unions *unanimously* agreed that a minimum wage 'should ensure the minimum human needs of the industrial worker, irrespective of any other considerations.'

The Minimum Wage

The criteria for this norm of minimum human need were carefully laid down and the Labour Ministry calculated in 1958, the cash equivalent of the need-based norm at Rs. 125. Labour has a justifiable grouse that even after 10 years there is no statutory enforcement of the minimum wage by the government or the employers. What right have the leaders of government and industry to preach self-abnegation to the workers when even the agreed minimum wage is not ensured and the profits of the industry keep rising!

The trade union movement in the country is split on political lines and some unscrupulous leaders have not hesitated to use labour to serve their party interests. Habibullah has dealt at some length with 'the strings which go back to ministers and others in powerful places.' He feels that trade unions in India do not provide 'proper motivation which could only exist when from top management to workers they felt that they could pull, sink or swim as one.' It should be realised that unless the minimum wage formula and incentives are provided to workers as a matter of legal right, society as a whole forfeits the moral right to the fruits of their labour. While long range national interest of capital accumulation for industrial develop-

ment need not be sacrificed on doctrinaire considerations, its attainment could only be possible by ensuring a fair deal to the workers as the first essential.

The Fears

Not much thought appears to have been devoted to the technological efficiency of production brought about by improvements in technique, machinery, equipment and increased productivity through automation. Work-study, time and motion studies, operational research and modern methods of process and product control, ought to rationalise production techniques and lighten the burden of labour. Instead they have been used to increase the work load and intensify exploitation of the working force.

There is a widespread belief and apprehension that automation will lead to unemployment and this has led to resistance by trade unions to the introduction of modern technology in industry. World experience is that improved technology has not led to unemployment but has demanded a more sophisticated knowledge, training and performance by the labour force. The strains that may develop in the industrial front could be avoided if labour could be ensured that automation and modernisation would not be used for class and sectional advantage. In a developing country, this may necessitate an increasing social control over the industrial process in which both management and labour have to submit to State control so that the nation as a whole benefits from the fruits of science and technology and not a particular section of society.

The industrial scene in India is depressing in its present outlook but still has the germ of promise and progress. It is the task of enlightened leadership to provide the necessary ingredients of social control which may enable the different elements in the industrial scene, public and private sectors, management, workers and trade unions, to blend into a fabric of development towards a socially regulated if not a socialist economy.

Agriculture

SUGATA DASGUPTA

FOUR out of a hundred SEMINARS are devoted to the problem of agriculture. The first (October '59) deals with food production, the second (January '60) with cooperatives and the fourth (May '66) with farms and tenure. The third SEMINAR (October '62) presents an analytical description of the trends of growth now evident in rural India and provides a dynamic view of contemporary agrarian society. This issue of the SEMINAR indeed provides the backdrop. If I were to rearrange the sequence, I would have put it first and the October 1959 number at the end.

Some twentythree analysts have contributed to these four numbers. They have covered between themselves a wide area. But amidst the variety of issues raised in different papers, there is a central theme that runs all through and is not difficult to discover. This concerns the development of food production as also the increase of farm produce.

A measure of the success of any seminar as of the four under re-

view, could have been the impact their deliberations might have had on contemporary policies of the country. But the position in India is different and so unfortunate that it would be wrong to apply this yardstick in this case. For, between the two groups of intellectuals who are concerned with problems of development today, there is very little communication. One of them sits at Yojana Bhavan and frames policies and programmes for the government and the other, even if it takes the liberty of voicing concern about these policies, has unfortunately to content itself just with that. Had this not been the case and had some of the suggestions of the four SEMINARS been heeded, the country might have been in a far better position to face the critical food situation of the day!

The seminar on SEMINARS—my review article—is divided in two parts. The first sums up the salient observations contained in the four

issues under reference and the second provides a critique of these. The purpose is not, however, to provide a faithful summary of all twentythree contributions but to select only a few for reference. This does not mean that the authors and articles that are not mentioned in the pages to follow, are of no importance at all. But the discretion that one has to exercise to limit this review only to a few selected ones is for want of time and space.

The four SEMINARS on agriculture have made, as I see it, three distinct contributions. The first is that they have provided a realistic appraisal of the economic structure which obtains in rural India today and presented a living picture of the agrarian set up, disproving in its course by facts and figures, some of the myths that still persist in the elite society. The other merit, closely linked to the first, is the forthright indication of some of the basic fallacies of Indian planning. In more ways than one, such expositions are of vital significance and cut at the root of certain major hypotheses which still haunt the dreamy architects of India's destiny.

The SEMINARS have also provided a series of recommendations for the development of food production and agriculture. The emphasis of the contributors has however not been on providing blueprints for action, but on arriving at a correct definition of the rural problem based on an analysis of the reality situation which obtains in the country today.

Basic Lack

If all these go to the credit of the SEMINAR, viewed from a different perspective the organisation of the main theme could be considered lopsided. SEMINAR is thus incomplete for three reasons. The first is the inadequate emphasis given to what is now well known as the wholistic approach to the problem of development, even if the concern is agriculture. The accent should have been on rural regeneration rather than merely on agriculture or food. For, as 'helping' social sciences see it,

development is an integral and germinal process and cannot be scrappy or unidimensional.

The other is the failure to note the all important role that a village level functionary plays in the development of agriculture. What we have forgotten in this process is in fact the king pin of development. The key agent, without whom no programme or policy of rural change can ever hope to succeed, is to be there to integrate technical, economic and social plans into an organic whole and to make it a part of the farmer's culture. His training, 'role' definition and his position in new forms of organisation, should have formed a chapter of the total discourse.

Welfare

The last criticism concerns the very trend of discussion of the SEMINARS. The main burden of argument of all four seminars has been a plea for development of food production, a matter certainly of great urgency and high priority to the urban elite. While it may also be true that food production should be the priority even of farmers, high and low, big and small, let us admit that what seems to us an obvious truth may often appear to the bulk of the farmers as elusive. Even if the national logic for food production presents itself in an irresistible form, the immediate concern of the small farmer will, for a long time, be for 'welfare'—freedom from day to day worries and attainment of a higher standard of living all around.

This question of 'welfare' and of a 'psychological assurance for immediate relief from abject poverty is closely linked to the problem of agricultural development. For, the psychosis of material deprivations has an overpowering political and human dimension both of which may well brush aside the biting logic of the economist.

The average ryot believes, for example, that his standard of living is incorrigibly poor. But what he does not want to believe

is that any effort, including the one that might increase food production, could be of any real help in the economic stupor in which he is placed. The only way to help develop agriculture is therefore to promote an integrated plan which starts with welfare. That would provide the initial break-through in the otherwise stagnant mind of the farmer.

There are two distinct modes of thinking in this regard and three types of needs. To the first category of this 'need typology' belongs the demand of the farmer as he sees it and as distinguished from what the experts diagnose. The need which the planners feel that the villager already feels, often a projection of the former's own perception from the position of the villager himself, yet belongs to a different order. Of the two types of thinking referred to earlier, the ryot's needs represent the plebian's point of view. The two other needs mentioned in this connection provide the clue to elite thinking. What is important in a discussion like this is to keep the ryot's concern in view, one that provides an invisible 'X'. The satisfaction of this 'X' is important, for that creates the 'will' power of the ryot to respond to planning and lends a 'multiplier' effect to total development.

The steps to be taken in this matter are clear. One should organise a break-through somewhere in the chain of 'interlocking needs' by first meeting the ryot's own needs and thereby introducing the 'multiplier'. The latter and the initial break will then help to move on gradually to new programmes and measures envisaged by the experts. Any scheme of agricultural development which has food production in view, need therefore keep this welfare orientation in mind. Mere craving for what economists call 'growth' will not accomplish the task unless the spirit of the farmer is kindled in the process.

Agrarian Structure

Out of the various points of view presented in the SEMINAR, a picture

of the agrarian rural structure emerges clear. My endeavour will be to reconstruct this picture in the pages to follow. For this has been, according to me, the most significant contribution of the long dialogue and needs to be widely noted.

The agrarian structure as it is now visualised is a dynamic society and disproves some of our popular misconceptions. There is a feeling, for example, that the rural economy has been more or less stagnant, even after the achievement of independence. Sulekh Gupta, a contributor to the third volume, explodes this myth. He shows that the economy has grown instead. A brief report of the developments that have taken place in the state of rural production is given below. The impressive rise is due to a number of factors. N. G. Ranga, who writes in the first SEMINAR, ascribes it to the indomitable will of the farmer despite the failings of the government. There are others who maintain that the increase in yield is mainly due to extension of farm frontiers.

Be that as it may. The volume of agricultural output, foodgrains as well as commercial crops, has steadily increased over the last 10 years since 1950-51 and this stands in sharp contrast to the picture of stagnation which had characterised the Indian economy in the preceding half century. The irrigated area has increased from 51.5 to 75 million acres. Similarly, the use of modern tools like tractors, electric pumps and sugarcane crushers have also been in great demand. Traditional items of the peasant's equipment, like the plough, cart, etc., have been in larger supply. The number of drought and milch cattle have registered a significant increase and all these have led to considerable expansion in the volume of fixed and working capital employed in agriculture.

Differences

The human factor in rural development, however, continues to be in bad shape. The most important fact in this regard is the

'differentiation' that exists in the rural area. There are differences all around—differences in holdings of land, in capacities to hire labour and in the manner in which each individual's personal labour and dignity are used. Similarly, financial potentiality of the farmer and the pattern of capital ownership are also different. All these naturally have a cumulative effect and cast their shadow on the whole life process of the villager and in fact the state of his very being.

The rural organisation bears the imprint of these inequalities and naturally grows into an inequitable and hierarchical structure. This, Sulekh Gupta says, is composed of three major segments. At the apex are what has been described as the 'capitalist farms', immediately below is the commercial farm and at the base are the large number of small farmers. The factors that distinguish them from each other are manifold as each of the segments represent a different form of economic organisation. The small farmers invest very little of capital, equipment or any other input and are mostly run by family labour. The return they obtain per unit of land is also minimal. The capitalist farms, on the other hand, are capital intensive, use modern equipment, hired labour and account, together with the commercial farms, for most of the agricultural growth in India.

Commercial Farms

Commercial farms stand somewhere in between; they employ more capital and equipment than the small farmers do and use both hired and family labour. 'Commercial fruits' and 'capitalist farms' are owned roughly by 1/4th of rural producers but they control 3/4th of total land and other agricultural resources. The crops they raise are mainly for commercial purposes while the small farmers turn out food simply to eke out an existence. There is, however, a point of similarity among the different types of landholders, one that recoils tragically on the small ones. M. L. Dantwala brings this out when he says that 10 per cent of all land under cultivation,

irrespective of the size and pattern of ownership, is, as a rule, leased out for farming.

Land Legislation

Regarding the impact of land legislation which was supposed to be the fore-runner of far reaching economic change, the consensus of the seminarists is discouraging. Most of them feel that the reforms have on the whole been inadequately implemented.

V. S. Vyas who writes on the subject however brings out the gains of the measure. These are two-fold. The successful abolition of intermediary tenures is the first. The fact that some tenants have become owners of land through operation of the 'ceiling' acts is the other. Vyas however maintains that the main beneficiaries of land reforms have been the big farmers—those who have successfully evaded applications of the act and reaped rich harvests of developmental aids. M. L. Dantwala and A. K. Sen take two interesting positions on the role of 'reforms'. Dantwala is of the view that we have far too long considered land reforms as the panacea of all economic ills and that not much purpose, in terms of development of agriculture, would really be served even if land reforms were all put through. A. K. Sen thinks otherwise. Reviewing the impact of fertiliser inputs on land, Sen has it that nothing really big will take place in agriculture unless land reforms are expeditiously implemented.

The nature of land reforms as well as their limited implementation is due, according to Bhavani Sen, to the half hearted efforts that had characterised their origin. The real intention was indeed to follow a middle path and not certainly to come out as the champion of the underdog! To keep the old pattern of land ownership intact and to promote along side of it the interests of the landless through diverse statutory measures was the real aim. The other finding in this regard is of great social importance. Even the limited application of reforms has, it seems, led

to polarization of forces in the rural society.

This together with the inequitous hierarchy referred to earlier, have been a heavy load on the farmer. Their visible impact evident even to the naked eye can be seen all around. Characterised by uneven distribution of resources, the emerging organisation has indeed failed to come to the farmer's rescue. Neither could it touch the core of the central problem, namely, that of increasing agricultural production to meet food demands as also to pay for exports.

N. G. Ranga is the only one who does not find fault with this structure of organisation. In an effort to diagnose the reasons for the backwardness of agriculture, he blames the muddle headed policies of the government. While the consensus of opinion has been that price stabilisation, increasing use of science, extension of irrigation facilities and a proper marketing organisation will go a long way to achieve the purpose, Ranga feels otherwise. The main difficulty is, says Ranga, that the peasants have no faith in administration and therefore their response to the overtures made by the government are woefully inadequate. Another important suggestion for agricultural development is that the introduction of a higher form of economic organisation will help in the matter.

Cooperatives

An entire issue of the SEMINAR has been devoted to cooperatives, an institution which according to many could provide this economic organisation and change the structure. The merit of this discussion, initiated in the background of the Nagpur resolution (or the A.I.C.C.) is that it has helped to define the structure of the cooperative and brought out its implications in the Indian context.

Some writers of this volume, A. N. Khusro for example, states clearly what one means by cooperative farming as distinguished from the collective. This is an important gain. For those who think that self employed labour is

the best entrepreneur in rural India and oppose the introduction of cooperatives thereby often fail to understand what cooperation actually is. Quite naturally, they also have, due to this inadequate understanding, a lurking fear that the protagonists of cooperation will ultimately drag the rural society, whole hog, along the path of collectivisation.

The differences between the two are however fundamental and one does not necessarily lead to the other. For, cooperativisation is not socialisation of ownership. It is only a call for joint farming. Consequently there are two rewards in cooperation—one for the property owned and the other for work; whereas there is common ownership in collectives and only one reward for labour.

This is the type of cooperative that R. P. Kamat feels will work in India. Balraj Puri thinks otherwise and advises going slow in the matter. Ranjit Gupta and Vijay Apte drawing from the lessons of Scandinavia and Israel show that marketing cooperatives have been a great success in North Europe and joint farms in Israel. G. Parthasarthy who writes on new trends of growth provides a suitable end to the long discourse. He talks of a golden mean and says that the challenge of Indian agriculture can only be met by providing a key organisation, one that will combine the virtues of family farms with the superior skills of the large scale units. Could the cooperatives be fashioned to meet this end?

Exploding Fallacies

The four SEMINARS explode some of the fallacies of contemporary planning. They maintain, for example, that the recent talks regarding investment of higher inputs and technical know-how, notwithstanding the kind of interest the owner has in land, is all hollow. What is required instead to expedite the process of production are right types of economic organisations and expeditious measures of land reform.

But the real crux of the issue even for land reforms is what

V. S. Vyas points out. Talking of a voluntary movement for the implementation of tenurial legislation, he says that the crucial question is to raise the 'will' of the farmer and help him to strive for a better standard of living all around. This indeed is the key not only for agricultural development but also for food production.

Boudayan Chatterji's suggestion for immediate demonetisation of the rural sector to mop up all black money, N. G. Ranga's scheme for insurance against food shortage with U.N. aid and Sailen Ghosh's plea for building a buffer stock for demoralisation of the hoarders are some of the other suggestions worth taking note of.

Contrary Pulls

Boudayan Chatterji does a yeoman's service when he assails the I.D.P. Unevenness of agricultural development, says he, 'is the fundamental reason for the basic instability of agriculture.' If the package programmes add to this, as they certainly do by the inequitous concentration of large resources on the privileged, it only helps to disintegrate the economy. The Ford Foundation is noted for its specialisation in reckless planning, all of which almost invariably, like the C.D., ends in a fiasco. But this particular programme, as Chatterji points out, has potentialities of great harm, much more than what the well meaning bureaucrats, who collaborate with the Foundation, realise. The warning raised in this connection should be especially noted.

Two other hypotheses of far reaching significance are the political and social consequences of land reforms. SEMINAR has brought these out in the open. The fact that there are contrary pulls in the agrarian set-up, a result of the uneven economic conditions of ownership and control, have been mentioned earlier. Sulekh Gupta brings this fascinating analysis to a superb end when he says that the contrary pulls in the rural set-up might not have led to open economic conflicts but have certainly created far reaching social disorganisation. Tension, caste

teuds, mutual rivalries, craving for political power and social leadership in the villages of the day are in no small measure due to this anomaly.

This is for the first time, thanks to Sulekh Gupta, that one sees the co-relation between economic inequalities and social tensions so clearly brought out. Boudayan Chatterji adds to the finesse and strikes a new chord when he predicts that the big business of the city is making a herculean effort to forge a firm alliance with the rural caucus. The aim is to galvanise the working peasantry under its wings and to execute thereby a spectacular break-through in the coming elections.

Now that the elections are over it is for the evaluators to test this prophecy. There is no doubt however that this endeavour to show that a co-relation exists between the various factors of disorganisation, social, economic and political, only states an obvious truth. For 'culture' is a 'whole' and only a wholistic and not 'partial' effort could reconstruct its elements.

The Dichotomy

The other fallacy ably exploded by Ashok Rudra is based on the theme that there is a certain dichotomy between economic growth and social welfare and if economic growth is our concern as it seems to be, one need not shy away from capitalistic farming. Neither does one need to have it as a premise that capitalist farming is bad in itself, especially at a time when socialists and democrats are participating in the establishment and consolidation of State capitalism in the urban sector. Ashok Rudra however harps on a familiar theme when he says, not unlike Vyas, that the central task of agrarian reconstruction is inextricably mixed up with the mobilization of small farmers. To initiate them in new forms of economic organisation and to ensure that the small farmer emerges as the most effective producer should be the real purpose.

It is time now that we gather the threads of this long dialogue,

put together the important lessons, the long discussion, and see how far they are relevant even today. Three of the salient features of the total discourse are of special significance in this regard. First is the question of implementation of land reforms; the second is the need for a viable form of economic organisation for farmers and especially for those who would reassert in a new situation after land reforms. The third is the extension of irrigational facilities and especially of 'minor' and 'perennial' ones.

Question of Organisation

While the values of these suggestions cannot be over-emphasised there are two others. The imbalances of the land-man ratio in the rural set-up is one. The proven merit of large farms is the other. 3/4th of total land holdings have at their disposal only 1/4 of land and other resources. Even if land reforms are ruthlessly enforced there will not be enough land to justify the type of holdings which would be able to produce economic returns. It will damage, on the other hand, the operational basis of big farms and may confiscate large volumes of production which are now a product of capitalistic farming. While there are many, including some seminarians, who would go to the extent of emphasising that small farms do not necessarily bring small returns—no long term, spectacular, rural recovery will ever be possible unless a large part of the small farmers join cooperative cultivation and an equally large number drift away to industry.

The search in the Indian society is thus indeed for a viable pattern of organisation. 'Could cooperatives meet this challenge' is a million dollar question; the real answer to it will only be found if we rummage the files of contemporary history with due objectivity! Wherever rural organisations have succeeded, be they cooperatives or farmers unions, the credit of the whole experiment has gone to a

wider scheme of reconstruction, to a cultural and not only to an agricultural revolution. Cooperatives flourished in Scandinavia, as Ranjit Gupta says, because of the agricultural revolution that took place there. What had actually taken place in Scandinavia was indeed a social revolution, the mainspring being provided by Folk High Schools and an integrated scheme of social growth. This had happened in Israel too. The development of cooperation and agriculture in Israel has been on the basis of a programme of social services termed 'Mutual Aid'. The operational frame of the economic organisation was thus provided by a welfare administration.

What developed in Israel, as a result, was not only cooperatives but cooperative rural settlements, and in fact a cooperative way of life. These have in their turn changed the whole life pattern of the Israelis and helped them to evolve new plans for community development. Every 5 or 6 of these villages, belonging to a common homogeneous cultural background, were grouped in village centres, the latter providing both social and economic services for the community. The centres run elementary schools, offer medical aid, tractor servicing and supply organisations.

The other supportive movement which has helped cooperation and planning grow in western as well as eastern Europe was provided for by a group of determined and declassed political workers. They were the members of the farmers' unions and farmers' parties in Scandinavia and of the communist party in eastern Europe. Similarly, it was the social democratic party which helped to build 'Konsums' in Sweden and the consumers' societies elsewhere in Scandinavia.

Integrated Scheme

The problem of agricultural development thus requires important social and political support and cannot succeed as mere economic and technocratic measures. It is here, in undermining this

global significance of agriculture, that the SEMINARS, despite the many contributions, have erred. That the question of agricultural development cannot be treated in isolation from the problems of total development has been missed by seminarists as a whole. How fallacious is the approach will be borne out by the experiences of Rabindranath Tagore! The poet had started his farming experiments with this same basic fallacy that food production could be increased by mere introduction of 'new inputs'. When his workers had thus arrived in the villages around Sriniketan in 1922, with packages of seeds, fertilizers and good practices, they had soon to come back frustrated. For, most of the farmers who were to use these inputs were then lying low in sick beds, down with malaria. The unifocal emphasis on agriculture had perforce to shift to organisation of the anti-malarial operation. This gave way to preventive measures for the eradication of malaria and then to programmes of health and health education and finally to an integrated scheme of rural development.

The other important aspect is provided by the problem of communication. The seeds and practices, programmes of reforms and cooperativisation, all these will have to be carried to the villager and interpreted in a language he understands. The process of communication is indeed a two way one and unless considerable skills of social engineering are put in it, the result may well be elusive. If the problem of food production is thus intertwined with that of development of agriculture and of agriculture with that of rural regeneration, the crux of the issue lies in the adoption of a multi-dimensional approach. The most crucial step in planning is thus the integration of the human factor with the technological and not merely a blind preoccupation with the latter. It is time that we realise this new role of social engineering and note that planning, even economic planning, is too serious a business to be left only to economists.

Science and technology

M. M. SURI

MAN, evolving through the millennia, cuddled and huddled by his environment, slowly developed his power to observe, to reflect, to deduct. This, coupled with his curiosity, almost playfully led him to what may now be called science. Once a hobby-horse of a few deeply reflective and almost totally detached individuals whose habits and actions seemed more eccentric than rational in the context of their own age and social environment, science has slowly but perceptibly penetrated the core and fibre of human thought and action today.

Science is the inquiry into the laws that govern nature, or natural phenomena, and their systematic discovery. The growing knowledge of such laws has given man increasing power to piece bits of science together, and string them into a system. And, while each component of the system is unalterably subservient to the discovered laws of nature, the system as a whole created by man, works and performs as per his wishes. This stringing of scientific knowledge, in the service of mankind, this creative effort of man is termed technology.

The concept of knowledge for the sake of knowledge, and science for the sake of science, held sway almost till the second world war. Nearly all the intellectual elite who were custodians of science, and more especially scientific

research, remained monastic and aloof. Technology, holding a poor second place was practised and developed often by unqualified engineers, technicians, etc., making use of such little science as they understood. Suddenly in the second world war, the entire civilised world, divided and confronted as two hostile groups for the first time through the fear of total annihilation, discovered a new most effective tool to carve out the destinies of nations. Science and technology were wedded together with inter-disciplinary teams of scientists, engineers, technologists formed deliberately to work with defined objectives within planned time horizons.

This phenomenon of planned scientific and technological attack on problems facing the human race has taken firm roots in the advanced countries of the world with all its ramification of organised growth, proper funding and purposeful emphasis. The science and technology issues of the SEMINAR which include *Into Space*, *Science*, *The Scientist and his Research*, *The Scientific Attitude*, *Energy* and *Science in Afro-Asia*, have remarkably well, directly or indirectly, brought to the fore this most important aspect of the present world's scientific and technological endeavour. The theme runs through all the SEMINARS, as diverse as they are in the scientific and technical discussion of space or energy or science at large.

The Only Tool

Especially in the case of the under-developed countries with limited resources of capital, extreme personal poverty, widespread disease and malnutrition, the imagination of mankind has grasped science and technology as the best available, if not the only tool, to rid them of these basic ills. We cannot forget that it is only with the help of science and technology that the so-called advanced countries, totalling only one-fifth of the world's population, today produce 80 per cent of the world's wealth and have eradicated poverty and epidemic diseases as known to the under-developed

countries. The SEMINAR issues concerned with science and technology published over the period 1960 to 1966, by example and discussion, leave one no choice but to accept this role of science.

Much more important than a particular idea thrown up in these SEMINAR issues is the fact that each of these issues has attempted, rather boldly, to project a particular facet of science and technology not merely as a subject or phenomenon limited to its own disciplinary spheres, but as a major involvement of the human race today. Science and technology is thus exposed to the pressures of national economies, international politics, social and psychological impingements. Perhaps those not directly involved in science and technology, see and feel these pressures far more clearly than scientists and technologists who are labouring day and night within the confines of their own disciplines, specialisations and narrowing fields of focussed penetrating attention.

The Confrontation

As an engineer given to such narrower, deeper reflection in my own fields, I find the confrontation in each SEMINAR with 'the problem', something of a novel and most invaluable experience. Reading through 'the problem' one feels a sudden thrust from so many sides which one had hardly suspected, bearing on science, technology, economics, politics, sociology, etc. The acceptance or the rejection of the views discussed is not so important. It is the exposure, and the resultant reflection which these issues of SEMINAR act to catalyse, which is of real significance.

As if through prescience has the SEMINAR arranged it, and an awareness amongst the scientists and engineers of this country has grown by pressures of reflection on the broader aspects of the scientific problems. In a single issue by confronting scientists in a debate with economists, politicians, industrialists, the SEMINAR is forcing the scientists and engineers to emerge as thinkers. The time has

come for those who are constantly creating science and extending its horizons, for those engineers and technologists who are making ever more extensive and sophisticated use of science, technology and engineering; to build up also a thinking force through conscious confrontation with the problems of science and its utilisation.

Scientists and engineers are realising that their playful experiments of yesterday, and the tricks and gimmicks of science, have been scaled up to such colossal magnitudes, especially in the last two decades, that it is hardly safe to leave the management or the use of science entirely in the hands of politicians who run the governments of countries, or even the industrial giants whose profit motives can be more over-powering than their philanthropies. The competing political camps could use science to destroy the adversary, and in the process, even themselves. The industries of the free economies could, as they often do, pamper human greed to waste a large proportion of the affluence created by the scientists and technologists.

In the context of this new realisation of the good and evil that science and technology can disburse, the responsibilities in shaping human destinies which hitherto were left to the literati, to the philosophers or political thinkers, have now to be shared by the scientists, engineers and technologists.

In this respect, on the Indian scene SEMINAR seems to have played a very vital pioneering role. Reading through the science and technology issues, one can almost see the emergence amongst the scientists of India of their capacity and competence to challenge, as well as compliment, the efforts of the country's government, economists, politicians, social reformers and industrialists.

Into Space

In its first attempt SEMINAR hurls us *Into Space* which even within

the scientific and engineering communities carries the misgivings of a war effort between two political factions of the civilized world. We may question man's space effort as the most capricious waste of resources. It appears to be motivated by the extreme fancy of today's politicians when four-fifths of the world is grovelling at the altar of starvation and disease. However, reading the debate as presented objectively by Dhawan one becomes aware of the profound influence of space exploitation on human life—as also the capacity of man to endanger his own existence on this planet. With the arguments of Kothari, Whitney, Pokrovsky, Bernal, Kulin, one is convinced, and even motivated by the immense possibilities opening before mankind for the benefit of the human race; the new scientific barriers of knowledge being broken, the use of satellites for communications, for effective meteorological forecasts, space laboratories, etc. The only thing I have missed in this issue is an appreciation of some kind as to what India could or should attempt to contribute so far as 'space' research is concerned. Some indicators would have been very helpful to Indian readers in special.

Energy

The issue on *Energy* has managed well to clear the minds of many regards the hotly debated issue of the expenditure, which in the Indian context may be considered vast, on atomic energy. Despite the criticisms which emerge in some of the issues of the SEMINAR, one is impelled to approve the great drive and wisdom of the late Dr. Bhabha who foresaw, on a broad canvas, the need for a country as poor but as large as India to invest in magnitude on atomic energy. There may be arguments regarding the quantum of expenditure and the actual physical achievements to date. But SEMINAR clears the perspectives. There could be little argument about the magnitude on which the investments ought to have been made, as well as the extreme urgency of having

made them at precisely the juncture at which they were made.

Qualitatively, at least, there are already achievements that justify India's venture into atomic energy. Quantitatively, if the benefits have not satisfied the critics yet, it is to be remembered that it is the inherent potential of investments in such new disciplines that one day, suddenly, all expectations from these investments could be more than fulfilled in one single decade of the future. The Indian public lacking in scientific tradition is over critical of delays. Even some of the senior scientists of the country, who manage science, often forget their prime function of looking for the strong points of scientific programmes in hand which they should further strengthen, instead of inflicting unenlightened, unscientific criticism.

An oft repeated theme in the SEMINAR issues is the utilisation of solar energy, the potentials of which appear both obvious and limitless. Indeed, a break-through in harnessing solar energy might turn the under-developed economies of a vast country like India, overnight, into potentially affluent economies. Lamented by Kosambi for neglect in this country, it might well have to wait till someone emerges on the scene in this field with the same force of personality as Bhabha lent to atomic energy. I am borrowing from Kosambi's own theme that the political, economic and sociological contexts more than govern the fate of the emerging scientific frontiers. He rightly points to the political situation as all important.

Irrational Attitudes

The issues on the *Scientist and his Research*, as well as the *Scientific Attitude* are extremely revealing and I am sure the participants themselves gained from SEMINAR's impositions. It is seldom that the senior scientists are questioned and forced to reflect on such basic issues as the mode of selection of their research projects or their attitudes to science. Perhaps it is because such debates have not taken place, at least in this country, that the scientists,

especially the career scientists, have never come face-to-face with their own irrationalities, beliefs, superstitions. Nor have they been challenged squarely over what they are doing inside their laboratories by way of scientific research or outside of their laboratories where they should be the nodal points of enlightenment. In a country so engulfed in its ignorance of the present times, its bigotry over its past, and its extreme self-assuredness about its own righteousness, this is a relevant enquiry.

Some solace is obtained from the fact that even foreign scientists lament about their societies' irrationalities in the wake of tremendous spurts of science amongst them! But perhaps the westerners with all their affluence can afford irrationalities of religion and tradition, same as they permit themselves material wastage in their new modes of living resulting from scientifically created affluence. True, a poor country like India cannot afford modern western ways of life and wastage. But even less can the Indian economy bear to labour under the impediment of our religious sentiment and inviolate traditions that afflict not only the large masses of illiterate or semi-literate millions, but also many amongst the few scientists we have!

Problems of Development

The issue of June, 1966, *Science in Afro-Asia*, has thrown up very lucidly the problems of the under-developed countries in the context of their political enlightenment and independent emergence. The awareness with which Zaheer pin-points the most noteworthy fact for under-developed countries, that the gap between discovery and its utilisation can be shortened, that the less developed countries have the advantage of access to the store house of world knowledge in science and technology to build patterns and designs entirely suited to their own requirements, gives confidence that the under-developed countries can create conditions for accelerated growth and obtain greater returns from

comparatively lesser investment of resources.

It is evident from the SEMINAR issues that India's experiments in forcing the pace of science through a deliberate government policy, no matter how limited as regards funds and facilities, are at last beginning to pay off. The Indian scientific mind is now applying itself to what is more important in an under-developed country than science itself—the subjugation of science to eradicate poverty and disease, to ensure better standards of living, to improve education and employment possibilities. The Indian scientists appear to be growing in their awareness of the larger issues concerning the country, of what science can do for their fellow countrymen and how the same can be achieved through State planning for rapid progress.

Major Shortcoming

There is criticism in the SEMINAR about little or no activity in scientific research sustained by private industry which is the largest supporter of applied research in the free economies of the advanced countries. Yet, in our planned economy, when the Government of India has reserved for itself a major role in industry by entering the public sector, which represents nearly half of the industrial investment in the country today, there should be little reason for government itself not to play an enlightened role in strengthening Indian scientific research and its utilisation. In keeping with their objectives while establishing a public sector of a few thousand crores, before any criticism is levied at the private sector, at least the government and its public sector should display the patronage that is due from them to Indian scientific research, especially engineering research. It is lamentable that viewed from this particular angle the government itself, while planning large industrial investments, has not been aware of its shortcoming in its meagre support to Indian science and engineering.

The situation is not merely anomalous today. It is assuming desperate proportions. Govern-

ment has invested very heavily in the public sector while what can keep this investment going, continuous research and live technology, has been neglected to a very large measure. Even though 80 per cent of the planned expenditure concerns engineering, which is an obvious acceptance that engineering is all too important to achieve our plan objectives, the investment on engineering research has been all too insignificant and inadequate. The result is that today when the vast public sector industrial capacity has been created through extensive foreign loans and internal resources, two-thirds of it is lying idle.

Yet, one does not see any respite in either new projections of further investment, which rigid analysis would show as redundant, or a cut-down on imports. Machinery and equipment, which can be easily developed and manufactured with our own idle capacity, continues to be imported even though our economy can no longer bear such burdens. This could be directly related to the scanty expenditure that government has permitted on Indian engineering research in general and on mechanical engineering in particular, which could have helped utilise industrial capacities for diverse needs, year after year.

No Implementation

It was in 1958 that the Government of India adopted the Scientific Resolution, perhaps the most enlightened and most heartening Resolution that any country ever adopted. Over the past nine years it appears to have remained just a Resolution. There is little evidence that government is in any way siezed over the lack of implementation of the Resolution which does hold within it the key to India's prosperity. The Indian scientific scene continues to suffer from a near total lack of planning, from an extremely frustrating bureaucracy and lack of evaluation of inputs/outputs of funds and facilities.

Priorities in research have not even been attempted and while thousands of crores are easily

wasted in public and private sector industrial investments, a few crores required on research which alone could sustain these thousands of crores of investments, are grudged in the name of economic strain, little knowing that this is like denial of water to the fields which have already been planted. The harvest shall be poor, the fruit dry. Indeed, such today is our wont despite the largest industrial complexes created in a developing country that we continue to look askance at foreigners and beg for technical and financial aid even in fields where our own scientists and engineers can deliver the goods.

Self-Reliance

Although this review is no place to argue or build up the case, but I make bold to state that scientifically and technologically assessed, permitted proper harnessing of Indian talent in the public and private sectors, the country is today self-reliant and the stage of self-sustaining economy has been reached if only we were today denied all foreign aid, *and were forced to live within the foreign exchange that we earn or are capable of earning.*

Our projected quantum of aid requirements, assessed against the 70 per cent or so idle capacity of the Indian engineering industry do not even measure up to 20-25 per cent of the already established available idle capacity; such is the state of our dire need to beg! I hope SEMINAR will find space in some future issues for such subjects of current interest as whether we need more aid, why industrial capacities are idle, has the public sector belied our hopes, the failings of our private sector, etc?

But even more urgent, I think is the debate on industrial research: are the research priorities known, is the management and organisation of scientific and industrial research sound? SEMINAR provides an effective forum for these urgently needed debates. And of all our needs today, I am convinced, the most urgent is for science and technology to find the forum.

Defence perspectives

ASHOK V. DESAI

INDIA is more capable of defending herself today than she has been or will be for many years.

India has achieved this capability by a more rapid rate of build-up of arms than her hostile neighbours. In the five years since the Chinese attack of 1962, India has probably doubled her air strength and tripled her army; besides, she has modernised her arms, and virtually caught up with the rest of the world in the standard of small arms.

In the same five years, Pakistan has found it difficult to preserve

her armed strength, let alone raise it. Her armour was badly mauled in the skirmishes of 1965; her air force also suffered badly from war losses and lack of spares. Since 1965, Pakistan has raised two new infantry divisions; but by arming them with Chinese weapons she has probably created a problem of spares and replacements for the future. Her acquisition of T-59 tanks from China and purchase of second-hand American tanks has probably still not balanced her 1965 losses. In fighters she has probably made a net addition to her strength with

her recent purchases through Iran and receipts from China.

There is no evidence that China's armed strength has risen significantly in the five years. In infantry arms, China modernised during and after the Korean war; the modernisation was probably completed in the fifties. India has been catching up in this respect since 1962, and no significant advances in China have been reported since then. China's air force is three times as big as India's in terms of numbers, but its age would reduce its effectiveness considerably. Above all, there has been no reported accretion of Chinese forces in Tibet. The strength with which China confronts India is severely limited by three factors—the strains in China's economy, the multiplicity of her hostile neighbours and her concentration on nuclear weapons.

Present Position

In defence, therefore, India has never had it so good. This has some corollaries which run directly against popular belief. One is that we do not face any major threat just now. Every autumn there is much speculation whether China is going to come down the Himalayas; this year the bogeyman was Pakistan instead of China. Such speculation can only be based on a mixture of ignorance and a fear complex; for there is no foreign policy objective that either Pakistan or China can be reasonably certain of achieving by fighting with India—not even a stupid one like humiliating India.

One might well ask: were conditions any different in 1962 and 1965? In 1962 they certainly were. In 1962 we were trying to strengthen our military position in areas where the Chinese definitely did not want us; and we went about doing it in a way that gave them a golden opportunity to sweep us out. We set up a string of outposts along our mountainous border, thinking they would make up a chain of strongholds. But a chain is useless if it breaks at one point; all the Chinese had to do was to break the chain at one

point and proceed to cut off the strongholds one by one. General K. S. Thimayya had advocated a very different strategy of mobile defence (SEMINAR, July 1962, p. 15). But he was wrong, like so many of us, to think that 'The terrain throughout the length of the India-China border favours us in the matter of defence'. This was true in the middle ages, but it is long since mass armies and fire power turned the scales against mountain defence. While mountains and forests may afford natural protection to a mobile guerrilla force (as they do in Nagaland and Viet Nam), they cannot be used effectively to prevent penetration. They did it very well. They had a limited objective, and they achieved it.

In 1965, as now, we had two armies, a mountain one and a plains one; and the latter was inferior to the Pakistan army, at least on paper. We had about six divisions facing Pakistan; Pakistan had as many, and their infantry was armed with more modern weapons. They had two armoured divisions, one made up of Pattons. We had one armoured division, an armoured brigade and two light tank regiments; except the AMX 13 light tanks, all were of World War II vintage. Pakistan had 155 mm. Howitzers for which we had no match. We had three times as many planes; but the Pakistanis banked on their 200 Sabres and Star Fighters. With a little bit of military bravado, it must have seemed easy to them.

Inexperience

That they did so badly was due to military inexperience. First they sent infiltrators into Kashmir without realizing that infiltration will fail without insurgency to absorb and utilize it. Next they sent tanks across Khem Karan without considering the terrain in which they would have to operate; in the event the soggy country under standing crops proved a graveyard for the tanks. Finally, they lost a classic battle of manoeuvre in Sialkot. People who make such egregious errors should

expect much rougher treatment than the Pakistanis got.

Since then, Pakistan has raised two new infantry divisions; we have added at least two to our plains army. Pakistan has bought three to five squadrons of Sabre Jets from West Germany and acquired perhaps three squadrons of Chinese Mig 19s; the net addition to their fighter force would be four to six squadrons, and would certainly be exceeded by the additional Gnat and Mig-21 squadrons we would have raised. Pakistan has acquired about 250 Chinese T-59 tanks, and perhaps a few second-hand West German Pattons. Her net acquisitions would be negligible, considering her heavy losses in 1965. Besides, there are American reports that we have imported at least that many tanks. It is impossible to strike a complete balance, but it is clear that there is an arms race between India and Pakistan, and that Pakistan has not been winning it—at the most she is keeping her end up.

Learning From Defeat

It is not in arms that Pakistan is gaining over us, it is in wisdom. For the loser learns more out of a war than the winner.

For one thing, Pakistan has learnt that she is militarily indefensible. Against either of her bigger neighbours, India and the USSR—and China if one thinks of her—Pakistan has no chance of standing up militarily for any length of time. West Pakistan is a long, thin strip that can be cut at many points; East Pakistan's defence capacity is even lower.

In such circumstances, Pakistan must follow two courses. One is to increase the cost of aggression on Pakistan. One hears of Chinese training officers in Pakistan's army; it is likely that the army is learning the Chinese methods of living off the land, making the best use of terrain and mobility.

The other course is to overcome the limitations of one's frontier by diplomatic means. The most significant of Pakistan's moves in this

direction is her closer relations with Iran and Turkey. Evidently, Ayub would like to weld the three countries into as close an alliance as their political systems would allow. Militarily, the pooling of more mobile material such as planes and troops would increase the fighting power of the three countries. Economically, it would ease their balances of payments by encouraging trade between them in complementary goods. The most important among the goods for Pakistan is Iranian oil which can replace Indian coal. If Pakistan is to live in hostility to India, it is a geographical necessity for her to extend westwards.

Besides these westward overtures, Pakistan has developed closer contacts with Russia and China. This is also a lesson well learnt, for Pakistan can confront India only in alliance with another great neighbour. Pakistan's most strongly felt need is for protectors against India. In the fifties she chose the United States for this role because the States were very eager to dole out arms. Now they are not so generous; so it is time to find new and nearer friends.

Our Lessons

We also learnt a few lessons, but that was earlier—just after the 1962 conflict. We learnt the necessity of modern weapons from rifles right up to anti-aircraft guns. We learnt the new air tactics from joint exercises with British and American air forces. We learnt that a strategically defensive war, which the government of that time used to believe in, was designed for defeat, and that attack on terrain of one's choice, attack on enemy country, were essential to the success even of a defensive war.

But these were all military lessons. We learnt only those, and even then not many of them, as Leo Heiman's article, reproduced as a document in *SEMINAR* (July 1966, pp. 35-39), showed. And none of the political lessons, because the military lessons proved adequate for our purposes. Of our major neighbours, China and Pakistan were tackled by armaments,

and with Russia we maintained friendly relations. Politically we are much where we were in 1962—perhaps slightly more cynical, slightly more of a *real politiker*,

But there are always new lessons to learn, and we cannot always arrange to lose a war so that we learn them.

Take the westward drift of Pakistan. If she forges a close alliance with Iran and Turkey, our military problem will be dramatically transformed. I do not think we would be capable of an adequate military response to the development. Hence political means must be adopted.

The Possibilities

Here there are many possibilities. For instance, we might try to wean Pakistan away from the temptations further West. The only way to do this is to remove our military threat to Pakistan. What this involves is not just the settlement of the Kashmir problem, but a liberalisation of trade and movement between the countries until they are too interdependent to attack each other. Concessions on Kashmir will have to be made; but if the two countries can agree to relax economic restrictions, they will also be able to work out constitutional solutions that make sovereignty over Kashmir less relevant and better, freer government of Kashmir more relevant.

Or we could let Pakistan drift westwards, encourage it, and bring East Pakistan closer to us. Here again, it is not necessary to think of encouraging East Pakistan to break away. What is necessary is encouragement of forces indigenous to East Pakistan. In all our dealings with Pakistan, we should try to develop our contacts with and assistance to the East. East Pakistan earns most of Pakistan's foreign exchange, and West Pakistan spends it. Hence West Pakistan is vitally interested in East Pakistan, and any effort to separate them by force will be resisted. But there are strains enough between the two wings, and they will be accentuated with Pakistan's growing orientation to-

wards the Middle East. The important thing is to recognise and pursue our interest in them.

A third course is to drift south-east ourselves. India is the smallest of the (geographically) large countries, and with industrialization she will find herself increasingly small. Even now our poverty in minerals and raw materials is seriously hampering us, and our attempts at import substitution by autarchy have not been a dazzling success. Rather than make synthetic rubber at a loss, we should import natural rubber from Ceylon; rather than try to smelt small reserves of zinc in Rajasthan we should get it from Burma. Both Ceylon and Burma have payments difficulties, and will import more of our goods if we import theirs. And once economic interdependence develops, other contacts and cooperation can follow. Like Pakistan, we also need to overcome the fetters of our nationality.

All these courses are not mutually exclusive; they can be combined in various proportions to meet circumstances. What is essential to them is that we should not regard ourselves as an island, but see the interrelations between our policies and those of our immediate neighbours.

Future Prospects

It is much more difficult to deal with China, mainly because we cannot understand her. China is an even more insular country than India. Her trade with her south Asian neighbours is negligible; overall, she is much more self-sufficient. Her understanding of other countries is as poor as ours—perhaps poorer. Hence at present she does not impinge on us in any way.

But the situation might be very different in ten years. For, China today is rapidly developing her missile technology. Missiles will have a radical effect on warfare because they are a versatile weapon that can be developed for use against a wide variety of targets. They can be made with different ranges, payloads and for different

degrees of accuracy. After development they are quite cheap to produce, and are an effective counter to such capital-intensive equipment as aircraft and tanks. Hence it is possible that with a mastery of missiles, China will be a far stronger power in the mid-seventies.

India has no answer to this development. She started experimenting with smaller ground-to-air and air-to-air missiles, but her programme appears quite backward. Recently there have been reports that Hindustan Aeronautics wants to develop a supersonic fighter-bomber in the mid-seventies; but its performance with HF-24 or HS-743 would not inspire any confidence.

This is why I said at the beginning that India is more capable of defending herself than she is going to be. She does not develop her own technology so she will always be a step behind the countries that do, for instance, the China of tomorrow. We worry about whether to make nuclear weapons. An entire issue of SEMINAR was devoted to this question nearly three years ago (January 1965). Contributors to it cited experts in support of statements such as 'India's Canberas are capable of delivering a (nuclear) bomb better than the Chinese Ilyushin', and 'it is considered unlikely...that, without Soviet assistance, she (China) could have an effective delivery system, consisting mainly of a modernised Air Force before 1975 or even later'. Looking back it would seem that while we had experts on our side, China had the capacity to confound experts. But the option is no longer ours. Nuclear bombs are useless without the means of delivering them. It would take five times as long to develop a delivery system as a nuclear bomb, and we have not even started. And even if we had it, a deliverable bomb would only save us from nuclear blackmail; that is only one of the many eventualities we might face. We will overcome them only if we foresee them and act in time. Foresight and action—of them we will never have enough.

Language and education

SUKHAMOY CHAKRAVARTY

THE editor has asked me to review the past issues of the SEMINAR dealing with problems of education. In preparing my contribution to this seminar on SEMINARS, I am struck not merely by the quality and range of the contributions but also by a deeper unity behind the seemingly diverse themes which includes, among others, the problem of one language for India, the politics of language in India,

the question of a uniform script for different Indian languages, the state of our universities, student turmoil, and more recently the problem of the 'brain drain'. It appears to me that the underlying concern behind these different topics has been a desire to understand the problem of creating a viable and expanding intellectual community in India, which will be effective without being 'elitist' in character.

Central Theme

In commenting on the past contributions, I shall also try to focus attention on this central theme, rather than deal with individual authors and their points of view. Further, the major emphasis would be on the problem of *language* in relation to education. In India, this is not the only problem to be tackled in connection with evolving an appropriate language policy. As the past contributions to the SEMINAR amply bear out, there are important political questions here which involve the very integrity of India as one nation. This is not surprising in view of the multi-lingual nature of the country, uneven regional development and the legacy of a colonial past. Thus, any language policy that we evolve must tackle simultaneously the problems posed by the educational system as well as the broader problem of retaining or heightening the sense of identity of the country.

For the sake of analytical convenience as well as from a fear that as a university teacher I may not have much to offer on the latter of the two questions referred to earlier, my observations will mostly relate to the problem of language in relation to education. Even here my observations are inevitably tentative and sketchy in character since the problems are vast and not easily tractable. Towards the end of this paper, I should like to offer my own observations on the second problem as well, especially because a number

of SEMINAR issues deal with this question in some detail and I believe that any discussion on the language question is bound to remain incomplete without some observations on this question.

Quality and Quantity

I take it for granted that the purpose of an educational policy in India today is to build a strong intellectual community, not merely for its own sake, but also for the material benefits which are strongly associated with having a highly educated society. The problem is how we go about achieving this ideal. Clearly, the problems here are twofold: qualitative and quantitative. A strong intellectual community today, unlike the middle ages, requires not merely *quality*, a few isolated geniuses, but also *quantity*. This is because knowledge has grown enormously, effective intellectual work today depends to a great extent on division of labour, and present day technology cannot function without a sizeable stock of (highly) trained people.

Thus, in approaching the central problem of an educational policy we cannot afford to be overly 'Brahminical', or display a 'Part pour l'art' attitude. Quantity is important and has to be rightly emphasized. Having said this much, one must point out the obvious limitation to the quantitative approach which consists in paying insufficient attention to the needs for differentiation. The problem behind Indian education today as distinguished from fifty years ago has perhaps been a far too uncritical acceptance of the approach based on mere quantitative considerations.

It appears to me that the present pressure on the language question can also be looked upon from this viewpoint. Emphasis on education in the mother tongue at all levels has come essentially from people who feel that the educational base

has to be expanded in quantitative terms. Supporters of English, on the other hand, have been typically people who fear a great loss in the quality of education when the mother tongue will be used as a substitute for English. For reasons that I have already mentioned, the argument of people who advocate the use of the mother tongue is very important and cannot by any means be dismissed out of hand. It is doubtless true that some education can be more easily imparted to a much larger number of people if we move over to the mother tongue than if it is given in an 'alien' tongue. If the distribution of 'intelligence' in a large population is a genetic constant, then clearly we shall be bringing up in this way more intelligent people than otherwise—quite apart from that, the social gulf between the 'educated' and the 'uneducated' may diminish substantially, thus reducing one negative element in a tense social situation.

The problem arises as soon as one tries to read some definite meaning into the expression 'some education.' Does 'some' mean 'all'? If so, are the problems at all levels of education merely one of *quantity*? If there are levels of education where mere 'quantity' is not merely not enough, but sometimes may be a negative factor to be reckoned with, then clearly the problem of educating students at *all levels* in the mother tongue does require more careful consideration.

Relevant Considerations

For an educational policy, what are the relevant considerations in this context? The relevant considerations are basically two: one is the transmission of a given body of knowledge and the other is to help the process of creating more knowledge, and also in the process to keep up with it. The word 'knowledge' includes two types: 'tool oriented' knowledge and 'concept

forming' knowledge.¹ These are very rough classifications but they will be shown to serve a purpose in my subsequent discussion. The role of a language of instruction is somewhat different depending on whether any of the four possibilities are the primary focus of our consideration: (a) transmission of tool oriented knowledge; (b) increasing the stock of such knowledge; (c) transmission of knowledge of the 'concept forming' variety; (d) to help the growth of conceptual knowledge.

Regional Language

So far as objective (a) is concerned, there is no doubt that the different regional languages in India can and ought to play a much greater role than has been currently assigned to them. In this category, I shall include not merely primary and secondary education on which there is not any dispute, but a great deal of technological education. This is because unless we attempt the monstrous and self-defeating job of using Sanskrit equivalents of terms of technological discourse, most of the words used have clear referential meanings. The syntax used is simple and has a strong formal pattern. Here the distinction drawn by logicians between a 'metalanguage' and an 'object language' is shown very clearly. Object language can here easily contain a large number of English terms or terms of local origin, while the metalanguage in which we discourse about the 'object language' can easily be the mother tongue. In fact, even without outside intervention, the logic of this situation will often automatically force the use of the 'mother tongue' or a simplified English, as can be witnessed when, say, a number of Bengali scientists discuss a technical problem amongst themselves.

So far as problems pertaining to group 'b' are concerned, there are again strong factors in favour of using the mother tongue, but one

1. I also include 'value forming' knowledge in this category.

is faced with an additional problem which arises because of the multilingual nature of this country. This problem arises because any attempt to increase the stock of knowledge even in a tool oriented subject requires communication among fellow workers. If each language group could constitute by itself a big enough intellectual community, then the problem would be much less severe. But even then, the problem remains, especially in today's world where the levels of specialization are exceedingly high and the centres of specialization are mostly located outside India. It would appear to me that an effective solution of difficulties on this score would require the simultaneous use of a mother tongue with the much greater use of a simplified 'English', an English specifically suited to the requirements of science and technology. Modern methods of teaching English have to be introduced on a much wider scale. In view of the stock of English educated manpower we have today, this is a task which should not prove altogether impossible.

The Two Extremes

We now come to the more difficult classes of cases. Here, problems are much more complicated and the dangers of getting lost in a 'vicious circle' are considerably greater. When we come to teaching and research in areas where words have no clear referential meanings, possessing what is called an 'open texture', and the problem of creating an ideal logical language for these subjects has been long recognized to be a lost cause, we enter an exceedingly difficult territory. Both the extreme answers, e.g., to stick fast to English or to throw it away altogether, appear to me to be based on insufficient appreciation of the difficulties of the situation.

The first solution of sticking on to English is inadequate because in its present form it helps only to perpetuate the vicious circle of low quality thinking in the mother

tongue by hardly giving any incentive to do otherwise. It is never the case that one language gives into another when the other is fully developed. Languages, unlike the mythical Minerva do not spring full grown from the forehead of the Zeus of a nationality. They develop in the course of use. Thus, sticking on to English by itself is no answer.

So far as the second solution is concerned, it is somewhat wrong headed because, in this case, doing away with the established mode of discourse may leave us in an intellectual vacuum, since, often in these areas, there is no special subject for the discourse apart from the discourse itself. Thus, the result may be utter chaos.

We are, therefore, faced with a seeming choice between sticking to a 'status quo' with its privileges, or a chaos in intellectual life.

Past Experience

It would be worth our while at this stage to recall the experience of Europe in this connection when it moved away from the use of Latin to a much greater use of the vernacular, which eventually displaced it altogether as a vehicle of intellectual instruction and communication. There are two outstanding facts about this experience. First of all, the process was neither very rapid nor very abrupt. It was a long drawn out process. Secondly, the process coincided with a tremendous intellectual ferment which changed man's view on life and the world. The shift to vernacular was an integral part of the growth of the new world view, free from the old religious viewpoint. In India, if a similar shift has to take place today, this has to be accompanied by important changes in the outlook on life.

In part, this happened in India during the 19th century when the impact of western education led to the development of a prose medium of discourse in many Indian languages. The new 'elite' sought to explain its newly acquired

knowledge and outlook to a much larger number of people who were not otherwise exposed to education in western style. Reinterpretation of India's history, culture, and changes in social habits and beliefs took place simultaneously with the development of Indian languages. For many reasons, this process did not extend very deep and very far. It appears that this limitation stemmed basically from the predominantly agrarian character of the Indian economy throughout the colonial period.

With the advent of independence, it could be expected that the process would gain considerably in momentum. During the last 20 years, while education has expanded significantly in quantitative terms, it is clear that nothing very significant has been done by way of interpreting the expanding world of science and culture to very broad masses of people through the medium of the vernacular tongues. It requires much careful sociological research before we can lay our hands on the important causal mechanisms at work.

Possibilities

Before we have grasped these factors at work and the nature of the problem, it is not clear what we are going to gain and how much by a precipitate change over in the medium of instruction in the areas we have called 'c' and 'd'. It is clear that the leadership thrown up by a 'populist' democracy may feel that it would gain in influence through this change over. But it would appear that mere 'populism' by itself would be unable to generate the intellectual ferment that alone would make it possible to change over from what has been described as the 'status quo' of the privileged which the present system enjoins, to a much fuller participation of the broad masses of people.

We may now sum up our observation as follows. The present system with its strong emphasis on the retention of English does

raise serious problems *vis-a-vis* subjects falling under our categories 'c' and 'd' in developing a sizeable indigenous intellectual community. But the alternative of changing over to the regional languages at all levels in the context of the intellectual life of the different parts of the country does also raise problems which are no less significant. The problems consequent on the change over will be all the more important in the short run and, depending on the circumstances, may be utterly destabilizing so far as the present educational system is concerned.

No Substitute

The usual panacea for containing the anticipated difficulties has been the idea of massive translation of books. For reasons which our earlier analysis should make clear, translation is no substitute for conceptual thinking in the language concerned, especially in its early formative stages. Furthermore, conceptual thinking is to be done by people who are trained in the subjects concerned and not by a different class of people, e.g., the class of professional translators. One knows from the experience of Russia and Japan that people who do the translation of important works are quite often important contributors in their own right. Thus, the usual remedy of massive translation, even apart from the financial and other feasibility considerations, is defective in principle.

At this stage we may very well throw up our hands in despair and consider the discussion as closed. Fortunately, the choices in reality as against choices on paper are never that simple or stark. Very often the problem is a specific or a concrete one. Thus, it may be found that in certain regions and in certain subjects, a lot of intellectual ferment is already there. It should be possible for us to make use of these special factors. Thus, take a language such as Bengali and a subject such as 'history'. It is quite possible that serious instruction can be imparted at all levels in history through the

medium of Bengali in view of all the work done by the Bengali scholars. Similar arguments can apply elsewhere.

For education in technology, for reasons I have elaborated earlier, a combination of the mother tongue and a simplified English may provide the needed 'meta-language'. For mathematics, there exists a comprehensive symbolic language.² Similar arguments may apply to other sciences.

Concrete Proposals

In short, what I am suggesting is that an approach involving the exclusive use of one language is unlikely to be helpful. Translations by themselves are inadequate even in principle. Further, it would be self-defeating to supplant existing resources and skill availabilities by fostering artificial constructs. Do these observations add to a language policy for educational purposes? I believe they do, in very broad outline. For concreteness, my proposals may be summed up as follows:

- (a) use the mother tongue for tool oriented education on a much larger scale than is done at present;
- (b) develop a 'simplified' English for the special purpose of imparting education in the above subjects.
- (c) instead of spending all money on translations, spend a part of the money in printing text books in 'simplified English' for wider dissemination of technical and scientific knowledge of the 'tool oriented' type. Such an English would not be an artificial construct in the sense of using neologisms, but would minimize the demands to be made on students' vocabulary, etc;
- (d) for better development of conceptual thinking, use mother tongue only when there exists an intellectual climate conducive to it. To

2. The eminent German mathematician wrote his famous book on analysis, using roughly 100 substantive German words.

implement such a policy we would require detailed information on the different languages and different regions. But it is idle to pretend that such knowledge exists today in any centralized form; and

- (e) above all, make use of the existing limited stock of educated manpower in forging a more effectual symbiosis between the different regional tongues and English, rather than use one at the expense of the other.

Political Aspects

So far I have confined myself exclusively to the demands of an effective educational policy. We now turn our attention to the broad political aspects of a language policy in the context of India today, which are reflected in several past issues of the SEMINAR. This relates to the desire which many of us share in having a strong intellectual community on an *all-India* basis. To a certain extent, such requirements would be reflected in having strong regional communities, since specialization would demand interchange of communicable materials. Thus, in many subjects, it would be possible to have a strong group within India only on the basis of an all-India audience. But, even apart from this requirement, there is a value one must attach to the facility of intercourse across different languages. These would arise from the pressing need to modernize the economy and improve the material well being of a very large number of people.

If modernization of India is a valued objective, then it would help things considerably by way of better communication if we decide to use the Roman script as an additional script for all the regional languages of the country. It would be difficult to imagine a substantial intellectual argument against this objective. In any case the issue was so thoroughly and ably discussed by many parti-

cipants in past issues of the SEMINAR that it is unnecessary for me to add anything to it.

Two Languages

Our conclusions so far amount to a 'two language' formula, involving the regional language and English with the additional suggestion that every regional language should have an additional script, e.g., Roman. This leaves out of account the very powerful sentiment that exists in parts of the country for having Hindi as a 'link' language for the entire country or, more recently, the strong opposition to such an idea in certain other parts. Do we have any suggestions on this score?

It would appear that the real issues behind the demand for having Hindi as a link language are only peripherally linguistic. They are based on fears and expectations which have both deep economic and emotional roots, which it is not possible for us to analyse here. By way of general comments, one can only say that any decision on this score cannot be divorced from the broader economic and political tasks which confront the entire Indian society today and in abstraction from the abilities that the different social groups have in carrying out these tasks.

In India, the problem of generating rapid enough economic growth without significant accentuation in regional or class disparities would appear to be such a task. It would be sheer commonsense on our part that any decision we take on this score should help in this task and not hinder it. It is possible that, even when all is said and done, the choices involved in modernization and betterment of the living condition of masses of people are too difficult to admit of an easy or even a successful resolution in all respects in the very short-run. But it would be minimum prudence on our part not to make a confused problem worse confounded by adopting a stance based either on dogma, status or populism.

Implementation

DILIP MUKERJI

MANY of the problems highlighted by SEMINAR over the past eight years are still with us. In a sense, this is not surprising. Take for example the problem of ensuring a cleaner and more responsive administration highlighted by SEMINAR as early as April 1960, in an issue devoted to corruption. It returned to broadly the same theme in June, 1961, with an issue on administration and again four years later with two issues—one on the *Indian Civil Service* and the other on *The Administrative Jungle*. As D. K. Rangnekar said in his piece on the Indian Civil Service, a nation gets the government it deserves, explaining this aphorism to mean that the character of the administ-

ration and its efficiency is bound to reflect the strength and weaknesses of the social environment in which it operates. It is idle therefore to expect administrative improvement to rush ahead of the changes in the social milieu, although one may perhaps regret that the administrative elite are not setting an example to the rest of the society in a bid to accelerate the process of change.

In a vast and amorphous country like India, generalizations covering the whole country are open to the danger of overlooking incipient but significant changes, specially those taking place in the underpublicised countryside, SEMINAR contributors, belonging to the urban elite living in the

metropolitan centres, have been understandably susceptible to this failing. It is otherwise difficult to understand why those who reviewed the administrative problem as late as September 1966, should have missed out the corrective to sloth and incompetence supplied by the growing assertiveness of the people, both rural and urban.

Assertiveness

One of the most heartening sights this reviewer has seen is a demonstration mounted outside a Block Development Office in South Bihar to ventilate indignation over the late supply of fertilizer. Not so long ago, fertilizer went a-begging: the farmer had still to be sold on the idea of using it. Not surprisingly, fertilizer bags piled up in Block Offices and co-operative stores while the agriculture administration merrily went on making claims about the efforts it was making to popularize this and other modern inputs. The effort was more imaginary than real, but there was simply no means of checking upon it. Today this problem has virtually disappeared; demand from below is pushing the administrators into improving their performance.

This is happening not merely with the fertilizers but the whole range of services which the government has undertaken to provide to the farmer. Rising literacy, growing awareness or rights, and finally the intensifying political competition in the countryside is, bringing in an unmistakable change in the temper and tone of administration.

Much the same process of change is at work in the cities, specially in the politically alive States like West Bengal, Maharashtra and Madras. When the SEMINAR issue on *Corruption* appeared in April, 1960, I remember discussing it with the Bihar journalist, who painted to me a frightening picture of the ramifications of graft in every walk of the State's life. His father, a retired policeman, had to make a small cash 'present' every time he went to draw his pension from a treasury at a district headquarter

in north Bihar. This is probably still happening, but I ventured to suggest that the incidence is shrinking as both government employees as well as the people they serve get better organized.

The humble rickshaw puller in Calcutta—totally helpless and defenceless vis-a-vis the rickshaw owner and the police—is acquiring a new backbone with the emergence of a pullers union. In a recent incident at the Howrah station, some of them got together to give a couple of police bullies a sound thrashing—something quite unthinkable even five years ago. That this incident has probably improved police behaviour towards the pullers is a reasonable surmise to make. Conversely, it is also likely that the spread of militant unionism among government employees, and the need stemming thereupon for mobilizing public support, makes them more mindful of the duty they owe to the public.

Parliamentary Checks

On another plane, a new kind of check on administrative arbitrariness is coming to operate through Parliament although this development does not seem to have been noticed by SEMINAR contributors. In the summer of last year during a particularly stormy session of the Lok Sabha, some strident MPs, including several from within the ruling party, successfully pressurized the government into instituting an inquiry about some administrative defaults in the Steel Ministry. The story goes that they were not after the administrator whose actions were impugned, but were really getting at those politicians believed to have pulled strings from behind. The result, as we all know, was that the ambassadorship offered to one of the administrators connected with this business had to be countermanded.

As a visitor to Delhi at that time, this reviewer heard many civil servants express the opinion that parliamentary inquisitions of this nature were bound to sap what little initiative the administrators are left with. Henceforth,

no one would want to exercise his discretion lest he should be hauled up before a parliamentary committee to account for his actions. This viewpoint is not to be dismissed lightly. While it is true that parliamentary interest in the minutiae of administration would tie up the executive in knots and slow down decision making very seriously, an occasional storm in the light of facts uncovered by the investigation of parliamentary committees should be welcome for its salutary effect.

The Civil Servants

Niranjan Mazumdar quoting Nirad Chaudhury made much of the cringing of the civil servant before the politician; 'Observer' writing in the same issue spoke of the pecuniary benefits derived by a civil servant who learnt to accommodate his political masters; H. K. Paranjape spoke of the allurements of employment after retirement. The misgivings on these counts are as valid today as before, but the possibility of a parliamentary exposure must indeed act as a powerful deterrent, more so in the changed political circumstances after the general elections. No party is so secure in its tenure as to be able to guarantee anything more than temporary protection. This is bound to make civil servants far more circumspect in dealing with their political masters than ever before.

These changes notwithstanding, the administrative jungle remains as murky as SEMINAR contributors made it out to be. The idea of promotion on merit mooted by Mrs. Gandhi (welcomed by H. K. Paranjape in the August 1966 issue) has been scotched at the start. It is an open secret that eight secretaries and 14 joint secretaries were adjudged as unsuitable for the posts they held after an inquiry made by their own peers, but the attempt to move them into innocuous positions elsewhere came to nought on account of powerful trade union pressure of the top civil servants. They came to the rescue of the condemned and prevailed upon the political leadership to drop the

idea of pushing merit to the fore. Another civil servants' conspiracy has recently prevented the elevation of a technically qualified additional secretary to the secretaryship of the same department. No, the job had to be given to a regular civil servant even though the minister concerned was much against it. The argument ran that induction of outsiders would limit the already restricted opportunities of promotion open to the senior civil servants, a view to which the Prime Minister apparently gave in because it was advanced by the senior-most members of the service in a deputation they led to her.

Public Undertakings

In its survey of the administrative scene, SEMINAR was quite right to devote special attention to the problems of the industrial enterprises in the public sector. The contributions of the late S. G. Barve, M. K. Mathulla and B. Venkatappiah were all pitched to the same key. As Venkatappiah said, the bureaucrat has beautiful plans on paper and rigid rules to thwart them, creating an Alice in Wonderland situation:

'But I was thinking of a plan,
To dye ones whiskers green,
And always use so large a fan,
That they could not be seen.'

Mathulla speaking from direct personal knowledge of the problem put forward a 10-point programme of reform while Barve went over the same ground but in somewhat greater detail. Many people, both inside the government and outside it, have had much the same things to say on the nature of the problem and the remedies available to New Delhi. Mrs Gandhi called in a hand-picked group of public sector managers to a conference last year at the end of which a note was prepared, listing in order of priority the things that needed to be done. Hopes were raised high, more so because Mrs Gandhi had brought in with her a mood of youthful iconoclasm when she succeeded to the Prime Ministership. The note had, of course, to be

'processed'—as every proposal must be on its way to the top—and placed before the Cabinet. There were some objections and the matter got side-tracked. It was resurrected again after the elections, only to be shelved when further objections were voiced by one of the new ministers. The result is that the note, which public sector managers had looked upon as a new bill of rights, is now as dead as the dodo. The fate that overtook it has only served to reinforce cynicism and apathy in the managerial ranks.

The crux of the problem vis-à-vis public undertakings is that of ensuring effective devolution of authority to managers on the job even while retaining overall control and supervision to meet the requirements of accountability to Parliament. The simultaneous need for centralization and decentralization creates conflicts of purpose which no country has found it easy to resolve as evident from the periodic heart-searching in a mixed economy like Britain's and a socialist economy like the Soviet Union's.

Rural Administration

The same conflict between autonomy and control arises in a number of other administrative fields, notably rural administration. In posing the problem in the September 1963 issue of SEMINAR devoted to *Panchayati Raj*, Hugh Gray pointed out quite correctly that the main consideration prompting the setting up of these village institutions was the aim of using them to enlist public co-operation and participation in development. The Chinese have tackled this problem by making the Communist Party the principal instrument of mass mobilization. The Israelis in their different circumstances draw upon religious fervour while India's multi-party system had to have a more institutionalized framework to do the same job. Apart from this functional need for Panchayati Raj, there is also a sentimental interest deriving from the myth of village republics of ancient India run by *Panch Par-*

meshwar. It was interesting to find E. M. S. Namboodiripad also subscribing to the myth which Hugh Gray sought to explode in his posser.

Local Autonomy

On the issue of local autonomy, Namboodiripad tried—unsuccessfully in the judgment of this reviewer—to walk a tight rope. His commitment to socialism and planning made him see the need for central direction and control in relation to 'major questions of policy', but he still pleaded for maximum possible freedom and initiative for lower units of administration. He failed, however, to specify the precise areas in which this initiative and freedom is to be exercised—a not uncommon failing on the part of practising politicians. If one is to judge from the example of Kerala—over which Namboodiripad now presides—there has been, if anything, an attempt to use both the government and the party apparatus to make Panchayats toe a line laid down from above at the State level.

E. M. S. Namboodiripad quoted with relish a joke once current in Poland that its planners had prescribed a target even for the production of pickled cucumber in drawing up the national economic plan. He quite rightly argued against such excessive centralization, but overlooked the basic truth that the progress towards decentralization is itself a function of development, as evident from recent moves towards more market-oriented planning in the Soviet Union. The greater the elbow room available in an economy, the more that can be left to look after itself. This is not to be read as a plea for planning the production of pickles—or the Indian equivalent of setting a target for a number of compost pits to be dug per village—but for a fair measure of detailed supervision to ensure that scarce resources are put to uses agreed upon in advance at the State or the Central level.

Unfortunately for Namboodiripad, the practical needs of the Left

Communist Party in the Indian situation do not coincide with the principles to which it subscribes vis-a-vis the role of the State in economic development. Logically, Namboodiripad should have supported a decisive role for the Centre in planning to ensure that local pressures do not lead to any deviations from aims or modalities, especially in the initial phases of the development process when the going is the hardest. But he departed from the logic to indulge in some sniping at the Planning Commission and the Finance Ministry in a prologue deploring the fact that Panchayati institutions had failed to come into their own in an environment dominated by a high degree of centralization. It will be rewarding for the political scientists to explore the reasons for this dichotomy in Namboodiripad's logic. Does it have something to do with the possibility that he and his colleagues of the Left Communist Party visualize revolution coming piecemeal to a vast and unevenly developed country like India?

The Dangers

Despite his tirades against control, Namboodiripad is careful however to distinguish his position from that of the Sarvodaya atomizers to whom village autonomy is an end in itself. Although he did not touch upon the role of parties at the village level, several other contributors to this issue did. M. Y. Ghorpade pleading for partyless democracy at the Panchayati level suggested that party politics had nothing to do with the running of a co-operative or with the construction of a road, school or dispensary. L. C. Jain agreeing with Hugh Gray's poser pointed out that power and politics were inseparable. As Jain succinctly put it, only a party in power, or a party without any organization at a village level, could afford the sentiment that Panchayats were something sacred which should be left alone. Hugh Gray went to the heart of the matter: he sug-

gested that the cry to exclude politics was in fact a cry for maintaining the *status quo* with all its authoritarian and hierarchical features.

Population Problem

SEMINAR devoted three issues to the population problem, setting it in the general perspective of the quest for health and physical well-being. A preview of the census operation was presented in February 1961, setting out a closely argued and well-documented plea for comprehensive demographic, economic and social data to permit the formulation of plans better geared to realities. The point made about the need for continuity in census activities still remains to be taken: the census organization is as much without a permanent home and address as it was in 1961. Considering that the next census is now less than four years away, some of the organizational problems highlighted by Ashok Mitra require urgent review so that improvements can be affected in time for the next operation.

The issue on census triggered off, via Sushila Gore's thoughtful article reviewing various methods of contraception, a closer look at the nature and prospects of the population problem to which the May 1962 issue was devoted. Apart from Raina's review of the work done in the family planning field, the other contributions appearing in this issue sought to explore how the concept of family limitation could be integrated with the values of as disparate a society as India's. Predictably, there was no agreement on the acceptability of the concept: Ashish Bose brought up the problem of mass illiteracy to suggest that the people of India were both unaware of methods of birth control and the need for it. Chandrashekhar took an entirely contrary view; he claimed that limitation was 'highly acceptable to men and women both in urban and rural areas'. Sovani preferred to keep an open mind: he offered the assessment that the structure of motivation 'was complicated, and

'next to nothing' was known about it.

Much more work on attitude surveys and the like has been done in the past five years since this particular issue appeared, but it is doubtful whether the lack of knowledge of which Sovani complained has been mitigated to any extent. What we know, however, is that wherever facilities have been available, the response from the public has been heartening as for instance in industrial townships and plantation areas where medical facilities are better organized than in the rest of the country. The moral to be drawn is the obvious one that while we continue to search for an understanding of the problem of motivation the concentration of effort must be on ensuring better access to facilities for birth control. To argue about motivation before the facilities exist is really to put the cart before the horse. Bose quoting R. A. Gopalaswamy pointed out that a major drawback was the lack of reliable contraceptive appliances. This lack has still to be remedied. The first Indian factory for the manufacture of condoms is yet to come into operation.

Shortage of Personnel

A particularly interesting feature of the issue was the debate on the merits of different contraceptive methods, to which the contribution by A. Nevett, a Jesuit, added a certain quaintness. The debate did not take into account, however, the basic truth that no method can assure full effectiveness without adequate instruction, supervision and follow-up. The limiting factor therefore is the availability of personnel trained to do the job as is borne out by the setback which the IUCD programme has suffered. When the loop was first introduced in pilot areas, the acceptance was phenomenal. This reviewer can personally testify to the popularity of the centres opened in the countryside near Calcutta to which women trekked from miles away.

Unfortunately, two mistakes were made. First, there was the

indiscriminate acceptance of all those who came forward without taking into account the physical ability to tolerate the loop. It was either that not enough was known about the tolerance factor, or because of a crazy chasing after numerical targets. Secondly, machinery was wholly inadequate to provide for a medical follow-up so that difficulties experienced by women opting for the loop could be quickly and satisfactorily remedied. The result was that within a few months strong resistance had developed to the whole IUCD programme. No doubt the resistance can and will be overcome, but a fine opportunity to cash in on the initial enthusiasm has been lost. In sum, this experience illustrates the basic point that the inadequacy of the organization on the ground remains the principal stumbling block.

Unorthodox Solutions

This brings up the problem of personnel, especially in relation to the rural areas which have only one doctor for every 25,000 people. As S. S. Sokhey underlined in his contribution to the August 1960, SEMINAR on the fight for health, the problem of rural neglect cannot be tackled except by adopting the unorthodox solution of building up an army of para-medical personnel. In the same issue, C. Dwarkanath pointed to China's example which had trained village headmen to carry out dressing, vaccination and other simple health measures. On another plane, the late D. R. Thapar argued for a massive programme of training girls as nurses, while Sokhey argued for a nine to 12-month course of practical training for bright young school-leavers willing to take up a career as health workers.

The thrust of these different suggestions was in the same direction: the need to make up for the lack of trained medical personnel by stop-gap arrangements so that some relief can be provided immediately to the rural masses. We are short of time as well as qualified manpower, but more than that the resources required in terms of

building and equipment for better standards of medical service are simply not available. Instead of waiting indefinitely for resources, a start must be made with whatever can be done immediately. This consensus, reflected in SEMINAR contributions of seven years ago, remains unimplemented, although one of the contributors now presides over the Health Ministry at the Centre.

Topsy Turvy

This idea of stop-gap arrangements has an important relevance to the family planning programme. While surgical operations can be successfully carried out by mobile medical teams, the preparatory work and after-care can be left to para-medical personnel. Likewise, the effectiveness of the IUCD programme can be greatly improved by the availability of medical workers to provide timely counselling if not actual medical help.

'Man', as the SEMINAR's August 1966 issue proclaimed, 'is the central figure of all our efforts.' This was more an expression of hope than a statement of fact. There is something basically wrong with the priorities of a nation which pushes through elaborate laws on the control of monopoly, sedition, and what else have you, but cannot find legislative time to put right the situation regarding medical patents. Drugs and medicines are far more expensive in India in relation to average income than anywhere else in the world. Yet, a government professing socialism contents itself with a system of price controls over drugs which only perpetuates high prices without being of particular benefit to the manufacturers either. This is because the fundamental problem of organizing the production of the primary pharmaceutical raw materials remain untackled. The plants listed by G. Ganapathy in 1960 are either just being completed or have still to stabilize their production. The progress in many sectors of the economy is slow, but drug manufacture has been slowest of all, readily illustrating the topsy turvy priorities ordering our national life.

The cultural crisis

ASHOK - RUDRA

IS there a crisis in our culture? The answer is definitely 'no' if one would go by the strict definition of a crisis. The 1965 edition of the Webster Dictionary has the following to say about what constitutes a crisis: 'the point of time when it is decided whether an affair or a course of action shall proceed, be modified or be terminated: decisive moment: turning point.' Also 'an unstable state of affairs in which a decisive change is pending.'

There is no crisis in our culture, because we are not at a decisive moment of our cultural history; we have not arrived at any turning point; there are no impending changes, and there is no instability.

To talk of cultural crisis is completely to misrepresent the nature of the disease that is afflicting our culture; for there is no doubt that our culture, the culture of modern India, more particularly of post-independence India, is a

sick culture. It is not a disease that has suddenly flared up and rapidly precipitated alarming conditions. Rather, it is of the nature of a chronic illness that keeps down a patient in a state of perpetual weakness and arrested growth. It is a sickness that has been transmitted gradually to the present generation by a civilisation that has been sick ever since it was born. The roots of our cultural malaise can be traced back to the origin of the Hindu society in a process of confluence of Aryan and non-Aryan ways of life and thought.

It is also not true that the writer or the artist in India is at bay. The picture of the rebel artist, the persecuted poet, the writer in conflict with the rest of the society, hardly reflects the Indian situation. Conformism has been the supreme virtue of Indians in all ages; conformism continues to characterise modern Indians; and writers

and artists are no exceptions. When did last an Indian writer incur the wrath of his reading public? When did an Indian painter really manage to scandalise the exhibition goer? 'Art and Society, in our times, far from being contributory to each other, are in deadly conflict' writes Gujral,¹ but he is really talking of a conflict that is real in the western society, not in that of India. Sachchidananda Vatsayan hits the nail on the head when he writes, 'The crisis is that there is no crisis', where the first use of the word 'crisis' presumably has to be understood in a non-rigorous colloquial sense.

Motherly Establishment

The Indian writers and artists are weak and ill members of a weak and ill society and no conflict is possible among them. They are too weak to be angry—there never has been in modern, post independent India any angry young or old men who have paid any price for their anger. Of course, periodically some writer or some artist has managed to keep up for some time a stance of resistance to the established order of values and institutions; but establishment in this country is like a large bosomed mother who reserves her special affections for her rebel sons; and the rebellion of the latter inevitably melts down in the warmth of her loving embrace.

During recent years, the Sahitya Akademi has gone out of its way to bestow honours on two well-known Marxist poets of West Bengal. Some young poets who sought notoriety in Calcutta by writing good poetry on 'pornographic' themes are at present thriving under the patronage of the most powerful establishment paper of Bengali literature, namely *Desh*. Indian painters, however much they express contempt for the philistines of the upper middle class, are at the moment the darlings of the ball room dancing,

cocktail serving, perfect Indian hostess, the wife of the Bombay business executive or the Delhi additional secretary.

Contradictory Systems

It may be pointed out that this has not always been so, that artists and writers did rebel and did invite persecution during the British period. This indeed is true, but discussion of this point could only help to establish more firmly the point I am trying to make. During the period of British domination, national humiliation and the urge of national self respect provided, for a period, a substitute for a philosophy of life. A consistent set of values both at the personal and the social levels could indeed be deduced from the general and fundamental basis of struggle for national regeneration and freedom from foreign domination. Nationalism and social reform filled a vacuum in the minds of Indians which was created by the bankruptcy of the Hindu tradition that became a patent and an irresistible fact once the encounter with the modern West took place.

Since independence, the chasm has yawned wider than ever before. Nationalism has lost its force after gaining its prime objective; social reform has been taken up as a task by the government of the country which in this matter is way ahead of the Indian masses, even its thin educated layer. In independent India nationalism, from a progressive ideology, could only turn into a reactionary ideology of chauvinism and that is precisely what has happened. Retreat into the Hindu tradition as the sole basis for one's system of values is no more possible. We have been exposed for too long and too intensely to the influence of the West. Yet our roots in our traditions are also deep and the net result has been the well known, much discussed, dual personality of the modern Indian.

Up to this point, the experience of India might not be very different to that of any other oriental society during the period of western do-

minance. But in the case of Indians the problem has acquired acuity by virtue of two special features of the Hindu tradition. Firstly, there could not be another set of ideals of life so diametrically opposed to the system of the modern West or rather that of modernity itself as the traditional Hindu values. If freedom and rebellion have been the cardinal values of the modern West, conformity and subservience have been that of the Hindu society. If the defiant Prometheus symbolises the spirit of the Europe of the French and Russian revolutions, it is the respectful Pavanputra that is deified by the order loving Indian. If movement and progress is essential to the western concept of reality, time was halted to a stop once for all by the Upanishadic Rishis and the Manu of the *Samhita*.

To be caught between two contradictory value systems is bad enough; but the matter is made infinitely worse for the modern Indian by the fact that he has been specially moulded by his heritage to be extremely insensitive to the nature of this very conflict.

Avoiding Confrontations

The other feature of the Hindu tradition referred to earlier is the genius it has revealed through the ages for reconciling the irreconcilable, not recognising conflicts as conflicts, avoiding confrontation of opposites and achieving a peaceful co-existence of discordant entities—whether different racial groups, or different gods, different social factions or different philosophical schools. Unity in diversity has been claimed as the distinguishing feature of this civilisation. The correct interpretation of the motto is probably that diverse elements have been forcefully unified or shown as one through a process of rationalisation.

This process that underlines the elaboration of the caste system through the absorption of different tribes and the ramification of the Hindu pantheon through the metamorphoses of different local gods

1. Seminar 16.

2. Seminar 21.

and goddesses, has indeed given the society a built-in capacity to survive. It certainly gives credit to the Brahmin theoreticians for a certain genius for the uncannily deft handling of logic and semantics. But what it has spelled for the average Indian thinking person down through the ages is a certain blunting of his capacity to recognise conflicts, a certain incapacity to make moral distinctions.

Patronage

Indian intellectuals of today are inheritors of this habit of woolly and phoney thinking and have therefore only a dull awareness of their moral and spiritual emptiness. They are hollow men—men without any convictions, men without any personality. If this hollowness is one dimension of the man-of-culture's predicament, a second dimension is provided by his total isolation from the masses. The Indian intellectual's public is confined to the same thin layer of the English educated middle class to which he himself belongs and this gives rise to an acute problem of patronage. Who is to appreciate him and who is to pay for him?

The different fields of art are affected to different degrees by these two aspects of the problem. The Indian film industry offers an extreme example of the working of the factor of artists' isolation. The financial requirements of film making make necessary a mass audience and there is not yet any mass audience for the director who would treat the film as a medium of art rather than a means of making money. Why a mass audience, the number of people in this country who can appreciate serious films are not much more than those who can make them. How, under these conditions, can one make a good film?

Satyajit Ray has answered this problem by completely forgetting the Indian audience and keeping an eye only on the foreign critic. As a result he seems to be getting more and more appreciated by the critics of Paris and New York as an interpreter of India rather than as an artist. However, it is a

wrong and harmful assumption to make that one cannot communicate with the masses without lowering the standard of one's art. After all, Chaplin never made compromises as an artist and yet could take the masses along with him. It is regrettable that this is not taken up as a challenge by any Indian film director. He likes to dwell upon the inadequacies of the mass audience but not on his own. Santi Chowdhury's article³ is typical of this attitude. He wastes his energy and time in listing the views of the Hindi cinema as if they need to be recounted. Other articles in the number devoted to films discuss different aspects of the problem of the film industry as seen from the inside by actors, directors and other concerned people but they all take for granted their alienation from the masses. But these very masses, the same that enjoy the grotesqueness, the absurdity and the all round bad taste of the Hindi film, are the only audience that we have: they cannot be dismissed in this way by the serious film maker.

No Playwright

If the cinema is the example par excellence of the artist's isolation pushed to the extreme, the theatre provides the other extreme example of an art suffering because of the artist not having anything to say. The Indian theatre does not lack talent in the field of acting. What is missing is the stage play, as Habib Tanvir⁴ rightly points out. Historical and mythological melodramas satisfy no more. The audience wants modern themes, social and psychological. And this there is nobody in the theatre world to provide—neither in the professional crowd nor among the amateurs. The latter are busy translating and adapting plays from foreign languages: they hardly ever manage to stage a serious social play bearing upon the problems of life in modern India. To realise the full significance of the phenomenon we have to take cognisance of its

3. Seminar 9.

4. Seminar 32.

dimensions: during the last one hundred years India has produced great poets, great novelists and great short story writers but not a single great playwright. It is doubtful whether even a single play has been written that is artistically consummate and thematically pertinent to the present day life and society. Why is it that the theatre lover has to see vernacular editions and English versions of Ionesco and Camus, Arthur Miller and Tennessee Williams, Ibsen and Chekov?

Why is it that in a country that does not lack literary talent there is not even such a category as the playwright? The SEMINAR's issue, *On Stage*, fails to ask this question, but I believe the answer lies in that lack of recognising conflicts which I have described earlier as a characteristic of the Indian mind. The Indian writer can see life in its lyrical aspects, but his mind that has been trained to see harmony within contradictions and unity within diversity is incapable of turning upon himself and his own background with the savage and incisive criticism with which the western intellectual recognises problems of his life and dissects them.

There are some who seem to think that the problem of the theatre can be tackled without touching upon these deeper issues by simply providing some external facilities. Thus, Alkazi presents in all seriousness a complete blue print of a National Theatre and goes into such minute details as in what phased fashion companies should perform in Delhi and tour in the country. But he does not stop to ask who will write the plays and on the basis of what experience. State patronage has not been lacking until now. Thus, the All India Radio provides an opening to playwrights. What has been its record of achievement to date?

The Painter

The painter's problem is akin to that of the film maker in that he also has no public. It shares something in common with the problem of the playwright in that

he also does not know what to paint. While the film maker has no problem whatsoever with tradition and the theatre world did not lose all contact with tradition thanks to the continuity maintained by the folk theatre, the painter (and the sculptor, and the architect) finds himself in the unenviable position of being the inheritor of an extremely rich and varied tradition of painting (sculpture and architecture) with which he has no live links whatsoever. The Indian painter is forever bothered by having to justify his existence to a public that is illiterate in the matter of arts. He is accused of being abstract and modern and what not; he is accused of being influenced by the West and losing his Indianness. He has to choose between patiently explaining as one would to a child or to give way to irritation and ask whether he has to paint in the style of Ajanta or that of Kangra to be Indian.

Borrowing

The SEMINAR issue (No. 16) provides examples of both these types of reactions. Sankho Chaudhuri and Paritosh Sen try the patient school teacher approach, whereas Krishen Khanna gives vent to justified irritation. One may entirely agree with much of what these artists have to say and yet not fail to notice a certain malaise in their self defence. The lady doth protest too much, one is tempted to say, like Hamlet's mother. Even if it be true that an Indian painter paints in various modern styles and his worth is recognised by critics in far off countries, is it a tenable situation for any artist to live and work in a society and fail to communicate with almost everybody around? Can the modern painter feel comfortable that currently his only patron is precisely the bourgeois in the person of the box-walla for whom he professes so much contempt? There is an even more severe question which the artists will have to face and answer. There is certainly nothing wrong in borrowing styles and assimilating whatever influences

come one's way. But can one borrow other people's anguish? Is it from the experiences of their own lives that modern Indian painters paint what they paint? One doubts, for the Indian artist, like most of his compatriots, lives a limited and circumscribed life that offers little scope for the agony and the ecstasy their paintings reveal.

Strength of Tradition

Music (and dance which SEMINAR has ignored) provides the example of an art at the other end of the pole of relationship with tradition. Both the strength and weakness of Indian classical music flows from the fact that it has kept itself confined rigorously within the framework of a tradition that has evolved slowly over time. The underlying aesthetic is of course a static one, in tune with the timeless view of life. It is all ornamental movement around a central axis, the *tan* inevitably returns, after all its wanderings and meanderings, to the fixed point of departure.

A valid and legitimate question that is often asked is, how long can a music (and a dance form) continue to live without adapting itself to the life and feelings of its audience? Bolder spirits have flirted with experimentations. The All-India Radio has tried to develop an Indian orchestra and Ravi Shankar has tried to jazzify his sitar. Few would claim that the experiments have yielded any significant success. Few on the other hand would deny that classical music of both South and North, despite their rigid adherence to tradition, despite their confinement to a narrow thematic range, is still robust and full of life and has got the capacity deeply to move any sensitive soul even of other cultures.

In terms of excellence there is no doubt that the heights reached by music have not been touched by any other art form in modern India, and this seems to have been possible not despite but because of respecting tradition. This music seems to more than compensate by

the depth of its probing the loss of what is left out by its narrow horizon. The opening article in SEMINAR issue (No. 28) on 'Music' makes a forceful case for modernisation, but it fails to convince. This is not to say that one should not experiment, but only to underline the importance one has to attach to the artist's complex relation with tradition.

The opening essay of the symposium on literature⁵ has somewhere the following: 'Like Arjuna he can hardly lift his bow any more.' But this pleasant imagery completely fails to fit the situation of the Indian writer. This failure can hardly be ascribed to numbness and there has not been any shock to give rise to it either. Gangadhar Gadgil makes a catalogue of 'the causes of the poverty of Indian literature' and such catalogues are generally not very interesting. Bishnu Dey accepts the idea of a crisis: '... now things have come to such a head that we either face the crisis and our poetry is *engagee*... or we shut our eyes and are, politely speaking, uncritical or mindless.' Ka Naa Subramanyam believes he can identify these fundamental causes for the barrenness of Indian literature: rapid development of mass media; the artist's frustrations born out of witnessing the turn of affairs in the world; and his having lost 'the art of being lonely.'

But, on the basis of the understanding of our culture presented earlier, we would prefer to stick to the two root causes of hollowness and isolation: in the case of literature these two factors seem to be playing equally important roles. Indian literature has been poor in all those forms of writing where lucidity of thought and clarity of expression are called for: not only the play is absent, but also the philosophical novel, the essay and criticism. It is mainly in the lyrical style that success has been recorded.

Physical Environment

SEMINAR has explored the field of culture well beyond the con-

5. Seminar 28.

lines of art, literature, music, theatre and films. Thus, number 79 is devoted to cities, which provide the physical environment to all cultural activities. The statement of the problem by Ashok Mitra characteristically combines knowledge with passion but then despite the fact that India has had a succession of the most brilliant Corbusiers through the ages the awareness of the relation between life and civic environment and the need for town and country planning is so recent a phenomenon that it cannot be said that there is any particular problem in the field of culture proper that is given rise to by the conditions in which our cities are. There is only one point to retain in our present discussion and that in the words of Barve is 'that in spite of this milieu there is so much cheer, companionship, humanism, and genuine fellow feeling in numerous little pockets of Indian urban life—not necessarily and not even generally in the plate glass villas but more often and surprisingly in the *bastis* and bazaars, in the chawls and the shanties—is an earnest of the efflorescence of gracious living, we may hope if more reasonable conditions are created.'

Menace

'Advertising' can be discussed in the context of culture only as a menace to culture. This is done in a forthright manner by Nissim Ezekiel. Dilip Mukerji ably supports him by refuting many of the claims made for advertisement as a necessary aid to sales promotion. But most of the other participants in the symposium (SEMINAR 27) seem to have rather vague and confused ideas of a social welfare that is allegedly promoted by advertisement. Thus Sirkar writes, 'Advertisement will surely play a crucial part in translating such "demand projections" into realities. Advertisement will be the key operation which will take the lamps and bicycles and biscuits and soap into houses which had not felt their need before.' This reveals a gross misunderstanding of the effect of advertisement on

consumer demand patterns. Advertisement cannot of course increase the size of aggregate consumer demand; it can only increase the demand for some products at the cost of some others and that cannot result in any increased welfare.

Review Columns

While the important part played by the press in the 19th century movement for reform and regeneration—often described hyperbolically as a renaissance—is a matter of history, the most that can be said about our press of the present is that it is not seriously aggravating the problems of our culture. The different ways in which an enlightened and socially conscious press can positively promote cultural activities are of course many. Keeping apart for the moment such obvious tasks as disseminating information and building up public opinion—of which the latter can be more evil in its effect than beneficial—the direct impact the press can make on the world of culture is through its review columns.

The best newspapers of the world maintain among their reviewers some of the most formidable critics of their times and the standards of performance in the world of art, literature, drama, music and cinema are far from being unaffected by the standards applied by these critics. In this particular matter, the contribution of the Indian press is zero. The reviews published by our newspapers are usually incompetent, irresponsible and frivolous. More often than not, the columns are used for publicity campaigns or character assassination as the case may be rather than unbiased criticism. This particular point does not come up in the SEMINAR discussion on the Press⁶ which is preoccupied with other problems more properly pertaining to the industry of news publication than to culture.

Censorship is not a serious cultural problem in our society, how-

ever obnoxious might be its mode of operation. As Romesh Thapar points out, censorship goes with conformism and it is the latter that is the real enemy of culture. The same point is made by Nissim Ezekiel. It cannot be maintained that censorship is responsible in any way for the low standards in our arts. As Satyajit Ray says, 'The necessity to keep an eye on the censors, rather than cause despair, should in fact encourage subtlety of expression. It may, after all, be more fun to imply intimacy rather than to display it.'⁷

Cocktail Party

All in all, SEMINAR seems to have covered the different fields of culture as adequately as it could possibly be done in its symposia by proxy. To have succeeded in roping in so many distinguished writers and artists is itself a major achievement: Bishnu Dey and Mulk Raj Anand in literature, Satyajit Ray and Chidananda Das Gupta in cinema, Akbar Padamsee and Satish Gujral in painting, Alkazi and Utpal Dutt in theatre, Narayana Menon and even Yehudi Menuhin in music—could there be a more star studded gathering? The star system has of course got its drawbacks too—the celebrities having agreed to write quite often oblige by merely dashing off some hurried words of wisdom. It is true that in these nine numbers one comes across articles of very different standards and types. There are thoroughly worked out historical and factual surveys, scholarly and well documented; there are those that excel in brilliance but not in substance; and there are also those that are simply trivial. But then it is not probably fair to judge SEMINAR as if it were a purveyor of knowledge in solid tomes. The present reviewer has never attended the SEMINAR expecting a dinner party. His idea of it has been of a cocktail party and as a cocktail party it has indeed been a great success, sparkling with wit and intelligence.

6. SEMINAR 42.

7. SEMINAR 9.

A society in change

RASHEEDUDDIN KHAN

GENERATIONS yet unborn may well recognize our contemporary times in India as the historic watershed which marked the gigantic transformation of a classic traditional society into a modern polity.

The phenomenon of change, volitional, deliberate and conscious at some points and sequential, contingent and unplanned at others, is wide in its dimensions.

In this milieu the role of the intelligentsia as a conscious articulator of change acquires a primacy. And it is in this context that SEMINAR evokes spontaneous tribute for playing a pioneering role as a stimulating new-style journal which became a forum for free expression and the interplay of many views yet retaining a certain coherence which made the symposium in its pages so meaningful.

Scanning the pages of the ten numbers of SEMINAR which constitute the background material for this review, (intellectually rewarding undoubtedly as the experience was) showed the wide range of thought and divergence of approach which synoptically revealed the variety that is India. Persuasive, vocational and age

difference apart, one was really struck, to borrow the words from the elegant tribute paid to the SEMINAR by C. Rajagopalachari, by 'the heavy, systematic thinking shown in the articles'. They cover many aspects of the contemporary scene. It is however proposed in this review to cohere the ideas around the central theme: *India: a society in change*.

The political revolution which compelled the withdrawal of British power from India also released forces of social change in the process whose creativity and articulation was frustrated far too long. The tragedy of the social revolution is that it began much earlier than the political revolution, almost in the thirties of the last century, but still remains incomplete: because it is more fundamental, it is resisted more vigorously by those who benefit by the *status quo*.

Institutionalised restraints of tradition and layers of decadent congeries in the villages and the towns congregate first to challenge and then to subvert the process of change.

Two aspects of social change deserve special attention—modern-

ization and secularization. In a sense the latter is subsumed in the former, which is a generic term, but in the context of the fusion of India's plural society into a political community, secularization plays a role more basic and distinct than it normally does otherwise. The basic components that are being fused in the political community striving to create a new identity of integrated nationhood, are the tribes, the castes and the religious communities.

Tribal India

The tribes¹ constitute about 6 to 7 per cent of the population in the range of about 30 million—the largest tribal population in the world—and pose a baffling problem of social adjustment, of integration in a democratic polity, of values, and of man-power accommodation. Certain anthropologists claim that the traditional Indian society did not coerce them to change their lives. But others doubt if this was so, and say that most tribal groups show in varying degrees elements of continuity with the larger society in India. Historians support the latter view and maintain that the very foundation of the caste system rests on the fusion of tribal elements into a general society.

Anyhow, the situation has now radically changed, partly due to the network of communication that has broken the isolation of the tribal habitat and by the fact that 'the sudden growth of India's population. (early in the 20th century) caused land hungry Hindu peasants to invade the sparsely populated tribal regions of Middle and South India.'

Secondly, the conscious policy pursued by the government after independence to bring the tribal regions and the tribal people within the orbit of participatory democracy, its processes and laws, has disrupted their traditional isolation. 'The question confronting India's policy-makers,' says

Haimendorf, 'is then ultimately one of values': should the aborigines be allowed to retain their culture-pattern or be 'compelled' and 'coaxed' to accept the 'social pattern represented by their Hindu neighbours'?

Definition

A succinct definition of the term tribe even otherwise difficult becomes more so in the Indian situation. Beteille suggests we may formulate a definition essentially for an *ideal type*—which we anyhow do in any definition, particularly of social categories—and then draw the line, albeit arbitrarily, as between tribal and advanced societies. With this proviso he defines 'tribe as a society with a political, linguistic and a somewhat vaguely defined cultural boundary;...based upon kinship, where social stratification is absent'. But the deviation in actual experience from this normative operational definition is so wide, as Beteille himself notes, that the inadequacy of such a definition becomes clear.

There is no separate tribal society (as most tribes are in varying degrees of absorption in the wider society). Except the notional basis of kinship and constant reminders of tribal origin by the 'advanced' neighbours, social reformers, politicians hankering after votes and support, and above all by the constitutional provisions safeguarding scheduled tribes and castes and governmental programmes for 'civilizing' them, there is no other determinate basis of defining or identifying the tribes. To say that in India the tribes we come across are 'tribes in transition' as Beteille finally describes them is to elude definition and to subtly divert the discussion from the field of anthropology to that of sociology.

Desai refers to Mamoria and Elwin for the classification of the tribes. Mamoria's criterion of distinguishing 'pure tribes' that have been resisting acculturation and absorption, constituting the hard-core of about 5 million, is based on the characteristics like

isolated living in hills and forest, speaking a distinct dialect, practising a form of animist belief, following primitive occupations, eating flesh and meat, living a nomadic, naked or semi-naked life, enjoying drink and dance, and belonging ethnically to one of the three stocks—Negritos, Austroloids or Mongoloids. Their transition to 'civilization' and 'corruption' began in the British period. They lost their moorings in the tribal economy, social organization, religion and culture and most of them were reduced to the status of bond-slaves or agrestic serfs of money-lenders and zamindars.

In an unequal society, like other backward sections, the tribes also remain uprooted and exploited, torn from the fabric of conventional life without becoming part of the new design of living. The basic issue is no longer their 'isolation' or assimilation and 'integration'. Fundamental policy in that regard, as Elwin states, 'has already been settled'. The main concern should be to work out effective ways of giving them the benefits of civilization, once they are made to become part of the mainstream of national life. That is the problem of equality of status and opportunity, of security of jobs and decent standard of living, of education and of cultural autonomy.

The Base

At the base of our social structure is caste²—the characteristic sociological unit of primordial cohesion peculiar to India. 'The caste system is truly a synonym for Hindu society', 'For the orthodox Hindu it is something so traditional as to be self-evident'. 'It is the functioning unit in the social system which fills an important gap in the life of the people, in the absence of well-developed interest-groups and voluntary associations.'

Since Max Weber, caste has been better appreciated in terms of a status-group rather than as a traditional variant of class, if the

1. Tribal India : SEMINAR 14.

3. Caste and the Future : SEMINAR 70.

latter is defined primarily in the framework of relations of production and the former according to patterns of consumption. Status-groups also exhibit distinctive consciousness of kinship and a peculiar sense of community cohesion based on a style of living. Beteille thinks this to be a more satisfactory approach to the study of caste. Definition is irrelevant and at best a satisfying esoteric exercise. Since its origin and history is unclear, for an empirical survey of socio-political relevance it will suffice to say: caste is what caste does.

The pervasion of caste and the latency of caste-consciousness in India today is detectable in many sectors of national life. In politics it is all too apparent. Sirsikar is of the opinion that while 'the form of our politics is secular the style is essentially casteist'. Morris Jones states: 'No account of voting behaviour, the legislative proceedings or even ministerial appointments would be complete unless considerable attention were given to this factor'. One way of explaining this is to remember that 'since Indian social life is mainly articulated through caste, any organization or association which is formed to further social interests tends to be coloured by caste'.

Important Dimension

An important dimension of the question is not whether as a system it is on the decline or not, but whether even if it is declining as a system, how rampant are the attitudes and values produced by that system which continue to inform the lives and social judgements of those who by accident of birth are born in caste groups. The question is important in order to measure the degree of secularization reached and indeed to evaluate the whole gamut of modernization. The evidence adduced in this regard from the study of socio-political trends over the last two decades is equivocal.

Those like Srinivas who hold that the caste system is growing more powerful, advance the thesis

that modern means of communication, the spread of education, increased prosperity, expanding political opportunities and above all the formation of caste associations, have strengthened the bonds of caste with greater vigour. Today, caste—the traditional integrative agency—has aligned itself with the modern integrative agency, the political party, and by this fusion gained new strength. The emerging power-structure of the Panchayati Raj reveals the entrenchment of the rural caste elite in the vital sector of the political process. Through the working of welfare politics, concerned as it is with the distribution of benefits, they have dislodged the urban elite by casting their net of patronage and power wide.

Form and Content

Those who perceive decline in the caste system cite its increasing politicization in recent years, not only as an index of the weakening of its traditional and ritualistic base but also as a factor whose preponderance itself would inevitably break the very solidarity of the caste system. Involvement in the electoral politics particularly in the framework of a multi-party system results in the fragmentation and then the crystallization of fragmented caste groups around new political loyalties. Precisely because today caste-consciousness is acuter, the contending political parties vie with each other in obtaining caste votes. But by so doing they are vitiating the caste system.

Firstly, they are splitting caste cohesion by using candidates belonging to the same caste; forcing coalescence of traditionally different and sometimes hostile castes for political and electoral purposes they are creating new cohesion which is based not on ascription but community of outlook and aggregation of interest; and thirdly by making caste perform roles which are new and secular they are striking at the traditional basis and role of caste in society. The apparent resurgence of caste, it is argued, is a false manifesta-

tion. One need not confuse the form with the content. Societal equilibrium demands continuity of form, even as the substance and reality goes on changing.

The Mosaic

The process of modernization in all societies has to take cognisance of the type of traditional forms and values that impede progress because of their anachronism and dysfunctional role. But no society, much less one with a background of centuries of developed civilization and culture, can discard straightaway those forms and values which for generations provided the equilibrium of social relations, and indeed became the very texture of life. Even revolutions after the first flush come to terms with certain deep-rooted institutions and mores whose content and symbolism undergoes a slow change until they are finally thrown upon the dump-heap of history.

Society never changes completely. It's always a patch-work, a mosaic of sunshine and shadow. And, in a society like India's where the revolution itself was a compromise at two levels—as between the nation and the retreating imperial power and, more particularly, as between the mutually antagonistic segments of the nation itself, especially the traditionists and the modernists—the grey patches are more visible. The national character of the liberation movement was always syncretic rather than eclectic. But what is significant in the post-independence phase is the other interlinked fact, that in that very alignment against foreign imperialism, the social conflict got internalized and postponed. Only after independence has this congealed internalized conflict been externalized by the working of a competitive polity.

The caste system is both hierarchical and segmentary. It is divided into several concentric circles—first the broad caste groups, *Varna*, then the sub-castes, *Jatis*, and then several enclosed layers of

the sub-caste. The caste syndrome has units of relevance to ritual, tradition and inter-caste and extra-caste activities, but all these identities constitute elements in a single series; hence the word 'caste' may be applied to all of them. But the first level sub-caste, *Jatis*, constitute the most important segment, the kingpin of the caste-structure.

The *Jatis* have a distinct regional-cum-linguistic base and because of that they constitute the basic cohesive focus in the caste-system. Ghurye has estimated that each linguistic region contains between 200 to 300 sub-castes. The distribution of people according to *chaturvarnashrama* is more theoretical and loose, and sub-sub-castes on the other hand have more ritualistic significance for things like marriage, death-rites, social customs, etc.

Changing Role

Cohesion round the *Jatis*, rather than round the *Varna* or the lower division, is clear not only in politics but also in the property relations on land. When we refer to the dominant caste in a village, region, or State we only talk about the *Jatis*, never the *Varna*. And it is clear that they acquire their dominance not by the gift of tradition, that is by caste origin and rank in the *Varna*, but by acquisition of landed property. In this way *Jatis* also play the role of a class, particularly by the deviation from the traditionally assigned function in the *Varnashrama Dharma*. From this angle, *Jatis* are non-traditional and in many cases essentially a cohesion based on the acquired economic functions and property.

This reveals not only the possibility of mobility within the caste structure, but more significantly, the possibility of the change of 'content' within the traditional form—'achievement' being transformed into 'ascription'. The induction into the caste frame by this reverse process, depending not on 'birth' but 'occupation', has extended the caste base, and in many cases due to the zeal of the

convert, accentuated caste consciousness. The Shudras, comprising 60 million in 1951, that is 1/6th of the total population, subdivided into 429 communities, have resorted to 'extra-varna' social progress. Groups of them who could not get sanskritized improved their position by becoming 'islamicized' or 'christianized', and now by getting 'buddhised'.

That the role and importance of caste is changing under the overall impact of urban growth and industrialization is clear enough. But what is not too well-known is the collapse of the *Jajmani* system, which provided the functional equilibrium to the caste structure by enjoining castes to observe the principle of mutual obligation to each other, by rendering specific services to the community without consideration of status and wealth. Migration from the villages of caste groups to nearby towns, occupational mobility leading up to the change in the sociological pattern of employment itself so contrary to the ascriptive caste-based division of labour, has shattered the very foundation of the *Jajmani* system.

District Weakening

The constitutional and legal system of India also militates against the traditional disabilities and special restrictions imposed by the caste system. Apart from the general egalitarian implications of the Fundamental Rights coupled with the clear provisions for the removal of untouchability and various laws passed by the State legislatures, there is specifically the Untouchability (Offences) Act of 1955 on the statute book, which has made the offence cognisable and punishable under law uniformly throughout the territory of India.

The cumulative effect is that 'there has been a distinct weakening of the ritual and social function of caste in recent decades', but not as an endogamous unit. The familial pattern, the bedrock of continuity, is slow to change. But it will be too rigid a formulation to make, as Madan does, that 'so

long as endogamy survives, caste survives'.

Communalism

Theoretically, in the ascending spiral of pre-modernized group-cohesions in India, communalism³ follows tribalism and casteism but it has neither the primitive roots like the tribal order nor the traditional sanction of the caste system. It is not primordial in its origin. Although like the other two it is ascriptive in its character, unlike them it is not anachronistic in social terms, except in a relative sense. In fact, if secularization is taken restrictively as a phenomenon only of the separation of Church from State, that is, the differentiation of belief-pattern from the political processes, then communalism may not appear totally irreconcilable even with secular politics, since the latter can also be articulated, though abnormally, through communal identities.

Much against the common impression, communalism is responsive to modernity in as much as it seeks to appropriate the benefits of modernization although exclusively for its own community, and does not repudiate it like tribalism does, nor resist it like the caste system. This is evident from the history of communalism in India. And now with the functioning of a participatory democracy based on universal franchise, freedom of expression and faith and of organization, communalism has grown as the natural beneficiary of a political revolution that has outpaced the long overdue radical social change and the growth of industrial economy. In the transition to an authentic modern polity the last to yield to a rational pattern of human relations will be not tribalism or casteism but communalism. And that makes the spectre of communalism really ghastly.

It is interesting to remember as Latifi points out that communalism as a term used in the special connotation of religious and racial

3. *Communalism* : SEMINAR 24.

antagonism, especially in India, entered the English lexicon at about the same time as the British Crown became the imperial sovereign. This simultaneity is not a mere coincidence. It establishes on the one hand a causality between occurrence in history and etymology and, on the other, an organic link between the role of imperialism and the rise of communalism. Not that communities, in the same religious sense, did not exist earlier nor that antagonism between them was completely absent. The pertinent point is that in the activation of that very antagonism, and its transformation from a latent and inward looking cleavage into the most articulate socio-political divisive conflict, the presence and policy of British imperialism played a decisive role. Partition of the country was not fortuitous but one aspect of the fulfilment of British rule in India.

Parallel Societies

Since the main reference of communalism in India are Hindus and Muslims (each for the other, and both for the secularists) it will be futile however to gloss over the historical implications that during the past thousand years of their co-existence in India Islam and Hinduism grew as exclusive entities resulting in the creation of what Panikkar called 'two parallel societies'. Symbiosis rather than synthesis was achieved. It is true that by the fact of even this parallel living many points of accord and fringe accommodations were reached, but nothing similar to either Muslim-Christian fusion in Arab nationalism or Buddhist-Shinto reconciliation in Japanese nationalism occurred in India, despite the fact of the Hindu origin of the bulk of its Muslim population. In the course of its encounter with Islam, coming as it did on the crest of political power with a defined world outlook and principles of social reconstruction, it was not possible for the doctrinally amorphous, socially segmented and politically dispersed and weak Hinduism to overthrow the emerging Muslim society in the Indian

setting. Nor was it possible for Islam to uproot the Hindu society, continental in dimension and embedded as it was too deeply, and for millennia, into the cultural traditions and agro-craft economy of the country, thereby becoming an integral part of its ethos and identity.

Due to its total rejection of Hindu traditions and because of its mercantile and quasi-urban appeal, Islam could not reach the recesses of rural India comprising thousands of closed villages, which as Marx put it had 'transformed a self-developing social State, into never-changing natural destiny'.

Seven hundred years of rule by Muslim sovereigns in many parts of the country as also almost continuously from the imperial capital of Delhi, did not lead to Islamization of India, as for instance of Zoroastrian Persia, Coptic Egypt, Christian Albania and the pagan Turks. Nor was Islam violently overthrown as from Spain or absorbed in the Hindu pantheon like Buddhism and Jainism nor yet tolerated like Sikhism and Christianity, and neither did Islam in India fuse into its sub-culture the traditional Hindu symbols, idioms and myths as the Indonesian Muslims have done with conspicuous success.

It is indeed tragic that the only outcome of parallel living for centuries of the Hindu and Muslim sub-systems of Indian society was firstly Pakistan—which has vulgarized the religious myth by whipping it to serve a communal political end; and, secondly, a vigorous manifestation of religious revival and bigotry of Hinduism, accompanied by superstition, chauvinism, and intolerance, masquerading as national re-juvenation.

No Sanctions

The communal form given to Hinduism in modern times is alien to its traditional basis, which is the caste system. British laws, reform movements like the Arya Samaj, fear of Muslim communal cohesion and the handiwork of politically-communal Hindu leader-

ship, combined to achieve a form which has no sanction in the tradition. For, strictly, Hinduism is no religion, much less a cohesive religion. Interestingly enough, it was never called Hinduism, or by its equivalent term in any Indian language, by those who by the outsiders—and only by the outsiders—were called Hindu. It was the generic epithet given to the pattern of belief of the population of this sub-continent by the Arab-Persian-Turkish invaders. Etymologically it only means 'faith of India'. Strictly speaking it should be called *Brahmanism* including the polytheistic caste agglomeration, but excluding the millions of out-castes—pagans, animists and the untouchables who constitute, in contemporary legal parlance, the scheduled castes and the scheduled tribes.

There is no duality of orthodoxy and heresy in Hinduism, because there is no defined and closed faith, no established church based on the foundations of a divine scripture revealed by a divine being to divining prophet/prophets. This pattern of belief has no comparison with the West Asian religious system of the Judaic-Christian-Islamic combine. This gives Hinduism a flexibility and resilience and a traditional base wide enough to cover the syndrome of the entire Indian culture. That is why the revivalism of Hinduism takes the form of revivalism of ancient culture, symbols, values, idiom and simplistic traditional pattern of living. It does not take the particular form of the revival of a faith because there is no such ordained, integral and defined faith to be revived.

Dominant Idiom

Communalism, as an articulation and communication pattern in India, grew as a result firstly of the deliberate fragmentation of politics into communal 'enclosures' by the unfolding of the British political 'reforms' appertaining to communal representation and separate elections to local, State and central bodies and, secondly, by the development and concentration of political power centres

in the expanding urban areas, where the consciousness of belonging to a community was more prominent than caste consciousness (with the possible exception of Madras and Kerala) or any other significant in-group feeling. In half-a-century of urban-based political manoeuvres, communalism emerged as a focal point of rallying people belonging to the same religion and as a dominant idiom of political bargaining for the (supposed) fulfilment of their basic demands.

Yet, simultaneous with the growth of communal orientation in Indian politics we also observe the coming into being of an antithetical corrective trend of nationalist secular politics committed to the unity of the nation and its democratization. In the final round of the struggle for independence, the main tussle was between the forces of secular-nationalist politics and the forces of communal-separatist politics. It was a draw of a sort under the pain of partition of the country, with the separatists congregating in Pakistan, at the crest of power, and the nationalists left over in India. This explains quite a bit of the policy differentiation, domestic and international, between the two countries.

Continuing Encounter

But, the point to remember is that even partition has not solved the continuing conflict between the communal and the secular forces. Both of them, though in an unequal proportion in the two countries, are still combating, more clearly in India, but not too insignificantly in Pakistan. Across the frontiers there is a detectable communication—of course of ideas and inspiration—between the protagonists of communalism and secularism because the encounter in both the countries is essentially between the old and the new—between reaction and progress, tradition and change.

What is unusual in the case of India is that the agrarian patterns have congealed into a hardness

unparalleled in the annals of the world. Feudalism, as Kosambi pointed out, continued here far too long, roughly from the 5th century A.D. to the mid 19th century, and with its organic unity with the traditional structure and values, it acquired a form more inclusive than its European counterpart, covering practically the entire domain of social life.

The anachronistic survival of feudalism due to many reasons, stifled economic growth, frustrated the rise of the middle, and the birth of the proletariat, class and thereby inhibited the release of those creative forces that could have re-structured the Indian society and its politics much earlier. The postponed socio-economic revolution got its momentum only after independence under the auspices of the political revolution which should have succeeded and not preceded it. The time lag between the two and their topsy-turvy relationship explains part of the tensions and crises facing India today.

Communal Manifestation

That the cow⁴ could be not merely a symbol but an object of revolt at this stage of our national growth indicates the nature of the society we are modernizing. The unexpected resources of energy, organization and dedication revealed in the fury over the cow agitation during the last year (1966) is the alarming reminder of the strength not only of those who love the cow more than man, but also of the extension of the agrarian way of life—vegetarianism with a vengeance!—brutalized by communalism fighting the process of change.

That no political party, no candidate seeking votes, dared open his mouth against the agitation whatever his personal persuasion, revealed the extent of trepidation and powerlessness of what in this context might rightly be called the forces of the rights of man in India. And this is one aspect of the crisis. But this aspect

is missing from the pages of the SEMINAR on *The Cow*. It deals almost exclusively, though one might add competently and irreverently with exploding the myth of the sanctity of the cow. Malkani's reproduced editorial from the *Organiser* is the solitary defence of the 'Mother'.

The case for the cow, that is for prohibition against its slaughter, if one might quote from Malkani's editorial rests on two propositions and a conclusion. One: 'Cow protection is the religions demand of the Hindu world,' based not only on their 'scientific *dharma*' but also on 'solid earthly reasons'. Two: 'Muslims of Bharat took to slaughtering cows not because that was a religious duty' but 'because the invading Muslims saw in cow slaughtering a means of humiliating and browbeating the Hindus'. Therefore, 'Article 48 should be amended to put a total ban on all cattle slaughter'.

Reverting to the refutation of the sanctity of the cow, Sankalia and Prodipto Roy have made out a convincing case that it has no validity either in tradition or in history. 'History may help' says Roy 'to demythologise the sacred cow, propagate images of, a beef-eating golden Hindu age and take much of the wind out of the politico-religious sails of Jagatgurus'. From the available archaeological, epigraphic and documentary material, it is clear in the words of Sankalia that even during 'what is called the Hindu period of Indian history, there never was a total ban on the slaughter of cows or any other animal, and this even when rulers like Asoka and Kumarapala were the champions of *Ahimsa*'. Only after the 12th century we find evidence of certain restraints, and by the 17th century a further stiffening of the attitude against slaughter, 'owing to the advent of the Muslims and as a reaction against their indiscriminate killing of cows.'

Economic Effects

The economics of the cow is against the 'Mother'. By 1976, we

4. *The Cow*: SEMINAR 93.

are told, the total bovine population in India—which even today claims one-fifth of the world's against 1/40th of the land resources available to support it, revealing its appalling excess to the fodder resources—would exceed the 300 million mark, as against 630 million people, thus roughly, '50 heads, of cattle for 100 human beings'.

One of our advanced and expanding industries, the leather industry, is experiencing the most adverse effects of the partial ban on cow slaughter. 'Over 100 crores of national resources are lost to the country due to lack of carcass recovery of dead animals in outlanding areas.'

Schizmatic Character

The increase in the political power of communal parties in the recent elections reveals an alarming trend which might complicate the process of change. The danger from communal organizations inducted into politics, is not merely in terms of their negative motivation towards social change, which is there and certainly vitiates the process, but essentially in the schizmatic and segmentary character of their politics and economics: classes and interest-groups get fragmented arbitrarily and irrationally, on ascriptive basis, thereby disrupting the flow of communication between segments facing common problems and desiring common solutions. Articulation of interests is dissipated and issue-specificity is either lost in the morass of communal antagonism or acquires a communal under-tone.

More democracy, material prosperity and affluence, a better integrated and enlightened educational system, firmer hold on the law and order situation, ban on the communal organizations, ideological unity against communalism, progressive role of leadership, are the stock in trade remedial measures also mentioned in the pages of the SEMINAR. On a closer look, measures like these couched as they are in the 'ideal' mould and

indicative of the 'ought', however well-meant and high spirited, appear unreal. They presume many pre-requisites, particularly an effective leadership, coherent and committed to change, not a compromised elite bound by strings of those coteries who stand to gain by chaos and crises—which now remains the only stratagem of prolonging the *status quo*.

To shatter this *status quo* and for the restoration of sanity, and the 'creation of a new centre of authority, to over-match the authority of tradition', the minimum which a firm leadership can do is scrupulously to implement policies of modernization calculated to strengthen the self-reliant economic base, establish a scientific and rational education system, and make secularism the vital idiom of political change.

In a changed ethos like this the virus of communalism might be less malignant, that is its political projection—schizmatic and aggressive—might disappear, but it is doubtful if its other role in the social and cultural domain will diminish. That presumes a more radical transformation of the very foundations of social life and social relations. Industrialization, urban growth, widespread modernization, including the technological and scientific revolution, has not lessened the community consciousness among the Jews and the Catholics in the western world. Fear of persecution (in the case of a minority), xenophobia (in the case of a majority) and the ubiquitous and latent dislike of the outsider and the 'other community' remain a constant psychological factor promoting and sustaining communal cohesion. But this however should not distract those whose faith in enlightenment remains unshaken, to hope and strive for a more rational world.

Secularism

Implications of such a national policy are discussed in the SEMINAR on *Secularism*.⁵ But the poser is too stylized and heuristic. Cant-

well Smith begins with the assertion: 'The secularism of India is an aspiration, not yet a reality.' In support of his contention he refers to the considerable incompatibility of the three views on secularism in the Indian condition. Debate on these lines, scholastic and hypothetical, will not help us to come to grips with the real problems. It might be erudite but barren. In the actual development of secularism in India we do not perceive the compartmentalization of the three exclusive categories which Smith utilizes to overcome what he calls 'the apparent insouciance as to what secularism means'. On the contrary we observe the collapse of their boundaries and a certain permeation of the three views. The complexity of life does not correspond to the 'either/or' dichotomy in all cases. And in the pursuit of secularisation, the road that leads from 'aspiration' to 'reality' is intersected by milestones of partial reality. The journey is not one long hop. Stages are also destinations and vice versa. Secularism in India is an evolving reality, through an agonizing process, but that probably is also true of the experience of any country. 'As a matter of fact the struggle for secularism in India', as Suri points out 'has been going on for about a century and a half since the time of Ram Mohan Roy'.

Irrational Norm

The historical context in which secularism became an objective of the modernizing nationalists in India would reveal the type of challenge that it seeks to resolve. In the last phase of the struggle for independence, communal identities acquired prominence, and the country was partitioned on the untenable premise that religion is the final criterion of national identity, and therefore of Statehood. The formation of Pakistan established an irrational norm in politics. It accentuated the fear that it might serve as a precedent for the demand of a Hindu State in India.

The fact that a conscious attempt had to be made first for

5. *Secularism*: SEMINAR 67.

the proclamation and then for the working of a secular State itself reveals the extent of the challenge that has to be met.

Engine of Change

Secularism like socialism is basically the 'engine of change' in India. In one case from a traditional to a modern pattern of human relations, and in another from exploitative to egalitarian production relations; that is, from ascription to achievement in one case, and from private profit to public welfare in the other case. Opposition to both, and not coincidentally, stems from the ranks of the decadent and the vested interests. The polarisation of the forward-looking and the backward, in this way, is quite obvious.

Smith's second doubt: 'India may be secular, or it may be democratic, but is there any real possibility of its being both', is yet another exercise in the normative, and in an avoidable confusion. He seems to treat democracy too literally and in its original Greek, direct form. Nobody counts heads for any national policy anywhere in the modern world. Decision-making is the function of the elite, and parliamentary democracy seeks to build consensus for national decisions. Further, the fact is that at the moment and probably for many decades, India is, from the classical standard, neither democratic nor secular. But how many countries are? The point is pertinent because except for a relativistic frame of reference, no absolute, abstract criterion will be able to measure operational reality. And relatively speaking probably India is more secular than Britain and more democratic than France.

Any political community at the developing stage is a mosaic of contradictory trends, generating tensions and conflicts. Suri strikes the right note when he says: 'The situation in India then is that the State—if we visualise it for the moment as a superstructure—is secular but the sub-structure,

namely, the masses of the people, are religious and even communal-minded. The distinction may not be so crass as stated above, for streaks of communalism are certainly noticeable at the top just as strains of secularism are visible among the masses. However, it is the contrast between the superstructure and the base which creates misgivings about the reality of secularism in India.'

The Village Level

Secularization of politics however would only remain an intellectual ideal without the concomitant and more comprehensive process of modernization reaching a certain level of maturity. And in a country like India whose 72 per cent of the people live and work in villages, modernization would remain an unconnected urban experiment unless it includes in its purview as an inalienable integral, the village. The programmatic aspects of rural development are discussed in one of the earliest issues of the SEMINAR, on *The Changing Village*. Since the publication of this number eight years ago, the face of rural India has changed quite a bit and the problems then debated are somewhat stale and out of context.

The success or failure of Community Development, as Ghorpade rightly maintains, has to be judged in the measure in which it provides and channelizes what may be termed, the elementary prerequisites of rural development. It was hoped in 1959, in the pre-Panchayati Raj era that once the delegation of powers and functions takes place as recommended by the Balwantrai Mehta Committee, many difficulties of implementation would be removed. Eight years later, today, after the stabilization of the structure of democratic decentralisation, which was ushered in with the promise that the new grass-roots bureaucracy, given the necessary 'development-cum-welfare orientation,' as different from the 'service-cum-authority orientation,' of the regular civil service, would act as the captain of change, we still find the problem of rural development as

intractable as before. Aspects have changed but not the main problem, and, certainly not the main challenge.

Non-implementation of programmes remains a major reason for slow change. Lack of leadership is another problem. With the dislocation of the traditional elite from the apex of village authority as a consequence of the wider democratization process, there is developing a serious crisis in village leadership which is not being met adequately. 'This is', says Ghorpade, 'the very heart of the problem of rural development in our country.' Community Development was expected to meet this challenge, but hopes are belied. Political parties have also failed in enthusing the people to action. Movement for social change from above, like exported revolution, brings more chaos than change.

Moral Appeal

The 'two major comprehensive movements' says Desai, 'in the post-independence phase, operating in rural India—the Sarvodaya and Community Development—have a single source of inspiration in the Gandhian ideals and strategy'. Both are 'founded upon the doctrine of the harmony of classes, and their method of realizing the ideal social order is to convert the exploiting and propertied classes through a moral appeal'.

While Sarvodaya is against industrialization, and visualizes a decentralized, self-sufficient village community based on plough-agriculture and handicraft-economy, the Community Development is avowedly a movement to promote agro-industrial development within the framework of five-year plans. But since both the movements are founded on 'close collaborationist principles' thus opposing class organizations and class struggle, they mutually serve, in the ultimate analysis, a common ideological purpose of bringing about larger prosperity but within the existing framework of production relations. Desai points out that the beneficiaries of the massive irrigation projects and

power-generation are the upper strata, the richer sections of the agrarian area. Inequality is increased and polarization is effected, as Mendelbaum reported, between the peasant agriculturists and landless labourers.

It is interesting to note that Gadgil who incidentally is now the Vice-Chairman of the Planning Commission clinched the issue when he wrote: 'The Community Projects are supposed to be the special field of the Planning Commission and great reliance is placed on them in relation to development in the future. Not only do these projects pay no attention to land reform or land distribution, but experimentation in relation to land management appears to find no place in them.'

Due to the heterogenous character of our agrarian society, torn as it is by the conflicting class-interests, and in the context of what Desai calls 'a capitalist, competitive economic matrix', governmental action tends to harm the interest of the exploited and propertyless classes and help create a sort of 'bourgeois social order' and therefore it is erroneous to assume that the State of India is a supra-class impartial State. Subsequent developments have considerably confirmed these fears by revealing that the political ramifications of Panchayati Raj reach the caste alignments, and one consequence of democratic decentralization is the legitimization of power based on land and the exercise of that power based on caste factionalism.

Congress Patronage

That the working of Community Development has thus strengthened the old caste domination based on proprietorship in land, and that it helped the induction of the politicized caste leaders into the three tiers of the Panchayati Raj mechanism is now too well-known, thanks to the accumulated evidence of pragmatic studies. What is less known is the identification of the benefits of Community Development, such as they are, mostly if not wholly with the government, and the latter's

identification solely with the Congress Party. Vellani cites the example from an Andhra village: 'It is a bitter joke among the rural folk,' he says 'that if you do not promise Congress a vote you cannot get loans from the development people.'

In the consciousness of the rural electorate in many parts of the country, the role of the Congress and the government remained mixed up inextricably, at least until quite recently. Even with the dislocation of the Congress power at the polls during the fourth general elections, it is doubtful if the victorious coalition parties forming governments in several States have managed to produce the same 'two step identification' for their parties.

Personnel

Yet another vital limitation of the Community Development system has been the lack of committed personnel imbued with the philosophy of change—like the TVA managers under Roosevelt, not to mention the Soviet functionaries. This is a lacunae which a governmental system, itself uncommitted to a cohesive philosophy of change, cannot fill.

Popular participation, and on which so much hope was pinned for the success of the Community Development schemes, remained elusive. The memories of slave-labour, of work under duress, precluded the success of mass-mobilisation, which as Dube points out, appeared 'as a revival of *begar*, a practice under which influential land-owners and government officials compelled the poor people to work without wages, or at normal wages, and which is now prohibited by law.' The criticism that Community Development projects while originally intended to be peoples programmes with government participation, have turned out to be government programmes with very little participation by the people is not totally off the mark.

While all this criticism of Community Development is valid, the inordinate idealization of Sarvo-

daya and Gram-Swarajya as an alternate strategy of growth needs careful scrutiny. Vasant Nargolkar quotes Nehru in defence of Sarvodaya and Vinoba, but only after making it clear that 'India had before her two alternatives—democratic socialism and Sarvodaya and that Nehru was a socialist of sorts from the beginning'. Now it is quite realized that Nehru, a shade less than Gandhiji and the Oracle of Delphi, is quite quotable by the two opponents with a fair degree of plausibility. But it does not prove anything except probably Nehru's acceptability and eclecticism.

Sharing Power

There are many loose ends in Nargolkar's arguments. Admonishing 'those who are in power' for paying lip-service 'to Gandhiji but remaining 'intellectual slaves' of the 'western, or communist models of industrial development, which has blinded them to the realities of India', he warns: 'they have yet to realize that in the peculiar conditions obtaining in India there is no short-cut to industrial development except through the growth of village industries, which have a vast employment potential'. He suggests a la Vinoba the establishment of Gram-Swarajya in every village, in order to build democracy 'from below'.

Quite reminiscent of Ayub Khan's basic democracy across the borders, with the difference that the latter is 'the lowest echelon in an authoritarian structure supported by a military rule, while the former would be the primary unit of national anarchy supervised by self-effacing *bhakts* roaming the country on foot'.

As expected, Nargolkar reminds his readers that 'the whole concept of *Bhoodan Yagna* has roots in ancient Indian culture'. But the highlight of the paper is the very honest testament that: 'The whole movement is based on the theme that the sharing of poverty alone can consolidate or create the community'. So things are clear. This is, if you please, pauperism with a vengeance exalted as a

creed of national identity. God save us from our saints!

Another dimension of modernization is the changing value structure. The SEMINAR on *Our Changing Values* discusses this interlinked problem of change in a traditional society, while the symposium on *The Indian Woman* conducted entirely by eight females of the species, covers a wide range of psychological and socio-economic implications of change on the status and opportunity of our women. Barring an unconcealed (and one might add, expected and condonable) expression of belligerency towards man—that is, on paper—the entire number is a refreshing example of erudition, insight and conviction. The tone is set by Uma Vasudev's poser—vigorous, fighting, iconoclastic, provocative, almost like a transcript of an angry woman's monologue, but meticulously pertinent about the main challenges facing urban women in India. Starting with the note that 'women have been very cleverly seduced by sociological romanticism' and 'succumbed to the magnificent martyrdom of the repressed', she accentuates the putative guilt in a man's conscience by reminding him that thanks to him 'the sanction for women's existence lies only in being the vehicles of the human race'.

Discrepancy

In *Our Changing Values* Chatterjee singles out the attainment of *moksha* or release from the cycle of re-birth, as the dominant and over-riding impulse of the traditional man in India. But it will be edifying to ascertain as Haldar cogently argues as to what extent this metaphysical 'end' played a part in determining the mode of life and values of the bulk of the traditional society. Was not the discrepancy between the theoretical ideal and the mundane practice so clear and almost complete as to render the metaphysical ideal irrelevant in life even if significant in discourses?

A better evaluation will be possible if we travel from the field of

mythology and legend to the field of history. Haldar contends that neither in the Harappan, Rig Vedic nor later Mauryan culture, is there any conclusive evidence to sustain the abiding predominance of *moksha* as the operative ideal. Except for the ascetics, the few devout brahmins and the experimentors of the occult comprising obviously the fringe of the society at any given time, it is doubtful if the doctrine of *moksha* conditioned the life of mankind generally in India. Even the Asokan edicts are silent about the nebulous quest for *nirvana* and *moksha*.

But, it is necessary to remember that beyond this 'sham mysticism' as Haldar calls it, there has also been 'positive, materialistic, secular, energistic and allied institutions and theories of Indian people', which the learned pandits of India, supported by their western compeers like Max Weber, tend to ignore or certainly play down. Thus, a world of make-believe was created in which the dominant Indian tradition was represented as that of nihilistic spiritualism in which maya reigns supreme.

The Deep Rift

However, it is significant that Tagore and Gandhiji's assertion of traditional values created 'a deep rift in the soul of modern India'. The cleavage between Gandhism and the five-year plan, to put it symbolically, is at heart the cleavage between superstition and science, between attachment to the past and breakthrough to the future. Sen brings in Gandhiji's humanism to defend his social obscurantism, when he says 'Mahatma Gandhi was positively worried about human welfare and dignity, and the ugly face of early industrialism shocked him much the same way as it shocked Marx. It took Marx to socialism and Gandhiji to the village industries.'

Apart from the fact that machine civilization, though inhuman in parts, represents a higher stage of social evolution, and could be preferable as a catalyst of more broad-

based material prosperity, out of which a rational humanism may sprout; it will be difficult to demonstrate if human welfare, quantitatively and qualitatively, could be assured by reverting to village industries in modern times. While there is an obvious identity of concern for human welfare in Gandhi and Marx, the differentiation is sharp in their responses and the schema and strategy of change to which they subscribe. Was it because Gandhiji was not aware of the 'full economic and social implications' of the machine that he preferred 'drudgery' of the cottage industry, or was it because in his design of social living, machine was anti-God, anti-man, anti-welfare?

Part of the answer is provided by a refreshingly candid testament of a great traditionalist, the intellectually agile C. Rajagopalachari. He says: 'I am a superstitious person in the etymological sense of the term, a revivalist, everything un-intellectual. I believe in something not related to reason and rationality. I believe reason and rationality cannot cover all things and some of them are important and cannot be ignored!' C.R. is convinced that 'if one does not believe in a soul, individual or cosmic... one must wander in deep darkness', and cites an apt piece from the *Upanishads* to underline the warning, that 'soulless' beings go to 'sunless worlds, dense darkness overhanging'.

This is so much beautiful poetry that one hesitates to shake its spell by striking a jarring note of reality. It may only be noted that while the inextricable linkage between values and soul ('if there is no soul, all values disappear') is self-evident to C.R. it is no more than a metaphysical abstraction for the many. The point is not whether 'secularly enforced laws can adequately replace traditionally inherited values', but whether those values can survive for long the glare of the emerging new world.

The Encounter

The encounter between the West and India, far more profound and

comprehensive than any previous experience in the long history of contacts with many cultural entities, signified a vital break from tradition. It created 'a profound, spiritual schism in the soul of India' says Saran.

The challenge of British domination was felt at two levels—political and cultural. The political challenge was responded to effectively with the formation of the liberation movement which had for its objective the unification of the people, accentuation of political consciousness, and increasing articulation of political values for the final realization of national independence. But the cultural challenge, which transcended its British and western origin, appeared as the formidable challenge to the very fabric of feudal-traditional society, and therefore could not be taken up, 'straightforwardly'.

Modernization

Unanimity against British rule was possible and indeed became the mainstay of national unity and the freedom movement, but unanimity about the characterization and much less about the desired response to westernization was never possible. So much of what is called westernization was pure and simple modernization in a western garb. Its momentum was probably retarded rather than accelerated by the British presence; firstly due to the colonial policies of Britain itself and secondly by the socially obscurantist but politically radical leadership of the nation which identified the machine, the scientific technology, urbanization, rationalist temper, representative institutions and the like, with British heritage, and hence alien to our genius and detrimental to our identity. They believed, and hoped others to believe, that modernization was an ideological guise for the perpetuation of foreign domination.

Authentic political freedom implied to the cultural revivalists the re-invigoration of indigenous culture, preferably in its traditional purity. The challenge was never considered effectively answered

by taking a forward stride; it was more satisfying to the tortured traditionalist consciousness to reject the modernized future in the process of discarding the present, for, both the present and the future as a continuum were visualised as un-Indian accretions made possible by the western impact of industrial civilization.

The Question

But, even here, there was a confusion regarding what really is to be revived? As Yudhisra in his answer to Yaksha in *Mahabharata* counterposed with great subtlety the question: What is *dharma*? Indeed that is the question even for our traditionalists to answer. The *Brhmo Samaj* was one organized response which promoted a syncretic belief-pattern fusing Upanishadic heritage with rationalistic and humanist strands of a western value-system. Paramhansa Ramakrishna and Vivekananda developed yet another response, more orthodox and steeped in spirituality with a robust message of revival of Vedantic faith.

The Arya Samaj was a third response, a Hindu protestant movement with Dayanand's emphasis not only on the infallibility of the Vedas, restoration of original form of Vedic Hinduism, but also radical social reform and re-conversion of the converted. All the three responses achieved limited success; for Hindu society, apart from being continental in its physical dimension replete with regional variations, has no communication pattern and universal sanction as in the Catholic Church.

Today with the slow moving but inevitable progress of modernization, the real problem that stares us in the face is the challenge to create in the conditions of contemporary life, a relevant and viable value system, neither imitative of the West nor repetitive of our own ancient and moribund past, but drawing from both such components that are vital and capable of fusion for the flowering of an authentic modern Indian civilization.

Ideology and pragmatism

B. NATARAJAN

THE volumes of SEMINAR under review span a period of six years. Yet the problems posed by them have a perennial freshness. They are problems that remain early and late with us, and may remain so for years to come. The merit of SEMINAR's approach to them lies not so much in having found a solution to any one of them, but having stirred our intellectual awareness to them and opened the door of perceptive understanding to the complexity of their exist-

ence; and perhaps in having left us somewhat disturbed in mind at the end. It is nothing short of a marvel that the editor has been able to think up such problems, and more so to find a galaxy of participants for the debate, persuade them to contribute in time and collate it all so reflectively.

Philosophy as science, as art, as religion, as hobby and as education—all these angles are brought into focus by Punya Sloka Ray in the issue *Philosophy Today* and in the

end Ray plumps for the last. Philosophy, he feels, must have some aspect which should be useful to the ordinary men and women in modern times, and the role of Indian philosophers lies in the field of popularisation. But he fails to state what exactly is it in philosophy that the ordinary man can find of use and so calls for efforts at popularisation; and certainly overlooks the fact that those who do not set their sights at the peak of creativity may for ever remain in the lower regions of interpretational endeavour.

Pronounce Judgments

The issue, however, is spelt out more explicitly by J. D. Swamidasan who considers that the role of the Indian philosopher is to evoke the spirit of enquiry and help sharpen the intellect—the imparting of philosophical skills required for grasping the problems of our times, and developing at once the moral fibre to state convictions fearlessly. The philosopher is therefore not merely to be a popular interpreter as Ray wants him to be, but is also to pronounce judgment and state his own value system.

Jitendranath Mohanty claims that Indian philosophy can be creative without degenerating into national chauvinism or merging its identity in a mystical world system. He is hopeful that 'new experiences in life, acquisitions of new knowledge, new contacts with other trends of thought and above all new historical researches into the tradition shall inspire new ways of thinking which on their part shall create new traditions'. Jitendranath Mohanty's plea is thus for a massive research effort pinned to hope and faith, but with little sense of a clear direction.

Debiprasad Chattopadhyaya, on the other hand, is all for the espousal of Marxism and repudiation of Vedantism in the Indian context; for Vedantism is 'not the philosophy of national reconstruction, while Marxism positively is: the one teaches that the world is a dream, while the other is the philosophy of the conquest of nature, and the philosophy of human

harmony based upon plenty'. For him as with Sartre, Marxism is not dated. On the other hand, 'it has not yet ripened, nor attained spiritual maturity, has been held up in the earlier stages of its growth'. Historical development may not, however, fully support this thesis; nevertheless it is true, Marxist philosophy still has its irresistible appeal in underdeveloped countries.

N. K. Devaraja laments the infertility of the Indian philosophical field in recent times. Despite all our just pride in our cultural heritage, we have failed to produce 'not only a Darwin, Freud, or an Einstein, but even a Bradley, a Croce, a Russel or a Jean Paul Sartre in our midst'. He points out that the greatest achievement of western philosophy in recent times has been in the thought province of physical sciences. However, Indian philosophers can score similar triumphs in the field of value judgements; and the marrying of the extravertic logic of the sciences and the inward feeling and vision of values can be a profitable field for students of Indian philosophy. Surindar Suri, however, repudiates all possibilities at a synthesis of the East and the West as a futile quest.

Spirit of Enquiry

Thus does the fierce current of Indian philosophical opinion run its heady course as it nears the shoals and rocks of modern thought. Philosophy here will now have to evoke a spirit of enquiry and sharpen the intellect. The philosopher should realise that philosophy consists not in airy schemes or idle speculations; the rule and conduct of all social life is her great province. As J. D. Swamidasan puts it, "The philosophical outlook that goes with service and technology should supplant that of the *atman*, *brahman*, of mysticism, ritualism and all the credos of ancient ignorance parading as eternal wisdom". And in this Marxism contends for a significant place.

Marxism stands almost opposite to Indian Vedantism. Marxism is the philosophy of national re-

construction. It teaches that emancipation of man lies in the conquest of nature. It is the philosophy of human harmony based upon plenty. Vedantism, on the other hand, teaches that the world is a dream, that *samsara* is eternal travail and the *brahman* alone is bliss. Can the twain ever meet? And need the product of a synthesis necessarily be a Schopenhaur's 'sterile mule'?

Jig-saw Puzzle

There are so many variants of socialism that taken together they pose a formidable jig-saw-puzzle to the common man as illustrated in the issue of *Socialism Today*. Such is the variety of doctrines that I am inclined to think with the editor that in the dark all cats look grey. At the extremes are the revolutionists and the revisionists. The revisionists in turn form an interesting mixture. They include all shades, from fundamentalists who seek refuge in Bhoodan and finally turn Swatantrites, to lesser heretics of the school of Crossland, Strachey and Galbraith who believe that socialism is dated as political democracy has already achieved the goal of socialism by creating affluent societies. It is obvious that the theories of these men do not apply to a poverty-stricken country like India.

Marxism has been under criticism ever since its enunciation. There is the familiar criticism that it does not incorporate the neophysics of Einstein, the neo-psychology of Freud, and the neo-economics of Keynes. This was controverted by Mohit Sen earlier in the SEMINAR. 'Can anybody say with any reason' asks Sen, 'that the equations of Einstein describe the behaviour pattern of that which does not exist?' Similarly, can even the most ardent Freudians deny that their psychology dealt with material happenings (experience) as reflected or distorted by another material substance—the proportions of the central nervous system? What about economics? Is the Keynesian technique of pump priming valid for developing countries? And

has it yet overcome the recurring economic fluctuations totally?

Another line of criticism is that the historically determined content of socialism has turned out to be different from the ideal. It has only enthroned the middle-class in place of the bourgeois. 'The poor is always with us'. Against this it is pointed out that a number of leaders in the socialist countries have come from the ranks of the working class. But one may turn back and ask, 'Were there not generals in feudalistic societies who came from the ranks of slaves?' All the same, one cannot deny that by and large the sense of direction in favour of the working classes is unmistakable. Further, the socialistic revolution is not all that complete. It has miles to go yet, miles to go.

The most interesting contribution comes from the pen of Deendayal Upadhyaya. He cannot believe how democracy and socialism can go together (in this he seems to be in the good company of the Congress Minister, Fakhruddin Ali Ahmed, who is recently reported to have said things to the same effect). Like Datta, the learned Upadhyaya is all for spiritual values. Both democracy and socialism have deformed man, and both capitalism and socialism make a slave of man to the machine. Neither knows the end. 'Man has not yet understood man.' Only 'Dharma Rajya' can bring about human welfare; and that is Hinduism which is but 'humanism'. A fitting epilogue, indeed to the symposium. The editor's hope for a 'tumult of ideas' has, I am sure, been more than fulfilled. But then the cats, all, no longer look grey!

Possible Synthesis

These criticisms, however, are no obstacles to a synthesis of Vedantism and Marxism at the philosophical level despite their differing foundations, the metaphysical versus the material—fundamental as the obstacles may seem. For, the end of socialism is in essence a humanism that is of the process of 'becoming', and that forms the very groundwork of

Vedantism also. There can really be a meeting point. For, man cannot live by bread alone; neither can he live wholly by metaphysics. But what seems to create a chasm is in the means.

The savage brutality exhibited during revolutions in the Marxist countries is revolting to the Indian mind conditioned by centuries of the *ahimsa* doctrine. Marxism, eschewed from violence, a revolution without bloodshed—this is what would find abiding acceptance in India. That synthesis need not necessarily be less of Marxism or of 'scientific socialism' in its essence.

Gandhism

It is in this context that the contribution of Gandhism assumes significance. 'Has Gandhism failed?'—is the central question posed by A. K. Saran in the symposium on the theory and practice of non-violence and truth in the SEMINAR issue of June 1963; and his own answer is unequivocal. The measure of the success of Gandhian ideas is best seen in the grotesqueness of its distortion. The distortion special to Gandhism is 'insincerity, religiosity; the lack of courage to resist evil, root and branch, under cover of reformism and reconstruction.'

It reached its anti-climax in the Peace March to Peking, referring to which Saran gives the verdict, 'If such bowdlerizations of Gandhism continue to appeal to eminent Gandhians, the prospects of Gandhism alias Sanity could not be gloomier'; and that indeed is a verdict harsher than Toynbee's which Saran patriotically set out to refute. After that, Vasant Nargolkar's call to Gandhians not only to preach and propagate against war, but to engage themselves in non-violent alternative experiments to war falls flat.

Unfortunately, many of the Rama Rajya ideas have an air of unreality about them. Gandhiji's idea of trusteeship, for instance, has not gained ground except among a few who are emotionally attached to him. Even Nehru rejected it. And so is the negative

attitude of Gandhism to the advance of machine technology. Within the mutually antagonistic groups, the injunction to love one's neighbour as oneself has proved to be as ineffective, century after century, as the commandment to worship one God. The result of such assumptions is seen in the grotesqueness of the distortion of Gandhian ideas by his followers, when they actually came to wield the realities of power.

R. R. Diwakar's exposition of the Gandhian attempt at reconciling religion and communalism, touching as it is, cannot but remind us of the tragic failure that it was during Gandhiji's life itself. Gandhiji had not only to live to see the partition of India, and the naked brutalities in Noakhali and elsewhere, but himself be finally consumed in the rage of fire that religious and communal passions kindled. The God failed, and communalism won.

Socialism, if it is to come, has to be swift in coming in the conditions of today's under-development. Otherwise, it would be a long long time a-coming, and by then the have-nots will have been smothered under a population explosion that will have no cure but total destruction by modern weapons.

Democratic Socialism

From Gandhi to Nehru is a natural transition. Nehru thought of democratic socialism much earlier than others, but it was born in a setting saturated with Gandhian ideas, and so Nehru's socialism eschewed revolution by violence. In the absence of the growth of a revolutionary working class, Nehru felt that the road to socialism could but be long and tortuous. The compulsions of the objective situation reinforced by Gandhian tradition led him to the concept of the 'mixed economy'. But the flexibility and pragmatism characterising it actually served to strengthen the forces of capitalism, thus making the journey to socialism harder than ever.

The November 1964 issue of SEMINAR is the product of a symposium

sium on the achievements and failures of Nehru and his era. Frank Moraes opens the debate with the tribute that Nehru was one of the world's truly great men, whose presence did make a difference to the world he lived in. Nehru talked in a language which India and Asia understood, and in an idiom which the western and eastern blocs alike respected. The masses acted on him like a tonic. He established an unflinching rapport with them, and to the end he was their Prince Charming. The wonder and questing of youth never left him. Nor was he the Hamlet of Indian politics as is often described. His mind was made up on the questions which mattered long before, and he seldom altered his views.

Contradictions

Yet, Moraes says, the man had a lot of outdated ideas in economic matters. The reference obviously is to Nehru's socialism. But Moraes himself admits that Nehru was right in setting before India the goal of democratic socialism. What has happened since the thirties when Nehru conceived them that he should revise those ideas? Moraes has no answer. If democratic socialism is an acceptably sound goal, what difference does it make how early Nehru made up his mind about it? Again, Moraes says in his anxiety to achieve a break-through, Nehru was often near-dictatorial and that the images of socialism and democracy were alike blurred in his thinking. On the other hand critics are not rare who charge Nehru with excessive liberalism. Men of action are variously tempered.

Mohit Sen considers that Nehru's charm lay in this that he so successfully and so often returned to the masses and yet retained a capacity for personal relations.

Nehru's great achievement was to fuse the elements of modernity and the mass movement. By this he raised the level of national thought and sensibility, especially among the urban intelligentsia and the workers. Nehru's great failure,

according to Sen, was when he began to equate socialism with equality of opportunity and the good life defined in a vague way, rather than with abolition of private property and socialisation of the means of production. While Nehru placed great faith in science and technology, he did not think it necessary to forge the linkage between the productive forces and the class structure. The equilibrium he wished to maintain between the public and private sector was developing to a point of tension in his last days. No wonder therefore that 'Nehru brooded and remembered the miles to go when the time of the deep dark woods had come'.

Hector Abhayavardhana dwells at some length on the limitations of Nehru's greatness. With all his left inclinations, Nehru was basically a bourgeois leader. Yet Nehru was not rejected, for such was his inspirational impact on the young, his appeal to the masses, and the dominance of his personality over the left-wing political leaders. The result was that the Indian socialists were held to him as if by an umbilical cord which they were never able to cut asunder. Nehru was India's surrogate for the national democratic revolution; and his greatest achievement was that he served as the symbol of national unity, especially after Gandhiji's death. Yet, he was an inhibiting influence in the way of consummating a national revolution and largely responsible for the stunted growth of radical parties. No individual, however great, is a substitute for a revolutionary political party.

New Legitimacy

According to Jitendra Singh, Nehru's greatest achievement lies in the fact that he gave to India 'new legitimacy', provided it with national identity, helped to lay the foundations of a new democratic polity, and gave a sustained push to the nation in the direction of socio-economic development. These are on his credit side. His failure to solve the problem of the 'amor-

phousness of Indian politics' is on the debit side.

E. M. S. Namboodiripad considers that the outstanding contribution of Nehru was his modernism. 'An ardent champion of science in opposition to superstition, a rationalist in outlook, an advocate of industrialization and modernization of economic life, a patron of the movement for equality between man and woman, a reformer of the family and social system, a supporter of social justice, and the cause of the working peoples—such was the man, his outlook on life and his career'. Yet Nehru failed in the task of arresting the tide of revivalism and obscurantism. Why? Because he was not a believer in scientific socialism. He suffered from all the limitations of the multi-class organisation to which he belonged. The radical ideas which he held so dear as an individual were baulked at every turn by his party colleagues. 'This is the tragedy of his life and work'. Somewhat in the same vein Sham Lal indicts Nehru's work as the 'failure of a democrat'. Between the promise and performance of his government, the gap was wide indeed.

Design for Living

And this brings us to the whole fabric of our society. The editor has sparked new thought on this in a 'Design for Living' project at the UNESCO forum. While it is true that man can mould his environment, the environment in turn moulds him. This head-on-tail-on process is continuous. History is full of examples of this continuum and we live in history, creating and experiencing it. So we feel new directions.

The problems of existence have been with man all through. Nor are they bigger now than what the ancients had. Words such as 'big' and 'small' are in this context subjective. What seem to us as problems of any significance may have been imaginably gigantic for people of a generation ago. So, too, the problems of living that we have today, which seem to

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be beset with insurmountable obstacles, may look insignificant to a future generation.

With increasing awareness of the physical comforts that are possible through development of technology there has been a trend towards traversing away from nature, both physically and mentally. All that we held dear and good, like pasturing and agriculture are no more so; but are only crude forms of life that can hardly give to men a bare existence from hand to mouth. Lord Krishna can hardly be expected to be happy today tending his cows.

More than these problems is the decadence of human values of love, forbearance, charity and fellow feeling that humanity cherished as dear all these ages. Life has become mechanical and our acts smack of machinations.

To my mind, the problems are not without solution. The art of living together without turning the city into a dunghill has been repeatedly discovered. Mohenjodaro, at the beginning of the third millennium B.C., had a water-borne sewage system; so several centuries before the siege of Troy, did Cnossos; so did many of the cities of ancient Egypt albeit only for the rich. A thousand years later Rome drained her swamps and conveyed her filth to the contaminated Tiber by means of the Cloaca Maxima. But the poor were left to demonstrate their intrinsic inferiority by stinking in their slums to high-heaven.

Goals

The first step in this is to set our goals. By goals I mean ideals. Under the changed conditions of industrialisation we are likely to find that the old values are no more suited. A new set of values on living are essential. It is not possible to demarcate one set of values as better compared to another. Such differences are immaterial once we decide what is good for us.

There are small jobs that can be done even now. Life in the slums can be made more comfortable. Central baths,

lavatories and more intense cleaning facilities can be extended to them forthwith. Instead of moving the slum areas to suburbs, efforts should be made to plant them where they are by putting up modern structures and integrating these with the master plans of the cities and towns. This is likely to reduce the problem of transport, wastage of human resources, and traffic bottlenecks in the future. The economic costs are not likely to be more and the social costs are certainly going to be much less.

The Lead

Aldous Huxley in an article entitled 'Hyperion to a Satyr' points out how the sewage systems and dry cleaning, hygiene and washable fabrics, DDT and penicillin represent a series of technological victories over two great enemies: dirt and that system of untouchability, that unbrotherly contempt to which, in the past, dirt has given rise. The 'Design for Living' should partake of a world-wide movement with technology for a sure weapon. The intellectuals of all persuasions and in all countries should take the lead. In England the heroes of the long campaign for sanitation came from the ranks of bishops, (Blomfield of London) radicals, (Edwin Chadwick), physicians (Dr. Southward Smith), aristocrats (Lord Shaftesbury) and men of letter (Charles Kingsley). In our own time Gandhiji set a noble example of washing latrines and scrubbing floors.

Equally important for us is to arrest the onward thrust of human increase in numbers. The essence of family planning has to become our new religion. All our efforts will have to be concentrated on it. Man has sparked the growth process and it is for him to solve the socio-economic impacts of this growth process. There should be a formidable defence to this thrust, and once we have put it up we will have done more than half the design for present and future living.

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Communications

"THIS doesn't seem to be a decent place; why do you come here?" The coughing Bani Master would smoke a bidi and say this to his journalist friend, Noshu, while handing over to him some money out of the tuition fee collections from his pupils, in a posh club. The school teacher who had come to his friend's rescue at an hour of dire need hardly knew that the money would be diverted to the black market.

A few weeks later Bani Master died of an epidemic because of shortage of drugs that had gone underground in the godowns of his trusted friend.

When Romesh Thapar played Bani in Zia Sarhady's memorable *Footpath*, we were at college, thrilled and fascinated by what probably has been the most brilliant character portrayal in Bombay's cinema even.

to this day. Many of us at Aligarh had pinned high hopes in the prospect of some more enjoyable performances by this artiste. But surprisingly enough, we heard nothing encouraging for a number of years.

We had almost forgotten this cinematic phenomenon when a rather irate bookseller threw on us a copy of 'yet another new journal', re-affirming his characteristic belief that 'new papers could hardly prosper'. SEMINAR, in broad Gillsanic lower case, looked an attractive name for a monthly.

According to our knack, I and my great bibliophile friend, Habib, started from the end and scanned the print line: Bani Master was the publisher editor. It seemed an almost personal triumph when, a little later, the hope in the journal's high standard of intellectualism proved a reality.

The detached admiration for the unique experiment in Indian journalism has sustained during over eight years of SEMINAR's existence: the journal's utility and its rather close relationship with this correspondent has undergone some welcome changes during the span covering a hundred issues. The shift of SEMINAR from Bombay's Malabar Hill to New Delhi's Malhotra Building brought him closer to Bani Master, personified as a teacher and elder brother, out to help young men and women fighting their way to success.

Free lance writing is a killing indulgence, particularly for those like us who have chosen the Capital as their field of operation, notwithstanding Rajaji's affront to the intellectual life of this city.* It has its own vicissitudes and stages of aberrations which could dampen the enthusiasm of many a brave soul. The attitude of Indian newspapers to free lancers drives them almost to breaking point and they become pathetically used to being looked upon in a way not always dignified. Their entire stature and calibre are, in fact, to be judged simply in terms of columns and centimetres, the units that are a free lancer's nightmare.

Writing for SEMINAR has always been different from writing for any other paper: it ceases to be professional and becomes an involvement. You are not treated as a robot; you are read and understood, whatever your point of view, liberated as it were from the fear of the blue pencil.

I have often wondered what is more trying as a SEMINAR assignment: a book review or

an article? While doing the former you have to operate in a disciplined confinement of your particular angle, exhausting all probable aspects, without encroaching upon the fellow-chronicler's domain. A book review, on the other hand, has to be an absorbing exercise resulting in a short note on the area of coverage rather than the flap re-written.

SEMINAR's success as the best Indian forum for discussion and intellectual review has mainly been due to two important factors: a dynamic selective knack and an unusual rapport between the contributor and the editor, the latter being a by-product of the former. The novel concept of dissecting one particular problem every month and the sharp research content in the articles are the highlights that distinguish it from other contemporaries. But this has its own disadvantages. (a) A particular development in the field of politics, economics, education and the arts has to be tackled at its point of near climax. The long period of a month normally shows significant diversions from the path chosen by the articles written about another month earlier. And this probably is the greatest editorial agony. (b) There is a dearth of competent writers, midway between popular chroniclers and slow-moving specialists, who could provide quick and relevant analysis of the issues involved. Therefore, if some authors feature rather frequently, and some important issues remain untouched, there is always a valid explanation for this.

While the problems of foreign affairs and economics have produced some immensely brilliant issues of SEMINAR, science has probably suffered. As perhaps competent specialists are commenting on the various subject-wise classified issues, I would better not venture into this realm of the present symposium. But I cannot help wondering why some vital issues have remained untouched: journalism, sport, caricature, to name a few subjects which have great bearing on our way of life.

Intellectual reviews with long periodicity of publication have, for the first few years, to operate in a vacuum: in search of a following as it were. This has been the case with all important journals from *Edinburgh Review*, *Fortnightly Review* and *Encounter* to our own *Modern Review* of the good old days. SEMINAR, in this regard, was fortunate, having got a break-through in the initial

*C. Rajagopalachari reacted adversely to Seminar's shift to New Delhi which he thought was 'hardly a civilized area, unless costly buildings made it so.'

stage itself. Editors, it is said, build a journal. In the case of SEMINAR, the editor is the journal. If an old subscriber ceases to be so, a personal letter would be sent asking him the reasons for his decision: any reader worth his salt, would hardly like to be deprived of this special companionship.

A novelty of SEMINAR is its very get-up that indicates the seriousness or otherwise of the contents inside. The poster cover, rather trickily printed on the reverse side of the paper, is an imposing way of creating the required effect, even though the doodles of Dilip Chowdhury or even Abhijit Barua are a bit puzzling and often make one run from one idea to another.

The one-column headline and the usual two-column layout for the beginning of the article are pleasing to the eye, and, even though the general criticism of waste of newsprint has some weight, the whole idea is aesthetic and should be continued. I have often been put off by the brown sheet between the pages 8 and 9 and particularly the appeal behind (facing Page 49) for the back issues, asking for the quotation of offers. Fortunately I have, so far, prevailed over temptations during financial crises, more than once.

I often question myself whether newspapers and journals make any serious impact on the personality of individuals. And, looking at the bounded volumes of *The Statesman*, that I used to collect during my college days and those of many weeklies and monthlies that I bought on instalments, years ago, I feel convinced of their profound potential. If they have to serve effectively in influencing generations, they have to be sincere about their responsibilities. Rising up to the occasion and enlightening one's countrymen, particularly the youth, should be the objective. It is by educating thus, and not by distributing Watumull Awards, that the future of India can be assured. The hundredth issue of SEMINAR provides both an inspiring backdrop and an attractive vista of such a national service. I join thousands of its readers in wishing this great venture all success.

ANEE CHISHTI

New Delhi

I AM a keen reader of your much applauded magazine SEMINAR and have been reading it regularly for quite some time. Since No. 49 to be exact. I may also congratulate you on the sorts of experts that you are always able to get to write for you and no wonder while reading the issues one does

get involved in day-dreaming. The solutions suggested do force one to imagine the kind of future this country can have if the solutions were implemented. One wonders what is keeping us braked.

But, the realities which confront us in our day to day life jar on us so much that one is apt to express the thought that 'that government is best that governs the least—to hell with laws'.

The causes and the remedies are being sought and SEMINAR is doing a yeoman service in this regard. But what good is it if not heeded in the least. Debates are sought everywhere and indulged in with great gusto; at bus stops, outside cinema halls, in cafes and social gatherings. Opinions are expressed for and against the rules—but to what good. Again the question mark looms up. What's holding us?

Every individual is a perfect man unto himself capable of setting everything in order if given a chance. And this is true about most of us and the political parties too. We criticize, we find fault and produce solutions. And some are lucky enough to bring their ideas into public notice as well. But the people at the helm of power silence them from their *gaddis*. They scare them. They prove in phrases: 'all such persons are fools. They are unable to comprehend the enormity of the problem which concerns a sprawling sub-continent, i.e., India.' But their basic objection at heart is that they do not approve corrections in their laid down policies—corrections whether worth consideration or not. If they do, they will have to admit that they are wrong and in a democracy this may be fatal. In these days of unemployment, they cannot afford loosing their *gaddi*. Nobody would.

The proceedings of every single conference, meeting or anything of that kind end with a resolution to form new committees and sub-committees to prepare detailed notes for the high-ups. This procedure is a sufficient incentive for every individual to feel like an expert. Who knows when his chance might come!

There is no shortage of foreign-returned among our leaders and they are always handy to suggest the import of experts from those countries to solve our problems. Does not this show how sluggish we are in solving our own problems? What is our attitude towards looking up to our own way of life and the problems involved therein? And how magnanimous we are! We never reserve words in projecting this state of ours to the whole world. This is what prompts the

looker-on to say, 'How is it that the whole of the Indian administration seems to be grinding creakingly to a halt? One reason is obvious. Twenty years after independence, there are now very few British trained district officers.' You cannot get away from this. Also, one should mark the fact that it is the 'district officers', whom we need.

If one looks over the last twenty years and the statistics produced by different groups, one won't know where this country stands. The foreign experts are there to show us the reasons, the problems, the solutions and all that. They have been doing so for quite some time now but to what use? True, we have learnt one thing for sure—to depend upon them and believe me we are doing that honestly.

It is not that we do not know our problems. We know them but the problem is that we do not have the knack to solve them.

SEMINAR posed the problem about the kind of society that should be built in India, and it was discussed by intellectuals like Sisir Gupta, K. N. Raj and N. C. Chaudhuri among others but to what use? We find today that the fears expressed by them have come true. There is a great scramble for power. Ideology has gone hay-wire and the rot is taking its toll—not so much of the leaders, who have brought us to this juncture, as of the common man. Nobody paid heed to the kind of doubts expressed. We find our leaders expressing very soberly 'the problems one has to face during the transitional period.' But how long is this transitional period to last one wants to know. Why has a popular government elected by the people to take refuge behind things like 'transitional period' and 'emergency'?

Where are the results of plans? We may be shown the dams, the plants and all that but then why the drastic changes and criticism of the Planning Commission at this late stage. And, again, we need the experts to show us the way to proper planning. True, some shops flourish and some fail but never at such a cost—proportionately. We were an agricultural country and as the records show we had enough of everything and then suddenly something happened. We were nothing but a begging lot. One look at the list of items for which the import licences are issued—issued some time in April this year—is enough to show us where we stand. We are the tradition followers. So we never searched for alternatives which could be

produced from our own resources but kept on the old traditions and even after twenty years of independence have to import to complete everything produced in India. There are experts apt to compare our resources with America and Russia but never with countries like Japan and Germany. The main thing is that we have miserably failed to harness our own resources otherwise one would not find pens manufactured in India stamped as having been produced in China. But the vicious circle of politics is involved in it up to its neck—along with the politicians.


In our state of affairs everything should be tackled on a war footing to march abreast with the world. We have the raw materials, we have the labour and we have the technicians (though a large number of them are serving abroad for obvious reasons). And not the least, we have the services of the foreign experts too to help us. Someone has said, 'corruption is wedded to democracy' and, not to let him down, we are the glaring example of the truth of his statement. That is at the root of the problem. Independence gave us the right to choose our representatives (now turned rulers) to serve us to the best of their ability. The representatives made it a point to come back by whatever means because they had tasted power while serving us. And power taught them to rule. Twenty years ago we were being ruled by Britishers, now by our own brethren—shouldn't we find some consolation here! Independence gave us the vote—a tool to shape our future. It has become a commodity—you can sell it.

The enthusiasm of the people is dying. We do not find the same turn-out on Independence and Republic days. We seldom find anything in common to be happy about. When we compare the national day documentaries of different countries, the difference slaps us. We realized, we awoke, we fought and gained the goal and we are again going into a slumber. And if we sleep now, God alone knows what will happen. The Pakistan aggression woke us again but the moment has been lost—the leaders failed to lead us. The happenings show it. I have not mentioned anything about the Chinese aggression because the government took us into confidence too late about the real happenings. So far so good in the interest of the security of the country.

ACHAL

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

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


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
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



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



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
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
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UNCTAD

a symposium on the
issues dividing the
rich and poor nations

symposium participants

THE PROBLEM

A short statement on the
existing situation

BACKGROUND

R. S. Arora, presently doing
research in the Indian Institute
of Public Administration, Delhi

POSSIBILITIES

Sudhir Mulji, business executive, writes
on economic issues

BASIC ISSUES

S. S. Mehta, Associate Professor at the
Indian Institute of Foreign Trade, Delhi

PATTERNS AND PROSPECTS

Ashok Guha, Professor of International Economics at
the Indian School of International Studies, Delhi

NET GAIN

Jagdish Bhagwati, Professor of Economics,
Delhi University

FUNDAMENTAL APPROACH

Sailen Ghosh, journalist and researcher,
at present Editor, 'Oil Commentary',
and Chief of Publicity, Petroleum Information Service

BOOKS

Reviewed by P. N. Dhar, Ranjit Gupta,
P. Chattopadhyay, J. N. Thadani and S. N. Mishra

FURTHER READING

A select and relevant bibliography
compiled by D. C. Sharma

COVER

Designed by Dilip Chowdhury

The problem

UNCTAD is going to be in session for two months, a marathon conference about trade, aid and development. The issue is quite simple. Two-thirds of mankind is wallowing in poverty. Can the affluent one third be stirred to assist the processes of international cooperation through specialisation without which there can be no world community? The record so far is dismal and the gulf between the rich and the poor nations continues to grow. This gulf inevitably generates tensions. In the course of the next two months, we will hear many familiar arguments, arguments rooted in situations where poverty and affluence exist side by side, situations embracing individuals, families, societies, nations and the communities of nations. In the maze of the debate, it would be good to remember the central fact that the wealth of one man or nation was built historically at the expense of another man or nation. These processes continue in various disguised forms. They must be halted. Today, if the needs of the under-developed nations have to be met from the resources of the developed world, then the developed nations must purchase what the under-developed nations can produce.

This issue of SEMINAR presents the complexities which have grown around this central fact and which have to be entangled if this world of ours is to feel secure.

The background

R. S. ARORA

BEFORE the present time, never have there been so many people actively concerned about the existence of 'sub-standard' living conditions among the majority of the people of the earth. Certainly, 'sub-standard' can never receive an

adequate definition; what can be defined is the feeling held by a large number that an even greater number are living in a much worse manner than they should, and could, be. The proverbial shrinking of the world brought about by

progress in communications has brought awareness of this problem to the rich, who either did not know or refused to face the fact, and to the poor, who have at last been given a standard of comparison. The poverty of two-thirds of the world's population has become a recurrent theme, as has also the determination of the submerged peoples to better their conditions.

These underdeveloped nations firmly believe that alignment with one of the established ideological-cum-military blocs would hinder development more than help it. Consequently, since achieving independence, most of the new nations have chosen to follow India on to the path of non-alignment, viewing this position as essential to their economic progress. They have linked the consolidation of their political independence to their increased economic independence; and all their actions have to be seen in that light. Further, they feel there can be no real stability in the world while the standard of living of many nations is manifestly unequal to that of other nations.

Self Reliance

There has been a strengthening of the feeling among the underdeveloped nations that they must primarily mobilise their own resources and energies and coordinate them into a planned programme of economic development. The emphasis, above all, is on self-reliance. At the 1961 Belgrade Conference of the non-aligned nations, the late Prime Minister Nehru stressed: 'Whatever they (foreign aid programmes) may do, the ultimate burden will be on the people of our own countries... so it is no good expecting others to do all of our work.'¹ At the same time, the underdeveloped nations acknowledged the need of temporary assistance to function as an activating factor in their economies.

Historically, it is true that in nearly all countries, the first phases

of industrialization have been generally the work of foreigners, for often it is they alone who possess the technical know-how and at the same time the capital. For instance, the earlier stages of economic development in the United States, Great Britain and Russia had the benefit of foreign know-how and capital.

Foreign Capital

Students of economic history would recall that the movement of investment funds from Europe—notably from Great Britain, Germany, the Netherlands, played a strategic role in the construction of America's great trunk rail-roads and direct investment took place in land and land-mortgage enterprises. In 1869, Europeans—British, German, Dutch, Swiss—owned \$243 million in American rail-road securities, in 1897 \$2,500 million, in 1914 over \$4,000 million. At the outbreak of World War I, in July 1914, foreign private investments in the United States totalled \$7,200 million and the President of the United States represented a debtor nation.

Reviewing the economic development of England during the 18th century, T. S. Ashton writes: 'It may be that the part played by Dutch investors in the finance of British Government and trade has been exaggerated, but there can be no doubt that it was considerable... There is reason to believe that investment by the Dutch helped to maintain the value of sterling...' In fact, owing to her development of trade and some industries, Holland had been the great foreign investor of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries; the proportion of the British national debt in the hands of Dutch bondholders in the later eighteenth century had provoked comment at Westminster.

In Russia, in the latter half of the nineteenth century, several industries were developed with the aid of foreign capital and know-how. For instance, the Russian cotton industry owes much to a German, Ludwig Knopp, who went to Russia

in 1839 and devoted his life to establishing and building up the industry of cotton spinning by machinery, until it was said that spinning factories were as numerous in Russia as churches. Up to the end of the 'seventies the railways were almost completely built out of foreign material. The desire to develop their own resources and attract foreign capital was the foundation idea of the protectionist movement in Russia.

While commenting on the economic development of Russia, M. S. Miller observes: 'One great effect of the high tariff was to tempt in foreign capital to develop industries inside the tariff wall, and a great industrial development which had begun in the 'eighties was continued in the 'nineties. Russia began to develop the great coal fields and the iron mines of South Russia as well as the naphtha industry. This southern district has been almost entirely developed by foreign capital. In 1879, Nobel's, the Norwegian firm, founded the Society of Petroleum industry, and in 1883 a French company, the Society of the Caspian and the Black Sea, was established with the support of the French Rothschilds. A great deal of English capital was also invested in Russian petroleum companies, both at Baku and Grozny... The coal industry was started in the same way by foreign capital.'

It will thus be seen how great a part was played by foreign investments and know-how in the industrial development of the contemporary big powers. In the present context, the marginal propensity to save is likely to be greater in a more advanced country, thus putting that country in a better position to supply capital and skills. Also, the introduction of foreign goods will increase the marginal propensity to import, which will encourage the general development of international trade.

Strings

Until recently, however, the aid from the larger to the developing

1. Mr. Nehru's statement at the first Conference of Non-aligned Nations held in Belgrade, September, 1961.

nations has been quite small. Moreover, it has been largely political in character and has tended to use the underdeveloped country merely as a supplier of raw materials. The view was prevalent in the West that agriculture and primary commodities were Asian and African specialties and it was in these areas that the new nations of Asia and Africa ought to be encouraged to increase productivity. The major powers were reluctant to make available industrial know-how, except in the field of light industries, which were set up to take advantage of cheap labour and power. Once having brought in light industry, they then demanded acknowledgement of how much help they were providing. Heavy industry and highly technical information was available only with a large number of involving strings attached. Aid programmes were practically nothing but elements of the cold war struggle. The attempt to establish economic dependence was part of a plan to ensure political dependence.

Actually, both aims were equally sought after respectively by the business and governmental interests of the investor nation. As late as 1962 *The Economist* pointed out:

'The fact has to be faced that the most effective motivation for providing aid has hitherto been the providers' desire to attach the recipients to themselves, or to detach them from rival powers. Some of this motive power has been lost as the providers—Western and Communist powers alike—found the receiving countries increasingly insisting on asserting their independence.'²

Terms of Aid

By John Foster Dulles' oft repeated proud admission, the policy of the United States in the 1950's was to provide economic aid only to those countries who would accept military aid. Those not for

the U.S. were against it and ought to be damned as such.

The terms of the aid granted determine whether or not the provisions will foster the underdeveloped country's own ability to grow. Loans at six or seven per cent are not really aid. Dr. I. M. D. Little tells us: 'Calling such loans "aid" often and rather justifiably raises a cynical laugh and helps to bring the concept of aid into disrepute.'³

Despite some past aid, the gap between the 'haves' and the 'have-nots' has not been reduced. Declines in the world market prices of primary materials has brought about the paradoxical situation that countries often lose more than they gain. It has been estimated that a five per cent fall in prices during one year would wipe out all the effect of the assistance of the previous ten years. Thus, countries producing raw materials are always looking for means to stabilise prices and prevent the fluctuations of the developed countries from having repercussions in their own economies.

Protective Groups

Another hindrance to the underdeveloped nations is the division of the advanced countries into protective groupings, such as the Common Market, the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance, E.F.T.A., and COMECON. These associations are a huge obstacle in the way of improved economic relations and development, especially since some of them have recently shown a trend to build even higher walls around themselves. Such groupings are, perhaps, inevitable since practically every country feels the need of greater economic security through regional cooperation. But it is obvious that this degree of exclusiveness is harmful to many others and, in the final analysis, to themselves because of the damage to world trade.

The final declaration of the Belgrade Conference stressed three points. First, the participants felt the United Nations would be the

best channel for the administration of economic and technical aid; consequently its facilities for promotion of economic development ought to be improved, and a United Nations Capital Development Fund should be formed. Second, they demanded establishment of just terms of trade and an effort to prevent excessive fluctuations in primary commodity prices in the world market. Finally, they agreed to cooperate in commerce to face the pressures of the already formed groups; and they invited all countries to plan an international conference to discuss ways to overcome and avoid present and future obstacles to development and to ensure the best realisation of social and economic growth.

The Trap

Some influential members wanted even broader cooperation established to coordinate development work and function as a lobby for the producers of raw materials; they advocated a sort of Afro-Asian common market which could negotiate with the outside world. But there are still limits to the expansion of inter-regional activity among these countries, because the markets for their products are still largely outside and the machinery of industry still largely comes from outside. In addition, these countries lack sufficient political and economic maturity and the necessary high degree of integration already developed in Europe. Despite the fact that such a grouping is not yet feasible, the reasons which inspired the demand are still important. The existence of prior groupings is a very serious problem for the underdeveloped countries and they see themselves potentially caught between the scylla of economic isolation, being entirely shut out from the world market, and the charybdis of being trapped as satellites to the economic hegemony of the developed powers.

The outcome of the third point of the Belgrade declaration was an economic conference of the underdeveloped countries held in Cairo in July 1962. The idea was

2. "Development's Brave Banners", *The Economist* (London), 14, July, 1962, p. 129.

3. I.M.D. Little, *Aid to Africa* (1964), p. 32.

first discussed by Presidents Tito and Nasser and Prime Minister Nehru in November 1961, and further developed in a meeting between Tito and Nasser in February, 1962. The communiques issuing from both preparatory discussions criticised the detrimental economic and political effects of the current economic groupings and emphasised the need for collective action on the part of the excluded countries.

Attending the conference were thirty-one representatives of developing countries and five official observers. This was the first conference of non-aligned nations on exclusively economic considerations. The agenda stressed the problems of (a) internal development, (b) the need for cooperation among the participating countries and, (c) the economic relations of the underdeveloped countries with the advanced nations. Recriminations against past 'colonial exploitation' were strictly avoided since all felt much more could be achieved by taking a moderate stance.

Cairo Declaration

The final declaration stated that to ensure lasting progress and peace the underdeveloped countries must have the maximum opportunity to use their resources. It especially emphasised that many problems could be better solved through concerted action and through established international channels, especially the United Nations. All the underdeveloped countries, it further said, required aid from the industrial powers because they had inadequate supplies of skilled manpower and scientific and other technical personnel. It strongly felt that the already developed countries should take the initiative to promote bilateral and multilateral trade relations, payment financing, and technical, scientific, and industrial cooperation.

Also advocated was an improvement in transport and communications; it was hoped that the advanced countries would take steps to upgrade old trade routes and open new ones. At the same time joint action would be undertaken to study world market

trends with an eye to protecting their primary materials. The United Nations, it noted, could take steps to stabilise the world market of raw materials with reference to the prices of manufactured goods.

On the problem of commerce, the conference was concerned to continue mutual consultation on terms of trade among the developing States, but simultaneously the advanced nations ought to relax discriminatory tariffs and barriers. The declaration remarked that existing aid had been of some assistance to development, but on the whole it had been insufficient. As a result, the economic gap was actually widening and the volume of trade was decreasing, and with it the demand for the goods of the industrialised powers.

The Development Decade

The General Assembly of the United Nations in December 1961 passed a resolution pledging an intensification of efforts on economic development and the 1960's were designated as the 'U.N. Development Decade'. Just before the Cairo Conference, the Economic and Social Council stated that the current 3½ per cent annual growth of national income of underdeveloped countries could be raised to a rate of 5 per cent in a few years and 6 per cent by 1970, in other words, rates that would begin self sustaining growth, if there was effective economic planning, increased export earnings, and improved foreign aid. It recommended that one per cent of net capital should flow from the richer countries' combined income; this would equal about 10 per cent of the national income of the developing nations. The Cairo Conference appealed for this one per cent and asked that for it to be most effective this donation should be administered through the U.N.

Participation in the Cairo Economic Conference gave the Afro-Asian nations, along with the other developing countries, the awareness that collective effort would be the best future method for attaining their economic goals. This new consciousness was one of

the major achievements of the Conference.

After the economic conference, the unaligned and underdeveloped countries began to put pressure on the United Nations to implement a resolution of the General Assembly (1707-XVI) which had advanced the idea of an international conference on problems of trade. The world body had finally given formal recognition to the supreme importance of trade in problems of economic development. The pressure brought to bear was also reflected in a decision of the Economic and Social Council to hold such a conference, 'bearing in mind the vital importance of the rapid growth of exports and export earnings of developing countries of primary products and manufactures, for promoting their economic development.'⁴ This resolution was endorsed by the General Assembly at the end of the year and the conference was finally held in Geneva, 23 March—16 June 1964.

The Motivation

Opening the first United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Secretary General U Thant declared:

'A long chain of events has contributed over many years to the growing conviction that the U.N. must make a determined effort to deal jointly with the problems of trade and problems of development or run the risk of frustrating the efforts of the Organisation to maintain world peace.

You can hardly do less than provide mankind both in the underdeveloped and in the developing countries with a framework of principles and active policy to make trade a real vehicle of progress towards economic development and thus help to secure universal prosperity and peace for this and succeeding generations.'⁵

The final report of the Geneva Conference held that the task of

4. Economic and Social Council, Resolution 917-XXIV, 31 August, 1962.

5. U Thant's inaugural statement at the first UNCTAD, 23 March, 1964.

development was for the benefit of all people. It noted that this process would surely involve a large number of structural changes in the socio-economic environment. By their own efforts and through their own changes each country was acknowledged as striving to reach a self sustaining growth rate. But, this achievement would be blocked by practically insurmountable difficulties unless international aid, of which trade would be an (or perhaps the) essential element, was granted. The report further noted that the joint income of the developing nations, which have two-thirds of the world's population was equal to only slightly more than one-tenth of that of the industrialised countries and that this disparity was showing no signs of decreasing.

Fundamental Causes

Terms of international trade disadvantageous to the producers of primary materials were seen as the fundamental causes of this continued and, in some cases, increasing, disparity. In the period 1950-1962 the value of the exports from the industrialised countries increased by 50 per cent, from \$19.2 billion to \$28.9 billion, while the growth of exports of the other nations was at a markedly lower rate. Consequently, there had been a shift in the apportionment of shares in the world export market, with the result that the portion of the underdeveloped and developing countries had fallen from nearly one-third in 1950 to just slightly greater than one-fifth in 1962. At the same time, the advanced western countries' share rose from three-fifths to two-thirds, while that of the socialist countries increased from 8 per cent to 13 per cent.

Because of the increasing inability of these countries to find markets for their exports, their funds available for the purchase of capital goods and machinery had fallen, thus actually causing a decline in the rate of economic development. The Conference felt that improved trade regulations

could easily destroy these obstacles to the export of primary products (and even the manufactures) of the underdeveloped nations. There was agreement (albeit of a limited scope) on measures to help increase rates of growth and to broaden the availability of foreign exchange for the underdeveloped countries; guidelines for international financial and technical co-operation were also set up.

U.S. Objections

The report embodied the positive achievements of the Conference. Unfortunately, its work was hampered and much bitterness was caused by the recalcitrance of the major industrialised powers, especially the United States and secondarily the United Kingdom. The Conference published fifteen General Principles, each agreed to by a majority of the participants; the U.S. voted against nine, while the U.K. vetoed five; France and the U.S.S.R. did not cast any negative votes but did abstain on several occasions. At the beginning of the Conference, George Ball, the representative of the U.S., set the tone of his country's opposition. 'The formula—Trade not Aid—,' he said, 'upon which the *raison d'être* of this Conference is founded, cannot be pushed too far. Carried to extremes it can become a dangerous slogan.'⁶

The import of the nine principles whose adoption the United States tried to block was as follows:

(1) Reaffirmed the principles of sovereign equality of States, and their rights to self-determination and non-interference and made these principles the basis of economic relations.

(2) Acknowledged the free choice of trading partners and disposal of natural resources as a sovereign right, to be exercised in a country's own economic interest.

(3) Forbade discrimination against systems of a different

socio-economic organisation and required that methods of trade not contravene this principle.

(4) Declared the concern of the entire world community in furthering economic development and social progress and added that this peaceful coexistence among States should be furthered by increasing the general well-being.

(5) Demanded that all countries alter their terms of international trade to make possible a rapid increase in the export revenues of the underdeveloped nations.

(6) Stated that 'most favoured nation treatment' should be a guide for international trade and required that no State adopt measures harmful to the commercial concerns of another nation.

(7) Stated that opening access to tutions and industrial States to prices or raw materials were necessary to any expansion of world trade and called upon the advanced nations to begin reduction of barriers, especially those directly restricting the developing countries.

(8) Asked international institutions and industrial states to increase the flow of loans, grants, and direct technical assistance to bolster the finances and efforts at self sustaining growth of the underdeveloped countries.

(9) Recognised that the resources released for general use following on a total disarmament agreement under international control ought to be granted for the economic needs of the underdeveloped nations.

The U.K.

The United Kingdom voted against propositions 2, 6, 7 and 8 as numbered above. Britain also voted against a motion calling for complete decolonisation and final removal of the remaining features of colonialism, since these were necessary prerequisites for economic development and were demanded by the principle of sovereign right over natural resources;

6. Cmdd 2417 (United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Final Act with Related Documents)

the United States and France abstained on this occasion.

The battle over 'Sovereignty over Natural Wealth and Resources' has had a long history, and the attitude of the United States has been evident from the beginning; unfortunately, increased world pressure has not caused a change. A motion passed by the General Assembly on 21 December, 1952, included the statement that 'the right of peoples freely to use and exploit their natural wealth and resources is inherent in their sovereignty...' The U.S. voted against this resolution. Her stated justification of this position was that she felt the motion did not provide sufficient guarantees to private investments as under international law, treaties, and other international agreements. With specific reference to two previous resolutions (523-VI of 12 January, 1952 and 626-VII, above) the General Assembly passed the new resolution (1803-XVII) on 14 December, 1962 on 'Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources.'

Violation

To the resolutions of the previous ten years it added the notions that this right was especially important for the national development and well-being of the peoples of all States. It further added that any violation would be an infringement of the United Nations Charter and would be condemned as an obstacle to the growth of world wide co-operation and the establishment of lasting peace. Despite all this weight of world opinion and despite safeguards of the legitimate rights of foreign capital, the United States voted against the same principle in Geneva in 1964.

Great Britain performed almost as poorly. Edward Heath, representing the U.K., was more positive than his government had ever been previously, but he issued repeated warnings about how easy it would be for the proposed measures to fail. An observer in his own country dourly pointed out:

7. General Assembly, Resolution 626-VII, 21 December, 1952.

In the economic sectors of international policy Britain's present situation is no easier; the U.N. Trade Conference at Geneva has not improved its relations with the underdeveloped world.⁸

The U.S.S.R.

Some western observers were highly critical of the conduct of the Soviet Union at the Conference, saying that she had contributed nothing. On the contrary, unlike the western countries, the U.S.S.R. had come prepared with trade figures. Afro-Asian observers, however, noted that the U.S.S.R. thankfully did not indulge in pyrotechnics, confining herself to a few suggestions and avoiding propaganda statements; and they acknowledged that country's preparedness and constructive attitude. Only later did the Soviet Union permit itself a note of triumph by pointing out that the U.S.S.R. bore no responsibility for the economic crises of the underdeveloped nations. These problems, had been the product of colonialism and attempted neo-colonialism. Consequently, one couldn't use the same approach and expect her to have a duty to compensate for the damage.

Many observers felt called upon to remark on the impressiveness of the success in the face of so many obstacles. *The Economist* applauded the efforts of the Seventy-Seven. It felt that their ability to salvage the Conference so beautifully would certainly have large future repercussions. The impact of this salvaging operation, it noted, was even greater than the effect of the actual material outcome. The western obstructionism was not confined to negative voting. It is believed that the U.S., the U.K. and France tried to apply pressure, especially economic, to those countries which fell within their traditional spheres of influence.

At a meeting in Paris in July 1964 the western industrial countries noted and regretted their poor showing in Geneva. This

8. "A Policy of Movement", *The Economist* (London), 13, June, 1964.

indicated that at future UNCTAD meetings the western powers would perhaps collectively take a more concerted stand.

The Cairo summit conference of the 'non-aligned nations' held in October 1964, reiterated the disparities between the poorer and richer countries and emphasised the importance of non-interference in their internal affairs. Only with assured non-intervention could they begin to surmount the huge problems facing them. The nations represented called upon the countries already in economic groups to take measures to protect the interests of those excluded. Several speakers specifically praised the results of the first UNCTAD which had, to their minds, confirmed the economic interdependence of all the countries of the world and which had agreed that problems of economic development would be best met by establishing universal economic relations without discrimination. Such freedom in trade would promote structural changes and a new international division of labour. Some speakers, in a more pessimistic vein, felt that the Geneva meeting had only established theoretical principles which could easily die for lack of continued effort.

At UNCTAD 1 it was decided that its secretariat would have its permanent headquarters in Geneva. At present there are several international organisations operating under the aegis of UNCTAD: the Conference itself which is a plenary body of 131 countries; a 55 nation Trade and Development Board which acts as an executive organ between meetings of the Conference; and numerous other specialised committees, sub-committees, working parties and expert groups, all are serviced by a formidable secretariat.

Unchanging Attitude

During the last three years, UNCTAD bodies have been meeting frequently, but their activity has not yet produced any basic changes in the policy of the rich countries. UNCTAD is viewed by the prosperous countries as a

creature of the less fortunate countries created to exert continuous pressure on the rich countries to find ways of meeting the economic needs of the poorer countries. Above all, the tug of old habits works all the time against the newness of thinking involved in any concept of a joint strategy for international economic growth. Paradoxically enough, as a percentage of national income, economic assistance from rich countries to poor ones has actually declined in all but two or three aid-giving countries. In some of them, it has fallen absolutely as well. In the United States, even the Development Loan Fund, a prime mover in effective aid, is being slashed by a third.

Any observer of UNCTAD activities will testify, tough as it is to get funds for foreign aid, it is even tougher to bring about changes in trade policy favourable to 'low-wage' countries. In a recent statement, U Thant, Secretary-General of the United Nations, deplored: 'the slow rate of progress on virtually every recommendation of the first UNCTAD Conference, even those adopted unanimously.'⁹ For instance, the principle initiated at the first UNCTAD and accepted in Chapter IV of GATT now provides for trade concessions to be extended to developing countries on a non-reciprocal basis.

While the western countries are still hesitant on this issue, the more enthusiastic support for this principle has come from most of the East European countries. Some of them have removed duty on imports from developing countries and a few of them have also accepted the principle of linking the repayment of loans given by them with the output of the industry set up with these credits. On the other hand, the industrial countries of the West have given each other more substantial concessions under the Kennedy Round.

Negotiating Character

The Fifth Session of the Council for Trade and Development (con-

9. Statement made to the Economic and Social Council at its 41st session, in the summer of 1966.

vened in Geneva August 15 to September 8) was called upon to make the preparations for the second UNCTAD to be held in New Delhi in February, 1968. It was agreed in principle that basically the second Conference should have a negotiating character. This does not, however, mean that it should be a gathering of government plenipotentiaries formally authorised to conclude international conventions or similar instruments. At the same time, this also does not mean that the delegates will not be expected to come to the Conference authorised to make decisions and undertake obligations on certain questions on behalf of their governments. During the Council's deliberations, other preparatory meetings were announced, not under the auspices of UNCTAD, but by the governments concerned.

Algiers Declaration

Thus, 86 developing countries—(known as the Group of 77 because originally 77 Governments signed in 1964 a joint Declaration of developing countries)—met in Algiers from October 10 to 24, 1967, to arrive at a common strategy to the second UNCTAD. The charter signed at the Palais Des Nations outside Algiers, was officially dated October 24 to coincide with the 22nd anniversary of the Charter of San Francisco which founded the United Nations.

The recommendations of this charter include:

- (i) Commitment of one per cent of their gross national product by developed countries for economic assistance to developing countries.
- (ii) Transformation of the World Bank into a development bank lending exclusively to developing countries.
- (iii) Ending of aid tied to purchases from the donor countries.
- (iv) Establishment of an international supplementary financing system to meet unexpected shortfalls in

export earnings of developing countries.

- (v) Tariff-free and unrestricted entry of manufactured and semi-manufactured goods from developing countries into developed countries.
- (vi) Setting up of a joint UNCTAD-GATT centre to promote trade between developing and developed countries.
- (vii) Conclusion of international agreements for cocoa and sugar by the beginning of 1968 and in course of time for a wide range of other primary commodities.

A demand aimed at the socialist countries is that they should link their credit for industrial development to a system of payment in kind from the products of the industries thus developed.

India's Effort

The active and constructive rôle of India's representatives in various UNCTAD commissions and committees goes a long way in synthesising the point of view of different groups and in helping evolution of workable concepts and acceptable formulations. India has been keen to see the machinery of UNCTAD used as a useful device on the pattern of OECD and GATT. The members of OECD and GATT have greatly succeeded in utilising the techniques of negotiations and consultation for achieving a remarkable expansion in trade exchange. India has all along been keen to build into the machinery of UNCTAD those devices which have enabled industrial nations to act in concert.

In Algiers, the Committee on Financing and flow of capital resources with India's Ambassador to Belgium and to the Common Market, T. Swaminathan, in the Chair, evolved a consensus on a proposal which when implemented will convert the International Bank of Reconstruction and Development into a purely 'development bank'. This Committee also envisages lowering of interest on loans to developing countries,

longer repayment periods and interest equalization fund. Another significant recommendation, in the context of recent trends exemplified by Indian experience, is the call to international lending agencies not to discriminate in the provision of financial assistance for industrial development against the public and in favour of the private sectors within a country.

In the Commodities' Committee, the Indian representative highlighted convergent points on issues relating to commodities with particular emphasis on the developed countries undertaking definite commitments on access of primary commodities into their markets and the importance of consultation and cooperation among the developing countries to defend and improve their income-terms of trade by harmonising their sales practices and policies. In the Manufactures Committee, the Indian delegate played a leading role in bringing about a common position of the 'Seventy-Seven' on the important question of preferences in favour of the developing countries. Quite often India has taken the initiative for forging a unified front by subordinating her own interests only for the common good of all.

Muted Hopes

However, hopes with regard to the second full session of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development have to be somewhat muted because of memories of what happened the first time. It is quite possible that this time leaders representing some of the West European countries may adopt apologetic attitudes since their own economies are in bad shape. For instance, West Germany has been confronting serious economic problems for the last couple of years. Germany also broods over its place in central Europe. For the United Kingdom, the devaluation of the pound sterling in November last was not caused by any bankers' ramp, or wickedness by speculators, or even any sudden upsurge in either the incompetence or the revived commonsense of Wilson's administration. Britain's share of the world

trade in manufacturing has diminished year by year, and the country has been living from one month's trade figures to the next. It was the inexorable pressure of facts alone that led to the devaluation of the British currency.

The Americans, bogged down in Vietnam, frustrated in the search for face-saving solutions, may long for the old disengagement and for a La Follette purity which puts reform at home above entanglements elsewhere. According to some observers, the general mood in the West is beginning to be disturbingly reminiscent of the mood at the end of the 1920s, when the age of the Locarno vision died with Stressmann and the myopic age of Poincaré began. Eyes are turned inwards. But super-power politics characterises some 'Zero-sum' elements. In a 'Zero-sum' game, whatever one player gains the other must lose, and in the contemporary world politics there are only two top players—the United States and the Soviet Union.

Generalised Preferences

What is giving ground for some encouragement is that within the U.S. Government, there has been a searching examination of a variety of policies, some of which would scarcely have been considered a few years ago. For instance, at UNCTAD 1, all the developing countries unanimously supported the idea of tariff preferences, but the United States firmly opposed it despite the official American policy against generalised preferences. However, in April 1967, President Johnson announced at Punta del Este the official American conversion to generalised preferences. Since then hopes had grown that a scheme might be worked out whereby all the rich countries of the world would give preferential tariff treatment to the manufactured and semi-manufactured exports of the developing countries. But the annual ministerial meeting of 21 OECD member countries held towards the end of November last at the Chateau de la Muette, in Paris, left a bitter after-taste. In the event, the ministers were so preoccupied by

British economic problems that they had little time to evolve a common approach to the forthcoming UNCTAD Conference. A working group report on generalised preferences was adopted as the guide line for New Delhi, but there was no ministerial discussion to find a line through the all-important points which the working group report is understood to have raised without supplying answers. It is on details that the ranks of rich countries remain dangerously split, although they have accepted the idea that generalised preferences are a good thing.

Supplementary Financing

Another field in which there is ground for hope is that of supplementary financing. This is an Anglo-Swedish proposal from UNCTAD 1 that a separate aid fund be set up under the aegis of the World Bank. Its purpose would be to bail out approved development projects which run into trouble through unforeseen shortfalls of export earnings, after the specifically short-term resort to IMF compensatory finance had been exhausted. However, the final success of this scheme depends upon the description of the disciplines implicit in the scheme which an applicant will be required to observe.

There has been also slow but marked progress since the first UNCTAD on commodity agreements. Several other suggestions are being studied and formulated by international organisations such as the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade.

Let us hope that during the 'New Delhi Round' rigid ideological positions on the side of both developed and developing countries would give way to a more receptive pragmatism in order to devise a working strategy for world-wide growth and hence for human survival. True, the problems are tougher, the perspective longer, the facts more complicated. But the stakes are as great as the future of mankind.

Possibilities

SUDHIR MULJI

THE need for a new world conference on trade and development became apparent when it was realised that under existing international trade policies and monetary arrangements, poorer countries would neither be able to earn nor borrow sufficient external resources for their development requirements. Post-war trade and

monetary arrangements were incorporated in three international agreements, two signed at Bretton Woods creating the International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and the third, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, grew out of tariff negotiations held in Geneva. It was hoped

that the Fund, the Bank and G.A.T.T. would provide the free world with both the resources and the rules for orderly expansion of international trade and investment, under conditions of stable exchange rates and growth. The institutions had complementary roles. The Fund was furnished with resources to help short term balance of payments deficits of its members whilst the Bank was to make available long-term capital for post-war reconstruction and development; the G.A.T.T. was to promote free trade by providing a forum for negotiating tariff reductions on a reciprocal basis.

The Failure

Unfortunately, however, so far as the developing countries were concerned this restriction-free, multilateral scheme never worked. Its success depended on the ability of countries to make rapid readjustments in their economy to correct any imbalance in their external accounts: it therefore presupposed that each country had the capacity—provided the will was there—to sell goods abroad. The imbalances the system provided for were of short-term and strictly limited nature: a country might run into temporary difficulties for international payments, the Fund would furnish the resources; a country might try to take advantage of the free trade system by imposing unilateral tariffs—G.A.T.T. could prevent that. A country's potential might be currently impaired by war damage or underdevelopment, the Bank would provide the investment.

No allowance was made, however, nor any mechanism devised to counter a situation of fundamental and continuous imbalance in the external account of a country, created by the structural inability of an economy to produce the right kind of goods. No system was devised by which a nation starting with a lower industrial base could be given sufficient resources and time to narrow the gap between itself and the rest of the world.

The monetary system envisaged at Bretton Woods might have suc-

ceeded if the resources of the Bank and the Fund had been ample; as it was, whenever a fundamental disequilibrium arose, the system had to be bolstered up by additional loans and grants outside the agreement. It is important to see how inadequate the system has been. Over 90 per cent of the total loans and grants given by countries to each other since the last war have been outside these multilateral agreements. Whilst much praise has been lavished on the role of the Fund and the Bank in acting as the catalyst for raising these loans, this does not alter the fundamental defect in the system. As any borrower knows, it is one thing to approach one's banker for a loan and quite another for the banker to have to approach his principal shareholders to furnish the resources.

Disadvantageous Equality

As for G.A.T.T., the principle of reciprocity which it had adopted assumed an equality among nations which just did not exist. Bargaining can only be mutually advantageous if both parties have something to give, but right from the beginning the bargaining strength of poor countries was shorn by having to sue for concessions, first to protect their infant industries, then to protect their agricultural and industrial exports. Their power, if any, lay in their unimportance; concessions could be given to them in areas where their exports made no significant impact, but as soon as their exports started to compete, quantitative restrictions were placed with impunity. The restricting advanced countries knew that the developing countries had nothing to retaliate with. They had already been forced to restrict their imports so there was nothing further that they could do. Whatever they imported was in any case absolutely essential for them.

The fundamental weakness of the entire multilateral system was that free and fair competition and its counterpart, free and fair bargaining in international trade, offered insufficient protection to

economically weaker countries. This is not to say that a better system was possible in a world where international co-operation was still very frail, but it might have been wiser if developing countries had refrained from endorsing their support to a monetary system which lacked the resources to solve their problem. It only delayed the creation of an organisation like UNCTAD which could represent them more effectively.

Narrowing the Gap

The basic problem of the developing countries was to narrow the gap which the industrial revolution created between the rich and the poor. To do this they themselves had to industrialise and, if the process was to be speeded up, they needed to purchase the technology and equipment produced by richer nations. In exchange they could only offer primary goods—raw materials, foodstuffs and fuel. Those poorer countries that were richly endowed with fuel had no exchange problem. They were able to sell enough of their products to richer nations whose industries needed this new source of energy, but those countries which were not so happily endowed, particularly the poorer countries of South-East Asia and Latin America, were unable to earn enough exchange to pay for their needs.

Their difficulties arose out of the fundamental fact that the base of their exports was too narrow; they depended heavily on being able to sell raw materials and crude foodstuffs, the exports of both of which were adversely affected by the fact that the demand for these goods rose very slowly and their prices tended to fall. Demand rose slowly, partly because new technology tended to replace raw materials by cheaper synthetic products and partly because the rate of increase in consumption of crude foodstuffs did not rise proportionately to income. If food is the prime necessity of man, there is also a limit to the amount he can consume.

The demand for these products rose slowly, but technology helped

to raise supply rapidly with the result that the price per unit of primary products as a whole fell. During the period between 1959 to 1966, for example, the world average price of primary products was lower by two per cent than the price prevailing in 1958. This would not have mattered much if the price of manufactured goods had similarly fallen, but during the same period the world average price of manufactured goods rose by three per cent over 1958 levels. Therefore, on an average, between 1959-66, primary commodity exporters had to pay five per cent more to import the same amount of manufactures than they would have had to pay in 1958.

Since even in 1965, primary products constituted 84 per cent of the exports of developing nations and manufactured goods 66 per cent of their imports, the effect of this price movement was disastrous to their balance of trade. Nor was this all; between 1961 and 1965, world trade grew at an average rate just below 7 per cent per annum, but the growth of primary products was about half as fast as manufactured goods. During this period, total exports of primary products grew from \$58 billion to \$73 billion, an average increase of about 4.5 per cent per annum; on the other hand, manufactured goods in the same period rose by over 8 per cent per annum from \$74 billion to \$110 billion.

Oil Benefits

Even this does not tell the whole story. Among developing countries, whilst exports of primary products rose at slightly over the world average of 4.5 per cent per annum, the largest benefit of this growth went to the oil rich countries. The export of petroleum products rose by an annual average rate of over 7 per cent whilst the exports of the remaining primary products rose at below 4 per cent per annum. This uneven distribution of benefit is all the more striking when it is realised that oil producing countries with 4 per cent of the developing countries population exported 31 per cent of the total exports from developing countries

whilst the remaining 96 per cent exported only 69 per cent of the total exports.

Growing Imbalance

The overall picture then was one of growing imbalance between the rich and the poor and among the poor, the richer poor and the poorer poor. The result was that between 1952 and 1964, whilst exports from industrial nations rose by 175 per cent, exports from developing countries (excluding petroleum) rose by only 32 per cent, in absolute terms in 1952 the industrialised countries exported \$46.2 billion against the developing countries export of \$19.1 billion (excluding petroleum). In other words, the industrialised nations exports were 2½ times those of developing countries (excluding petroleum exporting countries). By 1965, however, the developed countries exports rose to \$128 billion or 5 times more than the exports of developing countries which went up to 25 billion dollars only.

The consequence of this unyielding trade pattern was inevitable. The developing countries share of world trade steadily fell and their balance of payments on current account started showing large deficits. In the early years, these deficits could and were financed out of accumulated war resources, but by 1959 the tempo of development and the adverse trend for primary producers in international trade combined to increase their deficits on current account to over \$5 billion. The reserves were rapidly drained away and the developing economies were faced with a choice of four alternatives: (1) reduce their rate of growth, (2) reduce their reliance on imports, (3) increase their exports of goods and services or (4) hope that the industrialised nations would foot the bill for their development.

The first alternative was politically unacceptable both nationally and internationally. Indeed, the United Nations had in 1961 designated the sixties as the Development Decade and resolved that each under-developed country

should set a growth target 'taking as the objective a minimum annual rate of 5 per cent'. Looking to the needs of the poorer countries, this was not an over-ambitious target particularly since their population was growing at the rate of 2.4 per cent per annum. It was estimated that if population trends continued at that rate, even with a five per cent growth rate it would take developing nations eighty years to reach the current per capita average of western Europe and a hundred and twenty years to reach that of the U.S.A. Even so, the developing countries, faced as they were with a shortage of external resources, had no choice in the matter but to reduce their rate of growth. Their annual increase in gross domestic product (including petroleum exporting countries) went down from 4.9 per cent between 1950-55, to 4.5 per cent from 1955-60 and 4 per cent from 1960-64; correspondingly their per capita increase dropped from 2.8 per cent to 2.1 per cent and 1.5 per cent.

The second alternative—that of reducing their reliance on imports—was also tried by developing nations. Their annual import increases slowed down from 4.8 per cent in the fifties to less than 2 per cent in the sixties, partly through the introduction of stricter import controls and partly by increasing local substitutes; but for most developing nations there was a limit below which they could not reduce their imports because their nascent industries were not flexible enough to give scope for switching rapidly from imports to locally produced goods. Secondly, foreign capital represented additional savings for investment which could not be raised from internal sources without lowering consumption standards below the sub-minimal levels at which they already were. It was therefore clear that the deficits could be financed only by (a) increasing exports and (b) by raising the volume of aid.

Aid

In the face of structural difficulties, increasing exports proved to

be difficult, so they tried to borrow. The magnitude of their demand, however, soon exhausted their limited quotas from international institutions, nor were they able to obtain credits from private sources; increasingly therefore they were forced to ask for government to government loans on a bilateral basis, the availability of which depended on public opinion in donor countries.

Initially, enthusiasm for giving aid ran high in these nations; the success of Marshall Aid to western Europe and the importance of maintaining the balance in the cold war encouraged the industrialised nations to hope that their generosity would be well rewarded, the volume of aid therefore rose to an annual sum of over \$5 billion between 1959 to a peak of about \$6 billion in 1962. But gradually the dismal picture of constant economic crises and the increasing realisation that no economic miracle like the resurgence of Europe was round the corner led to public apathy and boredom with regard to the problems of developing countries. Nor were these loans particularly popular among developing nations, many of whom had recently freed themselves from foreign domination and looked with great suspicion at aid. By the time they had politically reconciled themselves to borrow, the burden of servicing these debts had reached substantial proportions and once again doubts this time on the economic front emerged.

The Realisation

On both sides, therefore, the realisation grew that without a radical change in trade policies there could be no reasonable solution to the developing countries' problems. The need for a change was particularly important to those countries who had to slow down their rate of growth and this culminated into a decision to call the first UNCTAD.

The magnitude of the problem as the first UNCTAD saw it can be

indicated by the following facts and figures. In 1961 the combined balance of payments deficit on current account of all developing countries (including petroleum exporting countries) was running around \$5 billion. If these countries were to achieve a rate of growth of five per cent per annum, as recommended by the United Nations, their imports were calculated to rise by 6 per cent per annum, and on that basis it was estimated that the balance of payments gap would have risen to \$20 billion by 1970. Professor Kaldor carried the arithmetical exercise further to show that if the assumptions continued to hold, the gap would be \$57 billion by 1980 and the total cumulative deficit would rise to \$1,366 billion by 2000 A.D.! The estimates were only potential; there was no prospect of being able to finance such a large deficit; the developing countries were, therefore, forced to reduce the potential gap by lowering their rate of growth.

Possibilities

What can the second UNCTAD do to improve the situation? So far the Conference and its Secretariat have concentrated their efforts in trying to persuade the Developed Market Economies to remove tariffs and barriers on imports from all developing countries. Much has been done in this direction; the principle of reciprocity has finally been dropped so far as the poorer countries are concerned; it has been recognised that concessions must be extended to them even if they are not able to lower their tariffs. However, no substantial break-through, no radical change has taken place to give the Conference a hope for imminent success.

The fact of the matter is that for a fundamental break-through in export earnings of developing nations, advanced countries who purchase 90 per cent of poorer countries' total exports would have to import more primary products. If petroleum is excluded, exports in 1965 from developing countries

to developed market economies consisted of 41 per cent foodstuffs and beverages, 35 per cent raw materials and 24 per cent manufactures. Since 1960, exports of manufactures have risen from 20 per cent of the total to 24 per cent, whilst raw materials have declined from 39 per cent to 35 per cent. If this trend continues, perhaps any concessions that developed countries make in the import of manufactures will help in the future. Presently, however, the intractable problem remains that over 76 per cent of the exports to developed countries are comprised of primary products. The export of these could only go up substantially if industrialised nations were either prepared (1) to penalise new technological inventions which substitute natural raw materials or (2) dismantle protection to local agriculture. Neither, however, have the slightest chance of being acceptable to those countries.

The social desire and political importance of protecting local agriculture is deep-rooted in most countries and no less so in richer ones. Free competition if it means displacing local farmers will never be accepted. This view was succinctly expressed by Baumgartner, the French Economic Minister, when he told G.A.T.T. in 1961: 'We must be realistic and recognise that, for all the goodwill we all of us display, the rules of free competition cannot be applied to agricultural products . . . for obvious social reasons we cannot agree to allow the freeplay of market mechanisms'. As for raw materials, it is unrealistic to expect in an age of technological excitement that industrial nations would deliberately restrict technical advance for the sake of protecting a poor nation's income.

Meagre Concessions

After the first UNCTAD, great hopes were placed that substantial concessions would be given to developing countries during the Kennedy Round negotiations. This was the sixth tariff cut negotiations since 1947 when G.A.T.T. was set up. Whilst it resulted in the largest

tariff cuts made in the history of G.A.T.T., the exports of developing countries did not fare too well. Wyndhan White, Director-General of G.A.T.T. summarised the results, as follows:

'The industrialised countries participating in the Kennedy Round made duty reductions on 70 per cent of their dutiable imports, excluding cereals, meat and dairy products. . . . The duty reductions affected various sectors differently, being most extensive in the field of chemicals, pulp and paper, machinery, transport equipment and precision instruments, raw materials other than fuels and agricultural raw materials, base metals and miscellaneous manufactures. Both the depth of the cuts and the range of items affected were below the average in the case of agricultural products, textiles and clothing, iron and steel, tropical products and fuels.'

Since agricultural products, textiles and clothing, iron and steel, tropical products and fuels also represent a large portion of total exports of developing countries, this can hardly be considered a hopeful sign for concessions from the market economies.

Origin and Limitations

In assessing various possibilities open to the Conference, it is important to start by recognising its origin and its limitations. It was called at the initiative of the socialist bloc who, having abstained from signing the post-war agreements, brought considerable pressure during the fifties to convene a Conference on World Trade. Nothing came of it until the developing countries added their voice to that of the Soviet Union and somehow managed to persuade a reluctant West to participate. Although it was supposed to be a Conference on World Trade, it has shown no interest in the trade between the advanced countries nor has it been particularly concerned with trade between western nations and the socialist bloc. Its primary and almost only con-

cern has been the trade of developing countries who control less than 20 per cent of world exports.

It is not, therefore, surprising that its support is only from poorer nations: both the other groups are reluctant partners in a venture which they think will give them little benefit. The first UNCTAD saw two distinct trends—firstly, the emerging nations stood united and through their numbers managed to pass many resolutions against the combined opposition of both the advanced countries and the socialist countries; secondly, the pressure group that the poorer countries formed was effective to the extent that the world has become increasingly conscious of the need to ensure that poorer countries share in their prosperity.

Equally, however, it must be realised that UNCTAD is recognised for what it is—a pressure group for poorer countries and a forum of confrontation between the developed and developing world. The Conference is not a mandatory agreement whose resolutions are binding on all participants; it can easily be ignored, and its effectiveness as a pressure group could easily dissolve if the unity that developing nations showed at the first Conference is not maintained. There are already signs of cracks in this unity particularly between those poorer countries who already enjoy special preferences in trade and those who want them generalised.

Chances of Success

The success of the Conference will depend (a) on its ability to maintain the pressure on the advanced and socialist nations and (b) on its realism in pressing in those directions where it can get concessions; yet it must not fall into the trap of asking far too little. What it must do is to ask for those concessions which would not disturb the internal social and political balance in the other groups, yet ensure that those concessions are large. On this assessment, pressure might be exerted in three directions; (1) in trade, the socialist countries must be persuaded out

of their shell. (2) In aid; the advanced countries must be shamed into making large concessions. (3) In overall re-alignment of trade and aid, the IMF and the World Bank must be reminded to wear Joseph's multi-coloured coat which Keynes had hoped some fairy would bless them with at their birth. They must be made conscious of the fact that the world which they represent does not consist of creditor nations only.

This is not to imply that the developed market economies are either ungenerous or unwilling to help poorer countries. In one way or the other, most developing countries have been able during the last ten years to obtain important preferential arrangements from their principal purchasers in the developed economies, but it would be folly to expect the richer nations to adopt changes of such magnitude that it would disturb their trading pattern or their internal economy. The most likely concession that can be hoped for at the second UNCTAD from the western nations is the introduction of full Kennedy Round concessions on imports from poorer countries immediately and not over five years. This could be of great benefit to the export of manufactures provided it is not undermined by quantitative restrictions, but since the bulk of the purchases of developed market economies consist of the exports of developing primary commodities, the failure to obtain from them substantial concessions on these products would obviously be serious. It would however be a pity if the second conference followed the custom of the Roman women and beat their breasts in vain at their loss.

The Socialist Countries

In 1965 only 7 per cent of the developing countries' total exports were bought by the Soviet bloc. The proportion is low but it need not be discouraging. Indeed, it is because they buy so little that the maximum possibilities of increasing trade may be in this direction. In order to look at this matter in proper perspective it is necessary

to forget projections and percentages for the time being and concentrate on the political and economic possibilities of increasing trade with the socialist countries.

It has been estimated that the Soviet Union and the Eastern European countries control 30 per cent of the industrial output of the world as against about 60 per cent by the developed market economies. Roughly, therefore, their control of industrial output is half that of richer countries. If, suppose, tomorrow they decided to step up their trade with developing countries in proportion to their output, they would be purchasing \$13 billion dollars worth from the developing countries—a seven-fold increase on their current purchases. If this 'miracle' took place, the developing countries' exports would increase overnight by 35 per cent; if the miracle went further and they continued to purchase much the same kind of goods as they do today—conspicuous in their absence for petroleum products—a step-up in trade of this magnitude would mean for the really poor countries an increase in exports by 50 per cent.

Realistic Possibilities

Enough of miracles, or we may get dizzy with success; let us return to possibilities. The first point to make is that the socialist bloc—and the Soviet Union in particular—does have the capacity to increase the trade of poorer countries considerably. Secondly, at least according to Professor Balogh, it could be very much to her advantage, to go ahead on the miracle path. She has still a large rural population which might be better utilised in industry; she has the industries to export the kind of capital goods that poorer countries need and, most important, perhaps she has the political ambitions of a great power. All three make the Soviet Union and the socialist bloc potentially great trading partners. The question is only whether this source can be adequately tapped.

It is up to the Conference to decide on the best method of

sounding the Soviet Union, but it is possible that some criticism of her present policy may not be out of place. After all, the socialist bloc clamoured most for a new Conference and the time has surely come for it to make some effort towards its success. The Soviet delegates had announced in 1964 that they expected to increase their trade with developing countries up to \$10 billion each way by 1980. But 1980 is rather too far for the poorer countries; their balance of payments crisis will not allow for such long-term hopes. Something more immediate is required.

Multilateral Agencies

There is also an urgent need for UNCTAD to bring pressure on multilateral agencies, particularly the I.M.F., to revise the scope of its activities. The problem of world liquidity shortage is now widely acknowledged, but the size of the solution envisaged under the S.D.R. Scheme is too small. This is not the fault of those who run the Fund but of the creditor member countries. However, the problem is aggravated by frequent and misguided warnings from the I.M.F. against inflation and fiscal irresponsibility. Caution is of course desirable but it should be matched by some degree of idealism and imagination. The kind of insistent curbs that the Fund attaches to its loans would suggest that the Fund is less concerned with trade and development than it is with financial discipline.

Whatever may be the advantages of financial discipline for richer industrialised nations, the kind of restraints which the United Kingdom and, more recently, the United States have imposed because of their balance of payments difficulties can only spell disaster for developing countries, who depend to a large measure on a sustained boom in richer countries. It would, therefore, be a great pity if the current schemes for raising liquidity are restricted by a similar narrow outlook. The volume of world liquidity needs to go up

to a point where developed nations are not forced to slow down their rate of growth to meet balance of payments difficulties.

The problem is of some technical complexity and great controversy among the advanced countries, but there can be no controversy if proper weight is given to the difficulties of the poorer countries. It was one of the aims of the Fund agreement that it should contribute to the maintenance of a high level of employment and that aim is far from fulfilled if the level of unemployment in developing nations is taken into account. It may be that UNCTAD could do something in persuading the Fund that even the most liberal of current schemes will not suffice to satisfy the needs of poor countries. After all, the Secretariat of the Conference consists of international civil servants who may be able to influence those other international civil servants controlling the purse strings of the West.

External Aid

Finally, the Conference must take up the question of external aid. It may not be possible to obtain larger quanta of aid in the future but perhaps something could be done for loans already taken as well as improving the basis of future aid. The total debt of developing countries stood in 1965 at about \$33 billion and will have risen by now to over \$40 billion. Even at an average interest rate of 3 per cent, the service charge alone would come to about 1.2 billion dollars a year, or over five per cent of the total exports of developing countries (excluding petroleum). There have been urgent appeals from the poorer countries that those debts should be rescheduled but even if all debts are rescheduled to become payable over 50 years, the burden would rise beyond ten per cent of the exports of poorer countries.

It would be of great advantage if the Conference took up this issue and recommended not for resche-

duling these debts but for writing them off. There is no great merit in the present system of lending. The money is treated by richer countries as charity while the poorer countries look upon it as a necessary but additional burden. It is, therefore, doubly cursed; it robs the donor of his generosity and fails to give the recipient the intended relief. It is reported that the western nations are eager to make some concessions to the poorer countries at New Delhi; there could be no more dramatic or useful gesture on their part as to write off this \$40 billion. It is not as though it will affect their budgets. A large number of the loans have been given on a long-term basis over forty and fifty years; therefore, the contribution they will make to the balance of payments of richer countries is negligible.

Nor should future aid be given in the form of loans. There is no economic merit to it nor does it increase financial responsibility. The United Nations has adopted the resolution that donor countries should transfer one per cent of their G.N.P. to poorer countries; the target has not been achieved so far. There is no point in keeping a target above what donor countries are willing to give, that does not help anyone. It would, therefore, be better to reduce the target to 3/4 per cent of G.N.P. but to recommend that it be given purely in the form of grants. There may be some chance of this being accepted more easily—particularly if the suggestion came from the developing countries themselves.

Determination

Ultimately, however, no amount of aid or assistance will succeed unless the developing nations show a determination to help themselves. There is much that some of them can do even outside such obvious solutions as disarmament. For example, if the developed market economies do make concessions in manufactures it could give substantial opportunities to countries like India. Our trade is not primarily dependent on primary commodities, we only export about 26 per cent of them, but nor have

we been able to achieve substantial success in selling our manufactures.

The result has been an extraordinarily depressing export picture. During the fifties our exports were totally stagnant fluctuating mildly with slight flutters in the tea market. We did not really cash in on the Korean boom as did Malaya, nor did our exporters make a fortune in the Suez crisis. Even during the early sixties when all other developing areas benefited from the boom in Northern America and western Europe, our trade gap merely worsened. It makes one despair to read that between 1961 to 1965 Latin America, *excluding* petroleum exporting Venezuela, was able to eliminate its annual trade deficit from about \$1.1 billion to a surplus \$214 million, Africa *excluding* South Africa reduced its trade deficit from \$1.2 billion to \$70 million whilst South-East Asia with a colossal trade deficit of \$1.8 billion in 1960 increased the deficit to \$2.3 billion by 1965.

Only Hope

It must be realised by us at some point in the game that at the present rate we are just losing out. We are the last of a hopeless league and our only hope is to reorientate our trade policies so that we are competitive in the world and learn to sell our products. To be competitive is possible although the sacrifice may be great; it may involve a further devaluation and one that is sensible, i.e., not one that neutralises all the incentives of exporting by taking away the previous incentives. It may be possible with a multiple exchange rate system, or by compulsory exports, or whatever other method we choose, but the point to stress here is this: if the western nations do give a general preference for manufactures and semi-manufactures to developing countries, we could be the foremost beneficiaries provided we are willing to act and act fast to take advantage under the concessions and if we are not going to realise this, it may be worth UNCTAD's while pointing it out to us.

Basic issues

S. S. MEHTA

INTERNATIONAL economic relations on the eve of UNCTAD-II present a sorry spectacle. The rich countries are becoming richer and the poor poorer. It is a study in contrast between unprecedented affluence in some countries and extreme poverty in others. Even the U.N. Development Decade whose avowed object was to bridge the gulf that divides the rich North from the poor South has turned into a Decade of Disillusionment for the developing countries. The modest growth target of 5 per cent set for the developing countries has failed to materialise. The growth rates of the developed countries during the first seven years of the Development Decade, on the other hand, have been going up progressively. The per capita incomes of the developed countries have increased at the rate of \$66 per annum in the case of developing countries.

The trends in international trade are equally disheartening.

The share of developing countries in the total world export trade has declined from 32 per cent in 1950 to 19.3 per cent in 1966. The annual rate of growth of the developed countries' exports, on the other hand, has been much higher during the period under reference. The picture becomes still more depressing if one considers the increase in the value of exports of manufactures from the developing and the developed countries. The increase in the value of exports of the manufactures between 1954-56 for the developed countries has been estimated at \$65 billion against an increase of \$3 billion in the value of manufactures from developing countries.

Not only has the rate of increase in the value of exports from the developing countries been painfully slow, even the terms of trade of the exports effected have registered a continuous decline in the mid 1960's. One estimate puts the

annual loss in purchasing power of the developing countries exports at \$2½ billion. Thus, 50 per cent of the total amount which comes to developing countries by way of aid is neutralised by the fall in the purchasing power of their exports.

Deteriorating Position

Nor do international aid flows hold out any prospect of hope. The international financial transfers have declined and have barely touched 0.46 per cent of GNP of the developed countries in recent years. The loan terms are hardening, the maturities are becoming shorter and the debt servicing is becoming an enormous problem. If the present aid levels with their terms and conditions continue, the roles of the developed and developing countries will be reversed after 1975, and there will be a net transfer of resources from the latter to the former.

The widespread concern caused by continued deterioration in the economic position of the developing countries resulted in a series of decisions at the first UNCTAD designed to reverse these trends. Unfortunately, however, the developed countries have observed the decisions more in their breach in the post-UNCTAD years. No standstill, for example, has been observed by the advanced countries in granting protection to the agricultural commodities of interest to the developing countries. No new Commodity Agreements except on 'tin' have been concluded. Synthetic substitutes continue to proliferate in the developed countries despite the recommendations of the first UNCTAD. There has been no reduction in the heavy fiscal charges levied on products of export interest to the developing countries. Other tariff and non-tariff barriers continue to be imposed.

Very little progress has been in evidence on some other fronts. Relaxation in quota restrictions on natural products, for example, has not been achieved. The transfer to developing countries of credit balances held by the socialist

countries has not made much headway. Above all, very few developed countries come close to having achieved the target of providing 1 per cent of GNP by way of aid to the developing countries.

Specific Issues

It is in this context that the success of UNCTAD-II acquires an urgency. The second Conference must improve upon the performance of the first. The developing countries of the world have pinned great hopes on UNCTAD-II. There is already a broad agreement among most members of the International Community that the second Conference must go much beyond the level of discussions. UNCTAD-II must, therefore, concentrate on specific issues designed to achieve concrete results through detailed negotiations.

It need hardly be emphasised that only those areas will lend themselves to negotiations on which there is a fair measure of agreement between developing and the developed (including socialist) countries. Areas of agreement in short should be tackled first by UNCTAD-II. Areas of disagreement should be taken up for discussion only after decisions on negotiable issues have been taken. If it is not intended to suggest that the areas of disagreement represent less urgent issues especially for the developing world. However, since actual negotiations will depend on the evolution of a consensus about negotiable issues between the developing and the developed countries, even areas which have the highest urgency from the stand-point of developing countries may get excluded if those are not acceptable to the developed countries. Concentration of attention on specific issues mutually agreed upon between the developing and the developed countries at UNCTAD-II is likely to achieve the best results in the shortest possible time.

The developing countries have already come to a judgment about their priorities. These priorities are contained in the Charter of Algiers. This Charter reflects the common approach which the developing

countries are going to adopt at the New Delhi Conference. The Council of Ministers of the OECD met at Paris recently to evolve a common platform on behalf of the developed countries. The socialist countries have decided to meet in Moscow to plan their strategy for the Conference. It is difficult to say what exactly will be achieved by UNCTAD-II until the respective groups of developed countries reveal their negotiating positions. Judging from the progress of implementation of even the unanimous decisions of the first Conference and picking up the threads from the newspaper reports, it is possible to give some essentially tentative conclusions about the issues which are likely to emerge as negotiable.

Trade Policy

The issues likely to come up for the adoption of concrete solutions at the UNCTAD-II belong to the sphere of both trade and financial policies.

The most important issues under trade policy relate to access of the developing countries' primary exports to the markets of the developed countries and stabilisation of prices of primary commodities. It is now commonly agreed that these problems are best solved on a commodity by commodity basis. Enunciation of general formulas like those advocated at the first conference only delays the emergence of concrete solutions.

International commodity agreements/arrangements properly conceived and well executed have proved most useful in ensuring guaranteed access to advanced markets for pre-determined quantities of primaries and giving stability to prices of the primary commodities covered by such arrangements. Agreements have already been concluded on wheat, coffee, olive oil and tin. The bulk of the developing countries export trade is accounted for by ten to fifteen primary commodities. An important step towards solving the trade problems of developing countries would be to cover all these key commodities with such ar-

rangements. However, the conclusion of commodity agreements is not such an easy affair. It involves intricate, time consuming negotiations between the producing and consuming countries. The two commodities which appear to be ripe for negotiation at New Delhi include sugar and cocoa.

Vital Commodities

UNCTAD has conducted discussions on sugar for the last two years. No solution has been found so far because of the reluctance of the developed countries to abandon the policy of over-production of sugar hurting the export prospects of sugar from the developing countries in the process. If the developed countries were producing sugar competitively, one could understand their reluctance. The cost of production of sugar is much higher in advanced countries. The developing countries, on the other hand, can produce sugar at a comparatively lower cost. If the experience of the last two years is any guide, it may not be possible to persuade the developed countries to cut down their present production of sugar. However, if UNCTAD-II succeeds in making the developed countries agree to allocate a certain percentage of their total annual increment in consumption to imports of sugar from developing countries, it should be possible to negotiate the sugar agreement at New Delhi.

Another agreement which is ripe for conclusion at the UNCTAD-II is cocoa. It must be stated that any attempt to insist on total adherence to the formulas evolved at the first conference will result in a breakdown of negotiations. Even if an agreement on cocoa to the entire satisfaction of the developing countries cannot be concluded at New Delhi, pragmatism demands the acceptance of an arrangement which goes only some way in fulfilling the expectations of the developing world.

Another commodity which needs urgent attention at New Delhi is rubber. Burma, Cambodia, Ceylon, Indonesia, Malaysia, Thailand and South Viet Nam which account for 85 per cent of the world's total

production of natural rubber have suffered a loss of \$238 million in their exchange earnings in 1966-67 due to a sharp deterioration in rubber prices. The U.N. experts meeting under the aegis of UNCTAD in December 1967 to discuss the problem of rubber have declared that the fall in rubber prices is on account of factors beyond the control of producing countries like increasing production of synthetic rubber and recession in some advanced countries. In this context, the experts have called for the evolution of a code of fair marketing behaviour.

Rubber and cocoa ideally lend themselves to market intervention through buffer stocks. The employment of buffer stocks to bring about price stabilisation has been approved in principle by the international community. There is however no agreement on the arrangements for financing these buffer stocks. Lack of agreement on agencies required to finance buffer stocks is one of the main difficulties in the satisfactory conclusion of an agreement on cocoa. The offer of the International Monetary Fund in the last meeting of the UNCTAD Committee on Commodities has revived hope that the fund might do something to solve the problem. UNCTAD-II would have made its modest contribution if it succeeds in persuading the IMF to finance buffer stocks in at least cocoa and rubber to begin with.

International commodity agreements, however, make only a marginal contribution in tackling the question of access to advanced markets of the developing countries' exports. The major contribution of these agreements lies in bringing about a stabilisation of the primary commodity markets.

Tariff Barriers

Elimination of tariff and non-tariff barriers has a major role in widening access of the developing countries' exports to the markets of the developed countries. It will not be possible to persuade the developed countries to agree to a complete removal of tariff and non-tariff barriers, within a certain

specified period of time as the developing countries have demanded in the Charter of Algiers. The UNCTAD-II would have achieved enough if it secures the agreement of the developed countries to a New Delhi Round of supplementary negotiations to complete the work left incomplete in the Kennedy Round negotiations at Geneva.

As regards the access of manufactures and semi-manufactures to the markets of industrialised countries, the prospects of New Delhi coming to a decision on universal, non-discriminatory, non-reciprocal preferences are very bright. The Ministerial Council of the 21 nation Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development in its recent meeting in Paris has decided to offer preferential tariff treatment in their markets to exports of all finished and semi-finished products from all developing countries. The formal offer of preferential tariffs on behalf of OECD countries will be made at UNCTAD-II. The developing countries have demanded preferential entry for their manufactures and semi-manufactures for 20 years initially. The OECD offer, however, is limited to 10 years. The concession is hedged with familiar reservations to withdraw the preference in case domestic production is disrupted. In negotiating the safeguards, the developing countries should ensure that the purpose of preferences is not defeated by deliberate loopholes left in escape clauses.

Market Facilities

The offer of market facilities in the industrialised countries is not enough to tackle the problem of promoting exports of finished and semi-finished goods from the developing countries. Some developing countries are not in a position to export manufactures at all. UNCTAD-II must persuade international agencies like GATT, UNIDO and UNDP to agree to specific proposals for rendering collective help in the establishment and promotion of industries producing manufactures and semi-manufactures, if the OECD offer

is to be of real benefit to the developing countries.

Yet another factor that would help broader access for the developing countries' exports is the promotion of trade between the socialist and the developing countries. Efforts at New Delhi must be concentrated on securing from the socialist countries concessions equivalent in effect to those granted by the developed countries. Besides, UNCTAD-II should strive to secure an agreement of the socialist countries to a synchronization of their national and regional plans with the national production and export plans of the developing countries. The socialist countries would have made a lasting contribution to the trade promotion and economic development of developing countries if they announced their agreement in principle to such synchronization of mutual plans at New Delhi.

The Developing Countries

Finally, access for the developing countries' exports can be widened by expansion of trade among the developing countries themselves. The developing countries must take vigorous measures to expand trade among themselves through inter-regional, regional and sub-regional arrangements like the customs unions, free trade areas and other forms. The Latin American governments have already taken an important political decision to form a Latin American Common Market. Such movements are taking place in Asia and Africa with the full backing of the U.N. Secretariat. Plans for inter-regional, regional and sub-regional trade promotion and economic integration cannot succeed without financial and technical assistance from the developed countries. This assistance can be asked for only after the developing countries unfold their plans for regional, sub-regional and inter-regional integration at New Delhi.

For once, the initiative will be in the hands of the developing countries. It may be too much to hope that some concrete regional integration arrangements will be negotiated at UNCTAD-II. How-

ever, following a suggestion made by India at Algeria, it should not be difficult to get the developing countries to agree to build into UNCTAD some permanent devices which can take advantage of the proved methods of multilateral procedures such as consultation, confrontation, continuing negotiation, judgment by panels and reviews designed to forge closer trade relations among them. The OECD has managed to promote trade among its members through the use of these multilateral procedures without in the least compromising the sovereignty of the participating nations.

Financial Policies

Having done with the trade policies, let us look into negotiable issues in respect of financial policies. A revision of the aid target as suggested by a U.N. Expert Group is overdue. However, in an international climate that is steadily changing against aid, developed countries may not agree to an upward revision of 1 per cent of GNP to be devoted to aid. UNCTAD-II should be satisfied with a firm resolve of the developed countries to devote 1 per cent of their GNP to aid the net of amortisation and interest payments. If this 1 per cent of GNP as aid does materialise in the remaining three years, it certainly would be better compared to 0.46 per cent estimated to be the proportion of international transfers in the first seven years of the Development Decade. Developing countries at UNCTAD-II, however, must persuade the developed countries to agree to reach the target of 1 per cent of GNP as aid by a certain definite date. The Danish Parliament's decision to reach the 1 per cent target within a specified period could be emulated by other developed countries and offers to that effect could be made at New Delhi.

Some progress in the solution of other problems connected with aid is also possible at New Delhi. The developed countries are fully aware of the hard terms of aid, the difficulties resulting from tied aid and the mounting debt obligations which are beginning to

cause balance of payments crises in many developing countries.

As regards the hard terms and conditions of loans, the Development Assistance Committee of the OECD has addressed itself to this problem and recommended more concessional terms than prevailing at present. If it is not possible to extort more concessions, UNCTAD-II should at least make the developed countries agree to the application of concessional terms recommended by the DAC.

Agreement may not be possible on the elimination of tied aid. However, the developed countries could be made to agree to the implementation of steps suggested in the DAC Resolution of 1965 on Terms and Conditions of Aid Implementation of those recommendations would partially mitigate the harmful effect of tied aid.

Similarly, the repayments problem is bound to be discussed at UNCTAD-II. It involves the interests of both the borrowers and the lenders. There is a general agreement that the solution to the problem of debt repayments and servicing must be found on a case by case basis in forums like consortia and consultative groups. Some agreement in cooperation with IBRD on linking the terms of aid to a more accurate assessment of the debt servicing capacities of the developing countries is possible at New Delhi.

Compensatory Facility

Another issue which is ripe for a decision at New Delhi relates to supplementary financing. The idea was mooted in the first UNCTAD by the developing countries who depend on one or two primary commodities for the bulk of their exchange earnings. Their argument was that unexpected shortfalls in their exchange earnings endanger their development plans. Compensatory financing facility available with the IMF is not adequate to meet their exchange requirements. Hence the need for supplementary finance. The developing countries are unanimous on the need for supplementary financing. The developed countries,

however, have submitted three alternative proposals on the subject. UNCTAD-II should succeed in bringing the developed countries to agree to one of these alternative proposals with proper safeguards to protect the sovereignty of the developing countries.

Above all, the unfinished task of the Kennedy Round in respect of international food aid should be finished at New Delhi. The proposal made at the Kennedy Round is only a small step forward. The developing countries are going to face the prospect of acute shortage of foodstuffs in the seventies. If food aid is not forthcoming, the developing countries will have to direct their foreign exchange required for development for purchase of food-grains. The foodstuffs required are going to be considerably in excess of 4.5 million tons agreed to by the developed countries at the Kennedy Round.

New Delhi must persuade the international community to accept a much higher target figure in respect of food-grains. It has been decided to allocate multilateral food aid on a fixed percentage basis to all developing countries. The international community must be made to accept that multilateral food aid should be distributed only on the basis of population. The delicate matter of allocating food internationally cannot be decided on any other basis.

To conclude, the necessity of quickening the pace of development of the developing countries cannot be over-emphasised. The economic lot of more than a billion people is at stake. This segment of humanity is demanding high living standards. The International Community can deny them their due only at its peril. In a world where distance has been conquered, the developed countries cannot live in peace if their neighbours are destitute. Mere speeches and resolutions will not carry conviction with the representatives of the developing countries. The sincerity of the developed countries at New Delhi will be judged by concrete concessions in trade and aid.

Patterns and prospects

ASHOK GUHA

THE U.N. Conferences on Trade and Development have focused world attention on a crisis in the affairs of the underdeveloped countries of today. During the last two decades, they have been caught up in the world-wide craze for economic improvement. But as they have sought rapid growth, their import requirements have soared while their exports have stagnated. For most of the backward world, therefore, this has been an age of continuous balance of payments pressure; and as foreign exchange reserves have dwindled, a retardation of growth in many of these countries has become inevitable.

Opinion is sharply divided on the origins of this crisis. There is the school of thought which regards it as the product of factors beyond the control of the underdeveloped economies. According to this school, the crisis is the inevitable corollary of rigid import coefficients and inelastic export markets; it may be visualised as a bottleneck in precious foreign exchange for which no sacrifice of domestic resources, however large, can be an adequate substitute.

On the other hand, there are those who see in it primarily a crisis of ambition. They maintain that the underdeveloped countries of today aspire to rates of growth far in excess of what is warranted by their ability and will to save. This generates a chronic saving-investment gap which in turn is reflected in continuous trade deficits.

This difference in approach gives rise to a difference in policy prescriptions. Those who regard foreign

exchange as the crucial bottleneck advocate large-scale aid and unilateral trade concessions by advanced nations to the underdeveloped world. On the other hand, those who believe that the underlying problem is the saving-investment gap suggest that underdeveloped countries should step up resource mobilisation or scale plans down more exactly to the resources presently available.

Yet, of all the fruitless controversies which afflict growth economics at present, this is possibly the most sterile. A 'pure' foreign exchange bottleneck would imply the total exhaustion of opportunities for economising foreign exchange either through technical substitution in any industry or through the substitution in the output-mix of less import-intensive commodities for more. It also implies complete inelasticity of export earnings. Unless both these conditions hold, adequacy of savings will always guarantee payments equilibrium. It is never seriously contended that underdeveloped countries fulfil both conditions simultaneously.

At the same time, with export markets highly—if not completely—inelastic, an altogether disproportionate sacrifice of domestic resources would be needed to generate a given volume of foreign exchange. And, if substitutability between more and less import-intensive commodities and techniques is very imperfect—though not entirely absent—foreign exchange requirements can be reduced only at an enormous cost in output. Formally, the foreign exchange gap is still a saving-investment gap; but it owes its magnitude to the fact that domestic resources have to be transformed at deteriorating terms of trade into imports in meeting investment targets.

Historical Process

An analysis of the payments problems of underdeveloped countries either in terms of a foreign exchange bottleneck or in terms of a saving-investment gap alone would leave a major part of the story untold. It would shed no

light on the historical process that has produced the present crisis. It may, therefore, lead to policy prescriptions which run counter to the logic of events and are doomed as such to futility.

The central historical fact in this connection is that this is the century of western disengagement from the underdeveloped world. The recession of colonialism on the political plane has been accompanied—indeed, preceded—by the erosion of western economic interest in the less developed countries. Our role in the trade of advanced nations has contracted sharply; our share in their net capital exports has diminished despite the rising scale of governmental assistance in the 1950's.

Evolution of Technology

The economic withdrawal of the West is not just an accident of history. It reflects a phase in the evolution of technology which began in the latter half of the nineteenth century and is not yet complete. This phase was dominated by two major lines of development, both flowing logically out of previous technological history and both with far-reaching economic and political consequences. The first was the revolution in land transport. Up to the late nineteenth century, the oceans were the main highways of long distance transport, economic development everywhere was essentially littoral in character with maritime countries and areas exercising a dominant influence on the affairs of the world. The main trade networks spanned oceans rather than continents, linking distant lands in a cosmopolitan economy which formed the basis of the colonial system.

Since then, the major technical problems of communication over land have been solved. The interiors of great land-masses have been penetrated, explored and finally unified by the railroad, the motorized highway and the aeroplane. No such dramatic acceleration has occurred in ocean navigation. The profitability of inland commerce, therefore, has increased far faster than that

of overseas trade—especially the long distance trade between the developed and the underdeveloped worlds—which has accordingly dwindled in relative importance. On the political level, the old imperial order has decayed. The Pax Britannica has been replaced by the global economic and political dominance of the great continental powers.

If modern transport technology has transformed the international economy, research into the atomic and sub-atomic structure of matter has had equally pervasive effects. It has revealed the uniformities which underlie the apparent diversity of natural materials. And as man seeks to overcome his dependence on capricious nature, to widen his control over his environment, this revelation has given birth to the chemistry of synthetics. The spatial pattern of production of most natural products was once rigidly prescribed by climate, relief and geology. Today, as they are increasingly replaced by substitutes conjured up in the laboratory out of ubiquitous materials, the geographical basis of comparative advantage is melting away.

The advanced world, then, has in this century turned increasingly inward to achieve the continental unity warranted by the new transport technology and to develop its own hinterlands. It has been helped in this by the fact that it need no longer depend on the tropical countries for its 'exotic' products. The trade links between the advanced and the backward nations have accordingly loosened; the flow of private capital from the former to the latter has dried up. Since the colonial system was designed to protect this economic relationship and to organise it monopolistically for purposes of maximum exploitation, the economic incentives behind it have been undermined.

Rising Expectations

Along with the disengagement of the West, this century has witnessed a revolution of rising expectations in the underdeveloped world. This itself is a by-product of the old colonial order. The colonial system exposed the imme-

morial East to the intoxication of western ways of living and standards of consumption. It stirred thereby an emulative urge in underdeveloped peoples which has percolated from the urban and commercial groups steadily downward to the broad masses. This generated the resistance to colonial exploitation; after independence, it has made economic development a political necessity.

Now, development has two components in a backward society—an increase in life-expectancy and a rise in standards of living. Increases in longevity are easily achieved through the techniques of modern mass medicine. But with birth-rates stabilised by old social values and institutions, this fall in death-rates initiates a phase of intense population pressure. And the exploding population has to be maintained at rising per capita consumption levels. The hectic tempo of aggregate economic expansion which this requires exerts pressure on foreign trade in two distinct ways. First, in the absence of a domestic machine-building sector, an expansion of productive capacity may necessitate large imports of capital goods initially. Secondly, economic growth comes up sooner or later against natural resource scarcities, giving rise to a spurt of demand for primary imports, both of raw materials and of food. Scarcities appear sooner in densely populated countries since supplies here are more inelastic to begin with. This explains the rather uneven incidence of payments pressures on different developing countries. Thinly populated Thailand has yet to experience natural resource inelasticities; on the other hand, by selling its rice in a market booming under the impact of demands for food from other developing countries, it has accumulated a trade surplus.

Changed Conditions

However, for most of the underdeveloped world, the effects described above have tended to increase dependence on foreign trade precisely at the time when their major trading partners in the West are turning away from the

traditional division of labour. The consequences are deteriorating terms of trade for the underdeveloped countries, which impairs their capacity to save and so makes chronic trade deficit inevitable.

The moral of this brief excursion into history is that there are inexorable forces at work, disrupting the old patterns of international specialisation on the basis of geographic advantage and consequently the established economic relationships between the developed and the underdeveloped countries. Any attempt to revive the old relationship—or even a modified version of it—would be anachronistic and futile; to take it for granted would be a fatal error.

Doomed Expectations

Thus, expectations of large-scale economic aid from the advanced countries to the underdeveloped world are doomed, by and large, to disappointment. The tapering off of aid in the sixties is not just the handiwork of a few crusty old members of the U.S. Congress. It is a reflection of the growing mood of indifference towards the underdeveloped countries in the advanced West—a mood that arises from loss of economic interest in the traditional division of labour. For the same reason, demands for unilateral trade concessions by advanced countries to underdeveloped ones are unlikely to be any more successful than they have been in the past.

Less obvious is the fact that arrangements between the underdeveloped countries themselves to protect the established pattern of specialisation—while capable of yielding some transient benefits—may in the long run be just as futile. Commodity agreements to restrict output and raise prices of primary products are bound to give added impetus to the search for substitutes in developed countries. The first UNCTAD sought to define a class of primaries for which no substitutes exist today (tea, coffee, cocoa, bananas and tin). But even here there can be little doubt that one must reckon with potential competition, as the evolution of

new techniques and products is stimulated by price supports for the natural materials.

New Basis

Salvation for the underdeveloped world if at all possible—must lie in finding a new basis for the international division of labour. Geography counts for little today; but differing labour-capital proportions in different countries determine a pattern of comparative advantage which underdeveloped countries may fruitfully exploit. Indeed, international differences in standards of living are perpetuated barriers to labour mobility such as transport costs and immigration restrictions; so that the logical step for backward nations is to turn this to advantage. To pay for their irreducible requirements of machinery, materials and food, underdeveloped countries must aim at exporting increasing quantities of labour-intensive manufactures. Indeed, some less developed countries—notably Japan and Hong Kong—have already achieved substantial success through this path of development.

What would be the probable reaction of the advanced countries to such a new design for the international economy? According to the principles of international trade, this design would be of long run benefit to them too: it would release their resources from labour-intensive industries for employment in sectors where their relative efficiency is greater. But the old international order has left its legacy in the advanced countries no less than in the underdeveloped ones: strong groups with vested interests in the labour-intensive sectors of developed economies would oppose any liberalisation of labour-intensive imports. Another remnant of the old is the escalation of the duties on imports into the developed countries according to the degree of processing. It is improbable that the developed world can be induced unilaterally to dismantle this elaborate structure. Only by offering reciprocal concessions can the underdeveloped countries hope to gain admittance to deve-

loped markets for their labour-intensive manufactures.

The programme of action that emerges then is one of phased mutual reduction of tariffs by backward as well as advanced countries; concessions by underdeveloped countries would serve a dual purpose; they would constitute an inducement to the advanced nations and a moral pressure on them and they would also reallocate resources domestically in line with comparative costs. It is often claimed that such concessions by underdeveloped countries would make it impossible for them to nurse infant industries to maturity. But there is in fact no contradiction between our programme and infant industry protection. For, the essence of such protection is that it is temporary. As the infant industry approaches viability, the tariff can be scaled down without adverse repercussions. Judiciously phased tariff reductions thus are not only quite compatible with infant industry protection but indeed an integral part of it. The industry that needs a permanent tariff is the one that can never become competitive and is as such a waste of resources.

The only alternative for the underdeveloped world would be to resign itself to a spell of increasing isolation from the advanced West. The pattern of economic growth for the backward countries would then be one of autarky, modified, of course, by specialisations, between themselves. Growth under such conditions would require intense austerity—too intense indeed for democratic governments in poor countries. Further, given our inability to buy food and materials from the West, growth would be likely to precipitate a struggle among developing countries for monopolistic control over sources of food and raw materials within the area of backwardness. Both considerations would tend to foster dictatorial, chauvinistic and irredentist governments all over the underdeveloped world. That surely would be the primrose path to the everlasting bonfire.

Net gain

JAGDISH BHAGWATI

THE second UNCTAD conference meets in New Delhi this month against a rather dismal background. Four years have lapsed since the first conference in Geneva, when the less developed countries (LDC's) emerged as a viable and continuing force in international economic relations.

During this period, few of the expectations which were aroused have been fulfilled, nor has much progress taken place in practically any sphere of trade and aid.

Perhaps this was inevitable. Progress inevitably comes in driplets and it was naive to expect the affluent countries to bend to the will of the poor except over a decade or more. Nor can it be argued that the many claims made on the affluent countries, for reorganising the international economic system, were well thought-out or backed by adequate intellectual and empirical support.

Indeed, the unanimity of the LDC-bloc was mostly political and, as a cynic then described, owed partly to the fact that the only 'economics text' which most of the LDC delegations had read was that furnished by Dr. Prebisch in his report from the secretariat and it said things they liked! Even this unanimity has later been shown up to be somewhat tenuous when intra-LDC conflicts of interest as on the question of preferential trade areas and preferential entry into the western markets,

have become evident in the deliberations since Geneva.

Deteriorating Climate

Recently, the climate for any progressive action by the rich countries also seems to have deteriorated. Where aid seemed to be getting larger and softer, only a few years ago, we now have the sorry spectacle this year of a major regression in its volume and terms. The U.S. House of Representatives has only last month limited the aid appropriation to \$2.2 billion, which is nearly a billion short of what the President had cautiously asked for, and which is the lowest amount voted for so far in the history of U.S. aid. Moreover, this decline is calamitous when set against the facts that, with rising prices, the real worth of this aid is yet less and that, with repayments mounting on earlier aid, the net outflow of aid is still smaller.

Another symptom of the deterioration in the foreign aid prospects is the continuing difficulty over replenishment of the International Development Association (IDA) funds (of which, incidentally, India has been a principal beneficiary). Even when agreement is reached on the subscription levels of the major donors, this is not likely to be at anywhere like the level in the past. The continuing difficulties of the British with their balance of payments are also expected to result in a reduced outflow from that country.

At the same time, the trend recently has been towards increased source-tying of aid which restricts the sources on which aid can be spent and thereby reduces the real value of the aid. There are hardly any donor countries today which do not source-tie their aid. The primary motivation behind this practice has been the desire of countries in balance of payments deficits to make sure that the aid outflow is matched by export increases and this does not aggravate the payments deficit.

Thus, the United States has, since 1961, steadily increased the scope of tying until it is today quite comprehensive. Surplus countries such as Germany, on the other

hand, have also resorted to similar practices despite their comfortable balance of payments, largely because they have found it difficult to contain public criticism of their aid being used to finance orders from another country when that other country itself ties aid. Thus, both deficit and surplus countries have ended up tying aid on an increasing and now altogether considerable scale. The real costs of such tying have been estimated to be quite significant in practice. For Pakistan, for example, Haq has estimated the incremental cost of the source-tying of aid at around 14 per cent of the total aid inflow into Pakistan, and his estimate is very much on the low side.

Selected Issues

The second UNCTAD conference thus meets, in an important sense, at an appropriate time. Although the objective conditions for any major breakthrough are lacking at the moment, the time has come for exerting such moral and political suasion as can be mustered at such a meeting to reverse some of the trends by concerted action and to accelerate implementation in areas where the rich countries have been dragging their feet while expressing pious sentiments.

While the first UNCTAD conference had inevitably before it an enormous range of issues, and resolutions were adopted on every conceivable question in the field of trade and development, clearly the second UNCTAD conference will do well to concentrate, *in the main*, on a few principal questions where either the situation has worsened so as to require immediate spotlight or there is reasonable scope of early action. The time has passed for extensive resolution-mongering; selective exercise of intellectual and political pressure is now called for. I think that it will be worthwhile to focus on (1) the volume and terms of aid, including aid tying; (2) measures to counter the effects of instability in foreign trade and payments, including commodity agreements and expansion of international liquidity; (3) preferential entry for LDC exports into wes-

tern markets; and (4) trade liberalization among the LDC's.

Foreign Aid

Admittedly, the climate for stepping up aid flows is bleak. The Viet Nam war has accentuated the balance of payments difficulties of the U.S., culminating in recent measures such as restriction on U.S. private investments abroad. The slashing of foreign aid this year and future prospects are partly to be seen in the light of the austerity that such a situation will impose. There is also a general disillusionment with the efficacy of foreign aid, which has generally built up in the western world, fed by accounts of corruption in recipient countries, persistence in inefficient economic policies (e.g. Bell Mission on us) and the feeling that aid often gets frittered away in indirectly financing local wars (e.g. Pakistan and India).

It will therefore be quite a heroic effort to impress upon the rich countries the absolute necessity to put foreign aid programmes on their high-priority agenda. The Gaitskellite idea that each donor country should set aside 1 per cent of its national income for foreign aid is perhaps now a distant ideal, although it appeared close enough to reality only a few years ago. But definite commitments in this direction, including a phased programme of implementation, are what the LDC's should aim at. Since the prospects of getting such commitments immediately are extremely poor, there should be an attempt, at the very least, to get early commitments to ensure that no donor country *reduces* its overall aid flows below its best level in the last decade, measured in real terms. Since aid can also be 'watered down' by converting grants into loans and by making loans on stiffer terms, definite commitments by the rich nations must be sought in this area as well. Since the repayments on past debts have now begun to mount in several LDC's, until they even exceed the gross inflow of fresh aid in a few countries, conventions and commitments also need to be established to ensure that the aid

outflow, which is to be agreed upon as almost a contractual obligation, should be defined in net, rather than gross, terms.

Practical Measures

On the question of aid-tying by source, the acutely difficult U.S. situation makes it impossible to consider the possibility that all aid can be simultaneously untied by the donor countries. The preponderance of the U.S. in the aid flows makes it certain that such a move would accentuate her payments difficulties. But, short of such a utopian solution, there are numerous measures which the LDC's can aim for. I have discussed these at considerable length in a paper on the 'Tying of Aid' which the UNCTAD conference is scheduled to discuss [Item 12(6)(ii)] and will only confine myself to a few salient points here.

(i) There is a finite chance that simultaneous and progressive reduction in aid-tying by small but similar amounts by all donor countries may be acceptable. As I have argued in the UNCTAD paper: 'Aside from the merit this would have of concerted action and an explicit recognition of competitiveness in aid-tying, it should also be easier for surplus countries such as the Federal Republic of Germany to be able to convince their public that the remaining aid-tying by deficit countries such as the United States was "justified" because it reflected both the larger aid-flows and the deficit situation.'

(ii) If aid-tying were to continue, however, at significant levels, the donor countries could further be asked to conform to certain simple, but important, rules which would minimise the costs that aid-tying imposes on recipient countries. Among these rules would be the avoidance of joint tying by source and commodity specification (which increases the possibility of monopolistic exploitation by foreign suppliers), the encouragement of competitive tendering on tied projects, greater facility to the LDC's to programme their aid (so as to enable them to introduce competition among foreign suppliers,

despite tied aid, by credible threats to allocate projects to other tied sources if one tied source is exploitative), and greater price vigilance at the donor-country's end. Also, since source-tying implicitly amounts to making the LDC's pay the export subsidy required to make the aid-financed exports from the tied source competitive, it would be a fair thing to separate out an estimated sum of this excess cost and to show it directly, in the budget of the donor country, as export subsidy rather than aid.

This would have a two-fold advantage: (a) it would bring aid figures closer to their "true" value, a matter of some importance when public opinion has become increasingly critical of budgetary appropriations for aid; and (b) it would save the recipient country, *ceteris paribus*, interest payments as a proportion of the excess cost so netted out.'

Further, the donor countries could also open up 'swaps' under which, for example, French aid to Gabon could be swapped for United States aid to Guatemala, with source-tying equally offset and thus leaving *de jure* tying levels intact for each donor but increasing the competition possibilities in both Gabon (which is otherwise strictly geared to French aid) and Guatemala (which is otherwise dependent overwhelmingly on United States aid). Moreover, the donor countries could, more widely and systematically, adopt the practice of specifying the LDC's as possible sources of supply for aid-expenditure, thereby facilitating the export expansion of the LDC's.

Liquidity Situation

A greater willingness to move in this direction will, undoubtedly occur if the international liquidity situation improves, enabling countries such as the United States and the U.K. to breathe more freely about their balances of payments. Thus, the LDC's should put all their weight, at the UNCTAD conference, behind getting the ultimate acceptance of the SDR scheme for the creation of new international resources, whose implementation is still subject to veto

by the European Community. The French intransigence in this matter, inspired by the Gaullist hostility to the Anglo-Saxon world, is the primary (though not the only) stumbling block in this direction. But the very fact that continuous pressure has nearly brought the matter so far as near-acceptance, is itself indicative of what can be accomplished through international diplomacy.

Instability

The issue of international liquidity further links up with the general question of the instability of foreign exchange earnings which the primary-produce exporters among the LDC's have been concerned about.

While my own view in the matter of earnings instability is that its impact on the balance of payments should be met through provision of more international liquidity and its domestic impact through domestic stabilisation measures (which would be entirely within the province of each country acting on its own), there is a general feeling that the instability should itself be eliminated and that *commodity agreements* aimed at this should be the solution. Both economic argument and past history, however, seem to underline the fruitlessness of such an approach to the problem. The recent efforts at reaching a cocoa agreement are in character with what experience would indicate.

While it is going to be impossible to draw the focus away from commodity agreements, especially as so much emotional investment has been made in them earlier, it will be to the general interest of the LDC's if some of them manage to highlight the importance of additional liquidity to meet the payments problems created by the instability. In this connection, the Anglo-Swedish scheme, mooted at the first UNCTAD conference, to provide supplementary finance for LDC's whose developmental plans were jeopardised by shortfalls in projected export earnings, is also relevant. This scheme has made some, though not sufficient, head-

way and is a step in the right direction. Care needs to be exercised, however, to ensure that this scheme will provide truly supplementary finance and will not be offset by corresponding reductions in aid commitments by the donor countries. Also, since instability can arise from sources other than export fluctuations (e.g. from bunching in aid repayments or import needs), we would do well to raise this question now so that eventually the scheme can be expanded to cover these contingencies (which are incidentally of greater relevance to India).

In the matter of international trade, rather than aid and liquidity, the significant change now from the time of the first UNCTAD conference is the conversion of the influential, among the rich, countries to the notion of giving tariff preferences to the LDC's in the western markets.

It was hoped that it may be possible for the rich countries to agree upon a scheme to give generalized preferences to the LDC's, especially since the conversion of the United States publicly to such an idea at Punta del Este last April. But, again, disagreement has been only too compelling. The French preference for a selective approach and for market allocations, as also the problem of phasing out the current preferential arrangements within the Commonwealth and among the Six and their African associates, have proved to be among the serious obstacles.

It was again hoped that the tariff cuts under the recently concluded Kennedy Round, while of little economic interest to the LDC's, might be made applicable to the LDC's *earlier* than to other Gatt members: this would have made the principle of preferential entry an actual reality and set a precedent. But even these hopes seem to have been dashed.

Concrete Commitments

Thus, while there is indeed an important change in the public postures of the rich countries on the question of preferential entry for LDC's, anything concrete seems

still remote. But this is clearly an area where the UNCTAD conference can aim at more concrete commitments. A caveat for the LDC's, in this area, is to avoid plumping for selective preferences by region, e.g., U.S. preferences for Latin America and European preferences for Africa. Dr. Prebisch has always deprecated these tendencies on the unassailable political premise that they would tend to perpetuate colonial-type politico-economic groupings and that, further, they would tend to split the LDC-bloc, such as it is.

Trade Liberalization

The UNCTAD also must try to get attention focused on the measures necessary to initiate greater trade among the LDC's. It is increasingly realised that industrialization behind high tariff walls and import restrictions is unduly expensive and that, consistent with protecting industries against the rich countries, the LDC's could try to reduce the costs of given industrialization by permitting greater trade among themselves.

But while there is agreement on this point, there is disagreement on every other. I discovered this when I was member of an expert group at the UNCTAD in February 1966 which considered these questions and, after considerable disagreement, managed to write a report whose unanimity was obtained at the cost of making its recommendations practically innocuous. The main problem is that the semi-industrialized countries such as India want to make the trade liberalization universal among the LDC's whereas the vast majority would want the possibility of *smaller* groupings and measures to be accepted.

While there are many economic and political arguments to buttress the bloc-wide approach of India, this position is naturally suspected as motivated by India's economic self-interest now that she is eagerly exploring foreign markets for her manufactured products. The opposition to the Indian position, which the Gatt and much economic opinion favour, comes not merely from

the smaller countries of Africa and Asia who wish to be able to protect their infant industries against 'less underdeveloped' countries such as Pakistan, Brazil, India, Mexico and Argentina, but also from Latin America where the Latin American Free Trade Area is running into increasing difficulties (as evidenced by the latest breakdown of negotiations on tariff reductions at Montevideo) in its goal towards 100 per cent tariff elimination within the Area and would prefer to have Gatt formalise the possibility of less-than-100 per cent tariff cuts within the Area, which would therefore involve legitimating preferential tariff liberalization among a *sub-set* of LDC's.

Possible Pressure

As more LDC's seem to opt for discriminatory, small groupings, such as that among Pakistan, Iran and Turkey, the Indian position on the issue seems to have shifted in this matter. However, there is little evidence—and, in my opinion, fortunately so—that the rich countries are yet willing to go alone with any general endorsement of less-than-100 per cent preferential groupings among *sub-sets* of LDC's. It would, however, be important to get the rich countries to accept the general principle of trade liberalization, among LDC's *as a group*, which does not necessarily extend to the rich countries. It might even be worthwhile initiating concrete moves in this direction, at the UNCTAD conference itself, so that they may culminate in actual tariff cuts among the LDC's at some future date.

If anything concrete materializes in any of these areas at the UNCTAD conference, it will be a net gain. And, while the current atmosphere is somewhat gloomy, I think it is useful to remind ourselves that the UNCTAD now is a permanent forum for spotlighting issues of crucial interest to the LDC's and has undoubtedly succeeded in giving focus to their pressing problems, thereby making it impossible for the rich countries to ignore the poor. In the long run, this can only be beneficial and even significantly so, for the LDC's.

The basic approach

SAILEN GHOSH

IF Marx were alive, he would have been the first to point out that the basic reality in the world today is the international class war between the 'have' nations and the 'have-not' nations, to which all other class conflicts are subordinate. With the plethora of State controls and welfare measures in the so-called free economies and the growing recognition of the role of market mechanism in the socialist world, even the Great Divide between the two systems is narrowing down: the unmistakable trend is towards a closer approximation of economic institutions.

The very rapid but extremely uneven growth of technology, the increasing equalisation upwards in the richer nations, and the growing adverse terms of trade against the less developed countries as also the growing inequalities within the poorer nations have brought about this sharp division of nations into classes. Better food, better clothing, better housing, better health and education are all on one side; and the gulf between the two

classes of nations is steadily widening.

This growing distance in living standards in a shrinking world is not only bizarre but also a positive source of tension everywhere. Frustration in the poorer countries is leading to outbursts of violence; and an innate sense of guilt at having ignored the Christian teaching of universal brotherhood is producing the Hippies and the schizophrenics in the richer nations. To prevent the conflict from erupting into international violence, a conscious attempt is being made on a significant scale to harmonise the interests of the different classes of nations. UNCTAD is the most important agency for this endeavour.

Those who have followed the strenuous efforts and the hard bargaining over all these 20 years since the birth of GATT know how difficult it is to get the richer countries to agree to the stabilisation of primary commodity prices or to the reduction of tariff or non-tariff

barriers to products from developing countries. Agreements in respect of even those primary commodities about which there was unanimity in the first UNCTAD have not yet been concluded: substantial and *meaningful* reductions in duties have not been made and progress has not been achieved in dismantling the non-tariff barriers inconsistent with the provisions of GATT. The volume of aid is also declining and debt-servicing liabilities have mounted meanwhile. The less developed countries are in the deadly grip of a crisis closing in on them from all sides.

The Resistance

The richer countries know full well that this will reduce the demand for their manufactures, too, in the poorer countries who will have no means of payment. Reportedly, this has prompted the richer nations now to agree to a wide-ranging scheme of tariff preferences to the developing countries without asking for reciprocity or even insisting on exclusive arrangements with chosen groups of developing countries. This measure they have resisted for long on the plea that it is contrary to the 'Most Favoured Nations' clause of GATT: besides, where some tariff concessions were made, non-tariff barriers such as quota restrictions made nonsense of the concessions. If now it goes through, it will be the most tangible result so far.

The success of the scheme, however, must not be taken for granted. On the eve of the New Delhi conference, we must remind ourselves that even if the report of the rich countries' readiness now to allow preferences on a non-reciprocal, non-discriminating basis is correct, it will not be achieved without very great and sustained efforts during the conference. Nowhere has any privileged class given up privileges voluntarily. In another context, Dr. Raul Prebisch, Secretary General of UNCTAD, has given an illustration of this resistance. When the cocoa agreement, after great efforts and a demonstration of goodwill by all concerned, was on the point of becoming reality, a

world-renowned newspaper in the U.K. opposed it on the ground that the country's revenue of £1.6 m. would decrease or perhaps disappear altogether. Its concern was that those who operate on the Exchange would no longer be able to reap the benefits of price fluctuations—an advocacy which struck at the root of the concept of relative stability. Nearer home, we find Japan niggardly in giving tariff concessions. One has only to look to the long list of unrealized promises published in the document, 'The Charter of Algiers', circulated by the UNCTAD secretariat.

The experience of the IMF and IBRD meets at Rio de Janeiro has also left a bad taste in the mouth. The richer countries have been thinking only in terms of securing their political and economic advantages over others and seeking to use the developing countries only as pawns in such a game, without any consideration of the latter's genuine interests. Naturally, such a game provokes retaliatory demands from the affected rivals which make any arrangement difficult. Even if this cynical indifference of the richer countries, barring perhaps the U.S.A. among the countries of the West, has engendered in the poorer nations considerable scepticism, we must not forget that the modest results achieved from the Kennedy Round of talks constitute a basis for further efforts. Disappointment need not shatter our hopes. As we shall see later, the forces of history are working for a levelling up of all and no power on earth can stop this process.

Difficult Way

Disappointment sets in when we pitch our hopes in a high key and underestimate the enormity of the obstacles. We have a very long and difficult way to go. Assuming that the duties are reduced to zero, which is unlikely, we will still be left with the problem of manufactured goods at prices which, after addition of freight, will be competitive in the export market, that is, in countries continually improving their technologies. This involves questions of transfers of capital

and technology on terms which will put the developing countries on their feet.

To secure the richer nations' consent to these transfers on *really helpful terms* is an even more formidable task than winning trade concessions. Dr. Prebisch, in his address to the U.N. General Assembly on November 15, 1967, quoted a comment heard in Algeria, 'aid which does not aid countries to aid themselves is not aid, not cooperation'. Yet, the manner in which financial aid (i.e. credit) has been given could only lead to improving the donor countries' balance of payments. The tying of aid both to source and project was meant to make sure that the recipient places orders for equipments and services in the donor country, and to protect certain interests of the donor, both economic and political. Price mark-up ranging from 20 per cent to more than a hundred per cent on goods purchased out of source-tied aid has not been uncommon.

Horowitz Proposal

To soften the terms of capital transfer, an UNCTAD expert group has made an intensive study of a proposal (Horowitz Proposal) which envisages an international institution raising funds on national capital markets of developed countries on *normal commercial terms* but relending these funds through IDA to developing countries at lower rates of interest for a suggested period of 30 years. The difference between the cost of borrowing and the lower rate of interest on lending would be covered by an 'interest equalisation fund'. This fund would be obtained through budgetary allocations of the developed countries to IDA plus a portion of the net income of the World Bank.

Of course, there are difficulties in the way of working the proposal, particularly in backing the obligations of IDA. But the expert group came to the conclusion that IDA Part I members could offer 'several', if not 'joint and several', guarantees in appropriate proportions; and this depended entirely on the political will of the govern-

ments. Besides, 'there is a need to improve the functioning of capital markets in order to facilitate and increase the transfer of savings into long term investments. If such improvements take place, and if the vast institutional savings which flow into capital markets continue their annual rates of increase, it would be reasonable to assume that significant amounts of resources could be raised for re-lending to developing countries at low rates of interest'.

Technology

Technology being the root cause of the difference in the living standards of the rich and the poor nations, its transfer creates the hardest problem. The largest firms in the richer nations, in whose hands there is a heavy concentration of technical know-how, are afraid of setting up their competitors, inviting the loss of markets for their own goods, or at least depressing their prices. They would rather participate in the developing countries' domestic companies and control them from within by setting up, if necessary, some nationals of the host country as public relations men mis-called Directors.* They sell licences only when they are too busy elsewhere or want to create a foothold for themselves in the market where others have it but they have none.

Of course, these possessors of technical know-how have their problems. Research and development is a costly process: the firm investing the money is entitled to a reward, which is also the stimulus for further innovation.¹ Moreover, they cannot afford to forget the competitive situation. They would be willing to part with their know-how if the domestic firm also can offer some technology in exchange and strengthen their competitive position in the world market. This the firms of the developing countries mostly cannot offer. The training of engineers

and technicians in developing countries may cause a drain on their highly qualified manpower.

Possibly, these technical men also often do not like to stay in the underdeveloped countries where standards of education and health are not high; communication, facilities for travel and other amenities are undeveloped and the managerial capacity fails to inspire confidence. Also, in underdeveloped regions the firms attracting them will not easily develop such external economies as will create more opportunities for sale or investment.

The developing countries' problems are far more serious. They are in a vicious circle. They are having a falling share of which-ever they require more for starting development: at a later stage—savings, exports, technique, in fact, everything. They find that the advanced countries who talk of dissemination of science and technology, publish literature which contains much of general character but very little hard information. Circumstances have also so ordained that the poorer nations' scientists and engineers have to live in relative isolation.

A Suggestion

To meet this situation, the U.N. Industrial Development Organization has suggested the setting up of an International Technology Transfer Centre. The proposal, according to an UNCTAD paper contributed by C. H. G. Oldham, C. Freeman, and E. Turkan, envisages two ways of financing the technology transfers. The enterprise supplying the technology could be recompensed largely by payments from the agency, which would draw its funds from contributions mostly from richer countries and to a small extent from importing enterprises. Such a scheme, however, may run into rough weather because money from one donor country may be used to recompense an enterprise in another donor country.

Alternatively, the government of the country whose enterprise supplies the technology may pro-

vide the compensation directly. If a French technology, for example, was selected by the developing country, then, the French Government would compensate the French enterprise. The agency might also handle negotiations with State licensing organizations, such as "Lit sensintorg" in the U.S.S.R., when requested to by clients in developing countries or other developed countries. Its services would become of increasing value as it gained experience. Such an arrangement, apart from helping the developing countries acquire appropriate technologies at greatly reduced costs, would also help the innovating firms in donor countries to which the orders will be channelled. The idea is that the major burden will be borne by the taxpayers in the donor countries.

Unequal Partnership

Will the electorates in the richer countries agree to bear the burden? And why will they? What is the extent of their sacrifice involved? Even those countries which have shown sympathy for the underdog always find fault with the poorer nations for not doing things in the way they think best. Will they ever understand that the conditions in the developing countries are altogether different? These are the basic questions and they must be dealt with at a fundamental level by the developing countries themselves and by their well-wishers in the developed countries.

Fortunately for us, there is a deeper awareness today about the mutuality of interest of all peoples. But this harmony can be established only if the present state of unequal partnership is taken into full account. Its policy implications are clear: the weaker partner has to be given a helping hand in the interest of all: an approach based on reciprocity between the big and the small, the rich and the poor, is a self-defeating pursuit. Expositions by eminent thinkers of the serious inadequacies and certainly the conservative predilections of the earlier theories—particularly of the theory of international trade,

1. While accepting this valid point, we must point out that the patent system has introduced strong monopolistic elements in an already imperfect market.

*Although this is a slight overstatement, it is essentially correct.

the doctrines of stable equilibrium, free trade and free competition²—have started new thinking. The approach of the UNCTAD expert groups is in refreshing contrast to the trend of thinking that had dominated the experts of the League of Nations. (Of course, the inequalities then had not been as sharp).

The Logic

The interest of development of the poorer nations and the equalisation upwards of all humanity will best be served if the richer nations are aware of the very dissimilar conditions under which the other countries are now developing and the poorer nations realise that however desperate their conditions, they can lift themselves up by their own 'shoe-strings' and if both are aware that we are headed for a welfare world on pain of common destruction. To strive for a welfare world, the developed nations have to grow beyond their nation-States and practise a little more of internationalism, while the developing nations will have to rouse more of their national emotions and exploit them to the fullest advantage. In thus beneficially utilising the 'healthy, normal nationalist urges, the developing countries will have followed the same historical sequence as the developed nations did. This, in fact, is the logic of uneven development.

If we consciously accept this position, there will perhaps be less of international disintegration preceding world integration and less requirement of sacrifice on the others' part. Only those who do not understand this, shudder at the shadow of nationalism in less developed countries. Every country must have a basic urge, a dominant passion which will be the propelling force, the fountainhead of creativity. Without this stirring of the soul, the idea of developing science and technology is an empty dream. Similarly, in the developed country, it is only a commitment to internationalism

and concern for the welfare of the whole of mankind that can spur even more creative efforts, greater mastery over science, and also resolution of the crisis in their own souls. This should be the basic philosophy of UNCTAD.

The reason why the two different kinds of approaches in the two different classes of nations are necessary to achieve the common objective of one welfare world will be clear from a comparison of their respective conditions now, as also in the corresponding stage of development.

Increasing Inequality

During 1960-65, the economies of 55 developing countries for which data are available grew at an average annual rate of less than 5 per cent, or less than 1.5 per cent *per capita*. This brief statement conceals a whole range of facts which are inevitable in the situation: increasing inequalities, utter frustration, chaos and threat of disintegration. Meanwhile, in the richer countries there has been not only an automatic, accelerating ascent to newer levels of living but also a trend towards greater equality of opportunities; more and more social welfare measures are developing 'by their momentum as almost incidental to economic progress'.

Describing the situation, Professor Gunnar Myrdal says, "The need for 'reformers' has diminished as now the reforms come without the necessity to fight for them. The distributional conflicts have become minimised and their continuous gradual solution secured by the expected general rise in productions."³ He cites the example of Sweden building a new edifice of social security, a compulsory provident fund and pension scheme which guarantees all old people 'two-thirds of their earnings during the best fifteen years of their working life' in *real terms*. Through this redistributive reform, Sweden aims 'at eradicating what are almost the last remnants of class distinction between manual

workers and other employees of public and private enterprises.'⁴

The people of richer countries, therefore, assume that the type of 'free enterprise' and 'free international trade' which their forefathers had seen will also be good for the developing nations of today. When they do not find the developing nations willing, they blame the latter for their lot and feel that they are being asked to make a sacrifice which was avoidable. They also feel that to their present prosperity these backward nations had no contribution. This is the background to the hard bargaining in the GATT or UNCTAD.

Favourable Circumstances

Perhaps the fact of unequal status of nations is now so well-known that none attaches any great importance to assumptions such as 'free (and unaided) trade starts a movement towards income equalisation' or that 'the price system alone is the objective criterion for efficiency or economy.' The basic fact that needs to be grasped is that the richer countries had opportunities for a long and gradual development under exceptionally favourable circumstances. When they developed, the world economic system was homogenous although at different stages of maturity: the migration of capital and labour then took place in the most productive channels. Investment was undertaken to open up empty areas overseas for primary production. Repayment proceeded smoothly⁵ because at the same time the population of the creditor countries increased rapidly, creating demands for the commodities the production of which they had financed.

The world economic system has now disintegrated and the individual economic systems have developed such rigidity that free movement of capital is impossible; and if liberty was allowed, it would flow not to the most productive area (in the sense of maximum economic benefit) but to the most

2. Particular reference may be made of Thomas Balogh's *Unequal Partners* and Gunnar Myrdal's *Economic Theory and Underdeveloped Regions* and *Beyond the Welfare State*.

3. *Economic Theory and Underdeveloped Regions*, Page 60 in Vora & Co.'s Edition.

4. *Beyond the Welfare State*, Page 48 in Gerald Duckworth & Co's edition.

5. *Unequal Partners*, Vol. I by Thomas Balogh, p. 227.

developed country or region. With the virtual ban on emigration, rendered possible by labour-saving techniques, the movement of labour also has stopped. The only migration of humans that takes place is through the 'brain drain' (as distinct from drain of labour) which should never take place.

Double Standard Morality

It is a sad commentary on the international 'free economic system' that the world's richest country gets the greatest benefit of brains developed by the poorer countries at costs higher than the total of all economic aid. Since migration is selective, all gravitate towards the developed regions. Trade, market mechanism and all else favour the richer countries. This is exactly the reason why import restrictions, protection and other interferences with foreign trade are imperative for the developing nations. This is also the reason why Gunnar Myrdal says that 'there are good reasons for a "double standard morality" so far as international trade is concerned', and Thomas Balogh says that the entire economic system of a developing nation can be treated as an infant industry requiring protection. Need we add that even large concessions given to the poorer countries are not likely to tilt the balance in their favour?

The countries which had a head start, had also the opportunity to develop with a surrounding world of backward nations which they could exploit as markets for manufactured goods and also as sources of raw materials. But the developing nations of today do not find markets for their goods. The demand for their primary commodities is shrinking as synthetics are being increasingly used as raw materials in the richer countries. With the breakthrough of manufacturing techniques in agriculture and the transition of the developed West from a food-deficit to a food-surplus area, it is rather the richer nations that supply agricultural produce to many underdeveloped countries. It is because of the uncertainty of demand as well as prices of any product of a

developing nation that Professor Myrdal says that 'there are sound reasons why it may choose to produce at home things which it could import more cheaply or to export things at a loss to be covered by subsidy'.

Then, with the increasing imperfection of the market, return from investment is no longer a proper index of the productivity of capital: it is influenced much more by the degree of monopoly in the industry. Over and above this, the industries in the developed countries have already acquired great external economies. If the less developed countries are to guarantee the same level of return, then, frankly, they have no chance.

Backwash Effects

It is very necessary that the developed nations realise that the developing nations are suffering more from the backwash of their (richer nations') development than benefiting from its spread effects. Even for the population increase they cannot really be blamed. It is observed that the rate of reproduction is generally at its highest during famines and other calamities and in poorer conditions when the instinct of survival through progeny is the most active. Besides, the lowering of mortality rates which in the now advanced countries was a slow process stretching over generations, is happening in a much shorter span of time in the underdeveloped countries. This is an instance of how a beneficial effect of science can turn into a problem in the short run for a developing nation.

A whole host of problems arise from the fact that the developing nations are having to do what the developed nations have achieved over quite a few decades, if not a century or more. They require far more savings to get equipments which have become highly capital-intensive; at the same time their savings potential gets eroded both by population increase and adverse terms of international trade.

Democracy and egalitarianism, which took root in advanced coun-

tries over hundreds of years, have travelled to the poorer countries and created new ideological impulses. Like people everywhere, they also are prone to make envious comparisons and want the same living standards as in the developed countries, which in a now shrunken world are visible to them—as also the same democratic liberties. Frustration in a compressed period of time threatens every now and then to erupt into violence, chaos and disintegration, the like of which the advanced nations never had to experience. If this brings instability, the frontiers of fury will not be limited to the developing nations.

The richer nations have a very great stake 'in this situation' even if it were not largely the product of their exploitation as well as of the demonstration effect of their prosperity. Forces of history will make them bear their part of the responsibility if they do not do it voluntarily. The same technology which has placed unlimited mechanical energy at their disposal is also integrating the world and making a world State the condition for peace. Now, an artificial satellite peeps into the world: a thermonuclear explosion anywhere increases radioactivity everywhere. Tomorrow, technology may help produce nuclear bombs so inexpensively that it may even be within the reach of individuals, leave alone States. Discontent anywhere will, therefore, be a threat everywhere.

The Genesis

It is worthwhile to remember in this connection the genesis of the accentuated welfare schemes in the developed countries as well as of these very inter-governmental organisations which we are discussing now. When the allies were fighting the great war against fasc-

6. While we speak of the richer nations' stakes, we must remind ourselves that it is our responsibility to wrest the initiative. We must prepare ourselves in such a manner that aid or no aid, we go ahead. How this can be done should form the subject of a separate article.

ism, the promises of closer international cooperation were made to keep up the morale of the soldiers, of the workers in the fields and factories and the people back home, and were also meant to broaden the forces of resistance in the enemy countries. People were led to feel that once the war was over, the 'world would be radically re-made into a happier, more harmonious and stable place,' where broadly planned progress and security would be for the benefit of all. In the first world war also, much the same promise was made. The lessons are obvious.

It would not be wrong to suggest that the present efforts to build a United States of Europe, a welfare West Europe, were not only a response to the threat of being sandwiched between the two giants (U.S.A. and U.S.S.R.) but intended to avert intra-European wars. Certainly, mankind should now be wise enough not to invite a war between the richer and the poorer nations—coincidentally a war between the whites and the non-whites—to initiate efforts for a welfare world.

Lessons of History

Naturally, anxious thoughts will turn to the question of whether it is possible now to think in terms of helping the developing countries on a massive scale, both by non-reciprocal concessions in trade and aid, without depressing the living standards of Europe and America. We may recall the fears when the redistributive reforms were being enacted in Europe—fears that they might hold back production and 'equalise downwards'. History has proved that they have roused the motivations of the working people and spurred on an accelerating economic progress.

The same will happen the world over if the developing nations take a more sympathetic attitude and extend a helping hand to their less fortunate brethren. As stated earlier, this will resolve the crisis in their own souls and lead to a single-minded pursuit of science for bounties. This will strike a new response and a new question-

ing in the poorer countries which are now letting off their heat on the ism which they think is the major roadblock. Maybe, some bearable sacrifice on the part of the richer people will be necessary in the beginning. There is definitely a way of doing it without substantially depressing their own living standards.

Positive Approach

One thing is unmistakably clear. Although the richer countries have resources enough to lend this helping hand, they have to prevent their diversion to weapons of destruction. And that is the core of the problem. It is a question of shaping the basic political attitudes and taking the lesson that totalitarianism can never, never be fought without further enriching the content of democracy. This is the reason why we find within the country the 'obese democrat's' inability to cope with communism, and, in the international sphere, the failure of 'unequal commerce-oriented' democracies to meet the challenge of undemocratic tendencies. Their weapon is negative—anti-communism, while it has to be positive, for a superior content of democracy. As somebody has suggested, the place of richer nations should be 'at the head of the world revolution', the revolution of technology for all mankind.

The success or failure of UNCTAD will depend on the approach to this basic question. For, once this is decided, the questions such as programme-lending vs. project-lending; non-reciprocal concessions in trade; large-scale aid in a compressed period of time to create an impact rather than aid in homoeopathic doses; vague promises of aid subject to annual review (which can be infinitely disruptive in their influence) etc., will all fall in place.

'Anyone who goes ahead and does not abide in the doctrine of Christ does not have God; he who abides by the doctrine has both Father and Son.'

He who fights for universal brotherhood and world welfare has both prosperity and peace!

Books

ECONOMIC GROWTH IN THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES By Jozsef Bognár.
Pannonia.

This slim volume consists of two papers: The Future Place and Role of the Developing Countries in World Economy, and Priorities in Scientific Research, and in the Application of Science to Economic Development. Presumably, these two papers are an outline of a forthcoming book by the author.

In the first paper, the author describes the North-South conflict as a fundamental contradiction which has arisen in the modern world between the concentration of economic resources on the one side and of population on the other—a contradiction arising out of the simultaneous occurrence of two revolutions: an industrial and scientific revolution in the advanced countries and a demographic revolution in the under-developed countries. The result of this,

according to the author, will be a dangerous polarization in the world unless, of course, a part of the economic resources of the developed world are used to accelerate the growth of the developing countries. The author makes a strong case for the desirability of transfer of resources to under-developed countries and calls for rational economic and political action on a global scale. He expects to present a detailed programme of this rational economic and political action in his promised treatise on the subject.

There is little which is new or fresh in what Jozsef Bognár says. What he says has been said more than a decade earlier by Professor Gunnar Myrdal with greater analytical rigour. In his lectures delivered in 1955 at the National Bank of Egypt, Cairo, Professor Myrdal brought out forcefully the nature of the mechanism of national and international economic inequality. Nor has there been a dearth

of advocates for greater and better economic aid to the under-developed world.

However, the reason why this book deserves notice is that it probably indicates a shift in the thinking of economists of the East European countries in yet another area of economic relationships. The problem of economic growth in the developing countries is being restated now by Bogнар in terms of North-South conflict rather than of the East-West cold war. The old Stalinist idiom of 'two parallel world markets' seems to have become out of date. Indeed, it should be easy for Senator Fulbright to quote approvingly Jozsef Bogнар; and the other way round, I imagine, should be equally easy. The principle of co-existence seems to have more than succeeded; it is not merely tolerating dissimilarities, it is also bringing about a better appreciation of more pervasive realities.

It is this development that makes Jozsef Bogнар's contribution a significant one. His contention that (a) the long-range tendencies of economic development have a polarization effect, (b) the present forms of international trade do not reduce but increase disparity and (c) the international flow of capital and credits that can be offered by socialist countries are insufficient to accelerate economic growth, will find wide support in under-developed countries. So will his plea for the direction of 'world economic processes' in 'such a way as to promote the economic growth of developing countries and liquidate the extremities inherent in the distribution of intellectual and material energies'. The under-developed countries made strenuous efforts in this direction at the Geneva World Trade Conference and are bound to repeat them at New Delhi shortly.

The second paper carries forward the theme of the first in the field of scientific research and its application to economic development. The gap between the economically advanced and the less developed countries is widened says Bogнар, by the circumstance that the basic factors of economic development like education and scientific research are distributed even more unequally than the more material factors of growth. He therefore considers broad-based international assistance as the basis and precondition of an accelerated progress in science. This, in his opinion, is possible only on the condition that the problems of the developing countries rank high in the tasks of the scientists not only of the under-developed world but in international science also to serve and enhance the welfare of all mankind.

Although at places Bogнар appears to be carried away by his humanist rationalism beyond the possibilities of practical politics, one also finds his essay punctuated with many realistic statements. To quote only one example: 'socialist economy exists only in part of the world, its chances of development are very good, but its present resources suffice only for limited influence over world-economic processes.' The forging of a mechanism to reverse the process

of polarization, however, continues to be a problem which preoccupies the under-developed world.

P. N. Dhar

FOREIGN, TRADE AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT OF UNDERDEVELOPED COUNTRIES By Ignacy Sachs.

Asia Publishing House, 1965.

FOREIGN TRADE AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT By V. L. D'Souza.

Karnatak University, Dharwar, 1966.

An ill-balanced commodity pattern of exports is common to all developing countries, regardless of whether they do or do not experience difficulties in selling their traditional export goods. The overall rate of growth of most of these countries, particularly those which are 'import-sensitive', is retarded by 'the bottleneck arising from the lag between an insufficient capacity to import, limited by the traditional and inelastic commodity pattern of exports, and the rapidly increasing import needs on account of development plans, grain and fuel shortages, and the high rate of population increase.'

This is the background against which Ignacy Sachs explores the prospects and problems of foreign trade of the developing countries. Since foreign trade is influenced by economic and political factors, internal as well as global, the scope of the study is extended to cover both sets of factors. The author has done this very ably, presenting his analysis and point of view methodically and yet lucidly in only 128 pages. In presenting his point of view, which he seems to have formed even before he had taken up the study, the author however commits the same mistake which a theoretician strongly committed to any political ideology usually does: that of letting his own political predilections to determine the content and conclusions of his study.

His outright rejection of the theory of international division of labour and his fervent plea for promoting social division of international labour (implying socialisation of foreign trade by developing countries and their joining the communist bloc) are based more on ideological and political considerations than on supporting economic or even political analysis of *Foreign Trade and Economic Development of Under-developed Countries*.

His analytical model of world trade proceeds on the assumption that the trading countries are divided into three broad political groups: (i) the developed or capitalist countries, (ii) the socialist countries, also developed but on a different political plane, and (iii) the developing countries, called the Middle World, comprising 'export economies' such as Venezuela and Congo and 'import-sensitive economies' like India, Egypt and Chile—all having a 'capitalist' or 'colonial' past but only a 'socialist' future.

The main idea underlying this assumption seems to be that the political and economic interest of the

countries included in each group are identical and complementary and that their participation in the world trade is guided by their group interest and not individual or national interest. It also presumes that whereas within the group the relations and interests of member-countries are harmonious, outside they are in conflict with other group interests. While this may be generally true, it is too simple a model to explain the conflicting and competitive interests governing the political and economic relations between two or more countries, both within and outside a particular group.

The author realises this weakness in his model when he outlines the 'Choice of Development Strategy' for the Middle World. He suddenly sees that his plea for the developing countries to unite and join the socialist bloc is unsupported by his own analysis of their trading and political interests and their international implications. Had he carried on this part of his analysis to cover the two other worlds—'developed' and 'socialist'—he would have found a similar situation limiting the possibilities of their functioning as compact or homogeneous groups.

The growing trade relations between Britain and China in contrast to the latter's relations with the U.S.S.R. or other socialist countries is a case in point. The ECM is not so much a dividing line between the 'developed' and 'socialist' countries as within the camp of 'capitalism' itself. Some socialist countries in fact, may be more eager to join the ECM than to support the Middle World. The Middle World is itself a heterogeneous complex, economically as well as politically.

Ignoring, however, the ideological overtones of the study and the bias following from them, it is a revealing analysis of the trends and problems of world trade especially in so far as the developing countries are concerned. A detailed study of the relative position of selected developing countries in world exports between 1913 and 1960 as compared to average world trends shows that their pattern of exports varied as below.

1. *India, Brazil, Argentina, Egypt, Chile*: 'a continuous fall of the country's share in the world exports'.
2. *Indonesia, Ceylon*: 'slight growth of exports in the inter-war period; a sharp decline in the last 20 years'.
3. *Mexico, Philippines, Colombia*: 'intensive growth of exports upto 1938; stabilization or regression of exports in the last 20 years'.
4. *Nigeria, Morocco*: 'a considerable expansion of exports in the last 20 years'.
5. *Venezuela, Congo*: 'intensive, continuous growth of exports'.

Two important issues which the author discusses in this connection are: the direction of this trade in terms of his triangular division of world trade, and

the trading prospects of the developing countries within this fold. So far as the first is concerned, the information is quite revealing. Between 1938 and 1958, world trade increased from 23.4 to 103.1 billion dollars (at FOB prices), or by about 80 billion dollars. Nearly 60 per cent of this increase or about 48 billion dollars was contributed by the developed countries: about 27 per cent or 21.5 billion dollars by the Middle World or the developing countries; and about 13 per cent or 10 billion dollars by the socialist countries. The network of world trade in 1960, showing the flow of exports and imports within and outside the three groups, on the other hand, was as below (percentage of total world trade from exporting to importing countries):

Developed to Developed—41.9%, Middle World to Middle World—6.2%, Socialist to Socialist—8.8%, Developed to Middle World—19.1%, Middle World to Developed—17.4%, Developed to Socialist—2.3%, Socialist to Developed—2.2%, Socialist to Middle World—1.0%, Middle World to Socialist—1.1%.

From this flow of trade, the author builds up his case for strengthening the trade relations between the Middle World and the socialist countries and, more particularly, within the Middle World itself. His arguments and analysis deserve careful consideration of not only the countries concerned but also of such world bodies as GATT and UNCTAD. The case he builds up for the developing countries is indeed a strong one even though the prospects of its realisation, as he himself acknowledges, are rather dim. 'There is not much', he concludes, 'that the developing countries can do to improve the situation in foreign trade. To some extent the situation can be improved by forming one or more regional trade blocks by the "import-sensitive" Asian and Latin American countries to trade mainly in capital goods and to eliminate intermediaries and shifting the purchase of oil, cotton, cereals, base metals and rubber'. Internal development policies maximising the rate of growth through 'anti-import production' within a given level of foreign trade is yet another way of resolving the long-term problems of foreign trade.

These are also the measures which D'Souza supports in his three lectures on *Foreign Trade and Economic Development*. The theme of his discussion is more or less the same as that attempted by Ignacy Sachs, except that it is not as rigorous and revealing in its presentation as the latter is. This may be due to the fact that he was addressing only a group of university students and not the intelligentsia guiding the affairs of the Middle World.

The first lecture deals with the changes in the body of international trade theory and the nature and content of economic policy *vis-a-vis* foreign trade. Lecture II discusses the general and specific measures to resolve the problems of ill-balanced payments arising out of high imports and low exports. Some policy measures to tackle a declining

export ratio are finally spelled out in lecture III. The publication is well suited to meet the demands of students and journalists requiring instant knowledge of foreign trade.

Ranjit Gupta

AID FOR DEVELOPMENT: A POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC STUDY By H.J.R. Arnold.

The Bodley Head, London, 1966.

Aid by the developed nations for the development of the underprivileged is not just a philanthropic scatter of available funds or knowhow, as is many a time made out by the accredited spokesmen of different points of view. The motivations of the aid-givers are indeed multi-faceted and deep-rooted. Often these motivations have been suspected and recognised in isolated cases but not quite grasped in their implications and import in the short and the long run, particularly in the aid-receiving countries when they enter into commitments and afterwards. These motivations have varied even between the aid-giving countries and also in the same countries over a period of time. At times these motivations have been dismissed in public discussions as political but this word has not indicated the exact nature of the political motive. Economic motives behind such aid have in general been more definable but here, also, the cross purposes sought to be satisfied have brought in many elements which are enigmatic.

On the question of motives-mix behind such aid, the degree in which various motives have combined themselves, and their relative proportion in the doses of aid, have depended on various considerations concerning both the aid-givers and the aid-receivers. Arnold gives a fairly objective account of some of these motivations on the basis of his comparative analysis of the aid policies pursued by the countries of the western and Soviet blocs. His emphasis is on the aid-givers' points of view, making his focus rather limited but he compensates this in different ways.

Arnold defines aid in its broader meaning, including both aid and trade in their different forms, involving both quantitative and qualitative aspects. The political motives of the aid-givers have been generally guided by the cold war considerations which are well known. To win political support and to spread ideologies have been discernible motives in the cold war; their important role as undercurrents has, however, remained as a hunch for long. In a short time span, it is not possible to measure the impact on the recipient countries because of the transitional phases through which they are passing and because of the nature of development sought to be achieved through such aid. However, the aid policies of all the giving countries have remained under constant scrutiny for any change that may be required for the relaxation of the terms and conditions attached to such aid or for a further tightening up. That such aid has departed from the

purely economic considerations and has borne almost no relationship to even the capacities of the giving countries in many cases, have to be understood in this context.

Arnold notices the differences in the emphasis on various aspects of aid in the policies followed by the giving countries. These differences are, in the composition of various forms of aid such as grants or loans, the manner of disbursements, terms of payments of interest and principals, the currencies in which repayments are to be made and the manner of negotiations for such aid as to whether it is in response to requests of the aid-receiving countries or in anticipation of the need for aid as felt by the aid-giving countries. Depending on the political currents flowing in the receiving countries and the importance given to such countries in the foreign policy of the giving countries, the terms and conditions have varied. The relative advantages and the choices offered by the giving countries have been closely related to the governmental systems followed in the giving and receiving countries, but in many cases these choices have not been real in so far as the conditions attached to such aid have precluded the receiving countries from making free purchases and striking a commercial bargain. Arnold makes an emphatic mention of the freedom afforded by the western countries but does not underline the fact that the receivers have in many cases had to pay much higher prices for the goods imported under such aid. His general mention of better conditions attached to the aid granted by the Western countries is also subject to several caveats such as the net benefit received by the aid-receiving countries *vis-a-vis* the costs.

On the economic aspects, Arnold observes that aid should be fitted to the requirements of the recipient countries which vary widely and mere flow of capital from one country to another may not serve the purposes of rapid economic development. In this context, the power of absorption of aid by the recipients should be closely studied so as to enable them to take off on their own and not just kick off, so long as the aid lasts. Generation of self-help is indeed an important criterion to judge the effectiveness of aid with, but it is on this ground that the recipients may find the aid rather useless when they have to seek aid to be able to reimburse commitments arising from aid received earlier. This is a phenomenon that has in fact arisen in many of the developing countries including our own. Another factor that he mentions is 'demographic credit-worthiness' as a criterion in granting aid, so that more aid should be channelled to those countries prepared to initiate effective birth control programmes; in the absence of such programmes, he cautions, the donor countries may increasingly find themselves in the position of men trying to fill a bucket without a bottom. He quotes George Woods to stress that in the long run, even the UNCTAD may prove hurtful, rather than beneficial, to the developing countries if it serves to divert the attention of these countries

from those things which they must do for themselves and induces them to concentrate instead on what the developed countries can do for them.

Perhaps in the context of the second UNCTAD, it is too pessimistic to say that essentially Woods was correct, but it can be easily borne out by facts that the export efforts of most of the developing countries have been too much dependent on the doles given out by the developed countries in the form of various concessions even where there are capacities to withstand these barriers. It requires closer introspection to find out whether we have been backing the right kind of products for promotional purposes, whether the high prices are germane to our products or are related to the high indirect taxes and curable inefficiencies, whether we have been passive watchers in foreign trade instead of active participants in export marketing and whether we have received aid in an over-dose in areas where self-help was possible. That any kind of obsession is good riddance from the viewpoint of both givers and receivers of aid and that the right kind of policies can enhance the effectiveness of aid, in whatever form it is, are held out in this little volume in a highly readable style. Whether one agrees with Arnold on specific issues is immaterial in the larger context of the need for development aid in the newly emerging, developing nations.

P. Chattopadhyay

INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC COOPERATION By Ratan Kumar Jain.

Popular Book Services, 1967.

Dr. R. K. Jain delivered two extension lectures at the Nagpur University in 1965 and the text of these, suitably edited and expanded, and supported with 15 tables of data, has been published in book form. The title of the work is somewhat misleading for Dr. Jain actually concerns himself with the history, character and some consequences of economic aid received by India.

He looks at the problem of economic development in India in the context of international politics; and his understanding of the international relationships involved is firmly based in cold war concepts. He has attempted to classify the basis on which international transfers of capital take place from richer to poorer countries. He divides economic assistance programmes into four blocs: American, Soviet, U.N., and 'Middle Group Countries', and then proceeds to examine the motives of American and Soviet aid programmes at some length.

It is unfortunate that in his desire to classify, the author has eliminated relevant considerations of clarity and objectivity. His list of the considerations influencing American economic assistance programmes in recent years includes the desire to assist needy countries to maintain their national independence; but it also mentions, in the same paragraph, the desire to prevent them from excessive dependence on Soviet sources, to influence their behaviour in the

U.N., and to keep in power governments deemed favourable to American interests. He mentions as an American objective the reduction of dependence on external assistance; and then adds to this their desire to assist political development that may help recipient countries to attain a status independent from communist influence.

Later, in listing the principles of Soviet international economic relations, he mentions the desire to support, encourage and strengthen the creation of independent self-generating national economies, to invigorate the public sector so as to break the shackles of colonialism and the stagnation of past centuries, to create the pre-conditions of rapid economic development, to strengthen the poor nations struggle against monopoly capital, and more in the same strain. He mentions the 'Soviet conviction' that economic assistance to recipient countries must correspond to the national interests of both the giver and the receiver, and the desire to promote equal rights for all nations, and to desist from hurting the self-respect and economic sovereignty of under-developed nations.

It is unfortunate that Dr. Jain has devoted more than half the total length of his book to an interpretation of political motives, and to some commonplace generalisations. It is possible that Dr. Jain would himself claim a great deal of objectivity for his work, for he appears equally happy to quote British, American, U.N. and Soviet publications in support of his generalisations. It is not difficult to find quotations in support of any line of argument. It is a little difficult, however, to identify any serious analysis of facts.

In the second half of the book, Dr. Jain does present some interesting data in respect of the external economic assistance that India has received, and the effect of this on planned economic development during the past 15 years. He explains the role of external financial aid in our development plans, the repayments problem, and the need for further assistance. But in this presentation, also, there is little analysis or examination.

The penultimate chapter of his book deals with the impact of Indian foreign policy on aid programmes. He genuinely believes in the close connection between political and economic cooperation in international relations; but in his desire to co-relate the course of economic development in India with the foreign policies of many nations, there is unfortunately a confusion of facts and prejudices which detracts from the value of his work.

J. N. Thadani

FUNCTIONALISM AND WORLD POLITICS, A Study Based on United Nations Programs Financing Economic Development By James Patrick Sewell.

Princeton University Press, Princeton, New Jersey, 1966.

Is there a 'functionalist' school of politics?

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Sewell's answer is: no. Instead, for his book, it is an argument. A school is what if not an argument! But then it is supplemented with a banner and a succession of faithfuls. The functionalist argument does not have these supplements in any measure. As a matter of fact, David Mitrany, who brought his *Marx Against the Peasants*, to the world of economists, is the father figure of the functionalist argument. A few others Sewell includes in order to straighten their theory into testable hypotheses. Thus the author is no functionalist himself, but an empirical examiner of their argument. That the urge of the examiner is not so much the currency or vogue of the functionalist argument in the world to-day as the application of scientific method to that vague field aggressively called political science, is written large in the book. It can be said with fairness that in this regard he meets with no success. He himself makes no tall claims. He is satisfied at achieving the status of a 'prescience' for his field of inquiry. Anything not science can be prescience, and this leaves us free from bothering about it.

Devoid of the empiricist objective, Sewell's book achieves two things: a clear exposition of the functionalist argument and an engaging account of the inception, growth and mechanism of the functioning of the U.N. financial organisations—I.B.R.D., I.F.C., I.D.A. and S.U.N.F.E.D. The second was meant to provide the testing ground for the first, which purpose of course, as we said, was lost. It neither refuted nor confirmed the functionalist argument. Corroboration of certain of its features was indeed forthcoming. But that does not explain the efficacy of the hypothesis itself, as any number of hypotheses could be corroborated from a given set of data. Sewell in fact exactly does this when he claims that 'redoubt' or the 'citadel' conception of the Bank's functioning provides a better explanatory tool.

The main lacuna in the functionalist thesis arises out of its abhorrence of politics. Since politics is to be avoided as an evil, functional organisations based upon common needs and problems chosen from non-controversial economic and technical fields are the natural building blocks of a secure world peace. Each specific function generates its own form of organisation through the mechanism of 'technical self-determination'. In this way, as the claim of functions increases, a corresponding chain of specialised organisations covers the world community.

The functioning of these bodies is governed by considerations of expertise. The experts who manage the affairs are naturally non-political persons interested in serving the common need without colouring their views with ideology etc. Every function develops its own 'structural support capacity' in the sense that over time the corresponding organisation develops, through suitable changes in its structure and working, more capacity for performing the original task as participation in the

function increases. David Mitrany is not all that consistent. For Sewell's purpose his inconsistency is not quite important, although it is admittedly one of the preliminary validity tests of a theory. Briefly, in this form the functionalist thesis confronts the reality of the U.N. financial function as it has developed since Bretton Woods.

This reality, much to the discomfiture of the functionalists, is engaging, as we said, by any accounts. If anything, it is woven around conflict. The functionalist premise of non-controversy is singularly absent. In Sewell's words, 'it is impossible to understand I.B.R.D., I.F.C., I.D.A., or the Special Fund without taking into account the impetus generated by friction between interest groups, political parties, government agencies, alliance partners, and alliances or U.N. voting coalitions themselves'. The Bank's membership and its operation are hardly explicable without reference to political polarisation of the nation-States. The I.F.C.'s history before establishment abounds with claims and counter-claims of various interest groups in the United States.

The eventual espousal of IDA by the U.S. administration is understandable both in terms of the quest for new swords to duel with the Soviet economic offensive of the post-Stalin era and a desire to shift part of the burden of international financial assistance to those allies who were prospering even as confidence in the U.S. dollar weakened. The Bank functions not in the spirit of cooperation but on sound principles of banking, not through consensus as the functionalists desire, but through a western caucus well defended by its weighted voting system from the onslaughts of the under-developed nations and also the socialist non-members.

Sewell provides enough material for exploding the functionalist myth of a non-political approach to world peace. He himself, however, does not do it. The functionalist line which demarcates the economic and technical from the political field of action is naturally shaky. A gradual reorganisation of the world community on this basis sounds like a reformer's wish.

Part III of the book, the authors' own interpretation of the reality, is at times illuminating but is largely messy. This defect arises perhaps from his generosity towards the functionalists. Without this it would have attained sharpness.

This book must be introduced to those political scientists who are struggling for a scientific method for their field of inquiry, even if only to make them aware that the task is not easy. Economists who refer every thing to market mechanism will well learn from this book how U.N. financial programmes are ridden with politics in spite of functionalists.

S. N. Mishra

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
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
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
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


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
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